Cases Cited by Prostituter To Show
That Defendant's Motions Were Without Basis
INTRODUCTION: You may not want to read this entire document. Even I find it somewhat tiring even with a
little humor thrown in from time to time. However, you should look at least at the highlighted portions of the text,
the comments and how the cited case is or is not relevant to UNITED STATES v. HENRY MATTHIES.
More importantly, I believe that you will come to the conclusion that NOT EVEN THE APPELLANT JUDGES
understand the tax law and the "word art" used to confuse any reader who doesn't have a century or so to study it.
Also, these cases show how bad case law builds on itself. If the arguments are not presented properly (and they
never really have been (at least not in published cases), the trial court goes off half cocked and so does the appellant
courts. It is necessary, therefore, if we are to win the BIG ONE, that we attack all the way down to the smallest of
detail in order to clearly expose the fraud.
UNITED STATES v. PEDERSON
03/21/86 UNITED STATES AMERICA v. JEROME DAVID PEDERSON
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[ Matthies is in the Ninth Circuit ]
 No. 85-3035
 784 F.2d 1462
 March 21, 1986
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
JEROME DAVID PEDERSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Montana. D.C. No. CR-84-57-GF.
 Carl E. Rostad, Ausa, Great Falls, MT for Appellee.
 Laura Lee, Esq., Billings, Mt, Scott McLarty, Esq., Athens,
CA for Appellant.
[ This was one of a duo of lawsters Mr. Matthies originally hired. Ain't that special! ]
 Nancy Hollander, Esq. Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, P.a.,
Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae National Asso. OF Criminal Defense
 The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kennedy
 Before: KENNEDY and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and
STEPHENS,* District Judge.
 KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:
 Jerome David Pederson appeals from his conviction for seven
counts of willful failure to file federal income tax returns, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. In addition to arguing that 26 U.S.C.
§ 7203 is void for vagueness, Pederson contends that his conviction
should be reversed because the prosecutor engaged in gross
misconduct, the district court failed to grant him a continuance,
and he was erroneously committed to a hospital for psychiatric
evaluation. We find no error, and we affirm.
[ OK, the guy starts weak and ends weaker. Of course, he had them there professional lawsters. Notice that, on the
whole, the Pro Se's actually did a much better job! ]
 Appellant claims the statute providing for criminal
sanctions for failure to file federal income tax returns, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7203, is void for vagueness. The section states:
 Any person required under this title to pay any estimated
tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under
authority thereof to make a return . . ., keep any records, or
supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated
tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information, at the time or times required by law or regulations,
shall . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .
[ This sounds as clear as mud to me! Notice the large words "person required"? This is one of the MAJOR KEYS
to the whole issue. Mr. Matthies has been asking for YEARS for the Individuals Representing Satan to show him
the law which requires him to file and pay. They can not do it because there is no such law!
If you remember from the Third IRS Transcript this was one of the two questions asked of the Supervisor of the
Special Agents of the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS. The Agent could not answer either question in
the meeting and three months later, still has not provided an answer! ]
 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1982). Pederson argues that the statute
fails to define the "person required" to file a tax return and is
therefore void for vagueness. We agree with the other circuits that
have addressed this claim that section 7203 is not vague. United
States v. Parshall, 757 F.2d 211, 215 (8th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Moore, 692 F.2d 95, 96-97 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Eagan, 587 F.2d 338, 339 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States
v. Lachmann, 469 F.2d 1043, 1046 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931, 93 S. Ct. 1897, 36 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1973); United States v.
Ming, 466 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915, 93
S. Ct. 235, 34 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1972). The definition of the "person
required" to pay an income tax is set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 1, which
imposes a tax on all individuals in accordance with detailed tables
set forth in that section. That definition of the "person required"
to file a federal income tax return is again explicit in 26 U.S.C. §
6012. See Moore, 692 F.2d at 96-97. The vagueness argument is
[ Just because a single section does not contain the definitions of all the terms used does not mean it is
vague. They claim that the definition is given in Section 1. Fine. If that statement is true, the form required is the
2555 (Foreign Earned Income -- See the Third IRS Transcript.) When we caught on to this, the OMB cross
reference for 26 CFR 1.1-1 disappeared and the OMB number for 2555 has been moved to the 6012
Section. However, this section already had four forms listed and now it has 5. The OMB number for the 1040,
1545-0074, is the FIFTH in the list. That really makes it clear as mud!
The Web page "Two Roads Diverged In The Wood" has an excellent discussion of 6012 if I say so myself! (By the
way, "Jack" is really Henry Lynn., Matthies -- he goes by "Hank", and "Jane" is his wife Judy).
I hope that you are as outraged as I was when I heard about the Prostituter trying to say that 6012 was the Section
which made Mr. Matthies required to file. ]
 Pederson next contends that misconduct of the prosecution
deprived him of the defense counsel of his choice, and that as a
result, the conviction should be reversed and the indictment
dismissed. We need not examine or accept the various legal premises
implicit in this argument, for we do not find it established on this
record that the government's misconduct was the cause or
justification for the withdrawal of appellant's lead counsel.
 On the day before the trial was set to commence, the
Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting the case allegedly made
certain disparaging and unprofessional remarks about Pederson's
principal defense attorney. The remarks were made to a defense
witness who happened to be Pederson's brother, and it is presumed
that the remarks were promptly relayed to Pederson himself. The
defense counsel in question unilaterally determined that the remarks
so impaired his ability to question the witness and to retain the
confidence of his client that he was required to withdraw from the
case. He announced his withdrawal accordingly. The abrupt and
determined decision of defense counsel to withdraw from the case
pretermitted full inquiry and resolution by the district court with
reference to the precise statements that the government made, their
effect on the witness and the client, and whether the defense
counsel's standing with the witness and the client necessarily were
impaired so his withdrawal from the case was required. Since these
matters were not presented to the district court, we do not have a
case where it has been established that counsel's withdrawal was
necessary or required, and we hold that the appellant has not
properly preserved that issue for our review.
 Pederson also argues that his Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel was violated because the district
court refused to grant a long enough continuance for his replacement
lead counsel to prepare the case. Pederson's original lead counsel
to prepare the case. Pederson's original lead counsel withdrew from
the case the day before the trial was originally set to begin, and
the district court granted a two-day continuance of the trial. New
lead counsel was already somewhat familiar with the case and arrived
to confer with Pederson the day before the trial began. Local
counsel had been involved in the case for some time and continued to
assist the new lead counsel.
 Granting a continuance is within the trial court's
discretion. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921,
84 S. Ct. 841 (1964); United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 305 (9th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Though the refusal to grant a continuance
in this case for more than two days was strict, it was not an abuse
of discretion. The two-day trial did not present complex factual or
legal issues, and the assistance of local counsel provided for
continuity in representation. Since appellant cites no specific
showing of prejudice or ineffective assistance of counsel in the
record, the denial of a longer continuance did not violate the Sixth
Amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064-69, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); United States v.
Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717-21 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S. Ct. 1772, 84 L. Ed. 2d 832
 Pederson next argues that the district court erred in
committing him to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners,
Springfield, Missouri, for three months for psychiatric evaluation
in order to determine his competency to stand trial. Prior to trial,
defendant refused to consult with court-appointed counsel and
insisted that his decision not to participate in the federal income
tax system provided him with a solid defense. Based on his
observations of defendant and defendant's answers to his questions,
the trial judge had a genuine doubt about defendant's competence to
stand trial, to waive his right to counsel, and to understand the
gravity of the proceeding. In such a situation, the court has an
obligation to mandate further inquiry and professional psychiatric
evaluation, even if no party so moves the court. Chavez v. United
States, 656 F.2d 512, 515-17 (9th Cir. 1981). In this case, we
believe that the trial judge's doubts concerning defendant's
competency to stand trial were reasonable, Id. at 516.
 Petitioner also objects to the length of his pretrial
confinement, claiming that it lasted for three months. It is not
clear to us from either the briefs or the record presented here that
the period of commitment or observation in fact exceeded the time
periods provided in 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). In any event, appellant has
not shown how any excessive confinement affected the validity and
fairness of the trial or of the conviction that followed.
 Appellant's remaining arguments are without merit.
