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The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia

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The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia Powered By Docstoc
					                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002


                The Making of Democratic Local Governance in Indonesia
                                                                                                   Hans Antlöv


Many countries around the world during the past two decades have experienced a growing disillusion with
state, government and public policies. A recent study of 47 Commonwealth countries argues that
“representative democracy and the institutions of State and government as we know them today are no
longer capable of serving citizens or ensuring good governance in the future”. (Commonwealth
Foundation 1999). In a similar manner, a World Bank-sponsored report based on local research in 23
countries concludes that “state institutions, whether represented by central ministries or local government
are often neither responsive nor accountable to the poor…Not surprisingly, poor men and women lack
confidence in the state institutions even though they still express their willingness to partner with them
under fairer rules” (Narayan et. al. 2001: 172)

Perhaps this disillusion is an intricate part of globalization. People do not feel at home in a world
increasingly characterized by competition, globalization and individualism. State power is being
increasingly eroded by the economic might of transnational capital. Late capitalism has become
characterized by free-floating financial exchanges and sophisticated technologies. The autonomy of the
nation-state is being limited through forces of the market and the demands of emerging global cultures.
There has emerged a strong belief in the regulating mechanism of a free market, in which liberalism and
pluralism is the caretaker of the public good, rather than the governments. States should only provide a
competitive and level playing field for political parties, investments, and citizens. People will then in
plurality manage by themselves to develop what is in their best interest. Political competition is the prime
mean of defining the value of society, and there is not such thing as public interest, only a plurality of
voices. People have become consumed with private live and do not have the energy, time or commitment
to care about public policies and the state. Both state and civil society suffers from this retreat into private
life. Bad policies lead to disillusionment which leads to passivity which leads to more bad policies.

All over the world, conservatives have taken these opportunities of failing states and disillusioned and
passive citizens to launch full-scale attacks on the state. Deregulation, down-sizing of social services,
privatization and reduced public spending are some of the key words at the turn of the century. It amounts
a “marketization” of our economies, societies and cultures – policies are reached by market demands. Led
by the United States, government power is increasingly seen to serve personal or narrow political interest
at the expense of more legitimate concerns. This view has become so common today that it has been
adopted also by Leftist governments, who, in the face of free-flowing capital and global markets, have had
little choice but to downsize their welfare systems. In Europe, the so-called “caring” or “nanny” state
(depending on what side you stand) is being dismantled, as governments as diverse as England,
Germany and Sweden have proved themselves incapable of providing basic care for their citizens.
Governments have been forced to radically rethink the character of their administrations and policies.
Public services are being privatized, and state companies are going public. State bureaucracies around
the world are being challenged. Some people would even say that it is a global crisis for the nation-state
as we know it

There is also a very different response to the erosion of democratic vitality from people who do not accept
the retreat to the private sphere and political passivity as the inevitable price of political progress.
Concerned citizens around the world – in Europe and North America as well as in Asia, Latin America and
Africa – no longer accept that decision-making is taken away from their local and national governments.
They demand direct involvement. Rather than decisions being made by technocrats, politicians and
bureaucrats (sometimes in unholy alliances) people are arguing that the world would be a better place if
decisions were taken in more unhurried and reflective deliberations, involving as many people as possible.
In the words of the Commonwealth Foundation’s study quoted above (1999:xxx): “People want a society
characterised by responsive and inclusive governance. They want to be heard and consulted on a regular
and continuing basis, not merely at the time of election. They want more than a vote. They are asking for
participation and inclusion in the decisions taken and policies made by public agencies and officials”. The
World Bank study concludes that xxx.. Citizens’ rights that are limited to electing their representatives
every three or four or five years allows for only the most shallow democracy. Proponents of radical


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                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

democracy want to see more substance in democracy. They argue, as we do, that it is not enough only to
have the institutions and process of democracy. Democracy must be made substantive through filling it.
Democracy becomes an empty and meaningless concept if people are not participating in decision-
making.

What these proponents argue for is not to erase the state, but to reform it, to build a new global
relationship between state and society. ++ correcting the view of governance through the market (Gaventa
and Goetz). The modern nation-state needs to reconcile the need to limit state power (since it interferes
too much in the daily affairs of its citizens, and since power corrupt), at the same time as it must protect
that power (since only the state has sufficient means to counterbalance the global corporate wielders of
money and information). The basic argument is that the pluralist “depoliticized” society described above is
not capable of providing pro-active policies for disadvantaged and marginal groups. Stable, responsible
and accountable public policies are needed to guarantee a society equal for all. Public trust must be
regained, by improving government performance, involve citizens in the political process, and identify
practices and innovations that work most effectively in government and that makes government serve
society better. Democracy cannot be built without a responsive state – but it is also imperative that that
state is empowered enough to carry through its policies. Developing this formula will be one of the main
                     st
challenges of the 21 century. If democracy fails to deliver peace and prosperity (as it did during many
                        th
decades in the early 20 century) we might once again see the global rise of authoritarian rule.


Indonesia: Lack of Accountability, Lack of Trust

In this chapter I will describe how citizens in a country that for a long time has been subject to very
unresponsive government and a distrusting citizenry is trying to mend the gap between state and civil
society. For 32 years (between 1966 and 1998), Indonesia was run by general Suharto. During his long
term, a society was created characterized by a strong central accumulation of power and a patrimonial
governance system. The relationship between the state and society is highly skewed in favour of state
precedence, with the public administration being paternalistic, interventionist, and everything but
transparent and accountable to the public. The lack of accountability or transparency, along with
paralysing paternalism and discouragement of local initiative has led to uniformity and standardization,
destruction of social fabric, co-optation of leaders on all levels, abuse of power and corruption and,
perhaps most serious of all, a deep distrust in civil institutions. For decades, the voice of civil society in
public policy was limited to the occasional letter to the editor and participation in the controlled election
process every five years. Pressures from civil society toward reforms were dismissed, and criticism of
official policy could be perceived as disloyalty or subversion. Civic and political liberties have suffered and
democratic institutions functioned in name only, creating an image of political stability and communal
harmony to spur increased foreign investments.

