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THE NUNN-LUGAR COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM: DISMANTLING THE FORMER SOVIET UNION’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Charles L. Thornton Research Seminar School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland 4 December 2002 Charles L. Thornton December 2002 1 Agenda  Nunn-Lugar Overview & Background  My Qualifications & Research Questions  Assessments  Criticisms of the Nunn-Lugar Program  Measuring Nunn-Lugar’s Effectiveness  Future of the Program  Nunn-Lugar’s Drivers & Fundamental Concepts  Generalizing the Nunn-Lugar Model  Request your ideas, guidance, and ... December 2002 2 Charles L. Thornton OVERVIEW & PROGRAM BACKGROUND Charles L. Thornton December 2002 3 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Mission Provide assistance to eligible states of the former Soviet Union in order to dismantle weapons of mass destruction and to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. [graphic extracted] Charles L. Thornton December 2002 4 Research Questions  Have the Nunn-Lugar programs been effective?  are the programs making tangible progress toward their stated goals and objectives?  Does the Nunn-Lugar cooperative security model have applications beyond the current FSU WMD programs?  is the program a unique solution to a unique problem/event, implemented under unique conditions? Charles L. Thornton December 2002 5 My Qualifications & Research Assets  Over 7 years direct experience on CTR, including over 30 trips to Russia Access to the relevant U.S. governmental community Access to the relevant Russian governmental community Well known to the U.S. and Russian non-governmental communities Increasing interaction with Pakistani and Indian governmental and NGO officials UMD: Professors Fetter, Gansler, Schelling, Steinbruner, Turner, and Quester; Dr. Gallagher; Ms. Harris; Mr. Leitenberg       CISSM Charles L. Thornton December 2002 6 The U.S. Government Nunn-Lugar Programs  Department of Defense  [depicted on following slides]  Department of Energy  (Fissile) Material Protection, Control, & Accounting  Reactor Core Conversion; Nonproliferation; Russian Transition; HEU Transparency; Plutonium Disposition  Department of State  Science & Technology Centers; Nonproliferation  Others  Department of Commerce  Department of Treasury   ~$10 billion total USG obligation authority thru FY 2002 ~$10 billion total allocations planned over the next 10 years Charles L. Thornton December 2002 7 The Former Soviet Union Challenge [graphic extracted] Charles L. Thornton December 2002 8 U.S. Department of Defense CTR Program Objectives 1. Assist Russia in accelerating strategic arms reduction to Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START) levels. 2. Enhance safety, security, control, accounting, & centralization of nuclear weapons & fissile material in the former Soviet Union to prevent their proliferation & encourage their reduction. 3. Assist Ukraine & Kazakhstan to eliminate START limited systems & weapons of mass destruction infrastructure. 4. Assist the former Soviet Union to eliminate & prevent proliferation of biological & chemical weapons & associated capabilities. 5. Encourage military reductions & reform, & reduce proliferation threats in the former Soviet Union. Charles L. Thornton December 2002 9 Nunn-Lugar Process [graphic extracted] Charles L. Thornton December 2002 10 U.S. DoD-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Overview of Implementation [graphic extracted] Charles L. Thornton December 2002 11 Eliminating Delivery Systems [graphic extracted] Charles L. Thornton December 2002 12 Securing Warheads & Fissile Material [graphic extracted] Charles L. Thornton December 2002 13 ASSESSMENT Charles L. Thornton December 2002 14 Why Study Nunn-Lugar?  1991: a new idea to address an acute threat  Any historical precedence?  Marshall Plan?  Now: it exists as a policy tool  proliferation is a prominent issue and generally considered to be a serious security issue  Nunn-Lugar addresses the supply side of the proliferation problem Charles L. Thornton December 2002 15 Criticisms of Nunn-Lugar  Nunn-Lugar is allowing Russia to sustain – and even expand – its vast and dispersed WMD complex  Nunn-Lugar funding allows Russia to divert its limited resources to operational military activities  this, in turn, may actually increase the threat to the U.S. in the long run  The U.S. government bureaucracy that has evolved is not centrally managed and often works at cross purposes Some aspects of the program have not begun to address their core missions  so, after 11 years is there really a threat?   The broader context: reducing Russia’s capabilities while simultaneously sustaining U.S. offensive and building U.S. defense capabilities sends a threatening message Charles L. Thornton December 2002 16 Existing Common Measures of Effectiveness  Financial: Appropriations; Obligation Rates; Disbursement Rates  most commonly used within DoD & USG  least helpful/explanatory  Program Management: Cost, Schedule, Performance  fine for contract evaluation, but what do they say about meeting policy & programmatic goals?  Scorecard All MOEs should be based generally on “threat reduction” and more specifically on “cooperative threat reduction” Charles L. Thornton December 2002 17  DoD CTR Scorecard Ukraine, Kazakhstan, & Belarus are Nuclear Weapons Free [graphic extracted] Charles L. Thornton December 2002 18 Potential Category: FSU WMD Rollback  Has the existence of the Nunn-Lugar program tangibly reduced the FSU WMD threat to the U.S.?  