[ And he was represented by lawsters! ]
 The opinion of the district court is AFFIRMED.
 * Albert Lee Stephens, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge for
the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
UNITED STATES v. STUDLEY
02/26/86 UNITED STATES AMERICA v. RUTH STUDLEY
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 No. 84-1288
 783 F.2d 934
 February 26, 1986
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
RUTH STUDLEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
 Appeal from the United States District Court for the for the
Eastern District of California, Honorable Milton L. Schwartz,
District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CR 84-35 MLS.
 Thomas E. Flynn, Esq., Sacramento, Ca, for Appellee.
 Ruth Studley, Pro Per, Project City, Ca, for Appellant.
[ Here is another one! ]
 The opinion of the court was delivered by: Canby
 Before: BARNES, FARRIS and CANBY, Circuit Judges.
 CANBY, Circuit Judge.
 Studley, a real estate broker, was convicted after a jury
trial of three counts of willful failure to file tax returns for the
years 1978, 1979, and 1980. *fn1 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Studley filed a
timely notice of appeal and raises a host of issues before us. We
 I. ARREST WARRANT
 Studley first contends that her arrest and prosecution were
illegal because neither the arrest warrant nor the information was
supported by a sworn oath or affirmation. As a result, she believes
her conviction should be reversed. *fn2
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a) requires a showing of probable cause
under oath before a warrant may be issued on an information. The
government candidly concedes that the probable cause statement was
omitted from the warrant application but states that it was filed
immediately after the omission was brought to the government's
attention by appellant.
 Despite the government's improper handling of the warrant
application, however, the conviction must stand. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that an illegal arrest or detention does not
void a subsequent conviction. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
119, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342
U.S. 519, 522, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952). Studley in no
way argues that her conviction was based on evidence derived from
any illegal police activities. Moreover, a prior judicial
determination of probable cause is not a prerequisite to prosecution
by information. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119. Thus, any illegality in
Studley's arrest does not require reversal of her conviction.
 II. JURISDICTION
 Studley argues that, because her arrest was illegal, the
district court lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
We disagree. First, the court unquestionably had subject matter
jurisdiction. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws
of the United States." These offenses include crimes defined in
Title 26 of United States Code. United States v. Przybyla, 737 F.2d
828, 829 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099,
105 S. Ct. 2320, 85 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1985). Moreover, the defect in
Studley's arrest did not deprive the district court of personal
jurisdiction over her. See United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680,
684 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980) (court has jurisdiction over any party who
appears before it, regardless of how appearance is effected).
[ Man are they slick! Notice how they wiggle out of this one. First they say CORRECTLY that the court had
"subject matter jurisdiction". Then they say that "the defect in Studley's arrest did not deprive the district court of
personal jurisdiction over her." This is also CORRECT. The real question is whether they actually had personal
jurisdiction over her in the first place.
If you have questions of jurisdiction, there are several great documents on the Web. Larry Becraft's is highly
 Next, Studley claims she was prejudiced in this case because
she never received a definitive statement of the basis for the
district court's jurisdiction. Our review of the record shows that
the district court explained the basis of its jurisdiction several
times, the last on May 21, 1984. Studley's assertion that she was
prejudiced by changes in the court's explanations is meritless; all
of her attacks on the court's jurisdiction were frivolous. She was
[ Well, if the Prosituter would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS, we could get a good feel for where we stand on
Jurisdiction and Venue. Of course, that is wishful thinking. ]
 III. TAXPAYER STATUS
 Studley contends that she is not a "taxpayer" because she is
an absolute, freeborn and natural individual. This argument is
frivolous. An individual is a "person" under the Internal Revenue
Code and thus subject to 26 U.S.C. § 7203. United States v. Romero,
640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981). *fn3
[ Slick again! And another charge of being FRIVOLOUS! They say "an individual is a 'person' under the Internal
Revenue Code". FINE. What individual? Any individual? Would it apply to a citizen of Bosnia? You have to
know WHICH INDIVIDUAL. They just begged the question. They were FRIVOLOUS! This all gets back to
jurisdiction, doesn't it! If the Prostituter would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS!
 IV. DENIAL OF JURY LISTS
 Studley also contends that reversal is required because she
was denied access to jury lists. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f), parties
"shall be allowed to inspect" records of the jury selection process
in order to prepare motions challenging jury selection. The right to
inspect jury lists is essentially unqualified. Test v. United
States, 420 U.S. 28, 30, 42 L. Ed. 2d 786, 95 S. Ct. 749 (1975) (per
curiam); United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir.
 Where a motion to inspect is erroneously denied, however,
reversal is not required. Instead, the case should normally be
remanded to permit inspection. Test, 420 U.S. at 30; United States
v. Beaty, 465 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1972). If inspection reveals
grounds upon which to challenge the jury selection, a defendant may
file a motion, such as for a new trial, under § 1867(a). Beaty, 465
F.2d at 1382. Such motions must be made "within seven days after the
defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of
diligence, the grounds therefor . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a). The
court shall then grant the § 1867(a) motion if it determines that
the jury selection procedure was prejudicial. Beaty, 465 F.2d at
 Before trial, Studley requested a list of all grand and
petit jurors. *fn4 The district court denied the request. After
trial, Studley renewed the request, citing Test. The court granted
inspection on November 11, 1984, but Studley has not subsequently
moved for dismissal of the indictment or a new trial based on her
 The government concedes that Studley's first request should
have been granted. Nonetheless, we decline either to reverse or
remand because Studley has received the benefit of the remedy under
Test and Beaty. Studley has already had an opportunity to inspect to
jury lists, but she failed to file the required § 1867(a) motion
within seven days. Thus, Studley's attempt to challenge jury
selection is not untimely.
 V. CONTINUANCE
 Studley argues that the district court committed reversible
error when it denied her continuance motion made on the opening day
of trial. She claim she needed the extra time to secure legal
assistance; therefore the denial infringed her sixth amendment right
 Generally, a decision to grant or deny a continuance is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Flynt, 756
F.2d 1352, 1358, modified on other grounds, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.
1985). When the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel is
implicated, however, a court must balance several factors to
determine if the denial was "fair and reasonable." United States v.
Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Among the
factors are: whether the continuance would inconvenience witnesses,
the court, counsel, or the parties; whether other continuances have
been granted; whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay;
whether the delay is the defendant's fault; and whether a denial
would prejudice the defendant. Id. Thus, a continuance may be denied
"even when that denial results in the defendant's being
unrepresented at trial." Id.
 Applying these factors to this case, we find no abuse of
discretion. At her initial appearance, Studley asked to be
represented by a person who was not a licensed attorney. At that
time, the district court told her that she could elect to represent
herself but that anyone else representing her in court must be
licensed. The court later asked the Federal Public Defender to
consult with her regarding appointment of counsel. The public
defender determined that Studley did not quality for appointed
counsel. Thereafter, based on Studley's representation that she
would choose either to represent herself or to retain counsel, the
court continued the matter for a week.
[ Well boys and girls, have you seen in these cases that the people who do NOT have a lawyer do better than those
who do? Why might that be?
Are not two heads better than one? If she had a cousin who was a public speaker who prepared taxes during the tax
season, would he not be a positive addition to represent her interests?
The defendant has the right to assistance of counsel. The Constitution of the united States of America which is
supposed to control OUTSIDE THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION as well as most state Constitutions provide for
Licensing does not insure knowledge of specific legal issues. This seems especially true in tax cases. Licensing
does not insure any level of ethics -- if it did, most lawsters would not qualify. And who put the "Slick" in "Slick
Willie"? A lawster! Licencing does insure a CONFLICT of interest. The first allegiance of the lawster is the
Bar. Then they are an officer of the court. Finally, if allowed, the client is in there somewhere.
Some courts (which are run by lawsters) have even concurred that defendants can choose whomever they want to
represent them. Here is a sampling:
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1, 7: "A state cannot, by involking
the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the
public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest. Laymen
cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with practised and careful adversaries, cf.,
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335, and for them to associate together to help one another to preserve and enforce
rights granted them under federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics."
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 US 3: "...his right to be heard through his own counsel is unqualified."
