human rights act 1998 in northern ireland courts

							Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission HUMAN RIGHTS ACT IN NORTHERN IRELAND COURTS 2004 (third report) CASES TO NOTE July 2004 – November 2004 Please note, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission does not accept responsibility for the accuracy of the reporting of these cases and individuals should not rely on this report. The following is for information only and the individual should take his own legal advice. Article 2 In the Matter of Applications by William Frazer for Judicial Review [2004] NIQB 68 (The applicant applied for judicial review to challenge a decision of the Secretary Of State refusing the applicant admission to the Key Persons Protection Scheme, and a decision of the Secretary of State rejecting an appeal from decisions of the Chief Constable of the PSNI refusing a variation of the applicant’s firearms certificate and in the second place, revoking that certificate.) The KKPS is a non-statutory discretionary scheme operated by the Secretary of State. The aim of the Scheme is to protect those whose death or injury as result of terrorist attack could undermine government, administration of government or the criminal justice system or maintenance of law and order. Admission applies to persons working in specific jobs who will qualify for inclusion if assessed by the Chief Constable as being under serious or significant threat and secondly, to persons not in those specified occupations but who provide a wider public role. Thirdly, there is a residual basis for admission for compelling political reasons and fourthly, home protection measures can be applied for outside the scheme where the person is under imminent risk. Decision – As the applicant was assessed by the police as being at significant risk, this involves a real and immediate risk. The state is required to take reasonable steps in response to that risk. In this case, ministers were briefed that in considering applications to the Scheme, a real and immediate risk for the purposes of Article 2 of the ECHR arises only in relation to an imminent threat – this attitude is flawed. Officials should have recognised that a ‘real and immediate’ threat for the purposes of Article 2 extended beyond an ‘imminent’ threat and applied to the ‘significant’ threat to the applicant. The decision of the Secretary of State in relation to the rejection of protection outwith the Scheme was quashed. In relation to the personal protection weapon, the Chief Inspector had given notice to the applicant that he was unfitted to be a person in possession of a firearm within the meaning of the 1981 Order – based on an intelligence report that he associated with loyalist terrorists. In addition, there was no information that the applicant was subject to a specific threat on his life to entitle him to hold a personal protection weapon.

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Decision – there were no grounds to set aside the police assessment that the applicant was not subject to specific threat- the applicant could renew his application. The Minister was entitled to rely on police intelligence in concluding that the applicant was unfitted to carry a PPW by reason of paramilitary connections. There was no procedural unfairness. Article 2 In the Matter of an Application by Ann Brolly and Francis Brolly for Judicial Review [2004] NIQB 69 (The applicants applied for judicial review of the decisions of the Secretary of State and the Chief Constable of the PSNI relating to their exclusion from the KPPS and refusal to disclose a risk assessment carried out by police.) The applicants were Sinn Féin councillors. Death threats had been issued to all Sinn Féin councillors by the Red Hand Defenders. On applying to the Scheme the minister advised the applicants that following a death threat assessment, they were not considered by the police to be under serious or significant threat. The risk assessment indicated a moderate level of risk. The applicants were refused admission because they failed to meet the risk criteria. They would have satisfied the occupation criteria as they were councillors. Decision – the state is required to take steps in response to the risk to the applicants. The risk is real and immediate. In accordance with Frazer above, if the officials had recognised that a real and immediate risk for the purposes of Article 2 of the ECHR extends beyond an imminent threat and applies to the moderate threat to which the applicants were subject, the outcome may have been different. The applicants were subject to a real and immediate risk to life. The decision to refuse a firearms certificate does not involve a determination as to civil rights and therefore does not engage Article 6. The applicants were provided with the gist of the information contained in the risk assessment; there are public interest grounds for denying disclosure of the full report. There is no procedural unfairness in the non disclosure. There may be cases where fairness demands greater disclosure; the Court may make an order in such cases or dispose of the case by way of judicial review. The availability of judicial review is sufficient to satisfy Article 6, should Article 6 have been engaged. Article 2 In the Matter of an Application by W for Judicial Review [2004] NIQB 67 (The applicant challenged the decisions of the Secretary of State and the Chief Constable of the PSNI to refuse admission to the KPPS and to refuse home protection measures outside the Scheme.) The applicant had been convicted of manslaughter; he served two years and was released in December 2003. As a result of these events, threats were made to his life. The applicant was denied access to the KPPS as he did not satisfy the occupation criteria or the wider public role criteria. The level of threat against the applicant was assessed as significant. Police recommended door protection, window protection, security lights and other measures. The threat against the applicant was later assessed as severe. The applicant applied for review of the decision.

