Scoping Study on Social Exclusion Volume II - Annexes

Scoping Study on Social Exclusion: Volume II – Annexes Dr. Emma Hooper Agha Imran Hamid October 2003 Commissioned by the Western Asia Department, Department for International Development (DFID), UK. The views in this study are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of DFID. 1 Contents Annex 1: Legislative Background to Social Exclusion: Women and Minorities in Pakistan – Farida Shaheed Gender and Social Exclusion in Pakistan –Khawar Mumtaz Annex 2: Annex 3: Annex 4: Annex 5: Annex 6: Annex 7: Annex 8: Labour & Social Exclusion – Tazeen Javed Land & Social Exclusion – Emma Hooper Biraderi, Caste & Provincial Ethnicity – Agha Imran Hamid Devolution – Agha Imran Hamid Micro-credit - Agha Imran Hamid Social Exclusion in the Provincial Participatory Poverty Assessments – Emma Hooper Use of the Media to Combat Social Exclusion & its Potential Role in Promoting Pro-Poor Social Change – Imran Rizvi & Samar Abbas Annex 9 : 2 Annex 1: Legislative Background to Social Exclusion – Women and Minorities in Pakistan Farida Shaheed Background There are many factors that lead to the social exclusion of women and non-Muslims. This paper, however, is limited to critical aspects of the legislative basis for social exclusion and some broad policy issues. It looks at Constitutional provisions, the so-called ‘Islamic’ laws introduced during Zia’s period when the legal basis for social exclusion – especially of minorities and women - took its most overt form accompanied by damaging policies that together have had the longest-term impact. It also looks at family laws and provides a quick up-date on developments. Factors of Exclusion in the Constitution The Constitution of Pakistan implicitly recognizes factors of social exclusion in the clauses aiming to safeguard nondiscrimination between citizens and in its provisions for affirmative actions for specific groups of people. These include gender, religion, race and language, geographical disparities (both in terms of province and rural-urban divides within provinces), and, of course, class. Article 25 provides for equality of all citizens; prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex alone; and clarifies that ‘nothing shall prevent the state from making special measures for the protection of women and children’. Nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth in government appointments and employment is guaranteed under Article 27 that also provides for special quotas/reserved seats for specific classes, areas and sex. Article 26 covers non-discriminatory free access to all places (except those of religious worship), while reserving the state’s right to make special provisions for women and children. Under the principles of state policy, the state is to discourage parochial, racial, tribal and sectarian & provincial prejudices among the citizens (Article 33); take steps to ensure the full participation of women in all spheres of national life (Article 34); protect the legitimate rights and interests of minorities, including due representation in Federal and Provincial services (Article 36); encourage local government (Article 32). Article 37 specifically mentions education and employment for backward areas and classes, guarding against unsuitable employment for children and women, maternity benefits for women and just human conditions of work for all. Article 51 originally provided 10 indirectly elected seats for women in the National Assembly and some 5% of seats in the provincial assemblies until the second general elections. 6 indirectly elected seats for minorities were reserved through the 4th Constitutional Amendment in 1975. There is a vast gap between de jure and de facto rights, however. While the potential marginalization of provinces in national-decision-making due to smaller populations is redressed through equal representation in the upper house of parliament (Senate), no legislation addresses rural-urban differences and to date, there is no legal cover for rural workers be they peasants or landless labourers. Also, for example, while the principle of universal franchise was adopted early on (1958 - 1st Constitution), citizens had to wait until 1970 for the first general elections to be held under this principle. Furthermore, franchise in fact excluded sizeable areas of Pakistan: Federally Administered Tribal Areas FATA and until 1996, Provincially Administered Tribal Areas.1 PATA areas were amalgamated into the provinces of Balochistan and NWFP. In FATA adult franchise was only introduced in 1997. Attesting to the strongly entrenched patriarchal framework, though no one questioned the universal right of franchise for men, women’s right to vote was aggressively opposed.2 The differentiated administrative treatment of these areas also has implications on family law matters discussed below. 1 FATA consists of the Agencies of Bajaur, Orakzai, Mohammad, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan as well as tribal areas adjoining Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Islmail Khan. PATA consists of Dir Malakand Swat and Zhob, Loralai (except Duki tehsil), Dalbadin Tehsil (Chagai) and Marri and Bugti tribal areas of Sibi. 2 See Shahla Zia & Farzana Bari, Baseline Report on Women’s Participation in Politics & Public Lif in Pakistan, Aurat Publication and Information Service Foundation. Islamabad: 1999. & Farida Shaheed Imagined Citizenship: Women, State & Politics in Pakistan; Shirkat Gah. Lahore: 2002 3 Even before the innumerable (and damaging) amendments introduced after 1979, the Constitution contained the basis for excluding non-Muslims. Article 2 declares Islam to be the state religion, Article 41 that only Muslims can become the President. (The first constitutional amendment in 1975 declared Ahmedis to be non-Muslims.) Article 31 requires the state to ensure that Muslims are able to live according to Islam and Part IX provides measures for ensuring that all laws are in keeping with Islam and the modalities for achieving this. The Objectives Resolution - retained from previous constitutions - states that ‘sovereignty belongs to God Almighty alone’ though authority has been delegated to the State of Pakistan to be exercised through chosen representatives. When this later became a substantive part of the Constitution (Presidential Order No 14 of 1985), it gave unprecedented primacy to the shariah interpreted for the most part by conservative elements, introducing an erosion of the rights and roles of women and non-Muslims. Social Exclusion Through Legislation During Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s tenure (1972-77) the potentially negative aspects of the Constitution lay mostly dormant; their full potential was not understood until they came alive, hugely strengthened in the hands of General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88). The privileging of religion in defining Pakistani nationhood placed non-Muslims at a disadvantage from the start. However Zia’s legislation overturned the state’s commitment to citizens’ equality and, by giving legislative backing to social exclusion of certain categories of citizens, especially women and nonMuslims encouraged the most bigoted sections of society. For women and minorities, two of the many seriously damaging amendments made to the constitution were the establishment of a parallel judiciary dealing with newly introduced so-called shariat or Muslim religious laws in 1979 (replacing Section 203 of the Constitution) and the introduction of separate electorates for non-Muslims in both the national and provincial assemblies in 1985 (Articles 51 and 106). Effective as of February 1979 the High Court Shariat Benches had jurisdiction “to examine and decide the question of whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam” on the petition of any citizen or federal or provincial government. If the law in question was found to be unIslamic, the new dispensation obliged the government3 to take steps to amend the law in question. Subsequently the Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court were added. Though it remains unclear whether the jurisdiction of the FSC supercedes that of the High Courts or vice-versa, 4the FSC (that includes ulema (religious scholars) with the same status as judges) is the main body for deciding the Islamic nature of laws and provisions; it is the court of appeals for cases under the ‘shariat laws’. And, even though non-Muslims can and are prosecuted under these laws, only Muslims can serve on the FSC, the High Court Shariat Benches and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. Hudood Ordinances & Qanun-Shahdat The Shariat Benches were to facilitate the newly promulgated and infamous Hudood Ordinances (1979). Other laws introduced critical to social exclusion are the new law of evidence (Qanun-e-Shahdat) and the law of qisas & diyat. Hastily promulgated on 22nd February 1979, the Hudood Ordinances cover theft, drunkenness, sexual offences under the zina and zina-bil-jabr sections; and bearing false witness (qafz) in separate sections. For women, the Zina (Enforcement of Hadd) Ordinance is unquestionably the worst of the discriminatory laws. The law protects rapists from maximum punishment, allows a rape victim to be sentenced for zina when the proof against the accused is insufficient, and negates statutory rape by making females culpable of zina at puberty (hence girls as young as 9 have been prosecuted under the law). Other problems of the zina section arise from contradictions between it and the marriage & divorce laws. Divorced women who remarry have been imprisoned and prosecuted under this law along with their new husbands by former husbands, most commonly because the vast majority of marriages and divorces are still not registered and conducted orally but also due to other technicalities. President if the law was a federal matter or Governor in case of a provincial matter law For the innumerable amendments see Makhdoom Ali Khan The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1996; for an analysis of the impact see Nausheen Ahmad in Shaping Women’s Lives (ed Farida Shaheed et. al. 4 3 4 Non-Muslims are not exempted from the purview of the sexual offences under the Hudood Ordinances, regardless of what their personal laws may say but non-Muslims cannot provide evidence against a Muslim being prosecuted for hadd or maximum sentence; maximum punishments for zina and rape can only be given if the witnesses belong to the same religion as the accused; a non-Muslim cannot serve as a judge in cases relating to the new laws; and a nonMuslim counsel cannot appear if the accused is/are Muslim(s). Over and above this, by making any extra-martial intercourse into a crime against the state, the Zina Section gives unlimited scope for the police and public at large to launch criminal complaints. The law presumes guilt rather than innocence of the accused, and is frequently used by men to punish women they have divorced, and by others as a tool of harassment. That most of the cases are false and/or malefide and that most victims are women, is evident from the statement of the former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Justice Mohammad Afzal Zullah, who confirmed that 95% of all Hudood cases in the superior courts had been decided in favour of women.5 Importantly, even when sentences are finally overturned by superior courts, the accused have already been socially condemned and stigmatised apart from being traumatised. A number of those accused have had to leave their homes, change their names and re-settle elsewhere. The Hudood Ordinances are responsible for the bulk of imprisoned women in Pakistan. (HRCP: 96) Under the law, qazf - pertaining to false accusations - is a separate law and criminal proceedings need to be launched afresh for this to apply. It has almost never been implemented. The laws have caused so much injustice that the Federal Shariat Court was: “…constrained to make observations that such reckless allegations are being brought so frequently that something should be done to stop this unhealthy practice. The prosecution agencies before putting people on trail for offences of zina on flimsy allegations should be mindful of injunctions of the Holy Qur’an and the message conveyed through the decisions from the early period of pious Caliphs.” [1991 Pakistan Criminal Law Journal 568 FSC] The law of evidence (Qanun-e-Shahadat) 1984 holds that, when reduced to writing, matters relating to future and financial obligations would require the testimony of two male witnesses, failing which one man and two women. In matters covered by the Hudood Ordinances and the new law of evidence (Qanun-e-Shahdat 1984), the evidence of both non-Muslims and women is considered less reliable than that of a Muslim male regardless of other individual credentials (education and sight or hearing for instance), yet the punishment they receive is equivalent. Hence by implication all non-Muslims as well Muslim women are reduced to legal minors in terms of rights while maintaining their adult status in matters of punishments. Though the exact implications of the Qanun-eShahadat remain unclear, it has prevented women corporate lawyers from signing contracts for fear these may be contested as invalid on the basis of their signature. Qisas & Diyat The law of Qisas and Diyat (retribution and blood money) 1990 is a direct outcome of the powers granted to the FSC and the Shariat Appelate Bench of the Supreme Court to rule on the Islamic nature of a law. Covering all offences against the body (assault, grievous injury and murder), the law came into effect through a presidential ordinance (Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance VII of 1990) after a FSC ruling held existing legal provisions to be unIslamic. It was neither debated nor passed by parliament (in fact Benazir’s government unsuccessfully appealed against the ruling of the FSC). 6 The law of qisas and diyat is inequitable both in terms of statutory provisions as well as practical application. It is specifically detrimental to the rights of women and the poor and in many ways has made murder a saleable commodity. First, it has introduced the idea that it is up to those affected (as victims or heirs) to forgive, prosecute for compensation (qisas) or settle for compensation (diyat). As such the new law seriously diminishes the state’s control and responsibility over serious offences against the person and property. Second, the law introduces new The Muslim, Islamabad, March 9, 1993 See Hassam Qadir Shah “The Law of Qisas & Diyat” pp. 253-267 in Shaping Women’s Lives – Laws Practices and Strategies in Pakistan Farida Shaheed et al (eds) Shirkat Gah; Lahore:1998. It finally became an Act on April 4, 1997. 6 5 5 categorizations of murder with different punishments. Hence the same crime of intentional murder (qatl-e-amd) can be punished with death (qisas) death or life imprisonment (tazir) or up to 25 years imprisonment when qisas is not applicable. Under the law qisas is not applicable when the offender is a minor, when the offender causes the death of his child or grandchild; when any wali (legal heir) of the victim is a direct descendant of the offender (Section 306 PPC) or when the wali voluntarily without duress, to the satisfaction of the court, waives the right of qisas (Section 307 (1).7 Hence murders within the family are largely excluded from the purview of qisas, reinforcing the notion that all kinds of violence within the family including murders is a personal matter for the family to decide rather a crime that the state must pursue as a responsibility. It also impedes the role of the judiciary by allowing a non-judicial process for negotiating compromises that are clearly susceptible to pressure from the stronger party. In short the new laws impede justice in cases where the victim and murderer are both from the same family and also in cases where the victim is poor. The most immediate impact has been felt in so-called ‘honour crimes’ where the offender is inevitably a family member who is also the legal heir of the victim – mostly women. Further, to avoid retribution, families have been known to forward a minor son (automatically exempt from the death sentence or life imprisonment) as the alleged offender in murders of family women. The courts have almost inevitably prosecuted the death of a woman at the hands of her husband under sections carrying lesser punishment, reinforcing the lesser value placed on a woman’s life. The law’s only positive amendment i.e. that of eliminating the concept of grave and sudden provocation as a mitigating circumstance for lighter punishment (as repugnant to Islam) has largely been ignored by the courts that have reintroduced it through their judgments.8 Thus under both the Hudood Ordinances and for Qisas and Diyat, crimes and culpability are now differentiated not just on the basis of the nature of the crime but also on the identity of the victim and offender. Under Zia the power of the judiciary was systematically undermined, not only by instituting parallel shariat courts but also by establishing military courts (later emulated by civilian governments though Special Terrorist Courts), and by introducing new procedures that ensured that the regime could appoint judges of its own liking and relieve less amenable judges of their duties. Over and above the specifics of modified laws, the unprecedented projection and legitimacy accorded the discourse of the religious right by the state encouraged conservative judgments in the judiciary. The trend was hugely bolstered in 1990 with the insertion of Article 2A making the Objectives Resolution a substantive part of the constitution. Allowing individual interpretations of religious injunctions to over-ride the content of the law and legal precedent, it legally opened the door for essentially reactionary and often bigoted views on women and minorities in court proceedings under the cover of Islam. The result is court decisions that have questioned such basics as a woman’s right to free choice in marriage and to mobility in direct contradiction to the rights provided under the Constitution and other legislation.9 Blasphemy Laws and Political Apartheid Blasphemy Laws 7 Section 310 also precludes qisas when the offender dies before sentence can be carried out or the wali dies and the offender himself becomes the person to decide the matter because the legal heir has died. One category of unintentional murder (qatl-bis-sabab) precludes imprisonment of any kind. 8 See 1992 PCrLJ 1596; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law vs. S. Gul Hassan Khan, PDL 1989 SC 633. 9 Justice Cheema of the Lahore High Court on September 25 1997 while disposing of writ petition No. 1301/96 (Mst. Ayesha Ijaz vs SHO) and writ petition no. 1195/96 (Mst. Shabina Zafar vs SHO and others) ruled that marriage contracted by a Muslim woman without consent of a wali (guardian) is void. Bringing into question constitutional clauses of equality (Article 25) and freedom of movement (Article 15). Fortunately, the Supreme Court granted a stay against this decision & accepted petition for appeal. Similar arguments were forwarded in the Saima Waheed case in the High Court ruling by Justice Ramday (PLD 1997 Lahore 301). 6 For non-Muslims the most pernicious legal change is the amendment to Section 295 of the Pakistan Penal Code, popularly known as the ‘blasphemy laws’, that vastly increased the scope of the previous offence to include unverifiable presumptions of intent. The new Section 295(c) reads: Whosoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death. Section 295(c) is inherently unjust because it fails to define the boundaries of law within which citizens are expected to live and fails to accord any significance to motive so that anything can be construed as derogatory. Further, through a subsequent amendment, the offence now carries a mandatory death sentence. The state’s institutions utterly fail to protect those accused under this section and a number of under trial Christians have been murdered in jail (others have been killed as they left the premises of the High Court). Those killed include Muslims. The law has been most frequently used against teachers – Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Persons accused of blasphemy find it difficult to find lawyers willing to take on their case, judges are often intimidated. In the famous Salamat Masih case in 1995, in which 3 Christians wrongly accused of blasphemy in Punjab were acquitted, one of the judges was later murdered. Little wonder then that many judges are reluctant to hear these cases. The existence of the law has also been used to intimidate, harass and blackmail people. Separate Electorates In terms of political space and national policy-making processes, the most damaging legislation was the constitutional amendment that introduced separate electorates for non-Muslims in 1985 (though, surprisingly enough, the seats for women in the national assembly were doubled and those for minorities increased from 6 to 10). The constituencies for these seats were nation-wide rendering impossible any linkage between the electorate and representatives. Debarred from voting with Muslim neighbours and obliged to vote for candidates they had never seen, minorities were neglected by the Muslim representatives elected from their own areas of residence yet unable to access ‘their own’ representatives. This further excluded already marginalized non-Muslims from development benefits and access to state benefits and provided legal grounds for social apartheid. Other Legal and Policy Measures excluding non-Muslims & Women Under Zia, strictures against the Ahmedi community multiplied. Pakistan became the only Muslim society which made it a crime for certain people to recite the kalma (Muslim creed), call their places of worship mosques, invoke the name of Allah. Absurdly, the word ‘nikah’ (marriage) was forbidden for use except by those the state defined as Muslim. These apparently insignificant changes greatly encouraged zealots to violently target the Ahmedis in their homes, places of worship, education and work. In the context of the growing intolerance starting with Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, the law seemingly unleashed the most base instincts, encouraging acts of wanton violence and intolerance by bigoted sections of society while paralyzing the saner ones. In educational institutions, religious studies (deeniyat) were replaced by Islamiyat as a compulsory subject and extended to higher educational institutions (beyond tenth grade). While non-Muslims are not obliged to attend this course, few institutions have the wherewithal to offer the theoretical alternative of religious studies. Many nonMuslims end up opting for Islamiyat. Knowledge of Islamiyat is tested (orally and through a written test) for admissions to higher education, including the technical sciences, but more importantly starting in the early 1980s, passing the Islamiyat test in the entrance examinations became compulsory for all public sector jobs. Also, if students are not obliged to attend Islamiyat, they cannot so easily opt out of assemblies and school functions that have all adopted the practice of beginning with Qur’anic verses as, in fact, have all state institutions and many non-state institutions and actors following Zia’s introduction of this in official meetings and the national carrier PIA. It would be a mistake to dismiss these seemingly cosmetic changes as only minor irritants, for they project a view of what the state considers appropriate, installing a new rigidity and putting those who differ on the defensive. With respect to women, the notion of a Pakistani woman with that of an ‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’ woman who was to 7 dress in a particular manner, be educated - if at all - preferably segregated in certain subjects, and be largely invisible. In a country where over 90% of the population is Muslim, the rules set up for Muslim women also impacted the lives of non-Muslims. Measures included the hiatus in the recruitment and promotion of women bankers and in foreign postings of women in the Foreign Office, the exclusion of sportswomen from international events, the obligation on public sector women employees and girls and teachers in public schools to wear the chaddor. (Over the years these have been reversed or lost enforcement.) State controlled media, government directives, martial law ordinances and regulations both encouraged and legitimized the most reactionary elements of society. Amongst these, the legitimacy provided to conservative politico-religious parties has had far reaching consequences for women, minorities and the general polity. Under Zia, the discourse of these groups - if not always the actions - had full state backing, and they succeeded in shifting the parametres of the discourse both in general political terms and also specifically with respect to women and minorities, towards the right and towards intolerance. Political parties share in the blame through their lack of political commitment to democratic norms and inclusiveness. Sectarianism and related violence grew as different groups vied with each other for the mantle of religious leadership. Minority women who joined protests against the laws proposed and passed by the military regime’s Islamization campaign, were told in no uncertain terms by the state’s law enforcing agencies that they had no business pronouncing opinions on, or participating in ‘Islamic’ matters. This, even though the laws so passed would affect them as well.10 The period put a stop to the movements to improve the basic personal status laws that in any case curtail women’s spaces and contribute to social exclusion. Personal Status Law and Women For the Muslim majority, personal status laws discriminate against women primarily in terms of inheritance (where daughters receive half-shares of their brothers), and in terms of divorce since the man has unfettered rights to divorce his wife without judicial intervention (talaq), while the wife’s divorce is mostly through court (khula, mubarat and judicial divorce). There are also numerous problems in the application of the laws, including procedures that put women at a disadvantage – but these are too numerous to deal with here. In any case the far more important social exclusion results from a complete ignorance of the law and its provisions. Also it needs to be said that until 1997, personal status law did not apply to sizeable areas of Pakistan i.e. those defined as PATA and FATA. FATA is still precluded from the laws of Pakistan so that none of the existing personal status laws apply. There is no requirement or procedure for registering marriages or divorces, nor do civil courts exist in FATA with obvious implications for all citizens. Those who need certification of their marriage (e.g. civil and military personnel to be eligible for residence and other benefits) need to apply directly to the office of the Political Agent for this. Though the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO) was promulgated in 1961, (and accorded constitutional protection from repeal and challenge except through parliament)11 the reality is that the vast majority of Pakistanis – men as well as women –are ignorant about the law. Marriages as well as divorces remain oral and unregistered despite the MFLO. In fact, divorce is unheard of in many parts of the country, forcing women to endure even abusive marriages. The positive provisions of the law – even those of the basic nikahnama (marriage contract form) - are therefore also unknown. Amongst these is the delegated right of divorce (talaq-e-tafweez) that gives women the same rights – without judicial process – to exercise divorce as their husbands, the documentation of the amount of dower (haq-meher), as well as the right to include other conditional clauses into the marriage contract. Even when the nikahnama is filled and registered, the vast majority of women – including well-educated women from well-off families – remain ignorant of the contents and are most often not included in the marriage 10 YWCA women who participated in a women’s demonstration in Lahore (February 12th, 1983) protesting the proposed law of evidence were visited by both the police and intelligence agencies an told to refrain from these demonstrations in the future. See Two Steps Forward One Step Back ? Women of Pakistan – Khawar Mumtaz & Farida Shaheed. Zed Books London & Vanguard Books Lahore 1986. 11 Although MFLO sections were challenged in 1993 in the FSC that in 2002 struck down Section 4 entitling children of pre-deceased parents to inherit from their grandparents and Sections 7(3) and Section 7(5) pertaining to divorce. The matter is before the Supreme Court. 8 negotiations. One survey indicates that over 80 percent of rural women and 66% of urban women are not even consulted in the decision of who they shall marry – despite this being an absolute right under law for a women over 18 years of age.12 Nor are they aware of legal provisions such as the Option of Puberty that allows a woman who has been married off by her parents at a younger age to cancel the marriage on reaching maturity (providing the marriage is not consummated). Yet the most serious impediment is customs that, prevailing over law, impede women’s access to whatever legal rights do exist. For example, although courts have systematically supported a woman’s inheritance rights and dismissed any promises made to brothers etc for foregoing inheritance share, the number of cases reaching court is minimal compared to other aspects of law.13 Again in the matter of custody of children, courts have inevitably held the child’s interest to be paramount, yet few women are aware of the possibility of justice through the courts.14 In some areas, the local population is in any case unable to access the judiciary because of opposition from the local elite that insists that all matters be resolved in non-formal forums of adjudication i.e. the jirga (NWFP and other Pakhtuns areas of residence) waderas (Sindh), sardars (Balochistan) or panchayats (Punjab). Non-Muslim Women - Doubly Disadvantaged The social exclusion of non-Muslim women depends largely on the position of their communities as a whole. Hindu women, concentrated in parts of Sindh that are marginalized, are most excluded from both development benefits and national processes. Indicative of the distance between the Hindu community and the state, their personal status laws remained uncodified and have been administered according to usage and custom. Though Caste Hindus (upper class/caste) settle their own affairs informally, Scheduled Caste Hindus have started approaching the Family Courts (set up in 1964) on matters of divorce, maintenance, restitution of conjugal rights, and custody. They plead on the basis of custom and usage their community. Christians with better education are somewhat better off. Though their share in population is about the same as Hindus, they have always been far more visible in the national polity both because of historical factors and because they are concentrated in Punjab and in Karachi. However as the most visible non-Muslim group, Christians suffered the greatest set-back during the Zia era. In any case Christian laws governing personal status matters have remained static since the 19th century. Moreover, divorce - largely restricted to grounds of adultery - became virtually impossible after the introduction of the Hudood Ordinances (discussed above). Better educated and more affluent, women from the tiny well-knit Parsi community, have managed to overcome social exclusion within their community most but they suffer the social exclusion as a group. Though no formal legal reform has taken place, the community takes its lead from the Parsi community in Bombay where case law has introduced improvements. One result of the increasingly aggressive ‘Islamic’ state under Zia was that minority women put their demands for legal reform in personal status law on the back-burner in order to present a united face of the community vis-a-vis the state. Conclusion Introduced by Zia, ‘Islamization’ is firmly entrenched. The Eighth Constitutional Amendment - a precondition for a return to a facade of democracy in 1985 - indemnified all previous actions of the martial law. Laws and Ordinances discriminating against women and minorities are exempted from being challenged in court (they can only be reversed by an act of parliament). The legacy is equally damaging in terms of social environment. Structural modifications and new parametres for social norms redefining society, permeated the entire edifice of the state and seeped into civil society to water the 12 Farida Shaheed: Imagined Citizenship: Women, State & Politics in Pakistan; Shirkat Gah. Lahore: 2002 13 Kamran Arif & Shaheen Sardar Ali ‘The Law of Inheritance and Reported Case Law Relating to Women’ pp. 163-180 in Shaheed et. al. (eds) op.cit.1998 14 Shaheen Sardar Ali & Mohammad Nadeem Azam “Custody & Guardianship: Case Law 1947-97” pp. 143-162 in Shaheed et al (eds.) 1998 op. cit. 9 roots of the worst bigotry. If previously, open discrimination - to say nothing of violence - was considered politically incorrect, even that modicum of restraint was swept away. After Zia the state’s official policy on women changed from one of aggressive hostility to a more liberal viewpoint. But support has been defensive and hedged by frequent references to Islam that allow far more space to politicoreligious elements of the right than is warranted. If women are more visible than before, democracy failed to curb the bigotry against non-Muslims who, as a whole, are excluded from the ruling elites. The emigration of upper class and upper middle class Christians and other non-Muslims accelerated under Zia years obliging non-Muslims to rely almost exclusively on what support can be mobilized amongst civil society and the political parties. The latter have proved to be unreliable allies for, on the question of Islam, major political parties more or less accepted the terms of discourse and politics set by the state. Most were anxious to indicate that they, too, were Islamic while none was capable of presenting an alternative vision of Islam. Hopes that democracy would greatly facilitate (if not automatically lead to) a more reasoned and just environment have not necessarily been justified. The failure of successive governments since 1988 to overturn even the worst of the laws enacted under Zia are evidence of this. Attesting to just how deeply entrenched the social exclusion of nonMuslims became and the extent to which the politico-religious parties succeeded in shifting the political discourse and social environment, is the fact that no elected government was able to reverse the constitutional amendment that provided for separate electorates. This was finally overturned in the 2002 general elections by the new military government under General Musharaf (Though the electoral rolls for Ahmedis were still printed separately for unknown reasons.). Nor did political governments restore women’s reserved seats in the assemblies (that had lapsed after the 1988 general elections – see Shaheed 2002) or accede to the demand for 33% reservation of seats for women. This too was left to the military regime of General Musharaf who introduced 33% seats for women in local government thanks to which some 40,000 women have been elected to office in the 2000-2001 elections. The government restored a greatly enhanced number of reserved seats for women in the assemblies (60 in the National Assembly) and for the first time introduced reserved seats for women in the Senate. Religious intolerance has also not abated. Violence against non-Muslims (as well as sectarian violence) has continued such as the appalling pogrom-style riot in south Punjab in 1997 when the Christian community was targeted in the ironically named Shantinagar (a place of peace) 15, or the more recent 2002 attacks on the Murree Christian Missionary school and the Idara Amn-o-Insaf office in Karachi. In Murree, attackers indiscriminately sprayed the school’s playground with automatic fire weapons, (luckily children had mostly gone back into school after the break) leading to its temporary closure and the departure of all foreign national children. In Karachi all workers inside the Idara were awaited and then shot dead – no apparent reason has been identified. In all cases the violence has been unprovoked and aimed at terrorizing non-Muslims. Sectarian and other violence is at least partially caused by the frustrations of people having to deal with a state that seems to have abandoned much of its responsibilities and an economic and social structure that has little room for fulfilling economic desires and potential. As long as the economy continues to be in the complete shambles it is, there will be minimal scope for a nurturing of tolerance and social inclusion for anyone. 10 References Shaheed Farida, Sohial Akbar Warraich, Cassandra Balchin & Aisha Gazdar (eds) Hassam Qadir Shah Shaping Women’s Lives – Laws, Practices & Strategies in Pakistan. Shirkat Gah Lahore:1998 Shaheen Sardar Ali & Kamran Arif Kamran Arif &: Shaheen Sardar Ali Farida Shaheed: Shahla Zia &: Farzana Bari Shirkat Gah “Reflections on the Law of Qisas and Diyat” pp. 253-270 in Shaping Women’s Lives – Laws, Practices & Strategies in Pakistan; (eds) Farida Shaheed et. al. Shirkat Gah; Lahore:1998 “Parallel Judicial Systems in Pakistan and Consequences for Human Rights” pp. 29-60 in Shaping Women’s Lives – Laws, Practices & Strategies in Pakistan; (eds) Farida Shaheed et. al. Shirkat Gah; Lahore:1998 ‘The Law of Inheritance and Reported Case Law Relating to Women’ pp. 163-180 in Shaping Women’s Lives – Laws, Practices & Strategies in Pakistan; (eds) Farida Shaheed et. al. Shirkat Gah; Lahore:1998 Imagined Citizenship: Women, State & Politics in Pakistan; Shirkat Gah. Lahore: 2002 Baseline Report on Women’s Participation in Politics & Public Life in Pakistan, Aurat Publication and Information Service Foundation. Islamabad: 1999. Women’s Rights in Muslim Family Law in Pakistan – 45 years of recommendations vs. the FCS Judgement (January 2000) 11 Annex 2: Gender and Social Exclusion in Pakistan Khawar Mumtaz Introduction Social exclusion manifests itself through the active exclusion of particular groups from political life, education, employment, health care, access to justice and so on, including the social exclusion of women. A general conclusion by poor analysts in the Pakistan Participatory Assessment sites was that it is largely the poor who are excluded from social and economic opportunities, pointing to the imperative of addressing both the symptoms and causes of poverty to end the social exclusion of a large number of Pakistanis from participating in decision making for themselves. There is a consensus, substantiated by statistical evidence that poverty in Pakistan has been on the rise since the early nineties. Without going into the debate over percentages of population living below the poverty line,16 or what constitutes the poverty line17, the fact of widespread poverty in the country cannot be denied. The regional variations in intensity and rural-urban differentials are also well established. The World Bank’s poverty assessment study18 characterises rural poverty as “stagnant” and Dr. Akmal Hussain’s 19as “systemic” with local social/power relations playing a powerful role in keeping the poor where they are. The Pakistan Participatory Poverty Assessment confirms the strong role of the dichotomies in social relationships in entrenching deprivation at the local level. The impact of poverty on women may be extrapolated from the country's social indicators that paint a rather dismal picture. There are still 48.1 females to 100 literate males (Census 1998). Female primary school enrollment stands at 74 girls to 100 boys. The level of anemia is higher among females. Maternal mortality rate of 340 per 100,000 is lower than that of other South Asian countries, and female labour force participation rate is at a low of 13.6% (Census 1998). While there is a growing volume of literature on different aspects of women's lives in Pakistan very few attempts to capture women's perspectives regarding poverty and the way it intertwines with the complex sociocultural realities of their life experiences have been made. The Pakistan Participatory Assessment (2002) represents perhaps the first systematic attempt to capture people’s perceptions and analysis, including those of the poor and very poor women from different ages across Pakistan (51 carefully selected districts of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan, FATA, and FANA) about their poverty. The PPA confirms the vulnerability of poor households to “a wide range of adverse shocks … trends … and seasonal cycles”, also that “women are much worse off” and that social exclusion as manifested in the political, economic, social and cultural experience is as much a consequence of poverty as one of its causes. Women’s exclusion was highlighted across the PPA sites. Women were found to have no say in decision-making and were subject to domestic and other forms of physical and sexual violence and harassment in both urban and rural sites. They recorded an increasing sense of physical insecurity. Gender inequalities in health (also RH facilities), education, decision-making, lack of right of inheritance, food, right of speaking, freedom of mobility and choice of spouse were common to all sites. There was also a sense of helplessness among women even though they contribute in some cases substantially to household income. Power and Powerlessness …"more than one-third of the total households in the country…with…close to 40% for the rural areas." According to the Asian Development Bank. ADB Poverty Assessment for Pakistan. 