Scoping Study on Social Exclusion in PakistanA Summary of Findings .

Scoping Study on Social Exclusion in Pakistan: A Summary of Findings Dr. Emma Hooper Agha Imran Hamid October 2003 Commissioned by the Western Asia Department, Department for International Development (DFID), UK. The views in this study are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of DFID. Scoping Study on Social Exclusion in Pakistan Executive Summary Understanding the mechanisms leading to social exclusion can help identify why particular groups remain poor, and what needs to be done to address their poverty. Providing a broader concept of poverty beyond income poverty, social exclusion is shown to be an active dynamic process- both causal and relational in nature. Social exclusion is embedded in and central to the formal and informal institutions of a society. To address social exclusion is therefore difficult without addressing the imbalances in existing structures of power relations within the household, the community, and within institutions. However, the removal of institutional constraints, and the enhancement of incentives to increase the access of individuals and diverse groups to financial and material assets and development opportunities, can assist and enable the accommodation of differences within a framework of common interest to the benefit of all. Systematic attention to social contexts, institutions and social relationships for pro-poor development interventions is essential in order to challenge both income-related and non-income barriers to poverty reduction. Addressing social exclusion will also enhance efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their associated targets. Without attention to a number of critical areas of social exclusion, meeting the MDG targets will remain partial and incomplete. These areas include the social processes that lead to exclusion, for example the influence of caste and low attributed social status in determining access to education and health services, or in a labourer’s negotiating power. They also include developing a better understanding of the policy and administrative framework around the promotion and protection of deprived groups. The Scoping Study identifies six key elements to be considered in Pakistan in reducing social exclusion, promoting inclusion, and in generating related policy changes both in the short and longer term. These are: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) The position, role and functioning of the army in today’s Pakistan as the key stakeholder institution; The role of the state and the bureaucracy; Justice (including issues of corruption, lack of access to justice, lack of a rule of law); Formal and informal “systematic social networks” such as safety nets and social security systems; Democracy, “enabling” democratic processes, and political stability; A sound educational system within which the talented can rise, irrespective of origins, and which fosters the creation of progressive minds; While the Study’s initial definition of social exclusion centred on occupational groups (including bonded labour), class, caste, ethnicity, gender, religious minorities, youth, ethnicity, and disability, many interlocutors broadened this definition to cover what one termed “’the 80%’ – those excluded from both development benefits and the ability to earn an income which enables other than basic survival.” This interpretation clearly places the vast majority of the people of Pakistan in this category. Many stakeholders identified the minorities as being the most excluded. Bonded labour, while recognised as a dreadful, medieval phenomenon by many, was none the less placed in numerical perspective in terms of the relatively small numbers involved in comparison with the rest of the disempowered. Additional forms of exclusion identified by numerous stakeholders were the exclusion of civil society by a “narrowing of the space” brought about by an increased involvement by the military in a range of arenas, including business; exclusion on the basis of educational system and language of instruction; and demographic exclusion. 1 The Scoping Study identifies approaches which can: (i) raise awareness on exclusion; (ii) create an enabling environment for addressing social exclusion, in ways capable of generating ownership by those who influence and/or who make policy in the short, medium and long term; and (iii) identify opportunities which move forward the development agenda in this area. However, moving forward the debate, and generating related policy changes will require time. The Study suggests five key areas under which measures for addressing social exclusion in Pakistan can be grouped: democracy, access to justice, institutions, education, and enabling interventions. It makes specific recommendations which include: (i) the provision of support for democratic processes; (ii) capacity building with a range of stakeholder partner institutions; changes in key institutional processes and structures that support social inclusion; (iii) educational measures which address social exclusion such as the promotion of a more tolerant ethos in curriculum content of all types of schools, and in teacher training; rightsbased functional literacy, particularly for women and the 15-25 age group; civics education in school; and including the disabled through mainstreaming in education and changed societal attitudes; (iv) “enabling” interventions in the areas of gender, labour, land, and micro-credit. Land is a critical resource for both the rural and the urban poor; and access to land ownership rights has a direct correlation with poverty. Land ownership in rural areas represents rights associated with livelihood (food, income, shelter and security); and in urban areas, shelter and security. Access to land ownership rights also has a gender dimension in the denial of land inheritance rights to women. Land fragmentation further contributes to impoverishment of disadvantaged groups. Micro-credit, if carefully targeted, can provide opportunities to the rural and urban excluded, including emergence from debt bondage. Labour rights too form a critical component of exclusion for three particular groups: informal sector labour; formal sector labour; and bonded labour, with critical issues identified as wages insufficient to meet daily consumption needs; considerable job insecurity; major, and growing unemployment; and the inadequate coverage and implementation of existing legislation. Women’s social exclusion is systemic and integrally related to the structures of social and power relations at the levels of family, community and state. Achieving long term goals of gender equality, and social equity will require, inter alia, accessible justice based on the rule of law applied equally to rich and poor, so that the rights of poor men and women are protected; the removal of gender based constraints/restrictions on women through the repeal of discriminatory laws; and implementation of existing relevant laws. To support these proposed interventions, creating an overall enabling environment will be a critical factor. The Study suggests it can be achieved through lobbying, advocacy, and capacity building with a range of partner institutions; through support for democratic processes; and by generating awareness through use of the media as a tool for pro-poor social change. Lastly, identifying and building on the positive aspects of Pakistani society and the opportunities it offers for social inclusion via the extended family and other informal mechanisms of social protections and support are suggested as supporting strategies. 2 Scoping Study on Social Exclusion in Pakistan: A Summary of Findings 1. Background 1. Addressing poverty requires an understanding of who are the poor, why they are impoverished and disempowered; the identification of entry points to address these issues; and the development of policies that address exclusion and inequality. Using the concept of social exclusion helps explain why particular groups remain poor, and what needs to be done to address their poverty, through use of an active dynamic rather than the passive, anonymous process of impoverishment and marginalisation. Adopting a social exclusion perspective can open up a larger and more complex “domain of disadvantage” than a conventional poverty focus, through adding concerns with social inequality. In Pakistan, as elsewhere in South Asia, poverty is characterised by acute inequity, exclusion, vulnerability and discrimination, particularly against women, low status groups and castes, ethnic and religious minorities, and the disabled. 