Johnson v. Avery, 393 US 483, 498: "The cooperation and help of laymen, as well as of lawyers, is necessary if the
right of reasonable access to the courts is to be available."
Mempha v. Rhay, 389 US 128: "The right to counsel exists not only at the trial thereof, but also at every stage of a
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected."
Burgett v. Texas, 389 US 109: "A conviction obtained where the accused is denied counsel is treated as void for all
purposes." ... "Lack of counsel of choice can be conceivably even worse than no counsel at all, or having to accept
counsel beholden to one's adversary."
QUESTION: If Mr. Matthies refuses to represent himself or accept a counsel beholden to his adversaries, is there
ANY POINT IN CONTINUING WITH THIS TRIAL? Why then has Judge Shanstrom told Mr. Matthies that he
has to have a professional lawster represent him or he has to do it himself? I heard this rumor that non-lawsters
because they have no allegiance to foreign powers and no respect for common criminals (like the Plaintiff) have
been extremely effective. But you would never know because the records in those cases seem to be sealed and
unpublished. I wonder why?
 The following week Studley again asked to be represented by
unlicensed counsel, and the court again denied the request, though
it permitted her to have an unlicensed assistant sit with her at
[ Well, isn't that special! Let me pose another basic question. Who would be the most aggressive counsel and bring
up issues that the Plaintiff DOES NOT WANT AIRED, the defendant or a representitive of their choice who has no
allegiance other than to the defendant? THAT'S WHY THE BAR DOESN'T WANT NON-LAWSTERS IN
 Studley then filed 31 motions and asked for another
continuance, which the court granted. Trial was set for six weeks
later. During this period, Studley apparently made no attempt to
secure counsel on her own or to inform the court that she had
changed her mind concerning self-representation at trial.
 On the morning of trial, more than three months after her
arrest, Studley again requested a continuance on the grounds that
she did not know the nature of the court's jurisdiction, that she
needed counsel, and that complex issues remained unresolved. The
district court denied the request, finding that the request had not
been made in good faith, that the trial had already been continued
several times, that the basis of the court's jurisdiction was clear
and had been explained repeatedly, that the facts of the case were
not complex, and that Studley would not have obtained counsel even
had the continuance been granted. As in Leavitt, 608 F.2d at 1294,
Studley knew of the need to get a licensed attorney for several
months and had been granted previous continuance. Still, she failed
to obtain counsel. Under these circumstances, the district court did
not err in denying another continuance. It had already displayed
[ YES! Just like Judge Shandrom said, any person of ordinary intelligence could understand the charges (and a
plethora of other related details) because either Mr. Matties filed or he didn't! I can see the jury instructions now:
"I have a golf game and need to run by the Lodge. This should be real simple for you little sheeple. Either the
defendant filed or he didn't. So if you find he didn't file then he must have meant to do it and everybody knows he
is liable. So elect a foreperson, take a vote and get back in here quick! Don't waste time on frivolous issues. If he
didn't file, lets hang him high!"
 VI. RECUSAL
 Following her conviction, Studley filed a motion for recusal
alleging personal bias and prejudice against her. In her affidavit
supporting the motion, she alleged that Judge Schwartz (1) knew that
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents had perjured themselves, but
did nothing; (2) had constantly deprived her of her "rights;" and
(3) hated her without any cause. The district court denied the
motion, and Studley objects. Denial of a motion for recusal is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d
605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984).
 We first note that a motion for recusal filed weeks after
the conclusion of the trial is presumptively untimely absent a
showing of good cause for its tardiness. See 28 U.S.C. § 144; cf.
United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (motion filed on fifth day of trial "much too late"). Even
assuming timeliness, however, we find no merit in Studley's
arguments on recusal.
 The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 is
"whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would
conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." Mayes, 729 F.2d at 607 (quoting United States v.
Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)); Ronwin v. State Bar of
Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 80 L. Ed. 2d 590,
104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984). The alleged prejudice must result from an
extrajudicial source; a judge's prior adverse ruling is not
sufficient cause for recusal. Mayes, 729 F.2d at 607.
 Studley's first two allegations are not extrajudicial
because they involve the judge's performance which presiding over
her case. See Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 701. Thus, these grounds do not
provide a basis for recusal. The third allegation is too vague to
meet the sufficiency requirement of Section 144. See 28 U.S.C. § 144
(party must file timely affidavit setting forth facts and reasons
for the belief that bias or prejudice exists). Moreover, the
allegation would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that Judge
Schwartz's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
 Following her trial, Studley filed a lawsuit against Judge
Schwartz and engaged in leafletting activities directed against him.
She argues here that these actions caused him to be "poisoned"
against her and were grounds for recusal. A judge is not
disqualified by a litigant's suit or threatened suit against him,
Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 701, or by a litigant's intemperate and
scurrilous attacks, United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954, 55 L. Ed. 2d 806, 98
S. Ct. 1586 (1978); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1243
(D. Conn. 1983), appeal dismissed, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985).
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
motion for recusal. *fn5
 Finally, we reject Studley's argument that the Chief Judge
or a committee of disinterested judges from the District was
required to rule on this recusal motion. We have held repeatedly
that the challenged judge himself should rule on the legal
sufficiency of a recusal motion in the first instance. E.g., United
States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 907, 99 S. Ct. 1213, 59 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1979). Here, the
motion was properly found legally insufficient.
[ I love it. The 9th Circuit is on the HONOR SYSTEM! ]
 VII. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
 Studley argues she has been illegally subjected to criminal
prosecution for violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, which she contends is
a civil statute. She contends that Congress has no authority to
establish criminal sanctions for failure to file income tax returns;
and even if Congress had the authority, Studley argues, it has not
been exercised. Finally, she argues that the entire Internal Revenue
Code was only temporarily enacted and is now invalid.
 These arguments are frivolous. *fn6 Section 7203 provides,
inter alia, that anyone who willfully fails to file a return "shall
. . . be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." Thus, Section 7203 is a
criminal statute, and Congress has exercised its power to enact such
a statute. See United States v. Acker, 415 F.2d 328, 329 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003, 90 S. Ct. 553, 24 L. Ed. 2d 495
(1970). The contention that Section 7203 is unconstitutional has
been repeatedly rejected. E.g., Wheeler v. United States, 744 F.2d
292, 293 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citing cases). We have also
held that the Internal Revenue Code was validly enacted by the
Congress and is fully enforceable. See Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325,
1328 (9th Cir. 1985).
 VIII. EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY CIVIL PROCESS
 Studley contends that her fifth amendment rights were
violated by the government's use of evidence obtained by civil
process. In 1982, the government petitioned for enforcement of an
IRS summons directed at Studley's accountants. Studley states that
the IRS sent her a Miranda letter at the time, and that IRS special
agent Anderson admitted at her criminal trial that his investigation
had always been criminal, rather than civil. Anderson also testified
that no recommendation for criminal prosecution had been made at the
time of the investigation.
 Generally, the district court's decision to admit evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ordonez,
737 F.2d 793, 811 (9th Cir. 1984). The court's findings of fact at a
suppression hearing are reviewed for clear error. United States v.
Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
839, 105 S. Ct. 140, 83 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1984).
 Studley's contention that the IRS acted illegally is without
merit. The facts of this case are nearly identical to those in Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 34 L. Ed. 2d 548, 93 S. Ct. 611
(1973). In Couch, the IRS sought enforcement of a civil summons
directing Couch's accountant to produce all documents pertinent to
Couch's tax liability. Id. at 323. See also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Manges), 745 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court
stated that "a special agent is authorized . . . to insure an
Internal Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with civil
and possible criminal consequences. . . . 'Congress clearly has
authorized the use of the summons in investigating what may prove to
be criminal conduct.'" Id. at 326 (quoting Donaldson v. United
States, 400 U.S. 517, 535, 27 L. Ed. 2d 580, 91 S. Ct. 534 (1971))
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court noted that under
Donaldson the summons must be issued in good faith and prior to
recommendation of criminal prosecution. Couch, 409 U.S. at 326 n.8.
 Here, there is no allegation that the IRS acted in bad
faith. Under Couch, it is irrelevant that Anderson sought the
records for criminal investigation so long as a recommendation of
prosecution had not been made.
