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					               APPEALS COURT OF THE STATE OF STONE

___________________________________
                                      )
Denny REYNOLDS,                       )
     PETITIONER                       )
                                      )
v.                                    )       No. ST-09-03
                                      )
PEOPLE of the State of Stone,         )
     RESPONDENT                       )
                                      )


Before DeVito, Dee, Greenman, J.J.

GREENMAN, J.

     On February 20, 2009, Denny Reynolds (“Reynolds”) was

charged with the murder of his girlfriend‟s ten-month old son.

Reynolds filed pre-trial motions to suppress statements he made

to a special investigator while imprisoned for an unrelated drug

offense.   The Superior Court denied his motions and on June 17,

2009, a jury convicted Reynolds of homicide in the second

degree, in violation of Stone Rev. Stat. § 4-205 (2008).

Following Reynolds‟ conviction, Sunny County Superior Judge Liam

McPoyle sentenced Reynolds to serve a fourteen-year sentence.

Reynolds appeals his conviction on the grounds that the Superior

Court erred in failing to suppress the statements.

     Reynolds puts forth two reasons why the lower court should

have suppressed his statements.   First, Reynolds asserts that he

was in custody for Miranda purposes, and, therefore, the

investigator‟s failure to give a Miranda warning violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.     Second,

Reynolds asserts that under the corpus delicti rule, the trial

judge improperly admitted his confession into evidence as the

sole proof of Reynolds‟ guilt.     Motions to suppress are reviewed

de novo.     United States v. Peterson, 353 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th

Cir. 2003).    For the reasons discussed below, this court rejects

Reynolds‟ claims and AFFIRMS the decision of the trial court.

I.   Facts

     In 2007, Denny Reynolds was sentenced to serve five years

at Patrick D. Kelly State Penitentiary for his second conviction

of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.        See

Stone Rev. Stat. § 5-112(b).     Upon entering prison, Reynolds

began suffering from violent nightmares.     As a result, he began

to speak with the jail‟s chaplain, Father Mac, a Roman Catholic

priest.    Reynolds enjoyed meeting with Father Mac and spoke to

him regularly.    Rather than meet in Reynolds‟ cramped nine-by-

nine foot cell, he and Father Mac would sit in the prison‟s

relatively large chapel during the prisoner‟s weekly free

period.    Reynolds enjoyed the privacy of the quiet chapel, which

afforded him some respite from the chaos and crowdedness of the

general lock-up where his cell was located.

     Reynolds spoke to Father Mac about the terrible things his

addiction to methamphetamine made him do, but initially did not

tell Father Mac about his nightmares.     Reynolds described his

                                   2
robbery sprees, the neglect of his children, and his terrible

withdrawal symptoms.     He spoke vaguely about some other

maddening event that troubled him, and frequently broke down

sobbing.    Reynolds seemed disoriented and unstable, and his

disjointed stories frequently made little sense to Father Mac.

Nonetheless, Father Mac encouraged Reynolds‟ confessions.

Father Mac told Reynolds, who was raised Roman Catholic, that

the way to salvation and eternal life was to ask forgiveness for

his sins.   He told Reynolds and that only after he took

responsibility for his past way of living would the doors of

heaven be open to him.

    Father Mac told the prison administrator, Francis Rizzo,

that he believed Reynolds should receive psychological

counseling.   In addition, Rizzo had received reports from prison

guards that during free time, Reynolds would frequently be found

sitting alone crying uncontrollably and mumbling to himself.

Because of Father Mac‟s recommendation and the guards‟ reports,

Rizzo agree to let a state psychologist evaluate Reynolds.      With

Reynolds‟ consent, Father Mac brought a state psychologist, Dr.

Lisa Cricket, to his next meeting with Reynolds.

    At this meeting, Reynolds told Dr. Cricket and Father Mac

that he suffered from nightmares and insomnia and that he felt

severe guilt and anxiety for his past bad behavior.    Dr. Cricket

and Father Mac both asked Reynolds what his nightmares were

                                   3
about, but he broke down crying and refused to tell them, saying

only that “it was horrible.”    After interviewing Reynolds, Dr.

