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Ejurope and Europeanisation

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					  Europe and
Europeanisation
    Alistair Cole
        What is Europeanisation?
   The success of the concept of Europeanisation in
    recent years is due to the realization that EU policy
    has become domestic policy, with 80 per cent of all
    policy sectors influenced in one way or another by
    the Union.
   Such processes might better be described as
    ‘EUisation’, insofar as they refer to the impact of the
    institutions, actors and policies of the European
    Union on its member states.
   But most scholars prefer to reason in terms of
    Europeanisation and to avoid the unattractive
    phraseology of the alternative term.
                      Definitions 1
   Ladrech (1994, p. 70), namely: ‘Europeanization is an
    incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of
    politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics
    become part of the organizational logic of national politics and
    policy-making’.
   Elsewhere, I have identified four main uses of
    Europeanisation: as an independent variable driving policy and
    institutional change, as a form of emulative policy transfer, as
    a smokescreen for domestic reform and as an imaginary
    constraint (Cole and Drake, 2000, Cole, 2001b).
   Europeanisation can also signify the uploading of state
    preferences or prevailing intellectual frames to the EU level,
    itself a measure of the competition between national models in
    the hybrid quasi-polity that the European Union has become.
    Europeanisation as an ‘independent variable’
   Europeanisation acts as an independent variable, when it can be
    demonstrated that the European Union has produced policy change:
    industrial policy, public services, environmental policy, or health and
    safety.
   The regulatory policy style of the European Union can either conflict with
    or comfort the policy norms prevalent in member-states. In the case of
    France, the role of individual commissioners as policy entrepreneurs, such
    as Leon Brittan, Karel van Miert or Mario Monti in the sphere of
    competition policy, has highlighted the tension between EU regulatory
    norms and national political traditions.
   In the British tradition, competition policy is an example of best practice, of
    preventing state interventionism and ensuring a level playing field between
    firms and countries. In the French tradition, competition policy has
    triumphed at the expense of industrial policy,
   This strong use of Europeanisation is the one that causes the most
    difficulty... as it conflicts with national traditions, by definition variable.
Europeanisation as lesson-drawing and best practice
   Soft Europeanisation refers to the process whereby member-states are
    influenced by strong national models within their midst.
   The case is demonstrated clearly in the monetary sphere, with the German
    model of monetary policy management acting as a benchmark for others.
   Best practice and a desire to imitate the most successful can produce a type
    of institutional isomorphism (Radaelli, 1997, 2004). Insofar as this involves
    importing models from a non-native political culture, this can also be
    considered as a form of Europeanisation.
   Europeanisation is actively promoted by the EU Commission, as well as by
    member-states anxious to retain ownership of more integrated processes.
   Thus: the Open method of Coordination is all about benchmarks in
    employment policy and the Lisbon agenda. Thus, the Bologna process of
    HE reform was initiated by member-states, not the Commission, and goes
    well beyond the actual EU. But it is a form of Europeanisation.
       Europeanisation as ideational
                 change
   In a more ideational sense, the European perspective
    has affected cognitive assumptions about national and
    European models.
   In all countries, public policy has become less self-
    sufficient, far more embedded in interdependent
    structures, and national elites have had to engage in
    policy learning and to experiment with new
    discursive forms.
   Role of trans-national elites in banking and finance
    especially. Role of epistemic communties, think
    tanks, benchmarking…
    Europeanisation as a smokescreen
   Europeanisation has also been used as a smokescreen for domestic political
    strategies

    The European ‘constraint’ has been evoked to make it easier to implement
    difficult domestic reforms. Administrative modernizers in France, Italy and
    elsewhere used Europe as a powerful domestic political resource for
    driving through change (Lequesne, 1993, 1996, Radaelli, 1997).

   Conforming with the Maastricht convergence critieria provided an
    opportunity to cut public expenditure and raise taxes; the Italian case was
    exemplary in this respect. Overdue reforms could be laid at the door of the
    European Union.