 Even if the evidence should have been suppressed, its
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the
evidence was merely cumulative. See United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d
886, 894 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047, 79 L. Ed. 2d
182, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984). The evidence consisted of a record of
payments made to Studley on a loan. The record was used to show
Studley's income in 1978 and 1979. Ample other evidence was admitted
to show that Studley's gross income was greater than the statutory
minimum that triggers the requirement to file a return.
 The conviction is AFFIRMED.
 * The panel finds this case appropriate for submission
without argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 9th Cir. R.
 *fn1 At trial, the government presented evidence that
Studley had had gross income totaling about $144,000 for the three
[ Guilty by assumption again! ]
 *fn2 She also contends that her detention was illegal
because she was incarcerated overnight before she was brought before
a magistrate; she feels this was an unreasonable delay under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5(a). We need not reach this issue. Studley does not
contend that evidence was seized incident to the arrest, that she
was subjected to improper interrogation before arraignment or that
she was otherwise prejudiced by the delay. Since the normal remedy
for violation of Rule 5(a) is suppression of evidence obtained
during the unreasonable delay, we need not decide whether Studley
was in fact subjected to any delay that would constitute a Rule 5(a)
violation. Cf. Morse v. United States, 256 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1958)
(per curiam) (delay in taking an accused before a magistrate, though
illegal, does not invalidate a conviction absent prejudice resulting
from the detention).
 *fn3 We note that this argument has been consistently and
thoroughly rejected by every branch of the government for decades.
Indeed advancement of such utterly meritless arguments is now the
basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise
[ Be careful what you ask them lawster fellers. They get mighty riled up if you ask the wrong thing. I heared one
old boy was fined $6,500 just for asking how to apply Section 83 in completing his tax return. ]
 *fn4 Since Studley was prosecuted by information, the
reasons for her request regarding grand jurors is not immediately
 *fn5 We note that Judge Schwartz delayed sentencing two
weeks to ensure that Studley's sentence would not be affected by any
anger her actions may have engendered. Studley's sentence reflects
the probation officer's recommendation and is less severe than the
sentence requested by the government.
 *fn6 These claims have been considered many times before and
have been rejected consistently. Thus, they would be grounds for
sanctions if raised in a civil suit. See supra note 3.
UNITED STATES v. HANSON
05/14/93 UNITED STATES AMERICA v. LAVON T. HANSON
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 No. 92-30093
 2 F.3d 942
 May 14, 1993
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
LAVON T. HANSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Montana. D.C. No. CR 91-43-BLG-JDS. Jack D. Shanstrom,
District Judge, Presiding.
[ Look, it's the same Judge Mr. Matthies got! ]
 Lavon T. Hanson, pro se, Littleton, Colorado, for the
[ Look, it's another Pro Se! ]
 Klaus P. Richter, Assistant United States Attorney,
Billings, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellee.
[ Look, it's the same Prostituter Mr. Matthies got! ]
 Before: William C. Canby, Jr., and Stephen Reinhardt,
Circuit Judges, and A. Wallace Tashima, District Judge.**
 Opinion by District Judge Tashima.
 The opinion of the court was delivered by: Tashima
 OPINION AND ORDER
 Defendant-Appellant Lavon T. Hanson appeals his conviction
for making false statements in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and
attempting to interfere with the administration of the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). As
grounds for his appeal, Hanson argues that (1) the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the evidence presented at
trial was insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the district
court applied the wrong Sentencing Guideline; and (4) the district
judge was biased and prejudiced against him. The district court had
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the conviction and reverse the sentence.
 The charges stem from Hanson's filing false IRS forms that
reported payments Hanson had never made and claimed a tax refund
Hanson was not due. Hanson filed, for the year 1989, forms 1096 and
1099 information returns stating that he had received $46,996,669.41
in non-employee compensation from three Farmers Home Administration
("FHA") employees. Since he had intended to report having paid that
amount to the FHA employees rather than having received it, he later
filed a corrected form 1096 stating that he had not received any
payment. He subsequently filed a third set of 1096 and 1099 forms
declaring that he had paid the three FHA officials $46,996,669.41.
Hanson reported payments of $31,331,112.94 to two other FHA
employees on forms 1096 and 1099 for 1990. None of the purported
payments was ever made.
[ Yup! That sounds xackly like that Matthies feller to me! ]
 Hanson also filed a 1989 Form 1040 tax return falsely
claiming a refund of $33,837,602 generated by income and
withholdings of $46,996,669.44. He was neither paid nor owed the
[ Well at least the guy thought big! ]
 Hanson was charged with four counts of making false
statements and one count of attempting to interfere with the
administration of the IRS. At trial, Hanson represented himself. The
jury convicted him on all five counts. He was sentenced to 12 months
in prison with one year of supervised release.
 Hanson challenges the district court's exercise of
jurisdiction over him on the ground he is a nonresident alien exempt
from the tax laws. We review a question of jurisdiction de novo.
United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 1986).
 It is firmly established that district courts have subject
matter jurisdiction over prosecutions for violations of the tax
laws. "Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction over 'all offenses against the laws
of the United States.' These offenses include crimes defined in
Title 26 of United States Code." United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d
934 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
[ Yes they have jurisdiction over the laws of the united States but those laws have to apply to the individual in
question. There can be no argument that this individual made false statements to a united States agency with intent
to defraud and therefore volunteered for jurisdiction. This is not the case with Mr. Matthies. If the Prostituter
would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS, the lack of jurisdiction in the Matthies case would be apparent. Of
course the Prostituter and the Judge could never allow that because if they did, it would serve as a precident for
others. Of course this never happens because wins in cases like this are ALMOST NEVER PUBLISHED. Isn't
that special -- they flaunt their wins and hide their losses under color of law! ]
 Hanson claims that as a natural born citizen of Montana he
is a nonresident alien and, thus, is not a "taxpayer" as defined in
the tax code. Accordingly, he contends that he is not subject to the
tax laws. In Studley, we rejected a similar argument as "utterly
meritless," holding that "an individual is a 'person' under the
Internal Revenue Code and thus subject to [Title 26]." Id. at 937 &
n.3. Thus, Hanson is subject to the provisions of the tax code and
the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
[ Wrong issues, weak arguments. ]
 Hanson contends the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions. In reviewing this claim, we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government to determine if any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Adler, 879
F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1988).
 The government correctly notes that Hanson failed to
preserve this issue on appeal because he did not move for a judgment
of acquittal at trial. United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 893
(9th Cir. 1991). This court may review the sufficiency of the
evidence only to prevent a "'manifest miscarriage of justice.'" Id.
(citation omitted). Nevertheless, even if Hanson had preserved the
issue, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the
convictions under both 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) and 7212(a).
 A. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)
 To prove a violation of § 7206(1), making false statements,
the government must prove that the defendant (1) filed a return,
statement, or other document that was false as to a material matter;
(2) signed the return, statement or other document under penalty of
perjury; (3) did not believe the return, statement or other document
was true as to every material matter; and (4) willfully subscribed
to the false return with the specific intent to violate the law.
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 350, 36 L. Ed. 2d 941, 93 S.
Ct. 2008 (1973); United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1380
(9th Cir. 1984).
 At trial, Hanson admitted to signing the false returns under
penalty of perjury. He conceded that the amounts he reported on his
1989 1040 form were incorrect. With respect to the falsity of the
forms 1096 and 1099, the five FHA officials Hanson reported having
made payments to testified that they never received the purported
payments. Payment amounts reported on forms 1096 and 1099 and refund
amounts claimed on a tax return are clearly material. Thus, the
evidence supported the first two elements of the false statements
 Hanson's assertion that the 1040 form and the 1096 and 1099
forms were not "filed" because they were never fully processed by
the IRS is meritless. Evidence was presented that Hanson personally
mailed the forms and that the IRS received them. A return is "filed"
at the time it is delivered to the IRS. Emmons v. Commissioner, 898
F.2d 50, 51 (5th Cir. 1990); First Charter Fin. Corp. v. United
States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1982). *fn1
 Hanson contends that the government failed to prove that he
knew the returns were not true as to every material matter and that
he willfully intended to violate the law. However, Hanson's own
testimony supported a finding that these elements of the offense
were satisfied. First, Hanson admitted that his filing of false
returns was motivated by his belief that the FHA officials were
double agents for the United States and the United Nations and were
being used to overthrow the United States government. He hoped
filing the false forms "would bring forth an investigation. The
government itself would be forced to come in and investigate, and
all of these claims then would have to be brought forward and we
could stop this overthrow . . ." Second, Hanson testified that he
arrived at the payment amounts he reported by adding together the
fines specified in Title 18 for the offenses he believed the FHA
officials had committed. A rational juror could have inferred from
this testimony that Hanson did not believe the payment amounts he
reported were true and that he intended to initiate an IRS
investigation of the FHA officials.