But this image shattered in the mid 1990s, when the corruption of Suharto and his officials become too
blatant. After the rapid growth of the late 1970s and 1990s, people started to demand more than material
development: increased voice. People started to distrust the government and its capacity to deliver and
organize society. In the end this led to the fall of Suharto in May 1998.

In theory, Indonesia is now a very different country from that ruled by Suharto. Dewi Fortuna Anwar has
described the transition in her chapter: democratic elections, a free press, a colourful civil society. But the
democratisation has been shallow. With the possible exception of the parties of president Megawati and
former president Wahid, none have any grassroots basis. Only the top layer of the bureaucracy has been
replaced. Most state officials have today not embraced the idea of new procedures and standards
accompanying decentralization and democratic reforms. Civil servants maintain old work patterns and
attitudes. As Patrick Heller recently has pointed out, although top-down planning has lost much of its
lustre in the past decade, it remains a powerful organizational reflex.

If public perception of corruption and abuse of power is a good index of trust, then citizens in Indonesia
have very little confidence and trust in the state. The country is one of the most corrupt countries in the
world. Indonesia is listed as number 88 out of 91 countries in Transparency International 2000 Corruption


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                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

Perception Index. Corruption prevails not only on the upper levels of power holders, but has trickled down
to individual bureaucrats in local offices. A recent survey in the weekly Tempo magazine concludes that
the two most distrusted public institutions in Indonesia are the police and the judiciary. These,
significantly, are the two institutions that are set to fight corruption and power abuse! Many if not most civil
servants and local politicians lived very comfortably – and gained considerable power and wealth – under
the Suharto administration, with privileged access to resources and power. They are obviously worried
about their future, and making the most out of the present.             These people – who are crucial for the
implementation of decentralization – might initially be very reluctant to support a democratic
decentralization. It is an irony, and a great problem, that those people who are to implement anti-
corruption and other good governance reforms are those that have most to loose from their
implementation: the local bureaucrats.

The state in Indonesia is highly present in everyday life: through development programs, cultural policies,
government decisions, and co-optation of local leaders. This demanding presence means the main
problem in Indonesia is not an absence of effective governance (as in parts of Africa or Eastern Europe),
nor that government is not close enough to people (as in South Asia). On the contrary, it could be argued
that the government has been too close to people and too effective, intervening in almost all aspects of
public and private life. The challenge in Indonesia is to reform existing institutions, not to build new
institutions. And more specifically, to democratise state institutions so that people can start to trust them.

Presently, three years into what is known locally as reformasi, citizens are in a myriad of ways are making
their voices heard, filling their new-won democracy, and in the process building a new relationship with the
state. These are new experiences in Indonesia. Only since the fall of Suharto has it been truly possible for
citizens of Indonesia to express their voices in public and speak up about what they feel important in life.
This can best be done at a local level, where interaction can occur between citizens and where decision-
making is confined enough to influence on a day-to-day basis.

I will argue in this chapter that there are two such policies used today: a top-down process of
decentralization; and a bottom-up process of citizen participation. The hope is that these will “meet in the
middle” and be able to build a new social contract and create the confidence in government that is vital for
Indonesia’s survival. National democratisation cannot be supported very long without recognizing the
similar need at the local level. More sustainable systems of economic growth together with political
stability can only be achieved through a process of careful empowerment and devolution of power to the
local level from the centre, in which meaningful authority is devolved to local bodies that are accountable
and accessible to local councils and citizens. Imperative in this process are the attempts to move
decision-making, policy-formulation and the provision of services closer to the people.


Decentralization Policies – Empowering Local Governments

Indonesia’s degree of centralization (pre decentralization) cannot be over-emphasized. There were few
comparable countries in the world. In 1995, the central government earned approximately 93 per cent of
total fiscal resources and spent more than 90 per cent, through its intricate web of line ministry agencies
(Buentjen 1998:15). These local agencies are set up to be miniature replicas of central authorities.
Needless to say, priorities and initiatives are not always in line with local demands, but determined from
atop. There is on paper a very impressive budget and policy planning procedure, with meetings held first
in each and every of Indonesia’s some 63,000 villages. But this is on paper only. In reality, on each of the
levels on the planning process upwards and on the implementation process downwards, there are mark-
ups and deviations, so that the funds and projects that after some 9-18 months actually reach the
community are very different from those originally proposed.

It is thus structure that two recent laws on decentralization and fiscal balance set out to reform. Law no. 22
of 1999 on Local Government proposes to give “full autonomy” to the (rural) districts and (urban)
municipalities to manage a number of services and duties (there are in Indonesia some 380 districts in 29
provinces). Similar to a federal system, finances, the legal system, foreign affairs, defence and religion are
retained at the national level, while the authority over roads, harbours, and other “areas of strategic


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                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

national interest” is to be transferred to the provincial level, an administrative arm of the central
government. Districts and municipalities are given authority over remaining functions, including health
care, education, public works and natural resources management.

Law no. 25/99 on Fiscal Relations between Centre and Region provides new formulas for dividing
revenues. Districts will in the future be able to retain 90 per cent of house tax, 80 per cent of land tax, 80
per cent of forest and fishery revenues, 15 per cent of oil and 20 per cent of gas revenues. In the previous
law (no. 5 of 1974), the fiscal relations were not outlined in detail, leading to a situation in which for many
years existing instruments of intergovernmental fiscal relations were not based on a consistent legal
framework (Buentjen, 1998: 8). The revenues that previously could be retained by districts and provinces
depended on bargaining with senior officials in Jakarta, with built-in kickbacks and mark-ups for all parties.
It is this rent-seeking behaviour that the new law, with its defined formulas, attempts to stave. One of the
crucial lessons of the Regional Autonomy Pilot Projects (1995-1998) was that fiscal devolution is key to
the success of decentralization and regional autonomy. Without sufficient self-governed funds, there can
be little hope that local governments can be autonomous of the central government and provide the high
quality services that citizens demand.

