An Analysis of Iridium by akimbo

VIEWS: 408 PAGES: 12

									An Analysis of Iridium


     For TLEN 5700

     Capstone Paper
       12-15-1999

          By:

     Laurel Burton
       Brian Holl
     JoseLuis Lopez
    George Singletary




                         1
     On August 13, 1999 Iridium LLC, the $5 billion global satellite phone system, filed for
bankruptcy when it failed to make a $90 million interest payment on its debt. Less than two
weeks later ICO Global Communications Services also filed for Chapter 11 protection after
failing to secure $600 million in financing commitments [1]. Witnessing the back-to-back
demise of two start-up satellite communications companies casts a shadow over the future of the
fledgling $20 billion industry. Both Iridium and ICO had special problems uniquely their own,
but their high profile belly flops made investors take another look at similar systems designed to
deliver a variety of voice and data services by satellite. Consequently, remaining competitors
will have difficulty sustaining their financing. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the reasons
why Iridium failed and how its failures impact and apply to the remaining satellite contenders.
As well, the paper will provide recommendations to the industry for its survival.

1. Industry History

Since the launch of the first Sputnik by the Soviet Union, one of the most common uses of
satellites has been for communications. Today many forms of communications, including voice,
data, and video are commonly relayed via satellites. However, until recently almost all of these
communications functions were provided via satellites in Geosynchronous (GEO) orbits. Recent
advances in satellite technology have made it both technically and economically feasible to now
launch Low Earth Orbit (LEO) constellations. Not only do LEO orbits result in less signal delay
and lower power requirements, but also their closer proximity allows for antennas small enough
to use in the mobile market. Today's systems range from terrestrial mobile voice telephone, to
simple low-speed data services (fax, paging, etc.), to more ambitious projects such as high-speed
wireless internet access from anywhere on Earth. Arriving to the marketplace first are the
constellations concentrating on voice services (with some paging, messaging, fax, position
location and some simple data services also available). Examples of this type of system include:
(1) Iridium: a 66-satellite LEO constellation currently in orbit and operational; (2) Globalstar: a
48-satellite LEO constellation that will be operational by year's end; (3) ECCO: a 46-satellite
LEO constellation still in the development stages; (4) Ellipso: a unique 17-satellite constellation
launching in 2002 that utilizes a combination of circular and elliptical orbits; and (5) ICO: a 12-
satellite constellation scheduled for 2001, but currently in bankruptcy proceedings.
         As mobile satellite voice services entered initial development, another emerging industry,
cellular, had fewer than 11 million worldwide subscribers, represented less than 2% of total
phone subscriptions, and existed in only fifty-nine countries [2].i In 1994 analysts inaccurately
forecasted a cellular market size of 224 million customers by the year 2000iihowever, in actuality
its size today is closer to 600 million [3]. In 1991, handheld cellular devices (weighing 11 to 12
ounces) ranged in price from $1,300 to $2,500 at service rates of $.35 to $.40 per minute [4].iii
         During this time frame use of cellular for data traffic was minimal to nonexistent. In fact,
even wireline data traffic was only just emerging. The Internet had just 5,000 networks in three
dozen countries by the end of 1991 constituting a majority of data traffic. It linked 700,000 host
computers used by 4 million people. It was not until 1993 that the World Wide Web began to
gain attention due to the birth of the browser, which made it easier to use [5].iv
         Meanwhile, satellite-telephony companies believed that (1) a significant number of
people required service outside the range of cellular phones, and that (2) sat-phones could
complement rather than replace cellular phones. In fact, in 1999 cellular phone networks covered


                                                                                                   2
only 20% of the earth’s surface [6].v Iridium competitor, Globalstar says it will focus on
suburban and rural markets where it is not economically sensible to invest in equipment to
extend coverage areas. Constellation Communications Inc. (CCI) maintains that LEO systems
can provide extensions of basic service at a lower cost than constructing new terrestrial services
[7].vi

