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The fight Al-Qa’ida has waged against the West has been fought on a virtual as well as physical battlefield. Recently, many jihadist strongholds and hiding places on the web have been shut down. This article charts the growth and the current crisis of Al-Qa’ida’s ‘media jihad’.
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THE RUSI JOURNAL
AL-QA’IDA’S VIRTUAL CRISIS
AKIL N AWAN AND MINA AL-LAMI
The fight Al-Qa’ida has waged against the West has been fought on a virtual as well as
physical battlefield. Recently, many jihadist strongholds and hiding places on the web
have been shut down. This article charts the growth and the current crisis of Al-Qa’ida’s
‘media jihad’.
O
ver the last five years, the ideo- starkly juxtaposed with the altruistic was still in its infancy,9 but also employ-
logical conflict that underlies actions of young Muslim men from across ing e-mail distribution lists to dissemi-
the ‘Global War on Terror’ the globe, perceived as having forsaken nate material to a diffuse but highly
has been conducted almost entirely on families, careers and even their lives in targeted audience. These pioneering
the Internet’s battlefield. As early as order to defend their Muslim brethren developments laid the groundwork for
2001, prominent jihadist ideologues like from further Serb atrocities, generated the ascendancy of the later media jihad,
Ayman Al-Zawahiri, acutely aware of immense public support for these ‘Muja- and are recognised and lauded as such
their increasingly marginalised status vis- hideen freedom fighters.’5 The renewed by contemporary jihadist strategist Abu
à-vis the mainstream media as a conse- vigour of a popularly conceived legiti- Musab Al-Suri in his Call to Global Islam-
quence of ‘the media war on terrorism’,2 mate defensive jihad necessitated media ic Resistance.10 Nevertheless, despite
appealed: organs that would publicise and convey being ahead of their time, jihadist media
websites during this period inevitably
we must get our message across to the Early jihadist websites adhered to a Web 1.0 paradigm, in some
cases as a result of their avowed limited
masses of the nation and break the
media siege imposed on the jihad move-
catered specifically to a remit of news provision, but principally
ment. This is an independent battle that thirst for news media due to technological limitations of the
we must launch side by side with the time.
military battle.3 news of the ‘heroic exploits of the Muja- The late 1990s also witnessed
hideen’ to sympathetic Muslim audi- Al-Qa’ida’s first official foray into the
Bemoaning this ‘media siege’, they ences around the world. Indeed early virtual realm with its now infamous
increasingly turned to the Internet, jihadist websites catered specifically to Alneda.com, which also sought to provide
which quickly surpassed all other media this news media need, as epitomised by news coverage from Muslim conflict
forms in becoming the principal platform the English language Azzam.com,6 which zones, but crucially located this report-
for the dissemination and mediation of described itself solely as ‘an independent age within a broader jihadist ideological
the culture and ideology of jihadism.4 media organisation providing authentic framework with a conspicuously prosely-
news and information about Jihad and tising bent. To this end, they published
Background the Foreign Mujahideen everywhere.’7 key statements, communiqués, works,
The history of jihadism on the web can The virtual media jihad continued to and treatises from leading jihadist ideo-
be traced back further still to the early gain momentum throughout the 1990s logues, including Osama bin Laden’s infa-
1990s, with the Bosnian War (1992– despite the denouement of the Bosnian
95) providing the initial impetus and conflict in 1995, as by this time the jihad- The late 1990s also
raison d’ être for the nascent jihadist ist media front had simply diverted its
web presence. As revelations of perva- gaze to the First Chechen War (1994–96) witnessed Al-Qa’ida’s
sive war crimes committed by Serbian and other nascent peripheral conflicts in
forces against Bosniak civilians began to the Muslim world. The developments of
first official foray into
emerge, foreign volunteers flocked to the jihadist media apparatus during this the virtual realm
Bosnia and fought alongside the Bosnian period were truly groundbreaking, with
army as part of the El-Mujahid Brigades. independent media groups such as the mous twin ‘fatwas’ upon which the new
The popular perception of an iniqui- seminal Islamic Media Center (IMC) not global jihad was crucially predicated.
tous UN arms embargo preventing the only producing and distributing online More insidiously, Alneda.com is also
Bosniaks from defending themselves, material,8 at a time when the Internet believed to have held steganographi-
© RUSI JOURNAL FEBRUARY 2009 VOL. 154 NO. 1 pp. 56–64 DOI: 10.1080/03071840902818605
AKIL N AWAN AND MINA AL-LAMI
the slogan ‘Hacked, tracked and now
owned by the USA’.15 Nevertheless, Alne-
da.com proved remarkably resilient, and
despite losing its domain name, contin-
ued to operate until at least 2003 as an
Internet parasite by furtively embedding
itself deep within the seemingly innocu-
ous sub-directories of multiple oblivi-
ous host websites.16 Messner’s tentative
successes inspired others to follow suit
and anti-jihadist cyber-vigilantes and
amateur sleuths, unfettered by official
governmental qualms over the infringe-
ment of constitutional guarantees for
freedoms of speech, and occasionally
employing illegal methods, emerged in
the renewed patriotic vigour of the post-
Many sites were
fleeting and
disappeared within
weeks or months
9/11 milieu. Notable amongst these was
the ‘Internet Haganah’ which, describing
itself as a ‘global intelligence network
dedicated to confronting internet activi-
ties by Islamists and their supporters,
enablers and apologists’,17 employed a
cally encrypted operational information sion a major news agency had investigat- ‘name and shame’ strategy by identify-
online, in addition to surreptitiously ed the website in relation to a story and ing site hosts and administrators and
directing trusted members to more clan- contacted the Internet Service Provider then informing the ISP on the nature of
destine websites.12 Concomitantly, this (ISP) for comment, who then baulked the material in question. Jihadist sites
evolutionary phase of the jihadist media at the prospect of continuing to host were often then suspended by their ISPs
front also witnessed the appropriation on the basis of unearthed content that
of early Web 2.0 capabilities, with the It was only following violated their terms of service, sustained
development of rudimentary online lobbying campaigns from other site visi-
forums and blogs, where users not only the momentous tors, or even implied threats of prosecu-
passively consumed online content but
actively contributed to its creation too.
