Cases Cited by Prostituter To Show

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					                                     Cases Cited by Prostituter To Show
                                 That Defendant's Motions Were Without Basis
INTRODUCTION: You may not want to read this entire document. Even I find it somewhat tiring even with a
little humor thrown in from time to time. However, you should look at least at the highlighted portions of the text,
the comments and how the cited case is or is not relevant to UNITED STATES v. HENRY MATTHIES.

More importantly, I believe that you will come to the conclusion that NOT EVEN THE APPELLANT JUDGES
understand the tax law and the "word art" used to confuse any reader who doesn't have a century or so to study it.

Also, these cases show how bad case law builds on itself. If the arguments are not presented properly (and they
never really have been (at least not in published cases), the trial court goes off half cocked and so does the appellant
courts. It is necessary, therefore, if we are to win the BIG ONE, that we attack all the way down to the smallest of
detail in order to clearly expose the fraud.




[ Matthies is in the Ninth Circuit ]

    [2]    No. 85-3035

    [3]    784 F.2d 1462

    [4]    March 21, 1986


    [6]    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
            District of Montana. D.C. No. CR-84-57-GF.

    [7]    Carl E. Rostad, Ausa, Great Falls, MT for Appellee.

    [8]    Laura Lee, Esq., Billings, Mt, Scott McLarty, Esq., Athens,
            CA for Appellant.

[ This was one of a duo of lawsters Mr. Matthies originally hired. Ain't that special! ]

    [9]    Nancy Hollander, Esq. Freedman, Boyd & Daniels, P.a.,
            Albuquerque, NM for Amicus Curiae National Asso. OF Criminal Defense

    [10]    The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kennedy

    [11]    Before: KENNEDY and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and
             STEPHENS,* District Judge.

    [12]    KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:
    [13]   Jerome David Pederson appeals from his conviction for seven
            counts of willful failure to file federal income tax returns, in
            violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. In addition to arguing that 26 U.S.C.
            § 7203 is void for vagueness, Pederson contends that his conviction
            should be reversed because the prosecutor engaged in gross
            misconduct, the district court failed to grant him a continuance,
            and he was erroneously committed to a hospital for psychiatric
            evaluation. We find no error, and we affirm.

[ OK, the guy starts weak and ends weaker. Of course, he had them there professional lawsters. Notice that, on the
whole, the Pro Se's actually did a much better job! ]

    [14]   Appellant claims the statute providing for criminal
            sanctions for failure to file federal income tax returns, 26 U.S.C.
            § 7203, is void for vagueness. The section states:

    [15]   Any person required under this title to pay any estimated
            tax or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under
            authority thereof to make a return . . ., keep any records, or
            supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such estimated
            tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such
            information, at the time or times required by law or regulations,
            shall . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .

[ This sounds as clear as mud to me! Notice the large words "person required"? This is one of the MAJOR KEYS
to the whole issue. Mr. Matthies has been asking for YEARS for the Individuals Representing Satan to show him
the law which requires him to file and pay. They can not do it because there is no such law!

If you remember from the Third IRS Transcript this was one of the two questions asked of the Supervisor of the
Special Agents of the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS. The Agent could not answer either question in
the meeting and three months later, still has not provided an answer! ]

    [16]   26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1982). Pederson argues that the statute
            fails to define the "person required" to file a tax return and is
            therefore void for vagueness. We agree with the other circuits that
            have addressed this claim that section 7203 is not vague. United
            States v. Parshall, 757 F.2d 211, 215 (8th Cir. 1985); United States
            v. Moore, 692 F.2d 95, 96-97 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
            Eagan, 587 F.2d 338, 339 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States
            v. Lachmann, 469 F.2d 1043, 1046 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
            U.S. 931, 93 S. Ct. 1897, 36 L. Ed. 2d 390 (1973); United States v.
            Ming, 466 F.2d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915, 93
            S. Ct. 235, 34 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1972). The definition of the "person
            required" to pay an income tax is set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 1, which
            imposes a tax on all individuals in accordance with detailed tables
            set forth in that section. That definition of the "person required"
            to file a federal income tax return is again explicit in 26 U.S.C. §
            6012. See Moore, 692 F.2d at 96-97. The vagueness argument is

[ Just because a single section does not contain the definitions of all the terms used does not mean it is
vague. They claim that the definition is given in Section 1. Fine. If that statement is true, the form required is the
2555 (Foreign Earned Income -- See the Third IRS Transcript.) When we caught on to this, the OMB cross
reference for 26 CFR 1.1-1 disappeared and the OMB number for 2555 has been moved to the 6012
Section. However, this section already had four forms listed and now it has 5. The OMB number for the 1040,
1545-0074, is the FIFTH in the list. That really makes it clear as mud!

The Web page "Two Roads Diverged In The Wood" has an excellent discussion of 6012 if I say so myself! (By the
way, "Jack" is really Henry Lynn., Matthies -- he goes by "Hank", and "Jane" is his wife Judy).

I hope that you are as outraged as I was when I heard about the Prostituter trying to say that 6012 was the Section
which made Mr. Matthies required to file. ]

    [17]   Pederson next contends that misconduct of the prosecution
            deprived him of the defense counsel of his choice, and that as a
            result, the conviction should be reversed and the indictment
            dismissed. We need not examine or accept the various legal premises
            implicit in this argument, for we do not find it established on this
            record that the government's misconduct was the cause or
            justification for the withdrawal of appellant's lead counsel.

    [18]   On the day before the trial was set to commence, the
            Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting the case allegedly made
            certain disparaging and unprofessional remarks about Pederson's
            principal defense attorney. The remarks were made to a defense
            witness who happened to be Pederson's brother, and it is presumed
            that the remarks were promptly relayed to Pederson himself. The
            defense counsel in question unilaterally determined that the remarks
            so impaired his ability to question the witness and to retain the
            confidence of his client that he was required to withdraw from the
            case. He announced his withdrawal accordingly. The abrupt and
            determined decision of defense counsel to withdraw from the case
            pretermitted full inquiry and resolution by the district court with
            reference to the precise statements that the government made, their
            effect on the witness and the client, and whether the defense
            counsel's standing with the witness and the client necessarily were
            impaired so his withdrawal from the case was required. Since these
            matters were not presented to the district court, we do not have a
            case where it has been established that counsel's withdrawal was
            necessary or required, and we hold that the appellant has not
            properly preserved that issue for our review.

    [19]   Pederson also argues that his Sixth Amendment right to
            effective assistance of counsel was violated because the district
            court refused to grant a long enough continuance for his replacement
            lead counsel to prepare the case. Pederson's original lead counsel
            to prepare the case. Pederson's original lead counsel withdrew from
            the case the day before the trial was originally set to begin, and
            the district court granted a two-day continuance of the trial. New
            lead counsel was already somewhat familiar with the case and arrived
            to confer with Pederson the day before the trial began. Local
            counsel had been involved in the case for some time and continued to
            assist the new lead counsel.

    [20]   Granting a continuance is within the trial court's
           discretion. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 11 L. Ed. 2d 921,
           84 S. Ct. 841 (1964); United States v. West, 607 F.2d 300, 305 (9th
           Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Though the refusal to grant a continuance
           in this case for more than two days was strict, it was not an abuse
           of discretion. The two-day trial did not present complex factual or
           legal issues, and the assistance of local counsel provided for
           continuity in representation. Since appellant cites no specific
           showing of prejudice or ineffective assistance of counsel in the
           record, the denial of a longer continuance did not violate the Sixth
           Amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
           2052, 2064-69, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); United States v.
           Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717-21 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam),
           cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S. Ct. 1772, 84 L. Ed. 2d 832

   [21]   Pederson next argues that the district court erred in
           committing him to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners,
           Springfield, Missouri, for three months for psychiatric evaluation
           in order to determine his competency to stand trial. Prior to trial,
           defendant refused to consult with court-appointed counsel and
           insisted that his decision not to participate in the federal income
           tax system provided him with a solid defense. Based on his
           observations of defendant and defendant's answers to his questions,
           the trial judge had a genuine doubt about defendant's competence to
           stand trial, to waive his right to counsel, and to understand the
           gravity of the proceeding. In such a situation, the court has an
           obligation to mandate further inquiry and professional psychiatric
           evaluation, even if no party so moves the court. Chavez v. United
           States, 656 F.2d 512, 515-17 (9th Cir. 1981). In this case, we
           believe that the trial judge's doubts concerning defendant's
           competency to stand trial were reasonable, Id. at 516.

   [22]   Petitioner also objects to the length of his pretrial
           confinement, claiming that it lasted for three months. It is not
           clear to us from either the briefs or the record presented here that
           the period of commitment or observation in fact exceeded the time
           periods provided in 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b). In any event, appellant has
           not shown how any excessive confinement affected the validity and
           fairness of the trial or of the conviction that followed.

   [23]   Appellant's remaining arguments are without merit.