2. Iridium

In order to understand better the plight of the satellite telephone industry it is necessary to review
the first player in the market space. Because Iridium was the first to market, because of the
extraordinary press coverage it has received, and because it is used as a financial indicator to
satellite analysts on Wall Street it is worthwhile to investigate the technological and business
aspects of Iridium. Iridium, a constellation of 66 satellites, was deployed in inclined orbits at an
altitude of 780 km. One of the unique features of the system is its use of Inter-Satellite Links
(ISLs) between each satellite in the constellation. These ISLs (four per satellite, to provide full
connectivity with adjacent satellites), combined with sophisticated on-board signal switching,
provides Iridium the capability of passing user traffic from satellite to satellite until the
destination is within the Earth footprint of the receiving satellite. ISL's allow Iridium to
minimize the number of Gateways required to support the satellite constellation. Satellites
provide user capacity via 48 spot beams with a reuse of twelve and a Time-Division Multiple
Access (TDMA) scheme. This scheme provides a total system capacity of 172,000 simultaneous
users spread across 2150 active cells (with 80 users per cell). Minimum cell diameter is 600 km.
User handsets communicate with satellites via the 1600 Mhz frequency band. For additional
information please refer to Table 1.
         Iridium's original target market was the global business traveler, out of range from
terrestrial cellular networks. It hoped to capture 1.5% of the 224 million person cellular market
of the predicted size by the year 2000 [8]. vii By 1992, Iridium determined its handheld device
would be the size of a cellular phone and would cost $3,000 dollars. In March, 1994 Iridium
predicted that cellular, currently displaying a 35% annual market growth rate, would
simultaneously generate demand for satellite phones. Iridium's initial strategy was to compete
directly with cellular interests.

               Table 1: IRIDIUM Technology Summary and Comparison [9]viii
                        Parameter                  Iridium         Globalstar             ICO
               # of Satellites/Orbital Planes        66/6             48/8                10/2
                      Orbit Altitude               780 km           1410 km            10390 km
                      Orbital Period              100.13 min        114 min            360.9 min
                      Earth Coverage                Global     +/- 70 deg latitude       Global
               Inter-Satellite Links/satellite         4              None               None
                     Satellite Weight               680 kg           450 kg             2600 kg
                  Satellite Expected Life           5 years         7.5 years           10 years
                   Spot Beams/Satellite               48               16                 163
               Uses Satellite Path Diversity          NO              YES                 YES
                Multiple Access Method(s)        TDMA/FDMA/     CDMA/FDMA/           TDMA/FDMA/
                                                     TDD              FDD                 FDD
               Handset Cost (approximate)           $2500             $750               $500
               System Development Cost              $3.7B            $2.2B               $2.6B




                                                                                                    3
3. Issues affecting Iridium

By August, 1999 Iridium was forced to file for bankruptcy, nine months after its high-profile launch.
Iridium had only obtained 20,000 customers from over 1,000,000 sales leads [10].ix Its $100 million
international marketing campaign fizzled and most of Iridium's top executives had been fired. Its
financial standing at the time of its Chapter 11 filing was as follows: Iridium took out a loan that hinged
on the acquisition of 52,000 customers by March 31, 1999. Instead, it obtained only 10,000. It incurred
annual interest payments of $250 million, satellite maintenance costs of $550 million, and monthly
operational and advertising costs of $75 million [11].x The company was forced to reduce price of
phone and service. Therefore, even with 100,000 customers each using $1000 of service, Iridium will
only be able to cover half of these costs[12].xi Iridium lost $507 million in the first quarter of 1999 and
expects to lose even more during the second quarter. Total debt was over $3 billion. Its stock price
dropped from $30 to $2 and subsequently trading was suspended. Upon closer examination of the
Iridium system several issues are apparent:

3.1 Proliferation of Cellular

Iridium underestimated the rapid expansion of cellular service, which eroded the demand for
satellite phones. In 1990, there were just over 11 million cellular phones worldwide; as of 1998
there were almost 400 million [13].xii Mobile revenues last year surged to $154 billion and
continues to rise [14].xiii Much of cellular’s success can be attributed to industry policies such as
roaming agreements, adoption of standards such as GSM, and creative utilization of spectrum
licensing. In other words, many companies are willing to negotiate contracts for development of
cellular networks in the more profitable urban areas in exchange for the development of under-
served, unprofitable, or rural areas. For example, when the South African government licensed
Vodacom and its competitor, Mobile Telephone Networks Holdings, to provide digital service to
the country in 1993, it also insisted that they install 30,000 payphones in under-served areas over
a five year period [15].xiv
         The increase in the number of cellular service providers is another reason behind
cellular’s success. Increased competition forced cellular companies to be both proactive and
aggressive in their marketing and pricing efforts. See Figures 1 and 2.




