New Georgia Island -- Working copy

Document Sample
New Georgia Island -- Working copy Powered By Docstoc
This work is still in Progress. I have not finished converting it to web format, fixing the formatting
or even spell checking it. Send comments and contributions to

         (Phil File)"In July 1943, we were alerted to move out with less than twenty-four hours notice. Camp

was struck and we trucked down the highway to the loading area. We passed under a banner stretched

across the road, between two trees, with the legend painted on it, to the best of my memory: 'The

Infantry, King of the Highway, Queen of Battles. Down this road marched forty of her men who were shot,

clubbed, and bayoneted as they lay wounded on hospital stretchers." Just the right note to set the tone

for a new campaign.

         "Reaching the beach, we were ferried to a low slung naval vessel which we were informed was an

APD - a converted destroyer. There were no berthing spaces; it was every man for himself on the open

deck. Shortly after dark, we moved out and were soon cutting through the water at near flank speed.

There was no rail at the decks edge and the lee deck was noon awash. Men who had opted for sleeping

space there were forced to move to higher, drier space -- crowding things considerably. There was a

certain amount of grumbling from the first troops but everyone gradually settled down into an uneasy


         "Before daylight (1 Au8.) we were in the New Georgia group and landed on the island or Sasavella.

In the dark, without guides, we stumbled through the water, stepping into holes in the coral that must

have been ten, or twelve feet deep. When daylight came we fanned out and made certain' the inlet was

unoccupied. We were then ferried over to the inland of New Georgia.

         (Bill Weidle) “After our campaign on the canal was over we went into a brief training period, part of

which consisted of coast watcher training plus further training, which had started in Hawaii, on enemy

weapons. The Coast watcher training was conducted under the direction of the Coast Watcher Unit, at

Kokumbona, for different units plus the 3d Marines. After we had been trained in these skills we made a
raid, by a New Zealand Corvette, T.O.2., to Florida Island, which was cancelled en route. we then went

to a part of the Canal where the enemy was "still reported.” When we arrived, it seemed native

Melanesians had already taken care of them. After a week of scouting and fishing with grenades, the

corvette returned and picked us up. When we returned we extended the special training to the rest of the

Regiment. I guess Wolfhounds could do anything.

     "We were ordered to pack only combat gear and, boarding troop carrying destroyers, were rushed to

the New Georgia mess. We were scheduled for landing at Sassevella, but were put on an un-named

island by mistake. At noon two C.T.’s came for us and we crossed the channel to Sassevella under

heavy enemy air attack. Fortunately, we incurred no casualties. On 2 August., we boarded another craft

and headed for New Georgia - under a great air cover of Army and Navy planes."

     The Tropic Lightning was scheduled for Bougainville; however, as on Guadalcanal, the High

Command had underestimated the enemy strength and determination; General Harmon alerted the 27th

Infantry, for movement to New Georgia, and that the 25 Division be taken off the Bougainville schedule.

Advance elements of the Wolfhounds and Division

Hqs. landed on Sassevella Island before daylight 1 August. 1943, and the Jap’s bombed and strafed the

landing and unloading ops, but no casua1ties resulted. On 2 August. the Regt moved to New Georgia.
The line, from the coast north was comprised of the 43d and 37 Divisions. Ten miles further north a

provisional regt. of the 1 Bn Marines and three bn’s of the 145 and 148 Inf. was located at Enogai Inlet.

The Wolfhounds were moved to the right flank (north) of XIV Corps and were charged with its protection.

Love Co. set up a series of outposts along Baxter Trail and on the east-west trail perpendicular to the

Corps' right flank.

     Col. Douglas Sugg commanded the 27th until a few days before the move when he fell ill and was

hospitalized, being replaced by L/Col. George Bus (?) until his return to duty 12 August. Patrols in force
were immediately sent north to clear out the enemy and contact T/F Liversedge, the combined force at

Eno8ai Inlet, where it had withdrawn after a costly attempt to …B….? Harbor.

    The 1 Battalion, with the AT Co. attached, jumped off along the Bairoko Trail toward Mt. Bao. Baker

Co. tried to reduce an enemy strongpoint -- following a barrage of 37 AT fire and heavy machine gun fire,

but could neither penetrate or reduce the well hidden enemy strong point. On 5 August., C Co. was

committed but couldn’t make any contribution.

                     (File)"I was sent to patrol a trail we landed astride of. About 800 yards from the

                beach we came upon the bodies of a patrol that had been ambushed by the Nips. I don ’t

                recall how many were there, about a half dozen. That did impress me was the fact that,

                although these GI’s had been dead only about two days, their rifles were already rusty

                and inoperable. Each rifle had fired the first round and then jammed. I emphasized this

                on my men for keeping their weapons clean."

                     The Regimental plan was, 1 Bn, commanded by L/Col Joe Ryneska, with the A.T.

                  Co. attached, to proceed north along the Bairoko Trail to Mt. Bao and then on to the

                  North Coast. Second and Third Bn’s, commanded by L/Col. Ben Evans Jr. and Maj.

                  Charles Davis, would follow the Zieta Trail then proceed to Sunday Inlet to deny the

                  enemy use of Diamond Narrows. These plans were greatly influenced by CICSOPAC

                  maps which proved inaccurate and misleading.

                     The landing was on Laiana Beach and moved off to the Parachute Drop

                     ______________________missing sentence____________________

out and the I Battalion encountered resistance in force 500 yards north of RJ-w (road junction W).

    (Joe Koontz) “'I do recall the wiping out of an AT Platoon crew - including Lt. Clark, Platoon leader,

who had been moved up to support the 1 Battalion on Hill V. I was there five minutes before the crew
arrived - tugging and pushing their gun thru the foliage. I was standing on the trail looking toward the Jap

strongpoint when instinct told me to get down just as the AT gun was pushed past me, to be moved into

position, when a long burst of machine gun fire, which would have gone thru me to the crew, flattened

them, They were wiped out to a

       Item Go. had been assigned establishment of a road block north of RJ-W and were pinned down

by an enemy machine gun force of company size. First Battalion. moved out at 0830, 4 August., with an

AT Co., up along the Bairoko Trail toward Mt. Bao. The 3 Battalion started up the Zieta Trail with the 2

Battalion in reserve. After making contact with I Co., Baker Co. was designated assault company on the

enemy emplacement; however, penetration of the enemy position failed and the Battalion moved into a

cordon defense position at 1400; 37 mm AT and heavy machine gun fire had been used during this

assault, but this had not helped either. The next day Charlie Co. enveloped the enemy’s left flank and,

though they could not penetrate the Jap position, they did make contact with Able Co. B Company went

on defense preparatory to a of artillery fire to the north.

       (File)"Our next move was up the trail behind Munda Airfield. We were disappointed to learn that to

someone else would go the glory of capturing Munda. We had a New Zealander with us leading a patrol

of Fiji Scouts who had a fearsome reputation as skilled woodsmen. It was a bit of an annoyance to them

when I would show up in their midst without an invitation and without detection. They were scouting

ahead of us and at a place on the trail marked "Point W (RJ-W) on the map, they encountered enemy

positions which they reported as light. After three days of bitter fighting we took the position to find it


                                                Lion Blue 3 Battalion..

     On the morning of 7 August, Lightning Forward sent out a Fijian patrol to recon the area around

Zieta. They returned at 1000, 9 August1 and reported that many Jap trails were crossed showing much
travel to the NE. An enemy transport patrol of 20 men was seen heading southeasterly, apparently for

Zieta, carrying large boxes of supplies. A few pillboxes were encountered on the Zieta Trail and

approximately one company of Japs were digging in along a river north of Zieta. Further, on 7 August.,

the banana plantation observed from Love Company's bivouac may be Zieta. No opposition, other than

sniper fire was encountered and seven enemy have been killed.

         By 21 August., a Rgt. Recon patrol was led by Lt. Koontz and succeeded in blazing a trail from

about a point 3000 yards North and slightly West of Zieta to the high ground on the east edge of Piru

Plantation and nearly opposite Cutters Point. Lion White is following this trail. Schultz' Battalion has two

platoon at the wharf on Lulu channel to the west of Zieta.

        On the night of 20-21 August five enemy barges left Bairoko Harbor at 0115. They were engaged by

PT's with unknown results, The PT's were subjected to heavy fire from shore batteries on Aruridel and


Missing Page or out of order

of over fifty well camouflaged positions. I took the optical sight off a Nambu in a position where the

gunner had made 12s mud dolls and set them on the edge of his hole. That was how many men we had

lost in front of that position. He had a tunnel field of fire, which was not

visible to a standing person and, when you stepped in front of the fire lane, he would shoot the legs out

from under you. I round the position accidentally while crawling forward. I poked my head into the fire

lane and saw the gun before he saw me. I got myself out of that fire lane p.d.q.

        When we brought up one or the 37mm AT guns and started blasting the Nip positions at near point

blank range, they left post-haste. We moved up the trail after them. The map showed it as a road to

Bairoka Harbor but, it was just a trail to be traveled single file. Our logistic support was again the cannibal

brigade and each day we moved up the trail added two days to our resupply time. The trail wound over
hills and up and down canyon sides, occasionally crossing ravines on two long trees laid side by side.

These trees were six to ten inches in diameter on the thick end and could be as much as seventy-five feet

long. They might have been adequate for the smaller Japs, but were a hazard to GIs, - and the native

carriers wouldn't use them. A week on the trail brought us to a Marine outpost, called Kelly's Bar,

manned by survivors or the Liversedge Task Force. The 4th Marine Raider Battalion commanded by

Colonel Liversedge, had made an assault on Bairoka Harbor only to loose ninety percent of their strength

in thirty minutes. Then we met them, the first question was, "What Army outfit is this?" When told we

were the Wolfhounds, the Gunnery Sergeant's comment was, “God, are we glad to see you!” Evidently

our reputation was preceding us. It didn't take the Marines fifteen minutes to vanish into the jungle

headed toward Enogai.

     On 6 August., Hq., B, D, and the AT Co.s were ordered to contain the enemy strongpoint and A, C,

and AT Companies.were ordered to bypass the position and proceed north along the Bairoka Trail. Some

slight sniping was encountered and three Japs were killed. About 2000 yards from the starting point a

large bivouac area was located on top of a hill - this was believed to be Mt. Bao.

The enemy had evacuated the position some days ago and a large quantity of U.S. arms and ammo was

found. One trail was found leading to the southwest and another was found leading to the north -they

were both in good condition.

     Also, on 7 August., 1800 hours. 1/27 and the AT Co. started digging in at the Jap bivouac site.
    Charley Co. moved out to reconnoiter the EW trail, the next day, toward Mt.. Tirokambia, while a
    second patrol (A Co.) moved north up the Bairoka Trail 3000 yards. Company C located another trail
    leading in a southerly direction.

     The native patrol, led by Lt. Koontz, on 7 August, went 700 yards north and came upon a wooden

toot bridge surrounded by about 58 enemy huts continuing further north the patrol came to a fork in the

trail with one branch going WN and the other NE.. Both trails were reconnoitered 4oo yards, but which

trail continued to Bairoka could not be determined. The patrol returned by 1500 hours.
     The Jap bivouac area, found 7 August, was designated RJR (Road Junction "R"). The patrol from C

Company discovered the trail to the southwest, from the RJR-Mt. Tirokambia trail eventually intersected

the Zieta Trail - where elements of Lion Blue ( 3 Battalion..) were contacted.

     The patrol of 8 August, am, led by Capt. Emory and Lt. Koontz, proceeded north of RJR for 7000

yards. (trail distance) and, upon return, reported: a (a) From Mt. Bao to the first bridge, a distance of 850

yds. was found a recently evacuated enemy bivouac area of 58 huts.(b) From Mt Bao to the 2nd bridge, a

distance of 3100 yds., was found another trail 1eading NW. (c) from Mt. Bao to the 3rd bridge, a distance

of 5150 yds was another old bivouac of 5 huts.

Missing Page or out of order

and proceed north. On 7 August., Able Co. moved out to lead with C following and, at 0700 hours and

500 yards north, they passed thronish an abandoned strong encrny defensive position. still further north

a battalion sized bivouac, recently evacuated, was entered and scoutinj£ patrols were sent on all trails for

sec'1rity purpose8. At 1120, a patrol from the Re 5imental I & R Flatoon~ led by Lt. Joe Koontz,

proceeded up the north trail and round two Japs. One was ~ and the other fled into the junsle. Later in

the afternoon the rest of the Battalion cau~ht the lead companies after destroyin~ the Jap atonE point

with the

aid of enaineers. The next day elements of the i6i ngt., which had been assi 8ned to maintain and protect

the~MSR, made contact with the Woithounds and no enemy were encountered. On the inorning of 9

Au~., Baker Co. reached a river thought to be the Bairoko and a halt was ordered while the Battalion 0.0.
took a six man patrol 4500 yards north makeins contact with Col. LiversedEe's Marine Rai6era. Much

information and maps, on the local terrain, were obtained from the Marines and the patrol returned by

1400. At 1730, the 1 Battalion.,was attached to the 161 Rgt. Two days later, at 1700, after a six mile

a4vance, the Battalion reached the Marine bivouac, known as "Kelly's Bar",and was attached to col.