[ And he was represented by lawsters! ]

   [24]   The opinion of the district court is AFFIRMED.

    Opinion Footnotes

   [25]   * Albert Lee Stephens, Jr., Senior U.S. District Judge for
              the Central District of California, sitting by designation.




    [2]     No. 84-1288

    [3]     783 F.2d 934

    [4]     February 26, 1986


    [6]     Appeal from the United States District Court for the for the
             Eastern District of California, Honorable Milton L. Schwartz,
             District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CR 84-35 MLS.

    [7]     Thomas E. Flynn, Esq., Sacramento, Ca, for Appellee.

    [8]     Ruth Studley, Pro Per, Project City, Ca, for Appellant.

[ Here is another one! ]

    [9]     The opinion of the court was delivered by: Canby

    [10]    Before: BARNES, FARRIS and CANBY, Circuit Judges.

    [11]    CANBY, Circuit Judge.

    [12]    Studley, a real estate broker, was convicted after a jury
             trial of three counts of willful failure to file tax returns for the
             years 1978, 1979, and 1980. *fn1 26 U.S.C. § 7203. Studley filed a
             timely notice of appeal and raises a host of issues before us. We
    [13]   I. ARREST WARRANT

    [14]   Studley first contends that her arrest and prosecution were
            illegal because neither the arrest warrant nor the information was
            supported by a sworn oath or affirmation. As a result, she believes
            her conviction should be reversed. *fn2

    [15]   Fed. R. Crim. P. 9(a) requires a showing of probable cause
            under oath before a warrant may be issued on an information. The
            government candidly concedes that the probable cause statement was
            omitted from the warrant application but states that it was filed
            immediately after the omission was brought to the government's
            attention by appellant.

    [16]   Despite the government's improper handling of the warrant
            application, however, the conviction must stand. The Supreme Court
            has repeatedly held that an illegal arrest or detention does not
            void a subsequent conviction. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
            119, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54, 95 S. Ct. 854 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342
            U.S. 519, 522, 96 L. Ed. 541, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952). Studley in no
            way argues that her conviction was based on evidence derived from
            any illegal police activities. Moreover, a prior judicial
            determination of probable cause is not a prerequisite to prosecution
            by information. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119. Thus, any illegality in
            Studley's arrest does not require reversal of her conviction.


    [18]   Studley argues that, because her arrest was illegal, the
            district court lacked both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
            We disagree. First, the court unquestionably had subject matter
            jurisdiction. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have
            exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws
            of the United States." These offenses include crimes defined in
            Title 26 of United States Code. United States v. Przybyla, 737 F.2d
            828, 829 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099,
            105 S. Ct. 2320, 85 L. Ed. 2d 839 (1985). Moreover, the defect in
            Studley's arrest did not deprive the district court of personal
            jurisdiction over her. See United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680,
            684 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980) (court has jurisdiction over any party who
            appears before it, regardless of how appearance is effected).

[ Man are they slick! Notice how they wiggle out of this one. First they say CORRECTLY that the court had
"subject matter jurisdiction". Then they say that "the defect in Studley's arrest did not deprive the district court of
personal jurisdiction over her." This is also CORRECT. The real question is whether they actually had personal
jurisdiction over her in the first place.

If you have questions of jurisdiction, there are several great documents on the Web. Larry Becraft's is highly
recommented. ]
   [19]   Next, Studley claims she was prejudiced in this case because
           she never received a definitive statement of the basis for the
           district court's jurisdiction. Our review of the record shows that
           the district court explained the basis of its jurisdiction several
           times, the last on May 21, 1984. Studley's assertion that she was
           prejudiced by changes in the court's explanations is meritless; all
           of her attacks on the court's jurisdiction were frivolous. She was
           not prejudiced.

[ Well, if the Prosituter would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS, we could get a good feel for where we stand on
Jurisdiction and Venue. Of course, that is wishful thinking. ]


   [21]   Studley contends that she is not a "taxpayer" because she is
           an absolute, freeborn and natural individual. This argument is
           frivolous. An individual is a "person" under the Internal Revenue
           Code and thus subject to 26 U.S.C. § 7203. United States v. Romero,
           640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981). *fn3

[ Slick again! And another charge of being FRIVOLOUS! They say "an individual is a 'person' under the Internal
Revenue Code". FINE. What individual? Any individual? Would it apply to a citizen of Bosnia? You have to
know WHICH INDIVIDUAL. They just begged the question. They were FRIVOLOUS!               This all gets back to
jurisdiction, doesn't it! If the Prostituter would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS!


   [23]   Studley also contends that reversal is required because she
           was denied access to jury lists. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f), parties
           "shall be allowed to inspect" records of the jury selection process
           in order to prepare motions challenging jury selection. The right to
           inspect jury lists is essentially unqualified. Test v. United
           States, 420 U.S. 28, 30, 42 L. Ed. 2d 786, 95 S. Ct. 749 (1975) (per
           curiam); United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir.

   [24]   Where a motion to inspect is erroneously denied, however,
           reversal is not required. Instead, the case should normally be
           remanded to permit inspection. Test, 420 U.S. at 30; United States
           v. Beaty, 465 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1972). If inspection reveals
           grounds upon which to challenge the jury selection, a defendant may
           file a motion, such as for a new trial, under § 1867(a). Beaty, 465
           F.2d at 1382. Such motions must be made "within seven days after the
           defendant discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of
           diligence, the grounds therefor . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a). The
           court shall then grant the § 1867(a) motion if it determines that
           the jury selection procedure was prejudicial. Beaty, 465 F.2d at
[25]   Before trial, Studley requested a list of all grand and
        petit jurors. *fn4 The district court denied the request. After
        trial, Studley renewed the request, citing Test. The court granted
        inspection on November 11, 1984, but Studley has not subsequently
        moved for dismissal of the indictment or a new trial based on her

[26]   The government concedes that Studley's first request should
        have been granted. Nonetheless, we decline either to reverse or
        remand because Studley has received the benefit of the remedy under
        Test and Beaty. Studley has already had an opportunity to inspect to
        jury lists, but she failed to file the required § 1867(a) motion
        within seven days. Thus, Studley's attempt to challenge jury
        selection is not untimely.


[28]   Studley argues that the district court committed reversible
        error when it denied her continuance motion made on the opening day
        of trial. She claim she needed the extra time to secure legal
        assistance; therefore the denial infringed her sixth amendment right
        to counsel.

[29]   Generally, a decision to grant or deny a continuance is
        reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Flynt, 756
        F.2d 1352, 1358, modified on other grounds, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.
        1985). When the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel is
        implicated, however, a court must balance several factors to
        determine if the denial was "fair and reasonable." United States v.
        Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Among the
        factors are: whether the continuance would inconvenience witnesses,
        the court, counsel, or the parties; whether other continuances have
        been granted; whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay;
        whether the delay is the defendant's fault; and whether a denial
        would prejudice the defendant. Id. Thus, a continuance may be denied
        "even when that denial results in the defendant's being
        unrepresented at trial." Id.

[30]   Applying these factors to this case, we find no abuse of
        discretion. At her initial appearance, Studley asked to be
        represented by a person who was not a licensed attorney. At that
        time, the district court told her that she could elect to represent
        herself but that anyone else representing her in court must be
        licensed. The court later asked the Federal Public Defender to
        consult with her regarding appointment of counsel. The public
        defender determined that Studley did not quality for appointed
        counsel. Thereafter, based on Studley's representation that she
        would choose either to represent herself or to retain counsel, the
        court continued the matter for a week.
[ Well boys and girls, have you seen in these cases that the people who do NOT have a lawyer do better than those
who do? Why might that be?

Are not two heads better than one? If she had a cousin who was a public speaker who prepared taxes during the tax
season, would he not be a positive addition to represent her interests?

The defendant has the right to assistance of counsel. The Constitution of the united States of America which is
supposed to control OUTSIDE THE FEDERAL JURISDICTION as well as most state Constitutions provide for

Licensing does not insure knowledge of specific legal issues. This seems especially true in tax cases. Licensing
does not insure any level of ethics -- if it did, most lawsters would not qualify. And who put the "Slick" in "Slick
Willie"? A lawster! Licencing does insure a CONFLICT of interest. The first allegiance of the lawster is the
Bar. Then they are an officer of the court. Finally, if allowed, the client is in there somewhere.

Some courts (which are run by lawsters) have even concurred that defendants can choose whomever they want to
represent them. Here is a sampling:
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Virginia State Bar, 377 US 1, 7: "A state cannot, by involking
the power to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the
public to be fairly represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest. Laymen
cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with practised and careful adversaries, cf.,
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US 335, and for them to associate together to help one another to preserve and enforce
rights granted them under federal laws cannot be condemned as a threat to legal ethics."

Chandler v. Fretag, 348 US 3: "...his right to be heard through his own counsel is unqualified."

