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Credit Information Sharing_ Creditor Protection and Ban Cross

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					                                                        Table 1: Variable definition and data sources
Variable                                                                 Definition                                                                     Sources
Panel A                     Variables on M&As
Cross-border Number         The aggregated number of bank’s cross-border consolidations in each country pair.                                 Authors’ calculations using
                                                                                                                                              data from SDC Platinum
Cross-border Probability    A dummy variable which takes on value one if there is a cross-border M&A between the country pair.                Authors’ calculations using
                                                                                                                                              data from SDC Platinum
Panel B                     Variables on Credit Institutions
                            A variable equals one if either a public registry or a private bureau operates in the country by the end of
Information Sharing                                                                                                                           Djankov et al. (2007)
                            2003, zero otherwise.
                            A dummy variable which takes on value one if a public credit registry operates in the country by the end of
Public Registry                                                                                                                               Djankov et al. (2007)
                            2003, zero otherwise.
                            A dummy variable which takes on value one if a private credit bureau operates in the country by the end of
Private Bureau                                                                                                                                Djankov et al. (2007)
                            2003, zero otherwise.
Black      and      White                                                                                                                     Miller (2003)
                            A dummy equals one if the public registry reports both black and white information, and 0 otherwise.
Information (Public)                                                                                                                          Jappelli and Pagano (2002)
Black Information Only                                                                                                                        Miller (2003)
                            A dummy equals one if the public registry only reports black information, and 0 otherwise.
(Public)                                                                                                                                      Jappelli and Pagano (2002)
Black      and      White                                                                                                                     Miller (2003)
                            A dummy equals one if the private bureau reports both black and white information, and 0 otherwise.
Information (Private)                                                                                                                         Jappelli and Pagano (2002)
Black Information Only                                                                                                                        Miller (2003)
                            A dummy equals one if the private bureau only reports black information, and 0 otherwise.
(Private)                                                                                                                                     Jappelli and Pagano (2002)
Public Registry Age         The years of establishment since the starting date of the public credit registry.                                 Djankov et al. (2007)
Private Bureau Age          The years of establishment since the starting date of oldest private credit bureau in the country.                Djankov et al. (2007)
                            The index measures the power of secured lenders in bankruptcy. A score of one is assigned when each of
                            the following rights of secured lenders is defined in laws and regulations: First, there are restrictions, such
                            as creditor consent, for a debtor to file reorganization. Second, secured creditors are able to seize their
Creditor Rights             collateral after the reorganization petition is approved. Third, secured creditors are paid first out of the      Djankov et al. (2007)
                            proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt firm. Last, management does not retain administration of its property
                            pending the resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4. Higher value indicates stronger
                            creditor rights.
                            The number of days to resolve a payment dispute through courts. The data describe the number of
Enforcement Days            calendar days to enforce a contract of unpaid debt worth 50% of the country’s GDP per capita. The                 Djankov et al. (2007)
                            variable is constructed as at Jan. 2003.
Panel C                     Bank Control Variables


                                                                                   35
Capital Requirement           Index indicates (1) is the minimum capital-asset ratio requirement risk weighted in line with the Basel
                              guidelines (Yes=1; No=0); (2) does the minimum ratio vary as a function of market risk (Yes=1; No=0); (3)
                              are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulator/supervisory authorities (Yes=1;      Barth et al. (2006)
                              No=0). Higher values indicate greater stringency.
Official        supervisory   Index of supervisory power of banking supervisors that has been computed as the sum of 1-0-dummies,
power                         capturing the following aspects: (1) Can the supervisory agency order directors/management to constitute
                              provisions to cover actual/potential losses? (2) Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder        Authors’ calculations using
                              rights and declare bank insolvent? (3) Can the supervisory agency suspend dividends? (4) Can supervisory      data from Barth et al. (2006)
                              agency suspend bonuses? (5) Can supervisory agency suspend management fees? The index ranges from 0
                              to 5.
Independence          of      The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the government and legally protected
supervisory authority         from the banking industry. The variable is based on two questions: (1)to whom are the supervisory bodies
                              responsible or accountable (=1 if the response is a legislative body, =0 otherwise); (2)whether or not        Barth et al. (2006)
                              supervisors are legally liable for their actions (Yes=0, No=1). Higher values signify greater independence.

Government Ownership          The fraction of the banking system’s assets in the banks that are 50 percent or more owned by government.
                                                                                                                                            Barth et al. (2006)
Foreign Ownership             The fraction of the banking system’s assets in the banks that are 50 percent or more owned by foreigners.
                                                                                                                                            Barth et al. (2006)
Entry Barrier                 Entry into Banking Requirement, which is a variable developed based on eight questions regarding whether
                              various types of legal submission are required to obtain a banking license. Which of the following are
                              legally required to be submitted before issuance of the banking license? (1)Draft by-laws? (2)Intended
                              organization chart? (3) Financial projections for first three years? (4) Financial information on main Authors’ calculations using
                              potential shareholders? (5) Background/experience of future directors? (6) Background/experience of data from Barth et al. (2006)
                              future managers? (7) Sources of funds to be disbursed in the capitalization of new bank? (8) Market
                              differentiation intended for the new bank? The index ranges from 0 (low entry requirement) to 8 (high
                              entry requirement). Higher values indicate greater stringency
Application Denied            The percentage of denied applications for commercial bank licenses from domestic and foreign entities.       Barth, Lin, Lin and Song
                                                                                                                                           (2009)
Herfindahl-Hirschman          The sum of the squares of the market shares (deposit) of each individual bank in individual countries in the Barth, Lin, Lin and Song
Index (HHI)                   sample in 1999. The (normalized) value of HHI ranges from 0 to 1.                                            (2009)
Panel D                       Corporate Governance Control Variables
                              A measure of the effective rights of minority shareholders, computed as the product of rule of law and
Shareholder Rights            anti-director rights, divided by ten. It ranges between zero and six. Higher values signify stronger La Porta et al. (1998)
                              shareholder protection.