Liversedge's command.

      (F.ile)"We moved onto a terrain feature that became known to us an Starvation Rid 6e. Our rations

were one can 0£ heavy and one can 0£ liEht C Rations per platoon per day. I had a spoon and we ate

our meal by dum pinE the cam or meat and beans or whatever into a helmet, breaking crackers into it

with half a canteen of water and then we would each eat a spoonful of food in turn until it wan all eone.

We tried to get re-supply by air but becAugustuste of the dense jun~1e the planes couldn't find us and a

lot of our supplies fell into Jap territory. One drop did hit our hill and all the ammo came crashing doriw

throu~h the trees. The one parachute or foodstuffs, being lishter, buns up in the top of the trees. We tried

to shoot it down but the harness beinE on the top side we didn't have any luck there. The tree was a

Ereat mahogany,

six feet in diameter without a limb for forty-five feet. The wire section's climbing spurs were too short to

act a purchase in the ~oft bark. The nearest tree to the ration tree had a heavy vine Erowins up

it and I decided to climb the vines and walk across On one of the
lower limbs to the ration tree. I didn't how brittle that jungle

'tgrowth was and halfway across the limb broke and dropped me with a great crash. When I came to I
was fightings the medics who were trying to get me on a litter. I was told that when I fell, Captain West

asked what that crash was and, when told that File fell out of the ration tree, he asked "Did he set the

rations?" So much for concerns Later, a man from Do~ Company, much sajaller than me, manaEed to

clinib the route that I had attempted. He cut the risers, but when he did so, the container swung pinnin~

him to the tree and amashinE his jaw.
Despite his injury he was able to finish cuttins the container loose and climbed down unassisted. Talk

about ~ritI The rations were just ena ugh to allow us to displace rorward to "The Gap", which was just

that It was a low saddle the trail crossed on a ridee before droppins down to the final approach to Bairoka

Harbor. There.we were stalemated a5ain. There was a Nip position on the trail about 300 yards beyond

the Gap and we would patrol up there and worry them: every day. One day I was sitting in my hole

watchin~ down the hillside (H 4 ?) while Roland Watts was asleep in the adjacent hole. A lizard, about

three feet ions, came waddling up the hill and seeing me watchin~ him, veered off and climbed the

parapet to Watt's hole. He peered down at the slespina Watts and then looked at mee. He looked down

at Watts asain and then back at me. I'll swear the beast actually Erinned. Then he dived in the hole riEht

on top of Watts. Roland let out a shriek and came BtraiEflt up like an explosion. I thought I would die

lAugusthing, I was rollin~ in the bottom of Wy hole, and Watts never did forEive rue. I think he always relt

I put the lizard up to it.'

     (File)"One day (8-23 7), the Battalion 0.0., Gol. Ryneska, had an
                                      - ~*     ~ jun              r'~~~~r'r'Ir4        t?'a -'~1 1

I, discussinE. the 8ituation, the old Man pointed back up the trail we

   had 8truE~led up and said, tken, if we E0 that way we know that it will be two weEks before we ect

   anythins to eat." Then he pointed toward Bairoka Harbor and said, "Ir we ~o that way, we will have

   food tomr~arrow or all be deadi" He then outlined the plan of attack.

   'the rifle companies moved out the followin~ mornins with fi'ted bayonets. There was a low sround fo~

   furnishins additional cover. By noon Bairoka Harbor was secure (8-24) and landing craft were cominS

   in with food arid en~ineer equipment. One of the Nip warehouses was filled with rice. Another was

   ruled with bicyoles, actually several hundred. I don't know what the flips planned to use them for
    unless it was in New Caledonia and New Zealand. The muddy trails of the Solomons were no place

    for them. Therc was a motorcycle and sidecar too and some of the men thought they would take it to

    Eno~ai becAugustuste the ensineers had started bulidozina. a road across the peninsula. After about

    fifty yards of trying to push it th~u8h the hub deep mud they abandoned it."

         The MSR now became the three mile distance from Enogni Inlet by the cannibal brlEade.

    Throush 27 Au~ the Battalion spent its time Patrolling the entire area, encountering and eliminatin 8 a

    few or the enemy, and, on 25~Au~, the Battalion. C.O. and Cal. Liversed~e went to the mouth of

    flairoko Harbor to contact the 145 Inf~ On 27 August, the volrha~nds were ordered to move to Enosal

    Inlet to relieve the Marines. The Battalion then went into a defensive position.

         (File)"The camp site at Erio~ai had been the 4 Marine Raider Battalion., 'rF Liversedse, bivouac

    and it was a disgrace to the American Forces.

        was ruthy. The flies were so bad they would crawl in your mouth

   While you were eatin~~ we had enoush nettinw~ for the kitchen 4nd the
*Zatrine. We would set our chow in the kitchen and go into the latrine

>to eat it. we cleaned steadily and never did set it cleaned enough

I                Bairoka Perimeter. They had been iyin~ there about a month and the Nips had stripped

                 the bodies of all id. All they could do was state that such a body must be so and so

                 becAugustuste that was the last place he was seen alive. It was a srisIy, odoroas task

                 and without tho Father Scannell's presence I think the men would have revolted.

                      SceAugustuste of my familiarity with demolitions I was detailed Battalion fisherman.

                   The la~aons teamed with mullet and other edible fish So
              we had all we could eat. One day a blast brousht a moray eel to the surface. He ~as six

              feet long an~ as thick as a man a thigh. He was wri~gling around on top of the water,

              stunned, and one of the men struck a blow at him with an aluminum ~oat paddle. The

              eel demonstrated the power of his jaws by bitinE a chunk out of the paddle the size

               of a mans hand. It was at this time that I inade my first acquaintance with prirna-cord.
               We wanted an OP to monitor activity on Kalunibangora.

              There wan a natural platform in a lar~e tree near the shore - except

              one lar3e limb was an obstruction to view. Told to remove the limb,

              I soon realized what>ar%fortidable task it would be. It was a foot in

              diameter and, not only difficult with the pioneer tools available to us,

              a sreat daneer to nplittin8 and throwing a GI to the Fround below. The syreenes had left

              a lot of varied~explosives behind, including rolls of prima-cord and I had had it described

              to me but had never before seen nor used it. It looked like safety fuse, but in larger

              diameter. I secured a half dozen blocks of TNT to the limb by lashing it with prima;cord

              and then letting the trailins end hans to the ground. I made a jury ne with 3renade

              detonators and then checked to see that the area was clear ( my buddies usually gave

              me a wide berth when I was play1n~ with explonives becAugustuste I was no sick and

              sore with my tree injuries they weren't sure I misht not end it all).; then pulled the pin on

              the detonator and swun~ it away from me. I stood, dreamily contempiatins the prima-

              cord waitine for the twist and tell tail smoke of safety ruse lightins off. Suddenly it

              dawned on me what I was about ~ witness and I pivoted, making a leap for an old Jap

              dugout, but the

     This move was accomplished afternoon, Lion white passing thru Lion islue.. About 1430, the lead

     scouts of George Co. entered a deep ravine, flanked by precipitous ridges, and G Co. came under

     intense enemy tire (at 82.1 - 44.9) in the form of ICiG in a pilib
    ox.       Ten enemy troops were killed while G Co. lost one man KIA. Fox Co. moved around on G

    Co.'s left flank - coming in from the west.. P Co. ran into a second IVIG nest which they knocked

    out.. Even so, a vicious fire fight had developed and flanking elements were sent out atop both

    ridges only to discover the enemy position was held in depth and, at 1700, the attack was

    discontinued in favor of a night defense position. The n~vc.Z morning. 9 August.. the 2d Battalion.

    jumped off, to continue the attack, at 0930, with ~ & F Co.s coordinating a frontal attack. After an

    advance 0£ 150 yds. northward, to the west of the zieta Trail, Easy 0o1 came under heavy fire and

    was pinned down on the slope of a hill1 Commo between the unitss was difficult becAugustuste of

    the rough terrain and the very thick jungle. Easy Co. was then attached to Lion Blue (3 Battalion.),

    by the Rgtl. CO, and the balance of Lion white (2 Battalion.) was ordered to envelop the enemy's

    right flank and by-pass the resistance to reach the rear of the Jap positions. Eoxx Co. passed G

    Co.. and proceeded northward to the Fast of the zieta Trail but ran into resistance which held them

    up. George Go. and figs Go were to flank while How Co.. moved several hundred yds. to the

    southwest and then followed a compass course, cross country, parallel with the zieta Trail. By

    1200, Georg;e Co. was still held up but plans were being laid to by-pass the resistance to get

    northward and engage a group of Japs, estimated at company strength, reportedly digging in along

    a river north of Ajeta. This into came from a patrol of 3/i48 Inf.~

         "blast cAugustustht me in,~id-air propelling

          me into the rear of the hole. It sure

          did a hell of a job on that limb -

          looked as it a big beaver had chewed

          through it in about six bitea."
                               2 Battalion. Ops.
               The mission of the 2 Battalion. was to

          pursue the retreating enemy to the                                                               'a'.
          north and clear the area between Firti                                  First mail call on New
                                                                                         twelve days

          Plantation and Sunday Inlet. This operation involved twenty two mile8, with no accurate maps

          available, across mountainous jun~les and swamplar; which, also, made supply extremely

          difficult. The Battalion. went into a res defense at the Para Drop until 6 August. when it moved

          out, at 0900, and ad anced 400 yards to west or RJ-W by 1430. Lt. Col. Ben Evans took


          next day the 2 Battalion. moved west on Baxter Rd. to RJ-J and then to an area between Twin

          Hills where the 3 Battalion. was located. Orders were received to pass throush the 3

          Battalion.~the next day,and continue the advance on Zieta. About 1430, 8 Au~. the lead

          scouts of Geor~e Co.

          entered a deep ravine, flanked by precipitous ridges~and a Co. came under intense enemy

          fire. A vicious fire fiEht broke out and fiankin8 elements were sent out atop both ridses only to

          discover the enemy position was held in depth and, at 17Q0, the attack was discontinued

          in favor of a night defen8e position. The next morning, 9 Augustust., the 2 Battalion. jumped

          orr, to continue the attack, at 0930, with E & F Co.s coordinating a frontal attack. After an

          advance of 150 yda. Easy Co.

          came under heavy fire and was pinned down on the slope of a hill. Comm~ between the units

          was difficult becAugustuste of the rough terrain and very thick jungle. Easy Co. was then

          attached to the 3 Etn.,by the Regimental C.O.)and the 2 Battalion. was ordered to envelop the
          enemy's riEht flank and by-pass the resistance to reach the rear or the Jap positions Co.a F,G,

          and Hq. went to flank while H Co. moved several hundred yds.

  to the southwest and then followed a compass course, cross country, parallel with the Zieta Trail. At

  1430, the lead elements of Fox Co. surprised the outer defense of a Jap stron~point and the lead

  platoon quickly pushed on to the top of the rid~e. It encountered a nurrter or pill boxes and foxholes

  and, in the ensuins fire fi~ht two machine gun pill' boxes were destroyed and a number of the enemy

  werc killed.

  Co. a then. came up but no further progress could be made, since the

enemy still held the commanding ground, and, with darkness at hand, the

  Etn. went into nisht positions. On 10 Au~, the stn. wig drawn b~ack so the enemy stronshold could

  receive arty fire. This saturation continued throuEh the entire day. The attack resumed, at 0730, the

  next nornina and3 after advancang 300 yds.1 extreme resistance was met and then the Japs launched

  a counter attack a~ainst F Cot.8 right flank. Fox Co .8 weapon8 platoon and all or a COa were

  committed and the combined fire power succeeded in drivins the enemy back. Repeated attacks were

  launched a~ainst the Jap positions, throush the balance of the day, but no proFress could be made

  and only heavy casualties were sustained by both sides. That nisht was relatively quiet, for the lines

  being so c4ose (a rew yards apart), but, about 0400, the Nip8 started throwin6 stones at our front lines

  and the Wolfhounds braced for a counter attack, which did not materialize. On the 12th, with drawl

  was a~ain necessary pending the use of arty as soon after daylisht as possible. Zfltense

  concentrations were laid down th~ entire mornin~ and a coord

 mated attack by both Ftn.s wan ordered. At 1200, the 3 Battalion. attacked
 aBtride the trail while the 2 Battalion. maintained contact and moved alonE £t the high ~round to the left

(west) of zieta Trail. Upon reaching the

   position of enemy resistance it was found the Japs had withdrawn and the 3 fltn. besran iinm~diate

   pursuit. The S Battalion. asnembied near the ~ieta River and went in reserve while maintainin~

   contact with 3 Battalion.