events of 9/11 that tion for materially aiding and abetting
terrorists. In other cases, jihadist sites
the jihadist media were frequently hacked, usurped using
Post 9/11 programmes like ‘Snapback’, or expe-
Whilst the 1998 twin terrorist bomb- presence really became rienced incessant DoS attacks. In the
ings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam an object of intense three years since its inception in 2002
and Nairobi focused greater attention until 2005, the Internet Haganah alone
of security services on the communica- international scrutiny claimed to have been responsible for,
tive and operational uses of the Inter- or assisted in, the shutdown of more
net by Al-Qa’ida and affiliated groups, it the ‘terrorist content’ in the new secu- than 600 sites it claims were ‘linked
was only following the momentous rity climate.14 Shortly thereafter, Alneda. to terror’.18 Indeed, so pervasive was
events of 9/11 that the jihadist media com’s subsequent incarnation was then this sustained assault that it resulted
presence really became an object of famously usurped by American porn- in perhaps one of the most enduring
intense international scrutiny. Indeed site owner Jon Messner for five days in features of virtual jihadist media, namely
Alneda.com, was shut down at least August 2002 before site administrators their almost ephemeral nature. Many
three times in 2002 alone due to denial- became aware of what had transpired, sites were fleeting and disappeared
of-service (DoS) attacks.13 On each occa- at which point he replaced the site with within weeks or months, resurfacing
57
AL-QA’IDA’S VIRTUAL CRISIS
shortly thereafter under different names since its inception, and in spite of the untraceable and indeed many jihadist
and guises, and with different ISPs. US fact that the site owner was surprisingly web forums actively encouraged users
security officials, who had adroitly moni- candid with her own personal details.24 to employ many of these methods as a
tored key websites over prolonged peri- Consequently, this observation combined safety precaution before engaging in any
ods for intelligence purposes, were often with the sophisticated and high-end potentially incriminating virtual activ-
exasperated by these Internet vigilantes, production values led some jihadist ity.27
whose reckless actions inevitably drove sites, such as Azzam.com and Maktabah The transition to Web 2.0 precipi-
the groups further underground and Al-Ansaar, to cast aspersion on the site’s tated the ascendancy of public and
away from surveillance.19 authenticity in 2002, claiming that it was semi-public, password-protected forums
During this period, security servic- a CIA front designed to monitor and even (muntadayat), which implicitly shifted
es also began to take an active interest entrap potential jihadists.25 the onus of responsibility for content
in those suspected of running jihadist from administrators to users. Site admin-
websites and in December 2003, thirty- Transition to Web 2.0 istrators further absolved themselves of
one year old British IT support special- The sustained assault on the jihadist liability by posting disclaimers such as
ist, Babar Ahmad, was arrested under media front resulted in a climate of anxie- this one from the Al-Hesba forum which,
the UK Terrorism Act 2000 in connection ty amongst Al-Qa’ida and jihadist website somewhat conspicuously on an Arabic
with Azzam.com.20 Highlighting the inad- administrators, precipitating the reali- forum, was offered in English: ‘The post-
equacy of existing terrorism legislation sation that the virtual jihadist presence ings in the discussion forums do not
that was unable to prosecute against an needed to be decentralised in the same undergo monitoring, and do not neces-
inchoate offence of ‘glorifying terrorism’ way that it was becoming physically,26 sarily reflect Alhesbah’s views. Alhesbah
(controversially later remedied with the such that attacks on any one node would claims no responsibility or liability to third
Terrorism Act 2006), he was released six not render the entire system defunct. party links or images contained within
days later without charge, albeit after Moreover, the change of strategy would users’ posts.’28 The disclaimer from the
allegedly being severely brutalised in also need to ensure they would be suffi- Mujahedon.net forum was even more
police custody.21 Nevertheless, the grav- ciently buffered from any potential legal guarded: ’The postings in the discussion
ity with which governments began to ramifications of hosting jihadist content forums do not undergo monitoring, and
view the jihadist media threat warranted do not necessarily reflect Mujahedon.