Cricket concluded that Reynolds suffered from clinical

depression.   Dr. Cricket filed a report with the prison and

informed Rizzo that she would like to arrange monthly meetings

with Reynolds to treat his depression with talk therapy.     The

report did not include any information covered by the doctor-

patient privilege, but it did include Dr. Cricket‟s diagnosis

and treatment recommendation.     After reading the report, Rizzo

called Father Mac into his office and asked him to inform

Reynolds that he would be receiving treatment from Dr. Cricket

beginning next month.

    Father Mac conveyed this information to Reynolds the

following week.    Father Mac also told Reynolds that he could

still meet and talk about his problems with him.     At the end of

their meeting, Reynolds broke down again and told Father Mac

that he felt ready to confess a horrible sin and wanted to know

if Father Mac would hear his confession.    Father Mac assured

Reynolds it was his job to hear confession and that God would

forgive his sin.

    Reynolds then told Father Mac that his nightmares were

about the death of his girlfriend‟s son, who died in October

2007, a month before police arrested Reynolds on charges of

methamphetamine possession.     Reynolds said that in his

                                   4
nightmares, his girlfriend, Beth Artemis, left him home alone

with Matthew, her ten-month-old son from a previous

relationship.   Reynolds had been unable to procure any

methamphetamine for a few days and, as a result, had a terrible

withdrawal symptoms and was disoriented.   Matthew had been

crying for “what felt like hours.”   Reynolds told Father Mac, “I

put a stuffed animal over the baby‟s mouth to try and make the

crying quieter.   But the stuffed animal wouldn‟t stay there, and

when it fell off the crying was so loud!   So I held the stuffed

animal in place over the baby‟s face, and the baby stopped

crying so I went to lie down.   The next thing I know, it‟s the

middle of the next day and Beth was screaming and shaking me,

yelling at me to get up and go to the doctor with her because

Matthew wasn‟t waking up.”   Father Mac asked Reynolds if this

was just a nightmare, and Reynolds replied he did not know how

much of it was real.   Reynolds told Father Mac he was “so out of

it” at the time of Matthew‟s death that he did not remember

much, but stated that his nightmares were “always about Matthew

dying” and that “it always happened the same way.”    Reynolds

said he could not tell if his nightmare was real or not, but

that “it felt real.”

    After this meeting with Reynolds, Father Mac did an

Internet search for “Matthew Artemis” and found a story in the

Stone City Inquirer from October 2007 about Matthew‟s death.

                                 5
According to the newspaper article, Beth Artemis had found her

son in his crib, not breathing.    The official autopsy revealed

the cause of death as Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (“SIDS”).

The article provided no other details about the incident.

    On February 17, 2009, the day after this meeting, a violent

riot erupted in the prison.     Several guards and prisoners were

injured when rival gangs squared off in the large common area of

the general population cell block.       Using knives smuggled in

from the outside, the prison gangs attacked each other, as well

as any guards that stepped in to stop the fighting.

    Prison officials believed that gang members on the outside

had been smuggling weapons to prisoners.       After the prison

guards quelled the uprising, they took a number of prisoners to

separate interrogation rooms for questioning.       Although Reynolds

was not a gang member, he was one of those prisoners

interrogated.   Because Reynolds had been acting strangely, the

guards felt that Reynolds might have been coerced into working

with one of the gangs to smuggle in weapons.

    Prison guards escorted Reynolds to one of the prison‟s

standard interrogation rooms.     Because Reynolds did not resist,

the guards did not handcuff him.       The interrogation room was a

twelve-by-twelve foot windowless room with a single chair and

table.   A hidden camera was placed in the thermostat on one

wall, and a single overhead light illuminated the room.       The

                                   6
guards placed Reynolds in the chair and left him in the room for

five hours, unrestrained and with the door slightly ajar.

    After five hours, Stone State Police Special Investigator

Charlie Day entered the room and introduced himself to Reynolds.

At no time did Day give Reynolds a Miranda warning.     Day offered

Reynolds coffee and told Reynolds that Day was here to help

ensure the safety of the prison and its inmates.   Day told

Reynolds that anything Reynolds could do to help him would “be

greatly appreciated.”   Day then asked Reynolds a series of

questions about the riot and the weapons used in the riot.