                                                                                                   4
Figure 1: Worldwide growth of cellular                     Figure 2: Penetration of cellular worldwide




Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database.      Countries refer to the 185 members of the United Nations.




3.2 Deployment Time Frame

From its inception in 1987 to its deployment in 1999, Iridium was twelve years in the making. In
the high technology arena, twelve years is a lifetime. Technologies changed; customer needs
changed; the competitive landscape changed. Iridium's inability to conform to such a dynamic
environment led to an outdated, misguided product. For example, Iridium's handsets are 16 oz.,
similar in size to cell phones of the late 1980's. But while cellular phones shrank in size and
weight in the 1990's, Iridum's handsets did not change. Its handsets were priced at $3,000 at $7
per minute [16].xv This was competitive to cellular early on. However, pricing is significantly
lower today in cellular as well as among other competing sat-phone companies. Despite the
amount of time it had for planning, Iridium was plagued with availability issues. Production
delays in the Kyocera Corp. caused considerable delays for new customers waiting for handsets
[17].xvi As well, Iridium faced quality of service issues that led to continual delays to its launch
date [18].xvii Also, because of the 10-year development cycle, the explosion of data services was
not acknowledged during its planning stages. Consequently, Iridium is not capable of this
broadband data service -- only narrowband. Indeed, Iridium employed a technology-push
strategy instead of a market-pull. Iridium's founders thought they could push the sat-phone
concept into the marketplace rather than following the market's trends. Next, Iridium had no
way to "test drive" its service along the way. Before it could solve any issues it first had to
design, build and launch expensive technology into space. Most importantly, its prolonged
timeframe gave ample opportunity for new entrants to the marketplace.

3.3 Business and Marketing Failures

Iridium initially targeted international business travelers estimated to number eight million
persons [17].xviii However, Iridium’s phones were not designed for use inside buildings … the
same venue where businessmen tend to congregate. Most professionals already carry cellular
phones (which do work indoors) and fewer than expected see a need for service beyond the
cellular boundaries. By August 1999 the company had 20,000 customers, well off its 200,000


                                                                                                                          5
mark forecasted for year-end. Based on these findings, one could conclude that Iridium's target
market is too narrow. Iridium's largest sales have come from industries in remote locations such
as oilrigs and fishing, not the global business traveler [20].xix A recent study by the Strategis
Group confirms this finding, stating that the largest market for satellite phones will be people
located in rural areas where phone service is not currently provided [21].xx
        Under Iridium's structure, each regional gateway was responsible for marketing Iridium's
phone and service in its part of the world. However many partners failed to build sales teams,
create marketing plans or set up distribution channels in time for the launch date in their
individual countries [22].xxi The ad campaign was considered too vague, criticized for its cost
($180 million), and for its misleading messages by critics (perceived vagueness regarding
locations where Iridium could not be used). As well, the combination of expensive satellites
(driven by the use of Intersatellite links) and a short expected satellite lifetime compared to other
proposed systems, conspired to drive the cost of airtime higher than that of terrestrial systems
and some other satellite-based competitors. Failure to predict a market change from voice to data
communications may have also contributed to the market erosion. Third generation of digital
phones, due out in the next few months, will make it possible for mobile phone users to talk and
access the Internet at up to 384 Kbps [23].xxii Such capabilities are not yet available via satellite.