                                                                                    36
                        A measure represents investors’ assessments of conditions in the country. Assessment of the ‘‘efficiency
Judicial Efficiency     and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms’’ produced by the     La Porta et al. (1998)
                        country risk rating agency. It scales from zero to 10. Higher values indicate higher level of efficiency.
Panel E                 Governance Indicators
                        The quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
Government
                        political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the           Kaufmann et al. (2006)
Effectiveness
                        government’s commitment to such policies. Higher value indicates better government outcomes.
                        The extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the
Rule of Law             quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.   Kaufmann et al. (2006)
                        Higher value indicates better government outcomes.
                        The extent to which public powers is exercised for private gain, including both pretty and grand forms of
Control of Corruption   corruption, as well as “capture” of the state of elites and private interests. Higher value indicates better    Kaufmann et al. (2006)
                        government outcomes.
Panel F                 Macroeconomic Control Variables
Common law              Equals one if the origin of the company law is the English common law and zero otherwise.                       La Porta et al. (1998)
Same language           Equals one when target and acquirer’s countries share the same main language and zero otherwise.                World Atlas 1995
Same Location           Equals one when target and acquirer’s countries are from the same continent and zero otherwise. We
                        classify all countries into seven areas (Africa, North America, South America, Asia, Australia-ocean,           World Atlas 1995
                        Middle-east and Europe ).
Same Law                Equals one when target and acquirer’s countries have the same legal origin and zero otherwise.                  World Atlas 1995
GNI                     Logarithm of GNI (current US dollars), averaging 1998-2007.                                                     IMF 2008
GDP per capita Growth   Average annual growth rate in GDP per capita from 1998-2007.                                                    IMF 2008
FDI                     Foreign direct investment in a country (current US billion dollars), averaging 1998-2007.                       World          Development
                                                                                                                                        Indicators (WDI)
Import                  Imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP, 2003.                                                       World          Development
                                                                                                                                        Indicators (WDI)
Export                  Exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP, 2003.                                                       World          Development
                                                                                                                                        Indicators (WDI)




                                                                              37
                       Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
                                                      Standard
                              Observation   Mean                  Minimum      Maximum
                                                      Deviation
Dependent
Cross-border Number              3306       0.392       1.580           0        26
Cross-border Probability         3306       0.081       0.273           0        1
Independent
A. Information Sharing
Information sharing               58        0.918       0.277           0         1
Public Registry                   58        0.449       0.503           0         1
Private Bureau                    58        0.735       0.446           0         1
Black and White Information
                                  58        0.041       0.200           0         1
(Public)
Black Information Only
                                  58        0.286       0.456           0         1
(Public)
Black and White Information
                                  58        0.245       0.434           0         1
(Private)
Black Information Only
                                  58        0.367       0.487           0         1
(Private)
Public Registry Age               58        10.388     16.642           0        65
Private Bureau Age                58        18.918     21.509           0        98
B. Creditor Rights
Creditor Rights                   58        0.347       0.481           0         1
Enforcement Days                  58        5.559       0.699         3.871     7.237
Controls
GNI                               58        25.819     1.501          22.649    29.876
GDP Growth                        58        1.983      1.604          -1.500    5.763
Import                            56        34.768     21.881          8.691   123.053
Export                            56        35.984     25.210          9.411   128.320
FDI                               57        20.988     47.530         -1.866   289.443
Capital Requirement               48        4.439      1.550             1        7
Supervisory Power                 55        10.798     2.589             5        14
Independence of Supervision       50        0.5349     0.505             0        1
Government Ownership              54        15.662     19.849            0      75.27
Foreign Ownership                 40        22.533     22.351            0      99.11
Entry Barrier                     50        7.093      1.556             0        8
Application Denied                37        22.160     26.312            0      91.666
HHI                               46        0.236      0.161           0.045    0.669
Shareholder Rights                49        2.066      1.3111            0        5
Judicial System                   49        7.485      2.309            0.09      10
Rule of Law                       58        61.568     30.336          2.857    99.523
Government Effectiveness          52        10.038     1.251             8        13
Control of Corruption             52        10.307     1.393             8        13
                                            38
   Table 3: Bank Cross-border Numbers (CBN) and Credit Institutions by County
Panel A describes data on bank cross-border M&A activities in 58 countries in the period 1990 to
2007, in which there are 33 developing countries and 25 advanced countries. It also reports the
information sharing institutions and creditor rights scores by 2003. Panel B provides the t-test on the
differences between different country developments and between cross-border numbers as target and
as acquirer. CBN=Cross-Border Number; DEV=Developing Countries; ADV=Advanced Countries.
*,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: Data on bank cross-border activity and credit institutions
                                                             Public    Private  Information   Creditor
                         CBN as           CBN as
Country                                                   Registry by Bureau by  Sharing by  Rights by
                          Target         Acquirer
                                                              2003      2003        2003       2003
Armenia                     4                 0                  0        0          0            2
Australia                   24               20                  0        1          1            3
Austria                     12                6                  1        1          1            3
Azerbaijan                  1                 0                  0        0          0            3
Belgium                     23               47                  1        1          1            2
Brazil                      33                9                  1        1          1            1
Bulgaria                    12                1                  0        0          0            2
Canada                      14               37                  0        1          1            1
Chile                       13                1                  1        1          1            2
Colombia                    11                2                  0        1          1            0
Denmark                     13               13                  0        1          1            3
Ecuador                     1                 0                  1        0          1            0
Egypt, Arab Rep.            8                 0                  1        0          1            2
Finland                     9                 5                  0        1          1            1
France                      39               74                  1        0          1            0
Germany                     63               81                  1        1          1            3
Greece                      7                 9                  0        1          1            1
Hong Kong, China            20               12                  0        1          1            4
India                       6                 2                  0        0          0            2
Indonesia                   30                0                  1        0          1            2
Ireland                     20                9                  0        1          1            1
Israel                      1                 3                  0        1          1            3
Italy                       46               31                  1        1          1            2
Japan                       13               13                  0        1          1            2
Jordan                      1                 0                  1        0          1            1
Kazakhstan                  6                 4                  0        0          0            2
Kenya                       1                 0                  0        1          1            4
Korea, Rep.                 9                 4                  1        0          1            2
Lithuania                   8                 3                  0        0          0            2
Malawi                      1                 0                  1        1          1            3
Malaysia                    4                 7                  0        1          1            0
Mexico                      20                5                  0        1          1            3
                                                  39
Netherlands            26           73             0              1              1         3
New Zealand            8            5              1              0              1         4
Nigeria                2            0              0              1              1         2
Norway                 14           7              1              0              1         1
Pakistan               4            1              1              1              1         0
Peru                   2            0              0              1              1         0
Philippines            20           1              1              1              1         1
Portugal               21           12             0              0              0         2
Romania                20           0              0              0              0         2
Russian Federation     33           32             0              0              0         3
Singapore              4            28             0              1              1         3
South Africa           4            12             0              1              1         3
Spain                  27           69             1              1              1         2
Sri Lanka              2            0              0              1              1         2
Sweden                 16           20             0              1              1         1
Switzerland            23           51             0              1              1         1
Taiwan, China          20           4              1              1              1         2
Thailand               13           0              0              0              0         2
Turkey                 21           6              1              0              1         2
Ukraine                27           5              0              0              0         2
United Kingdom          69          83             0              1              1         4
United States          142         137             0              1              1         1
Uruguay                 7           0              1              1              1         3
Venezuela, RB           3           0              1              0              1         3
Zimbabwe                4           0              0              0              0         4
Panel B: T-test
                       CBN as      CBN as
By Development                                  By Target and Acquirer       DEV        ADV
                        Target     Acquirer
DEV                     10.606      2.939     CBN as Target                  10.606      5.828
ADV                     26.960      33.960    CBN as Acquirer                 2.939      6.907
t-test: DEV vs. ADV   -2.984***   -5.073***   t-test: Target vs. Acquirer   4.774***   -1.961**