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The application was rejected, officials took into account the measures taken by the police and the NIHE and decided that additional protection measures outside the Scheme should not be provided. Decision – in accordance with the above cases, the officials in this case considered that a real and immediate risk for the purposes of Article 2 is limited to one which is imminent. The applicant was wrongly excluded from home protection measures because the real and immediate risk he was subject to was less than imminent. The applicant also contended that the operation of the Scheme involved discrimination in breach of Article 14 read with Article 2. The court held there was no breach of Article 2 as the Secretary of State has provided home protection measures under the Scheme and outside the Scheme for the purposes of Article 2. No citizen subject to real and immediate risk is excluded from consideration for the purposes of Article 2. Persons who fulfil the occupation or wider public role criteria have added protection provided under the Scheme. This differential treatment is justified as those individuals admitted are at greater risk and there is a need to maintain the confidence of those fulfilling public roles that those roles will be filled without intimidation. The measures applied are in proportion to the legitimate aim to be found in the objects of the Scheme. Provided that the state’s Article 2 obligations have already been met in respect of all citizens the differential treatment is justified. Article 2 In the Matter of an Application by Hugh Jordan for Judicial Review and the Matter of a Decision taken by the Lord Chancellor and in the Matter of a Decision taken by the Coroner [2004] NICA 29 On Appeal from the High Court of Justice Crown Side (Pearse Jordan died in November 1992 during an incident involving members of the RUC in controversial circumstances. Prior to the inquest the father of the victim lodged an application before the ECHR alleging a breach of Article 2. The European Court concluded that the Article 2 obligation to protect life requires some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of lethal force by agents of the State. The investigation must be capable of leading to a determination whether force used was justified in the circumstances and to detection and punishment of those responsible. In the present case there was a lack of independence and a lack of public scrutiny and information to the victim’s family containing reasons for failure to prosecute police officers. The police officer who shot the victim could not be required to attend the inquest as a witness, the procedure did not allow a verdict which could play a role in securing a prosecution in respect of any criminal defence which may be disclosed, the inquest proceedings did not commence promptly. Absence of legal aid and non availability of witness statements prior to appearances prejudiced ability of applicants to participate in inquest. The coroner decided to proceed on the basis of existing law in NI and not to make available to the jury the option of bringing in a verdict such as unlawful killing or an open verdict. The applicant sought an order requiring the coroner to conduct an inquest complying with Article 2 which he stated required such a verdict. The applicant challenged the failure of the Lord Chancellor to introduce legislation to ensure that the inquest system in NI complied with Article 2.)