3.4 Technology Issues

The Iridium constellation, while technically elegant, requires more satellites than it competitors.
This amounts to higher production costs, higher operational costs, and higher launch costs (a
differential of about $200M between Iridium and Globalstar to populate the initial constellation)
[24]. xxiii Furthermore, ISLs increase the complexity of the Iridium space segment resulting in
not only more expensive satellites, but also heavier ones that consequently cost more to place in
orbit. Complexity can also be attributed to the failure of five satellites, in service for less than a
year, requiring replacements to be put on-orbit [25]xxiv. Satellite lifetimes are only five years for
Iridium compared to 7.5 ears for Globalstar and 10 years for ICO [26]xxv. Also, the satellites lack
broadband data capabilities limiting the company’s opportunity to participate in that market
niche in the near future.
        While either TDMA or CDMA technology can be implemented effectively in a satellite-
based communication system, Iridium chose TDMA. Other constellations such as Globalstar
have chosen CDMA instead. Iridium’s comparatively low orbit, and therefore short visibility
times, combined with the lack of use of satellite diversity processing in the handsets, results in
more frequent handoffs among satellites. One potential advantage of CDMA for the satellite
telephony industry could be its ability to accommodate additional channel capacity. Unlike
TDMA’s finite capacity, CDMA’s maximum limits are soft and could be beneficial for future
growth. One possible explanation for Iridium’s larger handsets may be due to the components
necessary to support TDMA’s higher peak power requirements as compared to CDMA [27]xxvi
(an effect that is not evident with the much shorter-range/lower power terrestrial systems).
        Finally, since Iridium is able to bypass ground gateways there exists potential political
implications regarding lost revenues for local providers, depending on local tariff structures, as
evidenced by the number of countries where usage agreements are still "pending" [28].xxvii




                                                                                                    6
3.5 Financial Issues

Analysts agree that Iridium was a brilliant idea, but it did not capitalize in its first-mover
advantages and is now fighting for solvency. Even the most optimistic restructuring plan may
not stave off liquidation. Iridium's plan was unique and consequently they raised over $1.9
billion dollars of investors funding [29].xxviii If Iridium could have shortened its deployment time,
and launched its services back in 1995 with a less costly constellation, the market could have
been a more fruitful one than what they currently face.
        Iridium's funding requirements for the two to three year period following 1999 are
expected to be driven by costs similar to those expected in 1999 [30].xxix Expenses for the first
full operational quarter of 1999 (January 1 to March 31) were $505 million dollars; $180 million
from Sales and Administrative Expenses, $206 million from Depreciation and Amortization and
$119 million from Interests Payments. By annualizing the quarterly expense figure, one uncovers
more than $2 billion dollars in expenses.
        Given annual expenses, one can tabulate the amount of customers and revenue per
customer that Iridium needs in order to break even (please see table 2). The numbers are not
very encouraging -- even if annual expenses could be reduced by 20%. For example, based on
its current expenses, Iridium would be able to break even at 37,886 customers, but only if it is
able to generate $53,360 in annual revenue from each customer. Today, Iridium generates a
mere $560 in revenue per customer, therefore it would need 3,610,000 customers to break even
(please see highlighted area of the table).
        It is not unlikely that expenses could be significantly reduced through debt restructuring
with lenders or/and shareholders, but even then Iridium will need 377,165 customers billing
$357 dollars per month or any given combination that will break even at $1.6 billion dollars.
Four hundred thousand customers should not sound so unreasonable since it is less than 1% of
the 600 million worldwide cellular users expected by 2000 (See table “cellular growth by the
ITU), but new entrants into the market with lower costs and higher satellite service life shrinks
Iridium’s time for customer acquisition.




                                                                                                   7
    Table 2: Breakeven Analysis with Q1 1999 Financials. Current customer base is 20,000
                                          [31].xxx

                                            IRIDIUM BREAK EVEN POINTS
                                                     Revenue per Customer
                                       At current expenses      Cutting 20% of expenses
                     Customers      Annualy Monthly Daily     Annualy Monthly       Daily
                      3,610,000       $560      $47     $1.6    $448       $37      $1.2
                        377,165      $5,360     $447   $14.9   $4,288      $357     $11.9
                        198,977     $10,160 $847       $28.2   $8,128      $677     $22.6
                        135,134     $14,960 $1,247 $41.6      $11,968      $997     $33.2
                        102,308     $19,760 $1,647 $54.9      $15,808     $1,317    $43.9
                         82,313     $24,560 $2,047 $68.2      $19,648     $1,637    $54.6
                         68,856     $29,360 $2,447 $81.6      $23,488     $1,957    $65.2
                         59,180     $34,160 $2,847 $94.9      $27,328     $2,277    $75.9
                         51,889     $38,960 $3,247 $108.2     $31,168     $2,597    $86.6
                         46,198     $43,760 $3,647 $121.6     $35,008     $2,917    $97.2
                         41,631     $48,560 $4,047 $134.9     $38,848     $3,237   $107.9
                         37,886     $53,360 $4,447 $148.2     $42,688     $3,557   $118.6