Reynolds said he knew nothing about the riot and did not know

how the gang members got their weapons.   Day told Reynolds that

he understood that Reynolds must be under a lot of pressure, and

that Day could protect Reynolds if he just let Day know where

and how Reynolds was smuggling in the weapons.

    The questioning proceeded in this vein for an hour, but

Reynolds continued to insist that he had no information.

Reynolds never asked to leave or to contact an attorney, but he

did become increasingly upset and agitated.   The door to the

room, the top half of which was clear bullet-proof glass, was

never completely shut, and Reynolds could observe fellow inmates

being escorted between different interrogation rooms.

    After approximately one hour of questioning, Day threw his

hands in the air, exasperated, and asked Reynolds, “Well, what

                                 7
do you know?”   Reynolds, who was very worked up, exclaimed, “I

know that I am on the path to salvation, and that God will

forgive me all my sins!”   Reynolds explained that Father Mac

told him that all he needed to do to get forgiveness was to

confess his sins.   Day told Reynolds that right now would be a

good time to confess his sins, hoping that this new tack would

reveal some useful information about the riot.   Reynolds then

burst into tears and yelled that he had killed his ex-

girlfriend‟s baby Matthew.

    At this point, Day shut the door, and then asked Reynolds

if he would write down what happened.   Reynolds complied and

wrote the following:

    I was having bad meth withdrawals. I couldn‟t get to
    sleep. The baby was crying real loud and it was
    making me crazy. He wouldn‟t stop. Then I did a
    horrible thing. I walked over to him to make him
    stop. I took one of his toy animals and put it on his
    mouth. He stopped crying, but the toy fell off and he
    started up again. Finally, I just held the animal on
    his mouth until there was peace. Then I went to my
    bedroom and passed out. The next morning my
    girlfriend found the baby and called the hospital.
    She was pretty hung over, so she didn‟t get up till
    about noon. I didn‟t even go to the hospital with
    her, even though she was yelling at me to get up. The
    doctor said it was Sudden Infant Death or something.
    That night I found some meth and tried to forget about
    the whole thing. I‟m sorry. God forgive me.

After Reynolds signed the letter, Special Investigator Day went

to Rizzo‟s office and turned over the letter.    Rizzo called the




                                 8
state police, who arrested Reynolds the next day on charges of

second-degree murder.

      In a pre-trial motion, Reynolds asked the court to suppress

his confession.     The court denied the motion, and at trial, the

prosecution offered Reynolds‟s confession as the sole evidence

of his guilt.      A jury found Reynolds guilty, and he appealed

that verdict to this court.

II.   Discussion

      A. Petitioner‟s Fifth Amendment claim

      Petitioner claims that under Mathis, a prisoner is per se

in custody for purposes of Miranda.      Mathis v. U.S., 391 U.S. 1,

4 (1968).   Thus, he argues that because Special Investigator Day

failed to give Petitioner a Miranda warning during his

interrogation, all of his statements, including his confession,

should be suppressed under the Fifth Amendment.      For the

following reasons, this court holds that Petitioner was not in

custody for Miranda purposes.      Thus, Day did not need to give

Petitioner a Miranda warning.

      The Fifth Amendment protects a person from being “compelled

in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”      U.S.

Const. amend. V.      Statements made during custodial interrogation

are inadmissible unless the suspect receives warnings

summarizing his Fifth Amendment rights.      Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, 479 (1966).      Police or other investigators need only

                                    9
give a Miranda warning when the defendant is both in custody and

being interrogated.    Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325

(1994).    Interrogation requires questioning “reasonably likely

to illicit an incriminating response.”     Rhode Island v. Innis,

446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980).

    A person is in custody for Miranda purposes when he is

formally arrested or significantly deprived of freedom of

movement or action.    Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.     The specific

facts and circumstances of the interrogation determine whether

there was a restraint on the individual‟s freedom of movement

such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.

See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984).

