Get documents about "The Future of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Maintaining their
Document Sample
The Future of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones:
Maintaining their Relevance and Expanding their Scope
By
Sergio Duarte
High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
United Nations
Preparing for 2010: Striking a Balance
between Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Nonproliferation
Hosted by James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Monterey Institute of International Studies
L’Impérial Palace Hotel
Annecy, France
7 March 2008
This is a happy occasion for me, for many reasons – having the pleasure of visiting Annecy, having
the privilege of meeting with close friends and colleagues in the field of disarmament, and having the
opportunity to discuss the future of nuclear-weapon-free zones.
I am proud that the world’s first zone in a populated area was established in the region of my birth.
For his efforts in the field of disarmament, particularly in concluding the Tlatelolco Treaty – which
marked its 40th anniversary last year – Alfonso García Robles received a Nobel Peace Prize in 1982.
Regional arrangements to strengthen international peace and security are, of course, not at all new.
They are explicitly recognized in Article 52 of the UN Charter, as well as Article VII of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1968. A decade later, the General Assembly’s first Special Session
on Disarmament recognized the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as “an important
disarmament measure” – its Final Document described their overall goal as “a world entirely free of
nuclear weapons”.
Obviously, the point of such zones is not simply to regulate nuclear weapons – that is, to make
them more secure, or to limit their risk of theft or use, etc. – but instead to advance the goal of eliminating
them outright, and this logically also implies: non-proliferation. What do these regimes seek to do?
Together they seek nothing less than the strengthening of the emerging global norm against nuclear
weapons per se.
Since my task today is to look ahead, I will not address many of the important achievements of
these zones since Tlatelolco – including their establishment in the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa,
and Central Asia. I will also not elaborate on other related developments, including Mongolia’s nuclear-
weapon-free status, as well as the exclusion of nuclear weapons from deployment on the seabed, in
Antarctica, in orbit, and on the moon and other celestial objects. It is gratifying indeed that 112 states
have signed treaties establishing the regional zones, and that virtually all the states in the southern
hemisphere are parties to such treaties. Such progress speaks for itself.
Suffice it to say that nuclear-weapon-free zones are one of the true success stories in the field of
disarmament. So, are we at the end of the road of their possible accomplishments? No, not by any means.
In the words of the great American poet, Robert Frost, we have miles to go before we sleep.
The zones are facing many challenges. These include the lack of more substantial progress in
global nuclear disarmament, the dangers from the illicit nuclear market, the risk of nuclear terrorism, the
challenge of reliably safeguarding and physically protecting ever-increasing amounts of fissile material,
issues concerning nuclear cooperation with non-NPT states, the development of missiles and other
delivery vehicles that are nuclear-capable, and the challenge of maintaining or strengthening export
controls.
These challenges pertain not only to preventing dangers, however, but also to providing common
benefits, including the promotion of the many diverse peaceful uses of nuclear energy. I would like to
recall here that Article 1 of the Tlatelolco Treaty begins with the words, “The Contracting Parties hereby
undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their
2
jurisdiction”. Similar provisions exist in other such treaties, along with various institutions to ensure or
promote such peaceful uses, in cooperation with the IAEA.
So these zones feature the same three pillars that support the NPT: disarmament, non-
proliferation, and peaceful uses. Unfortunately, this means that the zones also face the same challenges
facing the NPT and that can be summarised in the existence of a serious credibility gap. This has to do
with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament; the lack of clear commitment coupled with the ever-increasing
restrictions being demanded of non-nuclear-weapon states; and the difficult challenges of preventing
violations of non-proliferation standards and enforcing such standards if they are violated.
For the immediate future, several steps would help these regimes. One such step would include
movement toward full universal regional membership in the various zonal treaty regimes – and this
applies particularly to Africa, whose Pelindaba Treaty has still not entered into force though it was signed
over a decade ago. There are many non-parties to this treaty who vigorously support nuclear
disarmament, and the world community would warmly welcome their accession to the treaty.
There is also a need for the nuclear-weapon states to complete the process of ratifying the various
protocols to these treaties – and this applies specifically to the treaties creating such zones in Africa, the
South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. It is most regrettable that states which freely agree to
create such zones, and relinquish their rights and capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, would still face
various potential threats of the use of nuclear weapons. Members of the zones have repeatedly asked the
nuclear-weapon signatories to revise the statements they made when they signed the protocols attached to
the treaties establishing the zones.
These protocols are quite clear with respect to negative security assurances. Nonetheless, some
nuclear-weapon states still maintain nuclear doctrines that contain provisos or conditions that allow for
the possibility of the use of such against non-nuclear-weapon states – even members of nuclear-weapon-
free zones. Persisting concerns over such doctrines have led many states to seek to establish legally-binding
and unambiguous nuclear security assurances, which have long been a goal in the Conference on
Disarmament, in the UN General Assembly, and also of states participating in the NPT review process.