4. Recommendations

While Iridium clearly shows signs of failure, the satellite telephony industry as a whole can
survive if drastic measures are introduced. Iridium, as well as other industry players, should
explore the following options: alliances and acquisitions, expansion of the target market, and
further capitalizing on existing services.

Recommendation 1: Alliances and Acquisitions

As it stands there are four major players in the satellite telephony market space: Iridium,
Globalstar, ICO, and Ellipso. With two already in bankruptcy it is clear there is not enough
business and not enough financial backing to warrant continuation of all four services
independently. In fact, analysts believe it is unlikely the market will be able to support more
than two competitive services (in the mobile satellite telephony market space) by 2000 [32].xxxi
Therefore, the industry must not only consolidate its businesses but also focus on strategic
acquisitions and alliances.
        Two obvious choices for consolidation are Teledesic 1 and Iridium. Motorola is the prime
contractor and an investor in both projects. By acquiring Iridium, Teledesic will be able to have
access to Iridium's intellectual capital. Motorola can apply its lessons learned, from designing
Iridium, to Teledesic's constellation. With both systems, Teledesic could begin generating
revenue ahead of schedule and would be able to offer a greater variety of satellite-based services.
However, Teledesic would be making a very risky investment. Because of its massive debt,

1
 Teledesic is sponsored by Gates, McCaw, and Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal. Scheduled to debut in 2003, this 288-
satellite constellation will focus on delivering high-bandwidth data and Internet services at a cost of $15 billion.


                                                                                                                       8
focus on voice rather than data traffic, and its poor reputation, Iridium is not well positioned for
acquisition. Other consolidation possibilities include either Teledesic or Hughes investing in
ICO.
        In order to grow its customer base, Iridium must consider alliances across a variety of
industries. For example, the company should form a strategic partnership with major cruise ship
companies. An alliance with the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) would provide
Iridium exposure to over four million passengers per year on the 16 largest passenger cruise lines
in an industry expecting to increase capacity by 43% between now and 2002 [33].xxxii Adventure
travel companies, arranging expeditions to Mt. Everest or leading African safaris, ought to be
locked in to a strategic alliance with Iridium. Iridium could acquire GTE Airfone or AT&T's
Claircom. Claircom offers Iridium a digital air-to-ground network and in-flight telephone
services to more than 1400 commercial jets and 350 executive aircraft allowing greater access to
the business travel market [34].xxxiii Governments, ranging from local to national, also represent
partnering opportunities.

Recommendation 2: Expand the target market and innovate

Iridium has concentrated on servicing the global business traveler. Therefore it has had to rely
heavily on partnering cellular companies to distribute and position its products and services.
Relying on others to market your product is hardly an arrangement one would want when in
bankruptcy and in desperate need to increase customers and revenue. Given its dire straits,
Iridium should adopt marketing practices similar to those done in the cellular industry.
        Cellular companies did an especially good job at targeting two major markets: working
professionals and safety-conscious consumers such as parents and/or spouses. They successfully
penetrated these markets by offering below-cost handsets tied to service contracts and by
expanding their distribution channels to include electronic retailers. Iridium needs to follow suit,
expanding its distribution channels as well as developing creative methods for customer
acquisition.
        Cellular phone networks cover only 20% of the earth’s surface, which leaves a list of
people who need something more than cellular coverage as they wander the globe [35]. For
instance, a significant number of people have only a temporary need for extensive phone
coverage. Examples include vacationers (expeditions, safaris, cross-country travel via motor
homes, cruises, yachting, etc.) or weekend warriors who may require an emergency lifeline.
This occasional user market has potential as long as the correct distribution channels are used
and a convenient service plan is applied. A daily, weekly or monthly handset rental plan,
including a specified number of minutes, through new distribution channels such as RV rental
agencies, national parks, car rentals, airports, wharf’s, hiking specialty stores or direct shipping
provides Iridium access to this type of consumer. However, Iridium should be aware that the
occasional user market may not be viable at current equipment and per minute prices. Phone
rental plans provide convenience while temporarily traveling outside cellular coverage, remove
the inadequacy of a long-term commitment, as well as provide access to new profits and
increased services to customers.