1.1 Concepts & Context: Defining Social Exclusion 2. Social exclusion1 is deeply rooted in the social, economic and political experience of Pakistan. Fundamentally, social exclusion refers to the relationship between citizens and the state. Other development concepts such as poverty, vulnerability, deprivation and inequality do not imply causality, whereas a social exclusion framework implies that someone or something is doing the excluding. Social exclusion is thus relational, and is embedded in the formal and informal institutions of a society, deriving from social relations founded on differences in status or power. In Pakistan, some of the main barriers to poverty reduction & social change lie precisely in social and institutional relations. 3. Addressing social exclusion through the removal of institutional constraints, and the enhancement of incentives to increase the access of individuals and groups to assets and development opportunities, enhances the ability of diverse groups in society to accommodate differences within a framework of common interest to the benefit of all, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Systematic attention to social contexts, institutions and social relationships as drivers for pro-poor development interventions is thus a key component of addressing both income-related and non-income barriers to getting out of poverty. In Pakistan, the role of the state is critical in this regard, and is explored further below. 1.2 The Regional Context Regional Comparison of Human Development Indicators 4. In addition to the persistence of a high rate of poverty, Pakistan suffers from the problem of a relatively low level of human development. Improvements in social indicators over the last decade have been slow, with relatively little contribution to their improvement via the Social Action Programme. The levels of key indicators remain poor when viewed in conjunction with those of other comparable countries. For example, looking at South Asian countries, Pakistan has the highest rate of infant and under 5 mortality, the highest rate of female illiteracy, and the lowest percentage of girls enrolled in school.2 This persistent level of under- 1 The concept of social exclusion is derived from French social thought and a concern with the relationship between members of society and the nation state. The term was popularised by Rene Lenoir (1974), in the context of an explanation of how les exclus were overlooked by the French Republican social contract. Goodin (1996) sees citizenship as a more useful lens than social exclusion through which to look at entitlement and access to resources and decision-making processes in society. 2 See World Bank figures for regional comparison of human development indicators (2002), cited in the Summary Report of the Participatory Poverty Assessments, p. 49 3 achievement in access to health and education is in part attributable to the exclusion of significant segments of society from access to development benefits. 5. Societies differ greatly in the extent to which social identity (gender, ethnicity, language, religion) rather than individual characteristics (strength, intelligence, willingness to work) determine differential access to resources and power. In countries where the state mediates between inherited economic, educational and social status to make access more equitable across the board, individual and group mobility tends to be high. In other countries, society is deeply hierarchical, with those at the bottom of the hierarchy facing entrenched economic, political, spiritual and psychological barriers to access, mobility and voice. Social exclusion in South Asia is based on more than caste alone: as in Pakistan, issues of class, access to power and resources, patron-client relations all play a part in perpetuating prevailing structures and systems throughout the region, to differing degrees, depending on educational levels, the structure of access to resources, the value placed on meritocracy, etc. What is important in terms of drivers for pro-poor, inclusive change, is how to build upon the enabling aspects of prevailing structures and systems, as well as the coping strategies and negotiating positions used by the excluded, to promote social inclusion. 1.2 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Social Exclusion & the MDGs 6. Promotion of a facilitating environment at national, regional and global levels will be critical to meeting the MDGs and their associated targets. For example, discrimination against female children makes a significant contribution to overall child mortality and therefore constrains progress towards the child mortality MDG. The gender equality MDG includes targets for women’s participation in paid employment, in political decision-making and in education and literacy: (for example, women’s share of paid employment in industry and services in Pakistan is only 8%.) Efforts to achieve the MDGs that do not address the social exclusion aspects of meeting these and other similar targets will remain incomplete, unless a number of critical areas are addressed. This will require both going below the “big picture” embodied in the MDG goals and related indicators; and will include interventions such as: identification and analysis of what are the social processes that lead to (informal) exclusion in-depth analysis of social practices among service providers, teachers, peers, that continue to marginalise social groups how caste and low attributed social status determine access to education, health, or a labourer’s negotiating power explicitly addressing the reduction of social exclusion in all programmes and projects developing a better understanding of the policy and administrative framework around the promotion and protection of deprived groups; and of the legal frameworks laid down by national constitution, to strengthen existing departments and institutions mandated with the welfare of excluded groups disseminating experiences of promoting social inclusion across Asia - 4 2. The Characteristics of Social Exclusion in Pakistan 7. Social exclusion is rooted in the social, economic and political experience of Pakistan. It is based on class distinction, biraderi, caste,3 ethnicity, hereditary occupational group, access to land ownership and productive resources, and gender. Social exclusion is strongly related to powerlessness, manifesting itself through the active exclusion of particular groups from political life, education, employment, health care, access to justice and voice – including the exclusion of women. There is also exclusion on the basis of belief – Ahmadis, Sunni-Shi’a sectarianism, minority religions (Hindus, Christians); and exclusion on the basis of provincial ethnicity. 8. Social exclusion prevents people being able to move out of poverty, in a variety of ways. In Pakistan, its outcomes, in addition to powerlessness, include: Blocked opportunities to move out of poverty Inability to participate in political life, education, employment, health care, access to justice Inability to exercise human and other forms of rights Lack of resources to afford the cost of social networking, little to exchange and reciprocate Inability to participate in community networks, with consequent negative impact on building social capital Stigma of poverty as basis for inclusion/exclusion The exclusion of women, including rigid gender segregation based on the ideology of purdah and rigid definitions of public and private spheres Exclusion of rural migrants, refugees, from the wider society and the public sphere on the basis of ethnicity and social identity4 Caste as a socially constructed concept for exclusion, and biraderi as an important source of power/lack of power. Traditional occupational castes are among the poorest and most excluded, particularly in rural areas. Additionally, being a woman, a child and belonging to a low caste automatically predisposes people to vulnerability. Lastly, among the outcomes of exclusion are fear, periodic violence, and vulnerability, which are lived with by the very poor, religious minorities and low castes, and women – cutting across class in the case of women. 