The decentralization policies were enacted on 1 January 2001, after a little more than a year of
preparation. Law 22/1999 (which was passed on May 1999) actually states that the preparation period is 2
years, but IMF and international donors pressed hard for pushing it forward, as an initial major step
towards institutional reforms in Indonesia. Laws 22 and 25 have thus been enacted for 11 months as I am
writing this, and there have been numerous problems. Law 22 assigns virtually all public services to the
district administration, without establishing the appropriateness of devolving these functions to this
particular tier of government, how this might be achieved, and the required sequence of measures. This
has initially lead to deterioration in the provision of services and a reduction of state expenditure for social
services, such as public hospitals and schools, and an exacerbation of inequalities as localities are asked
to pay for more and more of their own services. Since local governments have only limited economic skills
and remain prone to corruption, the benefits have largely been captured by local elites and reinforced
existing unequal relations. Regional autonomy has allowed resource-rich localities to keep their riches for
themselves, and thus augment existing interregional disparities. And since a larger share of revenues now
must be raised by local governments (rather than allocated by the central government), this has been an
incentive for resource-rich districts to make ultimate use of their resources – which has led to a rapid
destruction of natural resources such as minerals and forests. For all practical purposes, decentralization
has been revenue-increases: it has not been an opportunity to provide better public service, or
democratize local politics by pushing decision-making closer to people. It has meant that the natural
resources and taxes that are present in the area can be maximized. Perhaps it was only to be expected.
For three decades local governments around the country could see the central government get rich by
robbing their districts. Now, finally, it is there turn to harvest. It is local governments, rather than people,
that have been empowered.

But why is this happening? Why is not decentralization delivering its promise of better public policies? One
important factor is the resilience of the public sector. As mentioned above, it is all-pervasive, powerful and
corrupt. Many foreign donors have for decades provided training and technical assistance to the
Indonesian public administration, in the hope that exposure to other countries and correct ways of
managing public affairs would encourage self-reformation. There is only recently emerging a broader
consensus that there is a need to put other mechanism in place. The new understanding of the roots of
the abuse of power and money is that it is systemic, that it is not the individual official who is corrupt, but
that a system is put in place that encourages, even forces, bureaucrats to misuse their position. Training
of individuals will not by itself change systemic corruption (see Klitgaard 1988). This rent-seeking
behaviour is of course what researchers such as Richard Robison, Jeffrey Winters and Olle Törnquist
have described for years.

There is something with the political culture of public officials in Indonesia, the paralyzing paternalism
described above. Lower officials defy to higher authorities, and people of rank should be treated with
respect. An example of this kind of political culture is the publicized arrest of Tommy Suharto in November
2001. The son of former president Suharto was accused of murder and had escaped from a previous jail


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                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

sentence. And yet, when he was captured, he came smiling and without handcuffs. The national policy
chief embraced him. The police and media were treating this particular murder suspect very differently
from other criminals. We can see the same kind of behaviour in all levels of the administration. The
preferred culture is to “keep you boss happy” (asal Bapak senang) which means not to upset or cause any
problems, or even be novel. Indeed, there are dis-incentives for being innovative, since it might lead your
superior into trouble. There is a strong sense of camaraderie and esprit de corps among civil servants.
With decentralization policies, corruption prevails not only on the upper levels of power holders, but has
trickled down to individual bureaucrats in local offices.

There are thus not many dangers by engaging in rent-seeking or corruptive practices. The benefits of rent-
seeking and corruption clearly outweigh the risks. We are talking big money, and elected officials are
willing to take the chance of not being re-elected in 2004. They will be rich by then, and live comfortably
the rest of their lives. The stakes must be therefore raised – the police and judiciary must be reformed,
and their must be a political will to catch people breaking the law.

Agencies in Jakarta are fighting over the control of resources and power rather than supervising policies
of local government. In theory, government ministries should be monitoring that local regulations do not
contradict higher-level laws (the xxx principle) and that actual policies carried out are legal and beneficial
to the public. But because of the newfound freedom of districts, added with a deep distrust in central
government agencies, there is little higher authorities can do. In most cased, they were themselves deeply
involved in the rent-seeking and criminal practices themselves a few years back (and might still be, in
many cases) and their authority and goodwill is thus not soaring. Local government officials, previously
clients of central government agencies, have information about past practices, and government officials in
Jakarta are worried that this might be exposed. The police force is so corrupt that they are probably
involved in most rent-seeking, and the judiciary system is equally depressing: if ever a corrupt government
official is caught, they can in most cases find their way out of the system, with enough money. During the
last 3 years, xxx number of criminal rent-seeking behaviour has been brought to the courts, and we have
only seen xx convictions.

All in all, this political culture and organizational history means that we cannot really expect reforms of the
public administration to come from within, from civil servants themselves. There are too many risk and too
few rewards in being innovative. Public sector reforms in Indonesia must come from outside, through
pressures from a civil society and political reforms from legislators and the political parties.

It is not only unlawful behaviour we are talking about. Revenue-raising schemes in resource rich provinces
means utilizing the forest, minerals or fishing waters, and then using the revenues for questionable
policies, such as building new offices or buying cars for councillors. This is simply bad policy, not illegal.
And cannot be revised through legal means, only public pressures. However, political parties and regional
councils have yet to play their supervisory roles. One of the problems is that the electoral and party laws
do not encourage a monitoring function. There is for instance no recall mechanism through which a
corrupt local councillor could be recalled by the party. And even if there were such mechanisms, parties
might not want to use them, since graft is an important cash-cow for political parties: the old rent-seeking
and patron-client relationships are still in practice and corrupt party members siphon off part of their
wealth to parties. Political parties in Indonesia do not have any grassroots foundation that could remind
the leadership that the purpose of a political party is to represent in elected bodies their electorate and
constituency, not enriching its members. There is an urgent need in Indonesia to modernize parties,
“deepen” them beyond their present shallowness. The national and local Houses of Representatives (DPR
and DPR-D, Dewan Perwakilan Raykat- Daerah,) have not been able to counter the abuses. On the
contrary, they have been part of it – especially in the local level. These are the regional representatives
who were elected in 1999, and who thus should be part of a new and more democratic Indonesia. But
unfortunately, the pattern is quite negative. In most instances, they have colluded with local government
agencies to cash in on the new revenues made available to them. Indonesia is a resource rich country,
and the temptations to gain immediate wealth have simply been too large.