                                              40
                         Table 4: Credit Institutions by Development
 This table summarizes the means of credit institutions: information sharing and creditor rights. It
 also provides three types of credit institution variables that are not included in DMS (2007): the
 information content disclosed, information bureau age, and the contract enforcement days. See Table
 1 for variable definitions. The data are sorted by country development and t-tests on the differences
 between developing and advanced countries are provided. DEV=Developing Countries;
 ADV=Advanced Countries. *,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
 respectively.
Panel A: Information Sharing
                  Public Private Information Black          Both     Black      Both     Public Private
By Development
                   2003      2003     Sharing     (Public) (Public) (Private) (Private) Age       Age
DEV               0.424      0.455     0.667        0.030   0.454     0.090     0.151     7.515 10.484
ADV               0.360      0.840     0.960         0.04    0.08      0.36     0.52       10.6  23.24
DEV vs. ADV
                 2.49*** -3.20*** -2.874***        -0.197 3.34*** -2.61*** -3.212*** -0.737 -2.394***
(t-test)
Panel B: Creditor Rights
                                   Creditor Rights by 2003                    Enforcement Days
DEV                                         1.939                                    5.867
ADV                                          2.16                                    5.152
DEV vs. ADV (t-test)                      -2.748***                                4.448***




                                                  41
                    Table 5: Creditor Information Sharing, Creditor Rights and Bank’s Cross-border Consolidation
The table presents the results of six Tobit models estimated by maximum likelihood on the sample of 58 countries. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
The dependent variable is the Cross-border Number. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means
of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal effects of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected
value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets.
*,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
                                                        (1)         (2)          (3)      (4)            (5)           (6)            (7)          (8)
Information Sharing _t                               2.578**                                                                       2.400**       2.064*
                                                     (1.215)                                                                       (1.218)       (1.221)
Information Sharing _a                               2.728**                                                                        2.597*        2.032
                                                     (1.417)                                                                       (1.452)       (1.451)
Public Registry _t                                               1.275**
                                                                 (0.607)
Public Registry _a                                               1.245**
                                                                 (0.681)
Private Bureau _t                                                1.646**
                                                                 (0.764)
Private Bureau _a                                                 0.183
                                                                 (0.798)
Black and White Information (Public) _t                                       1.902***
                                                                               (0.671)
Black and White Information (Public) _a                                         0.807
                                                                               (0.785)
Black Information Only (Public) _t                                              1.854
                                                                               (1.323)
Black Information Only (Public) _a                                              0.791
                                                                               (1.205)
Black and White Information (Private) _t                                        1.387
                                                                               (0.834)
Black and White Information (Private) _a                                        0.739
                                                                               (0.763)
Black Information Only (Private) _t                                           2.834***


                                                                           42
                                                             (0.870)
Black Information Only (Private) _a                          -1.250
                                                             (0.947)
Public Registry Age _t                                                   0.013
                                                                        (0.017)
Public Registry Age _a                                                  0.029*
                                                                        (0.017)
Private Bureau Age _t                                                  0.039***
                                                                        (0.014)
Private Bureau Age _a                                                   0.029*
                                                                        (0.016)
Creditor Rights _t                                                                0.474**                0.317**
                                                                                  (0.252)                (0.148)
Creditor Rights _a                                                                 0.341                  0.121
                                                                                  (0.330)                (0.307)
CR_2: No Automatic Stay _t                                                                    1.519***                1.078**
                                                                                               (0.512)                (0.509)
CR_2: No Automatic Stay _a                                                                    1.301***                1.157**
                                                                                               (0.590)                (0.560)
Enforcement Days _t                                                               -0.872**   -0.976***   -0.807***   -1.148***
                                                                                   (0.384)     (0.365)    (0.262)     (0.414)
Enforcement Days _a                                                                -0.246      -0.174    -0.797***     -0.227
                                                                                   (0.387)     (0.347)    (0.248)     (0.414)
Control Variable
Same Location                         3.519***   3.120***   3.233***   3.383***   3.155***   3.238***    3.461***    3.500***
                                       (0.547)    (0.561)    (0.559)    (0.569)    (0.564)    (0.559)     (0.547)     (0.544)
Same Language                         2.156***   1.969***   1.975***   1.872***   2.010***   1.917***    2.133***    1.985***
                                       (0.736)    (0.780)    (0.774)    (0.760)    (0.781)    (0.772)     (0.739)     (0.738)
Same Law                              1.169***   1.289***   1.335***   1.299***   1.275***   1.285***    1.165***    1.187***
                                       (0.496)    (0.511)    (0.510)    (0.504)    (0.512)    (0.509)     (0.497)     (0.496)
Common Law _t                           1.026     1.328*     1.702*      1.091     -0.402      0.011       0.638       0.785
                                       (0.793)    (0.802)    (0.808)    (0.781)    (0.772)    (0.714)     (0.846)     (0.791)