                13 & 14 AuE., the situation remained static; however, a platoon

important supply and evac trail, to the west, that went to the sea. During the ni8ht a seven man carryin~

party, or Japs, was wiped out and the next day the roadblock patrol was relieved by apother H Co.

platoon, led by Lt. Johnson. Shortly after 2400, of the 14th, a Sap company sized party bivouaced a short

distance from the trail block and the following morninE they broke camp and moved down trail directly

Into the woirhound roadblock. Taken completely by surprise the leadins enemy troops were literally

mowed down by our machine gun8. After this

initial shock the enmy launched vi~rous attacks on the totally encircled platoons all round defense. After

five and a half hours of continuous rightina the platoon had only two grenAdes and a few rounds of ammo

left and, not knowins that help was on the way, Lt. Johnson succeeded in breakins his men throu~h the

enemy circle and returning to the Battalion. At a cost of two men SIA and seven wounded, the platoon

had eliminated Co of the enemy and wouflded many more. That same morni~ the 2 fltn.) preceeded by

light tanks, passed throu6h the 3 Battalion. and attacked enemy positions which had held the 3 Btfla for

the previous three days. No resistance was encountered and the Battalion. reached Zieta vilviase by

noon. Patrols from both fltns. were dispatched immediately to maintain contact with the enemy and locate

the 3 Battalion, 148 Inf. , somewhere in the vicinity. West of H Co.'s trail block the 3 Battalion. elements

aE.ain irade contact with the enemy and the 2 Battalion. patrol located the 148 mT. troops, which had

been on a hill overlooking the area for some time. The next day 2 Battalion. relieved the i48 mt. troops
and continued the all points patrol activity.. This same day a recon patrol, from the I&R Platoon, reported

the presence of Japs at riru Plantation, but none at Sunday Inlet. The Div. 0.0. then ordered the 2 and 3

Battalion.s to continue their movement to the north and west and capture Pirti riantalon and thereby deny

the enemy use of the Diamond Narrows, a narrow channel or water aeperatinE New GeorEja from

Arundel Island, as an evac route. Air recon of this area showed an apparent strip of hi8h Eround leadins

    across the swamp which surrounded Piru }lantation; however, this proved to be high Erass and not

    dry ground. After several days of frustatlon, tryins to rind a crossing, Col.Sugg ordered a trail be

    blazed directly through the swamp using the same route followed by the recon patrol on

     10-12 Augustust. On 22 Au~., the 2 Battalion. proceeded across the swamp and arrived 800 yds. to

     the rear of the plantation, opposite Cutter Point, that same afternoon. At 0700, the next day, the

     lead eleinente of the Battalion. entered Firu and pushed on to ilathorn Sound. One company

     advance.@ to the north and two companies made a sweep south throuEh the entire

     plantation discovering the enemy had evacuated the previous day.

          -a as evidenced by rnany supplies, dead beer cattle and prepared ensive positions left behind.

          The 2 Battalion. manned the beach defenses

     acir$ Kula Gulf and ;atrolled the area; however, with the exception ?~re;quent bombinEs by eneny

     aircraft, there was no enemy resistance

~t;gu;tatil 10 Sept , all active toperations for the 2 Battalion ended on New
                 I~s4 and.
Third 13attalion Ops.
               3 August., 1943, an Item Co. patrol moved north, frorn nj-W, alons

   the Hairoko Trail about 500 yds. where they encountered an enemy

   -      niachine gun position and bivouac area. I Cq. was ordered to move up and establish a

   defensive block just short of the en emy position, there

         to await further orders. Kins Co. moved to RJ-W to defend that spot ~a;nd ,also, maintain a road

   block at Baxter Rd. while the rest of the

   - Battalion. remained at the para drop. The follow1n~ day I 06., on the Bairoko trail, made contact with

       the enemy and located the trap flanks but could

.y£:ilot envelop them due to the companys small numbers. Around 1300, I Co. was releived by the 1

       Battalion. and then retired to bivouac, in the old 148 mt, c.r. area. Sins Co. was ordered to move

       west to locate the

       Zieta Trail; but, in doin~ So encountered small active ~roups or the 47$~nemy and)by contactin~

            these ~rouPs)K Co. could not reach its objectso it was ordered to return to RJ-W and ~o into

            bivouac with I and

    Hq. Co.s. M'Co. was ordered 400 yds. up the Bairoko Trail and Love Co. was to move up the Ziata

    Trail and establish the block K Co. had been unable to. At 1530, lead elements of the Co. ran into

    stronE Sap resistance and, becAugustuste or the time of day. w4thdrew to RJ-J and du~ in ror the

    niaht. On 5 Aua, the entire 3 Battalion. was consolidated at RJ-J and orders were received to attack
    and seize Twin Hills about 40o yds. to the north. Lead elements of K Co. made contact at 1500 and


3~~~~tected enerny machine gun emplacernent~ were attatked with iS traps

-£ thilled. At 1100, the second platoon of L Co. was sent on a wide envelopment On sth~ left ridge from

    which further ops coul& be effected

   asainat the Jap positions. This platoon gained hte high ground without dposition and joined the rest of

   t Co. went of the saddle. While ma'&ing this envelopment the second platoon encountered a full

   platoon 0£ the

  enemy. The Co. C.O. waflted~to use the first platoon to reinforoc the second platoon, but this was

  denied by Battalion. and the attack was continued as planned. By 1600, the enemy was dislod~ed

  leaving about six dead.

   L Co. was then ordered to leave a security detachment on the hi~h ground and push east to the

   saddle. Soth Love and Kins Co.s succeeded in

   taking their objectives but did not make contact at the saddle on this date. I Co., less weapons pltn.,

   tollowed L Co. and, on reachin? them, helped orsanize the position for hi~ht defense. A trap Battalion.

   sized bivouac was captured with many ma#s and much booty.

        (Bill Weidle)"It must have been 5 August. I joined the 3 Battalion. At a startins point, before

   niovina up to what' I called Hill K, a Wolfhound, Lt. Greene, died with about ten dead Japs around him.

   After moving up on the hill we had a very nice double top hut to sleep in, but from then on - very little
   sleepa The next day (6 August.) I went to the hut Davis was in to aet our orders for the day - it was to

   attack. Suddenly there was an explosion in the hut. I thou;ht it was a smoke round ithich wotild

        followed by HZ mortar shells. We all ~ot out some how - double quick. had happened was a Sap

sniper fired a bullet and hit flare equipm4
                                           II                          aLL                      a

lead elements moat of the time."

       Early on 6 Augustust. Item Go. rejoined it's battalion and with Kins Co. secu#ed the naddle

between Twin Hills. The Battalion. was tten ordered to move cross country to secure Zieta and, at i6oo,

Love Co. moved up the Zieta Trail, about 600 yards and established a block without any opposition.

The following day the rest of thc Battalion. moved up toward 1' Co. with I Co. in the lead. They

encountered sniper fire and I Co.'s 00, Capt. David Baird, was wounded and Lt. Williants assumed

command. Tttis same arternoon, 7 August., in order to maintain contact with the main ene~y body, I and

L Oo.s moved another i6oo yards up thc trail and established a bivouac in a small banana grove, but met

no opposition. When they moved on, S was uneventful but on the next day the 3 Battalion. made contact

with the 2 Battalion. and went into position on where the 2 Dtn. had been held up by stron~ enemy

resistance. On 10 Augustust, Item Co. moved east throush dense junEle, at 0900, then turned north to

attack in a north west direction, aEainst the enemy's left flank, while Easy Co. attacked frontally. By

1300, I Co. reached a narrow ridge top held by the enemy~ The attac& continued at 1400 and had sane

but a short distance when enemy machine sun positons were encountered and, becAugustuste of the

denseness of the

jungle and intensity of the fire, an order was Eiven to dis in for the nisht and establish a cordon defense.
     (Weidle)"About 10 Au3. my uniform and equtpment were wet butl did have a compas2 readins for

s~t. Gile which I gave to a Hq. Recon. man. My compass was broken but, with Lt. Hooks EettinE

readinBa, I didn't need mine. (Lt. Hooks was the IntelliEencc officer for Vur. Davis' 5 Etn. He was also a

map expert. He was a fine officer, but his thick glasses kept him from makinE patrols.)"

     AboutlicO, the next day the attack was pushed vi&~rqusly, using $mo'~e ~renades and intense basic

weapons rire, forcing the enemy back and destroying several machine gun emplacements. in the assault.

Tan&'~s were heard cornin~ up and the attac&' was not followed up since plans

would be made to coordinate the armour attack with the Woithounds.

On the 12th, the attack was delayed, while arty delivered a 90 mm. prepa,ration, until ll0O,and then

proceeded until the troops reached the Zieta River. After a brier halt the companies were reorEanized

and the

advance continued with 1£ Co. reachins a position about 1000 yds. BOuth of where Zieta was eupyosed

to be located. Enemy elements werE then discovered and two platoons of t Co. were advanced into

stronr resistance

Two casualties were sustained with one of them being t Co.'s C.o. Capt.

Oliver Roholt. The lateness of the day recuired the units then ~o

                                  ~~Vfl (William
into flisht defense.CLt.
                                                        Stroh was given command of L Co.,

JZ August., and, after a Battalion. withdr'awl to allow for an arty preparation, wb~ch started at 1100 and

lasted twenty minutes with the attacking Companies, L and K, movinE as close to the fire as possible
duri~ the last minutes, discovering the enemy had moved up with them durins the barra 6e and it became

a fisht just to get to the LD (Line of Departure). The Battalion. ran into intense enemy resistance and

becAugustuste of the dense jungles, swampy ground and the depletion of the unit stren~th (50-60 men

per comp any)flankin3 movements could not be wade. For example, Easy Co., re-att ached to the 3 fltn.,

had tried to sweep around the ri~ht flank of Love Co. In the afternoon, but was kept rrdrn enemy contact

by a swamp. The Battalion. retired to their positions of the previous night. It had been a day or

heavy casualties for the Woiffiounds.

     (Weidle)"on 14 Augustustr., Gen. Collins came up and talked with Davis

and 9ant. flayless. The 'raps must have thousht we had our chief there and all hell broke loose with

machine aun fire. We pushed on toward 2ieta with scouts who were blew Geor~ian Natives. I had to

watch mynelt pretty close as, arter several bouts on the Canal, I ~new I was malaria prone. tt

     On 14 AUE., the attack was resumed with the same results; however, this day .Si mm mortars

dropped rounds behind the trap lines and then wal&'ed them forward. Despite this tactic pro~regs was

not made and so

I               thr~e liEht Marine tanks came up and went to the front or the advance. Their machine

gun and .37 mm fire drew the fire of practically Every

                 enemy gun. £he tanks action and the locating of the enemy postions ~aa coordinated

                 b~y Capt. Ben fer~uson, K Co.'s c.Q., who wrote the Information on slips of paper and

                 passed them trirough the pistol ports. The tanks finally ran low on ammo and had to

                 withdraw. severai enemy pill boxes had been destroyed, but vhere was no apparent let

                 up In the inter

                enemy tire. casualties were a~-aiw heavy, but the aid of the tan&s
seemed to bolster the spirits atid morale of the Troops. The next day

the 2 Battalion passed throush the 3 Etn. lines and took up the attack with the tanks.

The enemy positions secmed to have been deserted,however,

and the woifflounds reached Zieta about 1200.

     (weidle) "About noon we hit Zieta Garden which had been an abandon

Ibanana plantation for years. ThE native scout said the swam-~s were ta and this is, it

and left us. Frorn then on we used native scoats from

she Canal. 'de had Lt. Col. Bush as Re~imental c.O. at this tirnern as

zoi . 5JA;72. 4ctS Ofl Guadalcanal sufferins from a bad jdflJl C p; zt. ~"''<S
                                                                ~ baQk later.

                                                                     "Now came the
                                                                     recon job with Lt
                                                       'S,-      Koontz, recan                scouts. a

                                                                 Koontz ~ave me a pair of

                                                                 sianal ~

                                                                 cutters to cut barbed wire
              :!~<~ .~
                                                       I         could have cried.                 Ev

                                                                  were all that were

                                                                       available. We ered

                                                                       the swamps with

                                                                       orders th
                                                                                        attacked~it was
                                                                                        every ~an for

                                  Jan hut at zieta
           >   himself. Lf$w' Btick..a and poles we were able to mark swamp trees with

               white cloth so the fltn. could follow us to hi~h 8round and not fall into the holes of stinking,

               dirty water.