Ahmad’s re-arrest eight months later, Security services also net views. Mujahedon.net claims NO
following a US extradition request on responsibility or liability to third party
charges of providing material support to began to take an links or images contained within users’
terrorists and conspiring to kill persons in active interest in those posts. We do not encourage any kind of
a foreign country.22 In a damning indict- “terrorism” and we follow Swedish law
ment of British justice, as of February suspected of running and order i.e. freedom of speech.’29
2009, and still awaiting potential extradi-
tion, Babar Ahmad had been held for over
jihadist websites For many years a select clique of
Arabic, password-protected forums
four years without trial or charge by Brit- in future. The glaringly obvious solution provided the key arena for jihadist
ish authorities, as the UK Extradition Act to both circumventing culpability vis-à-vis media, with important communiqués,
2003 did not require the US to provide online content, and decentralising media statements, interviews, books, manuals
prima facie evidence when requesting efforts entailed little more than complet- and audiovisual content appearing first
the extradition of UK residents. ing the transition to Web 2.0, thus dele- and (sometimes exclusively) on them.
The systematic disruption or gating responsibility for user-generated In addition to the provision of content,
removal of important jihadist websites, content to a suitably large and diffuse forums also served as an important
and the pending prosecution of indi- body of anonymous web users instead, communications medium for the global
viduals responsible for key sites, was so who would ensure the longevity of the cadres of jihad and their wider audi-
successful that websites which appeared message irrespective of attacks on any ences, which aside from facilitating the
unscathed by the campaign inevitably single node. Although Internet access did discussion and dissemination of new
faced suspicion. For example, the jihad- leave a ‘digital signature’ of sorts, issues material, also allowed ‘outreach’ facili-
ist news provider Jihadunspun.com, had of traceability of users were easily over- ties through which the uninitiated were
been so credible in its stated role that it come through various means such as the able to express discontent and discover
was at one point appearing within the use of anonymous peer-to-peer (P2P) a channel for its expression.30 Despite
top five search results on Google for networks, ‘anonymising’ software that the presumed egalitarian nature of Web
the term ‘jihad’, and included in Google masked a computer’s actual IP address, 2.0 spaces, Jihadist media production on
News as a bona fide ‘news provider’, and the use of proxy servers which acted key forums was hierarchically organised
much to the chagrin of US officials and as intermediaries between users and and strictly regulated, with actors (e.g.
anti-jihadist civic groups.23 Moreover, host servers thus masking users’ iden- Al-Qa’ida in Iraq – ISI), producers (e.g.
Jihadunspun.com had continued to tities. Consequently, employment of Al-Furqan), distributors (e.g. Al-Fajr),
publish content with apparent impunity such methods effectively rendered users and specific forum posters controlling
© RUSI JOURNAL FEBRUARY 2009
AKIL N AWAN AND MINA AL-LAMI
been fears of unpolished and unprofes-
sional content undermining the credibil-
ity of jihadist media and diverting atten-
tion from ‘official’ sources.34
Growing unease over the popularity
and apparent ubiquity of jihadist media
in Web 2.0 arenas, and its putative role
in processes of radicalisation amongst
young Western Muslim diasporic audi-
ences,35 caused disproportionate alarm
amongst not only Western governments
and security services, but also within the
media and thus broader society. Often
with little understanding of the nature
or function of jihadist content or the role
of the Internet,36 attempts were made to
curtail the ‘media exuberance’ of jihad-
ist sympathisers on mainstream Web
2.0 fora. For example, in 2006 follow-
ing alerts from anti-jihadist groups, USA
Today investigated some of the ‘jihad-
ist’ communities hosted on the social
networking website Orkut.com.37 In light
Al-Qa’ida’s second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri. of this unwanted scrutiny, Google (who
owned Orkut.com) felt compelled to
symbolically delete some of the ‘terror-
every stage of the process.31 Thus users by either perpetrators or subsequent ism-related content’ alongside a number
on these forums were often more akin to disseminators of the act. Moreover, the of the more avowedly jihadist commu-
traditional categories of passive media dissemination of the culture, ideology nities hosted there.38 Indicative of the
consumers that appeared inimical to the and media of jihadism across communi- floundering uncertainty characteristic of
revolution in audience roles heralded by ties on social networking sites like Orkut. this period, in another case from 2006,
Web 2.0. com and Facebook.com, and virtual
The meteoric rise and growth of worlds like Second Life was significant in The meteoric rise and
jihadist forums was also accompanied that these constituted novel arenas that
by the rapid adoption of other Web 2.0 appeared to be beyond the scope of offi-
growth of jihadist
tools that fostered more genuine collab- cial jihadist media organs. Consequently, forums was also
oration and participation, including the jihadist message, intended for, or
file-sharing portals, podcasts, personal only available to, smaller parochial audi- accompanied by the
spaces, social networking sites, virtual ences was increasingly granted much rapid adoption of other
worlds and the blogosphere. This was more diffuse audience penetration.
