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Possible draft outline for SOPRI paper

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					                          SOPRI
                nd
               2 Somaliland Convention
‘The Governance and Economic Development of Somaliland’
                 8- 10th September 2006
                 Washington D.C., USA




  Thoughts on elections and post-elections:
  a Somaliland/ UK civil society perspective.




             Steve Kibble/Adan Yusuf Abokor
                       Progressio.
                   London/ Hargeisa.

                     31st August 2006




                            1
Contents:

Introduction …………………….. P3.

Events to the South …………….P4.

Paths to Democracy ……………P5

Parliamentary Elections ………..P5

Post-election Challenges ………P7

International Support and role ….P9

Conclusion ……………………….P10



Summary:
This paper examines the parliamentary election of 2005 and its aftermath
from the perspective of civil society activists working in Somaliland and in
international advocacy on Somaliland for Progressio (which has worked in the
country for over a decade). It looks at the opportunities created by the path to
democratisation in a society changing from a hybrid „traditional‟ form towards
a more formal Western-type democracy. Within the regional context of events
in (South) Somalia, the paper calls for sensitive and collaborative outside
interventions, and for the momentum to democratisation not to be derailed by
external events. It makes some suggestions for the form such interventions
might take.

Whilst we work for Progressio, this paper is a contribution to debate rather
than a final position statement of our organisation.

Steve Kibble is also a spokesperson for Somaliland Focus (UK). Details of its
work can be found at http://www.somalilandfocus.org/uk




                                       2
                        Thoughts on elections and post-elections:
                        a Somaliland/ UK civil society perspective.
Steve Kibble/Adan Yusuf Abokor
Progressio1.

 „Something is wrong. In Somalia you just need to kill 100 people to be recognised by the international community as
a „player‟. But you do not get any recognition if several thousand people vote for you here [in Somaliland] „ – 2005
election candidate interviewed by Mark Bradbury quoted in Abokor and Kibble (2006) Further Steps to Democracy:
The Somaliland Parliamentary elections, September 2005. Progressio, London.


Introduction
This paper‟s focus is the parliamentary elections of 2005 and an assessment of what
progress has been made nearly a year later. This is against the background of how
outside assistance (especially non governmental) has helped (or possibly hindered)
Somaliland‟s progress to democracy and reconstruction. It stresses that whilst the
external environment is not helpful at the moment towards Somaliland (SL), both
Somalilanders and outside friends inside and outside the diaspora need to keep the
momentum towards democratisation. There is need for a sustained commitment and
interventions by key actors who know each others functions, approaches, methods of
assessing impact and the like. A multi-track approach to peace and stability in the
wider Somali region is vital.

We enter a plea for a greater historical understanding since many outside
interventions, colonial and post-colonial, have been based on misunderstandings of
Somalia/land and Somali culture and „tradition‟. Has Somaliland or the region yet
completely come to terms with the way that a decentralised [for men] egalitarian clan-
based system came into unequal contact with a modernist centralised colonial
system? Three historical eras followed this collision – all marked by violence. We can
see how the path to democratisation has attempted to reverse this process, whilst
external factors reinforce it.

Somaliland might be said to be poised between „traditional‟ structures arising from
clan society and the ideas emanating from civil society (often influenced by time
spent in the diaspora2) on more Western forms of democratisation. In terms of post-
election assessment it is useful to ask who negotiates this exchange? It seems as
though some key actors are beginning to move the hybrid form along to reflect more
clearly the developing Somaliland – women‟s groups, civil society3, urban youth,
some of the business sector. How the more traditional elements exemplified perhaps
by the ruling party UDUB4 and a number of clan leaders (and men in general?) react
to such movement will reflect the Somaliland post-election path. However we should
also be aware that this is unlikely to be a linear path or indeed take the form of binary
opposition between „so-called progress‟ and „tradition‟. We are trying to avoid the trap

1
  Known before 2006 as the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), with its skillshare
programme known in some countries, including Somaliland, as International Cooperation for
Development (ICD). Dr. Steve Kibble is the advocacy coordinator for Africa/ Yemen and Dr. Adan
Abokor is the country representative for Somaliland. Progressio as CIIR acted as joint coordinator for
the international election observers in September/ October 2005. It has played a role in the setting up of
Somaliland Focus (UK) and the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Somaliland (APPG).
2
  Members of the diaspora with dual nationalities have played an important role. They left their
homeland as adults being familiar with traditional systems to engage with the democratic systems in
the North.
3
  There is much debate on how relevant the term civil society is for countries like Somaliland, notably
from commentators such as Ioan Lewis.
4
  Although we should not underestimate in this hybrid system the role of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the
founder of UDUB, in the multi-party system/democratisation process in Somaliland, but stemming
from his experience as an ‘old guard’ in Somali politics.