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Decision – Appeals dismissed. Applying Section 3 (interpretative obligation) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to the conduct of inquests so as to widen the ambit of the inquiry in line with the Middleton case would not interfere with vested rights and would merely affect the procedure of an inquest which has only merely started. There is no reason why Section 3 should not apply to lead to a reinterpretation of the word ‘how’ in the statutory provision. ‘Where all members of the jury at an inquest are agreed …they shall give in their verdict setting forth, so far as such particulars have been proved to them, who the deceased person was and how when and where he came to his death’ (S 31 Coroners Act (NI) 1959). The case of McKerr does not preclude this approach, in McKerr there was no ongoing inquest. The next of kin in that case had no right to an Article 2 compliant investigation. The next of kin in the present case has the right to an inquest under the Coroners Act (NI) 1959. The duties of the coroner fall to be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with the Convention. The jury should meet the procedural obligation under Article 2 and be permitted to express their views on the central facts explored before them. The obligation of the jury to fully investigate the circumstances of the death and to reach facts or conclusions in relation thereto is an overriding duty arising out of the duty to investigate ‘how’ the deceased died (interpreting ‘how’ in the wider Middleton sense). The domestic rule which prohibits the coroner or jury from expressing an opinion ‘on questions of criminal or civil liability’ (Rule 16) must be read in a way which is consistent with the overriding duty to reach determinations of fact on the central disputed issues of fact surrounding the circumstances of the death. The Lord Chancellor is not under a duty to introduce legislation to allow inquest juries to return a verdict of unlawful killing. Article 2 In the Matter of an Application by Hugh Jordan for Judicial Review and in the Matter of a Decision taken by the Lord Chancellor and in the Matter of a Decision taken by the Coroner [2004] NICA 30 (The appellant challenged the decisions of the Lord Chancellor not to amend the Coroner’s Rules in NI so as to enable the jury to return a verdict of unlawful killing.) Next of kin cannot obtain an Article 2 compliant inquest on a person who died before the Human Rights Act became effective by reference merely to the fact that the UK is in breach of its treaty obligations, this was decided in McKerr. In Middleton, the next of kin may have obtained another inquest if there had not been a full investigation into the death at the original inquest. A verdict of ‘unlawful killing’ by the jury would breach the Coroners Rules (Rule 16) as they currently apply. Unless the Human Rights Act requires the Court to deal with the Coroner’s Rules under Section 3, to render it invalid, or Article 2 of the Convention applies so as to override the Rule, a verdict of unlawful killing is not open to the jury. If the jury is entitled to make findings of fact and reach a conclusion on whether the force used was unjustified, a verdict of unlawful killing is unnecessary. It may be that convention rights of an individual do not have to be engaged when applying S3 of the HRA, provided that convention rights in general apply. Decision – Appeals dismissed. The Coroner should apply the Coroner’s Law and Practice as at 2002 – the coroner was right to decide not to allow a verdict of unlawful killing, although the jury could make findings of fact on the central issues involved in the death of Pearse Jordan. The word ‘how’ in S31 of the Coroner’s Act should be

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interpreted as meaning ‘by what means and in what circumstances’, if this is wrong, give the wider meaning of ‘by what means’. Article 3 In the Matter of an Application by John Boyle for Judicial Review of the Decision of the DPP [2004] NIQB 63 (The applicant applied for an order of mandamus against the DPP, seeking the provision of full reasons for its decision not to prosecute two police officers for perjury.) The applicant was convicted in 1977 on a count of possession of firearms and ammunition with intent to endanger life and membership of a proscribed organisation. The Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the matter back to the Court of Appeal in 2001. It was alleged that the applicant had taken part in an IRA gun attack against police officers in 1976. The case against the applicant was based entirely on admissions obtained during interviews. At his trial the applicant denied making the admissions and claimed that the officers had written down things he had not said. On the basis of a test conducted by the ESDA process, the Court of Appeal accepted there were grounds for the opinion that there must have been another version of the interview notes in respect of one interview. There were verbal differences between the recorded interview and the impressions which were found by the investigator on examination. The officers maintained that the interview notes were made throughout the interview. There was a prima facie case that the notes had been re-written and the conviction could not be regarded as safe. The matter was investigated by the Police Ombudsman for NI. The applicant states that the Ombudsman recommended a prosecution of the two officers. The DPP consulted with Counsel and the Ombudsman’s Office and the Forensic Agency. Senior Counsel recommended that there was insufficient evidence to produce a successful prosecution of the officers. A direction not to prosecute was issued. It is the general practice in Northern Ireland for the DPP not to give reasons for failure to prosecute. The Attorney General, in response to a written question in the House of Lords, stated that in view of Jordan v UK, there may be exceptional cases in the future where an expectation will arise that a reasonable explanation for failure to prosecute should be given where death was or may have been occasioned by agents of the State. Decision – application dismissed. If Article 3 was engaged, that would be a relevant factor to which the DPP should have had regard in the decision whether or not to give reasons for failure to prosecute. In light of McKerr, the procedural element of Article 3 did not apply to the alleged mistreatment of the applicant at the time of the interviews (which occurred prior to the enactment of the Human Rights Act). The DPP was not in error in failing to take Article 3 into account. Articles 3 and 6 In the Matter of an Application by Michael Gerard Magee for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review [2004] NIQB 57 (The appellant challenged the decisions of the Secretary of State refusing him compensation under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the ex gratia scheme for the compensation of people who spent time in prison for a wrongful conviction.)