2001 17 Nutritional levels or basic needs including what Amritya Sen calls basic capabilites. For a summary of the approaches used for determining poverty levels in Pakistan, see SDPC, Social Development in Pakistan; Annual Review 2000. p.28 18 Pakistan Poverty Assessment; Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics. Document of the World Bank. October 2002 19 Dr. Akmal Hussain et al, National Human Development Report, Pakistan. UNDP. Islamabad. 2003 16 12 Social exclusion, as perceived by men and women in the PPA sites is related to powerlessness. The powerless, according to PPA analysts, are those who suffer from multiple vulnerabilities because of being poor, widowed, aged, illiterate, lower caste, ethnic or religious minority, female, etc. On the other hand the basis of power is linked to belonging to an influential family, being rich, owning assets, being male, etc. Local power relations play a central role in shaping poor people’s lives. The strong concentration of power, exercised since generations, is a general feature of influence and control according to PPA analysts. From the perspective of the poor the powerful and the influential are the main hurdle in the way of overcoming poverty because they control all resources. In most rural sites a handful of individuals appears to make all major decisions, resolve internal conflicts and act as the interface with higher authorities. In Sindh, it is the local sardar/wadera on the basis of landed wealth; in Baluchistan the individual sardar or a clan/tribe because of ownership of land, mines or public office; possession of weapons and capacity to harass others in NWFP; and religious authority combined with large landholding in Punjab. Even in urban areas land/property was regarded as a key source of power, although financial capital and the middleman traders (arhtis) are seen to have power in the market. Men were identified as more powerful compared to women in all PPA sites as the sole decision makers in households. However, the power of the rich and influential over the poor overtakes the power men have over women. As women in Chah Innow (Punjab) said: Rights are for the rich where men have more rights than women, rich women have more rights than poor men and poor women have fewer rights than poor men. The powerless are actively excluded from most community decision-making processes including politics, education, employment, health care, access to justice and social events. The degree of exclusion, however, has location specific variations. In Punjab, social exclusion in the PPA sites was primarily based on class distinction. The very poor/poor and people of low caste in hereditary occupational groups of barbers, cobblers, potters, etc. (kammis) are ignored in all the sites from community related decision-making, social gatherings and benefits of health and education services and political participation. Even when educated they are not accepted for participation in community level decision-making processes because of their class. Caste, tribal and religious identification were causes of discrimination of the poor and their isolation from the mainstream in Balochistan. In Joisar (Panjgur), the poor community was considered low caste in the eyes of the elite for “god had created them as low born”, therefore not eligible for benefits and rights. The zikris in Gawadar felt marginalised and subject to antagonism and attack as a result of their religious beliefs. In NWFP besides the exclusion on the basis of occupation (cobblers, etc.) conflict between clans sometimes lead to isolation. The exploitative and exclusionary relationship between landless (haris) and the large landowners (zamindars) was the distinctive feature of Sindh whereas in FANA ethnicity (Dome and Gujjar) was the basis of exclusion from mainstream village affairs and political processes. Gender based exclusion, in addition to poverty based social exclusion, prevail across the board with regional variations in the degree of control exercised over women mediated by their age, caste and class. The Social Exclusion of Women The social exclusion of women belonging to the powerless groups is compounded by their gender rendering them doubly disadvantaged and vulnerable. The basis of gender relations in Pakistan is the deep-rooted ideology of dominant-subordinate relationship between men and women whereby women are consistently denied inheritance rights, adequate food, freedom of expression, freedom of mobility, participation in community activities and say in the choice of spouse. They have none or minimal role in decision-making, do not have access to education, health care, or political and financial institutions. Women’s place in the family hierarchy and relationships within the home combine with the socially prescribed gendered division of roles to determine their levels of exclusion in both the private (household) and public spheres. The PPA reconfirms the above, at the same time giving insights to the local and regional nuances in the way gender relations are played out. Generally, the majority of women analysts viewed itself as dependent, voiceless, discriminated against and violated. The exceptions were: the educated women of a very few families in NWFP who enjoyed some say in decision-making related to children’s education (but are required to observe strict purdah); similar women in Balochistan whose decision-making powers were greater than those of poor men. Ismaili women 13 of Imit (District Ghizer of FANA) with higher participation levels in decision-making on household and personal matters than the women of minority ethnic groups (dome, gujjars); the rich and better off women in Punjab with greater access to education and employment, and sometimes of choice in marriage. And some affluent women in Sindh who have become more active in elected local bodies. Older women, it was found across the PPA sites, experience relaxation of controls, are consulted in household decisions, and exercise authority over younger women of the household. But they are not in a position to defy or go against male decisions, as a man pointed out in Kharan, “Whether women belong to a rich or poor family they do not have a right to make decisions.” The PPA underscores the fact that even if the condition of women may have improved in some places their social position has remained largely unchanged. Structures of Subordination Subordination of women that leads to their exclusion is effected in a number of institutionalised ways: Gender defined roles whereby from an early age, girls and boys learn that there are clear differences in their respective roles and responsibilities and the spaces within which these may be performed. Roles prescribed for both rural and urban women are largely in the domestic (private) space and consist of activities to fulfill the physical needs of the family i.e. cooking, washing, taking care of the home and its maintenance, livestock, children and other family members and craft production. In the public sphere their activities are confined to support activities like preparing seed-beds, thin maize crops, apply fertiliser, make dung cakes, weed and hoe, store harvests, grind grain or pick cotton. Permitted activities outside the house, generally includes livestock care including grazing and cutting grass for fodder, collecting fuel, medicinal herbs and fetching water. Seclusion and segregation go hand in hand with gendered role definition. Through the institution of purdah women’s mobility to remain within the prescribed paprametres is maintained. Thus there access to public facilities like schools and health care and financial and political institutions is restricted. Even in metropolitan Karachi women of Baldia Town felt that “religion,” the stigma attached to working and the issue of protecting their honour restricted their mobility. The rise in the influence of the Taliban and the mullahs in FATA (where women’s mobility has traditionally been acutely constrained) the situation has further worsened. Women are not only unable to access health services but are now restricted even from grazing cattle. Without mobility, a critical measure of women’s empowerment, women’s access to educational and health/reproductive health facilities and employment opportunities is severely curtailed. Given the primacy of health in the well being of the poor (indeed poor health emerged as the most critical human capital issue, more than education, for the PPA participants and was highlighted in the above mentioned Hussain study as well PPA) the unavailability and women’s lack of access to RH facilities where they exist become critical. Customary practices, sanctioned by tradition, custom or culture reduces women to the status of property or even commodities, owned by men to be bought and sold according to their wishes. Practices include walvar, dunia, and zhup (bride price) in Balochistan, FATA and FANA respectively (the prices range from Rs.10000 to 150,000); mismatches and exchange marriages; and the so-called protection of family “honour” or izzat. Called karo kari in parts of Sindh, kala kali in southern Punjab, and spin thore in South Waziristan (FATA) it involves the killing of the woman and man in a real or alleged adulterous relationship to restore the izzat of the families. The practice is widespread in most parts of NWFP and a woman marrying a man of her choice can lose her life. In other parts of the province, like Dera Ismail Khan, cases of elopement are settled by giving one to two young women or cash to the family of the eloped girl as compensation. Not giving birth to a male child can result in the husband’s remarriage or forcing the wife into an exchange marriage with an older or an already married man. Claims about honour are used in Sindh as a device to get money, with accusations of adultery serving financial gain. The fear of these practices, render women silent and unable to fulfil their aspirations or potential. Lack of assets, generally women are denied the right to inherit family land and other assets. This is true of women even in educated and well off families, and especially of poor women in all PPA sites in relation to productive 14 livelihood assets such as land, forests, house, money, etc. Even where women have legal rights over land and forests, for example, they have equal rights in forest royalty in rural Swat they are unable to exercise control over the use and benefits of their share. Neither do women have a say over the use of dowries that they receive at the time of marriage. In fact dowries in Punjab have become a bargaining chip for arranging suitable marriages. Given that power is seen as a factor of assets/land/wealth the lack of these not only makes women dependent on male relatives but also reduces their say in decision-making at the household as well as the community level. Violence against women is imbedded in customary practices as a mechanism to ensure women’s subordination and degradation. Women teachers of Quetta likened walwar to slavery that left a woman helpless to face the cruel behaviour of in-laws and beatings of her husband that can lead to death that in turn is never reported. The practice of bride price in FANA often compels women to commit suicide, and karo kari in Sindh as discussed above is a major form of violence against women and a real and serious threat to the lives of many women. The custom of childhood marriages was seen as responsible for the unusually high presence of divorces and suicides among women in FANA. Domestic violence, sexual harassment and the fear of both were widespread among women in the PPA sites. Domestic violence against women and children was found to be very common in NWFP and Sindh and considered acceptable both by men and women. In Punjab any lapse in what is seen as women’s prescribed role invites the wrath of men in the family. In Tharparkar, in Quetta, and equally elsewhere women victims of domestic violence have no recourse to justice and often do not get support from their own families. Women belonging to the Hindu community in Sindh, not having the option of divorce are driven to suicide by poisoning or drowning and in Punjab too suicide is a last recourse for women suffering domestic violence. In many of the PPA sites increase in the levels of societal violence has lead to a heightened sense of insecurity and vulnerability among women pushing them further away from public spaces. Lack of information about legal, economic or political rights further reinforces women’s low status. Women are largely unaware of their rights under the law especially those related to marriage and divorce. They are equally ignorant of the administrative, financial and political systems and the availability of opportunities and services. It is an aspect of their lack of information that they do not know where to turn when they are wronged or abused, like the women in Goth Pachan Mori, Sindh, who complained of their earnings from cotton and chilli picking being manipulated downwards. Similar manipulation was reported in other areas too both by men and women. The fact that they lack even basic education means that women’s access to information remains limited and their social exclusion unchallenged. Government policies reflect and reinforce the gender discrimination prevalent in society through social and cultural practices. This is evident from inadequate girls’ secondary and high schools e.g. there was not a single woman was found to be literate in the PPA sites of five NWFP districts (Mansehra, DIK, Kohistan, Swat, Mardan), nine out of the thirty sub-sites sites of Punjab did not have functioning girls public schools, etc. Similarly, poor to non-existent reproductive health facilities across the PPA sites present evidence of government priorities. The lack of protection and justice available and accessible to women reinforces their inferior status in society as also the existence of discriminatory legislation (Hudood Ordinances, Law of Evidence, Qisas and Diyat Ordinance). Women as a rule are not included in local judicial/conflict resolution institutions like jirgas or panchayat, in fact neither are the poor. Continuity and Change Generally speaking there is continuity with reference to prescribed roles for women and mechanisms of control and hence social exclusion, particularly for the poor rural and urban women. Two kinds of changes have however occurred. One substantial one, perhaps for the worse, has been the increasing workload of women caused by the outward migration of men for off-farm employment in FANA, NWFP, and rural districts of north and south Punjab. Women are left behind to take over tasks beyond their traditionally defined responsibilities as men migrate. Child labour and bonded labour has increased in these areas. The other is the shift, largely due to spiraling poverty, in the traditional view of men being solely responsible for providing for their families. This was particularly true of Punjab where male PPA analysts acknowledged female contribution to the family income in both rural and urban areas for fulfilling livelihood needs. Women were found extensively engaged in piece rate home-based work in the sites of Multan, Faisalabad, Lahore, and Rawalpindi but 15 paid a pittance for tedious and menial work (see Box) that engaged them in varying spans of time throughout the day, in addition to their household chores. They were also found working as domestic help, their only employable skill, in the homes of the local well off in rural and urban sites. Needless to say there was no sense of empowerment experienced by the women, the added burden reportedly resulted in the deterioration of their health with not enough income for treatment. The exceptional change for the better was reported in Panjgur (Baluchistan) where both men and women said that today women live a better life as they only need to do house work like cooking or fetching water (in pitchers as opposed to goat skin), and no longer have to work in the homes of the wealthy. Box: Piece Rates Paid to Women in Faisalabad Sites • • • • • • • Sewing of gloves/socks: Rs.4 per dozen Packing of gloves/socks: Rs.1.00-1.50 per three dozen Shelling of nuts: Rs.7-10 per kilo Embroidery of dopatta: Rs.70-150 per piece including material cost Bag making: Rs.5 per dozen Sewing of chemise: Rs.20 per dozen Packing of shopper bags: Rs.5 per 1000 bags According to the community, women were better dressed now with greater number of embroidered clothes and jewelry than in the past. Given the reduction in livestock, related tasks of animal care, managing milk and milk production and weaving woolen rugs no longer need to be done. Women now are able to earn more from embroidery in their spare time and contribute to the family income. External developments that have exacerbated women’s situation and thus their exclusion are religious extremism especially in NWFP and the rise in the rate of crime and violence across all PPA sites. Religious leaders in NWFP areas of Karak, Mardan, Kohistan, South Waziristan, Swat and DIK are very influential and have control over the poor and illiterate population and oppose initiatives for women’s development or welfare and their participation in elections. Enhanced crime and violence have translated into harassment, insecurity and abuse of women. Official initiatives with possible positive impact have been the local bodies and parliamentary elections. In both instances affirmative action resulted in greater representation of women: 33% in the case of Union Councils and about 17% in parliamentary bodies. As a result there are approximately 40,000 women now in different tiers of local government and another 213 in provincial and national assemblies. Despite the inadequate space given to women so far for participation in the male dominated representative bodies this is indeed a window of opportunity for women even if some are surrogates and the majority in parliament indirectly elected. Reactions during the PPA fieldwork were mixed about the local bodies elections, yet the election of women councilors in some sites was seen as an asset. Conclusions and Recommendations The PPA reconfirms that the main cause of poverty lies in the widespread structural inequity that leads to the exclusion of the poorest from both owning and accessing assets and services and having a say in decisions that directly affect them. This perhaps has been the reason for the failure of various poverty alleviation programmes. The other important fact it highlights is that of unequal gender relations whereby women are denied opportunities and restrained from playing a full and meaningful role at the level of the household and community. It further demonstrates that social exclusion is as much a result of poverty as its cause and that women’s social exclusion is 16 systemic and integrally related to the structures of social and power relations at the levels of family, community and state. While the poor women are doubly excluded even the better and well off experience powerlessness and social exclusion. Within the family women do not own assets (financial or material) and are dependent on the husband or other male relatives. Any departure from the prescribed path may result in dire consequences ranging from violence to divorce or death. Societal norms prevent women from exercising choices as basic as education and profession to more complex ones of marriage and divorce. And the state fails in its duty to provide protection, security and opportunities instead it reinforces negative attitudes and perceptions of women by keeping discriminatory legislation on the statute books and giving retrogressive and extremist elements a free hand to threaten and impose extra legal restrictions on women. Because of the above women have been unable to carve a space at the political level and only very recently been able to give voice to their concerns. Reducing and ultimately removing poverty by addressing social exclusion is not likely to be a successful strategy. The above analysis shows that both poverty and social exclusion need to be tackled simultaneously. The provision of services (health, education, skill development), access to services (information and location, roads and transport), opportunities for income generation (employment, credit, markets), social protection through safety nets (social security, pension schemes, etc.), and access to justice will contribute to the reduction of social exclusion. But not without systemic measures to remove discriminatory laws, creation of a conducive environment to exercise the right to full political participation and representation, affirmative action to draw women into the professional and public mainstream and benefit from services. More importantly, legislative and policy action will be required to redress the structural inequity in society that enables the ownership of minimal livelihood assets to ensure their well being and inclusion in political, economic and social decision making. A viable short to medium term strategy to be implemented by appropriate government, non-government or private sector institutions would be: To build the capacity of women in local bodies to play a comprehensive role in identifying and implementing development programmes and take up women’s issues in their forums. To lobby and support the placing the issue of women’s exclusion onto the political agenda by women parliamentarians. Establish women’s shelters and halfway houses to provide them refuge when abused or violated. Provide reproductive health facilities with requisite service providers (female doctor, LHV, TBA, LHW, etc.) and emergency obstetric care facilities at the village level to deal with rising maternal mortality and other problems. Provide quality schooling for both girls and boys at primary and post-primary levels with girls’ schools within walking distance to promote enrolment and attendance. Eliminate bonded labour and ensure fair employment conditions for rural men and women. In urban areas ensure fair remuneration to women’s home based and domestic work. Launch a national community education programme on rights to make women aware of their rights and informed of existing institutions/mechanisms to protect their rights. • • • • The strategy to achieve long term goals of gender equality, and social equity will require the following measures: • Given that land is the means of social as well as food security in rural areas a land reform programme be instituted to distribute state land to the landless with priority to the traditional tillers over outsiders. In the interim landless tenants be protected through proper implementation of the Tenancy Act and those allotted land/houses in previous regimes to be given ownership right by the Revenue Department. Where agricultural land is not available land for housing be provided to the rural poor for physical security and removal of fear of displacement/ejection. Housing for the urban poor also be provided. Ensure that accessible justice based on the rule of law is applied equally to rich and poor so that the rights of the poor men and women are protected. Removal of gender based constraints/restrictions on women through the repeal of discriminatory laws and implementation of existing relevant laws (e.g. preventing child marriages, treating ‘honour” killings as murder, preventing mismatched marriages, etc.). • • • 17 • Institute measures to stop violence/harassment of women and provide security to them to enable their working away from home. Enact legislation to deal with domestic violence. 18 Annex 3: Labour and Social Exclusion Tazeen Javed Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research Introduction The realization of universally acknowledged, though relatively abstract labour rights require commitment from agencies and institutions. Historically, two such institutions have been the state and the market. In Pakistan, both of these have been woefully inadequate in ensuring the realization of both rights and labour. Those of the population linked with the state have special rights and have special services provided to them. Those who have income producing assets or skills are better off than others. The proportion of workers in formal sector compared with total workforce is marginal. Daily-wage earners, seasonal or irregularly employed workers are worse off than tenants working in agricultural sector, as the contractor or the landlord at least has some form of contractual obligation towards them. Given the generally undemocratic character of the state, its subordination to the capitalist and feudal interests, and collusion between state apparatuses and local power wielders, the implementation of existing laws and the legislation of fresh ones becomes even more difficult, and as a result, they exclude the wishes of a vast majority of the population. With every passing day, more and more people are being denied the right to food and education, right to decent work and minimum wages and social security. This is social exclusion. From a neo-liberal perspective, social exclusion is an unfortunate but inevitable side effect of global economic realignment of production and the fact that workers who were previously protected by social security and formal employment conditions at a personal level are now excluded from such benefits. Social exclusion is a process by which people are evicted from the spaces they previously occupied or are deprived of rights of access in the first place. Over a period of fifty-five years, the working people of Pakistan have categorically been denied the basic rights. Furthermore, their rights have systematically been eroded to further worsen the situation. The magnitude of exclusion of the working citizens of Pakistan is evident from the fact that total employed labour force is 35,065,662 (Labour Force Survey 2000) working in formal, informal, manufacturing, agriculture and service industries. Of them, only 150,255 (Annual Consolidated Report on the Working of Labour Laws in Pakistan 2000) were employed in the factories that were inspected by the labour department or they reported to ministry of labour for the labour conditions in their units. The rest of the workforce was excluded from any such inspection or monitoring. Another reason for social exclusion of workforce is that now less people are participating in economic activity because of economic slump. If the general participation of people in economic activities was 29.4 percent in 1997, it declined to 29 per cent in 2000. History of Labour Legislation Since the inception of Pakistan state intervention in trade union movement have been very prominent. When process of rapid industrialization took place in early 50s, state set strict parameters for the formation and functioning of trade unions with the objective of controlling and subordinating them to the need of foreign and local capital who demanded a cheap and pliant labour force to secure super profits. The trend continues and it has obviously had far reaching impact on the growth of trade unionism in Pakistan. The effective rate of unionization, by various estimates, stands around 3-5 per cent of the total industrial and commercial labour force and is fast deteriorating because of persistent informalization of the economy. Workers of the agricultural sectors are denied this right completely. It is interesting to note that every new piece of labour legislation has been more regressive than the previous one. For instance, after independence, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) adopted Trade Unions act 1926 and Industrial disputes Act 1947 relating to the right of association and collective bargaining respectively. Though enacted by the colonial masters, the laws were fairly liberal and provided basic labour rights to all workers except those employed by armed forces. In 1952, GoP enacted Pakistan Essential Services Act, which deprived the workers of most of government concerns of the right to organize and collectively bargain. In 1959, Martial Law government promulgated the Industrial Dispute Ordinance, which excluded all police personnel from the definition of workman, thus depriving them from the right to organize. It also enlarged the list of public utilities to bring in more units under 19 essential services act to deprive them the right to organize and collective bargaining. In 1969 came the Industrial Relations Ordinance and it further tightened the grip of the state over trade unions. It prescribed stricter procedures for registration and certification for trade unions to become competent enough to represent the workers. It also excluded people employed in any service installation connected with or incidental to the armed forces of Pakistan or ordinance factory maintained by central government. With the corporatization of armed forces, many units employing civilian workers have been established to produce general consumption goods such as food products. Workers in those establishments are also denied the most basic rights guaranteed not only in international conventions that Pakistan has either ratified or signed such as ILO conventions 87, 98 and 105, but also the constitution of Pakistan itself. It also excluded people other than those defined as workman working in railways, Posts, telegraph and telephone departments. The IRO 1969 was further amended in 1972 and 1974 to exclude members of security staff and all employees up to group V in Pakistan International Airlines. The IRO restrict the formation of union only to a single plant or establishment level thus effectively blocking the formation of sectoral unions as is the norm in the rest of the world, which has been the biggest obstacle in the growth of a labour movement in Pakistan. Quite interestingly, the list of prohibited unfair labour practices detailed in IRO 1969 includes “go-slow” by workers, but omits even the failure of employers to pay minimum wages. Before IRO 1969, West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968 was promulgated, under which, labour laws are enforceable partially on an outfit employing 20 – 49 workers and wholly on a unit employing over 50 workers. Similarly, Factories Act is enforceable on units employing 10 or more workers. To evade the inspection and censure (if any) of the labour directorate, the general practice is that factories hire 9 workers with an employment proof and employ 100 workers through the contractor. Employers use these legislative loopholes to escape from the provisions of the different laws. Labour Policy 2002 and Industrial Relations Ordinance 2002 The biggest stumbling block that the labour movement had to face came in last year when IRO 2002 was promulgated and a new labour policy was proposed. Industrial Relations Ordinance of Pakistan, 2002, which came to replace the Industrial Relations Ordinance of Pakistan of 1969, was imposed by the Government without taking into account proposals and suggestions made by the trade unions, as well as those made jointly by workers and employers at the level of the Workers’ and Employers’ Bilateral Council of Pakistan and is highly restrictive contrary to ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 on right of association and collective bargaining and these conventions are also ratified by the government of Pakistan. The discrepancies between the IRO of 2002 and the conventions are numerous such as restrictions on the right of workers – without distinction whatsoever – to establish and join organizations; restriction on the right of workers’ organizations to establish and join federation and confederations; interference in the internal affairs of trade unions and federations of trade unions; restrictions on the right to strike; heavy penalties imposed on trade union officers for committing unfair labor practices; insufficient protection afforded to workers against acts of anti-union discrimination; inefficient labour judiciary system and insufficient mechanisms for collective bargaining. In addition, some more establishments are expressly excluded from the scope of the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 2002 such as Bata Shoes company, when supplying shoes to the armed forces; Pakistan Security Printing Corporation; Pakistan Security Papers Ltd.; Pakistan Mint; Establishment or institutions maintained for the treatment, care of sick, infirm, destitute and mentally unfit persons; Institutions established for payment of employees’ old-age pensions or workers’ welfare; Members of Watch and Ward, Security and Fire Services Staff of an oil refinery, or establishments engaged in the production, transmission or distribution of natural gas or liquefied petroleum gas or petroleum products or of a seaport and airport; railways, when used for defence purposes; and administration of the state, which hardly leaves anything in the gamut of law. The law is so faulty and so favourable for exclusion of workers that a production unit that produces water coolers sought exemption from labour laws on the pretext that they provide water coolers to Pakistan Army! The new IRO also does not cover workers engaged in agriculture and does not recommend an end to the suspension of trade union rights in Karachi Electric Supply Corporation. Pakistan International Air Lines, Banks under section 27-B of the Banking Companies Ordinance of 1999 (Amended), and Export Processing Zones. 20 The new IRO runs counter to the obligation of the Government to provide to workers an adequate protection against acts of trade union discrimination. The new law empowers the Labour Court to award compensation to workers who were wrongfully dismissed, it does not provide for the power of the Court to order a reinstatement of the worker. The proposed labour policy is no different and demands that the employer should be involved in the registration of a trade union, which is going to make the establishment of any new trade union next to impossible and will also lessen the effect of ILO convention 87. The labour policy also does not address the recommendation of Tripartite Labour Conference regarding the coverage of informal sector and home based workers under whole labour legislation. It recommends only the gradual extension of welfare laws on these workers without detailing the whens and hows. The policy aims to regularize the contract system, following that, the number of workers employed on nonpermanent basis will increase. This in turn would mean that job security would be further eroded in future employment. The right of association is reserved for industrial establishment and as the term ‘establishment’ does not cover nonprofit organizations, they are also excluded from the definition of establishment, in addition to workers of informal sector, agriculture and fisheries. The workers of big private school chains, hospitals and other organizations formed under societies act will be exempted from the implementation of Industrial Relation Legislation, even though most of these concerns function as businesses with the sole aim of maximizing their profits. The right to minimum wages, which is a core labour right, remains highly restricted and no provisions are provided in relations to home based workers, informal and agriculture sector labourers. In addition, the law has been amended and the minimum age for hazardous occupations is increased to 18 years but no list that defines hazardous occupations is provided. The policy is also not clear about the appropriate measures to protect workers in case of privatization of an outfit. The policy recommends compulsory arbitration for public utilities, which means the workers would be denied the right of strike, the right of collective bargaining and the right of mobilization. Secondly, the list of public utilities is at the discretion of government. If the government wants to declare any outfit a public utility, it can do so and deny the workers their basic rights. This should be revoked and if it cannot be done, then the government should the matter to Labour standing committee to decide it. Then there are limited provisions for essential services and as stated above, the government can declare any outfit as essential services and curb the rights of workers. Protection of Rights of Workers It is a known fact that the worker now is more vulnerable than ever before. Traditionally, the most important tool of worker protection has been the trade union. In Pakistan, there has never really been a strong and vigorous trade union but over the years, their membership has decreased in ratio with population. There has been de-unionization, but the most damning influence on workers’ rights came with the informalization, privatization and fragmentation of production units and services. There are other fundamental problems and anomalies that have persisted in the Pakistan’s economy and labour market since Independence; others have become prominent in the course of the country’s development. For instance, population growth rate remains high, and one direct result of this high growth rate is an ever-increasing number of young people entering the labour market. In Pakistan, the labour force is primarily rural, at around 68 per cent, and 48.4 per cent of the labour force is directly employed by agriculture. There is a steady rural-urban migration and this is brought about by the mechanization process that came in the wake of Green Revolution, and the attractions of modernization, which was perceived as primarily urban. Unskilled workers, looking for work in the industrial sector, glut the labour market and overburden the fragile infrastructure of the large urban areas. It is, however, not increasing as rapidly as might be expected due to the urbanization of rural areas. It is also almost completely a product of informal-sector development. 