                     At 1300, 15 A~uE.S Love Co. was ordered to move west1 alon~ a trail leadinE from

                Zieta, to locate H Oo~.s block. Thi8 was accomplished,

about 500 yds. to the west, and the patrol continued west for another 300 yds. untyl they encountered

enemy sniper fire. About this time King Co. arrived and Mjr. Davis directed that the two companies attack

the enemy position. The assault commenced until heavy rnaehinc gun tire and rifle fire were encountered

and the companies werE instructed to 6ig in for the night while harassinE arty was placed 400 yds. to the

enemy's rear throushout the night. The next morning, i6 August., the attack resumed and the companies

passed through an enemy bivouac, that had been

 deserted, and continued on~arrivin~ at Lulu Channel,where a block was A woirnouna restri          a t'ap nu~

 established to deny the enemy further use of the doc'&ing facilities.
 The roilowin~ day the woirhounds                                                            II
 were relieved by units or the 148                                                           ~-A
 mt. and returned to Zieta where                                                                           A 4 4

 the nights of 17 and :8 August. were

     (wetdle) "On iE August. we hit dry spent.
 8round_and when I opened a can of

 C Rations Koontz jumped me for throwins the can on the ~round. I then
 buried it - I should have known better. During this tirne Lt. Koontz sent me out to~firid a trail. After

sorne distance I could locate no trail, since the maps were too old and growthhad covered everythin~

over. I wasn't doina too good. I heard sornethin~ or a Jap patrol inside Piru and~ll~I had was a carbine -

wished I had my Ml. I wasntt supposed to fire anyway 80 as not to give away the b18 attack on Firu. I

don t know how lon~ I stumbled around; but, I didn't panic since I had sotten a reading when I left camp. I

finally ran into swamp ground, and had some idea where I was, and came out facin~ a Wolfhound with a

BAR. He wasn t tr1~~er happy~ an~ I was afraid no had thou~ht 1 waa a Jap. When I Eat back I met

with Koontz and it was decided I and a n&tive scout wo~ld cut the wire. I cut the wire while tile other

scutit held it, so to elim
                                                             "iflitO noise, and we then put it btsnc&' S

                                                            that it would look like it was and had

                                                            been cut. All that was necessary was t touch it

                                                             and it would fall down. We th hid behind a larse

                                                             rock and fisured all we had to do was wait as we

                                                             were exnau During the ni@ht, rifle fire oco~rred L

                                                             md us and I knew it was a Garand. We S reated

                                                             a while and then I finally went

                                                          t to sleep. The native stayed awake and

                                                  ~          told me that some Japs shook the wire t

                                                  tfli. didn't see what we had done. At dawn FF0. Win. F.

                wejale       Woithounds came up and I asked Lt. Koor

if I could ~o in with them but he said my job was done. The rifle shot durin~ the nisht, had hit S~t. Paul

and it had, also, 8iven away our plans. rae Japs evacuateS to Ar)ndl Isla~c&'.
       On 19 August. ths 3 Stri. floV£.¼ ~o Fox Co. S CL VO~,(,tC 103 ~s~-<~' to ½?:.

northwest, and remained there tThroush 20 Augustust. sendinE one patrol west

tryins to set to r'ru Flantajon and another patrol was sent north to locate Nt. Tirokambia. Other secisrity

patrols were aiso sent out. only the second patrol was succes0ful.

        (weidle) ItI thin~ it was 20 Au-g. the en~ineers save up on tryins to build a cord road - too rnuch

rnud. They wanted to ~et 155 howitzers up to support us. On 22 Augustust., the 2 and 3 Battalion.e

reached Piru Plantation, fOiloWins our trail across the marked places, and the occupation of riru

Flantation meant the end of the woifhounds carnpai~n on New aeor~ia Island. It was just in time for we

for I had developed a bad swamp

    rash and my malaria had come back. It was the hospital for ~e.

        On 21 AUGUSTUST., at 0700, the S Battalion., followed by the 38, proceeded into the swamp and

a distance of one thousand to fifteen hundred yards was ~sed in inud from knee to waist deep with full

combat equipment, and by afternoon,of the 226, thE wolfhounds arrived SOQ yards in the rear of

I                   the plantation opposite Cutter Point.

                       Early the next momma lead elernents of the 2 Battalion. entered Piru and then pushed

                on to Hathorn ~ound. Patrol activity conihed the plantation for the enemy, but the pos-

                                                                                 ?trt ~

                ition had been evacuated the
                                                    ,q ~
              previous day leavins food,                                 Cr

              equipment, and their defensive positions - all of which had been pointin~ out to sea. The

             Wolfhound Battalion.s prepared beach positions and patrols were sent out as far as Sund
            ay Inlet.         AUE. 23 brousht              -        Rairead +raekt runr'ng
narrow penInsula leading from p;ru
                                                                                                 to. t~e
                                                           L ~                                ---~--

               -to a close the drive in the northwest sector of New Georsia - which was reduccd to


                   The main body of Jap survivors had slipped out of both Zieta and

              Bairo~o. On 5 Au~.3 Gen. Sasaki felt he could no lONEer defend New

              Gcor~ia Island. He sent the 1~ Tnf. to Koiorrbangara and his reniainin#:

              Infantry units to B~ang>a.

                                              Arundel Island

                   The 172 mr., of the 43 Div., invaded Arundel Island on 27 Au~-.; however, the Japs

              offered slight resistance and was soon overcorne. The Island wns declared "clear of the

              enemyte. A few days later, however, strong enemy positons were encountered on

              Bomboc Foninsula, at the northem end of the Island. This was the situation when the 27th

              Inf. was att acheQ>~ to the 43 Div. and the Wolfhound Commander was siven control of all

              units on North Arundel. With the Wol£hcuuds were two Battalions. of 169 In£., one

              cornpn~y of the 103 Inf. , B- So. 82 Chemical Battalion. (debut of the 4.2 mortar in- the

              Pacific), the 43 Recon Troop and six Marine tanks had to be committed. On 8 sept., the

              indefatisable Sasaki sent th~ 3 Battalion. , 15 Inf.
       from Kolombansara to stnensth&-n Arundel and thc balance of the 15 REt. on 14 Sept.


I   (weidle) ~ doctor, on Kokurnb@na, as~cd mc riow I was anG, after a few days, I tol5 him I

     was rreat. I sot back with the outfit In time to make two lafldinss on Arundel and then fell on

     my face. At the Fiel~ Hospital I was sick as a do~ and when I wo 1&e up there was Eleanor'

    Roosevelt. She told me not to bother gettinE up and if I should ever have any problems to

    write her. 'jihen we ~ct back to New Zealand I thou~ht I hac that Malaria whipped; however, I

    couldn't shake it and doctors said I'd had ensash. I sce the Saps, at the barbed wire, in my

    sleep. The real heroes, to me, were the b~ddies we left out there

    in the islands.

         (Bill Naylor) "I was a 5tn. COT mander in th~ 172 £~Et., wt£ich had ~one

    --into ~rundei on 27 ~ preceedin~ the Woirhoholinds, and we had been en~a~ed by the 1~

    Jap REt., which was the same or~ani7ation that opposea the 27th mT. on Arundel. ~y

    account deals with an intervie~ of Saishiu Kinoshita, who was commander of a machine EUfl

    Co. and later, on Arundel, commander of the 13 Jap R~t. The 13th Jap REt. was frorn

    Kyushu (The main Island which the Wolfh;unds would later help occupy foliowin~ the war.)

    ans nad served in China for six years. The strensth of a Jap rst.

    in 'Cii II was 400c.
                 (xay1or4{ino~hita) "I was strack by the similarity of the Jap and US experience, on New

            Geor~ia~, no orde~~ of battle, no maps, scanty and sornetirnes faulty inteilisence and

            unreliable natives. (enemy viewpoint)

            *Cnen it Cal C tirne to discuss the Arundel phase, Kinashita stepped to the blaclcboard and

            without referin~ to a map or any sotes, drew the Island of Kolombansara, the icula "uif,

            Arundel Island, Wana Wana Island, the Diawond Narrows and Ondonga. He then proceetica

            to outline various of our units and positions. It was reiarWblc TOP its acciracy after 41 years.

            The trials and hardships that the l3Rst. faced were typical o£ most Jac units in the 3. £:ac. At

            one point a-urin~ the cjttle, Kinoshita's men coninlained about the lack of air sapport and they

            turned their pay back in to ~et air sun ort. A sin~le Zero came ove~ and

was~~d his winsa which was of little comfort to Kinosn1ta~s rnerl.

      001. £~~s was assi~ned CO of dll units on N. Atundel with Qrders to contain and destroy the

encmv on Sagekarasa and Bomboe Peninsula. The enemy was estimated at company stren 8th. Thc

Wolfhound I & R riatoon was ordered to outpost tslands 1-10 to protect the Rea-imentts ri#ht flank. The 2

Etn. and Re~irnental Hqs. moved by LCT.s to Bast1in~ Foint, on the west d          he Island, on 10 sept.,

then that nisht and the followins
day ifi                  wall craft to Bornboe. The ~ Btri. followed the same dav.

                                                 2 Stri. Ops.
   ______                                                            At 0900, ~o Sept., the 2 Battalion.
                                                                   was ordered to prepare to rnove with

                                                                       combat equipirent immediately, and

                                                                  the Co, t/Col. S.F.tvans was endered to

                                                                  kuna~a to make an aerial recon of Xorth
                                                                     Arundel Island. The next day the

                                                                     Battalion. cx. officers anz cornuany co.s

                                                                     ~a~e a surface recon

+he 27th Infantry C? at ucrnbo. viLLage, Arundel             at F. Bomb Ce and durin£j the day t Iqe
Battalion. moved froni Bustlins joint to F. Bostoc.

       (chaplain John scannell) Lt. Col. Ben Zvans was ~iven the mission of dislod~1n~ the Japs £rorn

Arundel Island in the northern Solomon Islands. Arundel is a arnall island about one-half mile off the

sout~ west shore of the laPser island of Kolomban?ara.

       Qnc company, from the 4~ Div., had earlier been assisned. the same mission as the 2 Battalion.,

but it wts feared that they Kad been totailAr annihilated. For some time there had been no coramo

contact with them at all. The directive from the coriimandinr< General, o£ the 25 Div., Li~htnin~ Joe

Coijins, also included the instruction to strive1 if possible, to contact any survivors of thc lost unit and

rescue them.

       '11n WW II, the TO for a Battalion. was l,OQQ men and all units in the Div. were slishtly

overstren?;th when we began our campai~n on thc Canal.

  "Now the Battalion. had scarcely 250 men left, includin.ct two cooks. After tht Quadalcanal Campaisn

  plus two rnorc months of fig~tin~ on New Geor~ia attrition had been heavy due to battle casualties and

  tropical diseases: malaria, densue, junsle-rot, 0-ration quick step and the like.

       "Now cooks are soldiers too, and well trained in the use of weapons other than pots and pans.

Since they would not be cooking, they became tnfantryrnen. For food we were issued C-rations of varitd

fare. Our Battalion. had been woved from ~ew Georgia island in Iii~~ins Boats, manned by Navy

personnel, to the east end of Arundel. ~e landed on a small peninsula, unloaded our amino and supplies
and, after settin~ up a perimeter defense, dus in for the niaht. there was no other unit of the wolfhounds

in direct contact with the enemy, at the moment, so I went with the 2 Battalion. as chaplain.

      "The next rnorfl~n~ we were to advance as skirmishers, and the men were spread ei~ht feet apart

so that none of the enemy would be bypassed. The only difficulty was the island widened rapidly as we

advanced and our right flank was soon in the air precariously. All the Nips had to do was set around this

flank and we would be trapped. I asked permission from the C.O. to accompany the troops and it was

granted with the admonition to stay out of trouble.

      "We jurnpe:5 off (Army term) 11 Sept., 1943, at Q7L,~O1 and it was a beautiful tropical day.

Throuet the dense junEle and huse trees one could evcn Sec, occasionally, a spotch of blue sky. 1he

temperature was 120 desrees and the humidity ico%. About an hour later an infantrymanto my left called

me over and askEd, 1padre, do you qee that coral snake curled up on the sround?~' Due to the

darkness in the jungle and becAugustuste the snake had the same color as the ground, of coral

composition, I had difEiculty focusins Thy eyes. Atter about ten seconos of hard starin~ T was able to

see the snake. ~here are several 8pecies of coral snakes in the tropical world, I am certain every

herpetaolo~ist would asree that every coral snake has a very dintinctivc head. To my knowiedse this is

the only venemous reptile in the Solomon Islands. The

  trooper smashed ttye snake with the butt of his rifle and we moved on~ I forsot to ask his name and - I

  forsot to ask that Woithound how he spotted that snake in the junFle Eloom.