Civil society, that broad category of media, students, citizen association, non-governmental organizations,
labour unions and peasant federation, is doing its best to limit the power of the state (which is one often


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                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

heard definition of civil society, cf. Hall 1995). There is a long history of civic associations in Indonesia. A
rich texture of social groups exists: religious societies, private schools, credit associations, mutual
assistance groups, neighbourhood organizations, and many others. In addition, over the past two decades
thousands of private and community-based non-governmental organizations have been established.
Unable to enter the political arena, concerned citizens have remained outside of state structures. Many of
these groups have proven innovative and effective at the project level in providing health and education
services, credit and micro-enterprise schemes, environmental protection, legal aid, natural resource
management, etc. Indonesia is characterized by a flowering of new ideas and social actors, as people
who have been denied participation seek to get involved. Indonesia is a country of potentially enormous
social change and entrepreneurship. People are actively questioning old ways of doing things, struggling
for more open and responsive governance systems. Myriads of new non-governmental organizations are
established, and civil society is very colourful. There is a lot of excitement about the new possibilities
allowed by regional autonomy and democratisation, and people are seizing these new opportunities.

There are many watchdog and monitoring private organizations in Indonesia today, doing their best to
influence local policies. And they are having a certain influence. Without them, the situation would be
worse. Local newspapers and tabloids are full of stories of misuse of power. But there is still a long way to
go. Olle Tornquist has discussed the reasons in an interesting paper. There are few political skills among
the civil society organizations, they are ideologically divided, and they have not been able to build mass
movements. An NGO might thus speak up on the corruption of the mayor or head of a local government
agency, but they do neither have the lobbying skills nor the masses behind them to make a difference. It
might become a story in a local newspaper, but the issue is gone again in a few days. According to
Tornquist, there is an urgent need in Indonesia to xxx. Another important reason for the relative failure of
civil society organizations is the paternalistic political culture and the lack of legal mechanisms through
which discontented citizens could express their criticism.

The missing figure in the equation is accountability and public control over decision-making. As we saw
above, it was hoped with decentralization that decision-making would become more transparent and
accountable as it was pushed downwards, closer to people. Indeed, decentralization policies are often
quoted as a pre-requisite for the growth of local participatory democracy. But as the Indonesian case has
shown, decentralization policies in themselves do not promote good governance. As argues above,
effective and more democratic state management requires improved governance practices at the local
level that encourage citizen participation. Decentralization policies cannot be carried out without
simultaneously launching democratic reforms. Decentralization must simultaneous strengthen local
capacity and build responsive governance systems (not only empower local governments, but also ensure
that they are held accountable and deliver social services).

It has been argued by many (Beetham 1996, Manor 1998, Gaventa and Valderrama 1999, Cornwall and
Gaventa 2001) that local government has the potential to democratise because the decentralisation
process allows for more responsiveness, representativeness and thus accountability. According to Michel
Pimbert (2001:81), “the democratic potential of decentralizations is usually greatest when it is linked with
the institutionalisation of local level popular participation and community participation”. Otherwise, when
government is decentralised, the local elites who would get the new power would be able to steer benefits
to themselves and their clients. Patterns of local strongmen, even warlords, can occur. We have seen this
is certain locations in the Philippines and Thailand, where local elites have been able to fully monopolise
the newly decentralised monies and powers. There are tendencies that this is happening in Indonesia as
well.

In order to avoid this, citizens must be systematically involved in policy formulation, decision-making and
program evaluation. This kind of citizen participation shifts the focus from a concern with beneficiaries or
excluded groups (as in much development work) to a concern with broad forms of engagement by citizens
in key arenas that affect their lives (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999: 5). Such deliberative processes
involve giving new voices to those that usually are excluded from both social and political participation. It
means new ways to involve as many people as possible in policy formulations, program implementation,
and outcome evaluations, to overcome the distrust in government and the crisis of legitimacy of the state.




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                        LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                             Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

Citizen participation is not only a way to instil new trust into decomposed political institutions. Equally
important is that it is a method and technique, as it emerged within participatory development projects in
the South and social activism of the North, to give the historically excluded a voice. It can, in the words of
Fung and Wright (2001:8) “surpass conventional democratic institutional forms on the quite practical aims
of enhancing the responsiveness and effectiveness of the state while at the same time making it more fair,
participatory, deliberative, and accountable”. By imbuing into public matters and institutions processes of
participation and deliberations, the hope is that governing the community, the city or the nation can
become more effective and accountable, thus remedying the failures of state agencies. As we shall see,
participatory methods can also be put to use to enhance social justice agenda by addressing directly
inequalities and the lack of accountability. There are thus at least four interrelated objectives of the
deliberative processes: forge a new contract between citizens and state; reconstructing state agencies by
making them more effective and accountable; encouraging a good political culture by providing a forum for
bottom-up citizenship; and to redress basic power relations within society by giving the poor and
disadvantaged a voice. Citizen participation can be driven by innovative and committed citizens
demanding their voices to be heard. It can also be provided by state agencies as ways to overcome the
distrust in government and to empower local communities. In the rest of this chapter, I will discuss two
such initiatives in Indonesia, one provided by Law 22 and the other a citizen-driven initiative.


Village-based participatory governance

We have so far talked mainly about local governance as something that happens between a central
government ministry and district or municipal governments. But decentralization laws generally go a step
further than this (in India to the Panchayati, in Philippines to the Barangay, in Cambodia to the Commune,
in Thailand to the xx etc). In Indonesia, Law 22 has 19 paragraphs on village governance and autonomy.
The section in the law 22 on village government is fairly good – better than the parts on regional autonomy
and better than most people expected of the Department of Home Affairs and the Suharto-appointed
             1
parliament. The law provides ample room for diversity, local aspiration and responsiveness. The village
community is to be “based on origins and local customs”. A village can be called anything: in Bali it might
be banjar, in Minang nagari, in Toraja lembang, and so on. The same goes for the headman: whatever
customary concept was in used can again be used. The village also has the right to reject projects from
outside if they are not accompanied by funds, personnel and infrastructure.