                                                            43
Common Law _a                      0.101        0.373        0.066      0.476      -0.685      -0.323     -0.108      -0.069
                                  (0.768)      (0.740)     (0.754)     (0.758)     (0.871)     (0.732)    (0.882)     (0.769)
GNI _t                           1.465***     1.326***    1.356***    1.433***    1.356***    1.351***   1.453***    1.457***
                                  (0.233)      (0.280)     (0.292)     (0.319)     (0.277)     (0.276)    (0.233)     (0.233)
GNI _a                           1.616***     2.183***    2.251***    2.132***    2.345***    2.263***   1.592***    1.587***
                                  (0.232)      (0.333)     (0.350)     (0.368)     (0.328)     (0.324)    (0.234)     (0.232)
GDP Growth _t                      0.362        0.301        0.352      0.173       0.153       0.218      0.331       0.307
                                  (0.272)      (0.292)     (0.290)     (0.281)     (0.288)     (0.290)    (0.272)     (0.273)
GDP Growth _a                    0.601**       -0.397       -0.385     -0.367      -0.435      -0.399    0.600**       0.470
                                  (0.289)      (0.362)     (0.359)     (0.362)     (0.361)     (0.360)    (0.297)     (0.300)
FDI _t                           0.014***       0.013     0.014***    0.013***    0.021***    0.021***   0.016***    0.017***
                                  (0.005)      (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.005)    (0.005)     (0.005)
FDI _a                           0.021***       0.013     0.014***    0.012***    0.017***    0.018***   0.022***    0.023***
                                  (0.005)      (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.005)     (0.006)     (0.005)    (0.005)     (0.005)
Import _t                                       0.024        0.089      0.127       0.067       0.071
                                               (0.074)     (0.072)     (0.082)     (0.073)     (0.074)
Import _a                                     -0.132**    -0.140**    -0.197**   -0.179***   -0.183***
                                               (0.062)     (0.061)     (0.076)     (0.064)     (0.064)
Export _t                                      -0.031       -0.069     -0.100      -0.059      -0.067
                                               (0.060)     (0.059)     (0.067)     (0.060)     (0.060)
Export _a                                     0.218***    0.237***    0.304***    0.274***    0.267***
                                               (0.075)     (0.075)     (0.094)     (0.078)     (0.078)
Capital Requirement _t             -0.049      -0.290       -0.302     -0.312      -0.141      -0.249      -0.090      -0.156
                                  (0.172)      (0.189)     (0.203)     (0.214)     (0.195)     (0.201)    (0.175)     (0.181)
Capital Requirement _a           -0.486***     -0.262      -0.417*     -0.041      -0.234      -0.068    -0.456***      0.290
                                  (0.179)      (0.207)     (0.237)     (0.268)     (0.235)     (0.240)    (0.195)     (0.202)
Official Supervisory Power _t    -0.534***   -0.529***   -0.521***   -0.448***   -0.552***   -0.559***   -0.530***   -0.520***
                                  (0.111)      (0.115)     (0.118)     (0.124)     (0.118)     (0.117)    (0.112)     (0.112)
Official Supervisory Power _a       0.068       0.085        0.048      0.121       0.003      -0.033       0.075       0.052
                                  (0.110)      (0.110)     (0.114)     (0.118)     (0.113)     (0.114)    (0.110)     (0.110)
Independence of Supervision _t    1.181**       0.685        0.041      1.264       0.815       0.560      1.134*      1.085*
                                  (0.593)      (0.670)     (0.806)     (0.706)     (0.666)     (0.660)    (0.613)     (0.595)

                                                         44
Independence of Supervision _a       1.029      0.931         1.486        0.151       0.265       0.363      1.090*        0.867
                                   (0.626)     (0.685)      (0.785)      (0.783)      (0.648)     (0.618)     (0.626)     (0.622)
Government Ownership _t           -0.030**     -0.011        -0.018       -0.001      -0.021      -0.019      -0.024*     -0.025*
                                   (0.014)     (0.017)      (0.017)      (0.017)      (0.015)     (0.015)     (0.013)     (0.013)
Government Ownership _a              0.020      0.015       0.035**        0.023       0.006       0.011      0.028*      0.026*
                                   (0.012)     (0.015)      (0.016)      (0.015)      (0.017)     (0.017)     (0.015)     (0.014)
Entry Barrier _t                     0.050      0.014         0.073        0.124      -0.188      -0.147       -0.007      -0.005
                                   (0.173)     (0.164)      (0.173)      (0.183)      (0.176)     (0.170)     (0.179)     (0.175)
Entry Barrier _a                     0.187      0.048         0.022        0.121      -0.211      -0.189        0.168       0.120
                                   (0.182)     (0.188)      (0.199)      (0.210)      (0.205)     (0.193)     (0.195)     (0.189)
Shareholder Rights _t                0.357      0.327       0.637*       0.647**     0.698**       0.510        0.463       0.378
                                   (0.281)     (0.312)      (0.348)      (0.320)      (0.319)     (0.313)     (0.293)     (0.281)
Shareholder Rights _a               -0.400      0.274         0.289      0.614*        0.453       0.251        0.335       0.337
                                   (0.280)     (0.330)      (0.355)      (0.347)      (0.357)     (0.329)     (0.320)     (0.280)
Judicial Efficiency _t             0.268**     0.259*       0.238*       0.248*      0.366***    0.309**     0.302**     0.267**
                                   (0.132)     (0.138)      (0.135)      (0.140)      (0.141)     (0.137)     (0.135)     (0.132)
Judicial Efficiency _a               0.191      0.195         0.173        0.183     0.367***    0.337***       0.206       0.193
                                   (0.135)     (0.146)      (0.140)      (0.143)      (0.144)     (0.137)     (0.139)     (0.133)
Cons_                            -91.89***   -102.38***   -106.89***   -105.17***   -98.97***   -94.92***   -90.68***   -88.65***
                                  (10.281)    (12.746)     (13.254)     (13.714)     (12.751)    (12.613)    (10.343)    (10.229)
Pseudo R^2                            0.24       0.25          0.26         0.26        0.25        0.26         0.24        0.24
Observation                          1560       1482          1482         1482        1482        1482         1560        1560