9. However, whilst social exclusion is a key factor contributing to the perpetuation of poverty in Pakistan, and hence a stumbling block in poverty alleviation, addressing it is difficult without fundamentally changing existing structures of power relations within the household, the community and above all, within institutions. Although addressing poverty requires an understanding of who are the poor, this understanding in and of itself will not bring about change. Such fundamental changes will not prove palatable to many. The challenge is therefore to identify policies which: raise awareness on exclusion and address it which can generate buy-in from those who influence and make policy which can generate ownership from those with a vested interest in the status quo 3 Caste in Pakistan is not the same as Hindu caste system, though it retains many of the (unacknowledged/unrecognised) features of it. This conceptualisation and related terminology is explored in the complete version of this report, in Volume II, Annex 5, Caste & Provincial Ethnicity. 4 Notwithstanding the way in which Pakistan has welcomed and sheltered Afghan (and earlier, Bihari) refugees in the past, at the local level the PPAs indicate social and institutional (eg police) discrimination against foreign refugees, though they are also perceived by Pakistanis to benefit disproportionately from scarce work opportunities through Afghans’ acceptance of lower wage rates (Punjab, NWFP, Sindh). 5 10. The Scoping Study identifies six key elements to be addressed in moving forward the debate, and in generating related policy changes both in the short and longer term. These are: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) The position, role and functioning of the army in today’s Pakistan as the key stakeholder institution; The role of the state and the bureaucracy; Justice (including issues of corruption, lack of access to justice, lack of a rule of law); Lack of “systematic social networks” such as safety nets and social security systems; Democracy, “enabling” democratic processes, and political stability; A sound educational system within which the talented can rise, irrespective of origins, and which fosters the creation of progressive minds; 3. Methodology for the Scoping Study 3.1 Methodology 11. The Scoping Study has been conducted in two phases: (i) a desk review of available documentation, including the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs); and (ii) a series of semi-structured interviews with over 80 key stakeholders from many walks of life in Pakistan,5 and two focus group discussions6 to explore issues around social exclusion, the types of interventions that may be required to address it, and how to take forward the agenda for pro-poor social change. These were supplemented by the compilation of an annotated literature survey and data base on social exclusion in Pakistan. This report is a summary of the findings of the Scoping Study.7 12. The first phase of the Scoping Study identified very clear articulations of what constitutes social exclusion in Pakistan by those at the grass roots, as expressed in the PPAs. For this reason, it was decided during the second phase of the Scoping Study to concentrate on accessing the perspectives of a different group of stakeholders:8 (i) (ii) (iii) those with a vested interest either in change, or in maintenance of the status quo those who are broadly representative of their particular interest groups (and in some instances, of more than one) those who influence policymaking in a variety of ways. 13. Selection of stakeholders for interview was made on the basis of which groups of stakeholders `they represented; and their availability for interview during the period June 3July 15 2003, when the field work was carried out. Discussions were frank, eloquent and free-ranging despite the many demands on stakeholders’ time. Though a new concept for many outside the development arena, social exclusion, and in particular an examination of the structures of power which perpetuate it, clearly struck a chord for many at this point in Pakistan’s history. 5 These included analysts, thinkers, academics, retired and serving bureaucrats, retired and serving military, politicians, senators, minority representatives, industrialists, journalists, trade union leaders and representatives, the legal profession, human rights activists, feminists, and NGOs. 6 With trade unionists and on devolution. 7 The complete version of the Scoping Study on Social Exclusion in Pakistan is in three volumes: (i) the main report; (ii) topicspecific annexes on legislation, gender, land, labour, caste and provincial ethnicity, micro-credit, devolution, the findings of the provincial PPAs, and the use of the media as a tool for promoting pro-poor social change; (iii) the annotated bibliography and data base. 8 The views of these key stakeholders are reflected in the analysis in this report though their requests for confidentiality have been respected, with no individual attributions being made. 6 14. Explaining the nature of social exclusion to those interviewed proved challenging, in terms of finding a way to describe it that was meaningful beyond the development specialist’s context. Social exclusion was therefore presented from the perspective of the types of structural changes in processes, institutions and attitudes which, based on international experience, would be required to enable Pakistan to take its rightful place in the modern world. A range of topics including structures of power were explored, together with who are seen as the excluded; potential mechanisms for addressing exclusion; and opportunities for moving forward the agenda, depending on the area of interest or specialisation of the interviewee. 3.2 Re-Defining Social Exclusion in Pakistan Narrower vs Broader Definitions of Exclusion 15. The Study’s original narrow definition of social exclusion, derived from the literature and from the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs), centred on occupational group (including bonded labour), class, caste, ethnicity, gender, religious minorities, youth, and disability. However, a number of interlocutors broadened this to cover what they termed as “’the 80%’ – those excluded from both development benefits and the ability to earn an income which enables other than basic survival.” This interpretation clearly places the vast majority of the people of Pakistan in this category. Many identified the minorities, particularly the Christians (and in some cases, Ahmadis) as being the most excluded. Bonded labour, while recognised as a dreadful, medieval phenomenon by many, was none the less placed in numerical perspective in terms of the relatively small numbers in bonded labour in comparison with the rest of the disempowered.9 16. Additional forms of exclusion identified by numerous stakeholders were: • • the exclusion of civil society by the military the type of educational system in which someone is educated (private English medium vs. government Urdu-medium vs. madrassah) which inhibits access to upward mobility and jobs; and produces very different thought processes and world views demographic exclusion (urban-rural definitions which impact on service delivery, voting patterns) • 17. Some stakeholders defined other groups as being excluded from the socio-economic mainstream and from development benefits. But a common thread between them all is disempowerment. (Indeed, one stakeholder suggested that being unwilling to participate in a culture of corruption results in exclusion). These groups were: • • • • the Shi’a population (which forms between 25-40% of the country, depending on which estimates are followed) is increasingly not considered as part of the mainstream women who have been declared karo in the context of “honour” killings Class C prisoners, who are frequently very badly treated and held in extremely poor conditions which may include forced labour child labour in motor garages, chai khanas (tea shops), child labour industries 9 Ercelawn and Nauman 2001 have argued all haris who are involved in credit relations with their landlords ought to be regarded as bonded labourers. On the basis of this assertion it has been argued that 6.8 million people in Pakistan– around one third of the rural population of Sindh, is bonded: see also Gazdar et al 2002: footnote 36, o. 41. 