hardly surprising considering that Web However, this diffuse dissemination Web 2.0 tools
2.0 applications increasingly became the of jihadist content across Web 2.0 plat-
most popular sites on the Web during forms outside of the ambit of forums, the very same organisation – Google
this period.32 Mainstream file-sharing was not necessarily welcomed by Jihad- – chose not to censor content on its lead-
platforms like YouTube.com, which host- ist media organs. Indeed, in Septem- ing weblog hosting service Blogspot.com,
ed jihadist videos, such as statements ber of 2006, Al-Boraq Media Institute after it was accused of hosting several
from Al-Qa’ida leaders and IED attacks published a detailed policy document sites for actual terrorist groups such as
on Coalition forces, were instrumental entitled ‘Media Exuberance’ which Al-Qa’ida in Iraq.39 In the wake of persis-
in facilitating the wider dissemination of sought to curtail the unsanctioned and tent complaints, Google responded by
jihadist content, and significantly, outside ‘exuberant’ proliferation and production maintaining its policy of free expression,
of its traditional ambit too. For example, of unattributed jihadist media by free- accepting that some of their blogs may
the video beheading of Nick Berg was lance amateurs, which it felt was divest- be unpopular or deemed offensive and
downloaded from Ogrish.com (a popular ing key jihadist media organs (As-Sahab, instead posted disclaimers and warnings
‘gore’ site) a staggering 15 million times Al-Fajr, Global Islamic Media Front etc.) before flagged blogs that read: ‘Some
upon release,33 which granted the mate- of control over production, mediation readers of this blog have contacted
rial a considerably higher publicity profile and dissemination of jihadist content. Google because they believe this blog’s
than could have possibly been envisaged The principal concerns appeared to have content is hateful. In general, Google
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AL-QA’IDA’S VIRTUAL CRISIS
does not review nor do we endorse the were removed, and a number of users ‘Result of Seven Years of Crusades’,
content of this or any blog.’40 with usernames explicitly lionising jihad which was designed to coincide with the
or jihadist leaders had their accounts commemorations of 9/11 and had been
Lieberman Campaign suspended,46 most jihadist videos which eagerly anticipated on jihadist forums.
The most high profile campaign to curtail did not contain ‘violent or hate speech The wave of unprecedented closures
the activities of jihadist media on main- content’ were not removed as they did may also have been linked to the arrest
stream Web 2.0 fora emerged in May of not violate community guidelines. of five key individuals on the same day
2008, when US Senator Joseph Lieber- by the Saudi Ministry of Interior for
man wrote to Google urging them to Forum Closures propagating terrorist thought over the
‘immediately remove content produced Despite this new security environment in Internet, using numerous pseudonyms
by Islamist terrorist organizations from which growing concerns over virtual radi- and accounts to promote and dissemi-
YouTube’, which he suggested Al-Qa’ida calisation and recruitment came to the nate Al-Qa’ida’s ideas on multiple jihad-
and ‘Islamist terrorist organizations use fore, jihadist forums continued to oper- ist forums.47 It is entirely feasible that
to disseminate their propaganda, enlist ate, at least superficially, with apparent these individuals were key forum admin-
followers, and provide weapons training impunity. Behind the scenes however, istrators whose physical incarceration
– activities that are all essential to terror- the innate nature and liability disclaim- not only spelt the end of their virtual
ist activity’.41 His lobbying campaign was ers of jihadist forums, which provided personas, but also the ability to resur-
predominantly based upon the find- some protection from potential incrimi- rect the forums for which they were
ings of the 2008 report ‘Violent Islamist nation, failed to furnish immunity from responsible. Whilst a statement from the
Extremism, the Internet, and the Home- the ongoing anti-jihadist web assault. Al-Fajr Media Centre rushed to assure its
grown Terrorist Threat’ by the Senate Consequently the roster of top forums followers that the downing of the three
Committee on Homeland Security and used by Al-Qa’ida changed on a regular sites was due to ‘technical problems’,
Governmental Affairs, which he himself members on other forums fulminated
chaired.42 He further pressed, ‘this ‘CIA agents and Al- against the ‘vicious attack’, which they
should be a straightforward task since claimed originated variously with the
so many of the Islamist terrorist organi- Fajr experts engaged ‘Anglo-Americans, Zionist-Crusaders or
zations brand their material with logos in one of the fiercest Saudis’.48 One prominent article posted
or icons identifying their provenance. In on numerous forums, entitled ‘The film
addition, please explain what changes electronic battles in the that downed the three sites’ suggested
Google plans to make to the YouTube
community guidelines to address violent
history of cyberwar’ that: ‘While 9/11 2008 seemed to be a
quiet and normal day to many, there was
extremist material and how Google plans basis, subject to site closures, transfers turmoil behind the scenes. CIA agents
to enforce those guidelines to prevent and hacking attempts. Nevertheless, as and Al-Fajr experts engaged in one of the
the content from reappearing’. Google a genre, jihadist forums survived and fiercest electronic battles in the history
initially refused to honour Lieberman’s continued to wholly dominate the virtu- of cyberwar’.49 Moreover, it suggested
request of removing all such material, al jihadist landscape. In fact, the stark the attack had been prompted by the
defending the decision on their blog: juxtaposition of the jihadists’ success release of the video to the CIA from Al-
‘While we respect and understand his in propounding their narrative, and Jazeera, who had been sent a copy ahead
views, YouTube encourages free speech the dismal failure of the Global War on of its release in the expectation that they
and defends everyone’s right to express Terror to either silence or counter this would broadcast the video in full.50