                                                          45
                Table 6: Determinants of cross-border consolidations between banks by target country’s development
The table present results of six Tobit regressions. In (1) to (3), targets are from developing countries. In (4) to (6), targets are from advanced countries.
The dependent variable is the Cross-border Number. See Table 1 for variable definitions. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the
marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal effects of a dummy variable is
calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
                                                        Target is DEV                                                    Target is ADV
                                         (1)                    (2)                  (3)                  (4)                   (5)               (6)
Information Sharing _t                4.441***                                                          4.254*
                                       (1.672)                                                          (2.536)
Information Sharing _a                  0.055                                                           3.773*
                                       (1.425)                                                          (2.015)
Public Registry _t                                           3.033**                                                           1.474
                                                             (1.516)                                                         (1.249)
Public Registry _a                                            0.308                                                          1.629*
                                                             (0.798)                                                         (0.875)
Private Bureau _t                                            2.683**                                                           1.603
                                                             (1.339)                                                         (1.342)
Private Bureau _a                                             0.366                                                           -0.092
                                                             (1.033)                                                         (0.907)
Public Registry Age _t                                                            0.080**                                                        0.027
                                                                                   (0.035)                                                      (0.025)
Public Registry Age _a                                                              0.006                                                      0.060***
                                                                                   (0.020)                                                      (0.020)
Private Bureau Age _t                                                              0.061*                                                       0.034*
                                                                                   (0.034)                                                      (0.021)
Private Bureau Age _a                                                               0.015                                                        0.015
                                                                                   (0.017)                                                      (0.015)
Creditor Rights _t                      0.181                 0.313                -0.665              0.984***              0.890**           0.995***
                                       (0.437)               (0.487)               (0.496)              (0.408)              (0.430)            (0.405)
Creditor Rights _a                      0.325                 0.082                -0.091                0.394                 0.467             0.409
                                       (0.297)               (0.310)               (0.320)              (0.310)              (0.321)            (0.315)


                                                                             46
Enforcement Days _t       -0.647      -0.587          -0.692     -0.858**   -0.874**   -0.836**
                          (0.943)     (0.838)         (0.757      (0.387)    (0.328)    (0.335)
Enforcement Days _a       -0.557      -0.638          -0.574      -0.243     -0.227     -0.282
                          (0.455)     (0.473)         (0.451)     (0.388)    (0.334)    (0.391)
Control Variable
Same Location             1.484*        1.500           1.424    4.105***   4.185***   4.003***
                          (0.905)      (0.997)         (0.992)    (0.753)    (0.755)    (0.764)
Same Language            1.817**      2.170**         2.486***     1.249      1.047      0.980
                          (0.897)      (0.954)         (0.947)    (1.110)    (1.109)    (1.092)
Same Law                  1.017*        0.726           0.736    1.697***   1.663***   1.731***
                          (0.612)      (0.616)         (0.609)    (0.704)    (0.702)    (0.695)
GNI _t                   2.194***     3.002***        1.712***   1.338**    1.275***   0.956***
                          (0.657)      (0.960)         (0.635)    (0.298)    (0.308)    (0.343)
GNI _a                   0.928***     1.570***        1.703***   1.916***   1.747***   1.374***
                          (0.286)      (0.405)         (0.434)    (0.273)    (0.286)    (0.311)
GDP Growth _t            0.719**       0.862*          0.572*     0.971*      0.773      0.333
                          (0.350)      (0.452)         (0.338)    (0.576)    (0.543)    (0.501)
GDP Growth _a              0.288       -0.581          -0.544      0.442      0.074     -0.032
                          (0.337)      (0.424)         (0.433)    (0.383)    (0.327)    (0.327)
FDI _t                    0.096*       -0.140         0.125***   0.022***   0.022***   0.023***
                          (0.050)      (0.073)         (0.049)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)
FDI _a                   0.018***       0.006           0.003    0.025***   0.026***   0.027***
                          (0.006)      (0.006)         (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.006)
Import _t                              0.248*           0.053
                                       (0.139)         (0.121)
Import _a                             0.211***        0.238***
                                       (0.090)         (0.098)
Export _t                             -0.242**         -0.008
                                       (0.120)         (0.108)
Export _a                               0.116          0.134*
                                       (0.075)         (0.080)
Capital Requirement _t   -1.156***   -1.454***         -0.446     -0.169     -0.309    -0.533*