   But since the early 2000s, also, the EU has been routinely blamed for
    national economic ills – to the extent that the key supranational institutions
    of the Union have had to fight hard for their legitimacy.
         Anti-Europeanisation and
              euroscepticism
   There is also a much more constructed, ‘bottom up,
    version of Europeanization and of euro-scepticism, its
    mirror image.
   How do people come to define and use Europe in
    their domestic arenas – whether positively or
    negatively – to justify and advance particular
    positions? This offers an actor-centred and not just an
    institution-focused approach.
   Rozenberg’s four euro-scepticisms.
    Europeanisation as adaptation

   Adaptation/adjustment of preferences to the
    perceived requirements of integration is the
    strongest form of Europeanisation. There has
    been a proliferation of work looking at the
    domestic effects of European integration on
    political (typically executive) structures and on
    public policies.
            Inertia and rejection
   Inertia signifies the absence of any causal
    relationship between European-level and domestic
    change (Börzel, 2002). Policy change, or changing
    relations between the state and non-state actors, for
    example, might have nothing to do with EU level
    processes.
   Rejection is much stronger. Social movement and
    party actors use an anti-EU discourse to shape their
    own strategies, while policy-makers resist unwelcome
    developments in European integration by all available
    means at their disposal.
                   A word of caution
   There is common agreement that European integration has called into
    question many features associated with traditional models of European
    politics and policies (Bulmer, 2005, Featherstone and Radaelli, 2004, Cole
    and Drake, 2000, Ladrech 1994).#
   It is difficult, however, to disentangle the impact of European integration
    from other causes of policy change, such as economic globalisation,
    changing policy fashions and endogenous political reforms. As much as a
    concept, Europeanisation is a discourse that can be used and abused.
   What is the unit of analysis? Is it a country? There are always coalitions,
    cleavages, partisan and issue-based rivalries
   The effects of Europeanisation are contingent on underlying events and
    closely related to the history of the European Union itself. The role of the
    EU in the mid-1980s, e.g., before the implementation of the SEA, was
    vastly different from that in the mid-2000s. The number of countries has
    doubled across the period.
    Europe and some national traditions

   Some traditions have always been difficult to reconcile with the European
    ideal:
   Britain as the awkward partner is a case in point.
   Others - such as the Federal Republic of Germany – for long appeared
    tailor-made to accompany the acceleration of European unity. Europe was
    Germany writ large: monetary policy was to be based on the German
    model; extending EU competencies was intellectually easy to conceive,
    because the EU seemed just to be another level in the federal system.
   But, even in countries such as Germany, the European construction is not
    static! The development of EI has been, to some measure, contested by
    German länder, who complain of losing functions to the German Federal
    government and to the EU.
                            France
   The domestic goodness of fit can vary considerably. In the
    case of France, the Europe of the Six was much easier to
    control than the Europe of the 25.
   Europeanisation is also closely related to leadership, to
    perceptions of the role a specific country has within the Union.
    In the traditional French model, .e.g., Europeanisation was
    greatly valued, as the EU was a means for disseminating
    French influence across and beyond Europe.
    But as the EU has enlarged, and as the policy direction it has
    taken has shifted, Europeanisation is less likely to be framed in
    such positive terms.
   Though this is especially pertinent in the case of France, other
    nation traditions can have equally complex relationship with
    the theme of EU and Europeansiation:
                   Italy and Spain
   Italy: instinctively pro-European and a founder member. But
    the Euro is causing serious adjustment problems. Italy can no
    longer use the tool of currency devaluation to ease pressure in
    its economy. The Euro seriously contested by parts of the
    Italian political class
   Spain: instinctively pro-European.. great beneficiary of
    structural funds from late 1980s onwards. EU as a safeguard
    for Spanish democracy. Massive Yes vote for the constitution
    in 2005 (72%). But also demonstrated itself to be a powerful
    defenders of its own national interest in the debates over the
    Convention and fiercely resist any weakening of its QMV.
      Ireland and the Netherlands
   Ireland: another country whose renaissance has been linked to
    EU largesse. Spectacular economic growth – one of the
    powerhouses of the euro-zone. Positive image of Europe
    inculcated by objective one monies. Yet, even in Ireland, the
    Nice Treaty was, at first, rejected by popular referendum.
   Netherlands: another key pro-European country, where the
    Monnet model of elite-driven integration was supposed to
    have large tacit support. But the spectacular rejection of the
    Constitution in June 2005 demonstrated the weakening
    popular legitimacy and the ability of Europeanisation to shift
    from being part of the national project to a perceived external
    and unwelcome force.
                New CEE states
   Poland: one of the key eurosceptical countries in the
    CEE. Europeanisation experienced as an assault on
    the key Catholic, clerical traditions: the entry of the
    Extreme Right (Sambroona) into the previous
    government a sign of the malaise of the Polish
    experience. The anti-EU discourse of the twins.. Now
    given way to a new wave of pro-European
    enthusiasm. But is this skin deep?
   Slovenia/Lithuania… Bulgarian/Romania…
     Europeanisation as the imperfect art of uploading
                           French preferences
   The European level has been valued as a site for the export of French ideas,
    policies and personnel.
   France has been at least as successful in uploading its preferences (and
    personnel) to the EU level as any other member-state.
   The basic architecture of the European bureaucracy (based around
    directions générales and competitive examinations) is drawn from the
    experience of the French civil service.
   Core common policies, such as CAP, were designed with the satisfaction
    of French domestic interests in mind.
   Through the logic of the acquis communautaire, the forces of path
    dependency within the EU are strong (Pierson, 1996). These forces have
    been consistent with the pursuit of French national interests.
   French leaders have been influential in steering key institutional reforms,
    such as the creation of the European Council in 1974, the draft
    Constitutional Treaty in 2004/simplified treaty 2007; and in launching
    major policy developments, such as the Single European Act, Economic
    and Monetary Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
           Unsuccessful uploading
   Attempts to upload French models not always successful
    The Jospin left-wing government of 1997-2002 repeatedly
    insisted upon the need to develop and defend the European
    social model, but failed to upload constraining targets and
    penalties (Cole, JCMS, 2001)
   Sarkozy, like other French leaders previously, has made little
    headway in terms of the ECB and Economic Government
   Selck and Kaeding (French Politics, 2004) calculate that
    France is less successful than the UK, Germany or even Italy
    in transforming its original policy preferences into EU
    legislative acts.
 Adapting and Adjusting to Europe
Adapting to the requirements of European integration is
 the strongest form of Europeanisation. The line of
 causality is clear. Domestic institutions and actors
 adapt their internal functioning to the logic of
 European integration.