Johnson v. Avery, 393 US 483, 498: "The cooperation and help of laymen, as well as of lawyers, is necessary if the
right of reasonable access to the courts is to be available."

Mempha v. Rhay, 389 US 128: "The right to counsel exists not only at the trial thereof, but also at every stage of a
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected."

Burgett v. Texas, 389 US 109: "A conviction obtained where the accused is denied counsel is treated as void for all
purposes." ... "Lack of counsel of choice can be conceivably even worse than no counsel at all, or having to accept
counsel beholden to one's adversary."
QUESTION: If Mr. Matthies refuses to represent himself or accept a counsel beholden to his adversaries, is there
ANY POINT IN CONTINUING WITH THIS TRIAL? Why then has Judge Shanstrom told Mr. Matthies that he
has to have a professional lawster represent him or he has to do it himself? I heard this rumor that non-lawsters
because they have no allegiance to foreign powers and no respect for common criminals (like the Plaintiff) have
been extremely effective. But you would never know because the records in those cases seem to be sealed and
unpublished. I wonder why?

    [31]   The following week Studley again asked to be represented by
            unlicensed counsel, and the court again denied the request, though
            it permitted her to have an unlicensed assistant sit with her at

[ Well, isn't that special! Let me pose another basic question. Who would be the most aggressive counsel and bring
up issues that the Plaintiff DOES NOT WANT AIRED, the defendant or a representitive of their choice who has no
allegiance other than to the defendant? THAT'S WHY THE BAR DOESN'T WANT NON-LAWSTERS IN

    [32]   Studley then filed 31 motions and asked for another
            continuance, which the court granted. Trial was set for six weeks
            later. During this period, Studley apparently made no attempt to
            secure counsel on her own or to inform the court that she had
            changed her mind concerning self-representation at trial.

    [33]   On the morning of trial, more than three months after her
            arrest, Studley again requested a continuance on the grounds that
            she did not know the nature of the court's jurisdiction, that she
            needed counsel, and that complex issues remained unresolved. The
            district court denied the request, finding that the request had not
            been made in good faith, that the trial had already been continued
            several times, that the basis of the court's jurisdiction was clear
            and had been explained repeatedly, that the facts of the case were
            not complex, and that Studley would not have obtained counsel even
            had the continuance been granted. As in Leavitt, 608 F.2d at 1294,
            Studley knew of the need to get a licensed attorney for several
            months and had been granted previous continuance. Still, she failed
            to obtain counsel. Under these circumstances, the district court did
            not err in denying another continuance. It had already displayed
            admirable patience.

[ YES! Just like Judge Shandrom said, any person of ordinary intelligence could understand the charges (and a
plethora of other related details) because either Mr. Matties filed or he didn't! I can see the jury instructions now:
"I have a golf game and need to run by the Lodge. This should be real simple for you little sheeple. Either the
defendant filed or he didn't. So if you find he didn't file then he must have meant to do it and everybody knows he
is liable. So elect a foreperson, take a vote and get back in here quick! Don't waste time on frivolous issues. If he
didn't file, lets hang him high!"

    [34]   VI. RECUSAL

    [35]   Following her conviction, Studley filed a motion for recusal
            alleging personal bias and prejudice against her. In her affidavit
            supporting the motion, she alleged that Judge Schwartz (1) knew that
            Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents had perjured themselves, but
            did nothing; (2) had constantly deprived her of her "rights;" and
            (3) hated her without any cause. The district court denied the
            motion, and Studley objects. Denial of a motion for recusal is
            reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d
            605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984).

    [36]   We first note that a motion for recusal filed weeks after
            the conclusion of the trial is presumptively untimely absent a
            showing of good cause for its tardiness. See 28 U.S.C. § 144; cf.
            United States v. Hurd, 549 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
            curiam) (motion filed on fifth day of trial "much too late"). Even
            assuming timeliness, however, we find no merit in Studley's
            arguments on recusal.

    [37]   The standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 is
            "whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would
            conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
            questioned." Mayes, 729 F.2d at 607 (quoting United States v.
            Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983)); Ronwin v. State Bar of
           Arizona, 686 F.2d 692, 700-01 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
           grounds sub nom. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 80 L. Ed. 2d 590,
           104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984). The alleged prejudice must result from an
           extrajudicial source; a judge's prior adverse ruling is not
           sufficient cause for recusal. Mayes, 729 F.2d at 607.

   [38]   Studley's first two allegations are not extrajudicial
           because they involve the judge's performance which presiding over
           her case. See Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 701. Thus, these grounds do not
           provide a basis for recusal. The third allegation is too vague to
           meet the sufficiency requirement of Section 144. See 28 U.S.C. § 144
           (party must file timely affidavit setting forth facts and reasons
           for the belief that bias or prejudice exists). Moreover, the
           allegation would not lead a reasonable person to conclude that Judge
           Schwartz's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

   [39]   Following her trial, Studley filed a lawsuit against Judge
           Schwartz and engaged in leafletting activities directed against him.
           She argues here that these actions caused him to be "poisoned"
           against her and were grounds for recusal. A judge is not
           disqualified by a litigant's suit or threatened suit against him,
           Ronwin, 686 F.2d at 701, or by a litigant's intemperate and
           scurrilous attacks, United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933
           (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 954, 55 L. Ed. 2d 806, 98
           S. Ct. 1586 (1978); In re Martin-Trigona, 573 F. Supp. 1237, 1243
           (D. Conn. 1983), appeal dismissed, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985).
           Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
           motion for recusal. *fn5

   [40]   Finally, we reject Studley's argument that the Chief Judge
           or a committee of disinterested judges from the District was
           required to rule on this recusal motion. We have held repeatedly
           that the challenged judge himself should rule on the legal
           sufficiency of a recusal motion in the first instance. E.g., United
           States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
           440 U.S. 907, 99 S. Ct. 1213, 59 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1979). Here, the
           motion was properly found legally insufficient.

[ I love it. The 9th Circuit is on the HONOR SYSTEM! ]


   [42]   Studley argues she has been illegally subjected to criminal
           prosecution for violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, which she contends is
           a civil statute. She contends that Congress has no authority to
           establish criminal sanctions for failure to file income tax returns;
           and even if Congress had the authority, Studley argues, it has not
           been exercised. Finally, she argues that the entire Internal Revenue
           Code was only temporarily enacted and is now invalid.
[43]   These arguments are frivolous. *fn6 Section 7203 provides,
        inter alia, that anyone who willfully fails to file a return "shall
        . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." Thus, Section 7203 is a
        criminal statute, and Congress has exercised its power to enact such
        a statute. See United States v. Acker, 415 F.2d 328, 329 (6th Cir.
        1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003, 90 S. Ct. 553, 24 L. Ed. 2d 495
        (1970). The contention that Section 7203 is unconstitutional has
        been repeatedly rejected. E.g., Wheeler v. United States, 744 F.2d
        292, 293 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citing cases). We have also
        held that the Internal Revenue Code was validly enacted by the
        Congress and is fully enforceable. See Ryan v. Bilby, 764 F.2d 1325,
        1328 (9th Cir. 1985).


[45]   Studley contends that her fifth amendment rights were
        violated by the government's use of evidence obtained by civil
        process. In 1982, the government petitioned for enforcement of an
        IRS summons directed at Studley's accountants. Studley states that
        the IRS sent her a Miranda letter at the time, and that IRS special
        agent Anderson admitted at her criminal trial that his investigation
        had always been criminal, rather than civil. Anderson also testified
        that no recommendation for criminal prosecution had been made at the
        time of the investigation.

[46]   Generally, the district court's decision to admit evidence
        is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ordonez,
        737 F.2d 793, 811 (9th Cir. 1984). The court's findings of fact at a
        suppression hearing are reviewed for clear error. United States v.
        Snowadzki, 723 F.2d 1427, 1429 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
        839, 105 S. Ct. 140, 83 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1984).

[47]   Studley's contention that the IRS acted illegally is without
        merit. The facts of this case are nearly identical to those in Couch
        v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 34 L. Ed. 2d 548, 93 S. Ct. 611
        (1973). In Couch, the IRS sought enforcement of a civil summons
        directing Couch's accountant to produce all documents pertinent to
        Couch's tax liability. Id. at 323. See also In re Grand Jury
        Proceedings (Manges), 745 F.2d 1250, 1252 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court
        stated that "a special agent is authorized . . . to insure an
        Internal Revenue summons in aid of a tax investigation with civil
        and possible criminal consequences. . . . 'Congress clearly has
        authorized the use of the summons in investigating what may prove to
        be criminal conduct.'" Id. at 326 (quoting Donaldson v. United
        States, 400 U.S. 517, 535, 27 L. Ed. 2d 580, 91 S. Ct. 534 (1971))
        (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court noted that under
        Donaldson the summons must be issued in good faith and prior to
        recommendation of criminal prosecution. Couch, 409 U.S. at 326 n.8.