                                                         3
here, common to much outside comment of an over-reliance on fairly simple
opposites/ binaries such as clan v religion, moderate v fundamentalist, modern v
traditionalist, monolithic Somali bloc versus monolithic Somaliland one, Islamists v
warlords, Christian v Muslim and the like.

Somaliland‟s declaration that its union with Somalia had finished given the lack of a
viable state in the south occurred within the second wave of democratisation in the
early 1990s; as Mark Bradbury has proposed, it arguably it had more success in
legitimating the state in the eyes of its citizens at least because it was based on well
understood and historically strong foundations that neither colonialism nor „scientific
socialism‟ were able to wipe out – in essence a social contract which regulates
political and economic relationships between pastoral kinship groups rather than
delegating responsibility to a central government. Somaliland‟s recent history of
conflict resolution has involved a bottom-up approach to building societies from local
communities upwards, gradually widening the arena of political agreement and
political consensus. According to Ioan Lewis, this method of widening political
consensus works when societies are as in the Somali case, highly fragmented and
decentralised, and do not conform to assumptions about the universality of civil
society and Western multiparty democracy. How does outside assistance sensitively
deal with such a (changing) process?

       What are the current challenges facing Somaliland in terms of development
        and democracy?
       Where are we nearly a year after the parliamentary elections?
       Is there movement on greater representation for women?
       In what particular areas are Somalilanders themselves looking for change
        (and outside assistance)?
       What practical steps in democratisation can outsiders help with?
       What are they already doing?
       Are the key areas the effective role of political parties, human rights training,
        media freedom issues, equality of gender representation etc?

Events to the South
Regionally, we appear to be in a delicately balanced situation for Somaliland. Part of
the „international community‟ was seemingly about to line up behind the African
Union (AU) as it looked at the case for recognition, but now the „Islamist threat‟
threatens to put Somaliland on the back burner5. Equally Somali „radicals‟ and
„moderates‟ alike reject either independence or federal solutions for Somaliland. Our
concern is over how far a destabilising external context derails the democratisation
process internally, with the danger of those in the SL state apparatus with a Siad
Barre legacy lapsing into what they have known in the past of anti-democratic
practices, executive diktat etc. There are also worries that Somaliland‟s native
extremists are getting stronger eg in Burco and that Islamist anti-foreigner rhetoric
has resonance inside the country. Do Somalilanders including the young see the
government doing enough for the country? There is need here to avoid an external
and internal alliance of extreme political Islamists – in Somaliland as well as Somalia
– by having a conversation with „moderate conservative‟ Islamists who have similar
views to the political Islamists but who are opposed to violence. It is unfortunate that
whilst Somaliland‟s people have been closely observing the situation (and are


5
 There is uncertainty following the African Union fact-finding mission which declared in 2005 that
Somaliland's status was "unique and self-justified in African political history," and that "the case
should not be linked to the notion of 'opening a Pandora's box.' However a decision was put off under
Arab pressure at the summit meeting of African Union heads of state meeting in July 2006 in Banjul.


                                                  4
concerned about effects on Mogadishu‟s civil society6 and the position of women
there) neither house of parliament has looked at either the events to the south or the
effect on Ethiopian- Somaliland relations – leaving it to the opposition parties.
However in terms of the wider regional context we leave it to other papers.

Paths to Democracy
The proclamation of independence in 1991 following the collapse of the unitary
Somali state meant that the new Somaliland state had the opportunity to break with
former corrupt, military and unrepresentative forms of government. The lack of formal
international recognition for Somaliland has its costs. Without it the country does not
qualify for bilateral donor assistance or the support of international financial
institutions for reconstruction. Lack of recognition has discouraged foreign
investments and constricts trading practices. The meagre international assistance
received, however, has meant that reconstruction has been largely achieved from the
resources and resourcefulness of Somalilanders themselves. The main source of
finance has been remittances from the Somalis living abroad. Since 1998 these have
replaced the income from livestock exports as the mainstay of the economy. Lack of
recognition also meant that Somalilanders had the opportunity to build their own
system tailored to their needs. For the first twelve years this was a hybrid system
combining traditional institutions of clan governance (or male pastoral democracy)
with formal Western-style government institutions.