                                                 47
                                  (0.387)      (0.520)          (0.563)      (0.286)     (0.294)     (0.293)
Capital Requirement _a           -0.497**        0.303            0.241       0.127       -0.033     -0.068
                                  (0.224)      (0.285)          (0.291)      (0.247)     (0.244)     (0.244)
Official Supervisory Power _t      -0.261      -0.420*           -0.132       0.006       -0.052      0.171
                                  (0.176)      (0.257)          (0.180)      (0.179)     (0.187)     (0.191)
Official Supervisory Power _a   -0.489***    -0.366***         -0.303**    -0.345***   -0.360***     -0.239
                                  (0.146)      (0.139)          (0.142)      (0.150)     (0.150)     (0.155)
Government Ownership _t            -0.019       -0.003          -0.040*      -0.009       -0.011     -0.000
                                  (0.014)      (0.017)          (0.022)      (0.026)     (0.027)     (0.027)
Government Ownership _a            -0.018       -0.007            0.008      -0.030      -0.034*     -0.031
                                  (0.018)      (0.021)          (0.021)      (0.020)     (0.020)     (0.020)
Shareholder Rights _t             1.311**       1.552*          1.785**     0.753**     1.059**     0.984**
                                  (0.640)      (0.833)          (0.896)      (0.384)     (0.480)     (0.447)
Shareholder Rights _a               0.321        0.642            0.538       0.381        0.065      0.179
                                  (0.332)      (0.398)          (0.429)      (0.321)     (0.356)     (0.361)
Judicial Efficiency _t              0.288        0.279            0.283       0.460        0.276      0.496
                                  (0.244)      (0.226)          (0.246)      (0.295)     (0.368)     (0.337)
Judicial Efficiency _a            0.360**     0.357**           0.363**       0.021        0.162      0.155
                                  (0.158)      (0.153)          (0.159)      (0.179)     (0.199)     (0.186)
Cons_                           -80.77***   -116.35***        -95.96***   -102.05***   -92.27***   -72.95***
                                 (19.167)     (26.774)         (22.321)     (13.619)    (13.143)    (12.992)
Pseudo R^2                           0.24        0.26              0.26       0.26          0.26      0.26
Observation                          741          722              722         819          819        819




                                                         48
                               Table 7: Governance motivation
The table presents results of five OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Cross-border Number.
   (Variable)a-t represents the value difference of the variable between the acquirer and target
countries. See Table 1 for variable definitions. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are
presented in brackets. *,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
                                        (1)           (2)          (3)           (4)            (5)
   (Information Sharing)a-t          0.08***                                  0.08***
                                      (0.03)                                   (0.03)
   (Public Registry)a-t                              0.02                                      0.01
                                                    (0.03)                                    (0.02)
   (Private Bureau)a-t                             0.07***                                   0.08***
                                                    (0.02)                                    (0.02)
   (Creditor Rights)a-t                                           0.02          0.02           0.02
                                                                 (0.02)        (0.02)         (0.02)
Control Variables
   (GNI)a-t                          0.02***       0.02***      0.02***       0.02***        0.02***
                                      (0.01)        (0.01)       (0.01)        (0.01)         (0.01)
   (GDP Growth)a-t                    -0.00         -0.00         0.00         -0.00           0.00
                                      (0.01)        (0.01)       (0.01)        (0.01)         (0.01)
   (Government Ownership)a-t          -0.00         -0.00        -0.00         -0.00          -0.00
                                      (0.00)        (0.00)       (0.00)        (0.00)         (0.00)
   (Supervisory Power)a-t            0.02***       0.02***      0.01***       0.01***        0.01***
                                      (0.01)        (0.01)       (0.00)        (0.01)         (0.00)
   (Import)a-t                         0.00          0.00         0.00          0.00           0.00
                                      (0.00)        (0.00)       (0.00)        (0.00)         (0.00)
   (Export)a-t                        -0.00         -0.00        -0.00         -0.00          -0.00
                                      (0.00)        (0.00)       (0.00)        (0.00)         (0.00)
Same Language                        0.15***       0.15***      0.15***       0.15***        0.15***
                                      (0.05)        (0.05)       (0.05)        (0.05)         (0.05)
Same Location                        0.36***       0.36***      0.36***       0.36***        0.36***
                                      (0.03)        (0.03)       (0.03)        (0.03)         (0.03)
Same Law                              0.06*         0.06*        0.06*         0.06*          0.06*
                                      (0.03)        (0.03)       (0.03)        (0.03)         (0.03)
Constant                              0.04*         0.05*        0.05*         0.05*          0.04*
                                      (0.02)        (0.03)       (0.03)        (0.03)         (0.02)
Adjusted R^2                           0.03          0.03         0.03          0.03           0.03
Observation                            1482          1482         1482          1482           1482




                                                49
                                                       Table 8: Difference-in-difference test
The table presents results of cross-sectional regressions for all countries that experienced reforms in credit institutions over 1990-2007. The dependent
variable is    CBN, which is computed as Cross-border Number as target (t+5, t+4, t+3, t+2, t+1)-Cross-border Number as target (t-5, t-4, t-3, t-2,
t-1) and Cross-border Number as target (t+3, t+2, t+1)-Cross-border Number as target(t-3, t-2, t-1), where t is the year of reform. ΔCreditorRights
measures the difference in the creditor rights score (0 to 4) before and after reform. ΔCBNControl, is Cross-border Number as target (t+5, t+4, t+3,
t+2, t+1)-Cross-border Number as target (t-5, t-4, t-3, t-2, t-1) and Cross-border Number as target (t+3, t+2, t+1)-Cross-border Number as target(t-3,
t-2, t-1), between countries in which there was no reform during the window period around t. ΔCBNControl, in (1) and (5) refers to countries that did
not experience reforms in creditor rights during the window period around t; in (2) and (6) refers to countries that did not experience reforms in
information sharing system during the window period around t; in (3) and (7) refers to countries that did not experience reforms in public registry
during the window period around t; in (4) and (8) refers to countries that did not experience reforms in private bureau during the window period
around t. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively.
                                           Panel A: X = 5 years                                                Panel B: X = 3 years
                            (1)           (2)               (3)               (4)              (5)               (6)                (7)            (8)
                        Creditor     Information      Public registry Private bureau Creditor rights       Information       Public registry Private bureau
                          rights        sharing                                                               sharing
Independent variable
                           1.11                                                             0.081**
ΔCreditorRights
                          (1.25)                                                             (0.04)
                        -0.005          -0.001           -0.015           -0.014           -0.001            -0.001            -0.002           -0.002
ΔCBNControl
                        (0.013)         (0.01)           (0.012)          (0.012)          (0.003)           (0.006)           (0.005)          (0.01)
Constant                  1.36          1.29*            4.20***            1.05            -0.069            0.90*            0.77*             1.26
                         (1.72)         (0.77)            (1.81)           (0.62)           (0.25)            (0.55)           (0.45)           (1.03)
Observation               23              31               23               17                27               34                26               18
Adjusted R^2              0.05          0.006             0.07             0.075             0.09             0.002            0.004             0.002