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The appellant was convicted of offences involving the assembly and transportation of a bomb intended to be used against members of the security forces. Evidence against him consisted of oral admissions and a written statement made by him at Castlereagh Holding Centre. The Court rejected the applicant’s claims of mal-treatment by the police. The appellant took the case to the European Court of Human Rights alleging a breach of Articles 3 and 6. The European Court held that the conditions of the appellant’s detention in Castlereagh led to a violation of Article 6 because he had been denied access to a solicitor during his detention. The Criminal Cases Review Commission referred the case back to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction as unsafe. The appellant’s application for compensation under the Act was denied because the Secretary of State stated that this was not a case in which the conviction had been reversed due to newly discovered facts which showed beyond reasonable doubt that there had been a miscarriage of justice. The conviction was reversed because there had been a breach of Article 6. The Court of Appeal had determined that in assessing the safety of convictions, the Court should give effect to Article 6. The appellant was also refused compensation under the ex gratia scheme because the conviction did not result from serious default on the part of the police or a public authority, he had not been exonerated of the crime and there had been no judicial error. Decision – Application dismissed. The Criminal Justice Act 1988, under which the applicant applied for compensation, was not designed to compensate accused persons whose convictions are judged unsafe. In this case there was no finding that the applicant was innocent nor was there a finding that there had been a proven failure of the trial process. As the law stood at the time of the trial the trial was fair and the law was correctly applied. A later House of Lords authority indicates that the Court of Appeal decision in quashing the conviction in Magee was wrong. The result of the later decision is that the retrospective effect of the Human Rights Act and direct enforcement of Convention rights do not apply when a defendant convicted before the Act came into effect brings an appeal after that date. The applicant has not established that he was the victim of a miscarriage of justice. In relation to the ex gratia scheme, the Secretary State was entitled to conclude that there was no miscarriage of justice or judicial error giving rise to exceptional circumstances. Article 6 In the Matter of an Application by Stephen Robert O’Neill for Judicial Review 10 September 2004 (The appellant challenged the decisions of the DPP and the Resident Magistrate at Belfast Magistrate’s Court whereby the appellant, as a defendant in a summary criminal trial, was denied discovery of notebook enquiries of police officers who were witnesses for the prosecution in advance of the hearing.) A Notice of Incompatibility was issued under Article 5 of the HRA 1998 and Supreme Court Rules that the Court was considering making a declaration of incompatibility further to the appellant’s claim that S3 and S8 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 were incompatible with Article 6 of the HRA. The RM decided that he had no power to force the DPP to make disclosure of the police notebooks. Decision - the 1996 Act does not require disclosure of the notebook entries in primary prosecution disclosure unless it is the prosecution’s opinion that they might

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undermine the case for the prosecution. The Resident Magistrate should adjourn the hearing of the criminal proceedings for a short time when the interests of fairness require that an accused and his representatives should have the opportunity to consider the contents of police book entries. If it is necessary to obtain additional time for the consideration by the defence of the notebook entries, the time can be afforded. Disclosure is a matter for the prosecutor and the Resident Magistrate has no power to order disclosure. No incompatibility with Article 6. Application for judicial review dismissed as the appellants complaints about disclosure could be addressed during the criminal trial.