[48]   Here, there is no allegation that the IRS acted in bad
        faith. Under Couch, it is irrelevant that Anderson sought the
           records for criminal investigation so long as a recommendation of
           prosecution had not been made.

   [49]   Even if the evidence should have been suppressed, its
           admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the
           evidence was merely cumulative. See United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d
           886, 894 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047, 79 L. Ed. 2d
           182, 104 S. Ct. 720 (1984). The evidence consisted of a record of
           payments made to Studley on a loan. The record was used to show
           Studley's income in 1978 and 1979. Ample other evidence was admitted
           to show that Studley's gross income was greater than the statutory
           minimum that triggers the requirement to file a return.

   [50]   HOLDING(S)

   [51]   The conviction is AFFIRMED.

    Opinion Footnotes

   [52]   * The panel finds this case appropriate for submission
           without argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 9th Cir. R.

   [53]   *fn1 At trial, the government presented evidence that
           Studley had had gross income totaling about $144,000 for the three

[ Guilty by assumption again! ]

   [54]   *fn2 She also contends that her detention was illegal
           because she was incarcerated overnight before she was brought before
           a magistrate; she feels this was an unreasonable delay under Fed. R.
           Crim. P. 5(a). We need not reach this issue. Studley does not
           contend that evidence was seized incident to the arrest, that she
           was subjected to improper interrogation before arraignment or that
           she was otherwise prejudiced by the delay. Since the normal remedy
           for violation of Rule 5(a) is suppression of evidence obtained
           during the unreasonable delay, we need not decide whether Studley
           was in fact subjected to any delay that would constitute a Rule 5(a)
           violation. Cf. Morse v. United States, 256 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1958)
           (per curiam) (delay in taking an accused before a magistrate, though
           illegal, does not invalidate a conviction absent prejudice resulting
           from the detention).

   [55]   *fn3 We note that this argument has been consistently and
           thoroughly rejected by every branch of the government for decades.
           Indeed advancement of such utterly meritless arguments is now the
           basis for serious sanctions imposed on civil litigants who raise

[ Be careful what you ask them lawster fellers. They get mighty riled up if you ask the wrong thing. I heared one
old boy was fined $6,500 just for asking how to apply Section 83 in completing his tax return. ]

    [56]    *fn4 Since Studley was prosecuted by information, the
             reasons for her request regarding grand jurors is not immediately

    [57]    *fn5 We note that Judge Schwartz delayed sentencing two
             weeks to ensure that Studley's sentence would not be affected by any
             anger her actions may have engendered. Studley's sentence reflects
             the probation officer's recommendation and is less severe than the
             sentence requested by the government.

    [58]    *fn6 These claims have been considered many times before and
             have been rejected consistently. Thus, they would be grounds for
             sanctions if raised in a civil suit. See supra note 3.




    [2]     No. 92-30093

    [3]     2 F.3d 942

    [4]     May 14, 1993


    [6]     Appeal from the United States District Court for the
             District of Montana. D.C. No. CR 91-43-BLG-JDS. Jack D. Shanstrom,
             District Judge, Presiding.

[ Look, it's the same Judge Mr. Matthies got! ]

    [7]     Lavon T. Hanson, pro se, Littleton, Colorado, for the

[ Look, it's another Pro Se! ]

    [8]    Klaus P. Richter, Assistant United States Attorney,
            Billings, Montana, for the plaintiff-appellee.

[ Look, it's the same Prostituter Mr. Matthies got! ]

     [9]   Before: William C. Canby, Jr., and Stephen Reinhardt,
            Circuit Judges, and A. Wallace Tashima, District Judge.**

    [10]   Opinion by District Judge Tashima.

    [11]   The opinion of the court was delivered by: Tashima


    [13]   Defendant-Appellant Lavon T. Hanson appeals his conviction
            for making false statements in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), and
            attempting to interfere with the administration of the Internal
            Revenue Service ("IRS") in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). As
            grounds for his appeal, Hanson argues that (1) the district court
            lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the evidence presented at
            trial was insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the district
            court applied the wrong Sentencing Guideline; and (4) the district
            judge was biased and prejudiced against him. The district court had
            jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28
            U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the conviction and reverse the sentence.

    [14]   I.

    [15]   The charges stem from Hanson's filing false IRS forms that
            reported payments Hanson had never made and claimed a tax refund
            Hanson was not due. Hanson filed, for the year 1989, forms 1096 and
            1099 information returns stating that he had received $46,996,669.41
            in non-employee compensation from three Farmers Home Administration
            ("FHA") employees. Since he had intended to report having paid that
            amount to the FHA employees rather than having received it, he later
            filed a corrected form 1096 stating that he had not received any
            payment. He subsequently filed a third set of 1096 and 1099 forms
            declaring that he had paid the three FHA officials $46,996,669.41.
            Hanson reported payments of $31,331,112.94 to two other FHA
            employees on forms 1096 and 1099 for 1990. None of the purported
            payments was ever made.
[ Yup! That sounds xackly like that Matthies feller to me! ]

    [16]   Hanson also filed a 1989 Form 1040 tax return falsely
            claiming a refund of $33,837,602 generated by income and
            withholdings of $46,996,669.44. He was neither paid nor owed the
            reported amounts.

[ Well at least the guy thought big! ]

    [17]   Hanson was charged with four counts of making false
            statements and one count of attempting to interfere with the
            administration of the IRS. At trial, Hanson represented himself. The
            jury convicted him on all five counts. He was sentenced to 12 months
            in prison with one year of supervised release.

    [18]   II.

    [19]   Hanson challenges the district court's exercise of
            jurisdiction over him on the ground he is a nonresident alien exempt
            from the tax laws. We review a question of jurisdiction de novo.
            United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 1986).

    [20]   It is firmly established that district courts have subject
             matter jurisdiction over prosecutions for violations of the tax
             laws. "Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have
             exclusive original jurisdiction over 'all offenses against the laws
             of the United States.' These offenses include crimes defined in
             Title 26 of United States Code." United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d
             934 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).

[ Yes they have jurisdiction over the laws of the united States but those laws have to apply to the individual in
question. There can be no argument that this individual made false statements to a united States agency with intent
to defraud and therefore volunteered for jurisdiction. This is not the case with Mr. Matthies. If the Prostituter
would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS, the lack of jurisdiction in the Matthies case would be apparent. Of
course the Prostituter and the Judge could never allow that because if they did, it would serve as a precident for
others. Of course this never happens because wins in cases like this are ALMOST NEVER PUBLISHED. Isn't
that special -- they flaunt their wins and hide their losses under color of law! ]

    [21]   Hanson claims that as a natural born citizen of Montana he
            is a nonresident alien and, thus, is not a "taxpayer" as defined in
            the tax code. Accordingly, he contends that he is not subject to the
            tax laws. In Studley, we rejected a similar argument as "utterly
            meritless," holding that "an individual is a 'person' under the
            Internal Revenue Code and thus subject to [Title 26]." Id. at 937 &
            n.3. Thus, Hanson is subject to the provisions of the tax code and
            the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was proper.

[ Wrong issues, weak arguments. ]

    [22]   III.
[23]   Hanson contends the evidence was insufficient to support his
        convictions. In reviewing this claim, we consider the evidence in
        the light most favorable to the government to determine if any
        rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
        the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Adler, 879
        F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1988).

[24]   The government correctly notes that Hanson failed to
        preserve this issue on appeal because he did not move for a judgment
        of acquittal at trial. United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 893
        (9th Cir. 1991). This court may review the sufficiency of the
        evidence only to prevent a "'manifest miscarriage of justice.'" Id.
        (citation omitted). Nevertheless, even if Hanson had preserved the
        issue, we find the evidence was sufficient to support the
        convictions under both 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) and 7212(a).

[25]   A. 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)

[26]   To prove a violation of § 7206(1), making false statements,
        the government must prove that the defendant (1) filed a return,
        statement, or other document that was false as to a material matter;
        (2) signed the return, statement or other document under penalty of
        perjury; (3) did not believe the return, statement or other document
        was true as to every material matter; and (4) willfully subscribed
        to the false return with the specific intent to violate the law.
        United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 350, 36 L. Ed. 2d 941, 93 S.
        Ct. 2008 (1973); United States v. Marabelles, 724 F.2d 1374, 1380
        (9th Cir. 1984).