7 4. The Grassroots Perspective on Social Exclusion: the Findings of the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) 18. The findings of the PPAs on social exclusion present a unique perspective on the nature and the experience of exclusion, from the point of view of the excluded themselves. Identitybased exclusion, which reflects lack of power, lack of influence, lack of respect, lack of justice – which results in the political and social exclusion of the very poor. Being from a low caste (eg kammi) is often synonymous with poverty. The Social Characteristics of the Very Poor, by Province10 Punjab: NWFP: Northern Areas: Balochistan: female headed-households, low caste, women, the disabled kammis, the disabled, female children, young women minority ethnic group, the disabled, young women, widows low caste, the disabled, widows, the stigmatised, female children 19. Country-wide, the very poor were identified in the PPAs as those without resources, status or who are dependent, such as: • • • • • • • • the landless widows, especially with dependents and no support young women households without, or with few male children people from low castes those without access to health or education those dependent on zakat those without power, influence or voice in decision-making 20. Overall, political and social exclusion for the very poor centre on lack of access to justice, voice, and power. Consequences of Political & Social Exclusion for the Very Poor, by Province Punjab NWFP Northern Areas No access to justice, no voice, no power, exclusion from social gatherings No voice, no power, no access to justice, low access to the police, lack of security, exclusion from social events, rigid gender-based exclusion No influence in decision-making, no rights, no freedom of expression, no access to formal justice systems, exclusion from social institutions, no contacts in government No voice, exclusion from social events, women denied right to vote, no decision-making power, unable even to express a view Lack of status, low access to assets and resources, low access to justice and low influence, lower access by young women to good clothing, food, and basic services than by men, lack of women’s participation in decisionmaking, powerlessness, institutional and traditional suppression of entitlements FATA Balochistan 10 P. 54, table 2.3 National PPA 8 Barriers to Emerging from Poverty 21. Factors which contribute to the inability to get out of poverty include: • Access to Education: In the national PPA, education was found to be the most significant factor distinguishing the poor from the non-poor. The percentage of literate household heads in non-poor households was 52%, compared with 27% in poor households.11 This has implications for social exclusion in the case of low castes where they are excluded from access to educational facilities. However, the stakeholders interviewed for the Scoping Study gave examples of even where a lowcaste origin person managed to get access to education, they were either the focus of economic jealousy (and often harassment and victimisation); or were still excluded from social gatherings and interactions on the basis of their birth. Exclusion from Access to Land & Water: The current concentration of land holdings is important both because it means that limited assets go to the poor, but also because it leaves open vast possibilities for exploitation and abuse, which in the view of the authors of the national PPA are unlikely to ever get effective regulation. Size of landholding is also an important variable in distinguishing the poor from the nonpoor.12 Access to Effective Safety Nets: Current programmes like zakat, bait ul mal, drought relief do not reach the needy. The PPAs conclude that a reform in existing safety nets is required.13 Furthermore, lack of access to social capital results in an exclusion from a vital form of (non-formal) support for poor households in both urban and rural areas.14 Exclusion from Decision-making & Service Institutions: Poor communities need greater access to key decision-making institutions. However, the redistribution of power from the wealthy elite in rural Pakistan to the poor, particularly women, is a daunting task. Some stakeholders commented that service departments (forestry, agriculture, irrigation, revenue, WAPDA) ignored the poor; were ineffective; corrupt; and help only the wealthy. Exclusion from Access to Political Capital & Power: Throughout Pakistan, there is a concentration of political capital in the hands of the few. However, their identity varies from area to area – both rural-urban, and between provinces. Those found by the PPA to have least political capital were often minority tribes and clans, people from low castes and especially women.15 Devolved Local Government: Whilst the union council provided some degree of accountability because its members were elected, money allocated was not always spent, because the union council was unable to use it effectively. Indications were given that where the presence of even one good person could make a difference in the effectiveness of local government. However in the Punjab, analysts perceived that the poor had inadequate access to union councils that were described as having a limited role and being inefficient. In some sites, newly elected councillors including women, were seen as an asset. The need to strengthen devolved local government at at district and tehsil levels was stressed by PPA analysts.16 Exclusion from Access to Development Interventions: Patron-client relations including political factionalism, and caste, can influence who obtains access to development schemes. • • • • • • 11 12 National PPA p. 48 National PPA pp 48-49 13 National PPA p. 21 14 National PPA p. 83 15 National PPA pp 85-87 16 National PPA pp. 86-87 9 • Caste is an important determinant of poverty status; and a cause of social exclusion across Pakistan. Low castes are among the poorest of the poor, suffering extreme discrimination and deprivation, though arguably for class-based, as well as castebased reasons. The PPAs found them to lack rights; to be compelled to obey the orders of “notables”, or face dire consequences; to be very vulnerable, and given no respect; to be considered as fundamentally unequal; to be dominated by other higherstatus castes. Kammis (low castes) were found to have no assets, no role in decisionmaking, low cultural status, a stigmatised group identity, and with livelihoods dependent on the larger society. Province-Specific Examples of the Effects of Caste on Social Exclusion Punjab: Access to livelihoods is strongly determined by social factors, Particularly caste and gender; as is social interaction and maintenance of social capital. Membership of a specific social group thus determines the degree of access to livelihoods, benefits, and rights. Low castes are characterised by lack of assets, lack of capital, high dependency on more powerful castes for their livelihood options. Two main castes18 in Mansehra district residing next to one another had had no contact for 16 years because of a longstanding dispute. (Though arguably could be same for tribes in dispute?) low castes “had no rights, as God created them low-born”; feeling of shame on identification of their caste; hesitation in identification of informal caste-based organisations. The Zikri sect were discriminated against because of their poverty “even considered non-Muslim”, DN –we should attribute this to a stakeholder yet were a well organised, cohesive community, one district nazim, and influential and respected community leaders (respected beyond the community) Social exclusion from mainstream village affairs and political processes, especially Domes and Gujjars,19 even conflict resolution processes; lack of matrimonial relations with other communties, denial of due shares in development funds, discrimination against their representatives Economic