      We had bcen advancins about three hours when suddenly there was a burst or fire to my ri~ht. We

Lad encountered a Jap outpost. One a.I. had been hit, not critically, th~k God. We continued our adv-

ance until about iboc, when the decision was made to set up a perimeter defense and bivouac for the

nisht. As it turned out, we werc o~ly about 100 yds. from the enemy force and didn't ~now it.
      "On the followins Thursday, in a fierce enemy attack, ~1~r front line was breached for about 100

feet, but we pluE~ed the sap as wcll as we could and the fiahting went on. The CasO. very probably

knew) by this time, that the Japs far outnuinbered us and he called for reinforcements from Div. Hq. He

also asked for tanks, but the request was denied, since Hq. was of the opinion that tanks could not be

used i~ dense jungle. Lt. Cal. Evans persisted and his request was finally ~ranted. 'tje had no tanks with

our Div. at this time, but Qen Collins was able to ~et the services of six li~ht Niarine tanks, manned by

Marines, attached to us. Our situation was desperate but wc held on becAugustuste it took the better part

of a week for the rest of the R~t. to arrive alons with the tanks.

      We had been fightins for about ten days when our conimo Sst. luckily picked up a weak radio

messa~e from the remnants of the 'tlost coinpany". Directions were received plus the information that

there were twenty two e.m. and one officer left. We were a~ked to please try to rescue them. Our C~O.

formed a squad of about iB men and armed them with B.A.R.8 so they could move ii8ht and fast as well

as a considerable distance behind enemy lines with the maximum fire power he could provide. In a

brill¶antpeice of rescue work the 23 men were located and returned without further casualties. They were

forced to bury their onc mortar and the ammo. It Was feared)at the time 2that those shells n,~~¾t pflTrC

+~ ~',,t ii~ p thiq is exactly what hannfl~Pa on the
           "following Sunday.

      lS0fl Sunday, 15 Sept., the attacLc on the enemy pon~tlons was planned

to ~ump off at 1300. Everyone was gettins behind trees and into foxholes, awaitinE a Jap counter-attack.

I was lookins for a ~ood tree for portectior and came upon two corporals who were behind a good sized

junsle tree. they very politely invited me to get In there with them and I accepted their kind offer. I had

barely gotten in there when an overpowerins urse in my soul told me that if I stayed in that place I would

be killed. What could I tell the two corporals? I had absolutely nothins upon which to base this intuition,
yet I felt that if I tried to explain my feelings they would think I had gone Section £isht - as we used to say

when a soldier had broken under the strain. No, or three days earlier we had three men who broke under

the stress of combat - and one of these had received the Silver Star for ~a1lantry on the Canal. When I

heard his Confession he calmed immediately. I felt that I simply could not let the rumor get out that I, the

Chaplain, had ~one psycho. I told these two wen that I wished to tal~{ with an officer behind another tree,

I was dismayed when I came to the other tree since it was snialler than the one I had left and there were

four men behind it. Ihese junEle trees have sceat supporting roots growina up to the trunk and often

these roots started thirty feet out and beeame so hi~h at the trunk a alan could not see over the top.

      ~1 had no sooner gotten into position than a mortar smoke round

fell amons us. (I had to take my hat off to the Nips they were good soidiers and were risht on target.)

The Japs had found the burled arms and, as Boon as the smoke round reil ten rounds of HE followed in

rapid succession. I lay next to a Ltd Wilcox,of the 65 Combat En~ineers, and he E.ot hit by a thin

fra~ment in his right wrist. It was not too serious but there was a streamlet or blood. I said "I've been hit

t00:si I could fed warm blood running down my right les. A shell fraEment about the size of a dime had

pierced the canteen I was
                              ,-~ + k 4 or' +             t~r                                     A

"I had a ~ood lAugusth when I discovered what had happened afterward.

I had learned on the Canal always carry two canteens one on each hip.

I had once been cAugustht with only a pint of water to last 36 hours. The

Saps had cut us off and the terrain was so bad that native carriers

(the Cann¶bal Brisade) were unable to Ect supplies up to us.
      'There was a lull after thc laBt shell had fallen and then I heard a call for help. I was paralyzed with

fear and, to 'fly shame, I must say that I lacked the courage to crawl out there alone to a wounded man.

This was the only time it happened. I looked around for someone to be miserable with me and I asked Lt.

John Flowe, from S.C., if he would go with me. He agreed and we made our way to the wounded Wolfb-

ound. My fear left inimediately and I stood up and asked Lt. Flowe to stay with the man4 and I would 60

for a stretcher. I didn't call for a medic since he was busy elsewhere. I went for the stretcher, about

100 yds. away, and on my way I passed the two corporals I had left. To my sorrow they were both dead -

literally riddled with mortar fraEments. They were the only men killed by the mortar barrase of

                             our own shells.

            'tfly feelinsa were inexpressible and, as I walked to the aid station,

I said a prayer for their souls. I grabbed a stretcher and headed back to the 4ounded trooper. He had

been hit in the middle of his back and it was a bloody wound about six inches in diameter. Lt. Flowe and I

placed him on the stretcher, carried him to a jeep and told the driver to rush him to the rear for medical

treatment:. As I pondered what had happened, I marvalled at how the Lord had spared me and why.

There was little time for thought, thoush. since our tanks beEan their assault and the wolfhounds were

risht with them. Within two hours the battle was over and the enemy had been routed.

     t1war brinsa nYshtmares and I thank God that my last one came Nov. of 1969. Before then they

would occur every two, or three years and were always identical, down to the last detail; however, they

had noth

ins to do with the events on Arundel Island. The locale was the
Island of Luzon and happened a year and a hair later. On thi8 particular day, in Mar. 1945, we had about

125 casualties - one or our worst days. I was so tired I was unable to dig a roxhole. I simply wrapped

myself in my blanket and lay down on the ground, even though the enemy mortar barase was exepected.

It was near 2000 and there was a full, very bri~ht tropical moon. About 0100 I could Sec an enemy

soldier crawlin~ toward me to stab me. I made a loud cry and woke myseir up. I was bathed in sweat and

very embarrassed and listened ror a while to sce if my scream cAugustusted any commotion. My

apc~rehension was met only with thunderous silence. That was my nishtmare and from that time on I

understood the shrieks I heard, at night, at difftrent times, during combat. ~y buddies, also, were having

their nightmares. What I~gaw some distance away wan not an enemy soldier but an American soldier

lying on the sround, plainly seen in the full inoonlisht, wrapped in his


      (Kinoshita/Naylor) "Kinoshita became Resirnental CO, of the 13 Jap flgt., on Arundel after his two

predecessors had been killed dUring] tkc Arundel fisht. It was agrecd by the ~tl. officers that tLe men

should fisht to t end. Durina the fiEfit with the 15 REt., it was wondered flow they could concentrate so

much fire powcr and Kinoshita said that he had 80 machine guns at his disposal and, beinF a former'

rn&chlnc gun company commander, he knew how to us~ them.

At 0730, IS Sept., the attack, of the 2 Battalion., jumped off with Sand G Co.s advancins abreast in a line

of squad columns. ~ox Co. followed about 300 yds. behind in a reserve status. The flanica were

Secured by

                      the north and south shores of the peninsula. By 1030 the Woithounds passed

                 though a company sized Sap bivouac, about 2000 yds. east of their landins point, which
                was deserted. Another vacated pqsition was passed through and from this time on light,

                delayin~ resistance was met at rcsular intervals, every two, or three hundred yds. and

                quickly overt-
           The advance continued until i6oo when the entire Battalion. went into a

                             cordon defense for the night - having covered 3000 yds. in their easterly

                             advance that day. The next day the advance was continued and, at 0930,

                             130 comma wire was found by kasy Co. and contact was attempted with

                             elements or the 172 mr. Front this point on enemy resistance became

                             increasinsly heavier with G Co. becoming pinned down and E Co. advancin~

                             to the northeast until they reached the crest of hi~h ground. After a ahort

                             advance the Battalion. was pinned down and went into a ni~ht defense. On

                             14 Sept., the Battalion. was ordered to hold in place while a patrol from L Gb.

                             was sent out, at 0730, to by-pass the resistance and try to contact the

                             el.ements~of 172 mr. This was established about 1100 an& the depleted

                             American Unit was attached to the Wolfhounds with orders to attack on an

                             azimuth of 290 degrees and contact the risht flank of the 2~Battalion., 27

                             Rgt. Heavy resistance was met immediately and the only way to effect the

                             mission wan to by-pass the resistance. This was accomplished and the 172

                             mr. remnants - entered the 2 Battalion. perimeter at 1730 hours. On Sunday

                             the Japs were shelled continuously by arty, 4.2" and .Si mm mortars. An

                             attack was launched by the Battalion, at 1150,

but was unstaccesaful and the Nips counterattacked in force and succeeded in drivin~ a wedge in Fox

Co.'s line. 43 Div.s recon platpon reinforced F Co. and they drove the Japs out of the original positions.

On 16 Sept. the enemy was again heavily shelled and, at 1300, the 1 Battalion., with the AT Co., arrived

with orders to attack the next day. At 1630, six liEht tanks entered the defense poattion9 during a

rainstorm, which deadened the sound of their arrival making their use a total surprise to the enemy.
                                               1 Battalion. Ops.

      (File) "The Only thins we could Ect on the radio was "Tokyo Rose" dishing up nostalsic music and

the latest news - with a slant. We never felt that she did any harm to our morale becAugustuste most of

her news was such a bald faced lie that we sot our kicks and we datually enjoyed the music.

  111£ the Japs had known what a morale booster she was, they would have at opped usin~ her;

  ho~ever, ene nisht she ~ave out some disquietin~ news. Elements of the 43 Div. had been beat up on

  the Island of Arundel losir tLeir mortars and machine guns in the process. Rosey had a special

  messa for you sallant m~n of the 2r7th mr. fist. The Wolfhounds arc goins to Ar~ndei where the 15

  Japanese Inf. RCflt~ will destroy you completely.' Su enou~h, the next day we loaded on a batEs and

  inovea over to Arundel Isis to join the second and third battalions who had arrived e& tiler. We late

  learned the 13 Jap mt. had thc 1 and 4 machined 8Ufl companies and one AT Co. attached to make

  their forces several tines the size of ours. Thi was is Sept. and I had two of the or¶~inal men left in m 3!

  platoon, cpl. Swede Swanson and Era. rociecha. Other Rgtl. platoons were as bad off.

"Arundel was a low island, with fairly even terrain, solid coral rock with a few inches of dirt so that di~ging

in wan a matter or picking up lo;ae rock and pilins it up in front of you. We had lisht Marine tanks

attached to us and they did yoernan service in the ensuing scrap. with the guns fbhe Nips had captured

and their own auto weapons it seemed that every other Sap had a machine gun and they kept a steady

rain of fire on our positions. It was all sighted hip high so, at least, we could crawl around underneath this

hail of lead. Usins our tanks as mobile piliboxes, we encouraged the Ijips to make frontal assaults. They

were then driven back and we could hear thern shoutins inatructions while resrouping. Someone, from

Dog Co,, shouted 'We're out of machine gun ammol91 The supply dump was just a few yds. behind

the forward units and everybody in the c.r. group, includinw the Battalion. c.0., rushed up with all the

ammo they could carry. It was distributed just before the Nips made their final attack. It was a hot tirne in
the old town tonisht. There was a Jap heavy machine gun blasting away in front or me and I crawled up

to have a look and saw the gunner hunkered over the gun, traversins and searchin~, while his number

two attached strips of ammo together to reed the Eun. I shot the number two and the gun ran out of

bullets right now. The gunner turned and, seeing his

                              number two indisposed, decided to take off. I shot him as he was getting to

                              his feet and he went at least six feet off the ground.