21 Education, or rather lack of education exacerbates the process of exclusion, making the resources more unattainable than they previously were. The official literacy rate in 37 per cent and functional literacy is much lower than that. These factors have led to a serious un- and underemployment problem. According to the 1999-2000 Labour Force Survey, total labour force of Pakistan is 39.4 million, of them 3.1 million are unemployed. That makes 7.86 percent of the population unemployed. In addition, around 10 per cent of the population is estimated to belong to the category of disguised unemployed, that is persons who worked less than 35 hours during the reference week. If all disguised unemployed persons are included, the unemployment rate jumps to at least 17 per cent. The government is the largest employer of non-agricultural labour due to the nationalization of major industries and the service and education sectors. State employment is highly prized as it provides security of tenure and socialwelfare benefits not available elsewhere. Overseas labour migration has provided an outlet for excess labour, although it has been decreasing steadily in the last decade due to economic changes in the Gulf. This circumstance has further encouraged the growth of the informal sector. According to 1999-2000 Labour Force Survey 68 per cent of Pakistan’s non-agricultural labour force work in the informal sector. New Forms of Unprotected Workers: Informalization of the Economy The informal economy presents perhaps the biggest challenge to sustainable development. On the one hand, it is vibrant sector of the economy, labour-intensive and responsive to new needs and opportunities. On the other hand, it is largely undocumented and distorts both official statistics and existing analyses of the economy’s performance. More importantly, it escapes the government’s taxation and regulation network. The various labour laws or regulations on working conditions do not govern labour in the informal sector. This means that workers have no paid holidays, no job security, no medical cover, no pension or provident fund, no limit on the hours worked and no overtime pay. Another vital issue is the gross neglect and denial of women’s role and contribution to the economy. Official figures give incredibly low female labour-force participation rates. A World Bank report suggests that 42 per cent of the economically active persons in agricultural households are women, working primarily as unpaid family labourers. Based on the under-reporting in the rural sector, the same report suggests that a similar level of under-reporting in the urban sector may be estimated. The fact that the informal sector extends well beyond family affects the structure of the formal sector. There is a trend among employers to redirect as much work as possible to sub-contractors and daily wage earners. This both limits the application of existing legal welfare provisions and makes it difficult to register unions, as the employer can simply disown non-permanent workers. Trade Unions and the Informal Economy With more and more employers hiring day-wage temporary workers or outsourcing most of the production, a dichotomy has appeared in the labour force. Within the existing formal sector, unions have a certain degree of collective bargaining power and have been able to protect the wages and conditions of workers. Permanent workers also have a large degree of job security. But traditional labour problems abound outside the formal sector. The use of child labour is common, working conditions are virtually non-regulated and terms of employment are oppressive. Formal-sector and particularly government employment comes to be regarded almost as a secure and the efforts of unions are largely limited to trying to contain the shrinkage of the traditionally unionized areas. Union activity on the whole is remote from the realities facing the overwhelming majority of the labour force. Excessive informalization has rendered the role of trade unions ineffective, as only few remain eligible for the membership of the unions. If unions are to serve their purpose of defending the interests of the working class as a whole, they need to find ways of addressing the needs of workers in the informal sector. Then there are exclusive forces within trade union movement itself. There hasn’t been any significant effort in ensuring that the non-regular workers get equal rights as those of the regular workers who are doing the same amount of work in similar conditions. There has hardly been any effort to recognize full contribution of women to the country’s economy, that women workers, who are particularly vulnerable to management pressures, are properly 22 organized and that women are granted equal status within the unions and federations themselves. Not only that, unions are still organized along the old lines and have not undergone the desired restructuring required to make them more inclusive and all encompassing vis-à-vis changes that neo-liberal market forces brought in its wake. . Serious reflection on the situation of workers and development of the trade union movement to truly benefit workers will also depend upon a serious and through analysis of the trade union movement. Unless a proper quantitative and qualitative picture of the labour movement is developed, effective strategies cannot be devised. Bonded Labour: The Nost Excluded of all As in other countries of South Asia, Pakistan remains characterized by widespread exploitation of labour. During 2000 the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) received “reports of thousands of cases of bonded labour.” Bonded Population in Agriculture20 Agriculture is a major location for debt bondage, particularly for sharecroppers. Bonded workers are forced to sell their labour in bondedness against monetary advances, which they need to tide over periods of prolonged joblessness as in the rural economy, only seasonal employment is available. Agriculture labour is further deprived of benefits such as social security and old age pension benefit since the relevant laws are not applicable to this sector. The government plans to introduce corporate farms but the workers who would work on the corporate farms would also not be allowed to form unions. The national minimum wage is set as Rs 2500 per month for working 8 hours a day, six days a week but for workers on corporate farms, the minimum wage is set at Rs 2000 – a discrimination which is a blatant violation of the constitutional rights of a citizen. This legally sanctioned discrimination and exclusion continues unabated. Sharecroppers in Bondage (begaar) 1990 (households) Pakistan Provinces Sindh Panjab 721,510 Sharecroppers in Debt Bondage 1990 (households) 1967,44 Sharecroppers in Bondage (begaar) 2000 (persons) 6,742,926 Sharecropper s in Debt Bondage 2000 (persons) 1,838,686 268440 303579 79901 58431 2508726 2837120 746721 546071 Source: Census of Agriculture as published in a study prepared for ILO -- Bonded Labour In Pakistan Note: Tenants excludes Owner-Tenants. Bonded Population in Brick Kilns The Bonded Labour Liberation Front, which works mostly with brick kiln workers, estimates that around 2,000 bonded labour and families were freed with its assistance between January 99 and May 2000. These belonged to various sectors, including agriculture and brick kilns, in all four provinces. Of those freed, nearly half were children and one-fourth were women. Not all brick kilns are registered with provincial labour agencies. The district administration probably does make infrequent estimates but we were unable to obtain any provincial summaries that may exist. A HRCP report cites 2455 brick kilns in the entire country, employing around 120,000 workers of whom around 48,000 were women. A recent estimate of the Punjab government counts around 2200 kilns, up from the 1800 20 See also Attachment to Annex 4, below, for a discussion of land and labour relationships in Sindh. 23 estimated by ASR for the early 80s. A couple of interviews with brick-kiln owners, conducted for PILER study on bonded labour, near Lahore indicated that there could be as many as 4000 brick kilns in Pakistan. An average sized kiln employs an average of 25 families of brick makers and another 10 worker families involved in subsequent tasks. Since workers are remunerated on a piece-rate basis, there is a premium on large families. An average family size of 7 persons among brick makers would indicate that 700,000 persons could be in the grip of the bonded labour system across the 4000 brick kilns in Pakistan. When other brick kiln workers are included, the very rough upper estimate of bonded labour and their families in brick kilns would be close to one million persons across Pakistan. In the year 2000, government earmarked a fund of Rs 100 million on programmes for child and bonded labour welfare. An action plan was formulated according to which creation of legal aid cells for bonded labour would have been set up by September 2001 and registration of all brick kiln workers and preparation of Rehabilitation Programme for freed bonded workers and relief package for haris living in camps would have been completed by December 2001. Sadly, the federal government has taken no initiatives and the provincial government of Sindh categorically denied the existence of bonded labour in the province. Not a single penny has been spent from that fund to date. Even the thousands fortunate enough to have escaped bondage over the years are no more than a fraction of the poor men, women and children across the country, in agriculture as well as in industry, who continue to bear the onerous burdens of forced labour. These workers are denied the most basic human rights such as right to move freely within one’s country, seek employment anywhere, right to decent work, education, health facilities and so on. They are not thought of when polices are being formulated. For much of bonded labour the nature of oppression is vicious. Even more extreme cases of oppression, of prolonged physical and sexual abuse that spares not even women and children can be found in the national press. For example, news reports have referred to the horrific stories of men and women in tenant families of Punjab, who are being forced to sell kidneys to repay debts to their landlords. In 1989 the Supreme Court ordered the abolition of bonded labour in deciding an appeal for justice by bonded brick kiln labour. The court held that past debts could not be recovered from wages or through any coercive system. Future advances were to be limited to a week’s wages paid directly to the worker. The labour contractor (jamadar) system was to be discontinued forthwith. Employers would not pressurize labour to use family women and children in work assigned to men. Every case registered with the police concerning brick kiln labour was to be reported to the Advocate General within 24 hours, who should then immediately report to the Supreme Court. Regrettably, there is no public record of effective compliance by the government, and active follow up by the Supreme Court. Exclusion from Social Services Pakistan’s constitution is interestingly one of the few in underdeveloped countries that delineate social security as an explicit citizenship right. Unarguably, this commitment of the state towards its citizens remains largely unfulfilled. Social protection schemes in Pakistan can be classified into two categories. The first category encompasses the employed labour force in the formal sector of the economy. These schemes provide benefits regarding contingencies of sickness, invalidity, maternity, old age, and work related injury. The second category has a broader range and is generic in nature. These are the zakat and Bait-ul-maal schemes. These schemes are deemed to target those who are outside the ambit of the labour market and are considered ‘poor and indigent’. Zakat and Bait-ul-maal are charity for the destitute not social security. Similarly micro credit is also not a substitute for social security. It is either occasional or a one time occurrence and not everyone has the capacity to use it successfully. Secondly, success of micro-financing is dependent on a macro economic policy that is conducive for small or medium scale businesses. Pro-Poor Non Budgetary Expenditures (Rs in million) Sector 2000-01 2001-02 Zakat 1,829 5,169 disbursement July-Dec 2002-03 2,731 24 EOBI 1,261 1,366 disbursement Social Safety net (number of beneficiaries) Zakat 930,223 EOBI 100,384 Source: Economic survey 2002-03 1,700,189 103,231 777 1,009,330 132,000 It is interesting to know that for the past three fiscal years, more money is allocated to Zakat Fund and the basic premise of zakat is charity that is dependent on the good will of the person handing out the charity. Whereas it seems that number of beneficiaries of EOBI has not grown according to the proportion in which the population has grown. Government finds it easier to console itself that it has helped so many but fail to acknowledge people’s right to social security. As the formal sector employs a very small number of workers, only a handful of labour, working for giant industrial units or government are entitled to the social security benefits. The rest are excluded from these benefits. Even if a worker wants to pay his or her share of the social security and gain benefits, they are unable to do so because a worker’s employment status has to be acknowledged by the employer. As expected, this provision is used to deny social security entitlements to contract workers even in notified sectors. Hence benefits are denied to the vast majority of labour in Pakistan. Due to legal exclusions, non-compliance by employers, weak and uncaring trade unions, and lax enforcement by government, only a tiny fraction of the labour force benefits from this Ordinance. The basic premise of taxation is to provide social services to the taxpayers. As value added taxes and General sales taxes are levied on every small item, even those whose income is not taxable end up paying indirect taxes hence they are entitled to social security. The neo-liberal market economics have created conditions that are not conducive to a viable social security environment and better legislation and improved implementation of laws is required. Inadequate or Unimplemented Labour Laws Certain categories or classes of workers come within the ambit of the Labour Code, for these workers a minimum level of protection is provided through the Labour Code. However, the workers who are covered by the Labour Code are in fact in the minority, they work in the formal sector mainly in manufacturing or service industries and by nature of the definition of "Workman" in various laws. Thus, the majority is not covered either because they work in the informal sector or in units which are too small to be covered by the laws or, because by virtue of the nature of their work they fall outside the classification of a workman. These employees would have to rely on the principle of master and servant and any redress required by them would be under the terms and conditions of their Contract of Employment (if they have such a contract) through the normal Civil Courts. Those governed by the master and servant rule can sue and claim damages for breach of a contract for personal service but are not entitled to a declaration or injunction. Specific performance is also not possible. Given the backlog of work in the Civil Courts and the enormous costs involved in litigation, it would be safe to say that most employees would not receive any form of redress at all. There is also a growing tendency in the Civil Courts as has been pointed out earlier to uphold commercial considerations as being of paramount importance when deciding such cases. Other workers get excluded from application of the Labour Code by virtue of their relationship with the Employer. Self-employed persons for example are treated as "contractors" and are therefore only governed by their contractual relationship. They cannot look to the Labour Code for protection. Home-based workers would fall into this category also and we have already pointed out that these workers along with bonded workers suffer the most exploitation. Labour law enforcement machinery is generally weak. Whilst corruption is an issue, problems are also caused by wrong staffing, lack of technical knowledge and expertise and, inadequate awareness. Because of the inadequate number of Labour Courts decision of cases is delayed for years. Many of the Labour Laws are antiquated and in need of change. Two commissions are independently looking at the simplification and rationalization of the Labour Code but each Commission has had few meetings, and little progress appears to have been made. This then effort then seems set to continue to remain like many others, with little tangible outcome. In this scenario it seems fallacious to talk about equal pay issues or broadening pension benefits 25 whilst even basic rights like the right to a defined working relationship between employer and employee are not guaranteed. In Pakistan, the right of association is still conditional, which is contrary to ILO conventions. Majority of workers work in informal sector and they are denied the right of association. There is no provision for agricultural workers working either in corporate farms or otherwise. It shows that the government does not recognize peasants and sharecroppers as worker and negate the recommendations of Tripartite Labour Conference (TLC) to give them the right to organize. The seasonal workers are also excluded in this policy that forms a major chunk of agro-sector labour force. According to the proposed labour policy 2002, the government is still ‘considering’ to extend them appropriate social protection. Not only they are denied a basic human right, as stipulated in several international conventions and the constitution of the country, the social and psychological repercussions of such ills are far-reaching and extremely disastrous. The mentality of subjugation, that an agricultural worker cultivates when he is denied the right of association, becomes an accepted practice. Secondly, due to mechanization process in the farming sector, its capacity to absorb unskilled or semi-skilled workers has shrunk considerably. More and more people are moving to cities to seek employment in the manufacturing sector. They bring with them the mentality of subjugation, which creates problem for workers in the industrial sector whose rights are protected by the law. Workers are excluded from the process of decision-making even at the lowest possible level by two methods. First is that a large number of workers are not even considered workers by the definition stated in the labour policy, hence they are excluded from the schemes for the welfare of the working people such as Social Security Institutes, Employees Old Age Benefit Scheme and Workers Welfare Fund. Secondly, under new Industrial Relations Ordinance, promulgated October 26, 2002, quite a few workers that have the right to form unions and collectively bargain have now been denied the right to do so. The government has come up with new and more innovative methods to make the process of unionization more cumbersome and difficult and trade union membership very exclusive, as a result ineffective, which will fail to bring about any social, political or economic change. The trade union leaders themselves have estimated that their total membership does not exceed 3-5 per cent of the total workforce of Pakistan. Recommendations Redressal of the existing conditions not only needs complete policy overhaul but also require the will to make these changes work. • Casualization of employment is the fastest growing trend. However, without creating asset specific human resources through training and retention of labour, labour productivity gains – so essential to remain competitive – cannot be realized. Thus employers, both in formal and informal sectors need to engage in facilitating conditions for secure employment. The right to decent work should explicitly become part of the agenda of human rights groups, public interest organizations and media. As far as industrial relations are concerned, labour, employer and government must learn to negotiate in cooperative rather than a conflictual framework. ILO conventions 87 and 98 on right of association and collective bargaining must be accepted in a true spirit. Employers must recognize this right. They must shed their mental block against unionism. Labour legislation must be amended to make it all-inclusive. Ban should be lifted from various trade unions and legislation must rework the definition of ‘Workmen’ to include home-based and informal workers as employees in the eyes of law. The system to appeals should be decentralized and labour directorate should be made accountable to labour councilors who are directly elected representatives of the workers in a particular locality. Legislation of Workers’ protection will have no meaning unless and until the economy is documented. In Pakistan, majority of employees is not registered, industries and businesses are not registered. In absence of • • • 26 basic registration it is virtually impossible to check the implementation of laws at the workplace such as condition of employment, occupational health and safety, leaves, working hours, decent wages and overtime and welfare legislation such as social security, EOBI and group insurance. For instance group insurance is awarded under Standing Orders 1968 but when factories are not registered under a particular law, the law become meaningless as the mechanism provides them a chance to evade the law. • There should be uniformity in different labour laws. Discrimination according to size of the production outfit and number of employees and sectors should be abolished immediately. No matter what the nature of employment is, whether it is the principal employer or contractor who hire workers, they should get the basic rights of association and collective bargaining. Social security should be strengthened and widened to cover every worker and that to as a right, not as a favour or grant. In fact, every citizen should be given social security as a citizenship right. As mentioned earlier, the reason for the whole system of taxation is to provide social services to the taxpayers and taxpayers are entitled to get the benefit, even if they are unemployed or retired. The charity and welfare approach needs to be changed and social security must be established as a right. In case of bonded labour, lack of adequate social security creates conditions for the perpetuation of human bondage as people take monetary advances when they are either jobless or need medical attention, provision of which is state responsibility provided in the constitution. At present, social security institutes are set up at provincial level. If worker changes its job from one province to another, he has to register himself all over again. Secondly, due to concentration of industrialization in central Punjab and areas around Karachi, there is a big population of migrant workers who are working in these areas but their families still live in their home towns and the families of these workers also loose out on social security benefits. To avoid such discrepancies, registration for social security should be done at national level. Workers should be given right of self-registration. They should not need their employers’ approval before registration with Social security institutes. It should be contributory, once the workers are properly documented, they can claim benefits. Bonded Workers are the worst off in the socio-economic ladder as they are denied even the most basic of citizenship rights. They should be recognized through a proper registration system and issued with a national identity card which they have been denied until now. The right to unionize should be extended to workers in agriculture. The legal stricture to exempt agriculture from the purview of unionization has no economic, social or moral justification. Since the share of unpaid family helpers is large in agriculture, appropriate legislation should be enacted to protect the most vulnerable section of workforce. The current mechanism for fixing minimum wage and the rates of minimum wages are highly flawed and restrictive in nature and needs to be reworked promptly. There should be a minimum income policy for the selfemployed, home-based workers, piece rate workers and unpaid family helpers, who are non-time wage earners. The government must set up an employment exchange and proper document the number of unemployed people. There used to be employment exchanges so it would be simply a revival of an old system. If local governments are given supervisory role in the development of these employment exchanges in all the commercial and industrial areas and in every district, the process of documentation as well as rehabilitation can speed up. It can be done in a new electronically linked form to document and inform users of available and marketable skills. Apprenticeship programmes should be set up in collaboration with employers associations. Arrangements should be made to pay a stipend during the apprenticeships and that can be paid from the Workers Welfare Fund as mentioned in the stipend ordinance 1962. Similarly, self-employed low-income people should be able to register themselves with social security on the basis of self-contribution. The rest of contribution can be made from Workers’ Welfare Fund. • • • • • • • 27 • • • Register mines and brick kilns are industrial establishments within the purview of industrial relations. Eventually, agriculture worker should also be included in it. Core labour rights in areas such as child and bonded labour should have an inbuilt implementation mechanism. There should be baselines and regular monitoring. Development activities should be promoted at the community level. For example, any new housing scheme should not be undertaken by the government directly. The government should only finance it and let the communities work to improve the quality of their lives. This will also put a lid to the problem of corruption in state offices. Redistribution of real assets, and access to basic requirements of life like education, health facilities and justice can include more people in making a more viable, productive and just society. 28 Selected Bibliography Amjad-Ali, Charles, Relative Stagnation: Pakistan’s Labour Movement, in Globalization and Third World Trade Unions, edited by Henk Thomas, Zed Book, New Jersy, 1995 Ali, Karamat, Trade Unionism under Dictatorship, in Society and Dictatorship by Bernd M. Scherer, Progressive Publishers, Lahore 1993 Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, Labour Force Survey 1999-2000, Islamabad July 2001 Ministry of Labour, Manpower and overseas Pakistanis, Government of Pakistan, Annual Consolidated Report on the Working of Labour Laws in Pakistan for the Year 2000 Islamabad 2001 Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER), Bonded Labour in Pakistan: An Overview, PILER, Karachi, October 2000. Sayeed, Asad and Ali, Karamat, Labour Market policies and Institutions: A framework for Social Dialogue Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research, Karachi 1999. Sayeed, Asad and Khattak, Saba Gul, Women’s Work and Empowerment Issues in an Era of Economic liberalization Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research, Karachi 2001 Social Policy and Development Centre, Social Development in Pakistan: Annual Review, 1998, SPDC, Karachi, 1998. Social Policy and Development Centre, Social Development in Pakistan: Annual Review, 2000 Towards Poverty Reduction, SPDC, Karachi, 2000. Social Policy and Development Centre, Social Development in Pakistan: Annual Review, 2001 Growth, Inequality and Poverty, SPDC, Karachi, 2001. World Bank, Pakistan Poverty Assessment, Poverty in Pakistan: Vulnerabilities, Social Gaps, and Rural Dynamics, Report NO 24296 – Pak, Islamabad, 2002. 29 Annex 4: Land & Social Exclusion21 Emma Hooper The Context Land has many roles: • • • • It has value as a productive factor Land ownership confers collateral in credit markets Land ownership provides security in the event of natural hazards or life contingencies Land ownership conveys social status, and confirms legal identity In South Asia, those who control land tend to exert a disproportionate influence over other rural institutions, including labour and credit markets, to the exclusion of other groups. In Pakistan, as the Participatory Poverty Assessments point out (see also Annex 8, below), access to land ownership rights has a direct correlation with poverty. Land ownership in rural areas represents rights associated with livelihood (food, income, shelter and security; and in urban areas, shelter and security). Access to land ownership rights also has a gender dimension in the denial of land inheritance rights to women. Land fragmentation further contributes to impoverishment of disadvantaged groups: smaller land holdings mean owners till their own land, and do not hire the landless to work on it for them (and the rich get the poor to work for free). Denial of land rights leads to the curtailment of other rights – for example, landless citizens do not have the right to register their children, and thus could not vote in the recent elections (2001/2). Pakistan: Issues in Access to Agricultural Land Patterns of Land Inequality The agricultural sector accounts for about one quarter of Pakistan’s GDP, and just under one half of the labour force. However, ownership of agricultural land is marked by great inequality. According to the 1990 Agricultural Census, nearly half of all the rural households in the Indus Basin (roughly speaking Punjab and Sindh) did not own any land at all; with another quarter owning 5 acres or less. 14% of the total area was in holdings of over 150 acres, whose owners accounted for only 0.2% of all rural households.22 Land Reform Redistributive land reform has been part of government policy in Pakistan since 1959, with three major legislations (1959, 1972, and 1977). The basic structure of these policies has been the same: the law declares a ceiling on the permitted size of an ownership holding. Land held surplus to this ceiling is supposed to be resumed by the government acting through provincial Land Commissions, and this area has then to be allotted to landless families in the same area. The land reform laws have progressively lowered the ceiling. A persistent complaint about the implementation of land reforms has been that they have allowed owners of large holdings to escape the net of the legislation by effecting “benami”23 transfers to family members, thus concealing size of ownership holdings. Government has also attempted to influence the distribution of land ownership through the allotment of state-owned land. However neither the latter, nor redistributive land reforms have seriously affected the highly unequal distribution of land and agrarian structures. 21 Sources of information for this paper were Reza Ali, personal communications (June-July 2003); Rae Porter, personal communication (June 2003); and Haris Gazdar, Ayesha Khan and Themrise Khan, Land Tenure, Rural Livelihoods and Institutional Innovation, February 2002 for DFID. 22 Gazdar et al, op cit, p.1 23 Benami refers to the nominal transfer of a property title to another person while retaining full control over the use and disposal of that property. 30 Access to land is more equal than land ownership. Landless tenants constituted a relatively large section of the rural population in Punjab and Sindh with the highest concentration of land ownership (22% of all rural households in Sindh; and 10% in Lower Punjab).24 However, while distribution of land ownership has remained relatively stable since the 1960s, there has been a decline in tenancy and a corresponding increase in owner-cultivation, due to demographic, technological political-economic and institutional reasons. Changes in the land-labour ratio (due to demographic change) can make landlords choose to farm more of their land themselves and offer less land to tenants. Technological change allows production to become more capital-intensive at a time when labour was becoming more abundant. Anecdotal evidence indicates that landlords “evicted” tenants because of fear of land reform legislation that might have accorded ownership rights on land to tenants of long standing. The greater commercialisation of all sectors over time has also affected the agrarian economy, with the decline in tenancy and particularly in sharecropping, and the rise in fixed lease rental seen as evidence of (spontaneous) institutional innovation over time. Under conditions of highly unequal distribution of land ownership, tenancy acts as a way of facilitating access to land, for the landless poor. The decline in tenancy therefore has led to a sharpening of inequality in access to land. Tenure Types The three main tenurial arrangements are: • • • self cultivation (where the landowners provide the inputs, and hire in labour; and the landless hire out labour, with no other inputs) fixed rental (where landowners rent out land, provide no other inputs; and the landless rent in land, and provide inputs) sharecropping (where landlords provide land and some other inputs; and the landless provide labour and some other inputs). The main technical difference between this and the former two is that return to both land and labour is not a fixed amount, but is referenced to the final output. Both landowner and landless are involved in a “piece rate” arrangement, most commonly a half-share of outputs.25 Key variables are not prices and quantities (eg wage and rental rates) but norms and conventions about sharing inputs, responsibilities and rewards. For the system to function, these norms need to be widely understood and followed by parties to the transactions. Changes in these norms – for example in the crop share accruing to the tenant, or the tenant’s share of the cost of fertilisers – will have an impact on the incomes of the different parties. Corporate Farming Two main forms of corporate farming appear to be emerging in Pakistan, with a third nascent potential alternative. One is foreign investment (Chinese and Australian companies) with advantageous tax breaks and favourable conditions for investment accorded by the government. A second is the “corporatisation” of existing feudal land holdings, with majority shareholders often being the same feudal families that had owned the land individually. A third, emergent form is in the examples of local level organisations (cited by Gazdar et al) in Sanghar and Khairpur in Sindh acting corporately to lease in land, and then allocating this leased land to their respective members for agricultural self-employment. This last example, in Gazdar’s view,26 would appear to give sufficient scope for market-based interventions that work with prevailing trends in tenurial arrangements – i.e the move from share tenancy to fixed lease rental – and provide positive opportunities for people who might otherwise have been marginalised. The extensive networks of organisations associated with the Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) might in due course make the policy shift to diversifying their activities from micro-credit into other forms of market intermediation. The shift towards state support for corporate farming is seen by some as threatening the future of small and large farmers, in part due to the formula-based distribution of water resources, which are likely to strongly favour corporate enterprises over individual farmers. Corporate farming would thus be facilitated by the state at the expense of the small farmers, including lowering the cost of production for the purpose of non-domestic consumption. 24 25 Gazdar et al, p. 5 See Gazdar et al, p. 26 26 op cit p, 13 31 Urban Land: Definitions of “Urban” & “Rural” & Demographic Exclusion In transitional societies, urbanisation and its key characteristics are major determinants of the political process, and have a bearing on social exclusion, not least through the maintenance and formation of social capital and social networks. Land is a critical resource in urban as well as rural areas. Access Independence, the historically significant areas of poverty and social deprivation and commensurate societal structures – together with explicit economic policies by successive governments – have contributed to the shaping of urban systems and hierarchies in Pakistan. The question of access to land is critical for shelter (which is also an issue in some rural areas for the landless, particularly in Sindh, where there is no common property or state land on which they can build). The cost of urban land (even unserviced) is high, and indicates a need for the type of incremental land development schemes with incremental payments exemplified by the Khuda Ki Basti programme. At present, housing finance is linked to development of the building (shelter) rather than access to land per se, which can also be used as collateral. The private sector development schemes are largely inaccessible to low income groups on the grounds of cost, because these invest in infrastructure up front, rather than incrementally. Attitudes to urban land can be viewed as an extension of the culture of feudalism to the urban areas, whereby the rental sector is small; the tenancy laws have resulted in the removal of rent ceilings so that protection of the tenant is absent; and multiple occupancy and lack of clear title in inner-city properties is common (both for land and built property). Commonalities between urban and rural land issues therefore centre on title, specifically: (i) access to land; (ii) land administration; (iii) tenure status, compliance with laws. Administrative Definition A recent paper27 highlights how issues of definition of urban areas have resulted in an under-estimation of the urban population; and how the administrative boundaries used in the 1998 census excluded those living outside them (through categorising them as non-urban), including – in Lahore - public sector housing schemes, most private sector development, and the Defence Housing Authority area. As a result, the proportion of the population living in rural areas of Lahore district increased over the period from 1981-98. Ali calculates that a more accurate reestimation of the urban agglomeration would result in an almost 20% increase (almost 1 million people) in the urban population of Lahore, with consequent implications for urban services and build up of social capital. Other related phenomena include: • The growth of peri-urban areas on the edge of cities, which remain outside any institutional arrangement for provision of basic civic services, even though they have acquired urban characteristics, and capitalise on their proximity, transport links, employment opportunities and access to urban services in the urban-defined areas. The ribbon development that has occurred along highways; between major urban centers and industrial satellite areas, largely due to accessibility to transport links, availability of skills and services, and tax and tariff incentives (linked to Nooriabad and Hub in Karachi; and Gujranwala and Sheikhupura in Lahore, with similar developments in other major cities of the country). Reviews of occupational structures show that rural residents have strong occupational interfaces with the urban areas. The separate, but related phenomenon whereby rural population settlement patterns show high density along major road corridors, which has enabled easier access to higher service levels in urban areas and in the transformation of rural into to urban areas. • • The realisation of political rights, participation in the political process; the relationship of, and responsibilities between, the citizen and the state, and related institutional structures; the nature of the breakdown of existing societal structures and the forging of new, more complex ones; the composition of the revenue base and criteria for 27 See Ali, Reza: How Urban is Pakistan? November 1999 32 resource allocations; and the effect of urbanisation on the nature of poverty, empowerment, gender, governance, culture and marginality will be key in developing an understanding of the political process and addressing demographically-based exclusion from development benefits. The Regional Experience: A “Complementary” Approach to Rural Land Access A recent World Bank approach to improving access to land by the rural poor in India as part of a broader strategy for reducing poverty through rural growth identifies the elements of a new, complementary approach to improving access to land by the rural poor, which could have applicability in Pakistan.28 This approach includes incremental reforms in public land administration that seek to reduce transaction costs in land markets, thereby facilitating land transfers, while at the same time increasing transparency and public access to information to ensure that socially excluded groups also benefit. The paper29 identifies a number of key issues that constrain access to land in India: • • • Incidence of poverty is highly correlated with lack of access to land - (as is the case in Pakistan, as the recent participatory poverty assessments show) - although the direction of causality in this relationship is not clear Households that depend on agricultural wage labour account for less than a third of all rural households but make up almost half of those living below the poverty line Many of these households also own some land, but in holdings that are so small or unproductive that their owners derive a greater share of their livelihoods from their own labour than from their own land. The principal concern in this paper is with the ability of the rural poor and other socially excluded groups to gain access to and effective control over cultivable land. In Mearns’ view, this calls for development of an analytical framework that allows for subtle nuances in the definition of property rights. The framework adopted distinguishes individuals’ rights, claims or interests in land according to three parameters: (i) whether or not they may legally be upheld, under prevailing legislation (strict legality); (ii) whether or not they are socially perceived to be legitimate, irrespective of their strict legality (social legitimacy); and (iii) whether or not they are actually exercised in practice, and therefore translate into effective control over land (effective control). The last of these parameters refers to the degree of tenure security that is enjoyed in practice, regardless of the type of rights. For example, an individual with limited usufruct rights may enjoy security of tenure, if s/he is confident that s/he will actually be able to exercise those rights when necessary. Conversely, an individual with ownership rights to a parcel of land may find his or her claim to be vulnerable to land-grabbing by another individual with greater bargaining power, voice, and leverage over government officials, particularly if the original landholder’s rights are not recorded in the official land records. The relative bargaining power of diverse agents strongly influences the extent to which individuals are able to enjoy effective command over land and other resources. The rural poor and other socially excluded groups, by definition, have less bargaining power vis à vis other agents (Leach, Mearns and Scoones 1998). Generally speaking, ownership rights (which may be acquired through inheritance or the sale/purchase market) are the most secure. They are also the least likely to be enjoyed by the rural poor and other socially excluded groups. Outline of the Analytical Framework 28 Robyn Mearns Access to Land in Rural India: Policy Issues and Options (World Bank Policy Research Paper 2123, 1999). The paper sets up a framework for a land and social exclusion study, investigates the context (history and political economy) and has carried out detailed research in one state. 