exclusion due to the weak bargaining power of the haris on the share of the division of produce (batai) between tenant and land owner; routine deprivation of agreed share of crops produced by their labour. Debt bondage as an important feature. Social exclusion of access to authorities including the police, who would not come to a village without prior permission of the landlord; control over access to zakat by waderas who appropriated it for their own purposes; directed voting (by zamindars). NWFP: Balochistan: Northern Areas: Sindh • • Exclusion on the Basis of Ethnicity & Tribal Identity: Being from a minority or less powerful ethnic group such as the Domes or the Gujjars in the Northern Areas, or the Dotani or Sulaiman Khel tribes in Southern Waziristan in FATA results in exclusion from access to, or deprivation of the most basic rights. In FATA tribal identity strongly determined access to fundamental rights: minority tribes were discriminated against due to their low share in the tribal nikkat system under which rights of access to and control over resources and services are apportioned on the basis of the number of warriors in a tribe. Non-influential tribes and clans were found to be more likely to be poor.20 Gender-Based Exclusion: Women’s access to, and control over resources and assets was found to be very limited in comparison to that of men. They had low – if any – access to decision-making; minimal access to justice; and low social status. Women are excluded from access to basic government services either through supply-side failures, such as lack of provision of school facilities for girls; or demand-side constraints such as the low value placed on female education within many families and communities. Similarly, women are denied their full rights to health care due to 18 19 20 In the PPA’s definition of the term, but in reality probably biraderis are being referred to. Again it is in fact biraderi that is being referred to, but is used as a caste label National PPA p. 62, 67 10 • lack of female medical staff in context where social norms require women to be treated by women. Exclusion Based on Age & Life Cycle Position: The very young, the very old, and those without social support had less access to education, good food and nutrition. Female children had less access than male children. 5. Issues Surrounding Social Exclusion: Stakeholder Interview Outcomes 5.1 Structures of Power 22. To understand and address social exclusion, the analysis of structures of power, both at the national and the local levels, is key. The nexus between the elites, the state and the state’s citizens formed an unsolicited and vocally expressed element in our stakeholder interviews, and a remarkable degree of unanimity across the board was expressed by interviewees, irrespective of background, political affiliation or profession. The findings of the study were that: • • • Local structures of power (including biraderi, caste, religion) inhibit access to services for the poor and the excluded The interplay between these elements is linked to accumulated capital and the resources that go with that power nexus, which at the national level takes the form of the prevailing power base. Arguably, neither democracy nor addressing poverty is possible without addressing the prevailing power nexus, because the social, political and economic capacity to mediate between the state and its citizens is strongly linked to it, through blocked access to social justice A third element which runs across the power base, in terms of perpetuation of the status quo is the bureaucracy. Institutions play a critical role in establishing the “rules of the game”; and structure access to the assets, capabilities and opportunities that allow people to meet their needs, manage risks and make progress towards achieving their aspirations.21 Institutions establish people’s obligations and their claims on assets and capabilities. Institutions also compete with each other for social legitimacy and power, thus opening up space for structural change. Disadvantaged individuals and groups may be able to use competing institutions selectively to negotiate ways of meeting their own needs and aspirations. Being socially constructed, institutions are dynamic, which means that the inequitable distributional rules established by one or more interlocking institutions, can be negotiated and changed. Within ministries and departments, the professional bureaucracy may have different goals than those of political appointees; and decision-makers may have different interests from those “in the trenches”. Similar differences in vested interest will be found between municipalities, provinces, federal government. These differences are likely to be stronger where the (new) political structure provides lower levels of government with an independent power base and reduces their accountability to higher levels - (though not to their constituents). • • • • • 23. There is therefore a need to consider both the informal and the formal, codified rules of the institutional game. Formal decision-making processes may be deceptive. Interaction between institutions often alters the formal rules, or creates a subset of informal norms which may foster corruption and bias. 21 See Bennett, April 2003 pp.7-10 11 5.1.1 The Role of the Military 24. The position, role and functioning of the army in today’s Pakistan formed an over-riding preoccupation for virtually all our interlocutors. Indeed, most identified it as the key stakeholder institution. In the context of exclusion, the army is arguably the only institution in Pakistan that allows people to rise socially. Its influence also extends strongly into the spheres of not only politics, but law, the economy, and how to generate social change. However, many people expressed a strong sense that “Pakistan is a nation in turmoil, and that the situation for its future has never been worse”. The perspectives of our interlocutors on these issues will be explored briefly below. • • Stakeholders saw the deteriorating law and order situation as being firmly in the hands of the military to address, but one which it has not so far done so. The army is probably the only institution in Pakistan which enables upward social mobility through merit. As an institution, it appears to also to see itself as the guardian of political, economic and social systems, and as being pivotal to the maintenance of internal stability and change. Whilst the army sees itself as being able to be instrumental to economic development and social change, this is via the use of a narrow, command model of economic and social management, which raises the question of whether the process of change should be participatory or top down. In the view of a number of stakeholders, the problem with the military is its difficulty in going beyond the hierarchical command model. In addition, all four military regimes have taken as partners, the feudal elites who are not noted for their forwardlooking stance in relation to social change. • • 25. Land & Land Reform: Stakeholders perceived the army as being disinterested in changes in structures of power around land, either because of their power alliance with the feudal elites; or because of internal expansionist aims. This has implications in a number of areas, such as where some feudal landlords have held onto their authority by blocking government’s attempts to foster social and economic development; or through the army’s lack of interest in agrarian reform, either because they are themselves land holders; or because of a need for the support of the feudal landlord class to stay in power. 26. The Potential Socio-economic Impact of the Solution to the Kashmir Problem: Many interlocutors saw the trade agenda as critical, though one which – in their views - is underappreciated by those in power. The solution of the Kashmir issue (quite apart from the potential impact on the defence budget and the implications for social sector spending) was seen very much in economic terms, as well as in terms of opening up society to outside influence (in the positive sense). Some of our interlocutors felt that Pakistan’s India policy would come on the table more if the civilians came back into government again, because as some stakeholders commented, many perceive it not to be in the army’s interests to have a solution to Kashmir. 