unpopular points of view. We believe message, engendered an aura of invin- Despite the setback, the delayed
that YouTube is a richer and more rele- cibility around these forums. In terms of video did eventually surface on other
vant platform for users precisely because propagandistic value alone, they became forums and file-sharing platforms
it hosts a diverse range of views, and the bane of governments everywhere, (including YouTube), albeit after the
rather than stifle debate, we allow our and apparently little could be done to all important commemorative date of
users to view all acceptable content and mitigate their effects. However, contrary 9/11 had passed. While this strategic
make up their own minds.’43 However, to all expectations, the jihadist forums blow to Al-Qa’ida’s media capabilities
this statement was somewhat prema- suffered a momentous reversal on 10 was widely lauded, it was not accompa-
ture as Google appeared to acquiesce September 2008, when, without warn- nied by attendant claims of responsibil-
to Lieberman’s relentless lobbying only ing, the three main forums sponsored ity. Consequently, speculation was rife
four months later,44 with the announce- by Al-Fajr Media Centre (Al-Qa’ida’s over who might be responsible, with a
ment that YouTube had in fact revised key media wing), Al-Ikhlaas, Al-Firdaws, number of potential culprits including
its community guidelines to dissuade and Al-Buraq, suddenly ceased to oper- state bodies (mainly USA, UK, Israel and
the uploading of material that would fall ate. The immediate antecedent to the Saudi Arabia), counter-terrorism groups,
under Lieberman’s new ‘potentially radi- forums’ disruption appeared to have anti-jihadist vigilantes, Shia groups, and
calising’ terrorist rubric.45 While many been the imminent release of Al-Qa’ida’s even Al-Qa’ida itself, who, it was suggest-
videos advocating or depicting violence latest video production by As-Sahab, ed, felt that their media was proving far
© RUSI JOURNAL FEBRUARY 2009
AKIL N AWAN AND MINA AL-LAMI
too revelatory in terms of intelligence were also rendered offline. The only cred- jihadist forums), and the group provided
information. ible jihadist forum still extant was now an effective functional alternative within
The disruption of these three key Al-Faloja, which quickly became oversat- this otherwise censored environment.
forums severely curbed the Jihadists’ urated with new members and material. However, the tentative success of Knights
communication and dissemination capa- Still reeling from the loss of their virtual of Al-Nusra Invasion was to be short-
bilities, leaving only the veteran Al-Hesba sanctuary and anticipating the imminent lived, and on 20 December, the burgeon-
forum to maintain Al-Qa’ida’s official web closure of Al-Faloja, members frantically ing Facebook group itself was closed,
presence. However, Al-Hesba, one of the searched for viable alternatives. leaving supporters completely bereft
earliest and by far most credible jihadist of exclusively jihadist virtual arenas.
forums, proved incapable of absorbing Facebook However, in a rapidly changing environ-
the influx of virtual refugees from the The most popular solution propounded ment, Shumookh Al-Islam reopened on
closed forums, particularly as its strict was the ‘Invasion of Facebook’ project, the same day, and was followed a few
security measures would only grant with key members stating, ‘we shall start days later by the reinstatement of Al-
membership upon recommendation using Facebook as a new jihadi media tool
from a credible current member. Other and to counter the ongoing cyber-attack Whether or not jihadist
less popular forums, such as Al-Faloja, on jihadi websites. Through posting our
and Shumook Al-Islam51 attempted to fill productions and news on Facebook, we
forums can re-emerge
the void by accepting the mass of virtual will be able to reach the American public remains to be seen
jihadist refugees, and consequently, both opinion and make it see the facts its
grew considerably in popularity and stat- administration is trying so hard to hide’.52 Faloja on 23 December 2008. Neverthe-
ure in subsequent weeks. Despite the The campaign stressed its unique advan- less, as of January 2009, the four key
availability of these alternative platforms, tages as an effective networking tool of jihadist forums – Al-Ikhlaas, Al-Firdaws,
forum members were cognisant of the global reach, illustrating this point with Al-Buraq and Al-Hesba – remain closed
fact that jihadist media itself was now reference to Barack Obama’s prolific use in the gravest indication of the future of
facing its gravest existential threat, and of Facebook during his successful elec- Al-Qa’ida’s official presence on the web.
that lesser forums would inevitably be tion campaign. Members advocating
targeted next. Rather than meekly await this strategy argued that it was entirely Conclusion
the inevitable, they turned their atten- inconceivable that intelligence agencies Whether or not jihadist forums can re-
tion to proactively countering the assault could close Facebook, and in the event of emerge remains to be seen, however,
instead, and with the motto ‘today your specific Facebook group closures, would even if they were to be resurrected or
sites, tomorrow your lands and homes’, simply persist in constantly creating new replaced in the immediate future, it
ad hoc groups like the Internet Invasion groups and new accounts, in addition to could not remove the tarnished image
Brigade of Al-Maghreb and Al-Nusra invading other non-jihadist groups. The of the impotent and fickle nature of a
Media Brigade were formed specifically purpose of creating a group on Facebook, beleaguered movement. Conversely,
to engage in a virtual counter-initiative. suggested one member on Al-Faloja, ‘is the sustained assault on jihadist forums
This info-war would be conducted princi- not to introduce jihadi forum members has not resulted in a jihadist informa-
pally along three fronts: to Facebook, but to introduce Facebook tion blackout that many security serv-
users to jihadi forums’. ices naively anticipated, and jihadism,
1) by disseminating jihadist content The Facebook appeal received albeit in somewhat attenuated form,
through Web 2.0 file-sharing portals widespread support on Al-Faloja, with has survived and indeed spread unim-
(focusing on uncensored sites like prominent animated advertisements peded across other Web 2.0 platforms.