29 Patterns of social exclusion tend to be closely correlated though not synonymous with the incidence of poverty. It is well recognized that people of scheduled tribes and scheduled castes in India are much more likely than other groups to live below the poverty line. Throughout Mearns’ paper, ‘socially excluded groups’ refer to people of scheduled tribes and castes, women, and the rural poor. All of these groups are more likely than better-off or more powerful and influential groups to suffer from forms of discrimination at the hands of those government officials with whom they come into contact, and to be more or less excluded from receiving entitlements through administrative procedures. 33 The framework provides a description of the context within which land relations are played out. Policy approaches to improving access to land are likely vary from state to state according to differences in agrarian structure, conditioned in turn by British land settlement history and variations between provinces in enacting and implementing land reform legislation. Evidence is presented on the distribution of rural land, and on the relationship between farm size and productivity. An outline is provided of the key issues that are suggested to be among the most important constraints on access to land for the rural poor and socially excluded, and which warrant further analysis in selected states; and the main policy options considered for enhancing access to land by the rural poor and other socially excluded groups are also summarised. The main issues constraining access to land for the rural poor in India were identified as: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) restrictions on land-lease markets, fragmentation of holdings, the widespread failure to translate women’s legal rights into practice, access to and encroachment on commons, and transaction costs associated with land transfers. Summary of Observed Trends in Land Access in Pakistan Agricultural Land Tenure Status There has been a sharp decline in the number and acreage of tenant farms as recorded in the agricultural censuses during 1960-90, with an increase in owner farms and their area. However, the average farm size of tenants has marginally increased. Sharecropping has declined significantly, although some tenant farms have become ownercum-tenant farms. Tenancy is a major issue in relation to land rights, including that of land and tenancy reform. The current interpretation placed on land reform by Prime Minister Jamali is that of ceilings on ownership. Since (rural) land revenues are no longer an important revenue source, the ascribed importance of keeping land records – in the view of the authorities – is low. However, from the perspective of exclusion, access to land (whether rural or urban) is critical, both for access to shelter, for formal credit, and to confer legal identity. Farm Size Marginal farms (less than 5 acres) and small farms (5-12.5 acres) have increased in number; and marginal farms have also increased in terms of area. The medium and large farms have seen a decline in both numbers and area, with no significant changes in the very large (50-150 acre) category. Farms above 150 acres increased both in numbers and in area in Sindh, but have declined slightly in the Punjab. Agricultural Employment There has been a decline in the proportion of those employed in agriculture. Possible explanations or interpretations of this phenomenon include: • • • • Landowners are acquiring land from tenants for self-cultivation and buying land from other landowners Many tenants and sharecroppers have changed status to agricultural wage labourers, or wage labour in towns To some extent, the increase in the number of small farms may be due to greater fragmentation due to inheritance There is some evidence of consolidation of holdings taking place (in the 50+ acre category). 34 Bonded Labour Some efforts are under way (eg the ADB Sindh Rural Development Project, which proposes amendments to the Acts covering tenancy and legal land records) towards a concentration on labour still in bondage (as opposed to previous efforts which concentrated on escaped or freed haris. Some degree of consensus has been reached with some landlords, on required changes in the implementation of the Sindh Tenancy Act, despite the bureaucracy feeling that it would disrupt traditional agriculture and landlord-hari relationships, and “destroy agriculture”. Considerable attention has been paid to the following areas: (i) how to repay debts; and how to incorporate provisions of the criminal acts to address the prevention of labourers leaving their landlords, within circumscribed limits – specifically, through the replacement of Section 25 (which has been used to prevent people leaving) sharing the cost of inputs, including water, all of which tenants are charged for by landlords: amendments have been made to implementation of legislation to cover pesticides, costs by type of water supply (eg high pumping costs) sale of inputs: substandard quality inputs are sold to landlords, which the latter then force onto their tenants, from whose accounts the cost is deducted enforcement of the Act governing the land administration system and land records. The land law recording system is both crude and has fallen into disuse in Sindh, having not been updated for 12 years (in comparison with Punjab where it is updated every cropping season). (ii) (iii) (iv) There is some evidence that Muslim tenants are in a slightly better position than Hindus, as the former have relatives elsewhere on whom they can rely in a time of crisis. The (Hindu) Bhils or Kohlis30 have relatives either across the border with India, or in Balochistan or further off in Sindh, and therefore experience different ethno-cultural relationships and linkages, with less social capital/social networks than Muslims, though their economic relationships remain similar. Suggested Areas of Intervention to Address Land-Related Issues of Social Exclusion in Pakistan: A. Annotated Bibliography Prepare an annotated bibliography on research and other papers on land, as background contextual reference, by province 1. Land Administration Undertake a land survey and land settlement study (title, consolidation of holdings, demarcation) Link with the ADB Sindh Rural Development Project; and Access to Justice Project Create an International Panel on Land Law to work on cadastral and land registration issues (modelled on those developed for Eastern Europe in countries where land records are lacking): computerisation alone will not change the quality of the records themselves Anticipated Outcomes: Improvement in land record-keeping: regular survey and computerised records/cadasters Land ownership and titles Improved transparency: summary records on web; greater public access Grievance redressal Improved compliance 2. Identity Cards 30 Bhils have a low social status within the Hindu context, as they are considered pagan; whereas Kohlis have some ascribed social status. 35 Extend provision of ID cards, especially to women, for whom they are essential; as is the case for pockets of the marginalised However, the issue of who attests ID will need to be addressed: (the current regulations make it extremely difficult and inconvenient to obtain an ID, and perpetuates both dependency and exclusion of those with low mobility (eg women) and low status/high dependency on the whims of others (eg haris) 3. Literacy Extension of literacy coverage, which is an essential element in addressing exclusion, particularly for women and youth: Extend literacy coverage, targeting women and with particular emphasis on the 15-25 years age group, who have dropped out from, or never attended school Literacy provides access to information (both agricultural and other, rights-based information) 4. Media Campaign Issues of social exclusion, required interventions, and information on roles, rights and responsibilities can be conveyed in local languages via local FM radio; TV (PTV has universal coverage); specially designed campaigns using channels of communication appealing to the grassroots population in rural areas, such as plays, dramas, etc`. This last would require proper programme design inputs (rather than leaving the content to PTV). Suggested Focus: Citizens’ rights and responsibilities The state and its functioning: • Law • Police • Lower judiciary • Executive • Local government - Union government - Municipality (tehsil/town) - District - Province - Federation • Legal Awareness 5. Credit Work with existing agricultural, enterprise development and credit institutions (ZIBL, FMB, Khushali Bank, SMEDA) to: • Improve access to credit for (a) opening up off farm employment opportunities; (b) improve access to onfarm credit overall, and particularly for women 6. Agricultural, Rural and Informal Sector Labour A large part of the labour force is excluded from the application of legislation. With the aim of protecting wage labour, legislation for which currently only is extended to the manufacturing sector and formal transport and construction sectors: • Agricultural Labour: examine the extent to which labour legislation applies to agricultural labour; identify shortcomings; make recommendations for the appropriate provisions for agricultural workers (see also below) 36 • • • Rural & Informal Sector Labour: examine the coverage of the law regarding working conditions, occupational health and safety, working hours, wages, disputes Extend Social Security Legislation to agricultural, rural and informal sector labour Labour legislation and administration of law, including improved compliance, for agricultural, rural and informal sector labour 7. Land Reform • Farm restructuring 37 Attachment to Annex 4: Feudal Landowning & Labour Structures in Sindh & the Northern Areas31 Zamindars & Haris The debate around the issue of land ownership and land distribution in Sindh focuses particularly on the relations between the large landowners (zamindars) and their tied agricultural labourers or tenants-at-will (haris). Central to the system is the form of sharecropping known as batai involving the division of the harvest between the direct producers and the landlord. The system is often compared with the feudal systems of medieval Europe, or the sharecropping and bonded labour systems of the Americas. The zamindari system was introduced into Pakistan during the colonial era as a way of dispersing ownership of the land previously considered the patrimony of the Mogul emperors. The colonial authorities were interested in entrenching a landowning class, partly to simplify revenue collection. The system has a history of critical analysis and investigation going back as far as the Hari Enquiry Commission of 1947, sections of which are “soberingly current and relevant still today” (Sindh PPA p. 120). Reports of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan repeatedly raise issues about the operational reality of the system, detailing cases of extreme abuse that have come to their attention; and a number of highly critical reports have been produced on the subject: (see PILER 2000). There are still disputes about the number of bonded labourers in Sindh. For Pakistan as a whole, estimates have been as high as 6.8 million people in 2000 (PILER 2000). On the other hand, provincial authorities in the recent past have insisted that the magnitude of the problem is overestimated. The level of abuse and exploitation to which haris in Sindh are subject, is widely discussed. Hindu haris seem to suffer more frequent and more severe abuses than Muslim or Christian haris (PILER 2000). There seems to be some confusion at the local level over the statues governing the practice of batai. At the national and international levels, the 1992 Bonded Labour Systems (Abolition) Act is accepted as declaring illegal all arrangements that impose restrictions on labour or service as a condition for loans and financial advances. However, it is widely held by both zamindars themselves and by the lower courts that the 1950 Sindh Tenancy Act takes precedence. This allows landlords to bond labour on the basis of debt and merely regulates the proportions of hari earnings that can be taken; the way input costs are shared between the parties, and similar details. Debt Bondage Means False Accounting A feature of the real social relations of landownership and tenancy in Sindh is debt bondage compounded by what people believe to be systematic false accounting by landlords: (see Sindh PPA section 6.3.1 p 121 for examples). Landlords fail to give accounts, or if they do, they are often false accounts showing lower weights for crop yields; the contractor or munshi takes bribes, and changes accounts; costs of tractor repairs are deducted from a hari’s batai (even if the tractor belongs to the wadera); haris are routinely charged for water, the use of a landlord’s bullocks for ploughing, seeds, fertiliser – resulting in huge seasonal deductions from batai. Women are paid in grain rather than money, for cotton and chilli picking, but with the monetary equivalent cost per maund of grain marked upwards from that of the market. The Power to Control Watercourses running through a village are under the control of the wadera, who thus has absolute control over cultivation in the area. Irrigation supplies are frequently shut off on a pretext, and examples were given in the PPA of when villagers tried to increase their landholding, water supply is stopped. Even other than through control of water, landlords have in practice vast powers to determine access to land. PPA analysts told of usurpation of land allocated to small growers under Ayub Khan (p. 122); decisions by landlords to cultivate only part of their land, thus reducing the amount available for cultivation further impoverish haris. 31 Summarised from Sindh PPA pp 120-125 38 In general, landlords seem able to limit haris access to other authorities, and exercise control over them (eg Khairpur, Tharparkar, Mirpurkhas, where analysts reported that the police would not come to the village without prior consultation with, and permission from, the landlord). Arrests and releases are frequently at the whim of the landlord. A number of instances where landlords do not pay taxes were noted in the Sindh PPA (p124). Zamindars have substantial influence over the voting and political behaviour of the people in many PPA sites. In some, villagers have to leave their work to attend political rallies if the landlord so orders; in others, landlords are perceived as not allowing development schemes “because the poor people will benefit and may develop their own status. If people’s status is improved, they will vote for the candidate of their choice. Who will then give importance to landlords? They would be hurt and become like common people, so they do not want the poor to develop their status.” (Sindh PPA, p 124). In some areas of Sindh, jagirdars, waderas and zamindars oppose each other politically, which results in either no work getting done, or in a feudal culture setting up people to fight each other using a system of divide and rule. Sometimes control of the zamindar goes as far as physically limiting people’s ability to leave the land without permission, even in the event of the death of a relative (see p 125 for examples); not allowing public transport to pass by the houses of haris in case they run away; preventing the community from organising to improve their lives; the harassment of women from hari families, which, where advances are refused, rebounds on the entire family which suffers the consequences (vivid electrocution example box 6.1). Urban Labour Exploitation Contract system of using different contractors to supply labour to departments within the same factory, whereby workers are dismissed and re-employed on new terms each three months. There is thus no permanent employment, no records, and as temporary workers, normal benefits are denied. Competition for regular work (regularity of income being seen as directly related to level of poverty) is reportedly intense in urban PPA sites in Sindh, and complaints about discrimination between immigrants and locals were widespread. Domestic informal sector activities (mainly relied on by women) are poorly remunerated and highly competitive, without satisfactory regulatory solutions yet having been found. Northern Areas The situation of the Northern Areas presents an interesting example, in relation to the current situation in Sindh, of the impact of the abolition of oppressive feudal systems. The abolition of the Rajgi system in 1973 when the rule of the local Rajas was terminated by government, was perceived by local analysts in the PPA as being of fundamental importance in eliminating their vulnerability; and in enabling a subsequent trend of the increasing introduction of various government and NGO institutions to the area. This led to social and economic empowerment, improved their access to social services, and eliminated the burden of heavy local taxes imposed by the Rajgi system. The work of NGOs in the area was seen as significant in reducing vulnerability to shocks and trends; in increasing the social capital of the poor; and helping them enhance opportunities for economic development. 39 Annex 5: Biradari, Caste and Provincial Ethnicity Agha Imran Hamid 1.0 Background The terms ‘caste’ and ‘biradari’ require explanation. Historically, caste refers broadly to a horizontal division of society over most of the Subcontinent from an indeterminate period following the Aryan migration/invasion of India. Hindu scripture speaks of four main castes or ‘varnas’32distinguished in terms of occupations. Over much of the period for which historical evidence is available, there have been a much larger number of castes or sub-castes pertaining not only to specific occupations (e.g., weavers, cobblers etc.) but sometimes region-specific. While the Vedic ideal may well have been a society with immutable social/occupational distinctions sanctified by a religious code, categorisation of whole populations into castes was often fluid and always untidy at different stages during the Hindu period as a new set of rulers sought to strengthen their overlordship by assigning lower status to most of the conquered33, co-opting some of the latter to relatively higher status castes. Caste divisions were by no means completely immutable with some (sub)castes raising their status in times of turmoil and higher castes attempting to enforce the status quo at times of stability and especially, times of stagnation. The term biradari comes from the Farsi for brotherhood and was used initially by Iranian, Turkic and Farsi speaking Afghans for Muslims exclusively.34 In time, the term came in Northern India to represent a largely, but not wholly, vertical division of society into groups that most but not all of the following attributes: • • • • • proximity community occupation linguistic unity and, in smaller sub-divisions consanguinity as elements of group cohesion Interestingly the term came to be applied to some Hindu and Sikh groups in Northern India as well; and could also transcend regional and religious boundaries - a prime example of which are the Jats. The term caste came to acquire a broad currency in both British colonial bureaucratic terminology and academic usage. In the former case, such items as recruitment forms and police reports listed ‘caste’ as one of the identifying characteristics and the information entered more often than not for Northern India was actually the individual’s biradari. The police reporting form remains intact in Pakistan to this day as does the practice of entering the individual’s biradari in slot marked ‘caste’. In the latter case, some academic practice retains the use of ‘agricultural castes’ and confusingly, even ‘ashraf’ castes as a reference to Mughal terminology for upper class landowning groups35, as confusing a mixture of Arabic honorific terminology - (the term does not by any means apply solely to Muslim land-owning groups) - and Hindu socio-religious divisions as it is possible to get. Furthermore, there are the self-seeking references in colonial bureaucratic usage to ‘martial races’ and ‘agricultural castes’ that further blur the issue. 2.0 Recent History: Caste & Biraderi in Pakistan Careful study of the history of the peoples of different religions in the area now comprising Pakistan shows that caste and biradari are far from synonymous, that while both have been used as instruments not only of social 32 33 The term has connotations of colour. “Aboriginal” tribes were often classified en bloc as low caste by the new Aryan order. 34 See the entry for biradari in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition, Vol. II 35 See Cambridge Economic History of India Vol II, pp. 10, 11, 14, 165 etc., but also several references in Vol. I by different authors. 40 exclusion but of social and political conflict, neither is either determinant or absolute in these situations. The determinant has always been control of land and other assets and the power to extract surpluses and revenues.36 The roots of much of Pakistan’s current socio-economic structure lie in the revolt of rural populations in Punjab from the mid-18th Century onwards against an increasingly exploitative and extractive Mughal power structure that was urban-based. These revolts succeeded in overturning the established structure and fatally undermined Mughal authority the destruction of which was further hastened by the successive invasions of Nadir Shah and the Afghans. In the process the third capital of the Mughal Empire, Lahore was reduced to an eighth of its size while other provincial cities suffered correspondingly. These revolts saw the ascendancy of biradaris and groups which had in Mughal times, a decidedly subordinate status. Contrary to popular myth, the destruction of Mughal elites in Punjab did not take place at the hands of the British although the latter did complete the process but preceded the colonial period. The British did however set the seal on the primacy of the relatively new rural elites and in general, the subordination of town to country. This is easy to understand. The Punjab as with some other parts of the British Indian Empire provided agricultural surpluses but almost uniquely, also military manpower, mounts and draught animals as well as forage and supplies. The way to ensure this was for the colonial power to recognise and in many cases formally grant property rights over land to new rural elites and in doing so “de-recognise” and exclude former elites and other competitors, in the process creating a symbiotic, mutually dependent relationship between themselves and the new rural elites. The process of formalising property rights was itself a process of excluding not only many cultivators and purportedly property-less cattle owners from rights to common and communally held lands but also one where entire groups were excluded by, for example, designating them as ‘criminal tribes.’ In Sindh, the pre-colonial landed elite proved pliant enough and some of the largest personal estates in British India were left undisturbed and indeed are to this day. In NWFP, the advent of canal irrigation brought feudal practices into a relatively egalitarian structure of tribal origins and created a group of maliks and chiefs that continue to dominate the politics of the present day province. Balochistan suffered a malign neglect in which tribal rights over land and resources were in many cases transferred to the tribal chiefs or sardars. The primacy of rural elites over urban has survived well into modern Pakistan. With the decline of share of the rural sector in gross domestic production and an increase in urbanisation from 8 percent in 1947 to 35 percent at the present time, the land-owning elites have had to cast about for allies to maintain their positions and avoid land reforms and agricultural income taxes. These have been found in the rent-seeking bureaucracy and a military establishment intent on maintaining its dominance over the political structure - all parties intent on avoiding transformation of the old top-heavy structure by emerging democratic forces. While some rural biradaris have risen from low status and little power to becoming major players on the national political scene such as the Arains37, others remain low in status such as the various kammi groups (sometimes described as castes). These are deliberately marginalized by more powerful groups anxious to maintain their position in a changing rural environment to the extent that “higher status” groups will try to prevent even educated members of lower status groups from participating in community affairs and especially in decision making.38 The position of lower status groups in rural society has also been weakened by the demise of the feudal jajmani system in which groups accorded control and higher status also had obligations towards members of lower status groups who were their tenants and dependents. The great levellers in this process are urbanisation and wealth. A member of a lower status group who either makes good in the big city or works abroad strengthens not only his own status but, by repatriating wealth and consumer durables and by purchase of land, raises the status of his extended family. The remnants of the caste system do work to exclude affect two sets of communities. The first are the Hindu Bhils and Kohlis of Sind, still regarded by fellow Hindus in Pakistan to be low caste and further excluded by the majority 36 See Imran Ali’s recent paper, “The Historical Lineages of Poverty and Exclusion in Pakistan” in a special issue of the Journal of South Asian Studies, Monash University, Australia, 2003. 37 To which formerly purely agricultural biradari General Ziaul Haq belonged. 38 As noted in the DFID supported Pakistan and Provincial Participatory Poverty Assessments. 41 Muslim community. The second group are certain communities, formerly low-caste Hindus who subsequently converted to Christianity who continue to work in menial occupations such as street cleaning and sanitation. Exclusion of and violence towards minority religious communities or sects which surfaced through tacit support of the state during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s campaign against the Ahmadi community and reached large proportions during the time of General Ziaul Haq does not stem from caste or biradari causes. It is a direct consequence of the religious mainly neo-Wahhabi fanaticism encouraged by the state and sections of the military for its own reasons during the Zia period and subsequently and deserves to be explored separately. Provincial Ethnicity One way in which anti-democratic regional elites can continue to cream off the surpluses produced by society while denying basic benefits to the majority of people is to highlight and exacerbate ethnic and religious differences. This is the case in the smaller provinces. In Punjab this takes the form of discrimination against lower status biradaris and communities. However in Sind in addition to the most feudal of societies in Pakistan, the mohajir-Sindhi problem (again fanned by the state) also assumes an urban-rural and an ethnic dimension. In Balochistan, the Baloch are themselves a minority if the Brahui (who are looked down by some Baloch) are separated out, while furthermore there is a major Pakhtun/Baloch divide. The south-western part of the province includes significant Seraiki and Sindhi speaking minorities who are poor and have little voice in their own regions let alone in the province. NWFP is split in an uneasy balance between the generally dominant Pakhtuns and the Hindko speaking inhabitants of Hazara. Within Pakhtun society, there are low status groups the exclusion of whom meets a general denial from the Pakhtun establishment ,who own a mythology of egalitarianism that is at odds with reality - especially in the irrigated Peshawar-Mardan-Charsadda area. The degree to which these divisions have obtruded on the national consciousness is a symptom of the decline of the writ of the state and its co-option for personal ends by different parts of the Pakistani oligarchy. Ultimately armed persecution of one ethnic or religious group by another also shows up the decreasing sphere of rule of law and an abdication by the state of its national responsibilities. This is very much a function of the crisis of the Pakistani state, its society and economy and much less that of the role of biradari or caste. 42 Attachment to Annex Five: The International Perspective on Caste Caste-based discrimination, which affects more than 250 million people worldwide, is a form of discrimination based on work and descent. Though the caste-system is most prevalent in South Asia, the abuse and exploitation of communities through a social system of hierarchy can be found in nearly all parts of the world to a certain extent.39 In caste-based discrimination, the caste into which a person is born places restrictions on the occupation they can perform, the areas in which they can live, the communities into which they can marry, and sets guidelines for general social interaction with the rest of the population. The caste system in India, particularly, is an extreme form of discrimination most affecting the Dalits, who comprise one-sixth of India's population, or 160 million people. Human Rights Watch, through research on these human rights violations and the exploitation and segregation of the Dalits over 6 states in India, concluded that Dalits are subject to the most extreme forms of discrimination and abuse. Some of these include having to live in separate segregated colonies from the upper-caste Indians, being forced to perform the filthiest occupations in society, and being restricted from marrying members from upper-castes. And out of this research, Human Rights Watch has also learned that violence has become a defining characteristic of this particular form of discrimination. As there are many similarities between the situation of the Dalits and the Buraku people in Japan, some common features we can observe of caste-based discrimination throughout the world are: As people in the lower-caste community are usually physically indistinguishable from members of the upper-caste community, discrimination does not rely on racially visual differences. This aspect of caste-based discrimination has led some governments to try to evade its responsibilities and escape international scrutiny by claiming caste-based discrimination does not exist because it is not linked to racism. Caste-based discrimination is often masked by the abject surrounding poverty. Though lower-caste people are bearing the brunt of poverty, many poverty-stricken communities are sharing the same problems, such as bonded labor, high personal debt, low wages, lack of access to education, illiteracy, etc. Despite anti-caste-based discrimination laws in many constitutions, none of these laws are implemented due to a lack of political will to raise consciousness and, in effect, disrupt economic status quo. Similarly, these same laws are not upheld by law enforcement agencies since these particular bodies depend financially on the upper-caste communities. There is a deeply rooted religious sense of purity, or cleanliness, associated with the upper-castes, and qualities of pollution or filthiness with lower-caste communities. In South Asia, lower-caste people exclusively hold the occupation of city sanitation. Many people feel religiously justified in their maltreatment of lower-caste members. In countries such as Japan, India, Nepal, Senegal and Nigeria, especially, many significant cases of caste-based discrimination still exist through strict prohibitions on inter-caste marriage. This sort of discrimination is of primary importance for the Buraku people in Japan. In India and Nepal, inter-caste marriages are an invitation to social ostracism and have sometimes lead to punitive violence, such as entire villages being burned down in retribution. The lack of economic opportunities extends to allocation of land, likewise. In Japan, land owned by Buraku people has lesser value, and many times they are forced to use land located near nuclear power plants or in regions that are 39 See Smita Narula: Caste Discrimination: A Global Concern 2001 43 unsuitable for agriculture. In India, despite decades of land reform legislation, most Dalits do not have access to land that can lead them to economic security. There is a stark distinction between upper and lower-castes in access to education, and in some communities, lowercaste peoples have less or no access to higher learning at all. South Asia has experienced high drop out rates, lower literacy rates, and lower enrollment rates for the children of the lower-castes. Sexual abuses of lower-caste women by upper-caste men have been reported, and in the Sri Lankan plantations, for example, acts such as these are common. Similarly, in India and Nepal, a significant percentage of Dalit women are forced into prostitution. The Example of Status-Based Exclusion in Nepal In Nepal as elsewhere in South Asia, the distributional rules of the game vary for diverse individuals and groups on the basis of their social identity. Historically, Dalits were not allowed to own land, or learn to read; Tamangs could not join the army and were compelled to provide unpaid labour to their Rana rulers long after most other Nepali ethnic groups had been able to free themselves of this type of taxation.40 As is the case for low-status, low-income occupational groups in contemporary Pakistan – particularly Southern Punjab, Sindh and parts of Balochistan - the Tamangs, Tarus and a number of other low-status ethnic groups could find themselves and their offspring enslaved for being unable to pay off their loans, with the difference that in Nepal, other caste groups could not be so enslaved according to the legally-enshrined “rules of the game”. Many kingdoms and principalities in the Subcontinent built and consolidated political and economic power by interlinking it with the Hindu caste system, though in Nepal the system remained in force long after most others had been diluted and contained by colonial powers - at least to some degree.41 As a unifying framework, the caste system was very inclusive in the sense that it encompassed all the diverse social groups in Nepal, with their varied languages, customary laws, and religious, social, and cultural traditions, within one overarching framework. But it was also exclusionary in that it classified all those groups as distinct castes within the broad framework of the traditional Hindu system of the four varnas based on concepts of ritual purity and pollution (Kshatrya, Vasiya, Shudra and “impure”/”untouchable” occupational groups of castes). Bennett p. 19 Within these four overarching categories, all groups in Nepal were further classified and placed in a strict caste hierarchy based on how closely their norms for gender relations, and their dietary and other socio-cultural practices conformed to those of the top-ranked in-migrating Brahmin and Chetri caste groups. Differential privileges and obligations were accorded to each caste and sub-caste within the system, prescribing certain hereditary occupations for some, and allowing or disallowing ownership of land for others; and designating certain groups as enslavable. Different punishments for similar crimes were prescribed based on the respective caste ranks of the perpetrator and the victim – with high caste perpetrators getting lighter punishments for crimes against those beneath them in the system, and vice versa. Pp 19-20 The incidence of poverty in Nepal today shows a close correlation between caste status, and health and education; and the majority of groups with a high poverty incidence are Janajatis or Dalits.42 However, Nepal is undergoing a deep structural shift away from predetermined and largely unchanging caste/ethnic identity as the primary basis for social status and economic and political power, towards an open society where status is based on attributes like education, wealth, and political influence which can theoretically be attained through individual effort. None the less, the Janajati and Dalit as historically disadvantaged groups lag behind in income and asset levels, as well as in human development indicators and the extent to which they are represented in the power structure. 40 David Holmberg and Kathryn March, “Local Production/Local Knowledge: Forced Labour from Below”, in Studies in Nepali History and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, June 1999, in Bennett, op. cit, April 2003, p 8. 41 See Bennett, op. cit. April 2003, p. 18 42 Table 2, Incidence of Poverty for Major Caste & Ethnic Groups, Bennett April 2003l op cit p 27; and Table 3, Human Development by Caste & Ethnicity, p. 28. 44 Annex 6: The Devolution Process Agha Imran Hamid 1.0 Historical Context In 1947, the population of Pakistan was overwhelmingly located in rural areas. Only an estimated 8 percent of Pakistanis lived in urban areas. Although literacy and political consciousness were higher amongst this small minority, political power, to the extent it was exercised at all by the indigenous population, was in the hands of large landowners in what became West Pakistan who were an essential intermediary for the former colonial power. This was as true of Sind and the settled areas of NWFP as of Punjab. The latter with its vast tracts of canal-irrigated land was very important to the colonial power not only as a granary but as a source of revenue. Industry was practically nonexistent, even by the low standards of pre-independence India. Given these facts it is hardly surprising that urban elites, regarded everywhere in India as potential troublemakers by British administrators, were especially shunned in Punjab. “Native” political power was firmly in the hands of a coalition of Muslim and Hindu landowners who comprised the Unionist Party. The Muslim League’s success in the 1946 elections and the subsequent achievement of Pakistan was crucially dependent on a compromise with the Muslim landowning elements of the Unionist Party who moved into the Muslim League en bloc and virtually overnight. The quid pro quo was the primacy of Muslim landowners in Punjab politics and by extension a very powerful position in the political system of Pakistan. The governing instrument of Imperial power before independence was a highly centralised bureaucracy at the apex of which was the fabled Indian Civil Service (ICS) described as the “steel frame” of Britain’s Indian Empire and below it a variety of provincial and specialised services including the police. The ultimate guarantor of British rule in the subcontinent remained the Indian Army, by 1946 after post-war demobilisation, only partially Britishofficered, and a declining proportion of elements of the British Army. The portions of these civil services and army falling into (or opting for) Pakistan formed, with minimal institutional change, the Central Superior Services of Pakistan with the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) a clear analogue of the ICS and the Pakistan Army equally in the mould of the British Indian Army. In the immense vacuum formed by the departure of the imperial power, the politicians, overwhelmingly the representatives of the landlord class and the civil services contended for power, ultimately forming an uneasy oligarchy. The military conditioned by colonial practice to remain aloof from politics was initially a sleeping partner within the oligarchy but in successive decades moved into a dominant position. The landlord class in the face of their own declining economic power as industry and urbanisation modernised the economy, played their political cards with great skill - it continued to overshadow urban politicians and was able to limit attempts at land reform to mainly cosmetic measures. In British India, in the areas later to comprise Pakistan there was a complete absence of institutions between village or tribal heads and their informal councils at the local and grassroots level and the highly centralised, bureaucratic post colonial system of government. In settled areas, the intermediary power between these two widely separated institutional levels was the landlord - in tribal areas there were sometimes tribal heads, occasionally tribal conclaves but often, nothing. Almost fifty years later, Pakistan has yet to evolve a workable model of local government. 