27. Social issues such as the potential HIV-AIDS impact of cross-border trucking once frontiers opened up were raised by some stakeholders, but only peripherally. The phenomenon of jihadis, despite the post-9/11 crackdown, continues, and some analysts see it as strongly linked both to educational systems and to scarcity of jobs. Re-educating former jihadis to take a place in the mainstream in the wake of a solution to the Kashmir problem, and addressing their economic needs, will be a key component in addressing this 12 phenomenon. The view was that jihadis would need to be reabsorbed into the polity, and that this reabsorption would need to be tackled up front. 28. Class as a Determinant of Action/Reaction: The shortage of jobs in the civilian sector and the relatively diminished prestige of the army have meant that a military career has become less attractive to the elite, and more attractive to people from lower middle class urban families (and as such, is therefore more representative of Pakistan as a whole). There have also been significant changes in the composition of the armed forces over time. It has become more lower-middle class, more broad-based in composition. Formerly the officer corps was mainly Punjabi, with a few from the Frontier and a few Urdu-speakers. The introduction of high ranking officers from the poorer provinces, and strong rural links may in time bring about a heightened awareness of poverty among the military decision-makers, but probably not for the next 5-10 years. 29. Industry & the Economy: The expansion of the armed forces into other areas of economic activity was considered alarming by our interlocutors, who saw the military as having the biggest industrial empire; being the biggest land owners as a group, with the largest urban land development programme, ownership of banks, insurance and transport companies.22 There was a strong sense of a reduced space for activity, as a direct consequence of the inroads into civil society and the economy made by the military, together with an increased polarisation of society. 5.1.2 The State & Society The State 30. The state was characterised vocally by stakeholders as parasitical, oppressive, vulnerable, dominated by individuals and individualism, rather than for the greater good. Some argue that the current form of state control results in a four-tier system of privilege: Tier 1 – those linked to the state in some way, who have special privileges provided to them (the army, the bureaucracy, government employees) Tier 2 – those with some form of livelihood-related asset (land, a food stall, a small business, possession of a skill) that is sufficient from which to earn a living Tier 3 - the formal sector labour force (less than 10% of the total), which is registered for social security and consists of protected (vs. unprotected) labour and as such are better off than the latter Tier 4 – the landless rural and urban populations; seasonal labour; daily and wage labour without access to regular employment, who constitute the especially vulnerable A Divided Society 32. Many stakeholders saw the country as currently pulling in two separate and different directions, which is resulting in a polarisation of society. One direction is the increase in unguided “religiosity”, which is seen by some interlocutors as being an undirected “loose cannon”; and the second is what was termed the “modern NGO” culture, which does not sit well with the former, and is seen by its proponents as representing the negative side of western society. There are no communications between the sets of stakeholders either: with the result that there is little understanding of one another, or of common problems. 22 In a recent Pakistani TV programme, Question Time Pakistan (June 13 2003), an audience poll was asked whether the current level of defence spending should be maintained at the expense of expenditure on health and education. The answer “no” was given by a resounding 95%. 13 An Islamic State, or a State for Muslims? “Whose Islam? And what is meant by ‘Muslim’?” 32. Many analysts in Pakistan see the country as having experienced the cooption of Islam over the past 30 years by an externally imposed “Neo-Wahhabi” interpretation of Islam, following the oil boom. The same stakeholders saw this as having been superimposed upon the (indigenous) Indo-Persian version of Islam that was rooted in the Sub-Continental experience. This “Neo-Wahhabi Islam” was seen as having been co-opted by the reactionary right, for its own purposes; and in the views of some, has resulted in the exploitation of Muslims by the imposition of a certain version of Islam promulgated by the few, upon the many. Again, this is arguably another manifestation of the trend towards “reduction of the space” - for freedom of action, diversity, belief and dissent. 33. Some stakeholders saw the ideology of jihad as having been used to preserve “national security”, hence the promulgation of oppressive laws; and the concentration on the preservation of the state of Pakistan on a contrived ideological basis of Jinnah’s conception of an Islamic entity. The stances taken by “Neo-Wahhabi” Islam on issues which have the “wrapping” of Islam and thus preclude debate, lead to perpetuation of exclusion. A perceived failure by the state to deliver on the needs of the people notably in the areas of education and employment – results in the disaffected (as well as the ideologically motivated) joining jihaditype organisations. This gives rise to a situation that mitigates against resolution of the Kashmir situation: what to do with unemployed (ex)jihadis who are unequipped and insufficiently educated to be employed in other pursuits, as well as having been inculcated with a culture of violence, and thus excluded from the mainstream? 34. One of the challenges in addressing social exclusion, rights and the political economy will be how to engage with this agenda with the current political representation, in the light of this increasing trend towards narrowness of ideology, and “reduction of the space”. The answer may lie in interventions centring on dialogue, awareness-raising, education and democracy, which will be explored further below. 5.1.3 The Bureaucracy 35. The bureaucratic management of the economy was regarded by some as the most important factor in Pakistan’s lack of progress towards development. Views included the following: • • At present, there is bureaucratic oversight, but not management. Stakeholders regarded the bureaucracy as inherently reactive, passive; not proactive; impeding, not facilitating. There needs to be generation of a belief in deregulation and mechanisms for oversight that are based on political participation; together with the creation of a “political will” to facilitate. This would need to be implemented via a small, lean, mean, merit-based civil service, which will need to adjust to a new, performance-based environment, and to partner with civil society at the grassroots. Checks, balances, safeguards are all critical elements, as is institution-building, and required changes in district structures (and informal and formal procedures). There is a need for the systemic improvement of governance; and the inclusion of the poor in decision-making, rather than adopting the top-down command model. A potential solution to lead towards merit-based employment and lessening corruption was seen as a reform of the pay structure of eg judges and clerks in the lower courts in particular, which would contribute to addressing the issue of bribetaking. • • • 14 5.1.4 Industry & Commerce 36. In the view of some business stakeholders, corruption, lack of justice, lack of a rule of law, lack of “systematic social networks” (i.e. safety nets, social security), and lack of political stability are the key factors which need to be addressed to enable Pakistan to take its rightful place in the modern world. In particular, political stability and justice were considered to be absolute prerequisites for economic and social progress. For organised labour, the view was that there could be justice if the 1973 Constitution was properly implemented. Taken together, they considered that: • Current educational systems are