In May 2003, the states comprising the New Agenda Coalition, circulated a Working Paper at the Second
Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Process, which contained a proposal for
an agreement or protocol to the NPT that would contain such assurances. There is little doubt that efforts
to achieve such assurances will continue in the years ahead, as indeed I believe they should.
I recall that in 1999, the UN Disarmament Commission adopted a set of guidelines for the
establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. These guidelines included the need for the nuclear-weapon
states to “undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty”. That language was straightforward in
intent, adopted by consensus, and remains a worthy goal to pursue.
3
Another forward-looking issue concerns relations between the various regional zones, the focus of
the world’s first Conference of States Parties to Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, hosted by the Government
of Mexico in April 2005 just before the last NPT Review Conference. Representatives of some 108 states
parties attended that event, which succeeded in producing a common Declaration identifying many
forward-looking initiatives. Longstanding efforts by Brazil and other states to promote the establishment
of a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere have also sought to deepen the scope of cooperation
between the zones.
The Mexico City Declaration identified many future initiatives, including – the promotion of
universal membership in the NPT, the removal of various reservations or provisos from nuclear security
assurances to zone members, the advancement of the norm of full-scope IAEA safeguards, the expansion of
cooperation among members of the zones, and the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy –
along with strengthened standards for protecting the environment and the transportation of radioactive
material. In addition, the Declaration also registered commitments to encourage disarmament and non-
proliferation education, and to the establishment of new zones in other regions – in particular, the Middle
East and South Asia.
In terms of the NPT, I believe that steps toward establishing such a zone in the Middle East will be
especially important, given the importance of the Middle East Resolution, adopted at the NPT Review
and Extension Conference in 1995, not to mention the strong support this initiative has in the General
Assembly, which has adopted over thirty resolutions promoting this goal – and virtually all of these were
adopted without a vote.
As suggested by the broad scope of the initiatives in the Mexico City Declaration, the challenge
facing members of these zones is clearly not to overcome any lack of ambition. Even if only a few of these
goals can be achieved in the years ahead, the gains for international peace and security would be impressive
and well worth the effort. They would underscore not just the abiding relevance of the regimes, but their
very indispensability to the future of the NPT and, arguably, international peace and security as a whole.
Yet I have been asked to offer only three specific, practical recommendations for action with
respect to the future of these zones. It is a difficult choice among the many options available, but I would
offer the following suggestions.
First, I would address the issue of cooperation among the zones. I would urge all the states parties
to the relevant treaties to share information and periodically meet to adopt common positions and
approaches at relevant multilateral meetings, including the various sessions of the NPT Preparatory
Committees and Review Conferences, the annual meetings of the First Committee of the General
Assembly, and the deliberations within the UN Disarmament Commission. At high-profile forums like
regional summits and in statements at the opening of annual sessions of the General Assembly, leaders of
these states should proudly point to the successes of the zones to which their nations belong and the need
to expand this cooperation to include additional states. The members of these zones are increasingly
forming their own common constituency, and strengthening their own sense of ownership of their
accomplishments. They can also discuss ways and means to strengthen the effectiveness of the zones. This
is something solid upon which to build.
4
Second, I would promote regional solutions to problems associated with the nuclear fuel cycle,
especially uranium enrichment and the long-term, secure storage of spent nuclear fuel. I believe that it is
necessary to avoid , with respect to the fuel cycle, the same discriminatory division between “haves” and
“have-nots” that exists regarding nuclear weapons.. Neither is desirable. I can see the day when regional
zones will, with the benefit of IAEA and regional safeguards arrangements, be able to handle their own
enrichment and spent-fuel management responsibilities within their own region consistent with their
international obligations.
Third, I would promote the evolution of existing zones into WMD-free zones that include delivery
vehicles. We have to recall that all states are already committed – including through the preambles of the
nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties – to the goal of “general and complete disarmament”, which
encompasses the elimination of all WMD and their respective delivery vehicles, as well as the limitation of
conventional arms. In my own region, the Declaration on Security in the Americas – adopted by the
states attending the third plenary session of the Organization of American Atates – agreed in 2003 “to
make the Americas a region free of biological and chemical weapons”. This is the kind of step in the right
direction that I had in mind. This is the type of “cascade” we need to pursue in this world: more states,
in more regions, repudiating weapons of mass destruction exactly because they are what they are.
I will now to conclude by returning to Alfonso García Robles. The Nobel Committee awarded
the 1982 Peace Prize both to him and to Alva Myrdal. The Committee recognized the work of both
individuals for the “central role” they have played in “United Nations’ disarmament negotiations”. The
Committee also praised both Laureates for having helped "to open the eyes of the world to the threat
mankind faces in continued nuclear armament". As we meet today, let us consider not just the
contributions these great people have made in describing common threats, but also the positive inspiration
they have left behind for the pursuit of a more peaceful and secure world for all. Their’s is truly a legacy
upon which to build. Let us begin today.
Related docs