How would the threat have changed if there were no NunnLugar program? Does the U.S. have greater insight into the FSU WMD programs? Has the routinization of interaction between the U.S. and FSU military, bureaucratic, scientific, and industrial communities reduced the FSU WMD threat?   Charles L. Thornton December 2002 19 Potential Category: U.S. WMD Defense  Has the U.S. WMD-defense program benefited technically from the Nunn-Lugar program?  Note: this subject may be politically sensitive. It may be one that, while important to U.S. national security, proponents would not want to advertise. Russia has long been concerned that the U.S. is dismantling Russia’s military capabilities on the one hand, while simultaneously using what it learned through Nunn-Lugar to enhance U.S. defensive capabilities. Charles L. Thornton December 2002 20 Potential Category: FSU Nonproliferation I  FSU Threat Perception  has the existence of the Nunn-Lugar program reduced Russia’s threat perception, and therefore its need to retain a substantial WMD capability?  Treaties & Regimes  are the existing international regimes helpful to the Nunn-Lugar program?  do they contain MOEs that could be applied to the Nunn-Lugar program? Charles L. Thornton December 2002 21 Potential Category: FSU Nonproliferation II  Political  have the FSU domestic political conditions changed in favor of the Nunn-Lugar program?  have the U.S.-FSU international political conditions changed in favor of the Nunn-Lugar program?  has the Nunn-Lugar program had a positive effect on the FSU domestic political conditions?  has the Nunn-Lugar program had a positive effect on the U.S.-FSU international political conditions?  Human  is the FSU WMD scientific community meaningfully engaged?  is the “brain drain” problem being effectively addressed?  are the human elements of the program reducing or sustaining the WMD threat? Charles L. Thornton December 2002 22 Potential Category: FSU Nonproliferation III  Culture  has Nunn-Lugar improved the security culture among FSU personnel?  has Nunn-Lugar contributed to an overall awareness of the proliferation threat among FSU WMD personnel?  FSU International Cooperation  has Nunn-Lugar facilitated a greater U.S. understanding of FSU WMD cooperation with other states?  has Nunn-Lugar provided a greater U.S. understanding of what types of WMD capabilities other states possess? Charles L. Thornton December 2002 23 Potential Category: Security  Physical Security  has Nunn-Lugar measurably improved the security of the FSU’s existing stocks of WMD materials?  Export Controls  has Nunn-Lugar measurably improved the FSU’s export control capabilities?  has Nunn-Lugar measurably improved the FSU’s export control statutes and regulations? Charles L. Thornton December 2002 24 Potential Category: Programmatic  Has the Nunn-Lugar program met the technical implementation challenges?  are the solutions unique, or generalizable?  Does the U.S. have control of the financing for the critical path parts of each Nunn-Lugar project?  if Russia is responsible for any show-stopper funding requirements, what assurances are in place?  Are the program and policy objectives being met in a timely manner?  if not, what are the obstacles to rapid implementation?  if not, have the original objectives evolved appropriately, or are the current objectives outdated? Charles L. Thornton December 2002 25 FUTURE Charles L. Thornton December 2002 26 Preventive Defense Continuum formal arms control treaties confidence & security building measures parallel unilateral initiatives formal cooperative security arrangements & military alliances  executive agreements & consultative arrangements CTR: links with above, but something new:  an arrangement through which states work together to address common security objectives, generally implemented below the formal treaty level, and usually involving the donation of assistance from one state to another Charles L. Thornton December 2002 27 Nunn-Lugar’s Drivers  Arms Control Treaty/Agreement Obligations Safety & Security Economic Disintegration Military Security Political Instability Other      Charles L. Thornton December 2002 28 Nunn-Lugar’s Principles & Concepts  Cooperation Expectations Flexibility/Adaptability Relationships Economic and Industrial Development     Charles L. Thornton December 2002 29 Venues for a General Model  Bilateral Programs Multilateral Non-Governmental Organizations Commercial Associations Scientific Laboratories International Organizations International Groups December 2002 30       Charles L. Thornton Candidate Applications for a General Model      India-Pakistan North Korea  Supplement to Formal Arms Control  Post-Hostilities Iraq Tactical Nuclear Weapons Global Fissile Material Accounting  Replacement for Formal Arms Control Beyond WMD Threats  HIV/AIDS  Migration  Environmental Concerns Charles L. Thornton December 2002 31 Expanding the Nunn-Lugar Concept Already Underway?  G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Pakistan North Korea Yugoslavia     Sense of Congress Charles L. Thornton December 2002 32 Conclusions  Nunn-Lugar appears to be a policy tool with an established record and some momentum  but, not without its problems and detractors  Therefore, it deserves academic attention  PLEASE HELP ME GET STARTED! Charles L. Thornton December 2002 33