                                                                                                  9
                        Table 5: Potential Target Markets for Iridium

                                                                                      EXPLORERS
                                                       BUSINESS TRAVELER              AIR OR SEA
                                                       VACATION TRAVELER
                                                                                    MOUNTAINEERS
                                                              RV’S         CARS
                                                                                     GOVERNMENTS
                                           MOBILE                            &
                                                             HIKERS
  The satellite phone marketplace can                                      TRUKS       MILITARY
be divided into four categories: remote                                              MOVIE MAKING
    places with mobile needs, remote                                               FORREST RANGERS
   places with fixed needs, close- by               (CELLULAR)
                                                                        EMERGENCY
 places with mobile needs and close-                                     SERVICES
                                                    (TERRESTRIAL)                                   (VSAT)
       by places with fixed needs.                                                     VILLAGES
 Iridium adds the greatest value in the                                                OIL RIGS
    remote places and mobile needs
                                                                                        MINES
     sectors. They are the easiest to       FIXED         SMALL TOWNS               TIMBER INDUSTRY
sustain over time and the ones Iridium
         should concentrate in.                                                      CONSTRUCTION




                                                             CLOSE BY                   REMOTE



Recommendation 3: Exploit existing services

Iridium needs to actively sell all of its existing services, not just voice. The company offers
voice, some data, fax, paging, messaging, and position location services, however its focus has
been on voice primarily. First of all, Iridium should consider strengthening its marketing of
paging services. Today's paging industry is fragmented, a multitude of companies providing
their services to specific geographies [36].xxxiv            Indeed, this regionalization makes
interoperability among the variety of companies and geographies difficult. Iridium's worldwide
coverage should offer a significant competitive advantage over rival paging companies. Second,
efforts to market position location services, a relatively untapped niche, should be strengthened.
For example Iridium could market to unlikely candidates such as the automotive industry (selling
its services to companies such as Chrysler's OnStar vehicle tracking), or to the fuel industry
(position location services allow gas pumps to process transactions at the pump rather than in the
store). Finally, Iridium could consider entering the data market by redesigning the next
generation of satellites it launches. This is the strategy ICO will be taking. In November, 1999,
ICO announced its plan to spend $60 million modifying its satellites to provide broadband data
services, in addition to voice and basic email [37].xxxv
        Customization of existing services is also important. Iridium originally tried to sell only
one type of service and was labeled as inflexible to user needs. Iridium must be proactive and
eager to provide customizable solutions to customers. In order to cater to the military, for
example, Iridium should be willing to customize a gateway, provide encrypted services, as well
as other specialized services. Another way to exploit Iridium's existing service offering is by
bundling (offering a better price on cereal if you also buy the milk). It allows Iridium to increase
its revenue per customer and to better bargain with prospective and current business customers
who want a complete suite of services from which to choose.




                                                                                                        10
5. Conclusion

By taking advantage of alliances and acquisitions, expanding its target market, creating
innovative solutions for its customers, and capitalizing on its expansive service offerings,
satellite-telephony providers have an opportunity to succeed. Iridium, however, faces a more
difficult challenge.     Not only will Iridium need to implement the aforementioned
recommendations but it must also restructure its finances via acquisition or drastic debt
restructuring. Even the most optimistic Iridium supporters must acknowledge that its demise is
imminent. In the end, applying the lessons learned from Iridium will benefit and strengthen
both existing and future competitors.