But most importantly, it provides a separation of powers in the rural communities. In the past, village
headmen were positioned as the instruments of higher authorities. They owed their power upwards and
could do nothing without the approval of sub-district and district governments. Villages were standardised
and firmly under the control of higher authorities. In exchange for the intervention and subordination,
headmen were given almost unlimited powers to run their village. There were no mechanisms of public
accountability. Headmen were ex officio chairmen of the Village Assembly (LMD) and of the Village
Community Resilience Board (LKMD), the government’s vehicle for developmental planning. They had
access to higher authorities, to government projects, and to government funds. Village leaders became
what I elsewhere have described as “clients of the state”. They were the apex around which governance,
politics and funds circulated. The result was a village leadership that was both weak and co-opted (seen
from above) and strong and authoritarian (seen from below).

With the introduction of Village Councils, (Badan Perwakilan Desa, BPD, literally “Village Representative
Board”) it is hoped that village governments will become more accountable and that local policies will
become better. The headman has a double public accountability: he is responsible to the village
population through the Village Council, and he must also each year provide an accountability report to the
district chairman. Headmen are thus no longer oriented upwards; they are accountable to the village
population and must answer questions at Village Council meetings. The authority of village headmen and
their village officials are limited to their executive functions. For the first time, there is a separation of
power in the community, and the village headman is no longer all-powerful.


1
    The law was passed in May 1999, one month before the democratic elections.


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                        LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                             Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

The authority and autonomy of the Village Councils is far greater than of the former Village Assembly (the
LMD) with members appointed by the headman who ex officio was chairman. The Village Council has the
right to draft village legislation, it approves of the village budget, and it monitors the village government. It
even has the right to propose to the district chairman that the headman is removed from his post (but the
decision is still taken by the district head). Depending on the size of the village, it consists of 9-13
members, and it is hoped that this diversification of governing the village will lead to more responsive
village policies. No longer will higher authorities, through the village headman, decide what the village
needs and wants. Local regulations and budgets are decided by the Village Council and the village
government and higher authorities need only to be informed about the decisions. With Law 22, the
autonomy of the village is strengthened considerably, while the patronage of the headman is weakened by
providing for a separation of powers.

During 2000 and 2001, there have been elections to the new Village Councils in most of Indonesia’s
63,000 villages (there are still district that have not yet passed the implementing regulations). Law 22
states that members to the Village Council “are to be elected from and among villagers”. This might sound
straightforward enough, but “elections” is a quite flexible concept. In line with the spirit of the new regional
autonomy, district governments themselves can determine what is in that word. And there is quite a
variation. Some districts have opted for systems with what they call formatur or electorates (in the US
sense). These formatur are appointed by hamlet leaders (one village usually consist of 5-15 hamlets or
rukun warga) who in turn elect the headman. In other district only the heads of the household are allowed
to vote for the village council, basically disallowing women from their voting rights. In yet other district only
certain organizations and bodies (neighbourhood, political, social and religious) can propose candidates.
Many districts indeed use direct elections without heavy restrictions on voting and nomination (as in
headman elections), but the vagueness of Law 22 has opened up for various forms of experiments, which
to some commentators have introduced distortions of the democratic ideal. Let me give you a taste of an
actual village council, in the village of Sariendah, just outside the town of Majalaya in West Java

           The district of Bandung was early to pass the implementing regulations on village governance,
           already in May-June 2000. The two by-laws on the Village Council – elections and functions – are
           fairly straightforward and in line with democratic spirit of Law 22. Candidates to the Village Council
           can be proposed by individuals or organizations, and all residents 18 years or older have the right
           to vote. Sariendah is a large village (around 10,000 people) so there are 13 members in the
           Council. There were 25 candidates who passed the eligibility screening and two who did not:
           criteria include a secondary education degree, that candidates have lived in the village for five
           years and that they are “loyal and faithful to Pancasila [the national ideology] and the 1945
           Constitution”. I was unfortunately not in Sariendah during the elections in September 2000 but
           have seen photos and a video. Headman elections in the village have always been very
                                 2
           competitive events, and so was the Village Council election. Candidate campaigned in their
           home hamlets for votes, and posters were seen all around the village with photos of candidates.
           Some of the more energetic candidate provided meals and cigarettes for potential voters.

           Voting was done on a Sunday, when people were off work, and most people actually voted, some
           70 per cent according to official statistics. Voting was done just as with national and headman
           elections: the ballot paper had photos of the candidates (at national elections parties are
           represented by a logo) and voters punch a hole for the candidate of their choice. The same polling
           stations as during the 1998 headman election and 1999 general elections were used, in twelve
           places around the village. No complained the voting was anything but free and fair. As is usually
           the case in local politics in Java, residency and family relations were important determinants for
           voting behaviour – meaning that people voted for candidates they know or lived in their hamlet. Of
           the 13 elected candidates, four were new to village governance, while nine had some kind of
           previous experiences. They had a variety of backgrounds: school teacher, religious leader, factory
           worker, entrepreneur, pensioner. Only one was a woman, and only two were younger than 30
           years. The chairman is automatically the candidate with the most votes: a primary school teacher
           and son of a former popular headman – he also shares grand-grandparents with the present

2
    See Antlöv 1995 and forthcoming


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                      LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                           Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

        headman. The runner-up becomes secretary. She is also a primary school teacher but her
        popularity comes from the fact that she is the most popular Islamic teacher for women in
        Sariendah, holding several classes per week in different hamlets.

        The Village Council was sworn in immediately and met during its initial year twice per month. The
        law mandates Village Councils to meet at least once a year, but the Sariendah council has taken
        their new task seriously and have been active. Their relationship with the village government – the
        headman and his staff – is fairly good. The Sariendah headman was elected after reformasi, in
        December 1999, and has after some initial troubles (see Antlöv forthcoming) proved his worth. He
        is energetic, sympathetic and popular. He consults regularly with the Village Council.

        What has the Village Council done to date? They have approved of the village budget for 2001.
        This was drafted by the headman, who submitted it to the Village Council. The total budget is for
        80 million rupiah ($8,000) compared with the 8 million Sariendah used to receive in the past. 50
        million is a block grant from the Bandung government, and the remaining are local revenues. The
        most important incomes are from land-tax, charges for minibuses passing through the village and
                                                                                         3
        revenues from a new market-place built in 2000 with “social safety net” funds. Funds have been
        used for regular infrastructural development projects (road and irrigation improvement, etc), to xxx
        … and to build an office for the Village Council, the first one in the sub-district. They have also
                                                     4
        been discussing building a swimming pool! This might sound a bit extravagant at first, but the
        pool would be owned by the village, and revenues would go to the village budget. Not everyone is
        in favour of this, though.