[27]   At trial, Hanson admitted to signing the false returns under
        penalty of perjury. He conceded that the amounts he reported on his
        1989 1040 form were incorrect. With respect to the falsity of the
        forms 1096 and 1099, the five FHA officials Hanson reported having
        made payments to testified that they never received the purported
        payments. Payment amounts reported on forms 1096 and 1099 and refund
        amounts claimed on a tax return are clearly material. Thus, the
        evidence supported the first two elements of the false statements

[28]   Hanson's assertion that the 1040 form and the 1096 and 1099
        forms were not "filed" because they were never fully processed by
        the IRS is meritless. Evidence was presented that Hanson personally
        mailed the forms and that the IRS received them. A return is "filed"
        at the time it is delivered to the IRS. Emmons v. Commissioner, 898
        F.2d 50, 51 (5th Cir. 1990); First Charter Fin. Corp. v. United
        States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1982). *fn1

[29]   Hanson contends that the government failed to prove that he
        knew the returns were not true as to every material matter and that
        he willfully intended to violate the law. However, Hanson's own
        testimony supported a finding that these elements of the offense
        were satisfied. First, Hanson admitted that his filing of false
        returns was motivated by his belief that the FHA officials were
        double agents for the United States and the United Nations and were
        being used to overthrow the United States government. He hoped
        filing the false forms "would bring forth an investigation. The
        government itself would be forced to come in and investigate, and
        all of these claims then would have to be brought forward and we
        could stop this overthrow . . ." Second, Hanson testified that he
        arrived at the payment amounts he reported by adding together the
        fines specified in Title 18 for the offenses he believed the FHA
        officials had committed. A rational juror could have inferred from
        this testimony that Hanson did not believe the payment amounts he
        reported were true and that he intended to initiate an IRS
        investigation of the FHA officials.

[30]   Hanson further contends that his subjective good faith
        belief that as a nonresident alien he was exempt from the tax laws
        precludes a finding that he intended to violate the law. He relies
        on Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 112 L. Ed. 2d 617, 111 S.
        Ct. 604 (1991), for the proposition that a good faith
        misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that one is not
        violating the law negates willfulness, regardless of whether the
        claimed belief is objectively reasonable. However, Hanson's actions
        in filing false tax documents as a form of harassment are not
        excused by a belief that he was not subject to tax himself. In
        addition, his testimony was such that the jury could properly find
        that his actions were the result of his disagreement with the tax
        laws, or his belief in their invalidity, rather than his good faith
        belief that those laws did not apply to him. Cheek makes clear that
        a defendant's views as to the unconstitutionality or invalidity of
        the tax laws is irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. The jury was
        properly instructed according to Cheek, and the evidence was
        sufficient to permit it to find that Hanson had the necessary guilty

[31]   The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most
        favorable to the government, supported a finding beyond a reasonable
        doubt that Hanson willfully filed returns he knew were materially
        false with the intent to violate the law. Accordingly, we affirm
        Hanson's conviction under § 7206(1).

[32]   B. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a)

[33]   To prove a violation of § 7212(a), attempting to interfere
        with the administration of the IRS, the government must prove (1)
        corruption, force, or threat of force, and (2) an attempt to
        obstruct the administration of the IRS. The evidence presented at
        trial clearly supports the second element of the offense. The
        government offered testimony that the IRS expended a large amount of
        time discovering and remedying the problems caused by Hanson's
        filing false forms.

[34]   With respect to the first element of the offense, the
        government charged Hanson with "corruptly" attempting to interfere
        with the administration of the IRS. An act is "corrupt" within the
        meaning of section 7212(a) if it is performed with the intention to
        secure an unlawful benefit for oneself or for another. United States
        v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 998-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
        834, 88 L. Ed. 2d 87, 106 S. Ct. 107 (1985); United States v.
        Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 118 L. Ed. 2d
        423, 112 S. Ct. 1760 (1992); United States v. Yagow, 953 F.2d 423
        (8th Cir. 1992). Mere evidence of an improper motive or bad or evil
        purpose is insufficient to prove corruption. nited States v. Kuball,
        976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992), we affirmed a conviction under §
        7212(a), where the defendant's conduct was factually very similar to
        Hanson's. As in the instant case, the defendant had filed false 1096
        and 1099 forms claiming substantial payments to individuals and had
        filed a false 1040 form claiming a refund that was not due. We found
        the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction because the
        defendant had testified that he intended for his conduct to have an
        effect on the individuals he claimed having made payments to and
        because by filing the false 1040 form the defendant had "hoped to
        benefit financially by obtaining a substantial tax refund." Id. at

[35]   Similarly, in the instant case, Hanson's 1989 tax return
        falsely claimed a refund of $33,837,602. This attempt to secure an
        unlawful benefit for himself satisfies the corruption requirement.
        Moreover, Hanson testified that he intended for his conduct to spark
        an IRS investigation of the FHA officials. "Section 7212(a) is aimed
        at prohibiting efforts to impede 'the collection of one's taxes, the
        taxes of another, or the auditing of one's or another's tax
        records.'" Id. (quoting Reeves, 752 F.2d at 998). Considering the
        evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude
        that the jury could reasonably have found that Hanson's conduct
        violated § 7212(a).

[36]   IV.

[37]   Hanson further contends that the district court erred in
        applying United States Sentencing Guideline ("U.S.S.G.") § 2T1.9,
        Conspiracy to Impair, Impede or Defeat Tax, as the applicable
        guideline for his conviction of attempting to interfere with the
        administration of the IRS in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
        Hanson argues that the application of this guideline was improper
        because the government neither charged him with involvement in a
        conspiracy nor presented evidence of any such participation.

[38]   The statutory index to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G.
        Appendix A, specifies that § 2A2.2, Aggravated Assault, and § 2A2.3,
        Minor Assault, are the guidelines ordinarily applied to a violation
        of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). However, the introduction to the statutory
        index instructs that:

[39]   If, in an atypical case, the guideline section indicated for
         the statute of conviction is inappropriate because of the particular
         conduct involved, use the guideline section most applicable to the
         nature of the offense conduct charged in the count of which the
         defendant was convicted.

[40]   U.S.S.G. App. A.

[41]   In the instant case, Hanson was convicted of corruptly
        endeavoring to impair or impede the administration of the tax laws
        by filing a false return seeking a refund and filing various false
        1096 and 1099 forms. No evidence suggests that Hanson ever assaulted
        anyone in attempting to defraud the IRS. Accordingly, the district
        court correctly determined that the assault guidelines specified in
        the index were inapplicable to the instant case. See United States
        v. Shriver, 967 F.2d 572, 574 (11th Cir. 1992) (upholding district
        court's decision not to apply assault guideline to conviction under
        26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) where no evidence of assault).

[42]   We disagree, however, with the district court's finding that
        § 2T1.9, Conspiracy to Impair, Impede or Defeat Tax, is the
        guideline most analogous to Hanson's conduct. Whether a particular
        guideline applies to a specific set of facts is a question of law
        reviewed de novo. See Shriver, supra. The evidence demonstrates that
        Hanson acted alone. Consequently, the district court's analogy to a
        conspiracy is flawed and unduly distorts the guideline range.

[43]   We conclude that § 2T1.5, Fraudulent Returns, Statements, or
        Other Documents, more closely fits Hanson's conduct. Applying this
        section, the appropriate guideline range is zero to six months,
        rather than six to twelve months.

[44]   V.

[45]   Finally, Hanson contends the district judge was biased and
        prejudiced against him. We find absolutely no support for this
        assertion in the record.

[46]   While we agree that the district judge erred by applying the
        conspiracy guideline, this error falls far short of suggesting
        partiality. Similarly without merit is Hanson's claim that the judge
        exhibited bias and prejudice by not admitting into evidence
        documents to support Hanson's belief that he was exempt from the tax
        laws. The judge permitted Hanson to testify about his beliefs and
        research and excluded only the underlying documents. Thus, Hanson's
              claim that the district judge was biased and prejudiced against him
              is unsubstantiated by the record.

    [47]    The judgment is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and

    [48]    ORDER

    [49]    The Memorandum disposition filed May 14, 1993, is
             redesignated as an authored opinion by Judge Tashima.

     Opinion Footnotes

    [50]    * March 4, 1993, Submitted, Seattle, WA; The panel
             unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral
             argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule


    [52]    ** The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, United States District
             Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by

    [53]    *fn1 Similarly unpersuasive is Hanson's claim that his
             filing of corrected forms to "zero out" the previously submitted
             false forms cancelled out any potential harm. Hanson's later filing
             of corrected forms is immaterial. "The fact that a fraudulent filer
             subsequently submits an amended return does not make the case any
             less one of a false or fraudulent return." Badaracco v. Commissioner
             of IRS, 464 U.S. 386, 78 L. Ed. 2d 549, 104 S. Ct. 756 (1984).

    [54]    *fn2 Since briefing was completed in this case, Hanson has
             filed a number of "affidavits." To the extent that these can be
             construed as motions seeking relief from this court, the motions are

[ Another case that proves that the Matthies motions were without merit -- NOT! ]



  [2]    No. 80-1250

  [3]    633 F.2d 1356

  [4]    December 17, 1980


  [6]    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central
          District of California.