 Hanson further contends that his subjective good faith
belief that as a nonresident alien he was exempt from the tax laws
precludes a finding that he intended to violate the law. He relies
on Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 112 L. Ed. 2d 617, 111 S.
Ct. 604 (1991), for the proposition that a good faith
misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that one is not
violating the law negates willfulness, regardless of whether the
claimed belief is objectively reasonable. However, Hanson's actions
in filing false tax documents as a form of harassment are not
excused by a belief that he was not subject to tax himself. In
addition, his testimony was such that the jury could properly find
that his actions were the result of his disagreement with the tax
laws, or his belief in their invalidity, rather than his good faith
belief that those laws did not apply to him. Cheek makes clear that
a defendant's views as to the unconstitutionality or invalidity of
the tax laws is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. The jury was
properly instructed according to Cheek, and the evidence was
sufficient to permit it to find that Hanson had the necessary guilty
 The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the government, supported a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that Hanson willfully filed returns he knew were materially
false with the intent to violate the law. Accordingly, we affirm
Hanson's conviction under § 7206(1).
 B. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)
 To prove a violation of § 7212(a), attempting to interfere
with the administration of the IRS, the government must prove (1)
corruption, force, or threat of force, and (2) an attempt to
obstruct the administration of the IRS. The evidence presented at
trial clearly supports the second element of the offense. The
government offered testimony that the IRS expended a large amount of
time discovering and remedying the problems caused by Hanson's
filing false forms.
 With respect to the first element of the offense, the
government charged Hanson with "corruptly" attempting to interfere
with the administration of the IRS. An act is "corrupt" within the
meaning of section 7212(a) if it is performed with the intention to
secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or for another. United States
v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
834, 88 L. Ed. 2d 87, 106 S. Ct. 107 (1985); United States v.
Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 118 L. Ed. 2d
423, 112 S. Ct. 1760 (1992); United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423
(8th Cir. 1992). Mere evidence of an improper motive or bad or evil
purpose is insufficient to prove corruption. nited States v. Kuball,
976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992), we affirmed a conviction under §
7212(a), where the defendant's conduct was factually very similar to
Hanson's. As in the instant case, the defendant had filed false 1096
and 1099 forms claiming substantial payments to individuals and had
filed a false 1040 form claiming a refund that was not due. We found
the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction because the
defendant had testified that he intended for his conduct to have an
effect on the individuals he claimed having made payments to and
because by filing the false 1040 form the defendant had "hoped to
benefit financially by obtaining a substantial tax refund." Id. at
 Similarly, in the instant case, Hanson's 1989 tax return
falsely claimed a refund of $33,837,602. This attempt to secure an
unlawful benefit for himself satisfies the corruption requirement.
Moreover, Hanson testified that he intended for his conduct to spark
an IRS investigation of the FHA officials. "Section 7212(a) is aimed
at prohibiting efforts to impede 'the collection of one's taxes, the
taxes of another, or the auditing of one's or another's tax
records.'" Id. (quoting Reeves, 752 F.2d at 998). Considering the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude
that the jury could reasonably have found that Hanson's conduct
violated § 7212(a).
 Hanson further contends that the district court erred in
applying United States Sentencing Guideline ("U.S.S.G.") § 2T1.9,
Conspiracy to Impair, Impede or Defeat Tax, as the applicable
guideline for his conviction of attempting to interfere with the
administration of the IRS in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
Hanson argues that the application of this guideline was improper
because the government neither charged him with involvement in a
conspiracy nor presented evidence of any such participation.
 The statutory index to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G.
Appendix A, specifies that § 2A2.2, Aggravated Assault, and § 2A2.3,
Minor Assault, are the guidelines ordinarily applied to a violation
of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). However, the introduction to the statutory
index instructs that:
 If, in an atypical case, the guideline section indicated for
the statute of conviction is inappropriate because of the particular
conduct involved, use the guideline section most applicable to the
nature of the offense conduct charged in the count of which the
defendant was convicted.
 U.S.S.G. App. A.
 In the instant case, Hanson was convicted of corruptly
endeavoring to impair or impede the administration of the tax laws
by filing a false return seeking a refund and filing various false
1096 and 1099 forms. No evidence suggests that Hanson ever assaulted
anyone in attempting to defraud the IRS. Accordingly, the district
court correctly determined that the assault guidelines specified in
the index were inapplicable to the instant case. See United States
v. Shriver, 967 F.2d 572, 574 (11th Cir. 1992) (upholding district
court's decision not to apply assault guideline to conviction under
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) where no evidence of assault).
 We disagree, however, with the district court's finding that
§ 2T1.9, Conspiracy to Impair, Impede or Defeat Tax, is the
guideline most analogous to Hanson's conduct. Whether a particular
guideline applies to a specific set of facts is a question of law
reviewed de novo. See Shriver, supra. The evidence demonstrates that
Hanson acted alone. Consequently, the district court's analogy to a
conspiracy is flawed and unduly distorts the guideline range.
 We conclude that § 2T1.5, Fraudulent Returns, Statements, or
Other Documents, more closely fits Hanson's conduct. Applying this
section, the appropriate guideline range is zero to six months,
rather than six to twelve months.
 Finally, Hanson contends the district judge was biased and
prejudiced against him. We find absolutely no support for this
assertion in the record.
 While we agree that the district judge erred by applying the
conspiracy guideline, this error falls far short of suggesting
partiality. Similarly without merit is Hanson's claim that the judge
exhibited bias and prejudice by not admitting into evidence
documents to support Hanson's belief that he was exempt from the tax
laws. The judge permitted Hanson to testify about his beliefs and
research and excluded only the underlying documents. Thus, Hanson's
claim that the district judge was biased and prejudiced against him
is unsubstantiated by the record.
 The judgment is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. *fn2
 The Memorandum disposition filed May 14, 1993, is
redesignated as an authored opinion by Judge Tashima.
 * March 4, 1993, Submitted, Seattle, WA; The panel
unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule
 PANEL FOOTNOTES
 ** The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, United States District
Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by
 *fn1 Similarly unpersuasive is Hanson's claim that his
filing of corrected forms to "zero out" the previously submitted
false forms cancelled out any potential harm. Hanson's later filing
of corrected forms is immaterial. "The fact that a fraudulent filer
subsequently submits an amended return does not make the case any
less one of a false or fraudulent return." Badaracco v. Commissioner
of IRS, 464 U.S. 386, 78 L. Ed. 2d 549, 104 S. Ct. 756 (1984).
 *fn2 Since briefing was completed in this case, Hanson has
filed a number of "affidavits." To the extent that these can be
construed as motions seeking relief from this court, the motions are
[ Another case that proves that the Matthies motions were without merit -- NOT! ]
UNITED STATES v. BURAS
12/17/80 UNITED STATES AMERICA v. JOHN E. BURAS
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT
 No. 80-1250
 633 F.2d 1356
 December 17, 1980
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
JOHN E. BURAS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central
District of California.
 John E. Buras, in pro. per. [ Do you think that these defendants which are
pro se or pro per did not WANT an attorney or could not afford one. From
the IRS hearings we learned that the IRS likes to pick on people who can not
afford to defend themselves. ]
 John W. Spiegel, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for
plaintiff-appellee; Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U. S. Atty., Los Angeles,
Cal., on brief.
 Before Wallace and Alarcon, Circuit Judges, and Copple,*
 The opinion of the court was delivered by: Copple
 John E. Buras appeals his conviction on four counts of
willful failure to file an income tax return in violation of I.R.C.