The government has signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; overseen
the restoration of peace; demobilised former combatants; brought about social and
economic rehabilitation and overseen the drafting of a constitution based on
universal suffrage, decentralisation and multi-partyism. There is a war crimes
commission looking into the human rights abuses of the Siad Barre years. There is a
reasonably high level of personal security for citizens. However, apart from its
economic viability, Somaliland‟s prospects also depend on the viability of its current
political order.

The recognition issue is a key litmus test for Somalilanders. In 1999, the then
President Egal argued that democratisation would facilitate international recognition
of Somaliland. In May 1999, the Hargeisa government approved a plan to move from
the clan-based system to a multi-party political system –providing the proposed
parties were not based on tribal or religious lines and drew support from all regions.
There were to be votes for women, although no women were actually consulted in
drawing up the draft. In 2001 a referendum on the new constitution was conducted in
Somaliland. In Dec 2002 and April 2003, the local government district councils and
the presidential elections were held respectively in a reasonably free and fair manner
as commented on by international observers such as my own institute7.

Parliamentary elections of 2005
In 2005 CIIR was officially requested by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to
invite and assemble the 76-strong international election observation (IEO) team for
the September 2005 elections for the House of Representatives8. In addition to the
IEOs selected from four continents, there were Somalilanders from the diaspora in

6
  The assassination of Yahye, the head of a peace research organisation affiliated with the War Torn
Societies Project (WSP now Interpeace) is greatly concerning in this context.
7
  Abokor, Bradbury, Kibble etc ‘Very much a Somaliland-run election’: Report of the Somaliland local
elections. 2003. CIIR. www.progressio.org.uk
8
  We coordinated other teams, but were only responsible for choosing our own election team personnel.
Other teams released their own report on the elections as well e.g. the Electoral Institute of Southern
Africa.


                                                  5
the UK, Sweden and Canada, and expatriate staff of international non-governmental
organisations (INGOs)9. After sending a preliminary assessment team to consult
widely with local civil society, political parties, media, the NEC etc, CIIR fielded a
team to observe the preparations for the poll, the parties‟ campaigns, the aftermath of
the poll, and to monitor media coverage. The elections were witnessed by a team of
76 observers from 19 countries - Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Mozambique, the
Philippines, Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Denmark,
Spain, Finland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand.

Since the European Commission (EC) could not provide funds directly to the NEC or
government institutions, there was a need for an intermediary international
organisation, able to submit a project proposal based on the “Somali Democracy
Programme”, Phase One of which addressed the Somaliland parliamentary elections
in Sept 2005. WSP matched the criteria as they have affiliates in Somalia/Somaliland
such as the Academy of Peace & Development (APD). The WSP and the APD had
management roles as well as financial responsibility.

A week prior to the poll, the peaceful election campaign was interrupted by a serious
security incident in Hargeisa, involving a gun battle between police and a group of
alleged militant jihadists linked to a Mogadishu Islamic radical groups. This appeared
a double purpose attack; firstly to disrupt elections, and secondly, to free prisoners
awaiting trial for the murders of foreigners in Somaliland. Several of those detained
by police have since been convicted of the murders, and sentenced to death10.

The elections themselves and the observation mission were not affected, and the
IEOs went on to visit 361 polling stations around Somaliland on the polling day itself
(over-one third of the total of 982 stations) and found the atmosphere highly positive.
Election day saw a turnout of over 600,000 voters. The IEOs were able to conclude
that despite many procedural problems as with the 2002 elections (lack of a census
and registration process; breaking of the voluntary code of conduct by political
parties; a lack of secrecy in some ballots; complicated ballot papers; attempts at
multiple voting; and unequal representation of women) the elections were conducted
in a „reasonably free and fair‟ fashion.11 Within days of the poll, but before the final
results were confirmed, CIIR issued an interim report in October to this effect to the
NEC. We noted in our final report that in contrast to neighbouring countries like
Ethiopia, the elections were carried out peacefully - yet again. The diaspora played a
visible role and contributed extensive experience of other democratisation processes.
The parties, although combative and unequally privileged, were disciplined. We
made recommendations to the NEC, the international donor community, political
parties and to Somaliland civil society including donor support to make the NEC a
permanent body. We also noted that we were about to see the working out of a
situation unique in Africa of a government without a numerical majority in parliament:
perhaps another example – such as the hybrid system - of Somaliland providing
lessons to the rest of Africa?