2.0 Current Situation Top-down authority has devolved only a single step - from the central (Federal) level to the provincial level. The lack of intermediate, especially local institutions means that decisions concerning not only political and administrative but also development matters have been made at levels unconnected with the grassroots realities. This goes a long way to explain Pakistan’s stunningly poor social sector indicators, in literacy, education, health, environment and virtually all civic matters. 45 The lack of accountability that is a by-product of this system has also had serious consequences for Pakistan’s political culture. A perverse assertion of feudal values has led to a blurring of lines between the power of the state and that of powerful individuals and interest groups as well as between private property and the resources of the state. As the oligarchy has resisted participation by the bulk of the people in the political process through a variety of means including military takeovers, electoral fraud, back-room deals and outright intimidation, a number of armed militias have sprung up. Many of these organisations have grown well beyond the boundaries imagined by their former mentors and form a focus for the agenda of the religious right wing or ethnic extremists and work by mobilising the resentments of deprived lower middle class youth. As such they are not only a challenge to the ascendancy of the state itself but are a major constituent of the social fabric in many parts of the country. Another by-product of the centralising tendencies of the post-colonial state is the tendency to encourage dependence by groups and institutions on the state. Apart from the symbiosis of the large landowning class with the state as noted above and the peculiar and inefficient state-protected growth of large-scale industry in Pakistan, other sectors of society have also been permeated by the same attitude. In fact, one of the paradoxes of the Pakistani state is that while on the one hand its record of providing essential social or development services is very poor, it does - in theory - take upon itself the responsibility to deliver these services to all citizens. In practice, development was conceived by the elite as a handout to the population, not as a right. Historically, the state has also not looked kindly upon other parties who have tried to provide these services. This is partly because the bureaucratic structure sees a possible invasion of its turf and partly because an elaborate system of kickbacks has enveloped the supply of what meagre services can be provided. Thus while the vacuum in actual delivery of development and social services would appear to offer favourable conditions for the growth of non-government organisations providing these services, to provide missing services, the enabling environment has varied from hostile to neutral, seldom friendly except in particular local conditions. The centralised, top-down, essentially monopolistic nature of the power structure sees NGOs oriented towards working with local communities as potential rivals. In rural areas the old power structure has been particularly well entrenched. Well into the 1980s, for example, feudal landlords in all four of Pakistan’s provinces actively discouraged the spread of literacy and primary education into their areas. 3.0 The Devolution Plan In this context the present government’s devolution plan is a welcome development. This calls for the construction of an elected local government structure of councils from the district level downwards, i.e., the zilla (district), tehsil (sub-district), union council and finally village level. The first three levels have a nazim (administrator) and naib-nazims (deputies) at their helm, presiding over councils of elected members amongst which up to a third of all seats would be reserved for women. In this, the military government has gone further than any other government. If devolution proceeds and this large proportion of seats remain reserved for women, this should represent a massive breakthrough for women in the country. The importance of the proposed devolution plan can be gauged from the fact that the District Nazim replaces the present Deputy Commissioner with all district level functionaries reporting to him/her rather than to the Deputy Commissioner. The twelve departments envisaged at this level would be district coordination, finance and planning, works and services, agriculture, health, education, community development, information technology, revenue, law and magistracy. District police would also report to the District Nazim. 46 A similar structure at the tehsil level would control municipal and local finance, local fees and charges and the important functions of land use and master planning.43 Essentially, the administration of local government and development initiatives at the district, tehsil and union council levels would devolve to the new local government tiers while Federal and Provincial representatives (MNAs/MPAs) would be confined to legislative and policy formulation functions.44 The implementation of this system should mark a massive change in Pakistan’s political and social landscape, overturning a system that has evolved very slowly to the degree that it has evolved at all, for over a century, but the very complexity of the changes require more time and thought than seems to have gone into the current exercise. The rusting steel frame of the civil service is being dismantled but not all the major replacement props are in place. To take one very major example, the dismantling of civil service control and oversight of police has left a vacuum that no statutory body has filled. An immediate result has been a rise in police abuses and simple laxity in police work. 4.0 The Devolution Plan’s Travails Three difficulties that immediately confront the process of change are: (i) (ii) (iii) determining the exact functions and procedures of work of each new functionary or body, developing the capacity of persons elected to these positions to discharge their functions (bearing in mind that the structures are new and the incumbents inexperienced); and monitoring the whole process to ensure that these functions are discharged not only efficiently but fairly. Elections have been carried out at district level but the transfer of authority is snarled in detail. Vitally, for local development and the social sectors, provincial government departments are disinclined to deal with these issues since the responsibilities are to be transferred to the districts. Not only is control over development budgets at issue, there are parallel questions on district revenue generation. To an extent, the entire process of development marks time until these issues are resolved. Exercising supervision not only over administration but over magistracy and law enforcement not to speak of financial oversight over specialised departments requires training. The previous district administration, whatever its state of decline had at least the basics of such training followed by long apprenticeships in subordinate positions. No similar training arrangements exist at present for the new local administration staff. Finally, election and other monitoring arrangements, whereby teams of army officers act as monitors rather than the more democratic procedure of responsibility to the electorate and to the civil arms of law and law enforcement raises an entirely different issue. Carrying out supposedly “non-party” local elections where the electees will be held responsible to the military rather than the electorate while politics at the provincial and national levels is banned, strikes many as a repetition of wellworn attempts by the military to institutionalise their role in running the country45. These attempts were made by Field Marshal Ayub Khan in creating a layer of ‘basic democrats’ in the mid 1960s and by General Ziaul Haq in the early 1980s. Both attempts failed. 5.0 Public Response Public response has been interesting. There has been no significant trend towards boycotting the elections as in the Ziaul Haq local bodies’ election, rather political parties have fielded or supported candidates in all but name. GOP National Reconstruction Bureau, Local Government (Final Plan 2000), Islamabad, August 2000 In practice, a strong battle for turf is being fought with the provincial assemblies feeling particularly threatened at the loss of control of resources and hence patronage. 45 Numerous newspaper reports have appeared concerning alleged attempts by senior military figures to favour certain candidates and oppose others. 44 43 47 Local government by its very nature is closer to its constituency than either the provincial or federal tiers; this is borne out by wide public involvement in affairs of local government throughout the country. Significantly a DFID supported research study/survey found that 69.6 percent of respondents nationwide wanted the devolution process to have constitutional cover.46 Another 67 percent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed to support the new devolution mandated balance between legislative assemblies and local governments. There was also clear support for a process of consultation between local and higher levels of government and for legislators to raise local (district) issues in the relevant legislative assemblies.47 Contrary to the expressed wishes of the military government, there was also support for involvement of political parties at the local level where the electorate had most chance of influencing party political practice in their own interest. Reservation of 33 percent of local government seats for women, a potentially ground-breaking measure not only received massive support from male and female respondents48, fully 67 percent of the latter supported extending the one-third reserved women’s’ seats to the provincial and federal legislatures where the proportion is currently only 17 percent. For the first time, there has significant NGO interest in and influence at local level elections. A number of nazimelects have been beneficiaries of NGOs as well as office-holders of COs. Conscious of the reputation of the better NGOs and their ability to deliver services locally, candidates, councillor-elects and nazim-elects have courted NGOs assiduously and invited them to cooperate in future development efforts in their area. When interviewed, NGO leadership made no bones about supporting candidates that they considered ‘pro-development’, with party considerations in this context evidently being quite secondary. Whatever the considerations of the military government in engaging in the devolution process, it seems that longsuppressed popular aspirations have been aroused throughout the country. There is of course, the downside risk of administrative chaos and the tensions of the attempt by the military to ‘manage’ the process. Local Government Elections 2001, Bari, Khan et al, Pattan Development Organisation, Islamabad 2001, Key Findings, pp. 8-12 ibid 48 32 percent of respondents actually wanted the proportion to be as high as 50 percent, ibid. p.11. The proportion amongst the poorest respondents was even higher, 42 percent. 47 46 48 Annex 7: Micro-Credit Agha Imran Hamid 1.0 Historical Background to Credit in Pakistan The banking sector, state-owned from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, did not lend without collateral, did not lend to groups, did not like managing small loans and was suspicious of lending to the poor. None of this stemmed from the banks’ own experiences. The elite in Pakistan has lived in a culture of default; obtaining loans has had little to do with productive use of credit (submitting business analyses or project feasibilities was a bureaucratic formality making the right responses on a long format) and little to do with credit history - poor performance did not bar the influential from getting more loans. The rich have not had to return loans, these were written off, if not on the banks’ balance sheets, certainly inasmuch as repayment was not pursued unless an individual were unlucky enough to be on the wrong side politically - and this is usually a temporary inconvenience. On the other hand access of the poor to micro-credit has always been poor to non-existent. The formal banking sector in Pakistan has avoided lending to the poor on grounds of supposed difficulties in collection and lack of collateral. This is something of a mystery since borrowing by the better-off classes, particularly by the upper classes, has been characterized by poor portfolio performance, “stuck” loans, non payment and outright dishonesty, often abetted by the government of the day. This practice over a period of two decades brought the Pakistani banking sector into a state of severe crisis. Banks were not only unwilling to try group lending, they were simply unwilling to accept even normal risks when it comes to lending to the rural poor. Equally, historically, return of small loans by the poor (even when lent money without collateral) has been very high. Typically a micro-credit agency such as an NGO would regard rates of return below 95% as worrying and rates of 90% and below as alarming.49 Till the mid 1990s, the rural poor in Pakistan had a limited track record with respect to institutional credit - because access has been limited to small, experimental bank programmes and to the credit programmes of a few NGOs - but that record has been very good. It has certainly been vastly better than that of the rural rich, who include a large proportion of chronic defaulters to whom the state-owned banks continued to lend. While continued lending to defaulting landlords may be a consequence of political pressure to which the nationalised banking system appears particularly susceptible, the reluctance to lend to the rural poor seems to have it's roots in the bankers' conservatism. The 1980s saw the emergence of a new type of NGO based on the principles of the participatory approach to development e.g., the Orangi Pilot Programme (OPP) and the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) which has since completely transformed the discourse in the development sector in Pakistan. Most of these NGOs were (and remain) essentially multi-functional where micro-credit is one amongst a range of agricultural, training and social sector interventions and serves also as a means of attracting potential beneficiaries to the NGOs’ programmes.50 A central part of the AKRSP philosophy is to mandate a system of savings by VO members; regular saving is linked directly to disbursement of micro-credit loans by AKRSP. It took a decade to show that the participatory approach could succeed in every province of Pakistan. Over this period and the succeeding decade, a number of variations on the original urban (OPP) and rural (RSP) theme were spawned as were a number of problems of a more or less generic nature. These problems and types of micro-credit providers are discussed below. 49 However, definitions of what constitutes default or serious delay in loan repayment as well as bad debt write-off policies are far from uniform amongst agencies that do lend to the poor. 50 It is interesting that in its early years AKRSP despite demands from beneficiaries, stuck to supporting income generation and productive schemes only, avoiding social sector schemes. This was to change in the 1990s. 49 2.0 The Role of Micro-Credit in Development Micro-credit has been shown to provide major benefits to poor and lower income individuals and groups in different settings provided programmes are carefully prepared, targeted and administered. 2.1 Micro-credit in the Urban Context In the urban context in Pakistan, it has long been recognized that small scale, informal enterprises whether manufacturing, cottage industry, trading or services have provided much higher returns on capital invested then large scale or medium scale enterprises in the formal sector. Employment coefficients in small-scale manufacturing (rather than in small-scale trading) are also high for every unit of capital invested. Paradoxically, this is the very sector that is starved for capital because the poor and even large sections of the middle class in Pakistan have no access to institutionalised credit. The case for provision of micro-credit is clear: the impact of micro-credit has been proven in urban and peri-urban settings. A very large number of studies conducted by development professionals, NGOs themselves and donors show a highly positive impact on income as a result of utilization of micro-credit. As an example the Orangi Charitable Trust’s (OCT) experience shows that since families of successful users of micro-credit register sustainable income increases, the impact is not confined to greater consumption or investment in the microenterprise. These households also show significant improvement in such social indicators as children’s education, family nutrition and improved hygiene. Returns on successful micro-credit use by poor and lower middle class households have typically been 30 to 50 percent annually in times of economic growth, substantially higher than in medium or large-scale industry. 2.2 Micro-credit in the Rural Context Rural use of micro-credit is important both for agricultural and non agricultural use. The need for credit is particularly important for poorer farmers. Their requirement for agricultural inputs, seeds, fertilizer, pesticide, etc. tends to be cyclical as does their income. Unfortunately the two cycles do not always coincide. The poorer the farmer, the greater the proportion of his produce that has to be diverted towards household consumption. In the case of poorest, those with the smallest or least productive land holdings, their consumption requirements will exceed their production of basic food items. It is common practice therefore for the farmer to have to purchase seeds and another inputs at the time of sowing from shopkeepers/traders (arhtis) on credit at inflated rates. The requirements to pay back these amounts along with the price of food also purchased from the arhtis on credit puts great pressure on the small farmer. He is obliged to dispose off his crop together which any dairy or poultry produce in order to pay of these debts immediately after the harvest in a glutted market when prices for his crop are low. In a lean crop year the pressure on the farmer to buy food and inputs on credit is all the greater. In such situations production loans for crop inputs ease the pressure on the farmer considerably. He is able to purchase better quality inputs more cheaply. The recent practice of some micro-credit providers of combining such input loans with crop insurance provides significant protection to both the farmer and the lending agencies. Farmers living hand to mouth seldom has the disposable income to improve productivity by such measures as land levelling, lining of water channels or by several farmers joining to construct a tube-well. Loans given for such improvements can be used to purchase materials, tractor time or small machinery while the farmers are able to provide a significant proportion of labour during the slack periods. The impact of these loans is highly positive. Rural loans for non-agricultural purposes include providers as village shops which provide basic consumption goods, clothing, and some inputs. Services of micro-credit users show that this is the commonest non agricultural rural use of micro-credit. Other growing areas are farm machinery repair and vehicle maintenance. 3.0 The Current Situation 50 3.1 Types of Retail Micro-credit Providers At present there is a wide variety of micro-credit providers operating in the field. These include: • • • • The Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) which are multi-functional in that they provide a range of services. Other multi-functional providers, mainly NGOs. NGOs dedicated to micro-credit as their primary service.51 Funding agencies, whether “wholesale or retail” such as the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), the Khushhali Bank and most recently the First Microfinance Bank as well as donor agencies that fund particular NGOs or some of the wholesalers themselves. It should be noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive. NRSP, easily the biggest RSP concentrates its work in the rural areas but also manages the Urban Poverty Alleviation Project in Rawalpindi. PIEDAR is single function, i.e., offers micro-credit in its urban/peri-urban Kabirwala operating area but supports community based irrigation management and primary education for rural girls (but not micro-credit) in its other, rural, operating area in Darkhana where it plans to expand its focus to include drinking water and income generation schemes. It also supports urban waste management in low-income wards of Quetta, Balochistan, conservation of lakes in Upper Swat, NWFP, and an environmental education network that spreads across Urdu-medium schools in low income areas of Rawalpindi-Islamabad and Lahore. Kashf is single function in the sense that its primary and most important service is provision of micro-credit but it has ancillary activities in elementary business management to assist its clients as well as an enterprise development initiative for the poorest women who cannot yet afford to run a business. Its Enterprise Development Section designs products, and explores markets for clients products. Kashf also works with clients on such social issues as prevention of violence against women and promotion of sanitation, etc. A new initiative, Shaafi Project, is looking at ways to improve the health of Kashf’s clients. Intensity of coverage of operating area is very much a question of policy choice. To take two relatively long-lived and large-scale NGOs, OPP/OCT has concentrated on covering its “home” area of Orangi52 and a few areas in and around Karachi. Its formidable influence in the rest of Pakistan has to do more with the personality and prestige of its late founder, its own very real achievements in Orangi and the alliances it has forged elsewhere rather than a farflung physical presence. NRSP on the other hand spreads its approximately 13,500 COs, each with an average of 21.6 members over 27 districts throughout the country. Coverage intensity is therefore necessarily low. Taken as a whole, coverage of potential poor users of micro-credit remains very low compared with Bangladesh, for example. 3.2 Issues in Provision of Micro-credit Micro-credit remains the single greatest demand of the poor, once they become aware that it is available. However the conditions under which micro finance, skill training and technical training can be made available to the poor in the first instance and achieve a positive impact need to be carefully observed. 3.2.1 Group Formation 51 Community Organisations (COs) including CO Clusters and independent COs some of which are partners of support organisations, are a diverse and interesting emerging group that should become a major channel for micro-credit in the near and medium term. These are distinct from COs formed by RSPs and some other support organisation under uniform terms of partnership. They can be new organisations or older COs that have transformed themselves into participatory organisations. They are clearly influenced by the participatory approach introduced by the larger support organisations both the RSPs and other organisations and sometimes key activists have served their apprenticeships with support NGOs or projects. They span urban, peri-urban and rural areas. 52 The agglomeration of kachi abadis known as Orangi has an estimated population of about a million. OPP points out that there is therefore, a lot of ground still to be covered in its immediate vicinity. 51 In rural particularly agricultural environments, there is a clear advantage in the formation of a CO, whether comprising the bulk of house-holds in a village or a group within a village of broadly similar economic level. This is because of the relatively isolated and self contained nature of small rural communities and also to the nature of social cohesion in these societies. Not only are occupations much more diverse in urban and peri-urban areas but the tight social cohesion of rural societies is greatly diffused. Never the less while biradari53 ties are replaced with broader ethnic identity and village communities with street or mohalla (urban neighbourhood) level communities or associations of persons in a particular trade or professions, some form of group association has been found to be beneficial for purposes of successful use and repayment of micro-credit54. 3.2.2 Other Conditions It is possible to provide micro-credit through groups formed specifically for the purpose or through groups formed for such other purposes as sanitation, productive infrastructure etc. What is necessary in a each case is that certain rules and conditions specific to the successful use of micro-credit be applied in every case. These include: • Some form of credit discipline needs to be transferred to the group. This is often done through a process of a saving whether it is a process of collective bank savings or internal savings aimed at internal lending within the group. The group acts as a guarantor of its members who are the individuals borrowers. This is more useful in rural than in urban conditions since greater social pressure can be brought to bear in village society than in urban situations. Loans given to a first time borrower should always progress from relatively small amounts to larger amounts. Larger loans given to first time borrowers do not have a good records of success in general (e.g., with OCT, PIEDAR and NRSP as well as a number of other NGOs providing micro-credit). The business plan of the borrower must be carefully scrutinised by the lender. Too many individuals granted loan for the same trade or shop in one area will result in over supply of that services. The borrower must show clearly what his or her market is and how that market will be accessed. Rudimentary business management skills should be transferred such as elementary bookkeeping, cost control, planning and not diverting capital from the business to social, consumption or other uses. Default where deliberate should always be pursued with all the means at the lending organisation. Where there is default whether deliberate or through force majeure such as through death or incapacitation of the borrower or through natural disaster, the amount should be written off through provision made in the budget and the result reflected in the lenders books. There should be no prevarication about not writing off bad debts because of supposed bad effects on other borrowers. Delay in repayment must also result in some sanction whether it is a smaller repeat loan or no further loans. If the loan is delayed owing to circumstances beyond the borrowers control the former applies and if the loan has been diverted to uses other than that intended, the severe sanction is indicated. • • • • • • • • • 53 54 See Annex 5 on caste, biraderi and provincial ethnicity. OCT which does not form borrowers groups nevertheless relies on guarantees from two previous successful borrowers. 52 • Delay or failure owing to bad management or poor business planning reflects badly on both the ability of the borrower and the capability of the lending agency. There are also major issues in targeting borrowers. Firstly, smaller sized loans (< Rs. 10,000) are generally better suited to the needs and repayment capacities of the poor; secondly, they also contribute to better targeting of the poor and offer less temptation to the better-off to compete for these loans. Organisations that have offered relatively high loans (Rs. 15-20,000 plus) report greater difficulties in repayment. Some of the latter organisations in this category are moving towards a smaller average size of loan and highlight the need for better scrutiny of borrowers’ business plans. Micro-credit is not necessarily synonymous with poverty alleviation. Specific targeting is necessary.55 3.2.3 The Role of Savings In early micro-credit practice as introduced by AKRSP the role of saving was central. Regular saving by CO members was linked proportionately to disbursement of loans. Not all other practitioners agree. There is wide divergence amongst providers on the role of savings and the link between credit and savings; this question is in turn linked with the question of whether loans should be made to groups or to individuals. At one pole, the RSPs have always stressed savings both as a means of strengthening COs and as a means of strengthening credit discipline. OPP/OCT’s modus operandi is radically different. It places no stress on savings. Its founder Dr. Akhtar Hamid Khan held that encouraging small entrepreneurs to hold savings in banks at declining real rates of interest rather than investing in their own businesses with inflation-adjusted rates of return of over 30 percent typically made no sense. He pointed to the ultimate absurdity of AKRSP beneficiaries holding tens of millions of rupees in bank savings where inflation erodes their holdings while the banks still refuse to extend credit to small entrepreneurs like them, choosing instead to lend to their usual dubious clients elsewhere in Pakistan. Thus the curious phenomenon of thrifty small savers in a deprived region providing funds for conspicuous consumption in better-off regions.56 While there is little doubt that while regular saving and processes like internal lending help to instil financial discipline, large savings are not by themselves necessary to successful micro-credit operations. 3.2.4 The Question of Interest It is a truism that borrowers everywhere dislike paying interest. This chestnut takes on an added dimension in Pakistan where interest poses a particular cultural/religious problem. There are also factors other than cultural/religious relating to interest that warrant close attention. i) During the time of the military regime in the 1980s when an attempt was made to “Islamise” the banking system, no distinction was made between interest and usury as is the case in a number of other Islamic countries. Interest therefore, became religious anathema. The regime’s “solution”, the transformation of savings accounts into “Profit and Loss” accounts was however, pure legerdemain which in fact resulted in higher transaction costs for bank clients at the time. The euphemisms “markup” and “service charge” have since been pressed into use to describe interest. The philosophy of subsidized credit has always had a following in government, if not in banking and financial circles. The Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, ADBP (since renamed and presumably re-born) long continued to dispense credit at lower than market rates (and to well-off clients only, at that), and there were a host of small government programs supposedly for disadvantaged groups such as women and unemployed youth, that followed (as some still do) similar policies. Unhappily, a number of donors have in the past accepted subsidized credit in practice. ii) 55 In one NGO operating area, of a sample of 20 borrowers, one household had 200 irrigated acres, 5 with over 30 irrigated acres and a further 3 percent with over 10 irrigated acres, targeting can at best be characterised as imprecise. This would matter less if the organization were not the biggest recipient of funds from the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF). 56 This situation has now changed with the formation of the First Microfinance Bank. 53 iii) NGO staff see their beneficiaries as a disadvantaged group that need to be introduced to the use of credit by initial use of “soft” terms. There is an underlying feeling that if the rural rich and politically well-connected can take advantage of subsidized credit, their own clients are surely more deserving. There is a direct link between programme sustainability and interest rates and other user charges. Without this perspective there can be little understanding of either the real cost of capital or the costs of running a credit program. In practice, NGOs in Bangladesh user charges make for effective annual interest rates of over 30 percent. This is not the case with any Pakistani provider of micro-credit. In times of high growth when returns on micro-enterprise can be as high as 40 to 50 percent, it may is possible for a successful micro-enterprise to repay these rates but this is not the case in periods of economic stagnation. iv) The prolonged economic downturn after 1995 and particularly since 1998 has affected the poor very severely with marginal/disadvantaged groups generally worst off although typically, micro-credit used in micro-enterprises has had high rates of return in times of moderate to high economic growth. Successful use of micro-credit in microenterprises becomes more problematic during a prolonged slump, the principal reasons being shrinking markets and pressures on borrowers to divert micro-credit to urgent consumption or emergency (e.g., health) needs. 3.3 Types of Micro-credit Providers Amongst the “retailers” i.e., director lenders of micro-credit the RSPs as large multi-sectoral development NGOs it difficult to view credit as anything other than a supporting leg of a larger, integrated programme. Equally, they find it difficult to separate costs specific to the credit programme. This not only alters their perception of the credit programme at the policy level by allowing subsidized credit to be seen as a means for facilitating the overall multisectoral programme, it makes it difficult to calculate cost recovery and break-even points for the credit operation. However the RSPs have a number of successes to their credit: • There is no doubt that the RSPs have played a central role in introducing and popularising the participatory approach in Pakistan. The RSPs have also shown that rural communities hitherto unevenly affected by a growth process external to themselves can successfully take charge of their own development. They have been at the forefront of NGO/Government agency models of cooperation (despite claiming not to be NGOs). The RSPs and in particular NRSP have the largest member base of any NGO in Pakistan. The RSPs have set up training facilities for various aspects of participatory development which have also been used by other organisations. • • • • OPP/OCT is different from the RSPs (besides the obvious point that it operates in an urban, not rural area) in that: • • • • Its infrastructure and overheads are far less and it lives within its means. It does not form COs although it will collaborate with them. It does not attempt to regulate the lives of communities and operates with a light touch. It does not expand beyond its original area or “replicate” itself elsewhere although it has many sincere 54 imitators and organisations to which it provides advice and sometimes material help. • It believes in dedicated workers with salaries much lower than with other large NGOs. On micro-credit too, OPP/OCT’s modus operandi is radically different: • OCT considers the family enterprise to be the basic productive unit in the areas in which it operates. OCT’s stated objective is to provide capital to emerging family enterprises, not to alleviate poverty, by giving small loans to the poorest of the poor. OCT relies on the undoubted multiplier effect on incomes and employment amongst the poorest when it invests in the micro-enterprises one rung up the economic ladder, so to speak. Its groups are much larger in size than the five-member Grameen style group. The average number of open accounts in each group in Orangi is 21 although in individual cases the number can be much higher. Loans are made to individuals who are backed by two guarantors. The key figure in these groups is the agent, analogous to the activist in some rural NGOs. The agent initially identifies and investigates potential borrowers, OCT verifies the information and carries out a business analysis. It then tracks each loan through to full repayment, delay or the occasional default. OCT does not accept claims of 98 or 99% repayments by some NGOs. It holds that this is statistically impossible in large groups where adverse local conditions, deaths, business or family disasters and the occasional cheat will make their appearance. OCT increasingly forms groups on the basis of trades or occupations and tracks their performance. Accordingly it will not only expand or reduce the portfolio in a region or of a group according to performance, it has begun to track the viability of businesses by type and region. As mentioned above OCT places no stress on savings. OPP has established partnerships with other NGOs in which affiliate NGOs act as an agent for OPP by identifying, vetting and supporting qualified borrowers who receive credit from OPP which also provides training on credit operation to the NGOs as well as other support. Some of these arrangements were a success, others less so. OPP has also experimented by giving larger sized loans to agriculturists and a fishermen’s cooperative. These were not a success. • • • • • • The Kashf Foundation was established to serve two main objectives, alleviate poverty and economically empower women from poor households. It operates in urban, peri-urban and rural areas Kashf insists that it is not the usual poverty alleviation oriented NGO with “beneficiaries”, it is a service provider with “clients”. That said, surveys show that (in the survey areas at least), Kashf along with PIEDAR targeted the poor better than most other NGOs. Its target clients are working women. While women in peri-urban areas are relatively less restricted by gender and society compared with rural women since feudal and tribal mores have less of a hold, theirs is a hard lot from the point of view of work load and household resources. Kashf’s approach in improving the economic choices of the poor focuses on supporting those within the poverty bracket who have existing economic opportunities. These households earn slightly more than one US dollar a day, but certainly less than two dollars. Kashf’s targeting is precise, loans sizes completely appropriate to its clientele and its MIS and monitoring systems amongst the best in the NGO world. Its staff is keen and efficient. 55 The emergence of a new type of Community Organisations (COs) marks an interesting stage in the development process. Where previously local community based organisations tended to be of a charitable nature or narrowly focussed on particular interests, the new ones are clearly development oriented and have absorbed and apply many of the principles of participatory development originally fostered by a few larger support organisations. Not having the access to funds that larger support organisations have developed, independent COs have to live within their means which means greater reliance on activists and on networking, limited scope of operation and in the case of successful organisations, a very focussed approach. These COs are likely to be of growing importance as conduits for micro-credit to their member households. 