                                                                            50
                      Table 9: Tobit regression with interaction terms
The table presents results of three Tobit regressions with interaction terms. The dependent variable
is Cross-border Number. See Table 1 for variable definition. The coefficient estimates are transformed
to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the
interval regressions. The marginal effects of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in
the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *,**,*** represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
                                                    (1)         (2)        (3)        (4)         (5)
Information Sharing                             1.893**      3.594**    2.45**     3.157**      2.458*
                                                 (9.630)     (1.786)     (1.18)    (1.399)      (1.401)
Creditor Rights                                  0.12***       0.326      2.003    2.442**      1.200*
                                                  (0.04)     (0.339)    (1.212)    (1.159)      (0.748)
Entry Barrier                                    -0.210*
                                                 (1.284)
Application Denied                                           -0.063*
                                                             (0.043)
HHI                                                                     -0.30**
                                                                         (0.11)
Judicial Efficiency                                                                0.87***
                                                                                   (0.339)
Rule of Law                                                                                      0.255
                                                                                                (0.211)
(Information Sharing)*(Entry Barrier)            0.226*
                                                 (1.321)
(Information Sharing)*(Application Denied)                   0.079*
                                                             (0.043)
(Information Sharing)*(HHI)                                             0.41**
                                                                         (0.11)
(Creditor Rights)*(Judicial Efficiency)                                            0.304**
                                                                                   (0.142)
(Creditor Rights)*(Rule of Law)
                                                                                                0.150*
Control Variables                                                                               (0.093)
Capital Requirement                               -0.154      -0.320     -0.203    -0.370*      -0.297
                                                 (0.184)     (0.232)    (0.181)    (0.216)      (0.198)
Supervisory Power                               -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39***
                                                 (0.094)     (0.110)    (0.094)    (0.095)      (0.095)
Independence of Supervision                      2.35***     2.46***    2.41***    2.37***     2.39***
                                                 (0.521)     (0.624)    (0.524)    (0.523)      (0.524)
Government Ownership                               0.020       0.019      0.009     0.006        0.010
                                                  51
                 (0.013)    (0.016)    (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.014)
Same Location    4.10***    3.56***    4.25***    4.20***    4.12***
                 (0.575)    (0.700)    (0.587)    (0.587)    (0.585)
Same Language    2.36***    2.30***    2.11***    2.15***    2.17***
                 (0.760)    (0.964)    (0.771)    (0.765)    (0.774)
Same Law         0.968*     1.59***    1.020*    1.056**    1.043**
                 (0.530)    (0.635)    (0.532)    (0.533)    (0.534)
Common Law       1.019*     1.248*       0.715    1.191*     1.115*
                 (0.609)    (0.736)    (0.608)    (0.647)    (0.667)
GNI              1.78***    1.77***    1.56***    1.85***    1.72***
                 (0.241)    (0.274)    (0.235)    (0.234)    (0.245)
GDP Growth        0.416      0.151       0.429      0.418      0.354
                 (0.320)    (0.336)    (0.290)    (0.294)    (0.306)
Import            0.012      0.001      -0.017     -0.010     -0.013
                 (0.019)    (0.023)    (0.018)    (0.019)    (0.019)
Cons_           -72.3***   -52.2***   -50.1***   -50.3***   -51.0***
                (13.333)    (8.130)    (9.169)    (6.932)    (7.079)
Pseudo R^2         0.11       0.10        0.11       0.11       0.11
Observations      1641       1230        1641       1641       1641




                  52
          Table 10: Robustness Test: Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
The table presents results of four IV test. Regressions (1) to (3) test for information sharing, and
regression (4) tests for creditor rights. The dependent variable is Cross-border Number. See Table 1 for
variable definitions. Legal origin, religion composition, and absolute value of latitude are used as
instrumental variables. The estimation is based on a consistent IV estimation of limited dependent
variable regressions. The coefficient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal effects
evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the interval regressions. The marginal
effects of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete change in the expected value of the
dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1. The heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are presented in brackets. *,**,*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level respectively.
                                   (1)             (2)           (3)               (4)            (5)
                               1.30**                           0.08                           0.12**
Information Sharing
                                (0.55)                         (0.60)                           (0.58)
                                               0.28**          0.27*
Public Registry
                                                (0.15)         (0.16)
                                                 0.30*         0.30*
Private Bureau
                                                (0.18)         (0.18)
                                                                                0.27**           0.19*
Creditor Rights
                                                                                (0.11)          (0.10)
Enforcement Days                                                              -0.684**        -0.783**
                                                                               (0.312)         (0.264)
Control Variables
                               0.45***         0.49***       0.49***           0.45***         0.45***
Same Language
                                (0.15)          (0.15)         (0.15)           (0.15)          (0.15)
                               0.64***         0.66***       0.64***           0.56***         0.56***
Same Location
                                (0.11)          (0.10)         (0.10)           (0.10)          (0.10)
                                  0.07            0.07          0.07              0.06           0.06
Same Legal Origin
                                (0.09)          (0.08)         (0.08)           (0.08)          (0.08)
                               0.35***         0.32***       0.31***           0.36***         0.36***
GNI _t
                                (0.05)          (0.04)         (0.04)           (0.04)          (0.04)
                                 -0.03           -0.01         -0.02            -0.06*          -0.06*
GDP g _t
                                (0.05)          (0.03)         (0.05)           (0.03)          (0.03)
                                -0.003          -0.006        -0.002            -0.004          -0.004
Import _t
                               (0.004)         (0.004)        (0.002)          (0.004)         (0.004)
                                  0.01            0.03          0.03              0.03           0.03
Supervisory Power
                                (0.02)          (0.02)         (0.02)           (0.02)          (0.02)
                                 0.001           0.001        0.39**             0.001           0.001
Government Ownership
                               (0.002)         (0.002)         (0.19)          (0.002)         (0.002)
                                 0.001           0.001         0.001             0.003           0.003
Foreign Ownership
                               (0.003)         (0.003)        (0.003)          (0.002)         (0.002)
                                                  53
                        0.04       0.04       0.08       0.04       0.04
Shareholder Rights
                       (0.06)     (0.04)     (0.05)     (0.06)     (0.06)
                        0.02       0.01       0.01       0.04       0.04
Judicial Efficiency
                       (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03)
                      -9.82***   -8.85***   -8.93***   -8.95***   -8.91***
Constant
                       (1.36)     (1.21)     (1.21)     (1.23)     (1.23)
Pseudo R^2              0.08       0.09       0.09       0.06       0.06
Observations            1584       1824       1824       1632       1632