  [7]    John E. Buras, in pro. per. [ Do you think that these defendants which are
            pro se or pro per did not WANT an attorney or could not afford one. From
            the IRS hearings we learned that the IRS likes to pick on people who can not
            afford to defend themselves. ]

  [8]    John W. Spiegel, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for
           plaintiff-appellee; Andrea Sheridan Ordin, U. S. Atty., Los Angeles,
           Cal., on brief.

  [9]    Before Wallace and Alarcon, Circuit Judges, and Copple,*
          District Judge.

  [10]   The opinion of the court was delivered by: Copple

  [11]   John E. Buras appeals his conviction on four counts of
          willful failure to file an income tax return in violation of I.R.C.
          § 7203.

  [12]   The defendant is a free-lance truck driver for various film
          studios in the Los Angeles area. For eight years preceding 1974,
          Buras filed income tax returns listing his wages as income. During
          this period, tax was withheld from his paychecks. After concluding
          that he was not obligated under the tax laws to report his wages as
          income, Buras did not file tax returns for the years 1974 through
          1977. Although he earned between $11,000 and $21,000 per year during
             this period, Buras filed withholding exemption certificates (Form
             W-4E) so that no tax would be withheld from his paychecks. Buras was
             indicted on four counts of willful failure to file income tax
             returns. See I.R.C. § 7203.

[ Notice that there is no mention of how liability was established or income was derived. It was all just
ASSUMED. Are you now starting to get what I mean by CONVICTION BY ASSUMPTION? ]

    [13]    Buras filed two pretrial motions which are subjects of this
             appeal: (1) a motion for a judicial hearing to determine whether
             wages are income and (2) a motion for discovery of an informant.
             Both motions were denied by the district court.

[ Whether wages are income is not the issue! You can actually lose on that one. The question is whether the
FRNs the defendant earns from driving a truck are income as defined at the time of the alleged passage of the so
called 16th Amendment. The wrong issue was raised and the criminals (Individuals Representing Satan) took
advantage of it.

Briefly, here are the facts (the Big Demand for Bill of Particulars) has dozens of details about this issue). Income
is gain. Gain is the excess of gross receipts over profits. There is no gain from labor. It is merely an
exchange. With regard to federal employees, they are being taxed on the privilege of working for the federal

The 1939 Act was titled the "Public Salary Tax Act". It was a tax on government salaries. In 1942 an emergency
tax was placed on all citizens. This was repealed in 1944. Many people, however, continued to volunteer. In
1954, the 1939 act was revised but the definition of income remained essentially the same. In 1986, the Act was
revised again but it incorporated the 1954 Code. The definition of income for tax purposes has remained essentially
the same since 1939!

Congress can tax citizens of the 50 states engaged in federally "privileged activities" which give rise to a "revenue
taxable event." That's why the IRS fraudulently codes Americans with engaging in distribution of narcotics,
importing liquor, manufacturing firearms, etc. in order to get the IRS computers to even print out
Notices. Interestingly, no "CP" letter (e.g. Notice of Failure To File, etc.) with a number with three digits is for
individuals! Mr. Matthies is coded as being a BUSINESS on his internal IRS files! We have not yet been able to
get documents from the IRS which will show us what business he is engaged in (alcohol, tobacco, firearms, etc.). ]

     [14]    At trial, Buras stipulated that during the period in
             question he earned wages of approximately $11,000 to $21,000 per
             year-well above the amount of gross income which would obligate an
             individual to file a return. The defendant also conceded that he did
             not file income tax returns during that period. *fn1

[ Well gee whiz, Vern, why did he not just ask for a visit to Club Fed. Here the defendant ADMITS that he earned
wages (which he DID NOT), admits that "$" in front of a number represents something real (which it DOES NOT),
and admits that he had substantial "gross income" (which he DID NOT). It is abundantly clear that this defendant
DID NOT understand the charges against him. If the Prostituter in the Matthies case would JUST ANSWER THE
QUESTIONS in the Bill of Particulars, it would show that the government does NOT have a case. It would also
expose the fraud. ]

    [15]    Thus, the only disputed element under I.R.C. § 7203 was
             whether Buras' failure to file was willful. To show willfulness, the
             government offered evidence (1) that the defendant had filed tax
             returns for eight years prior to 1974, (2) that Buras had
             substantial amounts of income withheld from his paychecks prior to
            1974, and (3) testimony from one of Buras' neighbors that Buras had
            told her that "he wasn't paying income tax because he thought the
            government ... did things to him."

[ Let's deal with these one at a time.

1.What difference does it make that defendant had filed tax returns in previous years. Probably 90% of the 35
MILLION current non-filers have filed in previous years. Just because you were once a sheeple does not mean that
you can not awaken to the truth. 2.What difference does it make that defendant had money stolen from his pay in
previous years. Probably 90% of the 35 MILLION current non-filers have been victims of theft of their pay in the
past. 3.Notice the quoted words above very carefully. You will see DIFFERENT WORDS in this same
document! If Mr. Buras actually said something like this, he either knew of a real plot or needed mental
help. Neither of these is criminal. ]

    [16]   After the government rested, Buras testified on direct that
            he did not believe that his wages constituted income under the
            Internal Revenue Code. Under Buras' theory, only profit or gain,
            such as that from the sale of a capital asset, constituted income
            subject to federal tax. *fn2 Wages could not constitute gain or
            profit because wages merely represent an equivalent exchange for
            one's labor. In addition, the defendant submitted IRS reports and
            estimates of defendant's income and tax liability for the years
            charged in the indictment as well as a copy of a letter Buras had
            sent to the IRS explaining why he recognized no obligation to file
            tax returns.

[ The defendant was basically correct in his assertions. However, he had already shot himself in the foot by this
time. However, it will get worse! ]

    [17]   On cross-examination, Buras admitted that this letter was
            written and provided to him by Arthur J. Porth. *fn3 After
            testifying that he had been acquainted with Porth since 1974 and had
            discussed the contents of the letter with him, Buras was asked
            whether Porth had ever told him that Porth had been convicted for
            failing to file income tax returns. The trial court sustained an
            objection to this question and instructed the jury to "disregard the
            question and any implications from the question." By implication,
            the court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial.

[ Again, what difference does it make who helped him write the letter? Lawsters are good at writing letters. Truck
drivers often are not. The most important point here is this: Was Mr. Porth wrong and did Mr. Buras know he was
wrong OR was Mr. Porth RIGHT and just got a free ride on the Club Fed Railroad? If a person is wrongly
convicted of a crime and continues to maintain the same CORRECT beliefs which led to his conviction, is this an
indictment of the person or of the system?

If you buy into the government's arguments, you should be a good little sheeple and pay the extortion. They are
proud to show dozens of examples of people who have been found guilty of willful failure to file through their
deception, intimidation, blatant fraud and "word art".    The problem is that 95% of these convictions are WRONG
because the defendant never was liable for the tax -- it was just ASSUMED that he was! ]

    [18]   Buras was also questioned on cross-examination concerning a
            profit he had made from the sale of his house during the time period
            charged in the indictment. He realized approximately a $20,000
            profit from the sale and spent the proceeds. Although he admitted
            that this gain was subject to tax under his theory, Buras testified
            that he did not report this income because he believed he had no
            such obligation so long as he intended to reinvest the proceeds in
            another home. The court overruled defense objections that this line
            of questioning delved into areas that were irrelevant to the crime
            charged in the indictment.

[ The defendant is weak here. His willfulness is in doubt. However, the defendant is WRONG that these gains are
taxable. The IRS has no jurisdiction or authority to tax this gain in the 50 states. So even if his willfulness is in
question, his liability is not and he should have been found not guilty. However, NO ONE raised the issue of
jurisdiction. Again, these questions are raised in the Matthies Bill of Particulars if the Prostituter would JUST

    [19]   After the defense rested, the trial court denied the
            defendant's motion for acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a) and
            refused two instructions offered by the defendant. The jury returned
            a verdict of guilty on all four counts.

[ I am sure that the learned legal scholars who wrote this understand how critical the use of words is. I would be
sure that if a FAIR trial and a FAIR set of jury instructions were given, only about 1% of all indictments under 7203
would be validated by a guilty verdict because only 1% were ever liable in the first place! ]

    [20]   Sufficiency of the Evidence

    [21]   Buras contends that the court below erred in denying his
            motion for acquittal because the government presented insufficient
            evidence on the issue of willfulness.

    [22]   A failure to file an income tax return does not violate
            I.R.C. § 7203 if the failure resulted from a good faith
            misunderstanding of the law. United States v. Matosky, 421 F.2d 410,
            413 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 398 U.S. 904, 90 S. Ct. 1691, 26 L. Ed.
            2d 62 (1970). See United States v. Ross, 626 F.2d 77, 80 n.1 (9th
            Cir. 1980).

    [23]   Since the defendant did not move for acquittal until after
            the appellant had presented his defense, this court must consider
            all of the evidence that the jury had before it. See United States
            v. Figueroa-Paz, 468 F.2d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir. 1972). Evidence is
            sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
            "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
            of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443
            U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See
            United States v. Kipp, 624 F.2d 84, 84 (9th Cir. 1980).