56 3.3.1 The “Wholesalers” Three new funding agencies that aim at supporting efforts in poverty alleviation have come into existence in recent years, the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), the Khushhali Bank (KB) and the First Microfinance Bank. Of these, the PPAF is in its third year of operation and the direction of its effort is clearly visible. PPAF lists as its objectives the following: • • • To empower the poor and increase their incomes, especially women; To enable accessibility of disadvantaged communities to infrastructure and other services To strengthen communities/partner organizations through institution building support. As a fund, PPAF specifies that it is a “wholesaler” rather than a “retailer”, i.e., it provides funding to beneficiaries through partner organisations rather than directly. In the light of the preparation and degree of beneficiary organisation required for the successful use of micro-credit (see 3.2 above), this would appear to be a sensible strategy. PPAF’s program, type and source of funding can be summarised as follows: Category US $ 1. Services to the Poor Credit & Enterprise Development Credit Community Physical Infrastructure Grant Service Delivery Capacity Building/ Institutional Strengthening & Training of POs/ Communities/PPAF Total Source: PPAF 45 28 Amount Source World Bank World Bank 2. Grant 17 US$ 90 Million World Bank PPAF is run with a professionalism that is rare in the NGO sector. Its Eligibility Criteria for Partner Organisations are stringent, perhaps overly so. It has also developed an operational manual and detailed monitoring procedures which continue to evolve with experience. Its operations are also very transparent to the public - even rarer in the NGO sector. PPAF’s operations are however, bounded by two considerations, the parameters set by its board and the procedures mandated by its donor, the World Bank. Certain of its rules tend to weigh against smaller, newer and less organised (in a formal sense)organisations, such as: • It [the partner organisation] must have a proven track record of at least two years in the area of micro-credit/micro-enterprise, and three years for small-scale community physical infrastructure development financing. The organisation must have a proper accounting system supported by balance sheets and profit and loss account statements or income and expenditure statements with the minimum requirement of a cash book supported by a bank statement. The organisation must have a system of internal controls and external audits, in accordance with the relevant laws of its registration, with audit scope acceptable to the PPAF and annual audits by a reputable firm. It should be willing to accept mandatory external audits by a firm of Chartered Accountants acceptable to the PPAF. • • 57 There is much to be said in favour of upgrading an organisation’s financial procedures but it must be recognised that one of the reasons that donors show a preference for dealing with larger NGOs is that with more procedures at least nominally in place and more worldly-wise senior management, they are better able to “talk the talk” with donors. Small NGOs will also be less able to work their way around detailed and sometimes inflexible procurement or reporting procedures mandated by donors. An equal or more important reason for donor preference of large NGOs is the ability to disburse larger sums of money. At the risk of reading between the lines, PPAF feels these pressures and is obliged to modify its operations accordingly. To its credit, PPAF does strive to build the capacity of its smaller new partners to meet the conditions set. In earlier years no less than 91.6 percent of all PPAF funds disbursed have gone to the RSPs and 59.3 percent to NRSP alone. This does point to a fairly narrow concentration of resources and raises a challenge for the PPAF board and management to widen their focus to support a larger number of the smaller organisations now operating in the field. In its current and penultimate years, PPAF has indeed broadened its partner base and actively encourages new partners. Another point in the Eligibility Criteria states that the organisation must be financially sustainable, or must be on the path to sustainability. In this regard, it should have a realistic business plan for achieving self-sufficiency, and show steady progress towards that goal. This requires thinking through by PPAF. If the objective is to move partner organisations to a point of commercial self-sustainability, user charges for beneficiaries is likely to be high, especially for organisations with large overheads. PPAF through its infrastructure and capacity building windows and its lower than market interest rates already provides a level of subsidy to partner organisations. Weaning them towards commercial self-sustainability may be only a distant dream at this point. The other alternative is to recognise that some organisations such as certain types of foundations in other countries make fund-raising from the public, state and philanthropists an integral part of their activities. With the PPAF already operational and providing funds for micro-finance lending and capacity building to partner organisations, the rationale for Khushali Bank was originally to “retail” directly to poor borrowers. In practice it has needed the intermediation of NGO etc. to reach borrowers. A special relationship with NRSP allowed it to reach a very large number of borrowers in a short time. It claims approximately 80,000 borrowers and a 98 percent loan return rate. Having exceeded its targets it has been eligible for early release of the next tranche of funds from the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It must be noted that the scale on which KB is operating is large compared with most other microcredit organisations. Its expansion plans are even more ambitious and this is both a great opportunity and a considerable risk. This calls for an analysis of its working methods so that a flexible program of technical assistance is able to provide close support to its rapidly expanding operations. It is too early to evaluate KB’s program, however a support team with the help of spot surveys could determine i) ii) iii) iv) v) vi) How KB finds its potential borrowers How KB relates to communities and community organisations How KB coordinates with NGOs How does it target the poor What is the impact of its loans Methods of extending the effectiveness of KB’s outreach and lending program. It could be more effective for an umbrella organization to support the growth of community organizations in smaller, contiguous regions whether they are districts, tehsils or cut across these to serve areas with particular demographic, agro-ecological or economic characteristics. 58 Annex 8 Social Exclusion in the Provincial Participatory Poverty Assessments A summary of the main findings relating to social exclusion for each of the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPA) is presented below, for Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan, the Northern Areas, FATA, and AJK. 1. Punjab PPA In the Punjab, social exclusion is based on class distinction; caste, hereditary occupational group, and gender. It is strongly related to powerlessness, manifesting itself through the active exclusion of particular groups from political life, education, employment, health care, access to justice – including the exclusion of women. There is a widespread perception expressed by participants in the PPA that economic disparity determines social interaction. Perceptions of Poverty Perceptions of poverty include the following: wellbeing is related to physical location: (lack of access to main road is a major feature of a poor village; salinity, waterlogging as indicators of poverty and as a cause of impoverishment of inhabitants; poor flood and rainwater drainage; lack of facilities and basic services) landlessness status of being a tenant size of land holding dependency on daily wage labour for income debt physical disability lack of access to justice for women, lack of a male household head; women having to work to supplement household income eating barely one meal/day ill health as a major cause of people being unable to work lack of voice: “The voice of the poorest is not heard and not accepted”. - Gender is a basis for social exclusion, which is exacerbated by ethnicity and social custom. While Punjabi women have some voice, Pathan women are not “heard” at all. The ultimate consequences of social and economic exclusion were identified as: being forced into begging becoming a bonded servant to a wadera (landlord)57 being forced into prostitution crime, theft drug abuse (perceived as both being bred and perpetuated by poverty) Declining Social Capital In rural Punjab, social capital is often determined by the hierarchical biraderi system based on the social and economic status of families, clans, tribes and castes. This system maintains the traditional oppression of, and discrimination against, particular groups of the population by other groups of “higher” status. While inter-biraderi social capital may increase in the face of problems faced by those in poverty, this may be inadequate to compensate for intra-biraderi discrimination and oppression. Clan, Caste, Biraderi, Tribe Access to livelihoods is strongly determined by social factors, particularly caste and gender; as is social interaction, maintenance of social capital. Membership of a specific social group thus determines the 57 Entire families are obliged to go into bonded labour when a loan is not repaid during a debtor’s lifetime. 59 degree of access to livelihoods, benefits, and rights. (There is some confusion over terminology in relation to caste and biraderi, which are used interchangeably by some. Technically too, there is no caste in Islam, yet in Pakistan as shown in all the PPAs, there is de facto occupation and status-based caste stratification and segregation.58 Status & Access to Livelihoods Kammis (a low caste group in Punjab) are characterised by lack of assets, lack of capital, which increase their dependency on the more powerful castes for their livelihood options. “Higher” castes exclude kammis from sitting on local decision-making bodies, depriving them of their right to participate in decision-making; and even from benefiting from development schemes (or conversely, expressing a negative view of a potential development project). Decisions are imposed on them; they are excluded from social interactions; are denied justice from the courts and the police; are discouraged from sending their children to school; are excluded from accessing firewood, fodder; and from formal social safety net programmes such as zakat. Even when educated, people in low castes are denied their rights (such as inclusion in the dera or decision-making forum of zamindars), and find it difficult to break down the social dimensions of their poverty. In marriages, social interaction remains within a given socio-economic class: for example, kammis are invited to the functions of the rich only if they are needed for work. Access to Justice Gender and caste are determinants of access to justice. The low status of women in society compounds the problems experienced by the poor more generally in access to justice. Women first approach their family and elders, then only if that route fails, do they approach the police, where procedures, attitudes are so cumbersome and inhibiting that they feel there is no hope of accessing justice. Caste/biraderi membership is important in conflict resolution: issues are often resolved at biraderi level, without using formal channels: “we don’t go to the police station as we belong to the same caste and we settle our disputes among ourselves locally”. Unequal access to justice also compounds material poverty: for example, the poor have to pay the phatta (extraction) tax on animals, carts, shops, to local police and officials, whereas the rich have access to the police, politicians and the dominant caste of the locality, and can protect their interests. Inability to pay bribes prevents the poor from accessing gainful employment or benefits which might enable them to move out of poverty (in comparison with the rich, who have “approach” (sefarish) and can avoid payment of bribes. Dependency on the rich for labour and employment also contributes to the lack of access to justice of the socially excluded, since efforts to obtain justice on the part of such groups are rarely supported by local zamindars (land owners). In particular, for a poor family living on the land of the rich, there is the constant fear of their women being harassed or sexually abused: “a woman’s honour/respect is always at stake”. Another PPA participant described “being treated like slaves” because of living on the land of the rich. Access to Institutions The most direct engagement of the poor with government structures is via the union council. However the poor have limited access to union councils (which in themselves perform a limited role and are inefficient); and experience selectivity in provision of assistance from nazims/naib nazims. Even access to equitable land transfer processes is frequently denied to the socially excluded, with landlords conniving with local officials of a Finance and Revenue Department to get land transferred from the names of the poor into their own. 58 Some 40 castes were identified by participants in the Punjab PPA, of which two at least are not castes in the strict sense of the term, but rather ethnic groups: Baloch and Pathan. The identified castes were: Gunju; Khamna; Nai; Pawali; Bhatti; Machi; Charoey; Tirkhan; Syed; Muslim Shaikh; Shaikh; Kharal; Awan; Bhareri Baloch; Rajpu; Arain; Chamar; Lund; Rind; Jat; Dindar; Rana; Malik; Qureshi; Kumhar; Mirza Mughal; Butt; Kalro; Ansari; Gujjar; Ghaffari; Changar; Mochi; Biratha; Rana; Chadhar; Supra; Warrah; Kamboh; Wattoo; Mutt; Chuttey; Pakhiwa. Specific biraderis referred to in the Punjab PPA were Sundaila and Sathara; and tribes identified included Bugti, Marri, Zahid Khel; Bhaggar Khel; Kallo; Kohistani and Hazara (though the latter two are in fact ethnic groups). 60 Access to Rights Access to land ownership rights has a direct correlation with poverty. Land ownership in rural areas represents rights associated with livelihood (food, income, shelter and security; and in urban areas, shelter and security). Access to land ownership rights also has a gender dimension in the denial of land inheritance rights to women. Land fragmentation further contributes to impoverishment of disadvantaged groups: smaller land holdings mean owners till their own land, and do not hire the landless to work on it for them (and the rich get the poor to work for free). Denial of land rights leads to the curtailment of other rights – for example, landless citizens do not have the right to register their children, and thus could not vote in the recent elections (2001/2). Other rights which the socially excluded are denied are: access to credit and bribe-free loans the right to receive correct utility (electricity) bills the right to be paid their full wages, on time the right of passage through land; or onto land on which they live, particularly landless tenants who are frequently denied free access to their homes the right to canal water for irrigation despite payment of abiana (water charges) the right to receive the full amount of zakat due, without the distributor keeping back a portion of it the right to respect (expressed by women and men, young and old) Women’s rights included: the right to mobility, inheritance, choice in marriage the right “not to be sold” (in marriage, in a gambling debt) the right to freedom from violence the right to receive haq meher (money stipulated in the marriage contract as belonging to the woman) equal rights of access to education and to marriage as men The PPA highlights a lack of access to natural capital, with key natural assets especially land and water being owned or appropriated by the few. Land ownership is a key issue for moving out of poverty. The current situation whereby ownership of land is concentrated in the hands of the few not only decreases the assets available to poor people for their livelihoods, shelter and security, but also results in opportunities for, and the perpetuation of, socio-economic relations based on exploitation of the poor: (see p. 161). Lack of security of tenure results in increased vulnerability, with even those better-off falling into poverty; and food insecurity where people eat fewer meals, and thus a decline in human capital. Declining social capital due to increased poverty results in people become increasingly inward-looking for the solution of their problems and unable to take on assisting with meeting the needs of others. Socio-economic status influences access to justice, to credit, to safety nets. The poor in general are excluded from social and economic opportunity. Power is associated with size and ownership of agricultural land (p 162).. The fate of the poor is thus dependent on their relationship with the local landlord. The PPA concludes that devolution represents an opportunity to include the marginalised in decisionmaking at the local level. Local councillors, village committees can play a valuable role in monitoring public services – (but the issue of who becomes a council member – women, the lower status groups?) Institutions Institutions can assist, block or hinder people’s efforts to improve or transform their assets into income and other improvements in their lives. These elements include: 61 - elements of traditional social order in the district official organisations such as schools, courts, the devolution structure governmental or NGO anti-poverty interventions, such as micro-finance banks Institutions unfriendly to or exploitative of the poor identified in the Punjab PPA (see p.166) include: - the police, who are seen as partial towards the powerful and the influential at the local level; frequently engaged in extortion; harass the poor with false cases; and show lack of interest in combating crime - the providers of utilities, who demonstrate graft in installation of electric meters - dispensers of relief, including zakat committees which are often distributed to the relatives of committee members; misappropriation of relief funds - Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, which reportedly takes bribes for approving credit, and provides loans only to the well off and the influential. There were mixed reactions to the (relatively recent) local government devolution effort, with some perceptions that union councils were unable to use allocated money effectively. Formal Safety Nets Socio-economic status influences access to credit, justice, social safety nets. Institutions are unfriendly to/exploitative of the poor. The police are perceived by PPA analysts to show partiality towards the powerful and the influential at the local level, use extortion, harass the poor with false cases, and show a lack of interest in combating crime. Providers of utilities use graft in installation of electric meters; distribution of zakat funds to relatives of those on the zakat committee, relief funds are misappropriated. Bribes and commissions have to be paid for approving credit (even the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan); loans can be accessed only by the well-off and the influential. The poor in general are excluded from social and economic opportunities: (see p 167). Formal safety nets provide inadequate protection to the poor (pp 136). The zakat and bait ul mal programmes were perceived as being little use to the poor in times of crisis. The value of zakat was too small; the programme reached few of the needy; targeting was poor, with the money in fact going to the better off with connections to the zakat committee, and corruption further reducing the value of the transfer as bribes were required for the zakat to be received. In Punjab, payment by cheque seemed to have reduced corruption, (though in Sindh recipients said that bribes were still needed to get their zakat cheque). A number of problems were reported regarding the bait ul mal programme. Lower amounts than the agreed transfer being handed out; low-weight or adulterated grain sacks; very cumbersome procedures which inhibited access; cooption of wheat seeds and fodder by the malik and other influential people. Towards Greater Effectiveness of Informal Safety Nets Traditional informal safety nets include: fitra (given to the poor at the time of the Eids) “zakat in kind” financial support from relatives sadqa (help from the rich at the time of travel or illness in their families) among the Shi’a community, khumsa (giving one fifth of yields and money in a year) to poor Sayyeds only The first three, closely followed by sadqa, were given the highest rating by analysts. All ranked significantly higher than the formal zakat and bait ul mal programmes. Recommendations on Addressing Social Exclusion Tackling social exclusion is singled out in the Punjab PA as one of the five lines towards a route out of poverty: (i) increasing access to key livelihood assets; (ii) reducing vulnerability; (iii) making public institutions pro-poor; (iv) tackling social exclusion and gender inequality; and (v) improving access to justice. 62 Key natural assets, especially land and water, are owned (or appropriated) only by the few. This excludes the poor from access to natural capital (land, water, forests and pastures), and is critical in view of the dependence of a large proportion of poor households on natural resources. Land ownership is a key issue for moving out of poverty. The current situation (in Punjab) where ownership of land is concentrated in the hands of the few not only decreases the assets available to poor people for their livelihoods, shelter, security, but also results in opportunities for, and perpetuation of, socio-economic relations based on exploitation of the poor. Lack of security of tenure results in increased vulnerability; even the better-off falling into poverty; food insecurity, where people eat fewer meals with a resulting downturn in human capital (p. 161). Power is associated with the size and ownership of agricultural land. The fate of the poor is thus dependent on their relationship with the local landlord. p.166 Specific Recommendations on Social Exclusion Protect the rights of minorities so they have greater access to public institution ns and the political system Mainstream gender across policy design and implementation Repeal discriminatory laws, implement existing laws Target micro-credit to literate young women Introduce a national education programme on rights Ensure that accessible justice based on the rule of law is applied equally to rich and poor Reform the police service to make it more accessible to the poor Examine how existing informal justice systems can be made more pro-poor and more egalitarian. Devolution presents an opportunity to include the marginalised in decision-making at the local level. Local councillors, village committees can play a valuable role in monitoring public services (but the question remains of who is enabled/allowed to become a member of these institutions/bodies). 2. Sindh PPA The PPA provides strong support to the view that rural Sindh is in the grip of a deep-rooted process of decline, with the burdens being shifted to a dangerous degree onto some of its weakest members. Economic growth and social progress in Sindh is hampered by the twin factors of a challenging natural environment and a system of social inequality that has resisted serious efforts to reform it since Partition and before: (see p. 15). As importantly, as the PPA puts it: “Poor people are angry” (p. 143). Powerful new testimony is presented in the PPA (see p. 121) confirming that the zamindar-hari system in Sindh is a dominant feature of the lives of some of the poorest people in the province, and is a critical factor keeping them in poverty. However, extreme power imbalances are not just restricted to rural feudalism: (see p. 146). Access to Land The greatest single issue in rural Sindh is the social exclusion of the poor from ownership of, or reliable access to, agricultural land and related natural resources (water supply, grazing). (p 13) Especially for haris (tied agricultural labour or sharecropping tenants-at-will), the extreme inequality of land tenure is an absolute barrier to social and economic progress. This insecurity is caused by, and in some cases compounded by, the power of the landlords. The role of government departments either aggravates insecurity, or appears spineless in the face of feudal power. The absence of a role for civil society groups vis a vis the lives of the poor is acutely sensed. Social & Political Capital There is evidence from some PPA sites that traditional sources of social cohesion such as wangar (“to work for each other out of affection” eg in mutual assistance in crop harvesting or house construction) have become weakened, without new sources of social capital giving unity across the primordial loyalties of religion and class: (see p. 14). The independent political capital of the rural poor is non- 63 existent, with even voting patterns dictated and enforced by landowners, who effectively monopolise local power. Under such conditions even where democratic forms exist, democratic substance is unlikely to emerge. PPA case studies contained numerous examples of arbitrary exercise of power, including illegal contract revisions, widespread bonding of labour through debt, organised private violence or the threat of it, and the extension of landlord authority into every aspect of the life of haris and other local people. The effectiveness of the law is limited in many places, and access to justice for poor people, non-existent: (see p..16). Access to Justice Women and men spoke of how justice is a matter of informal processes, whereby local elders are approached and the final recourse is to the landlord. Both women and men were also fully aware of the formal system of justice, and mentioned cases where it was accessed. However because of the inefficient functioning of the formal legal system, the poor have no choice but to rely on the authority of the powerful. The findings of the PPA confirm the view that a legalistic solution to the “hari problem” in Sindh – that tries to work around the power realities of stemming from the land-holding system, is never going to work. Any debate on a poverty reduction strategy for Sindh, and any effort to move forward the debate on reviving the national fortunes of Pakistan, will have to take a new look at this issue. Landlord social dominance weakens the institutions of the state as a source of independent authority and redress. Under such conditions, both social violence in general, and specific abuses against women and very poor men, are bound to flourish. The frequency of validates stories of the quadruple victimisation of women, as members of ultradependent social groups; excluded from forums of decision-making and justice; defenceless in the face of different forms of sexual violence; and subject routinely to high rates of maternal mortality and illiteracy. Evidence on the fact or threat of “honour killing” is particularly shocking. Some of the stories strongly suggest that karo kari killing is being used deliberately as means of acquiring wealth as well as controlling women. These issues need to be approached as an integral element in the process of social decline. PPA participants in Sindh revealed a varied and sophisticated understanding of their situation. The causes of poverty are also recognised as including the actions of human beings and the structure of social institutions. Poor people who participated in the field exercises were strongly aware of social inequalities, and saw many of their problems as stemming from the unequal conditions within which they strive to make a living – in a number of instances, as directly reflecting their relation to the local landlord. Example of the Role of Debt in the Hierarchy of Poverty & Disempowerment in Goth Pachan Mori:59 Lowest Rustamanis – the poorest; haris (sharecropping tenants-at-will); the group most indebt to the landlord. Khaskeli clan – also poor haris; in debt Low Umrani – poor, but better off than the Rustamanis because they are less in debt to the landlord and feed one of his buffaloes, using its milk for themselves The “Better Off” Poor Menghwar – somewhat better off because they work as wage labourers for the landlord and manage to earn without getting into debt; own small shops so have better economic 59 See Sindh PPA, p 65 64 Villagers were in no doubt that the landlords, or the feudal system, traps people and is responsible for keeping them in a continual state of poverty. Villagers felt that if they were to get fair and proper payment for their labour, they would not remain poor. It is the extremely exploitative nature of the feudal system that maintains and perpetuates poverty in the rural areas of Sindh: (see p. 66). Access to Rights Throughout the PPA (urban and rural), corresponding to this sense of injustice is a fairly developed sense of rights being denied by the current economic, social and political situation in the province. There is a conception among the poor of what their basic rights are, and of being deprived of these rights. They show awareness of being caught in an economic and social system that oppresses and exploits them, and perpetuates the status quo. P66. Particularly vulnerable categories of individual include the disabled, widows, orphans, the very old and the very young when deprived of social support. Poverty for whole groups of people can arise from either short term shocks or more long terms, structural factors, or a combination of these. The structural causes include socio-economic relationships that embody extreme inequality and consequent opportunities for exploitation of the powerless by the powerful. There is a widespread perception by local analysts that although poor people have rights, these are systematically denied because of the unjust social structures that continue to prevail in Sindh. “Poor people are conscious of their deprivation, and are angry” (p. 70). Gender Women experience a lack of physical mobility (restricted by tradition, honour - izzat -and religion). Even where restrictions on physical movement are not applied, severe social limitations often still are – limited access to education, the Union Council, the panchayat (as a local conflict resolution mechanism). Even when considering an issue relating to women, they remain the preserve of men. The voting choices of women are dictated by the men of the household, and the men generally follow the lead of the wadera. However, some improvements in access to education and health care (p128). Women felt that television had played a particular part in this change. Election of women councillors was seen as an example of improvement. Domestic violence, or the threat of it, remains a feature of the lives of many women. In some parts of Sindh, women are treated quite literally as the property of the men in their families, and even as commodities to be bought and sold Claims about honour are being used as a device to obtain money, with accusations of adultery serving for financial gain: see p.130-131 for a description of how in Jacobabad the “value” of girls is set by age and complexion in four tribes. Generally, women have little influence over who they marry; and the impact of divorce is terrible for many. Honour Killings The threat of “honour killings” (karo kari) is a real factor in the lives of many women in Sindh, and is seen by many women as a mechanism ensuring women’s subordination and degradation.60 The PPA concludes that the manipulation and exploitation of women based on the threat or reality of “honour killing” is being used to cloak motives of material gain, and provide immunity to murders, and as such, requires urgent policy attention: (see p.133). Institutions The Revenue Department is viewed by the poor as an institution to be feared. Poor villagers see the numberdar as corrupt and malicious, dreading his visits because it entails paying him bribes to prevent incorrect assessments. (p134) Both the Agriculture Department and the Irrigation Department are widely viewed as unhelpful to the poor, and favouring the landlords (p134-5). Even to obtain an 60 Karo kari is a customary practice found in a number of areas in Pakistan whereby the woman and the man involved in an adulterous relationship are killed in order to restore the honour of the families concerned, wiping out the bad blood between them. In practice, the woman is much more likely to be killed because the man can run away. If only the woman is killed, then the parents of karo pay off the parents of kari or give one of their own daughters in exchange. However the practice is becoming increasingly an instrument for the oppression of women, and increasingly being used for economic gain or to justify simple acts of murder: see Sindh PPA pp. 31-132. 65 identity card, bribes are required. In a context of deteriorating law and order in both rural and urban areas, the role of the police in preventing and resolving crime was seriously questioned in many PPA sites, with bribery and extortion being common, and with some analysts claiming that criminals are being protected by the police. In border areas, the Rangers are seen as another source of oppression and exploitation of the poor (pp 140-141). In the area of justice, the PPA concludes that government forces are as much a part of the problem as the solution. Selected Policy Conclusions & Recommendations 1. The PPA findings show that “there is a deep sense of deprivation, helplessness, exploitation, frustration and injustice among poor people in Sindh. The poor are conscious of their deprivation, have a sense of their rights being denied, and are angry. If even half of the evidence reported is valid and reliable, the anger is on such a scale that the authorities would be well advised not to ignore it.” (Sindh PPA p. 143). 2. The poor have different kinds of “capital” to draw on in constructing their livelihoods and survival strategies, but these include: (i) natural assets which are vulnerable to destruction or degradation through the outcomes of events and policy actions; (ii) inequality in the distribution of private assets – particularly land and water - the range of which, and the nature of power being such that some are poor because others are rich; (iii) inequality in the distribution of public assets and key government services, which, if they were effective, would allow poor people to build up their human capital. International experience clearly indicates that no modern nation has developed successfully with social relationships similar to those prevailing today in large parts of rural Sindh. 3. Social protection policies and strategies should aim to reduce the actual risk or probability of shocks, mitigate the potential impact, and create an enabling environment to adapt and strengthen livelihoods rather than simply helping people cope with the impact once a shock has occurred. (p. 144) 4. The full weight of the government and the courts needs to be placed behind the efforts of national and international campaigns against “honour killings”, as a point of entry into the more general issues of gender-based oppression highlighted in the PPA reports. 3. NWFP PPA Identity of the Very Poor Although in all provinces in Pakistan there are large numbers of people who earn and consume very little, and whose human development indicators are low, however, particularly in rural areas of NWFP, the number of people below the poverty line in the 1990s was much higher than in the other provinces of Pakistan. Women and children suffer much of the worst poverty; and members of minority groups are over-represented amongst the poorest. The livelihood prospects of the poorest groups, particularly women and low castes, are also affected by extreme economic inequalities that persist in many rural areas; and the continued prevalence of social institutions and different forms of violence that impact negatively on their lives. Power Perceptions of poverty in NWFP encompassed more than economic dimensions, including nonmaterial concerns with social, political and cultural identity of different groups of poor people. Poverty was characterised by analysts in the NWFP PPA as a condition of powerlessness, including lack of political capital and therefore lack of influence on decision-making processes affecting livelihood strategies, options, choices. The poor and the very poor were often determined by socially constructed factors such as gender, ethnicity, caste, all of which amplify the nature of powerlessness. In the view of analysts, non-income poverty comprises: lack of voice (in decision-making) 66 - powerlessness social exclusion and stigma inadequate access to goods and public services illiteracy injustice and disrespect inability to cope with shocks and strains remoteness and physical isolation lack of peace and security adverse and stressful seasonal changes Social Exclusion & Vulnerability Belonging to a low caste (kammi), being woman, a child automatically predisposes people to vulnerability. Discrimination and stigmatisation reduces their access to basic services, livelihood opportunities, rights and support, increases their vulnerability and re-enforces the cycle of poverty. Even within these social groupings vulnerability was experienced differentially, with female children being more vulnerable than male children; and young women being more vulnerable than older women. The outcomes of social exclusion in NWFP include: an inability to participate in community networks and social events, due to lack of time, lack of resources to afford the cost of social networking, little to exchange and reciprocate the stigma of poverty as the basis for exclusion/inclusion rigid gender segregation encoded in the ideology of purdah; rigid definitions of public and private spheres which limit physical and social mobilityrural migrants and refugees are excluded from wider society and the public sphere on the basis of ethnicity and social identity caste as a socially constructed concept, but an important source of power, or lack of it Gender The status of women in NWFP was determined by their relationship with men (husband, brother, father, son), rather than in their own right (see p. 20). Women considered themselves to be treated as commodities. Domestic violence was considered common, which in its most extreme, took the form of murder (“honour” killing). Discrimination against female children manifested itself in terms of less access to food, healthcare and education, together with an increased burden of domestic work. Women suffered disproportionately from lack of participation in community networks and social events, with rigid gender segregation encoded in the ideology of purdah as the single most important basis of social exclusion for women: (see p. 21). Ethnicity & Caste In urban areas, migrants from rural areas and refugees were excluded from wider society on the basis of their ethnic and social identity. The majority of the traditional occupational castes (kammis – eg cobblers, carpenters, potters; barbers, masons, water carriers) are among the poor and poorest. They experience a stigmatised group identity, very low cultural status, an extremely limited role in decisionmaking; and their livelihoods depend on the wellbeing of the wider community. When the latter experiences a general decline in wellbeing, the demand for the services provided by the kammis falls, and they suffer loss of income and livelihood. Access to Credit & Safety Nets In times of stress, the poor and the vulnerable relied on borrowing to cope. With few assets to use as collateral, informal sources of credit are used which often result in bonded or child labour. Credit is arranged in return for a fixed term of labour. In some areas (see p. 25) child bonded labour was very common, with rates ranging from Rs. 2000-4000 per annum. When a household needs a bride price, this is often borrowed, and the groom may then be required to work as bonded labour for a certain number of years to work off the debt. 67 Safety nets which could prevent the poor and the vulnerable from turning to credit sources resulting in impoverishment were few and inefficient. Zakat was paid to selected people, but political affiliation and kinship were frequently the basis for selection criteria. Social Capital Social capital is the most important asset to reduce vulnerability and pursue livelihoods in times of stress, with the main forms of social capital in NWFP being relationships based on caste, kinship, friendship. However, the poor were less able to participate in community networks and social events, due to lack of time, lack of money, and the stigma attached to poverty. Access to Decision-Making The poor - particularly the socially excluded - suffer from a lack of access to decision-making. Both the informal (jirga) or formal systems for decisionmaking require political connections, as does accessing basic public services, and access to justice and wellbeing. Jirga composition is determined by caste, wealth, influence and gender. Gender inequity and lack of women’s participation in decisionmaking result in conspicuous vulnerability at the household level. However jirgas (preferred by the poor to formal systems) are undemocratic in composition and in role, being composed of the influential, the wealth, with no representation from lower castes, tribal and religious minorities, women and poor groups. Women experience social, political and economic exclusion due to being unable to participate in decision-making. Formal systems are widely seen as failing the poor. (Mal)functioning of formal public institutions severely limits the opportunities for poor people to move out of poverty in NWFP. Summary of Selected Policy Recommendations There are five main areas of policy recommendations, and one set of cross-cutting policy implications: (see pp. 28-29): Cross-cutting Policy Implications - interventions to support and strengthen livelihoods should not focus exclusively on one type of “capital” or asset - policymakers need to understand the potential impact of policies on all social groups and ensure that they do not impact negatively on the livelihoods and assets of the poor, or benefit the well-off at the expense of the poor. - gender-based discrimination and violence must be considered in all policy and strategy formulation Specific Recommendations 1. Environmental management 2. Employment and markets 3. Access to basic services and institutions, including affordable credit to the poor and the marginalised; affordable, accessible health care and education for all (including addressing demandside constraints on education via eg mobile schools); equality of access to government services; and affordable utilities 4. Safety nets and social protection, including improving funding levels, transparency and accountability of existing methods; identification of new mechanisms specifically for natural disasters. 