not producing the type of educated labour force required to meet the demands of industry and commerce, and large enterprises recognise that they simply need to train or retrain their workers from scratch, in order to get the sort of attitudes and competencies required. Support structures to attract and retain trained workers such as pension plans, medical insurance are not within the conceptualisation of most enterprises. Space in a limited market is being taken up by one agency with unlimited resources through its industries - (the specific examples of the Fauji Foundation; Fauji Fertiliser; mineral water bottling; Askari Bank were cited) - which crowds out other commercial stakeholders with less access to that level of funds and subsidy The World Trade Organisation agreements could exacerbate poverty by reducing the space for poverty alleviation interventions. Trade agreements were seen as likely to more income disputes with labour; and greater unemployment - (a fear expressed by both trade unions and the private sector). Commercial interests felt that the country is ripe for internal domestic investment, if only the leadership gives a clear-cut signal to point the way (rather than focusing solely on foreign investment). There are some indications of the beginnings of the building of a culture of meritocracy: the example of the Lahore University of Management Science (LUMS) was given, where entry and retention is merit-based. In the Punjab, industrialists formed the Technical Education and Vocational Training Association (TEVTA), to train students according to the needs of industry and the market. • • • • • • 5.2 Political Processes, Rights & Democracy 5.2.1 Political Processes Separate & Joint Electorates 37. Until 2002, when President Musharraf re-introduced joint electorates, the voting system was based on separate electorates - (that is, the election of candidates exclusively by their coreligionists) - which were tantamount to virtual disenfranchisement of minorities. None of the three constitutions (1956, 1962, 1973) made provision for separate electorates. Joint electorates were viewed as a positive step, necessary for the development of a more equitable political process for enabling minorities to join mainstream politics. However the 1985 elections and following the enaction of the 8th Amendment, the 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1997 elections were held on the basis of separate electorates. 15 “Traditional groups based on tribal, caste and religious ties operate in a small radius of trust, and do not produce positive externalities leading to wider horizontal patterns of cooperation with “outsiders” 38. This “small radius of trust” has led to the perpetuation of an in-bred group mentality, with negative implications, characterised by ethnic and religio-sectarian differences.23 This in turn mitigates against the emergence of a pluralistic democracy in Pakistan. There is a need to go beyond the identity-based primary groups, to interest-based voluntary institutions to lay the foundations for representative, responsive, and responsible government in the country. Women Politicians 39. The consensus was that women politicians brought in at the national and the local levels in the recent elections are here to stay. However, the process of empowerment of women within the parties is slow, and they are still marginalised. In the view of some stakeholders, while women remain on reserved seats, they will never be treated as equals: (there are currently 72 women in the National Assembly). There is evidence that the new intake of women in local bodies and in parliament is on a sharp learning curve, though they still face considerable hurdles, including being trivialised even where they try to be articulate. 40. While reserved seats are however a useful transitional measure till women can be nominated for a seat: however, women on reserved seats lack a constituency in the eyes of male members. Because development funds (and thus power, patronage, as well as the opportunity to make money, and pride) are involved, male elected representatives are reluctant to “let go to women opponents”. Women were disempowered within parties by their male members having insisted on the funds from women’s allocations being put into a common pool. Working class women wishing to claim a space in power structures through challenging the traditional local power structure do so at considerable personal risk. Political Parties 41. One ray of hope for pro-poor, inclusive change was considered to be the bright new motivated intake in the young members of the new Parliament. Overall, however, the parliamentary intake does not have a high level of understanding of pro-poor change, and few politicians have an understanding of, or interest in, development issues. For some, educating those interested in development issues was seen as a potential way forward; together with equipping the library of the National Assembly with relevant reference material for those who seek it out. The view of others was that there was little hope for parliamentary-led change: “The only thing to change this attitude would be large scale unrest.” Some saw intraprovincial water issues as a likely focus of such social unrest. 42. There was a perceived lack of “space” for political parties/entities, yet these are the only real potential uniting force for change. The political party leadership was seen as a major part of the problem by many, lacking training, elected positions within parties, and regarded as comprised only of personalities and individuals. The challenge was seen as how to make it a part of the solution, since despite these shortcomings, stakeholders felt that there is a need for strong political parties who must organise, must be democratic, and have elected members within their own structures at least at the lower levels. Internal party democracy was regarded as a key element in addressing the short term perspectives of the parties as the local government system will generate a need for grassroots party democracy, for candidates to mobilise votes at the lower party cadre level. 43. Reasons why political parties have never addressed social exclusion were seen to include: 23 See Waseem and Burki pp 28-29 16 • • • • • • • • factionalism, which cuts across biraderi in political party structures, obscuring “real” issues such as social development and exclusion few people in villages have independent voting patterns, due to purchasing of votes the sense that the people’s true problems do not get addressed in parliament the feudal culture, which impedes the functioning of the political system at the lower levels due to victimisation of opponents the patron-client mindsets of NGOs the use of charity such as zakat, or flood relief (in 1992) to further marginalisation lack of internal party capacity to debate and address issues in depth lack of neutral all-party discussion fora on development and poverty related issues. 44. Social exclusion is complex to understand; and the political agenda is dominated by the immediate, not by long-term problems. This is compounded by the perception that economic (income-based) poverty is “easier” to deal with. Thus, what is required is a change of mindset, of social values, of “the rules of the game”, and a de-linking of ascribed status from income level, none of which is easy to achieve. 5.2.2 Rights & Democracy Rights 45. Aspects of social exclusion are fundamentally all aspects of rights-based poverty, though cause and effect are not necessarily consistent – take for example purdah: if there is more income, households tend to have their women move into purdah which restricts mobility – a plus, for the income, but a minus for the mobility. Are people thus better, or worse off? 46. The level of people’s awareness of their rights has increased in Pakistan. It is clear from the PPAs that people have in many cases a clear understanding of what they are being deprived of, and by whom. The gap remains however in addressing how to enable the mass of the population to exercise their rights. A large, conscious effort will be required to address this; and to encourage current structures of power and interest groups to shift their stance. Given the huge inequities and inability to access rights experience by most of the rural poor; and the increasing numbers of educated (primarily urban) unemployed, some of our interlocutors whilst hoping for the possibility of peaceful change felt that change was inevitable, and would occur by violent means if these issues were not addressed. 