    The Supreme Court has only briefly considered whether a

prisoner is in custody such that he must be given a Miranda

warning prior to questioning.    Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4.     In

Mathis, Internal Revenue Service agents questioned a prisoner as

part of a routine tax investigation without giving a Miranda

warning.   Id. at 2-4.   The Court held that the prisoner‟s self-

incriminating statements were inadmissible because he was “in

custody” for purposes of Miranda.     Id. at 5.    The Court did not

explicitly state whether prisoners are always “in custody” for

Miranda purposes or whether the holding was limited to the

specific facts and circumstances of Mathis, however.       Id.




                                 10
    Petitioner contends that Mathis supports a per se rule that

a prisoner is always in custody for Miranda purposes.

Petitioner argues that a prisoner is in custody because

prisoners cannot escape custodial interrogation and because

prison is “inherently coercive and is a setting that is

particularly susceptible to abuse.”      United States v. Morales,

834 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1987) (Oakes, J., concurring).

Petitioner asserts that questioning a prisoner involves neither

a brief detention nor does it invite public scrutiny; thus,

unlike a roadside detention, prison interrogations require a

Miranda warning.   See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-38; Morales, 834

F.2d at 40 (Oakes, J., concurring).

    Petitioner asserts that the Miranda doctrine‟s clarity is

one of its principal advantages.      Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430.

Miranda specifically instructs law enforcement officials on how

to conduct a custodial interrogation.      Fare v. Michael C., 442

U.S. 707, 718 (1979).   Petitioner argues that a per se rule

reduces the burden on courts by freeing them from having to

scrutinize individual cases to determine whether a particular

confession was voluntary.   Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430.

    Finally, Petitioner argues that a per se rule would not

disrupt prison administration.   A Miranda warning is only needed

when an individual in custody is subject to an interrogation.

See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.    Informal conversations between

                                 11
prisoners and guards or other officials would not require a

warning because such conversations are not an interrogation.

Morales, 834 F.2d at 40. (Oakes, J., concurring).

    This court finds, however, that the Mathis Court did not

explicitly hold that any questioning inside a prison requires

Miranda warnings.    Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th

Cir. 1978).   Mathis merely concluded that the prisoner was in

custody at the time of interrogation, without going into much

analysis.   See Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4.   Moreover, subsequent

Supreme Court decisions have made it clear that prisoners are

not per se in Miranda custody.    See Illinois v. Perkins, 496

U.S. 292, 299 (1990).    Finally, the per se rule would burden an

already overburdened prison system and put prison officials at

risk.    See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.

1985).   The Supreme Court specifically intended that Miranda not

hamper officials.    Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477.   Thus, this court

rejects a per se rule.

    Petitioner also argues that even if this Court rejects the

per se rule, the four factors of the “additional restraint” test

show that he was in custody.     First, Petitioner asserts that the

physical surroundings of his interrogation support a finding of

custody.    See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 (7th

Cir. 1994); People v. Alls, 629 N.E.2d 1018, 1022 (N.Y. 1993).

The interrogation room, however, was larger that his prison cell

                                  12
and did not create a coercive atmosphere.    See People v.

Macklem, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237, 254-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).

    As to the second factor, the language used to summon an

inmate, courts first look to the identity of the interrogator.

Here, Special Investigator Day, not a prison guard, interrogated

Petitioner.   Thus, Petitioner was not detained by his

interrogator, which argues against a finding of custody.     State

v. Owen, 510 N.W.2d 503, 522 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).    Petitioner

also points out that he did not initiate contact with his

questioner.   See Menzer, 29 F.3d at 1232.

    As to the third factor, the extent to which the inmate is

confronted with evidence of his guilt, Petitioner points out

that Special Investigator Day interrogated Petitioner regarding

the riots, held him in custody for over five hours, and

repeatedly pressed him to reveal information beyond the prison

riot.   See Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427.   Day, however, never

confronted Petitioner with any actual evidence of guilt.     See

Whitfield v. State, 411 A.2d 415, 426 (Md. 1980).

    Finally, Petitioner asserts that by isolating him for five

hours, prison officials coerced him to make his statements.

Petitioner points out that he was susceptible to coercion,

having just been through a violent prison riot.     Thus, given the

coercive atmosphere, Petitioner argues that under the totality




                                13
of the circumstances, he was in custody for Miranda purposes.

See Flittie v. Solem, 775 F.2d 933, 944 (8th Cir. 1985).

