GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS FUTURE PREPAREDNESS

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							GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS:
 FUTURE PREPAREDNESS
      Njuguna Ndung’u
           Governor,
     Central Bank of Kenya

                        July 30, 2009
Three Responses to the Main
Issue:
   Continue the development path: defend and ring-fence
    development spending to support capacity for future
    growth
   Build stronger and stronger banks – through re-
    capitalizing, consolidation and mergers to cover the
    EAC region
   Regulators should talk and coordinate with each other:
    have a coordinating platform, build supervisory
    capacity in the region and more strongly build the
    information capital to be used by credit reference
    bureaus in the region
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Economic Performance and Forecasts
for OECD and Emerging Economies
Country                               Growth of Gross Domestic Product
                     2009Q1-Actual          2009-forecast       2010-forecast
USA                  -2.5                   -2.8                +1.6
Britain              -4.1                   -3.7                +0.6
Euro Area            -4.8                   -4.1                +0.5
India                +5.8                   +5.0                +6.4
China                +6.1                   +6.5                +7.3
Singapore            -10.1                  -8.8                +1.0
Malaysia             -6.2                   -3.0                +1.2
Chile                -2.1                   -1.0                +2.0
Egypt                +4.3                   +3.4                +3.1
South Africa         -1.3                   -1.8                +3.1
Source: The Economist June 13, 2009
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 Africa Not Spared: Growth Outlook
 Revised Down Significantly
             2007       2008    2009a        2009b   2010a   2010b
Botswana     4.4        2.9     5.3          -10.4   4.7     14.3
Ghana        6.1        7.2     5.8          4.5     5.8     4.7
Kenya        7.0        2.0     6.4          3.0     6.2     4.0
Nigeria      6.4        5.3     8.1          2.9     7.7     2.6
S. Africa    5.1        3.1     3.3          -0.3    4.2     1.9
Tanzania     7.1        7.5     7.98         5.0     8.04    5.7
Uganda       8.6        9.5     8.1          6.2     8.0     5.5
Africa       6.2        5.2     6.0          3.9     na      3.9
  2009/10a IMF, WEO October 2008 estimates
  2009/10b IMF WEO April 2009 estimates
  2009-10 numbers are forecasts




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    Initial Phase of Economic Crisis
   Through weakening of local currencies, declining
    reserves and stock exchanges
   Depreciation as a result of
     Declining  commodity prices and general deterioration of
      terms of trade
     Non-resident outflows from equity and bond markets
      (“Flight to safety”). In addition the US dollar perceived by
      investors as a safe haven. (The distorted US dollar relative price)
     The market-determined or flexible exchange rate acted
      as an automatic stabilizer during this crisis in most African
      economies
                                                                       5
    Initial Phase of Economic Crisis…
   Weakening of Stock Exchanges as a result of
     Outflow  of non-residents’ funds
     Unfavorable investor sentiments: concerns about global
      recession and negative impact on domestic economies
   Drawdown of foreign exchange reserves
     The  law defines 4 months of import cover
     Kenya went to as low as 2.7 months of import cover

     But this is what forex reserves are for, accumulate in
      good times and cushion against shocks and drawdown in
      bad times
                                                          6
Economic Crisis
   Commodity exports have been one of the main drivers of
    growth in many African countries
   The economic crisis has dampened the expectations on
    commodity futures markets thereby inducing falling prices and
    demand for most commodities
   The crisis has taken a heavy toll on countries that are highly
    dependent on natural resources (e.g. copper, oil, timber and
    diamonds)
   The fall in copper and diamond prices has resulted in a
    significant drop of export receipts for Zambia and Botswana,
    respectively

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The Financial Sector Remains
Sound and Safe
     Indicators of Financial Sector Soundness :
1.    Capital adequacy: All the 45 banks meet the
      criteria for minimum core capital requirements
      (capital adequacy 18.1% June 09 vs required
      12%)
2.     Adequate liquidity to meet the payment needs of
      the financial system. (Liquidity ratio average
      42.4% vs required 20%)
3.    Appropriate balance between loans and deposits
      ratio (75%: Kshs712B against Kshs953B - June
      2009)
                                                       8
Indicators of Financial Soundness…