      ~1 had miBsed the first phase of our landins on Arundel becAugustuste the

fltn. sup~eon had evacked me with fever and arter effects of by "ration tree fall. I was sent back to

Munda where the field hospital was completely disorsanized. They hadn't taken my clothin~ and

equipment "from me yet so, at the opportune moment, I cAugustht the next boat going back to Arundel. I

got back just in time to catch the tail end of the Arundel action and was able to stay with the outfit for

several days betore the auracon found out I had ~one AWOL to get back with the. outfit. He ordered ~e

back to the hospital under threat of courts-martial. I was 8oin~ through periods of blackout and wasn't too

well orsanized. Just after I got back with the outfit, Swede, Pociecha and I were tryinE~to dig into the

coral. Swede was tryin~ to dislodge a rock where he wanted his hole and I heard a "clink" when he stuck

his entrenching tool. I went over to find out he had been peckin~ away at a dud lo5rnrn mortar round

buried in the coral. Swede decided it wasn t where he wanted his

                                               5 Battalion. Ops.

~Cajp~ of Arundel Island were issucd to 3rd Stri. at the time the official warnins. order was receive, on 10

Sept. 1943, while the Battalion. w&s still

at Plru riantation. Little was known of the situation exslstins on Arundel Island, and part of what was

known was later found to be false.
The Battalion. completed itarnove and consolidated on Bomboe reninnula by 0900 12 sept. The maps

disclosed a small 'tstepping Stone" Island midway between Sasekarasa and flomboc Peninsula and this

arpeared to offer the best route of approach to the Battalion.s objective. A careful recon was made by the

Battalion. officers and it seemed certain that wadins would be the best was to set to Stepping Stone and

then SaBakarasa. After first landing at Bustling Foint shuttling of troops beEan to Bomboe

Peninsula and by 1700, 11 Sept., Companies I, K, and half of L had been moved to a point about 2400

yds. east of Bomboc Villase where an all round defense was set up while the rest of the Battalion.

bivoQacked back at Bustlins Point. The next day the rest of the Battalion. was brought in and

consolidated by 0900. Twelve men were furnished to Fist. I&R to recon and seize islands 1-10 extendins

west of sasekarasa Island. At 1430, Love Co. was ordered to place a black on the Sap north-south trail

across Bomboc Feninsula. This was accomplished before nishtfall, with blocks emplaced on both ends of

the trail. On 13 Sept. the Battalion. moved oLit early, foIlowin~ the route taken by Love Co. the day

before, and reached L Co.s block at about 1000. They remained at the site until 1100, when orders were

received to proceed to the vicinity of Steppina Stone Island. This was accomplished about one hour later

and an immediate recon was made of the area. ~he Battalion. had been given the mission


of seizin~ Sa~ek~arasa Island and Steppin~ Stone Island seemed the best

route of approach. Mike Co. was to prepare Si mm mortar positions on the peninsula with the mission of

placing fire anywhere. The Co. started clearins firing positions and it becalne necessary t4 cut a number

of larse trees plus dense foltaEc before any firing could be done. Baker Co. 82 Ohern. Battalion.,

attached to the Woiffiounds, likewise started
preparins their positions.                                               ¶Th            '~
                   The Attack. by Item Co., jumped

             off at 1450 and the advance proceeded very slowly since the channel to Stepping Stone proved to be
             almost neck deep and rather swirt.                                                                          -
             The scouts led with the Company                                -~

arriving at 1~3O. A brief halt was
             :~;r~ A made, while a recon was conducted,
             Item Co Wolfhcunds cross 'from and then the advance continued. The             Steppins Stone Island

             channel to Sa6ekarasa was not as deep and the advance pro~res8Ed without

                     oppositon until the north shorc was reached at 1630. Kin~ Co. followed Item and the two

                     consolidated before ~oin~ into a cordon defense for the I Co. also established a block

                     opposite Stepping Stone. Three Japs walihed into this block durin~ the night and two were killed.

                     In the center or the island, at 2230, a K Co. machine gunner observed a column of Nips

                     approaching from the west and, as the moon was near full, he let thEm set within a few feet and

                     then opened up. The first five in the column were killed, with the other8 scatterin~ to the west.

                     The remainder of the night on this flank was quiet. or's which were located on the north flanks of

                     both coas noted extensive barse activity through the night in Dlackett Straits, which lay between

                     Sa5ekarasa and Kolombanaara Island to the north. Several times durin~ the night a Jap float

                     plane was observed landing and taking off near the southern shore of Kolombansara. Artillery

                     was requested from the 169 F.A.B., which was In support of the Wolfhounds, however, the gun8

                     would not resister on the tar~ets go as not to expose their position to

                     a Jap observation plane in the vicinity.

                          On 14 sept., shortly after daylisht, Japs were seen inrufratina from the west towards K Co.

                     and a brisk fire fi8ht ensued. It was still in prosress when the balance of the Battalion. arrived on

                     sasekarasa. In order to prevents the Nips from cuttin~ the commo l~ne M Co.s machine gun
         Bection wan placed in the sflp and intermittent rightinr took place all day alon~ this western line.

         At 1330 a platoon from I Co. was sent alons the southern slope of a small east-west riase near

         the middle of the island. A larse enemy bivouac was located and the patrol succeeded in

         surprising the Japs in this camp killing five and. then withdrawins to our line with the enemy

         followin~ them as they pulled back. The sporadic fighting which had be~n ta\&ins place all day

         intensified as the Nips tried to work their way into K Co.'s lines. Althouah the denseness of the

         junEle permitted ~hc enemy to

                     ~et_vent~ne.~afl to the Viol~ ;h.ou~pd pos~~1ons she us machine suris

                  and hand grenades prevented the Japs from penetratins the lines.

                  K Co,'s line was reinforced for the niaht by all available Hq.s personnel plus five men rrom

                  Itern Co. It was known, frorn captured Enemy rnaps,~hat a bar~e 1andin~ was located on

                  the northern shore of sasekarasa and, accondin~ly, all inortars 'rjere re~istered along that

                  area. si~nals were arransed so that barse concentrations could be put down in this entire

                  area in case the Japs used these facilities for reinforcin~ or cvscuatins.

(Kinoshita/Naylor) "}Cinoshita decided to withdraw from Arundel but had to contend wit~i the US Navy,

                  which patroll~d the Kula Gulf; however,

                      their patrol patteih did not vary and so thi8 permitted the evacuation


                  to be scheduled darins those gaps.

The re8istnations were completed on the afternoon of the 14 Sept. and
               a FO, from tke 192 F~, arrived on the sasekarasa to adjust fire on the western part of the

               island. At about 2115, OF-I reported several small landins craft were seen approachinin

               the northwest corner of the island and the barEe concentrati<-n was immediately laid

               down, No determinations were made on this fire; but, the barac activity continued

               throu&:h the ni~ a few ininuts after daylisht, 15 Sept., the Japs attacked along the west em

               line concentratin~ on the hish Eround in K Co. S area. Due to a lack

               of clean fire fields the enemy was able to work within Erenade distance of our lines. Also,

               considErable sniper fire and heavy machine ~ fire was laid on the wolfhound position. All

               men who could be spared froul W~ 009 8 mortars, plus Hqs. Co. men who had been

               carryin&tt suplies, ~ere sent in to reinforce the Battalion. A request was also sent to Rgt.

               that Love Co. be returned as goon as possible. With this help and with the help or

               Erenades and lig~t machine gun fire, the lines were held while Iteni Co. began preparins a

               secondary defense line to th*& rear of KinE 00.15 line. By 1150 the new positions were

               ready and K Co. was ordered to retire to the ne'~ defensive positions. Itern Co. took up

               the f¶rc 2i~ht, durin~ the movement, and about noon a platoon froni the 169 Inf. arrived

               and wet'

rollowed minutes later by L Cc. Uain~ a sinFle mortar with HE li?ht ammo, an observer from 14 Co.

started adjuistments west of the new lincs and near the center of the isla~d. This fire was then walked in

until it was fallins on the Nips ~OC yards west Q£ I Co. Ten rounds were fircd for effect and then was

brou;ht in 50 yards closer. Duri~~ this concentration, I Co. laid down a volume of rifle and machine gun

fire so that the Japs could not pull out of the impact area. This mortar fire was walkcd around, within 35

yards all up and down the Wolfhound front, and continued th£ rest of the day and durins- t~c nisht. All

enemy activity ceased to the west and both flanks were quiet for the rest of the ni~£ht.
On i6 Sept., after a ruortar preparation, which was started close to our lines and then walked westward

about 200 yds. , the attack jurnped off and progressed steaujy u~nti1 it had passed throush the area of

enemy activit yesterday, and then carneunder hostile fire. The fire increased in intensity until the entire

advance was pinned to the ~round. It was decided to pull back and saturate the Jap position with mortar

fire. The withdrawl was made and then di8covered two Wolfhounds frorn L Co. were pinned down out

there. After all attempts to rescue the two men ha& failed mortar fine was adjusted on the enemy position

and a barrase laid down. DurinE the afternoon a .37 mm AT gun was brouEht up along with two

                      .50 cal. machine guns and set up and cleared fire lanes alonE the shore line. At

                 about 2130, that ni~ht, OP-I rcported a strins. of six baraes approachin~ the north shore

                 and the barge concentrations were called in. As the bar~es pulled away the OF passed

                 on this information to the new gun crews and tbe 37rnm opened fire on the strina and Eot

                 a direct first hit on the lead barse. The second HE round was also a hit and the 50 cal.s

                 also raked the line of bar3es. trhis activity proceeded throush the night. Registration of

                 thc 105's by the to frotn the 169 FAB finally started that afternoon, and was completed

                 just before dark.

The registration started fran 150 yards in front of our lines to the west end of the island. On 18 Sept., the

AT Co., as a rifle Co., was attached

to the 3 Battalion. with the mission of establishin~ a block on the east end of the island. AT Co.'s

advance sot off atibo and, havin~ met no opposition in their assi~nment, they proceeded to establish the

block and then cross to the west end of the Peninsula and establish another block there. After two recon

squads were se~t out, and returned, the Co. came under a sudden and intense enemy attack loslnw. two

machine gun positions, before they could be established, and havins. the fire field of a third severely

restricted. The position soon becarne untenable and, at 1600, the cc. was ordered to withdraw while

cover1~5. fire from 2 Battalion. s machine guns, on Arundel, was laid down across the AT COa S front.
This fire was effective in distractina the Japs and aided materially in the manuever. The withdrawl of the

AT Co was completed In about 45 min~ and they went into a defense position, with K Co. and the

platoon from 169 Inf. About 1200, 18 Sept., the Battalion. was informed that A and B Co.s, 27 flcrt.,

would be attached and an attac'c was ordeeed as soon as possible after their arrival. The attack jumped

off, at 1545, but after advancin5 75 yds. came to a standstill due to intense enemy ~achine ~ fire. On the

19 Sept. the attack was attempted a#zain, but with the salne resultsand even flame throwers could not

displace the

Japs pilibox. That nisht barse activity was cbscrved again and one Wolfhound ~on outpost)sishted an

enemy 1andin~ craft about 25 yds. away and started firms., with his carbine, at the beat 6 He scored on

the boatman and started the entire shore linc firin% with the result that the boat was sunk. Other bar~es

wcre fired upon but with unobserved. effect. About 2215, the bar~e concentration started and this drew

the response of Pistol Fete from KolombanEara, which ~ave the area~a throush shelling - most of the

rotinds being lon~ and fallina in the rear area. At the heisht of the sheilins all commo lines were lost and

out until dayli~ht. At 0900, 20 Sept., the attack to the west was asain launched, with the lead elements

feelina> their way slowly throu~h the dense undergrowth. The main line of enemy resistance,the
                past two days, was reached and passed without opposition, while the western half of

                84a.ekaraea was subjected to intense h½ca88in5 rrorta.r fire. The rate of advance increased

                as thc undersrowth decreased and all mortar fire was lifted. At 1405 th£ western end of tYic

                island was reached and contact was made with the OP on Island 1. At abQlIt 1700 thc

                defense of the western part of Sa~ckarasa was take-n over by A Co. 169 Tnt. On 21 Sept.,

                the Battalion. plus attached units crosscd to the peninsula and repeated t~c same movement

                as the 20th until they m4~de contact with the 43 Div~ bloc'~ and then went into defensive

                positions~ Food and wat~r was brousht in to tV;c troops by boat, usin~ the south lasoon) and

                nothinF of consequence occured durins. the ntsht. The 3 Battalion., upon beins relelved by

                the 1 Battalion., moved via Stepn in8 Stone back to the bivouac area on Bornboe Peninsula.

                Their active part of this campatEn came to a close.



             C ~ ~~$~f IA S t
                    ~ P.
           4r t~r£'
             .4 pT;.~~Lz4 '7 ~ 4

3 Oct. 1943, by Lt.s Dick Ferriter. Dan Noorlander, cpl~ arnith and four natives, in two dugout canoes,

which the Japs paid no attention to, from Gomu ("Little Fly") Island, which was a 30.ty 30 yard
coastwatcher station. ~he mission was to report on Jap evacuation activities and debarkinFt points.

Landing point "A" was made at dawn the first day and

                                                                                           a recon of the airs
                                          4                       1 ¼                     and trails to "B" w
            ~                       \     ~              'V                                made. Location
                >.;n~tyr.,~frr;jic ,'>~~~;N;~¼L .                  "'%. 2             .~   evack point 'I~

                                                                                           made and recon

                                                                                           to and bivouac..