    The court, however, disagrees.       Instead, the court finds

that under the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner was not

in custody for Miranda purposes.       Prison guards escorted

Petitioner to the interview room with no physical restraints,

and Petitioner was not handcuffed while waiting in the room.

Although Petitioner waited in the room for five hours prior to

the interview, the interview itself was fairly brief.

    Even if we were to find that Petitioner was in custody for

Miranda purposes, Petitioner‟s questioning would fall under

Miranda‟s “on-the-scene” exception.       Under this exception,

questioning does not rise to the level of Miranda interrogation,

so warnings are not required.    The “on-the-scene” exception

allows prison officials to question inmates regarding a recent

or presently occurring disturbance so that officials can

maintain order.   State v. Overby, 290 S.E.2d 464, 465 (Ga.

1982).   Officials needed to quickly determine how weapons were

smuggled into the prison to prevent future riots or injuries.

Under this exception, Day was free to question Petitioner

without a Miranda warning.     See Garcia v. Singletary, 13 F.3d

1487, 1491 (11th Cir. 1994).    Thus, we conclude that the

Superior Court correctly denied Petitioner‟s motion to suppress

his confession on Fifth Amendment grounds.

                                  14
    B.      Petitioner‟s claim under the Corpus Delicti rule

    The common law corpus delicti rule prohibits the admission

of an extrajudicial confession as the sole evidence in a

criminal case unless the prosecution introduces independent,

corroborating evidence of the corpus delicti, or “body of the

crime.”    See, e.g., State v. Mauchley, 67 P.3d 477, 482 (Utah

2003).    Generally, the prosecution bears the burden of proving

three elements in any criminal trial: (1) that loss or harm

occurred (a body), (2) that someone‟s criminal agency caused the

loss or harm (a crime), and (3) that the defendant committed the

crime.    State v. Talbot, 665 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1983).

English courts developed the corpus delicti rule more than three

hundred years ago to prevent the conviction of mentally ill or

coerced persons who confessed to non-existent crimes.

    Under the corpus delicti rule, when a defendant‟s

confession is the only evidence that he committed the charged

crime, the prosecution must independently establish the first

two elements and cannot rely on the confession to show all

three.    State v. Weisser, 141 P.3d 93, 96 (N.M. 2006).   While

the evidentiary burden to establish those elements varies from

state to state, under Stone law, they must be established by a

preponderance of the evidence.    People v. Deandra, 136 Stone 33,

36 (1932) (applying the corpus delicti rule without discussion

in the state‟s only corpus delicti case).

                                 15
        Petitioner urges the court to apply the corpus delicti

rule.   Petitioner acknowledges that the voluntariness doctrine

serves some of the same purposes as the corpus delicti rule and

has been somewhat effective in excluding confessions from easily

coerced and mentally ill defendants.    See Blackburn v. Alabama,

361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147,

156 (1954).   Petitioner stresses, however, that the

voluntariness doctrine does not replace the need to corroborate

unreliable confessions.    See Smith, 348 U.S. at 153.

     Petitioner argues that the corpus delicti rule has become

even more necessary because the Supreme Court recently

disregarded the warnings it issued in Blackburn and Smith and

weakened the voluntariness doctrine‟s protections.     In Colorado

v. Connelly, the Court required the defendant to establish “the

integral element of police overreaching” to prove a confession

was involuntary.    479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).   Petitioner argues

that Connelly transformed voluntariness inquiry cases into

police misconduct cases.

     In addition, Petitioner argues that Miranda provides almost

no protection for those whom the corpus delicti rule is designed

to protect.   Petitioner points out that Miranda applies only to

those suspects who are both in custody and interrogated.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.   Moreover, Miranda only requires that




                                 16
police issue a warning and obtain a waiver before interrogating

a suspect in custody.   Id.

    Finally, Petitioner argues that the Sixth Amendment right

to counsel is insufficient to protect against unreliable

confessions for the same reasons Miranda is insufficient.

Defendants must receive a warning that they have the right to

have counsel present during an interrogation.    Escobedo v.

Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.