Article 6 R v Clifford McKeown [2004] NICA 41 (The appellant appealed against convictions for possession of firearms and possession of articles for purposes connected with terrorism on the basis that the failure of the prosecution to disclose certain material (on grounds of public interest) gave rise to unfairness in his trial and breached his rights under Article 6.) The appellant believed that he was entrapped by a person known to him working with the police and requested discovery of all information relating to the state of knowledge of the police prior to arresting him. Prior to the trial the DPP advised the applicant that they intended to apply for an Order under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the Disclosure Rules. The Order sought would permit the DPP to withhold disclosure in respect of specific information on the grounds that disclosure would not be in the public interest. The Order was granted and the reasons for the Order were contained in a confidential statement to the prosecutor and trial judge. The issue of the need to ensure that sufficient procedural safeguards were in place was referred to the disclosure judge. The disclosure judge held that special counsel should not be appointed and that if the defence raised an issue which made the disclosure of the information of assistance to the defence, then the prosecution should make the matter known to the trial judge and the matter should be referred back to the disclosure judge. The appellant argued that the position whereby the prosecution was the monitor of the need to disclose information amounted to an inequality of arms and was a breach of Article 6. In this case the trial judge had access to material which was withheld from the appellant. The disclosure judge could not be aware of the relevance of the material unless he had day to day access to the trial. The Court distilled the following principles: 1. Full disclosure of any material held by prosecution which weakens prosecution case or strengthens defence case should be made. 2. Only derogate from this when full adherence would create risk of serious prejudice to public interest. 3. Disclosure judge must have full understanding of all issues in the trial. 4. Appointment of special counsel will be exceptional. Decision – no breach of Article 6. The disclosure judge was well aware of the appellant’s defence, no new line of defence emerged that rendered the undisclosed material of assistance to the appellant’s case. The Trial judge did not see any material

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which was prejudicial to the appellant’s case; it was not an exceptional case where appointment of special counsel was required.

Article 6 R v Philip Blaney [2004] NICA 28 (The appellant was convicted of counts of manslaughter, causing explosions, possession of an explosive substance and possession of a firearm and appeals against his convictions.) The evidence against the appellant consisted of admissions he made to police at Gough Barracks. The appellant was not able to consult with a solicitor before being interviewed by police. Decision – no breach of Article 6 as it does not require that the legal representative of a suspect must always be present in the course of an interview. The refusal to allow a legal representative to be present may give rise to a breach of Article 6 but this is because of the effect that the absence of a legal representative may have on the fairness of the trial. In each case where a solicitor has not been present during interview, an assessment has to be made of the particular facts in order to determine whether a breach of Article 6 has occurred. Where a disadvantage accrues to the interviewee by the drawing of adverse inferences at his trial, the fact that he had not had the benefit of legal advice at a time when he had to make choices that would affect whether inferences might be drawn is more likely to give rise to a breach of Article 6. The decision to proceed to interview the appellant was reasonable, he did not make any adverse admissions before having had the opportunity to consult with his solicitor, adverse inferences were not drawn against him by the trial judge and there was no evidence to show that he found the conditions of the barracks in which he was held as oppressive. No breach of Article 14. Different legislation pertains to persons in England and Wales as opposed to the legislation which applies to analogous persons in NI. The difference in treatment derives from the geographical location of the applicant at the time of his arrest and not from factors such as national origin. Article 8 In the Matter of J and S (Supervision Order or a Care Order) [2004] NIFam 10 (An HSS Trust made an application for a supervision order in respect of J and S, boys aged 10 and 13.) The boys lived with their mother; expert opinions on the matter stressed the need to support family life between the mother and the children. An ongoing contact dispute between the parents had had a negative effect on the children. Decision – the threshold criteria under the Children Order 1995 for a care order or supervision order was satisfied. A care order gives the Trust the power to remove the child without recourse to the Family Court, the Trust is given parental responsibility and control. Under a supervision order, the Trust does not acquire parental responsibility, which remains with the parents. The Trust has a duty to advise, assist and befriend the child. The Court made a supervision order. The Trust did not