4.   The interbank cash market continues to be liquid
     and stable, the rates are coming down consistent
     with monetary policy projections
5.   Lending to private sector increased by 19.2%
     during the year to June 2009
6.   The ratio of gross non-performing loans to gross
     loans at 9.4% in June 2009 has declined from a
     high of 10.60% in December 2007
7.   Return on capital was on average Kshs25 for Kshs
     100 invested
8.    Return on shareholders funds 25.3%
                                                        9
    Monetary Policy Stance
   The Central Bank of Kenya is pursuing an accommodative monetary
    policy stance to help cushion the economy from the negative effects of
    the Global Financial Crisis
   Measures taken so far
     Reduction of Cash Reserve Ratio from 6% to 5% in December 08 -
      thus releasing an equivalent of Kshs8bn for lending to the economy
      and further to 4.5% in July 2009
     Reduction of CBR from 8.0% to 7.75% to signal to banks to lower
      lending rates
     Allowing a reduction in foreign exchange reserves to less than 3
      months to take pressure off the depreciation pressure of the Kenya
      shilling vis-à-vis the hard currencies [Had the CBK not allowed this,
      the inflationary effect of the shilling’s depreciation would have been
      worse - in terms of intermediate imports, oil prices etc]
                                                                         10
    Monetary Policy Stance…
   Monetary Policy stance adequate for now
   Banking system not lending to private sector because of perceived risks
    associated with global financial crisis. Once banks lending resumes the liquidity
    of the system will be reviewed by MPC among other instruments.
   CRR is used sparingly [like a water valve – once water is out, no control] (it
    reduces the monetary base and increases the money multiplier, it is not a tool for
    liquidity management)
      Price signals are good shock absorbers for supply shocks.
           In an economy buffeted by supply shocks such as food, using CBR rather than
            CRR was a more appropriate response in the crisis period.
           price effect (CBR) is superior and efficient to quantity effect (CRR)
       Too much liquidity in a sluggish economy might choke the economy
        generating inflationary pressure. Providing liquidity only when it is needed is
        prudent monetary policy and good economics
       the barometer for liquidity [Interbank rates at less than 3%].
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Overall the Global Financial Crisis
Presents Three Challenges
1.   Financial Sector Contraction – due to confidence–risk
     averseness
         Less resources mobilised yet banks are awash with liquidity
         But we can ring-fence domestic confidence and solve the resource
         constraints
2.   Real Sector Economic Decline: Poses Significant Risks
         But also Slow Adjustment
         Production processes must be supported through public investment -
         Protect wage goods
3.   Public Sector Resource Constraints:
        Buffeted by several shocks
         Flexibility of adjustment - ODA/BoP support has come via ESF
                                                                             12
Going Forward
   To support Government policy as envisaged in Vision
    2030 - strong, stable and efficient banks that offer
    services to a wider public are required.
   To realise this objective, the Law was amended
    requiring banks to gradually increase their minimum
    core capital to Kshs1bn by 2012.
   Consolidation of banks expected – but more
    importantly, they should be strong in their market
    niche.

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Going Forward...
  National Survey on Financial Access conducted
  Access to financial services by majority of Kenyans still
   limited
  Microfinance Act enacted and Regulations gazetted
   (One Microfinance Institution licensed)
  Regulations on Credit Reference Bureaus Gazetted

  Expansion of branch network

  Proposal to allow banks to use agents incorporated in
   2009 Finance Bill – Principal/Agent model of financial
   service delivery
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Going Forward...
Six Incremental Solutions – The Bank Advises:
1. Partnership: make resources available to ride over shocks
         – BoP support and quick disbursements from AfDB, IMF, and WB
2.   Domestic resource mobilization strategies
     –    Target to support production and open up production potential
     –    Avenue for investment & savings – (see the Kenya Infrastructure Bond
          Model, see also Diaspora Bonds)
     –    Protect the wage good – consumption (Kazi Kwa Vijana)
3.   Strengthen institutions and capacity in those institutions to
     focus on:
         Provision of a coordinating framework across regulators (formation of
          Financial Sector Committee)
         Innovative policy strategies
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Going Forward...
4.   Stay the path of reforms – do not sacrifice long-run
     growth
            Development budgets should not be cut – should be increased
            Remain within attainable targets
            In the 1980s and 1990s – short-run shocks were used as an excuse to cut
             Development Budgets – sacrificed long-term growth
5.   Aid Delivery Modalities in Times of Crisis: Quick
     disbursements to allow countries ride over shock quickly to
     protect economic erosion
             But also DSA frameworks should signal changes in the policy paradigm
6.       Look at the global financial architecture
              - see G20 Proposals from London coming from diverse groups and C10
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