    [24]   The evidence demonstrated that Buras had filed returns
            between 1966 and 1973, thus indicating an awareness of his legal
            obligation to file. United States v. Ross, 626 F.2d at 79. A similar
            pattern was established with regard to withholding. Prior to 1974,
            Buras had his taxes withheld from his paychecks. During and after
            1974, he submitted withholding exemption certificates. A neighbor
            testified that Buras had explained to her that he did not pay income
            tax because he thought the "government ... did things against him."
            Moreover, Buras testified that he did not report the gain he
            realized from the sale of his house, thereby casting doubt on Buras'
            sincerity. Finally, Buras was aware of treasury regulations that
            defined wages as income.

[ As stated earlier, the first sentence above is garbage.   All that shows is that the defendant had one set of beliefs
before 1974 and one set after 1974.

Now we come to the second instance of the quote.       The previous one said "the government ... did things to him."

Third we have the defendant saying that he was aware of treasury regulations. See [40] below for a discussion of
this. ]

    [25]   Considering this evidence, it would certainly be reasonable
            for a jury to conclude that Buras was aware of his legal obligation
            to file returns, and that his failure to file did not result from a
            good faith misunderstanding of the law.

[ Yes, a jury could conclude that, but they are using the WRONG ASSUMPTIONS. He had no legal obligation to
file returns. What he thought, given this, is irrelevant. ]

    [26]   The Pretrial Motions

    [27]   The defendant appeals from the district court's denial of
            his motion to discover the identity of an informant who had told the
            IRS that Buras had not filed tax returns. The court found that the
            informant was merely a "tipster". Buras argues that the informant
            might have been able to provide information regarding whether Buras'
            failure was willful or in good faith. Such unfounded suspicion or
            conjecture falls short of the showing of materiality required by
            Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d
            639 (1957). The appellant has not made any showing that disclosure
            of the informant's identity or of the contents of his communication
            would be relevant or helpful to the defense or essential to a fair
            determination of the case. This is not a case where the informant
            was a witness to the crime. See United States v. Kelly, 449 F.2d
            329, 330 (9th Cir. 1971). Neither is this a case where the informant
            must have participated in the crime. See Simpson v. Kreiger, 565
            F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 435 U.S. 946, 98 S. Ct.
            1531, 55 L. Ed. 2d 544 (1978). Although the informant's tip
            precipitated the investigation that led to Buras' arrest, that fact
            alone is insufficient to compel disclosure of the informant. See id.
            at 391.

    [28]   Buras also contends that the district court erred in failing
            to hold a hearing on the issue of whether wages constitute income.
            Since this issue is purely a legal one and since the court fully
            considered Buras' written arguments, the district court acted well
        within its discretion in denying defendant's request for a hearing.

[29]   Jury Instructions

[30]   Buras contends that the district court erred in refusing to
        instruct the jury that the government could avail itself of the
        civil remedy of assessing Buras' taxes without filing criminal
        charges. See I.R.C. § 6020(b). Because the availability of a civil
        remedy is irrelevant to the issue of criminal liability, the court
        correctly refused to give such an instruction. See United States v.
        Merrick, 464 F.2d 1087, 1093 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 409 U.S.
        1023, 93 S. Ct. 462, 34 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1972). Such an instruction
        would serve only to confuse the jury.

[31]   The appellant asserts that the district court erred in
        refusing to give his proposed instruction on willfulness. The court,
        however, did give an alternative instruction that covered the
        substance of Buras' proposed instruction. A defendant has no right
        to have the jury instructed in the precise language he may desire.
        United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied
        436 U.S. 911, 98 S. Ct. 2249, 56 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1978). The district
        court did not err in refusing Buras' proposed instruction.

[32]   Prosecutorial Misconduct

[33]   Buras contends that the trial court erred in not declaring a
        mistrial following improper questioning of Buras on
        cross-examination. After Buras admitted that Porth had provided him
        the letter Buras had sent to the IRS, Buras was asked whether Porth
        had ever told him that Porth had been convicted for his failure to
        file tax returns. Although the court sustained the defendant's
        objection and instructed the jury to disregard it, Buras argues that
        the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial.

[34]   The question was clearly relevant to the question of whether
        Buras' failure to file resulted from a good faith misunderstanding
        of the law. Lack of good faith would be indicated if the defendant
        were aware that the very person whose arguments he adopted to show
        that he did not have an obligation to file had been found criminally
        liable for failing to file a return. See United States v. Ross, 626
        F.2d at 78. Apparently, the court did not permit the question
        because the government was unable to show that Porth had been
        convicted well before Buras had submitted Porth's letter. *fn4 In
        any event, the curative instructions given immediately after the
        objection was sustained and again at the close of the trial
        eliminated any danger that the jury might be prejudiced against
        Buras because of his association with a lawbreaker.

[35]   Extent of Cross Examination
    [36]   Buras argues that it was improper for the government to
            question the defendant on cross examination about the gain he
            realized from the sale of his house. It is argued that the
            introduction of this evidence improperly broadened the scope of the
            indictment to include offenses not charged.

    [37]   This evidence was clearly relevant to the issue of Buras'
            good faith in believing that he had no obligation to file a return.
            Under Buras' theory, he had no obligation to file a return because
            wages are not income. Buras construes income as constituting only
            gain or profit. Whether or not Buras reported the gain from the sale
            of his house is relevant to whether Buras held his theory in good
            faith. This evidence is probative as to the sincerity of the
            defendant's beliefs. Considering that this evidence was clearly
            relevant to Buras' intent, it was not an abuse of discretion for the
            trial court to admit this evidence for that purpose. See United
            States v. Watkins, 600 F.2d 201, 205 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied
            444 U.S. 871, 100 S. Ct. 148, 62 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1980).

    [38]   The Definition of Income

    [39]   Buras contends that the district court erroneously
            instructed the jury that wages constitute income. In addition to
            arguing that only gain or profit can constitute income, Buras argues
            that the income tax is essentially an excise tax. He argues that he
            can be subject to an excise tax only if he benefits from "any sort
            of privilege extended by a government agency." Since he is only a
            wage earner, he argues that he cannot be subject to an excise tax.

[ The court never allowed the jury to know the definition of "wages", "employer" or "employee" as defined 26 USC
or the definition of "income" as defined prior to the 16th amendment. The court was correct that IRC defined
"wages" earned by an IRC defined "employee" working for an IRC defined "employer" constitute IRC "income" for
IRC tax purposes. However, the defendant was not an "employee", and did not earn "wages" per the definition and
was not subject to the IRC in the first place. ]

    [40]   Treas.Reg. § 1.61-2(a)(1) clearly includes wages within the
            definition of income. Buras, however, argues that this regulation is
            invalid because it is inconsistent with the constitutional
            definition of income. According to Buras, income must be derived
            from some source. Wages cannot be taxed because the wage earner
            enjoys no gain from that source. Since the wage earner exchanges his
            labor and personal time for its equivalent in money, he derives no
            gain and therefore cannot be taxed.

[ This MAY BE true for those under it's jurisdiction. However, it is not true when you look at other sections of the
code which say income is DERIVED FROM wages, etc. such as Section 861. ]

    [41]   Appellant's argument is refuted by one of the cases he
            cites. In Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399,
            415, 34 S. Ct. 136, 140, 58 L. Ed. 285 (1913), the Court did define
            income as gain derived from labor. The Court went on to explain,
            however, that "the earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided
            by capital" are commonly treated as income. Id.

[ Well isn't that special! Now we are talking about the way words are "commonly treated". We have 11,000 pages
of code and regulations alone and the definition of income which goes to the heart of the matter is defined with a
"common" use treatment? Give me a break!

The regulations are superceded by the code. It certainly doesn't say wages are income in the code.

Since we are dealing with non-positive law, the code is superceded by the statutes at large. I would highly doubt
that the underlying statutes say that wages are income.

The statutes are superceded by the Constitution. And I can guarantee you that the definition of "income" as it
existed, not "commonly treated" as it may be today, but treated and interpreted by the Supreme Court in DOZENS
OF CASES, does not hold that wages constitute income.

Just for clarification, court cases are at the BOTTOM of the food chain! ]

    [42]   As for Buras' argument that he may not be taxed because he
            is a wage earner, the Sixteenth Amendment is broad enough to grant
            Congress the power to collect an income tax regardless of the source
            of the taxpayer's income. United States v. Russell, 585 F.2d 368,
            370 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1220
            (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 431 U.S. 919, 97 S. Ct. 2185, 53 L.
            Ed. 2d 230 (1977).