9
  Abokor and Kibble (2006) ibid
10
   A complicating factor is that Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, chairperson of the Islamic Courts in
Mogadishu and previously one of the leaders of A-Itihad Al-Islamiya, a militant group involved in
violent acts in Ethiopia and Somalia/Somaliland was among 15 defendants (seven including Sheikh
Aweys in absentia) being tried for this attack.
11
   International Election Observation team interim report on the Somaliland elections to the House of
Representatives 29 September 2005, issued 7 October 2005, available at www.progressio.org.uk. The
findings and recommendations of the interim report were incorporated in the final report.


                                                  6
Whilst we believed and declared the elections to be „reasonably free and fair‟ (given
the prioritising in the polling process of transparency above secrecy), we were keen
to stress throughout, given our work with local NGOs in such areas as capacity
building, that this was just the beginning of the democratisation process.
Somalilanders themselves addressed some of these problems in a series of regional
and national workshops.

Post-election challenges
Economically there is drought and vulnerability of pastoral communities, with the loss
of sales of livestock as a result of the Saudi export ban. Somaliland is not in a
position to drive hard bargains from outsiders wishing to exploit natural resources
etc. Lack of investment, apart from that emanating from the diaspora, can be linked
to the lack of recognition which means would-be investors are worried by the lack of
insurance, concerned whether financial institutions are reliable etc. Socially there is
the qat chewing issue – which has social, environmental, gender as well as
productivity implications. In terms of gender, Somaliland has patriarchal structures
and practices; this is despite the existence of highly educated women with their
involvement in political, civil society and business matters. Terrorism is an internal as
well as an external matter. Somaliland blamed the jihadists attack just before the
September 2005 elections on organised terrorist groups in Mogadishu, recruiting
people from Somaliland and paid warlords militias. It must also be faced as an
internal problem linked to wider international concerns

In the electoral/ democratisation/ political domain which is the one we concentrate
on, there have been worries over human rights, an independent judiciary and the
continued existence of emergency law plus creeping corruption and an increasing
investment in internal security. The security mindset of the Siad Barre era and the
continuation of certain personnel means that the necessity of following formal legal
process (rather than arbitrary political action) is perhaps still not understood by all
ministers and parts of the government who have, in the past, appeared surprised at
objections to its practice, e.g. over the expulsion of EU delegate Ahmed Washington
in 2005 and Roland Marechal12.

In terms of a functioning parliament, the picture has been mixed with a somewhat
turbulent start as the parties negotiated their relationship with each other and with the
executive, helped by the consensus approach of the Guurti13. Subsequently there
have been interesting pointers in matters of consensus, democratisation and nation
building. There has been the formation of three subcommittees – which point to
greater involvement in national affairs – justice and human rights, anti-corruption and
environmental and rural communities. The majority of the MPs are new and while
many of them are said to be better educated than their predecessors, they lack
experience and are unfamiliar with the functions of parliament – although Interpeace
has moved into Phase Two of the Democratisation Programme with a resource
centre, parliamentary infrastructural improvement and IT training. The diaspora has
also provided advice.

Achieving political consensus has been the cornerstone of stability in Somaliland, to
the extent that uncomfortable compromises have been made at times. In the new
parliament, the opposition is looking to form a coherent alliance and challenge the

12
   Compounded some would say by lack of Presidential control over some ministers,their calibre and
the oversized cabinet which the recent reshuffle did not address. This is with the exception of the new
Minister of Planning who is a retired senior officer of the ILO and highly respected personality, which
gave the international agencies working in Somaliland great relief.
13
   One might omit from this assertion the latter’s recent desire to hang on to their positions.


                                                   7
government on a number of fronts. The system of opposition parties having a
parliamentary majority complicates matters such as collaboration between parliament
and presidency, which has led to dispute on issues such as the increase of the Guurti
term by four years. This was suggested by the President and approved by the Guurti
and rejected by the lower house. The term of the Guurti ends in October 2006 with
no solution in sight. Parliament is though, in the process of finalising the electoral law
for Guurti elections, although these are not immediately likely. Despite this
Somaliland has succeeded in reaching consensus on solving issues which could
have been damaging to the country.