Megavideo.com, and Tubemogul. and banners which read ‘Al-Faloja forum Naturally, this diffuse web penetration
com, following YouTube’s increasing invites you to invade Facebook’, publicis- has displayed some limitations, particu-
censorship of jihadist content); ing the campaign. In a prescient move, larly as other Web 2.0 fora are unable
2) by identifying and invading sites senior members filled with a sense of to competently fulfil all of the functions
in order to spread the jihadist ideol- foreboding asked fellow members to served by forums. For example, popular
ogy, with a particular focus on ‘quickly subscribe to Facebook before all file-sharing platforms cannot cater for
moderate Arabic forums and popu- our forums are hacked’, and on 12 Decem- non audiovisual content,54 or serve as a
lar social networking sites like Face- ber 2008, the plan finally came to fruition communications medium. Moreover, the
book; with the establishment of the Facebook media environment provided by these
3) by hacking ‘Western’ sites. group ‘Knights of Al-Nusra Invasion’.53 platforms impose their own restrictions
Barely a week later, on 19 December, al- and censorship, and so while Youtube
However, whilst these plans were Faloja joined the growing list of closed continues to host propagandistic films
being formulated, more jihadist forums jihadist forums. However, by this time like As-Sahab’s ‘The Power of Truth’ and
suffered closure and by late November the Facebook group membership had ‘Result of Seven Years of Crusades’,55 it
2008 Al-Hesba, Shumookh Al-Islam, proliferated (with many members joining nevertheless actively deletes graphic
Hanein and the English site Infovlad.net under their familiar nom de guerres from violence such as beheading videos or
61
AL-QA’IDA’S VIRTUAL CRISIS
footage of ‘Juba the Sniper’. Perhaps of physically engage in the jihad. Such indi- ambit. Moreover, this trend parallels
greater concern to jihadists has been viduals had, in the past, been shamed the evolution of the jihadist movement
the evolution of a far less controlled and for remaining behind and limiting their itself, which has metastasized across the
non-hierarchical media environment, in contribution to words rather than deeds. globe as a social phenomenon – crucially
which the role of jihadist authorities in However, the rise of the ‘media jihad’ amongst a younger, unaffiliated, and
setting the agenda amongst supporters legitimised this choice, and media jihad- increasingly diasporic demographic for
and framing the ‘jihad’ is contested, and ists gained a modicum of respectability. whom Al-Qa’ida represents little more
ultimately threatens to divest Al-Qa’ida However, in the absence of this arena, it than a motif.
leadership of all but a perfunctory spir- seems inevitable that more virtual and The jihadists’ goal, ultimately, is to
itual role. media jihadists may feel compelled to communicate a meta-narrative – a prism
Ironically, this unheralded and relinquish their virtual personas in favour through which they require the Muslim
unprecedented disruption of jihadist of real-life jihadist operations. masses to view contemporary conflicts
media may in fact make individuals more It is difficult to foresee the long-
susceptible to radicalisation (at least in
the short term), as divesting potential
term effects of this sustained assault
in such a rapidly shifting environment,
It is difficult to foresee
jihadists of both cathartic spaces to vent however it would be eminently impru- the long-term effects of
grievances and frustration,56 and remov- dent and premature to characterise
this episode as the tolling of the death this sustained assault
Jihadist media have knell for jihadist media. Jihadist media
have shown remarkable resilience in as part of a wider global attack on Islam,
shown remarkable the past, in their ability to utilise new by what they perceive to be the Zion-
technological innovations, to adapt to ist-Crusader alliance, in response to
resilience in the past the restrictive measures increasingly which they claim to serve as the crucial
imposed upon them, and to continue vanguard. The unsanctioned and exuber-
ing online fora in which to conduct ‘media to operate with apparent impunity in a ant proliferation of jihadist media over
or information Jihad’, may lead to a resort hostile socio-political context. Although diffuse Web 2.0 fora by autonomous
to actual physical violence and terrorism. jihadist media is indeed facing its grav- individuals may serve to divest Al-Qa’da
For example, a posting on Shumookh Al- est existential threat to date, the crisis of control of the message. But the over-
Islam (following its reinstatement on 20 is liable to simply expedite the evolu- arching narrative is so alluringly simple,
December 2008) lamented, ‘with the tion of jihadist media that is already and so germane to current events, that
closure of all our sites, you [the Crusad- well underway. This evolutionary phase its self-perpetuation is assured, so long
ers and their agents] have left us with no is witness to the inexorable transition as ‘Islamic’ conflicts remain unresolved
choice but to physically join the caravan from strictly regulated, hierarchical and Muslim grievances persist. ■
of jihad. With no jihadi sites through media provision in exclusively jihadist
which we can support our brother Muja- virtual arenas (which stifled debate and Dr Akil N Awan is RCUK Fellow and
hideen, there is no point for us to stay proverbially preached to the converted), Lecturer in International Terrorism at
behind. We shall join them. Your act has to decentralised, autonomous, diffuse Royal Holloway, University of London.
shamed us and caused us to think “what media production and dissemination
is left for us?”’ One of the previous over unregulated, and easily contested Ms Mina Al-Lami is a Research Associate
perennial debates on jihadist forums had Web 2.0 platforms, to multifarious audi- at Royal Holloway, University of London.