                                                                                           11
Endnotes


[1] Price, Christopher. "Iridium: Born on a beach but lost in space." Financial Times. August 20, 1999, Pg. 22.
[2]ii ITU. World Telecommunication Development Report 1999, Mobile Cellular. October 1999.
[3]ii “America’s Network. Big LEO’s clear hurdle, but race isn’t over." Financial Times. March 1, 1994.
[4]iii "The Phenomenal Phone." Success Magazine. February 1991.
[5]iv "History of the Internet," US National Science Foundation. 1999.
[6]v ITU. World Telecommunication Development Report 1999, Mobile Cellular. October 1999.
[7]vi "Protector or Predator?" Communications Magazine. November, 1992
[8]vii "America’s Network. Big LEO’s clear hurdle, but race isn’t over." Financial Times. March , 1994.
[9]viii "An Operaitonal and Performance Overview of the IRIDIUM Low Earth Orbit Satellite System". IEEE
Communication Surveys, Second Quarter 1999, pp 2-10.
[10]ix Price, Christopher. "Iridium: born on a beach but lost in space." Financial Times. August 20,1999. Pg. 22
[11]x Barboza, David. "Planet calling Iridium." The New York Times. September 7, 1999. Section C Page 1, Col.
2.
[12]xi 1998 Year end financials from Iridium, World Communication LTD. http://www.iridium.com. October
1999.
[13]xii ITU. World Telecommunication Development Report 1999, Mobile Cellular. October 1999
[14]xiii The Economist. Telecommunications Survey. The Economist. October 9, 1999
[15]xiv The Economist. Telecommunications Survey. The Economist . October 9, 1999
[16]xv "Iridium's downfall: The Marketing took a back seat to science" Wall St. Journal, August 18, 1999. Vol
CCXXXIV, No 34, Page A1. ISSN:0099-9660.
[17]xvi Bruno, Antony. "Iridium shifts to vertical market." Crain Communications Inc. May 3, 1999.
[18]xvii "Iridium's downfall: The Marketing took a back seat to science" Wall St. Journal, August 18, 1999. Vol
CCXXXIV, No 34, Page A1. ISSN:0099-9660.
[19]xviii Sheth, J. and Sisodia, R., “Why Cell Phones Succeeded Where Iridium Failed,” Wall Street Journal, August
23, 1999.
[20] "Creating brands: Three companies compete to market new satellite phone worldwide." Advertising Age.
January 11, 1999. Pg. 17.
[21]xx Dziatkiewicz, Mark. "Study says MSS should target rural customers." Wireless Week. April 19,1999. Pg.27.
ISSN 1085-0473.
[22]xxi Barboza, David. "Planet calling Iridium." The New York Times. September 7, 1999. Section C Page 1, Col.
2.
[23]22 1998 Year end financials from Iridium World Communication LTD. http://www.iridium.com. October 1999.
[24]xxiiiCalculated using constellation sizes and launch cost data from Encyclopedia Astronautica, available at
http://solar.rtd.utk.edu/~mwade
[25] ITU. World Telecommunication Development Report 1999, Mobile Cellular. October 1999
[26]xxv Constellation Tables,” www.ee.survey.ac.uk/Personal/L.Wood/constellations/tables.html, 6/23/98, pages two
through five, Lloyd’s Big Leo Tables.
[27]xxvi Dziatkiewicz, Mark. "Study says MSS should target rural customers." Wireless Week. April 19,1999. Pg.27.
ISSN 1085-0473.
[28]xxvii History of Iridium. (http://www.iridium.com/corporate/about/llc/docs/history.html), September, 1999.
[29] 1998 Annual Report. Iridium World Communications Ltd. 1998. http://www.iridium.com. October 1999.
[30]xxix 1998 Annual Report. Iridium World Communications Ltd. 1998. http://www.iridium.com. October 1999.
[31]xxx Long Distance Lines, Financial Times London. November 21, 1994.
[32]xxxi International Council of Cruise Lines, http://www. Iccl.org/whoweare/index.html. November, 1999.
[33] "Iridium Reports Fourth Quarter Results," http://www.iridium.com/corporate/news/1999/jan/docs/992501.html
[34] The Economist. Telecommunications Survey. The Economist. October 9, 1999.
[35] Brown, Tim. Lecture from TLEN 5510. November 3, 1999.
[36]]xxxvGutscher, C., "ICO Survival Plan Hinges On Switch To Data," Wall Street Journal, 10/30/99.




                                                                                                              12

								
To top