There has been surprising unanimity of all parties on occasion in relation to
government. The two non-governing parties have been successful in exerting party
discipline – picking a speaker and two deputies. Before that they had been seen as
weak institutions showing little life outside election campaigns, with little internal
democracy/ capacity/commitment to policy formulation. A major constraint has been
resources. It is perhaps early days but we are yet to see signs of differentiation
between the parties, or discern their internal dynamics as well as differentiated
programmes and policies. How do they see coalition-building and internal discipline –
in order to hold the executive to account? The opposition agenda, little of which has
been yet achieved, includes revoking the emergency laws, reducing the size of the
cabinet, transferring to Parliament a degree of effective power, reviewing the role and
length of tenure of the Guurti, increasing fiscal accountability and transparency,
reviewing media law, the security sector budget, decentralising government,
examining the validity of a three-party system in a plural democracy14.

There have been developments in the relationship between civil society groups,
political parties and the government. Women‟s groups and civil society groups have
been waiting for Parliament to organise itself in order to lobby it, but are hopeful of a
good working relationship: not least because several former civil society activists are
MPs. Given that this was the first parliamentary election in 36 years (and the first
time women were democratically elected to any Somali parliament) Somaliland has
some claim in the progress of women‟s representation. The lack of (but paradoxically
growing) female representation and the wider political and economic participation
overall have led to demands for an increase in set quotas/reserved seats for women
in parliament. A Kulmiye woman MP who managed to campaign in Awdal region
challenging men and clannism, has begun to focus on advocating for women‟s issues
in parliament. According to NAGAAD, the only chance for Somali women to have
more MPs is through a quota system, meaning hard work by women activists to gain
a constitutional review. At present this is at the informal workshops stage, involving
meetings of CSOs, MPs and Guurti members with more men seeming to accept the
idea. Parties will be under increasing pressure from women and civil society
organisations to review their policies on female candidacy, ensuring that changes are
made to structures, policies and personnel. Women in and out of parliament have
called not only for affirmative action but also for exposure visits to learn from other
African countries experience such as Uganda15.

In electoral terms for the future, there needs to be the establishment of the new NEC
as a sustainable and effective institution as the mandate of the current one expires.
This could examine the problems of voter registration and census, essential both for
holding elections and as part of the state-building process (by defining and counting

14
   The three parties emerged arose from the leading political groupings in the 2002 local elections as a
mechanism to ensure that parties did not represent single clans and had broad-based support across
regions – although clan as ever is the unstated invisible fact of Somaliland politics.
15
   See the expected paper to this convention on this.


                                                    8
citizens). It could also be part of the review of electoral law to consolidate and iron
out contradictions in the existing legislation.

International support and role:
The international community, in particular the EU, has to date, shown its support for
democratisation in Somaliland by funding the elections; following the elections,
Somaliland received messages of congratulations from several countries and
international bodies. Despite the lack of movement by the African Union, there is
growing support for Somaliland with favourable indications from Riyale‟s six nation
tour of East Africa. But words alone will be insufficient. The institutions in place to
sustain a democratic system in Somaliland need assistance. These include the NEC,
parliament, the judiciary and the government itself. It will also be important for people
in Somaliland to see the benefits of democracy, by investment in the country‟s
infrastructure and services and providing information on democratisation (not that
Somaliland should accept or believe all of this uncritically). In the various Somali
peace negotiations, the strategy of regional and international mediators was to park
the issue of Somaliland, in order to protect the stability in the region. The
international community should of course support a resolution to the crisis in the
south, but in a multi-track way that does not hold Somaliland hostage to
developments there. Obviously there is much to be done here with civil society
initiatives that build on Somaliland‟s consensual and peace-building approach –
which space does not allow us to expand on here. Suffice it to say that we see the
growing capacity of local NGOs in which we are involved as crucial in this.

A relationship of mutual respect between international and local NGOs is also key.
There are, however, few international organisations working directly with women‟s
groups, human rights and research organisations, such as Hargeisa Womens Group
Association (HAWO), Institute for Practical Research and Training in Somaliland
(IPRT), Academy of Peace and Development, Nagaad Umbrella Organisation of
Hargeisa Women NGOs, Samo-Talis, Womens Rehabilitation and Development
Association (WORDA)16.