 The defendant is a free-lance truck driver for various film
studios in the Los Angeles area. For eight years preceding 1974,
Buras filed income tax returns listing his wages as income. During
this period, tax was withheld from his paychecks. After concluding
that he was not obligated under the tax laws to report his wages as
income, Buras did not file tax returns for the years 1974 through
1977. Although he earned between $11,000 and $21,000 per year during
this period, Buras filed withholding exemption certificates (Form
W-4E) so that no tax would be withheld from his paychecks. Buras was
indicted on four counts of willful failure to file income tax
returns. See I.R.C. § 7203.
[ Notice that there is no mention of how liability was established or income was derived. It was all just
ASSUMED. Are you now starting to get what I mean by CONVICTION BY ASSUMPTION? ]
 Buras filed two pretrial motions which are subjects of this
appeal: (1) a motion for a judicial hearing to determine whether
wages are income and (2) a motion for discovery of an informant.
Both motions were denied by the district court.
[ Whether wages are income is not the issue! You can actually lose on that one. The question is whether the
FRNs the defendant earns from driving a truck are income as defined at the time of the alleged passage of the so
called 16th Amendment. The wrong issue was raised and the criminals (Individuals Representing Satan) took
advantage of it.
Briefly, here are the facts (the Big Demand for Bill of Particulars) has dozens of details about this issue). Income
is gain. Gain is the excess of gross receipts over profits. There is no gain from labor. It is merely an
exchange. With regard to federal employees, they are being taxed on the privilege of working for the federal
The 1939 Act was titled the "Public Salary Tax Act". It was a tax on government salaries. In 1942 an emergency
tax was placed on all citizens. This was repealed in 1944. Many people, however, continued to volunteer. In
1954, the 1939 act was revised but the definition of income remained essentially the same. In 1986, the Act was
revised again but it incorporated the 1954 Code. The definition of income for tax purposes has remained essentially
the same since 1939!
Congress can tax citizens of the 50 states engaged in federally "privileged activities" which give rise to a "revenue
taxable event." That's why the IRS fraudulently codes Americans with engaging in distribution of narcotics,
importing liquor, manufacturing firearms, etc. in order to get the IRS computers to even print out
Notices. Interestingly, no "CP" letter (e.g. Notice of Failure To File, etc.) with a number with three digits is for
individuals! Mr. Matthies is coded as being a BUSINESS on his internal IRS files! We have not yet been able to
get documents from the IRS which will show us what business he is engaged in (alcohol, tobacco, firearms, etc.). ]
 At trial, Buras stipulated that during the period in
question he earned wages of approximately $11,000 to $21,000 per
year-well above the amount of gross income which would obligate an
individual to file a return. The defendant also conceded that he did
not file income tax returns during that period. *fn1
[ Well gee whiz, Vern, why did he not just ask for a visit to Club Fed. Here the defendant ADMITS that he earned
wages (which he DID NOT), admits that "$" in front of a number represents something real (which it DOES NOT),
and admits that he had substantial "gross income" (which he DID NOT). It is abundantly clear that this defendant
DID NOT understand the charges against him. If the Prostituter in the Matthies case would JUST ANSWER THE
QUESTIONS in the Bill of Particulars, it would show that the government does NOT have a case. It would also
expose the fraud. ]
 Thus, the only disputed element under I.R.C. § 7203 was
whether Buras' failure to file was willful. To show willfulness, the
government offered evidence (1) that the defendant had filed tax
returns for eight years prior to 1974, (2) that Buras had
substantial amounts of income withheld from his paychecks prior to
1974, and (3) testimony from one of Buras' neighbors that Buras had
told her that "he wasn't paying income tax because he thought the
government ... did things to him."
[ Let's deal with these one at a time.
1.What difference does it make that defendant had filed tax returns in previous years. Probably 90% of the 35
MILLION current non-filers have filed in previous years. Just because you were once a sheeple does not mean that
you can not awaken to the truth. 2.What difference does it make that defendant had money stolen from his pay in
previous years. Probably 90% of the 35 MILLION current non-filers have been victims of theft of their pay in the
past. 3.Notice the quoted words above very carefully. You will see DIFFERENT WORDS in this same
document! If Mr. Buras actually said something like this, he either knew of a real plot or needed mental
help. Neither of these is criminal. ]
 After the government rested, Buras testified on direct that
he did not believe that his wages constituted income under the
Internal Revenue Code. Under Buras' theory, only profit or gain,
such as that from the sale of a capital asset, constituted income
subject to federal tax. *fn2 Wages could not constitute gain or
profit because wages merely represent an equivalent exchange for
one's labor. In addition, the defendant submitted IRS reports and
estimates of defendant's income and tax liability for the years
charged in the indictment as well as a copy of a letter Buras had
sent to the IRS explaining why he recognized no obligation to file
[ The defendant was basically correct in his assertions. However, he had already shot himself in the foot by this
time. However, it will get worse! ]
 On cross-examination, Buras admitted that this letter was
written and provided to him by Arthur J. Porth. *fn3 After
testifying that he had been acquainted with Porth since 1974 and had
discussed the contents of the letter with him, Buras was asked
whether Porth had ever told him that Porth had been convicted for
failing to file income tax returns. The trial court sustained an
objection to this question and instructed the jury to "disregard the
question and any implications from the question." By implication,
the court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial.
[ Again, what difference does it make who helped him write the letter? Lawsters are good at writing letters. Truck
drivers often are not. The most important point here is this: Was Mr. Porth wrong and did Mr. Buras know he was
wrong OR was Mr. Porth RIGHT and just got a free ride on the Club Fed Railroad? If a person is wrongly
convicted of a crime and continues to maintain the same CORRECT beliefs which led to his conviction, is this an
indictment of the person or of the system?
If you buy into the government's arguments, you should be a good little sheeple and pay the extortion. They are
proud to show dozens of examples of people who have been found guilty of willful failure to file through their
deception, intimidation, blatant fraud and "word art". The problem is that 95% of these convictions are WRONG
because the defendant never was liable for the tax -- it was just ASSUMED that he was! ]
 Buras was also questioned on cross-examination concerning a
profit he had made from the sale of his house during the time period
charged in the indictment. He realized approximately a $20,000
profit from the sale and spent the proceeds. Although he admitted
that this gain was subject to tax under his theory, Buras testified
that he did not report this income because he believed he had no
such obligation so long as he intended to reinvest the proceeds in
another home. The court overruled defense objections that this line
of questioning delved into areas that were irrelevant to the crime
charged in the indictment.
[ The defendant is weak here. His willfulness is in doubt. However, the defendant is WRONG that these gains are
taxable. The IRS has no jurisdiction or authority to tax this gain in the 50 states. So even if his willfulness is in
question, his liability is not and he should have been found not guilty. However, NO ONE raised the issue of
jurisdiction. Again, these questions are raised in the Matthies Bill of Particulars if the Prostituter would JUST
ANSWER THE QUESTIONS! ]
 After the defense rested, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion for acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) and
refused two instructions offered by the defendant. The jury returned
a verdict of guilty on all four counts.
[ I am sure that the learned legal scholars who wrote this understand how critical the use of words is. I would be
sure that if a FAIR trial and a FAIR set of jury instructions were given, only about 1% of all indictments under 7203
would be validated by a guilty verdict because only 1% were ever liable in the first place! ]
 Sufficiency of the Evidence
 Buras contends that the court below erred in denying his
motion for acquittal because the government presented insufficient
evidence on the issue of willfulness.
 A failure to file an income tax return does not violate
I.R.C. § 7203 if the failure resulted from a good faith
misunderstanding of the law. United States v. Matosky, 421 F.2d 410,
413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 398 U.S. 904, 90 S. Ct. 1691, 26 L. Ed.
2d 62 (1970). See United States v. Ross, 626 F.2d 77, 80 n.1 (9th
 Since the defendant did not move for acquittal until after
the appellant had presented his defense, this court must consider
all of the evidence that the jury had before it. See United States
v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1972). Evidence is
sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
"any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See
United States v. Kipp, 624 F.2d 84, 84 (9th Cir. 1980).