                                                                                           second day the


                                                                                           evack POiflt ~~2"


                                                         "                   H             located and the


                                                                                                      and fourth days, PC

                                                                 . ; "-'S                           ~ "D" thru "M" were ft

                                                                  g                                   Rations consisted C

                                                                                                             rice, raisins, tea
                                                                                                 The Jap

                                                                             '11t'a        f Kolombansara


                                                                   A                       :ompleted the nish

                                                             I~                            28 Sept. thru 3 Oc

                                                                                 cQIsr LLME,QH

                                                             and they managed t
                                                                                    some 9400 men
                                                                                    orf island, or
                                                                                    some 35 less
                                                                                    than they had

                       Detail of aerial composite                                   acuated from the

C ~ost of them were sent to southern sou~ainvi1le. Twenty nine landins C and torpedo boats were sunk,

one destroyer was darn~ged and 66 men kill southeast Area haval Ops. II, Jap ivono 3raph #49 (ocMH)

stated the Amen

    sneatly overeat j miter] tijeir ~QCCOSS a Inst b r Os *

        When th~ 1 Battalion. Wolfhounds la ~d at Hirpi Cove, on sojthern

                                 JAPANFSt ANTIA¶3~ AND L~ASTAL DEFEr


                                                                  ~~                                     -

                             ~                                                                               ~
                                               I                                                     ¾
a                                            -                                  e£7;?j~~.>#'~

                                                                                  cIa~6er aboard
                                                                                  H;gg;ns boats a+
                                                                                  North Arundel
                                                                                  Lefor,     g&- r
                             ike 4r;p *0 KCIo~bangara~                      yAt~£t~~~
                                                                                1~ Y~&&~~'
   Koloinbangaca, the rnornin~ of 6 Oct., they                                                 C ~+ fo~~nd

   only Potty-nine pieces of ab~j~ndoneo      ~tCJ C
   arty, smashed aircraft, and some scatterea                                                                   gunItVAABArr
   enemy personnel who had been left behind.                                    ;4~#~ #*&~tW~/~

        New Georgia L~d been lcn~xthy and costly. Cri~inally pi~nned Lts a single division operatijn (45

   Dlv.), it had ~sed up clerrcnts of four divisions. It would be rnQnths before both the 45 Dlv. and tha:


                                                                        tishtnins wo~ld be read for
                                 ~               r --
                                                   - ~                  action asn<ain. Tac fi~ure£ fo
                      4                   r                             the ,O% InC Liv w~r~ 141 deac

                                                                        550 wounded1 1 NIA, p acciden~

                                                                        dcaths; tLls did not include majority

                                                                        of casualties due to

                                                                        disease, cornbat fatigue, or WnS

                                                                        neuroses. Lncmy casualties cir

                                                                        not known, but XIV Corps repor ted

                                                                        a count of 2485 dEad on Vs tavciia

                                                                        a.1one. The total pict ure haL; to

                                                                        be considered a sue
doiTh und views smashed aircraft Qn Vila Field
Koloynbanmara proveC to bo a sati kfac tory deijionstration of this ne;, technique. certainly proof for       .

.   .    >>.'½½

future e'nployrnent of this type of operation.


In late November, 1943, the

Div. moved via the Canal to New Zealand arriv1n~ IN Au&iand around the 23d.
      (Phil File) "In Nov., 1943 I                       Abandoned enemy positions
                                                                      on Kolomban~ara was in the isolation
ward of tLe

52d Field Hospital, on the Oct nal, rccoverinct from neck and styoulder sursery and hem.; treated for

infecticus hepatitis which had alynost killed me before I could convince the sur~eon I was sic&. The saw

bones treatins Try injuries was certain that I was niaiinr:<erins. He threatened to courts-martial me if I

persisted in playin~ sick. One triornins I found that I was passin~ yellow puss instead of urine- When the

sur~eon came around and asked mc if I was ready to return to duty I told him I was sick with yellow

jaundice. I}e Lifted one of my evelids and left abruptly - five ~inutcs l&'- ten I was in isolation Wa crc I had

nothing but lukewarrn toinato juice for three weck£. The outfit went bac'& to the canal and Cast. rickett

pai6 me a visit and said the Div-was bein~ sent to Net Zealand for R & H. He was able to convince the

medics that he would havE me admitted ts a hospital in NOew Zealand if the 52 would release me. Capt.

?ickett was a tender hearted man. I

sot back to the Co. just in time to say ~oodbye to Willie Woifhcund, a youn.~ native boy who had

att.t:ched himself to our outfit and had
served as an unpaid volunteer throush all our campaisnins. Wc wanted to taice &'il~ie with us but the

authorities forbade it. So ~illic spent the last da with us   seatea QN a stump, cryinc;, with his helmet on

the ~round in fuont of him. Each man pass1n~ by woul~~£ shake

xi~iie's hand and dron scuic money in the helnict. Ther~'jier+e several hundrcd American doLlars in there

- no scyipt.

     "We left the Canal unescorted1 in a fairly fast ship and, ~oin? past

the New Hebrides, the skiI)ptr ran Us close to shore.. to evadE a sub tr£t had pickef us up. When the

sailors tried to ~et the troops below, we dared them to try to put us belo;~ decks. We linc~ the rail and

watchcA~ the torpeno run past the ship and explode when it hit the coral between us and the shoreline.

     'We landed in Auckland, tew Zealand or the ?.~ ~ov. ~ Shortly after tyins up to the peir we were

ta~en for a walk aro!;nd a fe'~ city blocks. We 'gene a pretty scroun~y loo'&inE bunch and didn't make a

verN impressive picture alongside the Marines struttin~ around town in their bellhop uniforms.

     "The 1 Battalion. was caniped near of Ati'~land. It was beautiful of the islands, felt vEry cool priniary

concErn of the commana

                                                      the town of Warkworth, about 40 ml. north countryside

                                                      and after the stiflins heat to us aithoush it was their

                                                      suir~er. The was to c~et us healed and returnea~ to


                  operational capability. For many of the vtoun~ men in t:ic C, ~.! &Zt~
55th R~t.s it would be the first time in their lIVOS they wene able to date a sin ~nd have the monev to

treat ncr' to a fliovie and dinner~. Au the eli~tble youn~ men of Ncw Zealand had been ~ons to service

for two yearb, so, the results were predictable. 'ilithin "jeeks applications for permission to marry wene

pourins ints the varied headquarters sections in a deluEe of pa ncr. Although it seemEd unfair tc) the Cl's


~ edid"iave b. W&1' to fS t:i~lt CXTI'fl ti wat' I   'Li-At f(~ lkJ~'r~Lt b v ricri Wi t~%;i;; t wI ve S

to be concerned with. A nuniben of men did a~ ahead and ~et mar~ilcd.

There was n; law a;'>ainst it - it was flust that obedience WLi£ £0 strongly drilled into the troops that very

tew d4 rca to violate the offic~al word. tven I was to meet the &)irl who would become my wife and cfl

Aterican Citizen.

      '1n Jan. 1944, we received replacernent3 tro cr tri~ Statcs. ~}18J we-re

outstandin~n. Nouns men, many of thert coil£;£e AJXaduates, and they learncd vcry quickly. Land was

leased from New Zealand farmers and a trainirE prosram was initiated. It was rernar~able what the fresh

meat and dairy did for us scarecrows. lYly own case was extreme but from the 125 lbs. I wei~hed, after

my bout with hepatitis I went up to 175 lbs. - and it was all muscle. I was an instructor at thc Div. Recon.

school whcre I ran a wan course over ru~~ed countryside)Cf about ten rni.s daily. The only vehicle in

camp was the kitchcn truck and it did riot leave camp after dark. After hi'{ins up and down hills all day,

several nij-~hts a week I would bathe (cold water), put on what Glass A uniform I had, and doEtrot over

the hills to Warkworth where I would catch the bus into Devonport. I WOUlS spend about thrce hours

vistttn~ my fiance and her rarrily before catchin; the last bus back to Warkworth and then trotting bac&'

across the hills to camp. It was roushly 6 - 7 mi.s across ~errain
                                                          I never saw in daylight and I ~ided myself by thi£

                                                          Southern Cross.

                                                                "Toward the end of Feb., we were

                                                     ~    alerted to move out. Oar Idyll was ove

                                                          Gen. Collins had been returned to the Z

                                                          and his replacenient (Mu1lins~) was conc

                                                          erned with the ability of the Div. to 1

                                              -           LIP to the reputation created by Li~htni

                                                          Joc. "e moved down to Aukiand where th

               6                                          1 Battalion. boarded the ATS ceoraici Clyrnen.

                                                          while we wore standinp> at dock waitins board two

                                                          of 'ny buddies showed up c&rr

                                                           a duffle bag between them. Th~s pa
                                                     A         bd~s bein~ full of beer - almost
                                                     f         quart bottles. They were debati
     Joe Cohn, salins'&1, File -                     h cy could Smuscle it aboard ship
    ~ueen St., Aukland, ~ ~ since the ~an~plank was too narrow fort

I               "nie~ to carry it toEether. besides, it would aro<'se trIE sn'spicions of the watch. The~r

                   asked me for help and wc tied ny duff~lc ba~t to theirs and, hang~in~ them ovcr my

                   sLoulder~, I carried tr~o load aboard. Once clear of the watch thev reclaimed their beer.

                   By the time I Fot my platoon quartered and duty assisninerits handed out - it Wa too latc.

                   The beer was all ~orie.

                        "A larr#e aroup of youn~ ladies on artered one of the local ferries

                   to carry them bac&' and forth as close to the transrort as authority would allow. Whey

                   rode back and forth all ni~ht lonvr, callins out to their boy friEnds each time they passed

                   the transnort. It develpped that Skinner1s airi-friena had an extremely piercins voice and
                each time the ferry would approach she would cut loose, 't3kinnert Clarence skinnerlit

                over and over till the boat passed out of earshot. My fiance wag not in the sroup; but, the

                next inornins I saw her at the railin~ of the ferry boat on her way to work in Auklana. With

                iny field Elasses I could see her forlornly WaViflrZ he hand'&erchief, but unable to

                diStiflM£ uish me at that distance.~'

                                                         Cha~ter 11
                                          ~rrmended for FurthcrjL4;ij~r1~Trainin~ New Cal

                  (File)ttwhen we unloaded in Nournea, New Caledonia it was besinnin# to rain. We were

                  trucked miles down the coast fran No>'rne-tt to H canipsite on a red clay plateau

                  covered with suava bushes &DQ a smallish tree th&t bud sQft <to bar'{.. By that tirne

                  it was pour~ns (r' don't know -and I never ~ot an answer - why in hell it seemed it

                  always had to rain when we were movins. I ~uess the Army had planned it that way.)

                  and the clay was a sea ankle deep of red mud everywhere except whcre vehicles had

                  plowed thru - there it was knee deep. We strussled thru the mud to set our pyramidal

                  tents to their assisned spaces, then create thern and be7>an dissing draina£e ditches

                  in case it rained. Fortunately, aitho the rain felt as cold as sleet, the temperature was

                  actually warm and the exercise kept us steamed up.

     "Aitho my platoon was carried on thc TO as an Infantry Anti-tank ?latoon, Hq. Cc., 1 Battalion., it had

been decided that becAugustuste of the paucity of Jap armor, we would relegate the AT assignment to

secondac status. Are would keep the guns and train with them, but our primary duty would be recon,

answering to Battalion. 5-2. This suited me just fine becAugustuste the S-~, tt. Williams, was a sensible

'nan that I 5ot alons wit well. I split the platoon into three patrol teams and began trainin~ them In root

and beach recon. In this training I Was workins closely w¶th Recac, ttrinkyt~ dirt and others in the 3-2
 Section. We made a game out of it and wor&ed hard. We spent weeks on the beach, practloins nisht

 landinsa from rubber rafts and erisineer boats. I tAugustustht them how to draw panoramic sketches of

 terrain and analyze soil sampi to deterinin suitability for vehicle movement. I really enjoyed the traininE~

 and tried to impart my fecliriss to the men under me. I had a short break froin training when I spent a few

 days in the hospital to surgery on my lease The day I returned to duty I was asked if I woul fisht for the

 Resiment. dhile I was in the hospital there had been a

 smoker between the ~7th and iGi. The Woithounds had been shellacked

                                        "~'t ~$[$CC$[~~'~ttWr' 67


                                                     --~ ~

                                                             S                                IF
        -~                                                                 bu~
                        ~f tk. ~ U9~i~'~g ~ . ~. ~.d . q~In9I.m.a+ durisg trifling mafl~uyin on Niw
                                                                      a                       3+r~i




                                                                              :rtt:1tti~~~tr~' %Y~33t2;~

UttCA LU ~y u~iic- R Wb~W L~L I ~ Li £~ UIIUt£ ai~£'t S - wrileri was a~ainst Afis. I had been under

arrest over a week and 24 hours was prescribed for charbes, or release to be made. I requested of the

CO to be released and the Buildo~ said, weSre wait1n~ for that report to come back down so courts

martial proceedings can take place." I then told them there will never be a Yip report come down on me

since the Div. CS tore up that report. I asain requested release so I could

set bac~ to trainin~ my platoon. with that I excused inyseif and left the orderly room tente The next day

Capt. Fickett went to the hospital and the Top never bothered me again.