As with the right to remain silent, that right can be waived.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.     Moreover, Petitioner asserts that the

right to counsel does not protect the incompetent defendant who

volunteers a confession without counsel or outside of custody.

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167-68. Petitioner points out that he did

not have an attorney when he confessed and that his clinical

depression made it difficult for him to evaluate the

ramifications of his answers.

    Petitioner concedes, as he must, that the first prong of

the corpus delicti rule, evidence that harm occurred, was

satisfied by the child‟s death.    Talbot, 665 P.2d at 1276.

Petitioner argues, however, that the prosecution did not meet

the second prong, proof that the harm was caused by a criminal

act, because the prosecution failed to offer any proof

independent of his confession that a criminal act caused her

death.   People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Mich. 1996), 548

                                  17
N.W.2d at 201.    Petitioner points out that the autopsy report

indicated that the child died from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome

(“SIDS”).   Thus, Petitioner argues that because the prosecution

did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that a crime

occurred, under the corpus delicti rule, Petitioner‟s confession

should have been suppressed.

    This court disagrees.    In infanticide prosecutions, there

is often little available evidence to show that death occurred

via criminal means; a confession may be the only evidence.

State v. Reed, 676 A.2d 479, 480 (Me. 1996).     Here, because

Petitioner‟s victim died from SIDS and no one witnessed the

child‟s death, no other evidence of the crime can ever be found.

    Moreover, constitutional protections that address coercion

and police overreaching make the corpus delicti rule obsolete.

When the Stone court adopted the corpus delicti rule, concerns

about the trustworthiness of a confession were well-founded.

Since that time, however, the United States Supreme Court has

held that confessions elicited by physical force, duress, or

psychological coercion violate a defendant‟s constitutional due

process rights.    Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949);

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936).    Thus, the

rule no longer serves the purpose it once did.    In fact, in

1954, the Supreme Court rejected the corpus delicti rule for the




                                 18
federal courts, adopting the trustworthiness standard in its

place.   Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954).

     Thus, this court finds that the trustworthiness doctrine is

the proper tool to analyze a confession.1   Under the

trustworthiness doctrine, a confession may be used as the sole

indicia of guilt if the confession appears to be trustworthy.

The trustworthiness doctrine does require corroboration of the

confession through “substantial independent evidence which would

tend to establish the trustworthiness of the [confession].”     Id.

In addition, the prosecution must still establish a harm or loss

caused by a criminal act committed by the defendant.    See Smith,

348 U.S. at 156.   These elements, however, may be established by

independent evidence of the crime, a corroborated confession, or

a combination of both.   Id.   By considering all relevant

circumstances, the trustworthiness doctrine can “fulfill the

„avowed purpose and reason‟ for the existence of the corpus

delicti rule and protect accused persons against conviction of

offenses that have not in fact occurred.”    United States v.

Johnson, 589 F.2d 716, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1978).




1New Jersey has adopted a hybrid corpus delicti-trustworthiness
rule referred to as the Lucas Rule. State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d
50, 60 (N.J. 1959). Respondent argues that if the court rejects
the trustworthiness standard, we should consider adopting the
Lucas rule. Because we adopt the trustworthiness standard, we
need not consider this argument.

                                 19
    Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial

judge determined that Petitioner‟s confession was trustworthy

enough to be admitted.   The confession was then subject to a

vigorous examination by both prosecution and defense counsel,

and weighed, along with all the available evidence, by the jury.

Thus, this court finds that the trial court correctly admitted

Petitioner‟s confession as the sole evidence of Petitioner‟s

guilt.   We AFFIRM the decision of the trial court.




                                20
                  SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF STONE

___________________________________
                                      )
Denny REYNOLDS,                       )
     PETITIONER                       )
                                      )
v.                                    )         No. ST-09-03
                                      )
PEOPLE of the State of Stone,         )
     RESPONDENT                       )
                                      )


                         NOTICE OF APPEAL

     Petitioner Denny Reynolds was convicted of second degree

murder and sentenced to serve fourteen years in prison.     The

court hereby grants Defendant leave to appeal his conviction.

The court will consider all issues raised in the courts below.




                                      ______________________________
                                      Leatrice Joy
                                      Clerk




DATED: September 25, 2009




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