        Which leads us into a discussion about the quality of participation, and the internal governance of
        the Village Council. It is all nice to have Village Councils and to have new members elected. But if
        they only sit at the back, quiet, not much is won. It is not simply to involve people, but it is also
        who is involved and how the involvement is managed. If it were only members of the elite who find
        a new forum for their participation, not much is gained. If the poor and marginal formally are
        present during meetings, but dare not speak up and only remain passive in the back, not much is
        gained. In some of the literature on popular participation, one sometimes finds this overall
        enthusiasm with any kind of popular participation – often the smaller the better. We have to be
        careful and actually look at who participates, who control the agendas, how are decisions reached
        – all the basic power relations within any type of social interaction.

        But obviously we cannot expect power relations to change over night. I have participated during
        meetings, and felt the tensions between members who want to be more aggressive towards the
        village headman and his staff, and those who say that this is not the role of the Council. But
        already after one year, some of those quiet and more withdrawn members dare to speak up in
        front of the headman the Council chairperson.

        With the new office, Council members will be on call everyday. Anyone can come to the office with
        a complaint or a suggestion. This is very new: the former Village Assembly was monopolized by
        the village government, and people knew it of no use to protest against official corruption or abuse
        of power. But this has changed radically today. It is too early yet to say how the Sariendah Council
        will manage to balance demands of the village headman and of people, but the start has been
        promising. People have trust that the government in Sariendah is becoming better. Although in
        theory the authority and power of the headman has been circumscribed, he has also benefited
        from the increased prestige and trust.
        And have the village gotten any better, the acid test of participation? One of the promises of
        democratic local governance is that priorities are changed so that more funds are allocated to

3
  After the Asian financial crisis, the government changed its regular development programs into so-called Social
Safety Net projects, infusing cash into the countryside through a number of food-for-work projects, subsidized
foodstuff, and micro-credit schemes.
4
  Swimming-classes are compulsory in Indonesian school. To date, schools in the Majalaya region have travelled to
Bandung. The hope is that this new swimming pool would attract not only private visitors, but also schools.


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                      LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                           Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

        those who need the extra money. This has not happened yet, as funds have been used for village
        infrastructure projects, such as building the Council office. But the new market is appreciated:
        residents do no longer need to travel to dirty and crowded Majalaya to do their daily shopping.

        How does the village government relate to the Village Council? As mentioned briefly above, the
        headman is open enough. When I have talked with some of his staff, though, you can definitely
        still sense a reluctance and hesitation towards the Council. In that past, being a village official was
        a quite prosperous position, being able to engage in various rent-seeking projects in the village,
        scaving off project funds, etc. This was a major motivating force for becoming a village official –
        and it not as lucrative today. But in a way, whether they like it or not, village officials must be more
        accountable and transparent in their wheeling and dealings. There is someone watching them,
        even taking joint decisions on a number of points. The village headman and his staff is no longer
        that only power in the village – and it is always important to have a separation of powers and
        multiplicity of voices.
                  Does the Council represent villagers? (yes…)

As we have seen in the case of Sariendah, village councils introduce a possibility of a meaningful
separation of powers. But we should perhaps not have too great hopes and expect immediate results. It
will take some time before the governance equation is turned around: that the village government is
relatively dis-empowered and the Village Council empowered. Most Councils will initially bow to the
powers of the executive. Members of the council need to be trained and empowered: they need to be
reassured that they will not, in the tightly-knit village community, be subject to social or political sanctions
by the executive or other members of the elite. The support of the village council by higher authorities can
also be put in question. District governments will continue to need a loyal headman and village
government, and might therefore in the future continue to support the executive branch rather than the
legislative.

The effectiveness of the Village Council is very much dependent upon who is elected into the village
council. There is no systematic mapping done yet, but during a number of meetings and workshops
organised by the Forum for Participatory Development (FPPM), cases from around 50 villages in West
Sumatra, West Nusa Tenggara, East Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi and Java show that very few new
members are elected into the councils. With “new” I mean here persons that previously were not involved
in village organisations. We can thus preliminary assert that village councils to a large extent are
populated by members of the village elite (the case of Sariendah is bit different. Why? xxx). This should
perhaps not come as a surprise, especially since neither the central nor the district governments have
done anything at all to reach out to new categories. There are no provisions for affirmative action, or
attempts to provide easier access for women or under-privileged groups to become council members.
This is different from India, for instance, where affirmative action policies state that thirty three per cent of
Panchayat Raj members and chairpersons must be women

Another important issue that has arisen is the nature of the relationship between the village headman and
officials, on the one hand, and the Village Councils, on the other. There are different concerns here. One
is that Council members will only be “second-class” members, those who did not make it to the village
government. They might not thus have the full capacity to monitor and balance the village government,
which would be too strong. Another scenario is related: that the Village Council is constituted by members
who have failed to become village headman but who because of this are in opposition to the village
government. There are districts in which the relationship between the Village Council and village headman
is extremely contentious. Since the headman is accountable to the village council, who has the power to
suggest to the district government to discharge the headman from his position, the village council has very
strong powers. If they want, they can put the village government to a virtual standstill, again and again
proposing to the district government that the headman is discharged. A third risk scenario is that the
Village Council becomes co-opted by the village headman. It says in Law 22 that the Village Councils “sits
on the same level and as a partner to the Village Government”. This could be interpreted that the Council
might not criticise the headman. There are cases in which the village headman provides salaries to
Council members, who feel obliged to support him (the Council office in Sariendah could be interpreted in
such terms).


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                      LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                           Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002



But in spite of these possible shortcoming (and they are really only possibilities, since it is too early to say
anything definitive), there are many good things to be said about the Village Council. It is a major
democratic innovation and has great democratic potentials, opening up decision-making and popular
participation. As I hope the Sariendah case showed, villagers have more trust in the local government
now, simply because it is performing better under scrutiny and supervision. It is much more difficult for
village officials to be corrupt today (although there are cases of collusive and rent-seeking relations, just
as in the district level). More people learn how to be democratic, etc. With the presence of Village Council,
there is also a hope that the village government can attract new kind of staff, people who are committed
and well-intentional, rather than the rent-seekers of the past. This is an important contribution that we will
return to in the final section. But before that I would want to discuss the issues of participation and
accountability from a slightly different perspective, that of a citizen social action group.