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foresee the need to invoke the power of removal. The minimum invasion to the right to family life under Article 8 should be the Court’s approach. If emergencies arise, an emergency protection order can be arranged. A care order would not be a proportionate response to the legitimate aim of protecting the welfare of the children. Article 8 Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland v Minister of State for Health, Social Services and Public Safety [2004] NICA 39 (The appellant appealed against the decision to reject the application for judicial review it brought against the Minister. Leave to intervene was granted to Archbishop Sean Brady and the RC Bishops of NI, the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children and others.) The appellant had sought a declaration that the respondent acted unlawfully in failing to issue advice to women and clinicians in NI on the availability and provision of termination of pregnancy services in NI. It sought a declaration that the respondent had acted unlawfully in failing to investigate whether women are receiving satisfactory services in respect of terminations of pregnancy in NI and a declaration that the Minister acted unlawfully in failing to make arrangements to ensure that such arrangements are made. Decision – Article 2 of the Convention is not engaged in the case of any pregnant woman with an unwanted pregnancy. So far as Article 8 is concerned, there may be positive obligations on the State inherent in an effective respect for private and family life. This may require the respondent and the Court to ensure that confidentiality is respected for the pregnant woman in the case of an application to the Court for an abortion. Article 8 does not impose a heavier burden on the State to require the provision of advice to women or to dedicate resources to improving the circumstances of women than the burden imposed under the 1972 Order. The law in NI does not impose excessive burdens on women contrary to Article 14 based on the principle of equality. The Convention does not assist the appellant or respondent. Articles 8, 10 and 1 Protocol 1 In the Matter of an Application for Judicial Review by Misbehavin’ Ltd and in the Matter of an Application for Judicial Review by Ian Brown [2004] NICA 41 (The applications sought to challenge the decisions of 2 district councils to refuse permission to licence sex establishments under the Local Government Order 1985.) Decision – held. It requires exceptional circumstances to engage the European Convention in respect of the effect on the applicant of the refusal of planning permission to a third party but this threshold does not apply to the refusal of a licence to carry on business activities. Where the refusal of the licence has a direct effect on the use of the property and the interest of the business, it is not apparent that the effect should only engage Article 1 Protocol 1 in exceptional cases where there is a particularly adverse effect on the party concerned. The control of the use of the applicant’s premises engages Article 1 Protocol 1. The respondents engaged in the exercise of determining the character of relevant localities and the appropriate number of sex establishments in those localities. This takes into account social and moral considerations that would render it inappropriate to locate a sex establishment in a locality, e.g. the presence of religious establishments or schools. The Councils are not