 The evidence demonstrated that Buras had filed returns
between 1966 and 1973, thus indicating an awareness of his legal
obligation to file. United States v. Ross, 626 F.2d at 79. A similar
pattern was established with regard to withholding. Prior to 1974,
Buras had his taxes withheld from his paychecks. During and after
1974, he submitted withholding exemption certificates. A neighbor
testified that Buras had explained to her that he did not pay income
tax because he thought the "government ... did things against him."
Moreover, Buras testified that he did not report the gain he
realized from the sale of his house, thereby casting doubt on Buras'
sincerity. Finally, Buras was aware of treasury regulations that
defined wages as income.
[ As stated earlier, the first sentence above is garbage. All that shows is that the defendant had one set of beliefs
before 1974 and one set after 1974.
Now we come to the second instance of the quote. The previous one said "the government ... did things to him."
Third we have the defendant saying that he was aware of treasury regulations. See  below for a discussion of
 Considering this evidence, it would certainly be reasonable
for a jury to conclude that Buras was aware of his legal obligation
to file returns, and that his failure to file did not result from a
good faith misunderstanding of the law.
[ Yes, a jury could conclude that, but they are using the WRONG ASSUMPTIONS. He had no legal obligation to
file returns. What he thought, given this, is irrelevant. ]
 The Pretrial Motions
 The defendant appeals from the district court's denial of
his motion to discover the identity of an informant who had told the
IRS that Buras had not filed tax returns. The court found that the
informant was merely a "tipster". Buras argues that the informant
might have been able to provide information regarding whether Buras'
failure was willful or in good faith. Such unfounded suspicion or
conjecture falls short of the showing of materiality required by
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d
639 (1957). The appellant has not made any showing that disclosure
of the informant's identity or of the contents of his communication
would be relevant or helpful to the defense or essential to a fair
determination of the case. This is not a case where the informant
was a witness to the crime. See United States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d
329, 330 (9th Cir. 1971). Neither is this a case where the informant
must have participated in the crime. See Simpson v. Kreiger, 565
F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 946, 98 S. Ct.
1531, 55 L. Ed. 2d 544 (1978). Although the informant's tip
precipitated the investigation that led to Buras' arrest, that fact
alone is insufficient to compel disclosure of the informant. See id.
 Buras also contends that the district court erred in failing
to hold a hearing on the issue of whether wages constitute income.
Since this issue is purely a legal one and since the court fully
considered Buras' written arguments, the district court acted well
within its discretion in denying defendant's request for a hearing.
 Jury Instructions
 Buras contends that the district court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury that the government could avail itself of the
civil remedy of assessing Buras' taxes without filing criminal
charges. See I.R.C. § 6020(b). Because the availability of a civil
remedy is irrelevant to the issue of criminal liability, the court
correctly refused to give such an instruction. See United States v.
Merrick, 464 F.2d 1087, 1093 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S.
1023, 93 S. Ct. 462, 34 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1972). Such an instruction
would serve only to confuse the jury.
 The appellant asserts that the district court erred in
refusing to give his proposed instruction on willfulness. The court,
however, did give an alternative instruction that covered the
substance of Buras' proposed instruction. A defendant has no right
to have the jury instructed in the precise language he may desire.
United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
436 U.S. 911, 98 S. Ct. 2249, 56 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1978). The district
court did not err in refusing Buras' proposed instruction.
 Prosecutorial Misconduct
 Buras contends that the trial court erred in not declaring a
mistrial following improper questioning of Buras on
cross-examination. After Buras admitted that Porth had provided him
the letter Buras had sent to the IRS, Buras was asked whether Porth
had ever told him that Porth had been convicted for his failure to
file tax returns. Although the court sustained the defendant's
objection and instructed the jury to disregard it, Buras argues that
the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial.
 The question was clearly relevant to the question of whether
Buras' failure to file resulted from a good faith misunderstanding
of the law. Lack of good faith would be indicated if the defendant
were aware that the very person whose arguments he adopted to show
that he did not have an obligation to file had been found criminally
liable for failing to file a return. See United States v. Ross, 626
F.2d at 78. Apparently, the court did not permit the question
because the government was unable to show that Porth had been
convicted well before Buras had submitted Porth's letter. *fn4 In
any event, the curative instructions given immediately after the
objection was sustained and again at the close of the trial
eliminated any danger that the jury might be prejudiced against
Buras because of his association with a lawbreaker.
 Extent of Cross Examination
 Buras argues that it was improper for the government to
question the defendant on cross examination about the gain he
realized from the sale of his house. It is argued that the
introduction of this evidence improperly broadened the scope of the
indictment to include offenses not charged.
 This evidence was clearly relevant to the issue of Buras'
good faith in believing that he had no obligation to file a return.
Under Buras' theory, he had no obligation to file a return because
wages are not income. Buras construes income as constituting only
gain or profit. Whether or not Buras reported the gain from the sale
of his house is relevant to whether Buras held his theory in good
faith. This evidence is probative as to the sincerity of the
defendant's beliefs. Considering that this evidence was clearly
relevant to Buras' intent, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to admit this evidence for that purpose. See United
States v. Watkins, 600 F.2d 201, 205 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
444 U.S. 871, 100 S. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1980).
 The Definition of Income
 Buras contends that the district court erroneously
instructed the jury that wages constitute income. In addition to
arguing that only gain or profit can constitute income, Buras argues
that the income tax is essentially an excise tax. He argues that he
can be subject to an excise tax only if he benefits from "any sort
of privilege extended by a government agency." Since he is only a
wage earner, he argues that he cannot be subject to an excise tax.
[ The court never allowed the jury to know the definition of "wages", "employer" or "employee" as defined 26 USC
or the definition of "income" as defined prior to the 16th amendment. The court was correct that IRC defined
"wages" earned by an IRC defined "employee" working for an IRC defined "employer" constitute IRC "income" for
IRC tax purposes. However, the defendant was not an "employee", and did not earn "wages" per the definition and
was not subject to the IRC in the first place. ]
 Treas.Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(1) clearly includes wages within the
definition of income. Buras, however, argues that this regulation is
invalid because it is inconsistent with the constitutional
definition of income. According to Buras, income must be derived
from some source. Wages cannot be taxed because the wage earner
enjoys no gain from that source. Since the wage earner exchanges his
labor and personal time for its equivalent in money, he derives no
gain and therefore cannot be taxed.
[ This MAY BE true for those under it's jurisdiction. However, it is not true when you look at other sections of the
code which say income is DERIVED FROM wages, etc. such as Section 861. ]
 Appellant's argument is refuted by one of the cases he
cites. In Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399,
415, 34 S. Ct. 136, 140, 58 L. Ed. 285 (1913), the Court did define
income as gain derived from labor. The Court went on to explain,
however, that "the earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided
by capital" are commonly treated as income. Id.
[ Well isn't that special! Now we are talking about the way words are "commonly treated". We have 11,000 pages
of code and regulations alone and the definition of income which goes to the heart of the matter is defined with a
"common" use treatment? Give me a break!
The regulations are superceded by the code. It certainly doesn't say wages are income in the code.
Since we are dealing with non-positive law, the code is superceded by the statutes at large. I would highly doubt
that the underlying statutes say that wages are income.
The statutes are superceded by the Constitution. And I can guarantee you that the definition of "income" as it
existed, not "commonly treated" as it may be today, but treated and interpreted by the Supreme Court in DOZENS
OF CASES, does not hold that wages constitute income.
Just for clarification, court cases are at the BOTTOM of the food chain! ]
 As for Buras' argument that he may not be taxed because he
is a wage earner, the Sixteenth Amendment is broad enough to grant
Congress the power to collect an income tax regardless of the source
of the taxpayer's income. United States v. Russell, 585 F.2d 368,
370 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1220
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 919, 97 S. Ct. 2185, 53 L.
Ed. 2d 230 (1977).