focused on the status of those who fail to ences outside of the traditional jihadist
NOTES
1 This article draws on research 3 Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Fursan Taht Rayah during the 1980s to denote Muslim
undertaken for the Economic and Al-Nabi (Knights Under the Prophet’s fighters during the Soviet invasion
Social Research Council research Banner), Part 11, Section 1A (2001), of Afghanistan), see for example US
project: ‘Legitimising the discourses of <http://alarabnews.com/alshaab/GIF/28- Assistant Secretary of State and Peace
radicalisation: political violence in the 12-2001/Zawahri.htm>. Envoy to Bosnia Richard Holbrooke’s use
new media ecology’, led by Andrew of the term in a 2005 interview
Hoskins (University of Warwick), Ben 4 A N Awan, ‘Virtual Jihadist media: with PBS <http://www.pbs.org/
O’Loughlin and Akil N Awan (both Royal Function, legitimacy, and radicalising newshour/bb/bosnia/july-dec05/
Holloway University of London). efficacy’, European Journal of Cultural holbrooke_11-22.html>.
Studies (Vol. 10, No. 3, 2007),
2 P Hammond, ‘The Media War on pp. 389–408. 6 Azzam.com was run by the UK
Terrorism’, Journal for Crime, Conflict publishing house Azzam Publications
and the Media (Vol. 1, No.1, 2003), pp. 5 This was a common and uncontested and eponymously named after Abdullah
23–36. designation at the time (just as it was Yusuf Azzam, a highly influential
© RUSI JOURNAL FEBRUARY 2009
AKIL N AWAN AND MINA AL-LAMI
Palestinian scholar and advocate for 14 Paul Eedle, ‘Al-Qa’ida Takes Fight For subsequent activism, <http://www.
defensive jihad, particularly during the “Hearts And Minds” To The Web’, Jane’s jihadunspun.com/articles/20030911-
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He also Intelligence Review (August 2002). ashes.to.light/>.
served as an early mentor for Osama bin
Laden in Afghanistan. 15 Mike Boettcher, ‘Pornographer says 25 Interestingly, the claim was iterated
he hacked al Qaeda: “I wanted to do by Rita Katz, director of the Search For
7 The website is no longer active, however, something...I know the Internet”’, CNN. International Terrorist Entities Institute
an archived version of its mission com, 9 August 2002, <http://archives. in 2003; S Shane, ‘The Web as al-Qaida’s
statement can be found at <http://web. cnn.com/2002/US/08/08/porn.patriot/>. Safety Net’, The Baltimore Sun, 28
archive.org/web/20000510182502/ March, 2003.
http://www.azzam.com/>. 16 Michelle Delio, ‘Al-Qaeda website
refuses to die’, Wired.com, 7 April 2003, 26 See for example, Abu Musab Al-Suri’s
8 Professional audiovisual content was <http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/ theory of ‘nizam la tanzim’ (system and
naturally distributed on CD-ROMs in an news/2003/04/58356>. not organisation) which advocates a
era prior to high speed Internet access, ‘leaderless resistance’ in his 2005 Call to
broadband and live video streaming, but 17 <http://internet-haganah.com>; Global Islamic Resistance.
sold online through the websites, for Haganah is a Hebrew word meaning
example Azzam Publications produced ‘defence’ that stems from the name 27 The now defunct mujahedon.net forum
and sold a number of titles, including of an early Zionist militia operating in provided detailed instructions on the
the renowned ‘Martyrs of Bosnia’, and British Mandate Palestine. use of such methods for new users
‘Russian Hell in the Year 2000’. in the form of a sticky post featured
18 Jonathan Lasker, ‘Watchdogs sniff out prominently on its homepage.
9 Lia Brynjar, ‘Jihadi Web Media terror sites’, Wired.com, 25 February
Production’, paper presented to 2005, <http://www.wired.com/politics/ 28 <http://www.alhesbah.com>
‘Check the Web: Monitoring, research security/news/2005/02/66708>.
and analysis of jihadist activities on 29 <http://www.mujahedon.net>
the Internet’, Berlin, 26–27 February 19 Carmen Gentile, ‘Cyber Vigilantes Track
2007, <www.mil.no/multimedia/ Extremist Web Sites, Intelligence Experts 30 Akil N Awan, ‘Virtual Jihadist media:
archive/00092/Jihadi_Web_Media_Pro_ Balk at Effort’, FoxNews.com, 22 March Function, legitimacy, and radicalising
92100a.pdf>. 2008, <http://www.foxnews.com/ efficacy’.
story/0,2933,340613,00.html>.
10 Abu-Musab Al-Suri, ‘Theory of Media 31 For a detailed study of the media
and Incitement in the Call to Global 20 The actual website, Azzam.com, had production process, see Daniel Kimmage,
Islamic Resistance’ in Call to Global been officially shut down shortly after The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual
Islamic Resistance, Chapter 8, 9/11, however a number of mirror-sites Network Behind the Global Message
section 8 (2005). Available at persisted for some time thereafter. (RFE/RL: Washington, 2008).
<http://mobasher.110mb.com/
AbuMusabSyrian.htm>. 21 Although the resulting Independent 32 As of January 2009, a search on Alexa.
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) com revealed that seven out of its top
11 These were the 1996 ‘Declaration of inquiry concluded Ahmad‘s complaints ten websites worldwide in terms of
War against the Americans Occupying could not be substantiated, the ‘Free traffic ranking (excluding search engines)
the Land of the Two Holy Places’ and Babar Ahmad Campaign’ maintains could be classified as belonging to Web
the 1998 ‘Statement from the World allegations of systematic abuse, see 2.0.
Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and <http://www.cageprisoners.com/
Crusaders’, available at <http://www. prisoners.php?id=1268>. 33 David Talbot, ‘Terror‘s Server’, in
mideastweb.org/osamabinladen1.htm>. Technology Review, February 2005,
22 USA v Babar Ahmad, Affidavit in support <http://www. technologyreview.com/
12 G Weimann, United States Institute of of request for extradition of Babar web/14150/?a=f>.
Peace Special Report No. 116 Ahmad. No. 3:04M240(WIG), September
‘www.terror.net – How Modern 2004, <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ 34 David Kimmage, The Al-Qaeda Media
Terrorism uses the Internet’ ct/Documents/AHMAD%20extradition Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the
(Washington, 2004), <http://www.usip. %20affidavit.pdf>. Global Message.
org/pubs/specialreports /sr116.html>.
23 Akil N Awan, ‘Virtual Jihadist media: 35 For more on processes of radicalisation,
13 Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are Function, legitimacy, and radicalising see A N Awan, ‘Antecedents of Islamic
attempts to make a computer resource efficacy’. Political Radicalism Among Muslim
unavailable to its intended users, usually Communities in Europe’, Political Science
by saturating the target with external 24 The site was run by Khadija Abdul & Politics (Vol. 41, No. 1, 2008),
communications requests, such that it Qahaar (formerly Beverly Giesbrecht) pp. 13–17.
cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or from Vancouver, BC, Canada. A lengthy
responds so slowly as to be rendered biography entitled From Ashes to Light 36 In the most prominent example, Judge
effectively unavailable. chronicles her conversion to Islam and Peter Openshaw, presiding over the 2007
63
AL-QA’IDA’S VIRTUAL CRISIS
trial of ‘cyber-Jihadist’ Younes Tsouli (aka 41 For a copy of the letter see portion of the video and were fiercely
Irhaabi007) interrupted proceedings to <http://lieberman.senate.gov/ criticised by Al-Qa’ida sympathisers on
state, ‘The trouble is I don’t understand newsroom/release.cfm?id=298006>. Arabic forums for ‘manipulating’ public
the language. I don’t really understand opinion by broadcasting only parts of the
what a website is’; Lewis Page, ‘Judge 42 The report can be accessed at video that made Al-Qa’ida appear ‘as if
in tech trial says he “doesn’t know <http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/ it’s descending from loss to defeat’.
what a website is”’ TheRegister.com, IslamistReport.pdf>.
17 May 2007, <http://www.theregister. 51 This is spelt online as Shmo5alislam.net,
co.uk/2007/05/17/judge_website_ 43 See <http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot. using the phonetic system that replaces
shocker>. com/2008/05/dialogue-with-sen- unique Arabic consonants with Latin
lieberman-on.html>. numerals.
37 K Hunt, ‘Osama bin laden fan clubs build
online communities’, in USA Today, 8 44 As a triumphant statement on 52 See for example <http://www.al-faloja.
March 2006, <http://www.usatoday. Lieberman’s website announced, info>.
com/tech/news/2006-03-08-orkut-al- see <http://lieberman.senate.gov/
qaeda_x.htm>. newsroom/release.cfm?id=302825>. 53 The now defunct group was available
at <http://www.facebook.com/group.
38 Examples of explicitly-named jihadist 45 See <http://uk.youtube.com/ php?gid=56004446512>.
communities on Orkut included: ‘Osama blog?entry=YMavGxHoewU>.
Bin Laden tHe HeRo’, <http://www.orkut. 54 A particularly pertinent point considering
com/Community.aspx?cmm=3595115>; 46 For example see <http://www.youtube. that text materials account for the vast
and ‘Jihad lovers’, <http://www.orkut. com/user/mujahidfesabeelillah>. majority of jihadist media production;
com/Community.aspx?cmm=31397322>. Kimmage’s 2008 study of jihadist media
47 ‘Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, ‘Saudi Arrests Five showed that in July 2007, text products
39 These include ‘The Caliphate Voice Web “jihadis”’, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (statements, periodicals, essays, books)
Channel’, <http://cvc-online.blogspot. 10 September 2008, <http://www. accounted for 90 per cent whilst videos
com> and the previous incarnation, asharqalawsat.com/english/news. accounted for only 9 per cent.
‘The Mujahideen Shura Council’, asp?section=1&id=14016>.
<http://albayanat.blogspot.com>. 55 Available at <http://uk.youtube.
48 See for example <http://www.alhesbah. com/watch?v=l_ooEt-yoaA> and
40 Dana Rosenblatt, ‘Cyber-spies tracking com>. <http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=
terror on Web’, CNN.com, 29 September puecNYmQXQc> respectively.
2006, <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/ 49 Taken from the ‘Al-Jazeera talk’ forum
WORLD/europe/09/28/internet. <http://www.aljazeeratalk.net/>. 56 A N Awan, ‚Radicalization on the
spying/>. Internet? The Virtual Propagation of
50 Al-Jazeera in fact only aired a small Jihadist Media and its Effects‘, in RUSI
Journal (Vol. 152, No. 3, June 2007).
© RUSI JOURNAL FEBRUARY 2009
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