                                      54
                Table 11: Robustness Test: Probit Tests with More Controls
The table presents the results of four Probit models estimated by maximum likelihood on the sample
of 58 target countries. The dependent variable is Cross-border Probability. We also include another
macro institutional controls: the Governance Indicators. It includes Governance Effectiveness, Rule of Law,
and Control of Corruption. See Table 1 for variable definitions. The coefficient estimates are
transformed to represent the marginal effects evaluated at the means of the independent variables
from the interval regressions. The marginal effects of a dummy variable is calculated as the discrete
change in the expected value of the dependent variable as the dummy variable changes from 0 to 1.
The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *,**,*** represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
                                     (1)            (2)              (3)           (4)              (5)
Information Sharing _t            2.845***                        2.860**                        3.225***
                                   (1.177)                        (1.346)                         (1.195)
Information Sharing _a              1.430                          2.223                           1.836
                                   (2.066)                        (2.255)                         (2.077)
Public Registry _t                               1.411**          1.067*
                                                  (0.534)         (0.578)
Public Registry _a                               1.523**         1.706***
                                                  (0.602)         (0.631)
Private Bureau _t                               1.691***          1.387**
                                                  (0.653)         (0.705)
Private Bureau _a                                  0.086           0.391
                                                  (0.706)         (0.776)
Creditor Rights _t                                                               0.333*          0.392**
                                                                                 (0.203)          (0.204)
Creditor Rights _a                                                              0.429**          0.455***
                                                                                 (0.204)          (0.204)
Enforcement Days _t                                                            -0.926***        -0.875***
                                                                                 (0.385)          (0.265)
Enforcement Days _t                                                              -0.174         -0.723***
                                                                                 (0.363)          (0.274)
Control Variables
Same Language                     3.344***      3.375***         3.381***       3.380***         3.316***
                                   (0.494)        (0.496)         (0.497)        (0.493)          (0.493)
Same Location                     2.131***      2.160***         2.173***       2.074***         2.011***
                                   (0.639)        (0.643)         (0.642)        (0.643)          (0.641)
Same Law                           0.827*         0.854*          0.838*        1.010**          0.959**
                                   (0.450)        (0.450)         (0.452)        (0.451)          (0.452)
GNI _t                            2.030***      1.975***         2.038***       2.080***         2.111***
                                   (0.228)        (0.233)         (0.237)        (0.229)          (0.232)
GNI _a                            2.940***      3.025***         3.021***       3.031***         3.009***
                                                    55
                                (0.249)     (0.264)     (0.263)     (0.252)     (0.252)
GDP g _t                         0.423*      0.267        0.434      0.148       0.402
                                (0.258)     (0.253)     (0.265)     (0.241)     (0.257)
GDP g _a                       -0.718**     -0.779      -0.670*   -0.903***   -0.808***
                                (0.341)     (0.329)     (0.348)     (0.330)     (0.345)
FDI _t                         0.082***    0.083***    0.082***    0.077***    0.076***
                                (0.018)     (0.018)     (0.018)     (0.018)     (0.018)
FDI _a                           0.006       0.007        0.005      0.009       0.003
                                (0.017)     (0.018)     (0.018)     (0.017)     (0.017)
Government Ownership _t         -0.024*     -0.023       -0.023     -0.018      -0.018
                                (0.015)     (0.014)     (0.015)     (0.014)     (0.015)
Government Ownership _a          0.019       0.015        0.019      0.017      0.022*
                                (0.013)     (0.012)     (0.013)     (0.012)     (0.013)
Shareholder Rights _t          0.453**     0.508**       0.442*    0.503**      0.427*
                                (0.231)     (0.233)     (0.236)     (0.229)     (0.231)
Shareholder Rights _a            0.120       0.069        0.034      0.095       0.083
                                (0.238)     (0.245)     (0.252)     (0.236)     (0.239)
Judicial Efficiency _t           0.197       0.182        0.212     0.253*      0.243*
                                (0.142)     (0.166)     (0.169)     (0.142)     (0.143)
Judicial Efficiency _a           0.051       0.135        0.145      0.146       0.146
                                (0.147)     (0.179)     (0.180)     (0.152)     (0.151)
Government Effectiveness _t    1.730***    1.578***    1.742***    1.834***    2.185***
                                (0.548)     (0.542)     (0.552)     (0.577)     (0.594)
Government Effectiveness _a      1.263       1.513        1.499      0.465       0.364
                                (0.901)     (0.932)     (0.931)     (0.962)     (0.962)
Rule of Law _t                   0.014       0.049        0.038      0.150       0.112
                                (0.651)     (0.689)     (0.685)     (0.655)     (0.652)
Rule of Law _a                 2.693***    2.957***    2.924***    2.455***    2.359***
                                (0.758)     (0.804)     (0.799)     (0.767)     (0.765)
Control of Corruption _t         1.016       0.883        1.010      1.046      1.473*
                                (0.756)     (0.774)     (0.773)     (0.778)     (0.782)
Control of Corruption _a         0.802       0.626        0.651    1.445**     1.523**
                                (0.618)     (0.633)     (0.637)     (0.684)     (0.691)
Constant                      -144.6***   -139.6***   -145.4***   -141.1***   -147.7***
                               (13.096)    (12.732)    (13.195)    (12.669)    (13.115)
Pseudo R^2                        0.24       0.24         0.24       0.24        0.24
Observations                      1806       1806         1806       1806        1806




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