Adjusting to Europe implies a rather less clear-cut
  causal dynamic whereby the requirements of
  European integration are accommodated within
  existing institutions.
               Strategic Adaptation
   The Council of State long resisted the doctrine of the primacy of EU law,
    affirmed by the European Court of Justice as early as 1964. It finally
    admitted the principle of EU legal primacy in its Nicolo ruling of 1989.
    Transforming constraint into opportunity, the Council of State
    subsequently acted as a political entrepreneur, seizing the window of
    opportunity provoked by legal uncertainty and the legitimacy vested by the
    European treaties to redefine its role within the French polity.
   As the highest body of administrative law in the land, the Council of State
    has insisted upon its role as the guardian of the EU treaties and their
    implementation in France

   Europeanisation strengthens legal actors over political ones.
   Administrative tribunals have insisted on the legality of EU directives even
    when they have not been transposed into domestic law by the French
    government
   Some examples where the ECJ has been asked to arbitrate have been
    genetically modified foods (1998), the remuneration of banking depositions
    (2002) and over working time (2003).
     Reluctant Adjustment;The core
     executive and EU policy-making
   European has created serious challenges of coordination and cultural adaptation for
    the French administration and core executive
   In comparative terms, French decision-making on European issues is in theory a
    model of tight coordination and core executive control. European policy is
    officially managed by the General Secretariat for European Affairs (SGAE), an
    inter-ministerial mission formally attached to the Prime Minister’s office
   Officials in the SGAE consider the French model to be the best in Europe. The
    SGAE not only coordinates French positions before and during EU negotiations,
    but arbitrates between rival ministerial claims and attempts to police the
    implementation of decisions taken.
   Officials contrasted the French model favorably with that of Germany in particular,
    where multi-level institutional inputs and a lack of chancellor coordination were
    deemed to produce sub-optimal outcomes.
   But in its 2007 report, the Council of State recommended the creation of a strategic
    European cell in the Elysée, argued for a stronger presidential political steering of
    European issues and implied shortcomings with existing arrangements.
    Adjusting (with difficulty) to Europe: the French
                        civil service machine
   There is underlying unease across the French governmental machine about
    the role of EU actors usurping traditional prerogatives.
   There remains a weak EU culture within French ministries. Central
    divisions within individual ministries are imbued with the culture of the
    decree and are reluctant to engage in impact assessment exercises.
   As directives are highly technical, delays are commonplace. In terms of
    directives, the numbers have been increasing, from 70 in 1995 to 130 in
    2003 and 111 in 2004. Ministries complain that they lack the expertise to
    transpose EU directives into national law.
   In a string of reports, the European Commission has criticized France for
    its poor record in transcribing directives
    France has regularly been found guilty by the ECJ, most recently (at the
    time of writing in December 2006) in relation to its failure to implement
    correctly the 2001 directive on genetically modified foods.
    Inertia and institutions: the case of
          the French parliament
   The existence of a democratic deficit is an established feature amongst
    scholars of the EU system of governance. In the case of the French Fifth
    Republic, the democratic deficit forms part of the 1958 constitution itself,
    which removes large areas of public policy from parliamentary scrutiny.