Citizen Interest Groups

One of the more exciting new mechanisms that civil society in Indonesia today is trying to develop is
around citizen-based social action groups, mobilized around an issue or community. I would want to
describe briefly one such initiative, before I end the chapter with some more general questions about the
future of local participatory governance in Indonesia.

Let us return to Majalaya, but this time remain in the town. This is a crowded and dirty town of some
200,000 persons, known for more than half a century as the textile centre of Indonesia. It is characterized
by an unplanned growth, complex political issues and intense social conflicts. Due to a number of recent
political scandals, there is very little trust in the local Majalaya and Bandung authorities. This situation has
developed over the past 10 years with raising unemployment figures combined with political abuses has
created strong tensions between government and civil society. With this background, in late 1999 a
number of prominent local notables and community leaders decided that something needed to be done,
and eventually established a citizen forum, the Forum for a Prosperous Majalaya, FM2S (Forum
Masyarakat Majalaya Sejahtera). Because of the social and political tensions, they decided to invite an
outside group to facilitate. IPGI, the Indonesian Partnership in Local Governance Initiatives, was
established in mid-2000 and consists of a mix of experienced and committed bureaucrats and community
activists: government officials from the Regional Planning Board, public planners from the Bandung
Institute of Technology and researcher-activists from non-government organizations in Bandung. Through
a number of evaluations and mappings, FM2S was formally established in October 2000. Members
consist of prominent Majalaya residents with some local notables representing themselves, while others
are elected by interest groups such as factory workers and street vendors.

Initial meetings were characterized by suspicion towards one another and especially towards with the
local governments, who in people’s view were leading Majalaya down the road towards misfortune. The
participants spoke very heatedly when they expressed their grudges, and were reluctant to listen to
others. Several participants had difficulty to control their emotions, especially when there was no response
to their suggestions. It took quite some effort on the part of the IPGI facilitators to create a civilized culture
and atmosphere. Today, meetings are much more democratic. Members are willing to listen and show
respect for the views of others.

How is FM2S organized? Presidium members are elected through a democratic process among the
members. The composition of the members covers various backgrounds (religious teachers,
professionals, entrepreneurs, sidewalk vendors, youth, government officials) ranging from 25 to 60 years.
Men play a very dominant role in the presidium as well as in the committees. To date, not a single woman
sits in the presidium and only two in the committees. Changes have been made to the composition of the
presidium members in order to embrace several components that initially were not represented in the
presidium, such as Village Council chairpersons and village heads. The participation level in the presidium
meeting, committees and task force is relatively high. Intensive meetings are held at least once a week by
the presidium and the committees, respectively, to develop plans and realize the collective working
programs. FM2S is what in the development world is called a “multi-stakeholder” forum: members come


                                                                                                               11
                      LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                           Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

from a variety of backgrounds. And there are government officials on the forum: the Majalaya sub-district
head was the first chair of FM2S and the Bandung Regional Planning Board member from IPGI is also a
formal member. In fact, both of them put their careers at stake by participating in FM2S (which until now is
not legally recognized by the Bandung government). One of the keys of success is right here: it has been
very important during meetings at FM2S to have someone to turn to: what does the government do about
this? What about the Regional Planning Board? How are decisions taken at the Bandung House of
Representatives? What is the view of the street vendors? What can factory merchants do to support us?
These and many similar often technical and practical questions have addressed directly during meetings,
rather than having to wait for a formal appointment with some decision-maker. Importantly, this has also
instilled people with a sense of confidence in the government, which as we remember, is in great demand
in Majalaya.

The track record after only about one year is quite impressive. The most visible achievement has been
collecting 350 million rupiah from factories to repave and build a new bridge over the main road to
Bandung that was often flooded and damaged. As I am writing this, FM2S has taken on its largest task
ever. Every ten years, each sub-district town in Indonesia has a new urban plan made. In mid-2000, the
time had come to Majalaya. The Regional Planning Board and the Bandung bureau of the Ministry of
Public Works commissioned a plan by a private consulting firm. When the plan was made public in May
2001 and discussed in a FM2S meeting, a number of shortcomings became obvious. Worst, the data the
consulting firm had used was hopelessly outdated, from the early 1990s. They had projected this forward,
but had seriously underrated population growth, shops, vendors, vehicles, everything. All the plans were
inaccurate. During a number of meetings, FM2S discussed what to do. Two meetings have been held with
the consulting firm, and representatives from the Regional Planning Board has been called in (remember,
one of IPGI’s members work at the Bandung Board). Finally, in November 2001 a decision was reached to
try to produce an alternative town plan, and have this approved as the official plan. This work is still going
on as I am writing this. Both the ITB and BAPPEDA members of IPGI are playing key roles, in providing
technical assistance in how to manage a plan, technically and politically. The main target of the revised
town plan would be to relocate the market. By having a new market in the outskirts of the city, the street
vendors around the town square could be relocated, and the bus terminal could expand to the old market
(they are now besides each other, right in the town centre, around 150 metres from the town square).

The most notable achievement of FM2S is not the material development. FM2S has achieved a sense of
civility in discussing sensitive matters. Meetings are generally held in an intimate atmosphere, although
the attending participants came from parties who had been (and are even still) disputing. Despite these
relatively significant different opinions, meetings have succeeded to reach a consensus and agreement as
well as a commitment for a follow-up. The jargon and prejudices that characterized early discussions have
been reduced significantly. And importantly, the distribution of information has opened up. In the past,
information was inaccessible to people in Majalaya, such as data about budgets or town plans. With
FM2S, it has been easier for residents to access facts and figures.