                                                          11an8 were arc-an~ing another smoker, but this

                                                          time they were as3emblin~ what was left of the

                                                          peace time Regimental boxin~ team. The award

                                                          was soing> to be a case of stateside beet for

                                                          each winner. I asreed to £isht, sayin8 that I

                                                          thousht I should be able to get back into shape

                                                          in two, or three weeks. No one arbued with that

                                                          - the n~xt day I learned the smoker was for the

                                                          followin~ nisht and I still had the stitches in my

                                                          le~s. But I couldn't let the Rgt. down and the

                                                          next nisht found we in faded trunks and nioldy

                                                          tennis shoes, waitina rYnsaide while th£ li~htw2

                                                          8hts went t~ru their ro'jnds. .The~ Wolfhoundg
won every fi&at that nisht to re-establish their

supremacy in the field of fisticuffs. And then we

couldn't find the beer! I still don't know who 6ot

it. (Coincidently enoush, author had a work

companion who was a First Sgt. in the iCi, we

had four 25 Div. men in our office, and he still

lau~hs knowin~ly when I inquired about that

missins beer.) The day I went bac'& to the

hospital for check up one of the officers in the

Battalion.asked me to ~o to the Navy small

stores in Nournea and buy him a pair of Navy

low quarter shoes. I as~reed to get him the

shoes without ~ivin~ thought to the

consequences. The Gen. Hospital was several

miles out or Nournea and my pass only coveted

transportation between the ptstl. area and the

hospital. It didn't cover gojifl~ to Nournea. When

I left the hospital I was ridin~ a ration truck into

Noumea, and 'naking arrangements with the

driver to pick me up on the way back. Havintt

time to kill I dropped into a local Gin NAll and got

nailed by th6 S.B~: I~ended up in front o£ the

First Sat. the next day '4ho listened gleefully as

the M.~. related the details. The Buildos,

                       and I didn't see eye to eye and he encourased the C.O., Capt. Fickett, to take

                action. The followin~ mornin~ I was informed there was a phone call for me in the orderly

                tent and the caller said, '1ThiS is Blcdsoe. (001. Bledsoe, Div. Cs) File, what in hell have

                you been up to nowli??" I gave him the details and he said, "l~w listen to this younct

                mani" Al I could hear was paper tearing. "rhat was your delinquency report I just tore up.

                Now So and sin no more.." I thanked the Col- and went
      (Ernie Lucas) CII took my Basic ~rainin~ at Ft. hdcClellan, Ala. I

                     had a roueh, hard, soo6 time through Basic. There were five out of my company

                who boxed (I won 5 and lost 1).

'After a seven day delay in route, I was gent to California. First to Ft. Ord and then to Camp Stoneman.

We shipped oat Cf Stonernan dn a ferry to Frisco where we boarded the ro~lau taut (which had been

converted from a Dutch freishter into an Army Transport) and 31 days later

                     -se landed in Nournea, New Caledonia. We were trucked to the 6th Repi.

                       Depot where we stayed several weeks.

                       We were then sent to the 27th Ir

                       S5 Div. The 2'$th had just arrived from New Zealand where they had be

                recovering from combat on the Canal.

                                                                 44; ~

                 L-R:     Kecarley, Kaza, Dishner, rop Rehner, Yaalone Lambert

"O~r truck stoppa front of Item Co., was the best thins ever happened to me There to greet us w three 2

Lts. who we our hand to hand Co instructors aboard and they also refer the boxtn~ aboarQ Itwas like a

farnil reunion. Lt. Kaza 2rowfl, ant Lt.

           Sin~letary, three of the BEST officers one could have. After evenin~ chow 9 they sot us to~-

           a ether with the old pros oV the Canal who let us know risht 0ff there would be no stea1in~, no

           1yins,~no Ecotins off and that we were goin~ to be as one. ~ ~ent u~by~e.--3ew~Qaledcni


   £rAny9ne with problems were told to ~o 0 them and they woula help us 0

   And that was the way it was. As time went by, we became closer than brothers. We worked hard

                                                             and they rewarded us with    '6-
  special privile~es, such                                                                       r
  as hi&es across the Col-                                                                                -
  onial Hwy. to the beach                                ~6 f_             -

  with plenty of ammo to v~ A ~
  shoot at will. We piozed                               -                                  C             -       ¼
                                                ~< i,Ar &~
  up shells, cats eyes, and                       ~ +                                                i            '-K
                                                                               -                                         -
                                                                               ~        -t

              5enerally had a 8ood time..
                                                           I -~                   -- -      -. ..             ---
             Also, we searched the                                .;. j*! 'a     -
                                                                               ~~                                            -
                          banks for deep holes I Cc. diEginE drainase ditches. L-R: Tirn
              river                                            McAllister, Mooch. Dishner? Lucas?

              of water for good swimmin~. At one part of the river there vtas a lar tree and we tied a rope to a hiEfi

              branch and swunE. out for hi~h divin We played a lot of sports and, at ni 8ht, we'd sit on the hill and

              study the stars and accasionally see a shootins meteor. We had a view of the southern Cross which

              was very beautiful. In our free tim. we woald wal& to the histhway and catch a ride to Div. Area to havE

              ft developed and tani up on soft ice cream which tney made in a small bu i~s beside the road. Je

              found some lemon trees and cran~e znoves wjhi raided once in a w~ile. They were delicious and we

              would carry oacZ barracks ba~s cra'r~ed to th~ to;.

                                                                                   S     Sgt. swadiski and I were

                                                                                   -   luc~y enou;h to ~o to the ft

                                                                                       Camp in Noumea for two week

                                                                                       He had a buddy, from the Ca

                                                                                       who was a. :&.E. and really

                                                                                       us a Eood time. No, I didn
                                                                                       SO to the "Fink House", but
                                 £rnie Lucas and friend                                S4adis'&i did (he was sin~nle
                      1tGood thinsa can't last - due to jealousy of other company conirnander

           Lt.s Brown and sinsletary were transrerred to other companies and that left Kaza in I Co. It made us

           very ~nhappy t~ lose those good officers but, I suens we had just made too ~ood a nhowin~, we could

           coinwunicate with each other without sayins a word just gestures.

'tAfter a month, or so, Lt. Kaza sent word he wanted to see me in the orderly roolntent. As I wal'&ed in he save me

              that twisted grin of
      has and then 1/sEt.                                                     I

      Duesans said It's time                                           4

      for me to leave.' Kaza

      then told me an Assault -~

      Platoon was beins forined #.~J

                                                   ana he would be the C.O. Top R is ~ with his K.B.s - He
                                                   went from squad Leader to Cook -till a real

         He said it would be all irolunteers from the 3 Battalion. and no E.oof-offs..

   wanted me to be on a demolition team ana I could bick my partner.
                              ~       a'.~L4 %}i,i~ywt*r,'.£[tf~~< ;..~.
                                  6      ~
L - H Rear ~obilio, Murphy. Yalone, ~CAllister, Merchi, Lambert L-R Front xcaarley, nehner, Mooch
Randue. Ro~ers, Marincarco, Dishner.
hirn to let me th~n~

it.        He said not to too ion~ becAugustuste tY would be doin~ six of special traiflin; the heavy £ir1n~

ra near TilLie's T1t~ went bac& to my ter wnera one of my be buddies was waitir wanted to know wha tap.

I told hitri an



        talked for a while and fina1~y~fle said he would volunteer if I would.
                                I              -
That' stow we ~ecarne 'mem~be'ra~o?      4-ihe~AssauYtt~latoon. He name was
          -      ronald La inbert,~frdin 1Mo.~(wy younEeat son tears his na~~me)~- he was
   later killed by a Jap sniper.

                                                                                :Q ;½'~~
                       ~ ~'$tt'<. 4+~~',~

t~ '~; ~

      'Lt. Kaza sot us 0CM ized with special help front weapons specialis the platoon consistins two name

   thrower team

   two bazooxa teams, one

   demolition team with a

   'nan back up, two sub

         Thompsons, one sniper The inramous Tillies Tit". flew Cal..
   a~3o-o6 an3 scope, two BAR men, and four riflemen. Later, in combat,

               had availlable a 37mm rifle with base plate and Yi~ sub-inaehine suns. In Nov. 1944, the

               Regimental 0.0..       , -~ -

    was informed that the Wolfhounds would               'C be en~ased in the Luzon operation of the Philippine

    Liberation campaisn, Code name ~i£e I of ~s'aeteer III. The Division was scheduled to land over the

    beaches ad~acent to tin~ayen Gulf with the miscion of 6 Army Reserve. ori~ginally the Tarset Date was

    20 Dec. 1944; however~ this was chansed to 9 Jan 1945 Prior to this the Div. was shocauled tar

    operations On Bousanville, but this was cancelled.

   After study 0£ info supplied by sowerac Area of terrain studies ana intel reports, study of I Corps r.c.a
   __________                       ~'-

                 Flamethrower Team. Tdp: Gainc
ation of F.O. I was commenced. A series of 8ubjects were scheduled

for further trainins related to reports of 6 Army ops then current.
 Amons these subjects were Tank-Infantry operations, Street and Villa~
















































                                                                                          ~ap and

                                                            Further emphasis Wa


                                                            aced or phyalcal cor

                                                            icrims including war
L               ~---
hill clirabins, and
                                             f~Atssault Platoon's training and
                                     Lateh~anvtofvi.ritnht r;tlK;~near TilliesjLt.1
                                     ____ J on the bayonet cour C.O.s were issued
                                     tnc ft F 0 and were authorizec

     access to the War Room for study dr all available info Supply shortaEss were

     replaced, all

unit8 crated their equipment, and

supply 'novernent Was colninenced to Nornea.
Zquiprnent was sesresated into three                                     I..
                       srOups: Assault zchelot. Forward Zchelon+                                                N
                                                     9          -
                           N                           --
                                                - ~t   . -< - ~

                                      Chow line at heavy firms ran~e
                                         during special trainins.

       Bazooka Team. Top: Keith, a Lucero, Murland?
       ~nd near Echelon.

(Les ~hornas, 2/Lt, S? R~t. ) This was a sure 81r~ - we had e~hoe inspection (non. Brown, Oar unsan?

hero). shoe~ in co-~bat WC1'r~! juat as important as arnphib~o~s trainin#:. A soldier ruarches on h16

Ve(t and not his stowach. Gri yes, dere we the only ones to have Our own overseas lybrary.

       "We continued hard trainin~, however morale formed a problem in the Army's rotation system. At

the time a perc~ntaje of each colnmand was to be rotated to the ZI monthly, based on length of overseas

service, and every non-corn in the 25th had at least 3 yrs. overseas.

Div. ilqs. could not allow the non-corn ranks to be decimatcd and a policy was set up whereby a

pcrcenta~e of each rank would be rotated. This plan heavily favored the lower ranks and NCO's started

turni~g~ in their stripes en masse. The next edict decreed that any non-corn reduc for any reason, with

or without prejudice, would not be eligible for rotation for another six rnonth8. Morale became so bad in

the Liv. that the 25th was scratched from a scheduled operation. To top it all off, M/~st. Webb, ~tl. s/Mjr.,

of the Woithounds had to ~o to the hospital. (Webb left the ZI in 1918 and had not been back to the Stat

for thc 25 intenvenins years and thc beneficiary listed on his service record was the U.s. Govt.). -ebb

carri~o with him to tLe hospital many personnel records and data pertinent to the rotation situation.

(I found Webb, after the War, livins. In an aoartment by himself in Fri a loneiv old man. It it hadn't bE£-n

for the rotation kICL( I''n sure
(ebb would have stayed with the. R~t. until he died.)"

     (Tony Crnko) "I landed 4 Mar. 1944 on Nournea, Ne1tj Caledonia, and th next dav went to tL~c <~t'a

Repla Depo. I wa-s assisned to NA~{e Cc., 27th Rst., and COP a number o£ months went thru Lt lot of

intensive tcainin~
-                        -~ --                               -    -           It