   But European integration has not really empowered the French parliament.
    The National Assembly still only gives its opinion and has no binding
    authority. The French executive has used the ‘urgency’ procedure measures
    to push through EU legislation by decree. EU directives have been
    regrouped into packages and presented to parliament for block approval

   The weakness of the French parliament owes little to the European Union.
    Inertia and the causality of policy
                 change
   In the Europeanisation literature, inertia signals the absence of clear causal
    relationships between the policy change and European integration.

   The case of economic and monetary union demonstrates the limits of
    Europeanisation analysis. EMU is the Europeanised policy domain par
    excellence. But, as I have argued elsewhere, EMU was only possible
    because the fundamental economic policy paths in France, Germany and
    elsewhere had narrowed long before the moves to monetary union.

    Monetary Union crowned a process of EC economic convergence that was
    already well engaged. From the 1970s onwards, German norms in
    economic management were exported across Europe.
    Resistance: public services, state
          aids, industrial policy
   In the case of France the toughest challenges have been in
    those areas where the French model has been the most
    distinctive, in public services and industrial policy notably.
   In the mainstream French tradition, in contrast, competition
    policy is criticized as a practice inspired by US anti-trust
    policies, designed primarily to safeguard the interests of non-
    European (American and Japanese) trans-national
    corporations.
   competition policy threatened cherished French beliefs about
    the role of public service and economic policy and forced
    French governments to abandon key elements of their post-war
    political and economic model.
                     Service public
   Traditional French conceptions of public service were based
    on the delivery of essential services by public sector
    monopolies (gas, electricity, rail, postal and
    telecommunication services, air transport), which benefited
    from protection against domestic or foreign competition, and
    which were recognized with a public service mission in French
    administrative law
   The liberal frame of opening up monopolies was prevalent
    within the Commission Favoured measures included
    privatisation, the strict regulation of state subsidies, the
    opening up of specific industrial sectors to competition and the
    creation of independent competition agencies.
    The 2005 referendum on the draft
         Constitutional Treaty
   The rejection of the constitutional treaty in the May 2005 referendum sent
    shockwaves around Europe. There was a No vote of 54.7 per cent (45.3 per
    cent for the Yes) on a high turnout (69.4 per cent).
   The No vote progressed by almost 5.72 per cent of electors by comparison
    to 1992 (Hainsworth, 2006). It recruited a majority of electors in all social
    classes except the liberal professions.
    The mainstays of the No camp in the two referendums were the left of the
    left and the right of the right, with the No in 1992 and 2005 supported by
    the vast bulk of electors identifying with the FN, the PCF and the far-left
    (Perrineau, 2005: 239).
   This traditional alliance represented three-quarters of the No vote in 2005.
    They were joined by a small majority of PS voters, signifying a major shift
    since 1992, with 56 per cent of declared PS electors voting No in 2005,
    against only 22 per cent thirteen years earlier.
                     Popular fears
   the referendum campaign revealed deep seated popular fears
    about the direction of European integration. The campaign
    abounded with uncertainties about the new Europe.
   The proposed Bolkestein services directive mobilized trade
    unions and anti-globalisation groups such as ATTAC in fierce
    opposition to the treaty.
   The centre of gravity of the French debate revolved around a
    binary opposition between ‘social’ Europe, presented as
    consistent with national traditions, and an alien liberal Europe.
   But Eurobarometer puts the French in the EU average.
                  Conclusion
   These empirical cases demonstrate examples
    of uploading, adaptation, inertia and resistance
    to change.
   Europeanisation needs to bear in mind these
    fine distinctions and not overplay or stretch the
    concept too much

				
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