In spite of this progress, however, it is important to recognize that FM2S in its initial stages was a very
elite-oriented forum: members were leaders and local notables, and a few powerful individual
monopolized much of the discussion (we will return to this issue later). The facilitating group IPGI was
acutely aware of these problems, since one of the issues they staff had been researching in the past was
poverty alleviation schemes for the urban poor. The democratic outcome of a citizen forum can be
seriously distorted or discredited if the internal democracy does not operate: if deliberations are
monopolized by powerful individuals or if the forum falls prey to powerful outside agents who use it for
their special interest. Put simply, if disadvantaged and marginal people are put around the same table as
the articulate and powerful, with theoretically the same amount of voice, they will loose out. This will
                                                          5
probably happen in most countries around the world, but is especially true in a society such as that
Indonesia with its long history of patron-client relationships and appearance of social harmony. Once the
poor become disillusioned and leave the table, it is very difficult to win them back again. For them, it will


5
 See for instance Blair’s the comparison of six democratic local governance schemes, in which he argues that
affirmative action schemes have had very limited results in the short term (Blair 2001).


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                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

be yet another of those many government and top-down projects that promises to involve the poor, but
that never does.

IPGI (more than FM2S) decided therefore quite consciously to have a two-tracked strategy in Majalaya.
They had the facilitation of the broad-based (but elite-oriented) deliberations with FM2S, as described
above. But equally important was to launch a program of grassroots empowerment and training, with the
aim of supporting various disadvantaged groups to eventually take full part in FM2S. This obviously is
much more difficult to achieve than the facilitation of the citizen forum, and much more long-term. There
are six full-time community organizers working in Majalaya with this task. All of them come from the town
and thus know the people. They have been trained by the senior IPGI staff and international facilitators.
The main approach by the community organizers and IPGI is “learning by doing”. As a start, IPGI chose
the Town Square as their main area. This is where most of the problems in Majalaya are centred, with
street vendors, markets, public buses, the mosque, and lots of shops. With the help of IPGI, and after
much discussion, an association of street vendors were established. They have elected through public
deliberations the representatives to sit in FM2S. These persons are now full members of the Forum, even
though they still remain a bit withdrawn.

In conclusion, FM2S is a very interesting social and political experiment in Indonesia of a civil society
group that previously have never existed in the country. One of the promised of democratic
decentralization and the introduction of empowered deliberative forums is that basic power relations are
revised and revoked. This is a very contentious issued in Indonesia, with its long history of patrimonialism
and patron-client relationships. In a way it is about changing people’s behaviour and attitude, both of the
powerful elite and of the dis-empowered clients. FM2S is an experiment in allowing people who in the past
did not have a voice to participate democratically with the elite. In this interaction, a new political culture
has already begun to emerge, more characterized than in the past by tolerance and respect for other
peoples’ views, by more flat organizational structures, and by more transparent decision-making.


Democratic Local Governance

Building functional, democratic and autonomous local governments in a situation of political distress,
economic demise, floundering social institutions and thirty years of hegemonic authoritarian rule is a
daunting task – and yet something that Indonesia is embarking upon with its impressive decentralization
policies. However, devolving power and funds is only a necessary and not sufficient condition for effective
and transparent local governments. In Indonesia, as we have seen, there are limited forms of political
accountability. One important strategy that has been launched both by the government (for the Village
Councils) and people directly (the citizen forums) is to engage people, to encourage their participation,
and in this way regain an amount of trust and hopefully improve public policies.

Poverty is more than material depredation. It is also vulnerability and exclusions (quite often, material
poverty has its roots in exclusion, xxx quote Blair’s study). Participation is thus not only a means, but also
a direct way of overcoming poverty. The Sariendah Village Council and the FM2S have allowed for the
participation of people who previously were left outside, and opened up the local governance. Already
during their very short time of existence, decision-making has become more equitable and democratic:
parties are agreeing upon what is fair rather than pushing for their own views. It might not have produced
better public policies quite yet (but the work on the town plan and relocation of market in Majalaya
promises policies that benefits vulnerable groups, and the Sariendah Council can decide to use revenues
from the market place for a vaccination program or better schools) but decision-making is more
democratic and the deliberations have surely produced better citizens. And this is indeed, in the words of
John Stuart Mill, a good way to measure democracy.

Is there a danger that FM2S deflects interest in politics away from the formal political institutions, as we
have seen happening in the United States and Europe, where people are retreating back into the conform
of their private life? I think that most of the people working within the Sariendah Village Council or FM2S
would reject such a notion. For them, their active participation is really a way to revive politics. The issue
is thus not to replace the state, or make it redundant. It is rather finding new ways to build social contracts


                                                                                                             13
                     LogoLink International Workshop on Participatory Planning. Approaches for Local Governance.
                                                                          Bandung Indonesia, 20-27 January 2002

between the private concerns of citizens and the public good. FM2S is an attempt by both citizens and
government in Majalaya to find a new formula for working together. No one sees this as replacing the
formally elected council in Bandung. But everyone hopes that the model of collaboration – the
commitment, the enthusiasm, the self-sacrifice – one day will make it into the regional House of
Parliament. It is supplementing rather than replacing elected bodies, but it is more: FM2S is also a role
model for how citizen participation can be achieved in real life.

Citizen forum and councils are ways to save decentralization from some of the excesses and of making
democracy work on the levels that matters most to people, in their own communities. If decentralization is
to deepen democracy by pushing decision-making closer to people and produce more “rooted” public
policies, citizen forum and village councils are two mechanisms through which people actually can get
involved in governance on a day to day basis. Participatory forums and councils are attractive because
they are important learning grounds for basic democratic and political skills, because they hold out the
possibility of improved decision-making, and because, in the end, they could point to a revival of peoples’
interest in the state and government. Citizen participation, in short, is a way to reformat political powers,
allocating power for those who need it most.


References

Antlöv, Hans,

Blair, Harry, “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six
        Countries”, World Development, vol. 28, no. 1, 2000.

Buentjen, Claudia 1998, “Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia”, Report P4D 1998-11, Support for
       Decentralization Measures, GTZ-Jakarta.

Hall, John A., “In Search of Civil Society” in John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society. Theory, History, Comparison,
        Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.

Heller 2000

Narayan, D.C., R. Chambers, M.K. Shah and P. Petesch, Voices of the Poor: Crying out for Change,
       Washington DC: World Bank, 2001.

Törnquist, Olle,




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