The issue of diaspora funding is ambiguous. On the one hand it can be seen as
providing both investment and good people-people initiatives and can be very
productive (e.g. Amoud University). On the other hand it does not seem to nurture
either a good relationship with the government or ensure that governments have to
be accountable to tax payers as well as voters for policy etc. Similarly to Angola
where there is 'a state without citizens' i.e. the government is entirely externally-
oriented due to oil revenues, the Hargeisa government does not have to be
accountable to its own citizens, if outsiders are relied upon for funding key elements
of policy. We are not suggesting that the Angola case is directly comparable to
Somaliland given the latter‟s low tax base and very small revenue flows. However
dependence on diaspora funding for much of the social services (hospitals, education
– in fact most things bar security and the president's travel) mean the government
does not concern itself with many elements that other governments do. Additionally
many current and Egal era ministers and political party leaders have dual nationality
and many Somalilanders joke that they „have a government in exile‟ i.e. ministers
(and political party leaders) etc spend more time soliciting support from the diaspora
than working on policy at home or engaging with Somalilanders.

We suggest below some of the ways that civil society, diaspora and parliamentarians
can bring about greater awareness of Somaliland‟s achievements and help its push
for democratisation (not to gainsay what is already happening).

16
     National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Progressio undertake much of this work.


                                                 9
          Providing assistance to the emerging democratisation process. Areas might
           be the effective role of political parties, human rights training, media freedom
           issues, equality of gender representation etc. This needs a strong link to
           poverty reduction programmes.
          Bringing awareness of the Somaliland peace-building approach.
          Suggesting outside parliamentarians such as the UK APPG17 liaise with their
           counterparts in selected African, European and other states to raise the
           profile of the case of Somaliland via parliamentary questions, briefings and
           encouraging their respective governments to encourage the development of a
           follow-up mechanism to the AU 2005 Fact-Finding report on Somaliland.
           Focusing pressure on states that are members of the AU's Peace and
           Security Council. Lobbying for joint investment opportunities in Somaliland.
          Lobbying including via the G8 to provide grants for road infrastructure,
           expanding Berbera port, schools and clinics, as part of the Gleneagles
           agreement to provide poor countries with grants.
          Engaging with the Nepad secretariat to look into post-conflict infrastructural
           development.
          Seeking greater coordination between the various Somalilander organisations
           and support organisations abroad – and indeed Somali ones for people-
           people cooperation. Being aware of the dangers of dependency, whilst
           seeking greater coordination.
          Lobbying on overcoming the Rift Valley Fever ban on livestock exports to
           Saudi Arabia.
          Helping make the case that Somaliland is an existing fact and a coherent
           political entity. Drawing the parallels with what is happening in South Sudan
           and pursuing the agenda that the International Crisis Group (ICG) has put
           forward of e.g. an observer role for Somaliland in AU forums.

Conclusion
How best do outsiders, however sympathetic, concentrate on the issues we outline
here of democratisation and development and perhaps more immediate questions
facing people, parliament and government? Having staged three elections, the
commitment of the Somaliland people and the political elite to a democratic form of
politics cannot easily be questioned or ignored. To do so would make a mockery of
the West‟s commitment to support democracy. To ignore what has been achieved in
a democratic Islamic country would also send the wrong message to Somalia and to
countries in the region and the Middle East.

Most importantly let us not reinvent a process that has no purchase in Somaliland or
indeed in Somalia. What we should look at is the way that the people of Somaliland
brought peace through indigenous and understood forms – mechanisms of dialogue,
clan structures, elders (and women‟s input even if only behind the scenes?). In a
sense this paper is an unfinished chapter in a wider story about how the mix of
traditional and understood structures change, at what speed, and who controls and
wants to control the process. The government is in the paradoxical position of having
had to go its own way given the lack of international recognition, but its poverty and
lack of resources means that it is in fact very dependent on the outside – both in
terms of economic support and how the outside community views events in (wider)
Somalia. Creative engagement on sensitively overcoming such dependence between
those living in Somaliland including the government and those outside (diaspora or
friends) will remain key for many years.

17
     Briefing to the APPG by Somaliland Focus (UK) 28 th June 2006 available from SF(UK) website.


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Description: Possible draft outline for SOPRI paper