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operating a policy of blanket rejection for such proposals. A fair balance was struck between the applicant’s interests and the public interest. The actions of the respondent have not interfered with the applicant’s Article 8 rights. The applicant is not prevented from carrying on a business but from carrying on a particular business. The work is not part and parcel of his life to the extent that it is not clear in which capacity he is acting. If Article 8 is engaged and the respondent has interfered with the right, the actions of the respondent must be justified. The interference is in accordance with law and the legitimate aim is for the protection of morals. The measures taken are necessary in a democratic society and are proportionate to the legitimate aim. The refusal of the licence to the applicant impacts on the imparting of certain information by the applicants and constitutes interference with freedom of expression under Article 10. The measures taken are prescribed by law, the legitimate aim is for the protection of morals – the interference is justified. Article 1 Protocol 1 In the Matter of J David Nagra for Judicial Review [2004] NICA 36 (The appellant, a solicitor, was informed by the Legal Aid department of the Law Society, that in a large number of criminal legal aid cases in which he was involved, no application for legal aid had been made to the appropriate authority. The appellant stated that the failure to apply was the fault of an office manager who advised him that applications had been made but payments had not been received due to the delay of Legal Aid. The appellant began to make late applications but did not apply for extensions of time. The legal aid department invited the appellant to attend a meeting to discuss the late applications. The appellant appeared before a panel which considered that his fees should be reduced. The appellant challenge the decision in an application for judicial review, the application was dismissed, he then appealed against that decision.) Decision – if the costs payable by Legal Aid constitute property for the purposes of Article 1 Protocol 1, no breach of the article occurred. The provision requiring that there should be prompt application for disbursement of public funds is in the public interest. The burden by way of the deduction is not disproportionate as there is a need to ensure the efficacy of the scheme and the need to encourage celerity in submissions. Article 1 Protocol 1 In the Matter of an Application by Donal McQuillan for Judicial Review [2004] NIQB 50 (The appellant challenges the decision of Newry and Mourne District Council to pay him half pay rather than full pay during the period of his suspension from employment. Half pay was paid in accordance with ‘Disciplinary procedures for manual employees’, according to the terms of which the appellant was employed.) The appellant was employed in 2001 as a waste disposal operative at a landfill site. As a result of investigations undertaken by the respondent into illegal dumping at the site, the appellant was arrested by police in 2002 and immediately suspended from employment on half pay. A clerical officer, who was also employed by the respondent on different terms and conditions, was also suspended but received full pay. The appellant received notice of a disciplinary hearing in 2003; he was found guilty of gross misconduct and was liable to summary dismissal. He appealed against

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the dismissal decision and his appeal was dismissed. The appellant’s Statement of Main Terms of Employment stated that his employment was governed by collective agreements and that disciplinary matters would be dealt with by council procedures. The Green Book was agreed in respect of manual workers and provided that they would receive half pay on suspension. The Purple Book was agreed in respect of clerical workers and it provided that they would receive full pay on suspension. Decision – application dismissed. The applicant claims that the decision to take away half his pay during the period of suspension interfered with his rights under Art 1 Protocol 1. The absence of half the salary is a consequence of the agreed terms and conditions of employment. Accordingly, the one half of his pay is not an existing possession during the period of his suspension. It is not unreasonable that the suspension of work should carry with it an alteration of the benefits to be gained from work. Article 1 of Protocol 1 is not engaged. If the payment of the half salary is a possession for the purposes of Article 1 Protocol 1, interference with it must be justified. Interference must serve a legitimate aim by proportionate means. The aim is the recognition of established negotiating arrangements; the maintenance of ordered industrial relations is a public interest. There is a fair balance between the public interest and the private interest. The interference is justified. The applicant contends the loss of half his salary had the consequence of interfering with his rights under Article 8. He was unable to pay his mortgage and the mortgagee took proceedings for possession. Article 8 is not engaged, the respondent did not take any action which interfered with the appellants respect for his home and the action taken by the mortgagee does not interfere with the appellant’s right to privacy. The case is not within the ambit of Article 1 Protocol 1 or Article 8 therefore Article 14 does not apply. Even if Article 14 could attach to one of the substantial rights here, the differential treatment to which the appellant is subject is justified because it is a proportionate means of reaching a legitimate aim. The applicant’s dispute is not excluded from the scope of Article 6 because under Pellegran v France, he is not a public servant ‘whose duties typify the specific activities of the public service in so far as the latter is acting as the depositary of public authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the State or other public authorities’. The rights claimed by the appellant in respect of the application of the collective agreements to his situation do not give rise to a civil right for the purposes of Article 6. The application of contractual arrangements does not amount to a determination for the purposes of Article 6. If Article 6 is engaged, the availability of judicial review of the decision is sufficient to render the decision process compliant with Article 6.

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