[ See how they always state a truth and make it sound like it makes a point which it does not? Let us assume that
the 16th Amendment really was ratified (there have been court cases and one major book which found that it
not). The 16th Amendment is broad enough to collect taxes on income regardless of the source. HOWEVER:
1.The tax has to be on "income" as defined when the 16th Amendment was supposedly ratified. 2.Second, it has to
be "income" from a source which is defined specifically in the law. You can not define wages as income. Wages
may be a source of income just like a well may be a source of water but a well is not water! Get it?! 3.The wages of
a federal employee can be taxed because they are covered under the jurisdiction of the federal zone and are not
subject to any restraints of the Constitution. That's why a Supreme Court case held that the 16th Amendment
conferred NO NEW POWERS on Congress. If it conveyed no new powers, and the prohibition against direct taxes
was not repealed, then the tax could not be direct if applied to citizens of the 50 states and be constitutional. If it is
an excise tax, it would not meet the necessary requirements to be structured as it is. It would have to be levied on
"revenue taxable activities". 4.Congress has to specifically tax a source of income. If the 16th Amendment gave
any power to lay a tax on income, it did not automatically cause all incomes to be taxed. As we know, there are
numerous exemptions from taxable income. Congress had to specifically define the sources of income which could
be taxed. Congress did so define both sources of income and items of income. The money earned for the ordinary
American is not an item of income from a taxed source of income. ]
 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
 Finally, Buras argues that he was prejudiced by ineffective
assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to argue Buras'
theories at trial. Counsel was involved in at least some of Buras'
pretrial motions arguing that wages do not constitute income.
Considering the district court's disposition on these motions, it
would have been inappropriate for counsel to have argued Buras'
theories at trial, except to the extent that they indicate that
Buras' failure to file resulted from a good faith misunderstanding
of the law. Both during the trial and closing argument, counsel
sought to demonstrate that Buras' sincerity in his beliefs and his
openness regarding his theories precluded a finding of willfulness.
Merely because the district court refused to accept Buras' theories
as the correct interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment is hardly
an indication that counsel was ineffective.
[ How about the fact that the "theories" may have combined with other material presented to let the jury know that
the defendant had no liability. This would probably not have occurred as a practical matter, however, because the
defendant apparently was not sufficiently educated in the facts and the lawster was not about to violate his oath to
the Bar and duty to the court by helping him out EVEN IF the lawster himself even knew the facts. ]
 The judgment is AFFIRMED.
[ Either the appeal court judges don't know better or they were part of the conspiracy. It's hard to tell which most of
the time. ]
 * Honorable William P. Copple, United States District Judge
for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
 *fn1 The government also introduced evidence on this point.
 *fn2 Under Buras' theory, interest and dividends would also
be subject to the income tax.
 *fn3 Porth has been convicted under I.R.C. § 7203 for
willful failure to file tax returns. United States v. Porth, 426
F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 824, 91 S. Ct. 47, 27 L.
Ed. 2d 53 (1970).
[ So What! ]
 *fn4 As it turns out, Porth's conviction was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit in 1970, more than six years before Buras submitted
Porth's letter. See United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 824, 91 S. Ct. 47, 27 L. Ed. 2d 53
[ So What! ]
UNITED STATES v. HURD
01/12/77 UNITED STATES AMERICA v. GERALD S. HURD
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 No. 76-2192
 549 F.2d 118
 January 12, 1977
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
GERALD S. HURD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington.
 Gerald S. Hurd, Pro Se, (argued) of Everett, Washington, for
[ Here is another Pro Se case! Why do you think that is? ]
 Jerald E. Olson, Ausa, (argued) of Seattle, Washington, for
 Wright and Goodwin, Circuit Judges, and Ingram,* District
 The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam
 A jury found the defendant guilty on two counts of failing
to file income tax returns [26 U.S.C. § 7203 (Supp. 1976)]. At trial
he chose to represent himself and had the assistance of a
court-appointed legal advisor. He appears pro se in this appeal.
[ I am sure that the court-appointed legal advisor was extremely helpful -- not!]
 During the years in question, Hurd was a self-employed
roofing contractor. His gross income for 1971-1972 was established
by the bank deposits method of proof. Several customers testified
that Hurd had performed work for them during those years.
 Of the errors urged on appeal, none deserves serious
consideration. On the fifth day of trial, the defendant filed an
affidavit of prejudice against the trial judge. He was much too
late. The statute provides that an affidavit of prejudice should "be
filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at
which the proceeding is to be heard." 28 U.S.C. § 144. At the time
of arraignment, the district judge invited Hurd to follow the
appropriate procedure. Instead, five months passed before he acted.
The judge properly refused to recuse himself. In any event, the
affidavit of prejudice was wholly inadequate to demonstrate bias or
 There was no error in the denial of the defendant's motion
for inspection of the jury list. The motion was filed but not timely
served or noted for hearing. Nonetheless, the court considered it on
the first day of trial and denied it because it was untimely. The
ruling was clearly appropriate. People of Territory of Guam v.
Palomo, 511 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1975).
 There was no error in the trial court's refusal to excuse
for cause a prospective juror whose wife was employed as a property
clerk with the Internal Revenue Service. The juror had stated that
his wife's work was unrelated to collections and that he would not
be influenced in his deliberations. In the absence of a showing of
actual bias the fact that a juror or his spouse is employed by the
federal government does not disqualify him. United States v. LePera,
443 F.2d 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S. Ct. 326,
30 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1971). There was no abuse of the trial judge's
broad discretion in this area.
 During the trial the defendant distributed to the jurors a
pamphlet of which he claimed authorship and which he said was
"intended to straighten [the jury] out and unbrainwash them." He now
claims that the court erred in advising the jury that it was
improper for anyone to communicate with a juror during the course of
the trial. The defendant's attempt to find error in the court's
comment is absurd.
 The trial court excluded evidence offered by the defendant
to the effect that Federal Reserve Notes did not constitute legal
tender. The ruling was clearly proper. United States v. Wangrud, 533
F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976). The court was also correct in rejecting
the defendant's proferred evidence to the effect that the system of
taxation was based on voluntary compliance. Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370, 96 S. Ct. 1178 (1976).
[ Again, the defendant missed the point. The legal tender issue is not primary and can only be won on
Constitutional grounds since there is a law in place which says FRNs are legal tender. The primary question which
the defendant was trying to get to was as follows:
1.Federal Reserve Notes are classified as "securities of the united States". 2.They are allegedly notes but they have
no interest rate or method of redemption. 3.They violate 12 USC 411 in that they can not be redeemed in lawful
money at the U.S. Treasury or any Federal Reserve Bank. In fact, they can not even be redeemed for other Federal
Reserve Notes. 4.Because of the above, they are "worthless securities". They can not be taxed either at the state or
ONCE MORE, I will point out that the above questions would be answered and the issues either resolved or joined
if the Prostituter would
JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS!]
 The use of evidence obtained by a subpoena of Hurd's bank
records was clearly proper. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976), and Kelley v. United States,
536 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1976).
 In his reply brief, for the first time, Hurd charges the
government with selective prosecution. The claim comes too late but
has no merit in any event. Hurd has failed in his burden of making a
prima facie case under the standard which we have prescribed in a
series of recent decisions. United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953,
954 (9th Cir. 1976).
[ His lawster feller didn't tell him that he needed to raise this issue during the trial. Here are some points which
could be made in Mr. Matthies case:
1.There are 35 MILLION non-filers according to the IRS. 2.There are only about 1,500 people prosecuted each year
for ALL TAX CRIMES COMBINED. That would include alcohol, tobacco, firearms, corporate, personal,
etc.. There are many types of crime under each of these. Therefore, I would doubt if more that a few dozen are
prosecuted every year. Let's see, that would mean it would take about ONE MILLION YEARS to prosecute them
all. 3.We know from the Senate hearings that IRS agents go after "plums" from the middle class. 4.In Mr. Matthies
case, he owns his home, etc.. 5.He earns in the $30,000 - $50,000 range.
Could you see that with ONE MILLION TO ONE ODDS, the prosecution might be just a little selective. AGAIN,
if the Prostituter would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS, we would know for sure that this WAS
ABSOLUTELY a case of selective prosecution. ]
 Appellant's other contentions are wholly without merit. The
judgment of conviction is affirmed.
[ Yea, but what if he had raised the RIGHT issues? ]
 * Honorable William A. Ingram, United States District Judge
of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
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