[ See how they always state a truth and make it sound like it makes a point which it does not? Let us assume that
the 16th Amendment really was ratified (there have been court cases and one major book which found that it
not). The 16th Amendment is broad enough to collect taxes on income regardless of the source. HOWEVER:

1.The tax has to be on "income" as defined when the 16th Amendment was supposedly ratified. 2.Second, it has to
be "income" from a source which is defined specifically in the law. You can not define wages as income. Wages
may be a source of income just like a well may be a source of water but a well is not water! Get it?! 3.The wages of
a federal employee can be taxed because they are covered under the jurisdiction of the federal zone and are not
subject to any restraints of the Constitution. That's why a Supreme Court case held that the 16th Amendment
conferred NO NEW POWERS on Congress. If it conveyed no new powers, and the prohibition against direct taxes
was not repealed, then the tax could not be direct if applied to citizens of the 50 states and be constitutional. If it is
an excise tax, it would not meet the necessary requirements to be structured as it is. It would have to be levied on
"revenue taxable activities". 4.Congress has to specifically tax a source of income. If the 16th Amendment gave
any power to lay a tax on income, it did not automatically cause all incomes to be taxed. As we know, there are
numerous exemptions from taxable income. Congress had to specifically define the sources of income which could
be taxed. Congress did so define both sources of income and items of income. The money earned for the ordinary
American is not an item of income from a taxed source of income. ]

    [43]   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    [44]   Finally, Buras argues that he was prejudiced by ineffective
            assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to argue Buras'
            theories at trial. Counsel was involved in at least some of Buras'
            pretrial motions arguing that wages do not constitute income.
            Considering the district court's disposition on these motions, it
              would have been inappropriate for counsel to have argued Buras'
              theories at trial, except to the extent that they indicate that
              Buras' failure to file resulted from a good faith misunderstanding
              of the law. Both during the trial and closing argument, counsel
              sought to demonstrate that Buras' sincerity in his beliefs and his
              openness regarding his theories precluded a finding of willfulness.
              Merely because the district court refused to accept Buras' theories
              as the correct interpretation of the Sixteenth Amendment is hardly
              an indication that counsel was ineffective.

[ How about the fact that the "theories" may have combined with other material presented to let the jury know that
the defendant had no liability. This would probably not have occurred as a practical matter, however, because the
defendant apparently was not sufficiently educated in the facts and the lawster was not about to violate his oath to
the Bar and duty to the court by helping him out EVEN IF the lawster himself even knew the facts. ]

    [45]    The judgment is AFFIRMED.

[ Either the appeal court judges don't know better or they were part of the conspiracy. It's hard to tell which most of
the time. ]

              Opinion Footnotes

    [46]    * Honorable William P. Copple, United States District Judge
             for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.

    [47]    *fn1 The government also introduced evidence on this point.

    [48]    *fn2 Under Buras' theory, interest and dividends would also
             be subject to the income tax.

    [49]    *fn3 Porth has been convicted under I.R.C. § 7203 for
             willful failure to file tax returns. United States v. Porth, 426
             F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 824, 91 S. Ct. 47, 27 L.
             Ed. 2d 53 (1970).

[ So What! ]

    [50]    *fn4 As it turns out, Porth's conviction was affirmed by the
             Tenth Circuit in 1970, more than six years before Buras submitted
             Porth's letter. See United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th
             Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 824, 91 S. Ct. 47, 27 L. Ed. 2d 53

[ So What! ]



    [2]    No. 76-2192

    [3]    549 F.2d 118

    [4]    January 12, 1977


    [6]    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
            District of Washington.

    [7]    Gerald S. Hurd, Pro Se, (argued) of Everett, Washington, for

[ Here is another Pro Se case! Why do you think that is? ]

    [8]    Jerald E. Olson, Ausa, (argued) of Seattle, Washington, for

    [9]    Wright and Goodwin, Circuit Judges, and Ingram,* District

    [10]   The opinion of the court was delivered by: Per Curiam

    [11]   A jury found the defendant guilty on two counts of failing
            to file income tax returns [26 U.S.C. § 7203 (Supp. 1976)]. At trial
            he chose to represent himself and had the assistance of a
            court-appointed legal advisor. He appears pro se in this appeal.

[ I am sure that the court-appointed legal advisor was extremely helpful -- not!]

    [12]   During the years in question, Hurd was a self-employed
            roofing contractor. His gross income for 1971-1972 was established
            by the bank deposits method of proof. Several customers testified
        that Hurd had performed work for them during those years.

[13]   Of the errors urged on appeal, none deserves serious
        consideration. On the fifth day of trial, the defendant filed an
        affidavit of prejudice against the trial judge. He was much too
        late. The statute provides that an affidavit of prejudice should "be
        filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at
        which the proceeding is to be heard." 28 U.S.C. § 144. At the time
        of arraignment, the district judge invited Hurd to follow the
        appropriate procedure. Instead, five months passed before he acted.
        The judge properly refused to recuse himself. In any event, the
        affidavit of prejudice was wholly inadequate to demonstrate bias or

[14]   There was no error in the denial of the defendant's motion
        for inspection of the jury list. The motion was filed but not timely
        served or noted for hearing. Nonetheless, the court considered it on
        the first day of trial and denied it because it was untimely. The
        ruling was clearly appropriate. People of Territory of Guam v.
        Palomo, 511 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1975).

[15]   There was no error in the trial court's refusal to excuse
        for cause a prospective juror whose wife was employed as a property
        clerk with the Internal Revenue Service. The juror had stated that
        his wife's work was unrelated to collections and that he would not
        be influenced in his deliberations. In the absence of a showing of
        actual bias the fact that a juror or his spouse is employed by the
        federal government does not disqualify him. United States v. LePera,
        443 F.2d 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S. Ct. 326,
        30 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1971). There was no abuse of the trial judge's
        broad discretion in this area.

[16]   During the trial the defendant distributed to the jurors a
        pamphlet of which he claimed authorship and which he said was
        "intended to straighten [the jury] out and unbrainwash them." He now
        claims that the court erred in advising the jury that it was
        improper for anyone to communicate with a juror during the course of
        the trial. The defendant's attempt to find error in the court's
        comment is absurd.

[17]   The trial court excluded evidence offered by the defendant
        to the effect that Federal Reserve Notes did not constitute legal
        tender. The ruling was clearly proper. United States v. Wangrud, 533
        F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1976). The court was also correct in rejecting
        the defendant's proferred evidence to the effect that the system of
        taxation was based on voluntary compliance. Garner v. United States,
        424 U.S. 648, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370, 96 S. Ct. 1178 (1976).
[ Again, the defendant missed the point. The legal tender issue is not primary and can only be won on
Constitutional grounds since there is a law in place which says FRNs are legal tender. The primary question which
the defendant was trying to get to was as follows:

1.Federal Reserve Notes are classified as "securities of the united States". 2.They are allegedly notes but they have
no interest rate or method of redemption. 3.They violate 12 USC 411 in that they can not be redeemed in lawful
money at the U.S. Treasury or any Federal Reserve Bank. In fact, they can not even be redeemed for other Federal
Reserve Notes. 4.Because of the above, they are "worthless securities". They can not be taxed either at the state or
federal level.
ONCE MORE, I will point out that the above questions would be answered and the issues either resolved or joined
if the Prostituter would


    [18]   The use of evidence obtained by a subpoena of Hurd's bank
            records was clearly proper. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
            48 L. Ed. 2d 71, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976), and Kelley v. United States,
            536 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1976).

    [19]   In his reply brief, for the first time, Hurd charges the
            government with selective prosecution. The claim comes too late but
            has no merit in any event. Hurd has failed in his burden of making a
            prima facie case under the standard which we have prescribed in a
            series of recent decisions. United States v. Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953,
            954 (9th Cir. 1976).

[ His lawster feller didn't tell him that he needed to raise this issue during the trial. Here are some points which
could be made in Mr. Matthies case:

1.There are 35 MILLION non-filers according to the IRS. 2.There are only about 1,500 people prosecuted each year
for ALL TAX CRIMES COMBINED. That would include alcohol, tobacco, firearms, corporate, personal,
etc.. There are many types of crime under each of these. Therefore, I would doubt if more that a few dozen are
prosecuted every year. Let's see, that would mean it would take about ONE MILLION YEARS to prosecute them
all. 3.We know from the Senate hearings that IRS agents go after "plums" from the middle class. 4.In Mr. Matthies
case, he owns his home, etc.. 5.He earns in the $30,000 - $50,000 range.
Could you see that with ONE MILLION TO ONE ODDS, the prosecution might be just a little selective. AGAIN,
if the Prostituter would JUST ANSWER THE QUESTIONS, we would know for sure that this WAS
ABSOLUTELY a case of selective prosecution. ]

    [20]   Appellant's other contentions are wholly without merit. The
            judgment of conviction is affirmed.

[ Yea, but what if he had raised the RIGHT issues? ]

    Opinion Footnotes

    [21]   * Honorable William A. Ingram, United States District Judge
            of the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
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