5. Access to justice, including tackling lawlessness and crime effectively; placing extreme importance on elimination of gender-based crimes including “honour” killings, and increasing accessibility of formal justice systems and institutions to women; addressing corruption within the police and the judicial system; and providing a quick, cheap and efficient justice system accessible equally to all. 68 4. Balochistan PPA Access to Power & Rights Whilst lack of power was common to all those in poverty, socially constructed factors such as gender, ethnicity and caste amplified the nature of powerlessness: (see p.16). Women generally had low status, low access to assets and resources, low access to justice and low influence. Young women particularly suffered lower access to good clothing, food, and basic services such as education or healthcare, than men, despite being often burdened with heavier workloads than their young male counterparts. The very poor were considered by analysts to be widows with no support, orphans, the low caste, the disabled, the mentally ill. The poor are considered to include those who cannot feed guests, or those unable to afford a bride price. (The perspective of viewing women as commodities is exemplified by analysts remarks that if a woman did not take a bride price, she is taunted, disrespected, and “perceived of as a person with no value”): (see pp 16-17). Tribal structure is also a significant determinant of power, with the sardar (tribal chief) or malik (clan chief), followed by religious leaders and local politicians seen as wielding significant community-level power: (see p. 18). Poverty and vulnerability are closely tied in with the lack of power to influence decisions at household, community and policy-making levels. The unique tribal features and troubled political history of Balochistan have deep social influences on the lives of ordinary people in the province. Powerlessness is a fundamental experience of the poor, in all spheres of their social, cultural and economic life (see p. 61). This dimension of poverty has wide repercussions upon the ability of the poor to access formal structures and institutions in the areas of health, education, justice and credit: “Throughout my life I have seen poor people getting worse because they have no power. Sardar and government are the same, and they are never going to allow poor people to have any power” (81-year old poor male analyst, Kharan District, p. 61). At the household level, gender inequities and lack of women’s participation in decision-making are the most conspicuous elements of vulnerability, with analysts explaining in great detail the effects of powerlessness on their health and reproduction choices, their wellbeing, social status and mobility: (see p. 62) Rights Poor people in Balochistan stated that one of the main reasons for their poverty was that their rights were not being delivered – and their entitlements were ignored or suppressed, both institutionally and under the guise of tradition and culture. The source of this denial, together with the failure to deliver rights, is seen by analysts ars lying firmly with the government (p 18). Women were particularly excluded from exercising the right of access to basic government services, either from supply-side failure (inadequate school provision for girls; lack of female medical staff in a social context where women are required to be treated by women); or demand-side constraints (low value placed on female education within many families and communties). Women were denied equal rights in decision-making at both community and household level, including the right to choice in marriage. The ability of the poor to access their rights is limited first by institutions not supporting effective provision, exercise and protection of rights; and second by poor people being unable to afford to exercise their basic rights, even where these were provided. The perceptions of rights and entitlements of the poor in the PPA were a close reflection of what analysts felt was being denied to them, and the denial of which results in their poverty. (A direct correlation was made between perceptions of rights and entitlements, what rights and entitlements are felt to be denied to the poor, and how this results in their poverty: (see pp 65-66). Analysts were articulate and vociferous about their rights, and in many cases were aware of why their rights were 69 being suppressed, and by whom. However, this awareness was also accompanied by considerable helplessness. Exclusion from Political Processes Political capital in the PPA sites was heavily concentrated in the hands of the few. Poor people viewed political power as being enjoyed only by the better-off and the rich. Minority groups such as the darzada (low-status occupational caste of blacksmiths) were generally excluded from mainstream political processes. Overall, minority ethnic groups, and lower castes suffered from more limited access to assets, basic services, institutions, rights and justice. In at least one PPA site (Killa Saifullah), the poor were considered to be ignored even within the tribal jirga system -(the most significant decision-making institution at the local level in Balochistan PPA sites, being perceived of as quick and fair, with little or no government interference.) However, women had no representation on any jirga, and overall, had no access to justice. Caste Caste is also a major factor in determining poverty, with darzada households being called in to work at weddings or deaths. People from low castes had no rights, and if they did not obey the orders of the “notables” in the area, they faced dire consequences. Low castes were extremely vulnerable, given no respect by others, and not considered to be equal with others. (see pp. 23-24; 63). However, low status, yet internal cohesion and social capital was visible within a zikri low-status minority clan: (see p. 104105). Policy recommendations on caste include: - the general exclusion of low castes from mainstream village life and decision-making requires policy consideration at various levels. Legislation, policies and strategies should engage service delivery agencies to ensure that minority groups are not discriminated against in provision of social services, employment opportunities, or in dispensation of justice. Inequality of Access to Natural Resources: Land & Water Unequal land distribution was a feature of some PPA sites in Balochistan, where 50% of the land was owned by three individuals: (see p. 68). Water was regarded as the most critical natural resource, particularly in a context of drought. Lack of Access to Formal Credit Formal credit sources were considered to be inaccessible, unaffordable and corrupt. They are considered inaccessible to the poor and the very poor because they had no collateral and procedures are too complicated, with bribes often being demanded for sanctioning a loan. Poor people obtained credit from informal sources – family, shopkeepers, landlords, and professional moneylenders. Even informal sources of credit can have serious negative impacts on the poor. People tend to be able only to access loans at a time when they or their relatives have land as collateral. Failure to repay can have dire consequences – including kidnap or even murder. It can also create a cycle of indebtedness, which when it reaches unrepayable proportions, can lead to bonded labour, or the sale of assets, even daughters, to repay a debt: (see pp 114-115; 122). 5. Northern Areas PPA Poverty status was found to depend on gender, age, tribe/caste, religion, family structure, and local conditions. Analysts perceived three levels of poverty – community, household and individual. Whole communities could be poor due to isolation. Within communties, households could be poor due to ethnicity; and within households, individuals could be poor due to gender. 70 Ethnicity & Caste Ethnicity and caste determine access to basic services and rights. Both the Dome and Gujjar ethnic groups felt that they lacked access to development resources, or government and NGO serviceproviding institutions. Belonging to the Dome ethnic group61 meant being socially excluded, having less access to assets and resources; being less respected than other non-Dome community members; and not being a member of, or represented on, the village jirga. Minority groups were often excluded from mainstream village affairs and political processes, thus increasing their isolation and marginalisation. Both groups felt they were discriminated against in both the economic and the social spheres – for example, in matrimonial relationships, being treated as an inferior class, exclusion from livelihood systems such as rights to common property (forests, pastures) in villages to which they had migrated. Inter-tribal ethnic conflict was considered to be a major cause of poverty, preventing consensus over development schemes; and resulting in cooption of income by the few, and exacerbation of local political rivalries (see p. 88). Gender Within Gujjar households, women were particularly marginalised and discriminated against, sometimes not even able to eat from the same plates as men. Women generally had low status, low access to assets and resources, low access to justice, and low influence. They also often had much heavier workloads than young men. Widows without support, the disabled, and households with disabled heads were considered particularly poor. (p16) The tradition of bride price (zhup) reduced the status of women to mere commodities in some communities, also causing indebtedness and the selling of land and livestock by the groom’s family. The tradition of dowry too – whilst seen as a right for women – also led to the taking of loans from banks and relatives, pushing some households into poverty. The preference for male children was seen as pushing men into taking second wives, thus increasing household size and the burden on its assets and resources: (see p. 83). Overall, the status of women varied between ethnic groups, with Ismaili women having a perceived higher status than women from Gujjar households, and better access to education: (see p. 17). Age While older analysts reported enjoying greater access to decision making at household and village level than the young, conversely, they also felt they had fewer rights to better clothing and in some instances, to health facilities. Selected Policy Recommendations These centred on four main areas: (see pp. 25-26): 1. 2. 3. 4. Strengthening livelihoods by increasing access to, control over, and quality of a diverse range of assets and resources Reducing vulnerability and providing adequate social protection Eliminating discrimination based on gender, ethnicity or caste Ensuring equal access to justice regardless of gender or social status Elimination of Gender, Ethnic or Caste-based Discrimination Gender-based discrimination must be considered in all policy and strategy formulation to ensure that women benefit fully and are not marginalised further. Government must ensure that minority groups are not discriminated against in the provision of social services, employment opportunities, or in the dispensation of justice. Both supply side and demand side constraints on the access of women to basic services must be addressed. Cultural and traditional discrimination must be addressed through strong and effective policies and strategies, backed by the political and judicial will to implement them fully. 61 Originally the Domes were in-migrants from Kashmir, brought in as musicians and skilled labour during the Rajgi era, which was terminated by the government in 1973. 71 Ensuring Equal Access to Justice, Regardless of Gender or Social Status Addressing the subjects of crime, disorder and police corruption should be a central focus in any political platform or policy initiative to promote development and reduce poverty Access to affordable and fair justice for the poor and the marginalised and particularly for women must be increased 6. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Poverty status is dependent on gender, age, tribe/caste, religion, family structure, and local conditions. Tribal identity is particularly important in FATA; and gender is strongly associated with poverty status, with women lacking power and influence within both the household and the community. Rights to justice and freedom were strongly articulated in FATA by analysts, but oppressive systems of governance and socio-cultural norms were seen as denying these rights to many. In particular, the freedom to make decisions was repeatedly identified as a fundamental right by many analysts. Women and young men were unable to exercise their right to freedom of expression, and the right to vote was often denied to the poor, but particularly to women. Both men and women were reportedly consistently denied their right to inheritance, even though there was awareness that Islam gives them this right. Tribal Ethnicity Social exclusion is experienced particularly by members of powerless tribes (eg the Dotani or Suleiman Khel in South Waziristan who are poor due to their low share in the tribal nikkat system, under which rights of access to resources and services are allocated according to the number of warriors in a tribe); widows with dependent children. Its outcomes include being viewed with contempt, not being called by one’s name, and not being able to sit with others on public transport; lack of voice, exclusion from social events and occasions; and for women, denial of the right to vote: (see Table 2, p. 13). The jirga is the main decision-making forum, though its membership was restricted to men from powerful tribes. Land disputes were the main cause of conflicts including access to common property; and sometimes sectarian strife, drawing in the entire tribe or sub-tribe of conflicting households (see p. 22). Insecurity, or inability to access and obtain justice kept the poor in poverty and could push even the better-off into poverty. The maliks are the key liaison between the local population and government, making them and the tribes they belong to, very powerful. The number of maliks selected by the government and local people from each tribe conforms to the ratios apportioned under the nikkat system of allocation and distribution of resources and rights. Gender Women’s lives were characterised by seclusion and restricted mobility; limited or no access to assets and resources; few or no rights; no influence in decision-making even over their own marriage (though the latter applied to men also but to a lesser degree); and gender-based violence. Women had limited levels of social capital and extremely low levels of political capital, with their identity being strongly linked with that of a male family member (father, brother, husband). Male-dominated tribal identity is the key determinant of social capital, and women reflected this capital as an appendage, rather than in their own right. Purdah was strictly imposed on young girls and women, even within their own homes. Rigid tribal norms severely restrict women’s mobility, and women analysts perceived that there are more restrictions on women now than formerly, with women being prevented even from going to the homes of relatives. Restricted mobility impacts on women’s access to education and basic health care. As in other areas of Pakistan where this is the norm, the tradition of bride price (wulwar) reduced the status of women to that of commodities, with women purchased from their families for prices ranging from Rs. 100,000-Rs. 300,000. Women were also given as compensation to settle disputes (see p. 15), and as a consequence were usually treated very badly in the homes of their husbands. In South Waziristan, the custom of spin thore (similar to karo kari in Sindh) allows for any couple suspected of an illicit relationship to be murdered – even on allegation alone – which was perceived to often be a cover for a more sinister financial motive, such as land inheritance (p. 15). Women also expressed 72 their right to protection from violence and cruelty by men - (a particular problem when men gamble, when if they lose, they become violent and at times even sell their wives to cover losses). Being a woman in FATA meant generally having less access to resources than men; limited access to, and even less control over natural capital, particularly land: (see p. 20 ). Religious Identity Religious identity and affiliation with religio-political groups increasingly determined power status, though it remained less dominant than traditional tribal identities. (see p. 21). Summary of Selected Policy Recommendations The four main policy recommendations (see pp. 22-23) were: 1. 2. 3. 4. Increase access to, and control over a diverse range of resources and assets. Reduce vulnerability and provide adequate social protection Eliminate discrimination based on gender or tribal identity Ensure equal access to justice regardless of gender, tribe or social status Reduce Vulnerability and Provide Adequate Social Protection take a broad view of social protection to include risk reduction, impact mitigation and coping strategies improve current formal safety net funding, transparency, accountability examine other possible mechanisms for provision of social protection, including support for traditional tribal mechanisms Elimination of Gender or Tribal Identity-based Discrimination address supply side and demand sides constraints on women’s access to basic services address bride price implement strong and enforceable laws to eliminate domestic violence against women ensure that minority groups are not discriminated against in provision of social services, employment opportunities or in the dispensation of justice examine the nikkat system on the allocation and distribution of resources and rights, and particularly government services and programmes address cultural and traditional discrimination through strong and effective policies and strategies, backed by the political will to implement them fully Ensure Equal Access to Justice formal institutions dispensing justice should be made more effective and more transparent examine policies to ensure the increase of affordable, fair justice for the poor and the marginalised, particularly women the Frontier Crimes Regulation should be seriously reviewed to ensure affordable and fair justice for the poor and the marginalised, particularly women, is increased examine strategies to prevent the exchange of women in the resolution of disputes and the enforcement of justice through informal or semi-formal institutions, eg the jirga consider strategies to increase the representativeness of the jirga as a provider of justice, and address the exclusion of women and minority tribes 7. Azad Jammu & Kashmir PPA Levels of poverty and wellbeing are unequally distributed both within and between households. The basis for inequality includes biraderi, religion, gender and age. Azad jammu & Kashmir (AJK) does not display the strong feudal characteristics seen in other parts of Pakistan, analysts none the less locate the success or failure of their livelihood strategies overwhelmingly in their social position in the community, with tribal, caste, clan, religious and gender identities all being significant. These 73 identities largely determine the levels of social and political capital that people see as crucial to access institutions, resources, cope with shocks, or exploit positive economic trends. Gender Women and girls are in a relatively weak position socially, economically and politically compared to men and boys. Four issues were flagged as important in gender discrimination: access to education and health care; workload, decisionmaking and control over assets within the household; participation in community activities; and sexual harassment. While the condition of women has improved in terms of access to health care, education and skills, their social position remains unchanged, and discrimination on the basis of social, cultural and religious tradition remains common: (see pp. 19-20). Poor women from minority tribes are the main victims of sexual harassment, violence and abuse but rarely feel able to report these crimes to the police for fear of reprisals, since perpetrators are usually men from more powerful tribes. Biraderi & Access to Rights Biraderi, as well as gender, play major roles in perceptions of and access to rights. Majority or dominant tribes had greater access to rights than minority tribes; and men had greater access than women. Some participants showed reluctance to discuss the rights that they should have access to and control over, and actions they should be able to carry out, for fear of reprisals from local influential people (p. 20). Men and women prioritised rights differently. Women were more likely to refer first to rights to participate in decisionmaking, and to access clean water and education facilities as fundamental rights - (indicative of those they felt were most consistently denied). An overarching lack of political rights meant that in general, access to these rights was very poor for all communities in AJK. However, it was particularly limited for minority tribes and religions, women and the poor. There are strong socio-economic hierarchies between genders, age groups, and biraderis, as well as high levels of cohesion, ooperation and support within these groups. However, intra-biraderi cohesion is declining, and is often inadequate compensation for inter-biraderi oppression and conflict. Many analysts resided in villages where conflicts based on sect, religion, or tribe are a significant and increasing part of life. Tribal and sectarian conflicts increase during election periods. Those at the bottom of the social structure feel more insecure in terms of vulnerability to crime and conflict, and do not feel that formal systems of security and justice are accessible to them. P.25 Bonded Labour In AJK, repressive forms of tenancy or bonded adult labour are relatively uncommon. Feudal forms of landlord-tenant relationship are uncommon, because few tenants are themselves landless; and sharecropping arrangements are relatively egalitarian. Bonded labour of adults has largely disappeared since being outlawed, though instances of debt bondage still occur. However, child labour occurs across the area, and is affected by biraderi or tribe – children from minority tribes more often work outside their own household in the homes of the well off, whilst those from majority tribes are less likely to do so (p24-25). Informal justice mechanisms (jirgas, panchayats) were preferred to formal ones, which mean lengthy procedures, high costs due to bribes, and a low likelihood of justice being achieved. Pursuing justice through the courts was seen as lengthy and complicated. Official justice systems were seen as particularly inaccessible by women, the poor, and members of minority groups. However within informal systems, favouritism is common, and they are becoming increasingly politicised, with minority tribes, the poor and women again being excluded from decision-making. Summary of Selected Recommendations The four main recommendations of the PPA were: 1. fight biraderi-ism through encouraging community level organisation and participation; improve public and private sector accountability through monitoring 74 2. 3. 4. fight gender-based discrimination and violence, including adopting, implementing and monitoring a “zero tolerance” policy to gender-based harassment, abuse and violence; implementation of rights-awareness programmes for local institutions and communities; increasing access to girls’ post-primary education; female friendly, pro-poor health services foster sustainable use of natural resources recognise and manage the various effects of the Indo-Pakistan conflict on border livelihoods 75 Annex 9: The Use of the Media to Combat Social Exclusion and its Potential Role in Promoting Social Change Imran Rizvi & Samar Abbas 76 List of Acronyms CBO --- Community Based Organization CESSD --- Community for Effective Social Service Delivery CTV --- Cable Television FAB --- Frequency Allocation Board LHV --- Lady Health Visitor LHW --- Lady Health Worker LMDS --- Local Multi-point Distribution Service MMDS --- Multi-channel Multi-point Distribution Service NGO --- Non-Governmental Organization NRB --- National Reconstruction Bureau PBC --- Pakistan Broadcasting Company PEMRA --- Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority PRSP --- Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PTA --- Pakistan telecommunications Authority PTV --- Pakistan Television SPTV --- Shaheen Pay TV WRC --- Women’s Resource Centre 77 The Use of the Media to Combat Social Exclusion and the Potential Role in Promoting Social Change ‘Poverty has many dimensions and they combine to create and sustain powerlessness, lack of voice, and a lack of freedom of choice and action.’ Context The key to sustainable development in Pakistan depends on involving and invoking participation at all levels of stakeholders, including those marginalized by our society and by societal norms. Their participation, in the development process is vital, as they-- women, the disabled, religious minorities, ethnic minorities, and the landless--represent at least more than 60% of our population. For their active participation they need to be reached out to and realized of their own worth. The key to reaching out to them is social communications using media channels. But reaching out to them to create knowledge of their own worth isn’t enough. There has to be a two-way flow of communication, their voices and concerns need to be heard and reflected in development policy, programmes and projects. Recent efforts of the governments’ commitment to empower grassroots level participation in policymaking and decision-making spheres include the creation of the National Reconstruction Bureau and the formulation of the devolution plan. The devolution plan aims at involving the least represented segments of the society; special seats have been reserved for women, labourers and peasants. Local decisions are to be made by locally elected officials. The devolution plan so far has had mixed results. While many powers have been delegated to local bodies, some eternally marginalized groups continue to remain excluded from decision-making. Women councillors have complained of being harassed and of not being consulted in issues pertinent to localities. The presence of minority representatives remains primarily symbolic. Social Communication efforts that animate interpersonal and institutional mechanisms, such as Lady Health Workers (LHWs), Women Resource Centres (WRC), Community Based Organizations (CBOs), Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) is essential. All these initiatives use a variety of media channels to raise awareness about their presence and their commitment to ensuring participation and capturing the voices of the marginalized. Existing Use of the Media Historically, all formal forms of media—newspapers, radio, TV—have been regulated and monitored by the state. While private ownership of newspapers allowed a greater level of freedom, it was far from complete. In recent years, with the opening up of the country to foreign media through satellite and the internet, and the licensing of private radio and TV operations, state policies towards the media have been forced to change (documented later). Currently, all formal forms of media are being used by both the government and NGOs to disseminate information to invoke social change. The devolution process is another such example. State TV and radio were used as forums for discussions in which politicians, analysts, and representatives from civil society were involved. Newspapers in all languages carried full coverage of the plan as it evolved. NRB media cells were used to convey every step in the progress of the plan, which was then debated in the press. Local communities were involved by engaging traditional kutcheries and nambardars, and through announcements from mosques and government-dispatched vehicles. Packages including translated and easy to understand versions of the plan were kept at council office to be accessed by the public freely. Government policy, has in recent years become more accommodative to the use of media and electronic media is being opened up. Formal media still has quantified following. The print media cannot reach the illiterate masses, and electronic media is of little use in non-electrified rural areas. And it is these groups that are most socially excluded from the system. The following section looks into the respective uses and limitations of various forms of media before going on to discuss their role with respect to social exclusion. Informal Media 78 Informal forms of media have, in the past, been kept out of the control of the government. Mosques, shrines, Hujras, teashop gatherings, panchayats, Autaqs, Kutcheries, Baithaks, Chopals and jirgas, to name a few, have been used at the micro level by communities for communication. This decentralization, while extremely effective, has had undesirable effects such as isolating communities and keeping traditional exclusion insulated from the scope of scrutiny. Recently, steps have been taken to regulate these community based means to influence change at the local level. This combination of formal and informal forms of media has been used in Pakistan with some success. Informal media used by the government and NGOs include lady health workers (LHWs), lady health visitors, and programme packages including easy-to-understand information booklets, audiotapes and posters. The Pakistan polio programme that initially met with scepticism by conservative and less informed segments of the society has been turned into a success through the use of these media. Recently, the Rural Support Programme Network, (RSPN) has also used media tools, such as video taping opinions of the grass root communities, to make sure that the voices of the poor were included in the PRSP process. Additionally the AURAT Foundation is also using their WRCs, to create knowledge and ownership of the marginalized women in the PRSP process through posters, and other media tools. Through these media tools they are also spreading awareness about the Khushali Bank and its micro credit scheme. Print Media Newspaper readership broadly follows the pattern of literacy in Pakistan. Gallup estimates 60% of urban and 35% of rural Pakistanis read newspapers. Newspaper readership is 31% in urban areas (compared with 75% TV viewership), 26% in the electrified rural areas and only 18% in the nonelectrified areas. English language newspapers reach a small but influential segment of the population, living for the most part in the cities and large towns. It is Urdu newspapers and (in Sindh) Sindhi dailies which account for the mass readership of newspapers, whether in urban or rural areas. Apart from one newspaper, with a limited readership, being published from Peshawar in Pashto, there are no regional language newspapers in the country. A lack of Punjabi language newspapers means that a large chunk of Punjab’s rural population—which accounts for the largest rural population in the country—stays without a mode of information in its mother tongue. Urdu media is relatively accessible in its reach to the urban middle classes and the literate rural populations. Its biggest problem seems to be that of sensationalism that stems from commercialism. In trying to gain readership, Urdu papers usually portray groups equally excluded from the society in a way so as to gain maximum approval. The portrayal of girls who choose to marry of their own will as ‘beautiful maidens who run off with’ someone is one such example. Not only does it reinforce stereotypes, but also makes it difficult for such marginalized groups to come out of their exclusion. Further, Urdu press seems to show little faith in policies enacted by the state, and through its representation of facts—again designed to sensationalize—it presents a rather negative image of affairs. English press, though restricted in readership, can be used to inform policy makers. It is generally freer and more open than Urdu press. It can be effectively used for conveying the message from the masses to the top, thus making policy makers more aware of the real life day-to-day issues. Regional language press, though not developed yet, except for in Sindh, can be used to reach out to rural classes. It can be particularly useful in localizing the message and thus involving local populations in lateral communication. Gallup has recently conducted a survey of newspaper readership across Pakistan. This provides data on readership not only by province but also by different parts of each province. It shows readership for different newspapers and would make it possible to match newspapers to target audiences, both geographically and to some extent by income. This survey would be an invaluable tool in the planning of any media campaign in different parts of the country. TV 79 According to Gallup, there are approximately 43 million TV viewers in Pakistan out of a total population of about 145 million. This includes 24 million urban viewers and 19 million rural viewers. TV viewing among adults (approximately 55%) is now much greater than radio listening (32%). The most significant recent development in the television field is the growth of satellite channels serving Pakistani audiences. New channels include Geo-TV, ARY, Indus Vision and the Sindhi language channel KTN, which is popular in both rural and urban Sindh. In 2002 Gallup estimated that around 30% of TV homes were watching satellite TV – an increase of 18% over two years. There will have been further penetration of satellite TV over the past year, though this has not been measured. In the urban and peri-urban areas of Pakistan, satellite TV channels like Geo are now serious competitors for state-run PTV and regarded as more credible by many viewers. However, PTV still has the greatest reach of all television channels and is accessed by 6 or 7 times as many people as satellite TV in the rural areas. According to Gallup, of an estimated rural TV audience of 19 million only around 2.5 million watch satellite TV, though these numbers are increasing rapidly as cable TV spreads to the districts. Though TV’s penetration of urban areas is high and there is much public viewing of TV in teashops and bazaars, many of the poorest urban dwellers living in slums or shantytowns do not access TV regularly. Consequently, special provision may need to be made to reach these segments of the population. Further, female viewership is significantly lesser than that for men, mainly because of limited personal ownership and the socially unacceptable nature of women sitting around and watching TV in bazaars and teashops. This further strengthens the grasp of exclusion as all-male audiences watch women on TV as merely objects of desire, and refuse to allow the same rights as ‘the women on TV’ to women in their own households. The concept of the male patriarchy’s izzat (honour) and dignity attached with the women is further strengthened rather than being weakened. Further, though TV is the most useful means of reaching urban and electrified rural populations, its message in terms of social exclusion can lose its meaning because of excessive censorship and depiction of certain classes as ‘good’ and others as ‘bad’ members of the society. While PTV censors music videos and concerts, the youngsters enjoying music in TV plays are also shown robbing banks on motorcycles. In patriotic plays, the enemies of the country are always shown as either ‘bad’ Muslims (again listening to rock music) or Hindus working against Islam. Radio Radio has been losing ground to television in Pakistan for many years but PBC with its many provincial and district stations remains the most effective means of reaching the non-electrified rural areas. PBC is also in a better position than television to make programmes serving specific localities and language groups. In the large cities, radio ownership is only 35% compared to 77% for TV ownership. In urban Pakistan as a whole, radio ownership is 41% compared with 65% for TV. Only in the un-electrified rural areas is radio more widespread than television. In urban Pakistan, FM has become a significant player, with private sector radio (FM100) well ahead of its PBC competitor (FM101). FM100 is heard by 50% of the urban radio audience compared to 16% listening to FM101. PBC is soon to face new competition from a series of freshly licensed FM stations. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) recently issued over 25 new commercial FM licences for the urban areas and the stations are expected to go on air from August onwards. Most of them are expected to be music-based but there is no restriction on news and current affairs or spoken word programmes and the new stations will present opportunities to reach wider urban audiences. PEMRA is also considering issuing licenses for community-based radio stations, whether in town or country, though no decision has yet been made. Once community-based radio has been set up, it can be used to encourage participation and debate on the local level, and key exclusion issues can be addressed in a local context. 80 While private radio remains the freest form of media in the country, it is not allowed to work without unnecessary censorship either. Despite the movement to liberalise the broadcast media, the state still wants to retain total control. An apt example of this is a private radio in Mithi, which has been granted a license to operate. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority recently cancelled the radio’s license for airing Hindu prayers ignoring the fact that it is situated in a Hindu-majority area and thus catering to its listenership. The license was restored after promises by its operators not to broadcast “bhajjans” in the future. Media, Social Exclusion and Rights The ancient linguistic and culturally diverse nature of Pakistan has resulted in a lack of communication and interaction between different groups within the social structure. Pakistan is far from one unified pyramidal structure, different groups identified through their linguistic, cultural and sometimes religious identity exclude others. The patriarchal nature of our state is designed to exclude the youth and women. The familial system of landholdings, and the resulting arrangement of castes, is designed to exclude the landless and the artisans. The educational system is designed to exclude those who cannot afford private education. The ‘national language’ excludes the rural majority. The political system excludes everyone but the educated, religious scholars or the landowners. The list could go on. The task that we face is to bring each and every one of these countless forms of exclusion to the forefront, to expose them and to eventually include them into the system. Communication is the key. However, this communication cannot be only top-down as has been the case historically for that does not give a voice to the voiceless. To address exclusion communication processes also need to involve communities and address the voiceless. This communication from a human rights perspective gives a voice to the voiceless claim holders, so they can express themselves and be heard in modes that are indigenous and authentic to them. The aim is to enable duty bearers to listen to the opinions of the marginalized and the disempowered, so that all viewpoints can be considered and included in decision making. The following section seeks to identify some of the critical prevailing forms of exclusion currently faced and how the media is itself has perpetuated to their exclusion. Exclusion by Gender Pakistani women have been ceaselessly excluded from all spheres of life. The legal system has been altered to target women for exclusion. The Hudood laws have destroyed more lives than they have saved. In the house, a female is to be submissive to first her father and brothers, and then to her husband and his family. Female literacy is nowhere near male literacy; society would rather keep the girl child at home, where she is supposed to belong. Female child mortality is much greater than male child mortality; and those who grow old enough live in the constant fear of being killed for honour. With special seats now reserved for women, the situation has been ameliorated slightly and is improving. Women parliamentarians and local council members are slowly being involved and consulted on key policy issues. The role of the media in excluding women has been mixed and deeply segmented. In cinema, women have never been shown as anything but objects of desire for a predominantly male audience (with the exception of when she is playing the hero’s mother, where she is the epitome of virtue: another stereotypical depiction). In TV and radio, the roles have been more diverse. For example a very famous and highly viewed drama, ‘Sitara and Meher ul Nisa,’ addressed the societal injustices faced by two equally good sisters that simply differed on the basis on their physical beauty. In the ends the not-sopretty but amiable sister Meher ul Nisa, lives happily ever after. But such dramas are a rarity and mostly TV has reinforced existing stereotypes of women. Urdu dramas on TV, have not completely put a halt on the portrayal of a ‘good’ daughter as the one who pushes a food trolley for her in-laws-to-be, and they often continue to show ‘Morally decrepit’ women speak in English to their Urdu speaking families. Respectable Urdu morning newspapers run pictures of women smiling, or enjoying themselves at a social gathering, on the front pages to attract attention. Evening newspapers rarely bother with news, often running a large picture of a Hollywood star on the front somewhere near the news report of a young girl who ‘ran away with her lover’. The coverage that women who choose to marry of their own will, or who have already been honour killed because of that ‘act’, is hardly ever 81 sympathetic in the vernacular press. English press tends to be more sympathetic towards women’s causes, because of its largely different readership. Local channels of communication are the biggest culprit as far as gender exclusion is concerned. Society is not supposed to notice a ‘respectable family’s’ daughter, so if anyone is even talking, that is considered bad. These channels of communication effectively ensure that women are locked up in their houses. Media’s portrayal of the conception of beauty is highly discouraging. In line with tradition, fair skin is portrayed as being superior to darker skin, contributing to insecurities already embedded in the society’s psyche. Religious minorities in Pakistan have faced exclusion in many ways. While the constitution guarantees rights to all citizens, certain legal loopholes have always ensured that religious minorities face the brunt of persecution. The Blasphemy laws, invoked to protect Islam, have always been used as a tool to seek personal revenge from members of minority communities. The role of the media has hardly been sympathetic towards minorities. All forms of media have officially maintained, and continuously highlighted, the tolerance that Islam has towards minorities. The Ahadis before the news bulletins on TV and radio ask us to be kind to non-Muslims, and the newspapers run those Ahadis as well. But, apart from that the media has not been particularly considerate. Movies, and TV and radio plays portray Hindus of all sorts as the enemies of Pakistan and of all Muslims. The villain’s sidekicks in many movies carry Christian names. Religious and political talk shows continuously talk about the Jewish-Hindu nexus. Leaders of the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat movement, the movement that succeeded in Qadianis being branded as non-Muslims, are glorified as heroes of Islam and the saviours of Pakistan. Print media continues, in editorials and reports, to warn of non-Muslim conspiracies against Pakistan. Minorities are thus automatically branded as the internal enemies of the state. Exclusion by Religion “. [A]dequate provision shall be made for the minorities to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures freely...” --Preamble to the Constitution “295-C Whoever by words, either spoken or written or by visible representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Mohammed (PBUH) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine” “298-C Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves Ahmadis or any other name), who directly or indirectly, posses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine” “Quaid-e-Azam saved us from the Hindus”. --Textbook, 2nd grade. Exclusion by Age Demographically over 60% of Pakistan’s population is comprised of young people below the age of 25. Pakistani youth are made to feel marginalized at numerous levels. Exclusion from family decisions, a lack of political representation and a social voice keep the youth out of any involvement at any level. The media’s role in youth issues is deeply divided. On one end private radio, satellite TV and the English press address youth issues as youngsters form an important component of their revenues. Private channels such as Indus Music clearly are intended for the young and accepting of Pakistan. Youth interests and activities such as rock music used to be portrayed as antisocial activities that 82 threaten to rip the fabric of the society apart. However ever since the introduction of Indus Music, young talent from all corners of Pakistan has been introduced. The liberal distribution of private TV channels has brought about this change. On the other end, state media and the vernacular press continue to reassert the patriarchy. In soap operas and the cinema, even though love triumphs over social norms, it is the ‘normal’ patriarchal structures that are shown restored in the end. Exclusion through Land Ownership The traditional social division of the landed and the landless stands largely unchallenged and ignored by mass media and informal channels of communication alike, if not enhanced. Dialogue that aims to bring together different strata of the society is more or less nonexistent; when social issues are seriously presented the relationship between the landed and the landless is left largely untouched, and even when touched upon, a dismal outlook is shown. The media both state owned and private have made efforts to portray the injustices perpetrated by our landed social hierarchy towards the landless. Numerous entertainment dramas and plays have been telecasted over the years on TV, radio, and (street)theatre including Waris, Marvi, Chand Grahen, Mehndi, that portray the reality of landless rural life in Pakistan. Exclusion through Education The electronic media has largely ignored the divide between private English medium, public Urdu medium, and Madrassas, though it is visible in all segments of the society. The feeling of disempowerment that stems from a lack of ability to communicate in the official language is ignored by the media in order to further the emphasis on the national language. In fact even our national and provincial academic curriculum reinforces such norms and messages. The media have, however, played an important role in the literacy drive by aiding the education department through a series of informed, targeted campaigns aimed at improving literacy, especially female literacy. Campaigns similar to this can be used to address exclusion issues. Policy Focus: The Advent of the Satellite Media The arrival of satellite mass media in South Asia in the beginning of the 90s heralded a new era for mass communication. Where the state broadcasters previously had a monopoly on electronic media, they now had to face competition from the satellite channels for viewership. Where most of the advertising expenditure went to the print media, the opening up of new channels with a greater access to the consumers meant that money was now flowing towards TV. Within years, the dominance of the state over mass media was over. This has had wide ranging implications. In Pakistan, cable and satellite TV have reached high levels of penetration. One-third of all TV viewers are currently able to watch satellite channels. The low costs of satellite receiver instalment, and low cable rents have meant that the numbers are growing by the day. Additionally, Shaheen Pay TV- a direct to home, DTH antenna based rebroadcast service provides 10 international and 4 Pakistani based channels. Presently reaching over 4 million people, and aimed at being upgraded 60 channels by the end of next year, available in Karachi, Islamabad, Multan, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sialkot, and Lahore. Till recently, all satellite channels, with the exception of PTV world (which was also available terrestrially in most of the country) were foreign. The allure of western entertainment, and the Pakistani public’s love affair with Indian cinema led to instant popularity of these channels. Indian channels were particularly popular, till they were banned last year, because of the ease of comprehension of Hindi programming. PTV, with its messages, was left lagging behind. The satellite media in South Asia have given access to new and articulate voices, never heard before on PTV. Politicians and public figures have been called to account in programmes which have broken with the deferential tradition of state broadcasters. Audience participation in debates, discussions and interviews has added a new dimension to civil society. 83 Satellite TV has created its greatest ethical and cultural ripples as a result of a new series of soap operas which broke with the traditions of cinema and offered the public bolder themes, franker treatment of personal relations, and fewer happy endings. Cinema, or state TV, did little to challenge the extended family or the values it enshrined; A great deal of the debate about satellite television has been about its influence on women. The story lines of satellite TV serials are of special interest because they project women in different roles from those of wife, mother and homemaker. TV serials on these channels have dealt with issues of working women, divorce, extra-marital relationships, sexual harassment, rape and abortion in ways that were unfamiliar in the days of PTV’s monopoly. With their depiction, they have offered a variety of new role models to the urban middle class: of women confident, discerning, living fully in two worlds of home and career, by no means a beast of burden but constantly stressed trying to balance self and family. Till recently, however, all of this was one-way: from outside to Pakistan. With the opening up of channels serving Pakistani audiences, namely GEO, ARY, Indus Vision, specific to the Pakistani scenario can be brought into focus. Since these channels are not subject to the same standards of censorship as PTV, they are capable of addressing socially tabooed issues in a more open and honest manner, as the above example with women’s issues illustrates. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) was set up in 2002 with the mandate of inducting the private sector into the field of electronic media for the first time in the country’s history. Though 25 FM radio channels have been given licenses in various cities, no licenses have yet been issued to any television in the private sector. However, the Authority has initiated the process of inviting application from Pakistani companies interested in establishing satellite television broadcast stations in Pakistan. The process for issuing licenses for terrestrial television stations will be initiated in the coming months. Significantly, it will be binding on a licensed broadcaster, like the private channels, to allot at least 10 per cent of its daily airtime to broadcast programmes given to it by the government. The law says a licensee must “broadcast or distribute programmes in the public interest specified by the Federal Government or the Authority in the manner indicated by the Government or, as the case may be, the Authority, provided that the duration of such mandatory programmes do not exceed 10 per cent of the total duration of broadcast or operation by a station in 24 hours except if, by its own volition, a station chooses to broadcast or distribute such content for a longer duration.” This can be used to run a public campaign focussing on social exclusion to complement a similar campaign run through the state media and the print media. . Currently, government bodies are using this 10 per cent government programme time to disseminate public service messages. Examples include Ministry of Law’s “rights” awareness radio skits and the forthcoming Islamabad Police’s “Myths and Fact Series” for broadcast on FM radio stations. Additionally, private channels have taken the initiative of putting on socially responsible programmes (e.g. Capital Talk and Pachas Minute on Geo) that have proved extremely popular amongst audiences, thus gaining both revenues and viewership for the channels at the same time as getting social messages out. Regional language satellite TV channels, like KTN, open a real window of opportunity to reach out to the illiterate masses. No licenses have been issued by PEMRA to any such channels so far, but proposals have been sent for approval. Till the issuance of new licenses and the establishment of the networks, programmes in regional languages can be run on existing channels and on the new PTV 4 channel launched June, 2003. Policy Focus: PEMRA, Opportunities and Challenges 84 The government instituted the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) in March 2002 through an Ordinance to induct the private sector into the field of electronic media for the first time in the country’s history. (Attachment One) Notwithstanding the tremendous scope for community development through radio and television in the private sector for the first time in Pakistan’s history, things have moved at a painfully slow pace. The 25 radio stations permitted so far by PEMRA are still awaiting a green light to begin operations even seven months after obtaining licenses. And it seems it will be quite a while before terrestrial private television stations become a reality. Despite all this, Pakistan has done well in the period under review (2002-2003) to initiate the process for what will undoubtedly be a substantive electronic media revolution in the country. When it comes to electronic media opportunities, Pakistan is poised for exciting times ahead. PEMRA, the regulator for electronic media in Pakistan, has been made responsible for formulating technical standard and scrutinizing technical feasibility for broadcasting services including radio, television, satellite broadcasting, cable television, multi-channel multi-point distribution service (MMDS) and local multi-point distribution service (LMDS). According to PEMRA Ordinance 2002, the Authority has been mandated to: (1) Improve the standards of information, education and entertainment, (2) Enlarge the choice available to the people of Pakistan in the media, (3) Facilitate the devolution of responsibility and power to the grassroots by improving the access of the people to mass media at the local and community level, and (4) Ensure accountability, transparency and good governance by optimising the free flow of information. PEMRA has been mandated to provide project management guidelines and action plans to the private sector interested in establishing radio, television and cable TV stations in the country. The Authority has been empowered to issue licences for broadcast and CTV stations in the following categories: (1) International scale stations, (2) National scale stations, (3) Provincial scale stations, (4) Local Area or Community based stations, (5) Specific and specialised subject stations, and (6) Cable television network stations. The law lays down stringent and subjective pre-conditions for eligibility of a license. It says a broadcaster or CTV operator issued a licence under this Ordinance must, among others, guarantee the following: (a) Respect the sovereignty, security and integrity of Pakistan, (2) Respect the national, cultural, social and religious values and the principles of public policy as enshrined in the Constitution, and (3) Ensure that programmes and advertisements do not encourage violence, terrorism, racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, sectarianism, extremism, militancy or hatred or contains pornography or other material offensive to commonly accepted standards of decency. One shortcoming of the law is that even after a broadcaster has been issued a license by PEMRA after paying a heavy fee, he or she will have to obtain separate licences from the Pakistan telecommunications Authority (PTA) and the Frequency Allocation Board (FAB) before being eligible to import any transmitting apparatus for broadcasting or CTV operation system. Ideally all of this should have been under one roof. Currently a broadcaster is not guaranteed operational freedom even after obtaining a license from PEMRA. And then a licence will be valid for a period of five, 10 or 15 years subject to payment of the annual fee prescribed from time to time. Among the prohibitions on private radio or television include broadcasting, re-broadcasting or distribution of any programme that in the opinion of PEMRA “is likely to create hatred among the people or is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order or likely to disturb public peace and tranquillity or endangers national security or is pornographic or is offensive to commonly accepted standards of decency.” As for offences and penalties, any broadcaster or CTV operator or person who violates or abets the violation of any of the provisions of this law will be guilty of an offence punishable with a fine which may extend to one million rupees. Where such broadcaster or CTV operator or person repeats the violation or abetment, such person will be guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 85 The Pakistan government, however, has included an indemnity in the law for itself. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding will be allowed against the federal or any provincial government or local authority or any other person exercising any power or performing any function under this law “or for anything which is in good faith done or purporting or intended to be done under this Ordinance or any rule made there under.” All these rules show that operating a radio or television station in the private sector in Pakistan will not be an easy task and some of the main problems will involve huge operational funds, an absence of formal professional training for technical and production staff and abiding by government regulation. The prevailing policy environment is conducive to addressing social exclusion e.g. PRSP, the National Plan of Action for Women, Youth Policy (Draft), National Disability Policy, and Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) etc. provide a opportunity framework to address social exclusion as a priority in the national development agenda. The Use of the Media as a Tool for Pro-Poor Change: Strategic Recommendations Recommendation a)Policy Level 1. 2. The government must expedite issuance of licenses to community-based radio. Grant subsidies to TV channels and reduce license fees to Channels that address social exclusion explicitly and implicitly in its programming. Use the 10 % PEMRA Programming regulation effectively Desired Outcome • • • • Ensuring that communities are actively engaged Encouraging socially responsible programming Increasing Socially Responsible Programming Increasing Coordination and Effectiveness 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Institutionalise these efforts with Ministry of Information as lead ministry with close coordination with Ministry of Women’s Development, Special Education and Social Welfare, Ministry of Law, Justice, and Human Rights along with the NRB and Planning Commission media cells. Increase subsidies to enhance broadcast timings of PTV regional language programming and extensively utilise information, education based programs such as on agriculture, hygiene, and environment to advocate issue of social exclusion Grant licenses to local terrestrial TV. • Increasing involvement and interest at grassroots level • • • • • • • • • Expanded and subsidized access to telecommunication for rural areas. b) Program Level 8. Train Print, TV and radio journalists/producers/script-writers and technical crews to be sensitive to the needs of the socially excluded. Workshops/Seminars should be held to build their capacity to challenge stereotypes and to promote inclusion of the socially excluded. 9. Specialized training workshops may be arranged eg in subjects such as investigative reporting, legislation and censorship policy. 10. Ensure social exclusion issues as across cutting themes in all social/ public media campaigns. 11. CESSD suggests that hujras will be useful in NWFP. They also suggest that CBOs will be effective at engaging the Increasing affordability and viewership Increasing channels of communication De-stereotyping excluded groups and presenting a fair image that is sensitive. Portrayal of women as respectable citizens rather than objects. Encouraging research based Rationalizing Censorship Raising Awareness on Exclusion Issues Increasing Awareness Providing Feedback 86 public at the ‘drawing room level’. 12. Invoke supportive Ahadis and Quranic verses and Use religious symbolism for media campaigns 13. Involve and sensitise religious leaders and mosques to issues surrounding social exclusion. • • 14. Organize lateral communication, catalysing informal folk media e.g. “Urs and melas” to create awareness about social exclusion. 15. Provide community TV sets at Aurat Foundation’s Womens Resource Centres, to increase rural female viewership. 16. Produce more TV plays that generate debate, namely on issues such as honour killings, street children, sexual abuse, domestic violence. 17. Use street theatre and puppetry especially in rural communities. 18. Provide LHWs with media tools such as posters, aids, information packets 19. Seek synergies with ongoing initiatives such as the Asian Development Banks Access to Justice Programe, District Strengthening Program, UNDP’s Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) initiatives, DFID’s Gender Equity Project (Advocacy Program), PRSP Communication Strategy (Draft), PPA communication strategy, CESSD and the forthcoming National Education Communication strategy to integrate national efforts addressing social exclusion. • • • • • • • • • through discussion Gaining indigenous support for inclusive efforts backed by traditional messages Gaining indigenous support for inclusive efforts backed by religious scholars/institutions Promoting discussion and debate Raising awareness and generate discussions Increasing female dialogue and participation Increasing Awareness Providing viewers’ feedback Increasing Awareness/sensitivity and community based dialogue Increasing Awareness and acceptance Increasing Government donor Coordination Effective usage of resources 87 Bibliography Books 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. The Hudood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction? Asma Jahangir & Hina Jilani Pakistan: Eye of the Storm Owen Bennett Jones Satellite Over South Asia David Page & William Crawley The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power Seyyed Vali Raza Nasr Reports 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. “CESSD (Draft) Communication Strategy” (2003), CIDA “PRSP (Draft) Communication Strategy: Stakeholder Analysis Report” , DFID “IDS Policy Briefing: Rights-based approaches to international development” (2003) “Participatory Poverty Assessment: Theory and Practice”(2002), DFID “RSPN-Including the Poor in the PRSP Process by Consulting the Poor at the Grassroots” (2003), DFID “Pakistan Poverty Assessment” World Bank (2002) “Communicating Pakistan’s PPA—A Strategic Framework” DFID Gallup report 2002 Websites 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. www.un.org/undp www.pemra.gov.pk www.nrb.gov.pk www.internews.net.pk www.epoor.org www.ptv.com.pk www.pta.gov.pk Media Clippings --- Miscellaneous, June – July 2003 88 Attachments to Annex 9: Documentation of Policy Shifts: Attachment IA PEMRA mandate, PEMRA functioning, licensing of cable operators Freedom of Information Ordinance Attachment 1B Ethical Code of Practice Ordinance Title: Freedom of Information Ordinance. Promulgated by: President General Pervez Musharraf. Enactment date: 26 October 2002. Stated objective: To ensure transparency by providing access to information. Text of Ordinance No XCVI of 2002 AN ORDINANCE to provide for transparency and freedom of information: WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for transparency and freedom of information to ensure that the citizens of Pakistan have improved access to public records and for the purpose to make the Federal Government more accountable to its citizens, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto; AND WHEREAS the President is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take immediate action; NOW, THEREFORE, in pursuance of the Proclamation of Emergency of the fourteenth day of October, 1999, and the Provincial Constitution Order No 1 of 1999, read with the Provisional Constitution (Amendment) Order No 9 of 1999, and in exercise of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is pleased to make and promulgate the following Ordinance: 1. Short title, extent and commencement, (1) This Ordinance may be called the Freedom of Information Ordinance, 2002. (2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan. (3) It shall come into force at once. 2. Definition, - In this Ordinance, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, (a) “complainant” means (i) a requester, or (ii) any person acting for and on behalf of requester; (b) “complaint” means any allegation in writing made by a complainant; (i) where he is a requester, that access to record has been wrongfully denied to him by a public body; (ii) where he is a requester, that access to and/or correction of his personal information has been wrongfully denied to him by a public body having the custody or control of the record; (iii) where he is a requester that the information requested by him has been unduly delayed by a public body; (c) “designated official” means an official of a public body designated under section 10; (d) “employee” , in relation to a public body, means a person employed in a public body whether permanently or temporary; (e) “Federal Tax Ombudsman” means Federal Tax Ombudsman appointed under section 3 of the Establishment of the Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 (XXXV of 2000); 89 (f) “Mohtasib” means the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) appointed under Article 3 of the Establishment of the office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 (PO No 1 of 1983); (g) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Ordinance; (h) “public body” means; (i) any Ministry, Division or attached department of the Federal Government; (ii) Secretariat of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament); (iii) any office of any Board, Commission, Council, or other body established by, or under, a Federal law; (iv) courts and tribunals; (i) “record” means record in any form, whether printed or in writing and includes any map, diagram, photography, film, microfilm, which is used for official purpose by the public body which holds the record; 3. Access to information not to be denied. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, and subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, no requester shall be denied access to any official record other than exemptions as provided in section 15. (2) This Ordinance shall be interpreted so as (i) to advance the purposes of this Ordinance, and (ii) to facilitate and encourage, promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost, the disclosure of information; 4. Maintenance and indexing of records. - Subject to provisions of this Ordinance and in accordance with the rules that may be prescribed, each public body shall ensure that all records covered under clause (i) of section 2 of this Ordinance are properly maintained. 5. Publication and availability of records. - The acts and subordinate legislation such as rules and regulations, notifications, by-laws, manuals, orders having the force of law in Pakistan shall be duly, published and made available at a reasonable price at an adequate number of outlets so that access thereof is easier, less time-consuming and less expensive. 6. Computerization of records. - Each public body shall endeavour within reasonable time and subject to availability of resources that all records covered by the provisions of this Ordinance are computerized and connected through a network all over the country on different systems so that authorised access to such records is facilitated. 7. Declaration of public record. - Subject to the provision of section 8, the following record of all public bodies are hereby declared to be the public record, namely: (a) policies and guidelines; (b) transactions involving acquisition and disposal of properly and expenditure undertaken by a public body in the performance of its duties; (c) information regarding grant of licenses, allotments and other benefits and privileges and contract and agreements made by a public body; (d) final orders and decisions, including decisions relating to members of public; and 90 (e) any other record which may be notified by the Federal Government as public record for the purposes of this Ordinance. 8. Exclusion of certain record. - Nothing contained in section 7 shall apply to the following record of all public bodies, namely: (a) nothing on the files; (b) minutes of meetings; (c) any intermediary opinion or recommendation; (d) record of the banking companies and financial institutions relating to the accounts of their customers; (e) record relating to defence forces, defence installations or connected therewith or ancillary to defence and national security; (f) record declared as classified by the Federal Government; (g) record relating to the personal privacy of any individual; (h) record of private documents furnished to a public body either on an express or implied condition that information contained in any such documents shall not be disclosed to a third person; and (i) any other record which the Federal Government may, in public interest, exclude from the purview of this Ordinance. 9. Duty to assist requesters. - A public body shall take necessary steps as may be prescribed to assist any requester under this Ordinance. 10. Designation of official. (1) A public body shall designate and notify an officer or employee to whom requests under this Ordinance are to be made. These officials will be designated to ensure easy public access to information. (2) In case no such official has been designated or in the event of the absence or non-availability of the designated officials, the person in charge of the public body shall be the designated official. 11. Functions of designated official. - Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance and the rules made thereunder and the instruction if any, of the Federal Government, the designated official shall provide the information contained in any public record or, as the case may be, a copy of any such record. 12. Applications for obtaining information, etc. (1) Subject to sub-section (2), any citizen of Pakistan may make an application to the designated official in the form as may be prescribed and shall with his application, furnish necessary particulars, pay such fee and at such time as may be prescribed. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to such public record as has been published in the official Gazette or in the form of a book offered for sale. 13. Procedure for disposal of applications. (1) Subject to sub- section (2), on receiving an application under section 12, the designated official shall, within twenty-one days of the receipt of request, supply to the applicant the required information or, as the case may be, a copy of any public record. 91 (2) In case the designated official is of the opinion that(a) the application is not in the form as has been prescribed; (b) the applicant has not furnished necessary particulars or has not paid such fee as has been prescribed; (c) the applicant is not entitled to receive such information; (d) the required information or, as the case may, be the required record does not constitute a public record under section 7; (e) the required information or, as the case may be, the required record constitutes a record which is excluded under section 8; He shall record his decision in writing and the applicant shall be informed about such decision within twenty-one days of the receipt of the application. (3) The information from, or the copy of, any public record supplied to the applicant under sub-section (1), shall contain a certificate at the foot thereof that the information is correct or, as the case may be, the copy is a true copy of such public record, and such certificate shall be dated and signed by the designated official. 14. Exempt information from disclosure. - Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, a public body shall not be required to disclose exempt information. 15. International relations. (1) Information may be exempt if its disclosure would be likely to cause grave and significant damage to the interests of Pakistan in the conduct of international relations. (2) In the Section, “international relations” means relations between Pakistan and (a) the government of any other foreign State; or (b) an organisation of which only States are members. 16. Disclosure harmful to law enforcement. - Information may be exempt if its disclosure is likely to (a) result in the commission of an offence; (b) harm the detection, prevention, investigation or inquiry in a particular case; (c) reveal the identity of a confidential source of information; (d) facilitate an escape from legal custody; (e) harm the security of any property or system, including a building, a vehicle, a computer system or a communications system. 17. Privacy and personal information. - Information is exempt if its disclosure under this Ordinance would involve the invasion of the privacy of an identifiable individual (including a deceased individual) other than the requester. 18. Economic and commercial affairs. - Information is exempt if and so long as its disclosure (a) would be likely to cause grave and significant damage to the economy as a result of the premature disclosure of the proposed introduction, abolition of variation of any tax, duty, interest rate, exchange rate or any other instrument of economic management; 92 (b) would be likely to cause significant damage to the financial interests of the public body by giving an unreasonable advantage to any person in relation to a contract which that person is seeking to enter into with the public body for the acquisition or disposal of property or the supply of goods or services, or (c) by revealing information to a competitor of the public body, would be likely to cause significant damage to the lawful commercial activities of the public body. 19. Recourse of the Mohtasib and Federal Tax Ombudsman. (1) If the applicant is not provided the information or copy of the record declared public record under section 7 within the prescribed time or the designated official refuses to give such information or, as the case may be, copy of such record, on the ground that the applicant is not entitled to receive such information or copy of such record, the applicant may, within thirty days of the last date of the prescribed time for giving such information or, as the case may be, of such record, or the communication of the order of the designated official declining to give such information or copy of such record, file a complaint with the head of the public body and on failing to get the requested information from him within the prescribed time may file a complaint with the Mohtasib and in cases relating to Revenue Division, it subordinate departments, offices and agencies with the Federal Tax Ombudsman. (2) The Mohtasib or the Federal Tax Ombudsman, as the case may be, may, after hearing the applicant and the designated official, direct the designated official to give the information or, as the case may be, the copy of the record or may reject the complaint. 20. Dismissal of frivolous, vexations and malicious complaint.- Where a complaint instituted is found to be malicious, frivolous or vexatious, the complaint may be dismissed by Mohtasib, and fine may be imposed on the complainant up to an amount not exceeding ten thousands rupees. 21. Offence. - Any person who destroys a record which at the time it was destroyed was the subject of a request, or of a complaint with the intention of preventing its disclosure under this Ordinance, commits an offence punishable with imprisonment for, a term not exceeding two years, or with fine, or with both. 22. Indemnity. - No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any person for anything which is done in good faith or intended to be done in pursuance of this Ordinance or any rules made thereunder; 23. Ordinance not to derogate other laws. - The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. 24. Power to remove difficulties. - If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Ordinance, the Federal Government may, by order in the official Gazette, make such provisions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty. 25. Power to make rules: (1) The Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such rules may provide for(a) the fee payable for obtaining information from, and copies of the public record; (b) the form of application for obtaining information from, and copies of, the public record; and (c) the form in which information from public record shall be furnished. Signed General Pervez Musharraf (President) Justice Mansoor Ahmad (Secretary) 93 Ethical Code of Practice Mandate: The Press Council of Pakistan has been mandated with implementing the following 17-point ‘Ethical Code of Practice: (1) The press shall strive to uphold standards of morality, and must avoid plagiarism and publication of slanderous and libellous material. (2) The press shall strive to publish and disclose all essential and relevant facts and ensure that the information it disseminates is fair and accurate. (3) The press shall avoid biased reporting or publication of unverified material, and avoid the expression of comments and conjecture as established fact, generalization based on the behaviour of an individual or a small number of individuals will be termed unethical. (4) The press shall respect the privacy of individuals and shall do nothing which tantamounts to an intrusion into private, family life and home. (5) Rumours and unconfirmed reports shall be avoided and if at all published shall be identified as such. (6) The information, including picture, disseminated shall be true and accurate. (7) The press shall avoid originating, printing, publishing and disseminating any material, which encourages or incites discrimination or hatred on grounds of race, religion, caste, sect, nationality, ethnicity, gender, disability, illness, or age, of an individual or group. (8) The press shall not lend itself to the projection of crime as heroic and the criminals as heroes. (9) The press shall avoid printing, publishing or disseminating any material, which may bring into contempt Pakistan or its people or tends to undermine its sovereignty or integrity as an independent country. (10) The press shall not publish or disseminate any material or expression, which is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. (11) The press shall rectify promptly any harmful inaccuracies, ensure that corrections and apologies receive due prominence and afford the right of reply to persons criticized or commented upon when the issue is of sufficient importance. (12) While reporting on medical issues, care must be taken to avoid sensationalism, which could arouse baseless fears or false hopes in the readers. Early research finding should not be presented as though they were conclusive or almost conclusive. (13) Sensationalism of violence and brutalities shall be avoided. All reporting shall be accurate, particularly when court proceedings are covered and an accused person must not be presented as guilty before judgment has been pronounced. (14) In the cases of sexual offences and heinous crime against children, juveniles and women, names and identifying photographs shall not be published. (15) Confidentiality agreed upon at briefings and background interviews must be observed. (16) The press while publishing findings of opinion polls and surveys shall indicate the matter of people, geographical area on which the polls and surveys were conducted, and the identity of the pollsponsor. (17) Any kind of privilege or inducement, financial or otherwise, which is likely to create conflict of interest and any inducement offered to influence the performance of professional duties and is not compatible with the concept of a reputable, independent and responsible press, must be avoided. 94