47. For a democratic system to fully represent all citizens, it is important to overcome the forces that disempower some segments of society – women and religious minorities. Women’s under-registration as voters remains a problem. Electoral lists are inaccurate, due to changes or address or death of voters, changes of women’s names on marriage, inability of women to register, reduction in the age of eligibility (now 18 for local bodies elections), registration of refugees as voters, double registration at place of origin and work, and fraudulent registration for vote rigging purposes. Democracy 48. Democratic processes, and education were the two key issues singled out by our interlocutors as presenting a chance for change. As noted above, there is widespread awareness of rights, coupled with a frustration at being unable to realise them. Many observers considered regular - (and to the extent realistically possible, free and fair) elections as a critical element in addressing these frustrations and in exercising rights. 5. 3 The Legal Context to Social Exclusion 17 Discriminatory Legislation: Impact on Excluded Groups - Women & Minorities 49. The majority of our interlocutors saw both the Hadood and Blasphemy Laws as ways of marginalising people; of perpetuating fragmentation and control over the disempowered; and of perpetuation of disempowerment itself. Some regarded the Constitution of Pakistan as the root basis for exclusion, since it refers to an Islamic Republic of Pakistan. They saw the state as an entity that has a religion (Islam) and therefore responds only in areas associated with the practice of Islam; which it is enjoined to promote. This facilitation of religion (Islam) by the state, de facto excludes all other (religions) from State responsibility. 50. However, on the one hand, the Constitution of Pakistan implicitly recognizes factors of social exclusion in the clauses aiming to safeguard non-discrimination between citizens and in its provisions for affirmative actions for specific groups of people. These include gender, religion, race and language, geographical disparities (both in terms of province and ruralurban divides within provinces), and, of course, class.24 51. On the other hand, the Constitution also defines the country as a federal parliamentary system, and does not recognise the heterogeneity of society, and therefore denies diversity and pluralism. The concept of minority religions is present, and thus could present an entry point, but provisions for inclusion need to be made. At present, there is a concept of tolerance and passive acceptance of other religions, as opposed to acceptance, inclusion and interaction. Minorities are not recognised on an ethnic basis in the Constitution. There is no concept of being anything other than a Pakistani, since the conceptualisation of the nation state does not leave room for a “conglomeration of nationalities” through recognition of ethnic diversity such as Baloch, Pathan, Sindhi, Punjabi, Kashmiri, Seraiki etc. In contrast, people actually do define themselves – increasingly – in this way. Arguably, it suits certain interests not to recognise this diversity, in order to exercise control in the name of homogeneity and religion. 52. Introduced by General Zia, “Islamization” is now firmly entrenched in Pakistan’s legal system. The Eighth Constitutional indemnified all previous actions of the martial law. Laws and Ordinances discriminating against women and minorities are exempted from being challenged in court, being only reversible by an act of parliament. The Zia legacy is equally damaging in terms of social environment. Structural modifications and new parameters for social norms redefining society permeated the entire edifice of the state and seeped into civil society, sweeping away lingering inhibitions against open discrimination or violence. For example, after the Zia period, many activists consider that the state’s official policy on women changed from one of aggressive hostility to a more liberal viewpoint, but that support has been defensive and hedged by frequent references to Islam that allow far more space to politico-religious elements of the right than is warranted. Even if women are more visible than before, democracy has failed to curb the bigotry against non-Muslims who, as a whole, are excluded from the ruling elites. 53. Religious intolerance has also not abated. Violence against non-Muslims (as well as sectarian violence) has continued. In the view of many stakeholders, sectarian and other violence is at least partially caused by the frustrations of people having to deal with a state that seems to have abandoned much of its responsibilities; and with an economic and social structure that has little room for fulfilling economic desires and potential. This results in an economic situation which allows minimal scope for a nurturing of tolerance and social Article 25 provides for equality of all citizens; prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex alone; and clarifies that ‘nothing shall prevent the state from making special measures for the protection of women and children’. Non-discrimination on the basis of race, religion, caste, sex, residence or place of birth in government appointments and employment is guaranteed under Article 27 that also provides for special quotas/reserved seats for specific classes, areas and sex. Article 26 covers non-discriminatory free access to all places (except those of religious worship), while reserving the state’s right to make special provisions for women and children. 24 18 inclusion for anyone. The Police & the Poor 54. For many of the poor, the police are the first point of contact with authority. The experience is rarely a positive one. There is little or no redress against the police: the checks and balances of the past have been lifted and a vacuum left in its place. For many victims, both the army and the police are seen as being above the law. The District Magistrate (DM) who was also the head of the police (rather than that position being held by the Superintendent of Police), used to be a check on the arbitrary excesses of the police in the past, from the time of the British Raj. However the DM’s position (and its later incarnations, Deputy and Assistant Commissioners) was abolished under the devolution process in 2002, without giving powers to the nazims over the police, as had originally been the intention. The result has been a remarkable – and alarming - rise in the incidence of police crime.25 In the view of many, police rapes have increased because there are no checks on them any more. People have no faith in the lower judiciary, which are considered by many to be corrupt.26 55. The poor are very vulnerable to police exploitation. Prisoners (both male and female, but particularly female) are among the most abused and excluded from access to their rights. For many of our interlocutors, police reforms were seen as a key element in restoring law and order, with the aim of de-politicising the police force and addressing social exclusion. Proper education, proper pay scales, and above all, accountability, transparency, and having honest officers setting the lead, were seen as critical interventions in such reform,27 and in combating the apathy of police leadership which has failed to stand up to the police/criminals nexus. The absence of a credible system of police accountability was singled out: accountability is not institutionalised within the police, but rather ethics and efficiency are (re)defined by whoever is in charge. Another view is that the Public Safety Commission and Police Complaints Authority could create a responsible, accountable force. The Rule of Law 56. The lower judiciary is considered by some stakeholders to be the most corrupt department, which combines with the police to oppress the people. This has a major impact on lack of empowerment of the poor. In the view of others, the issue of access to justice and the police has become so bad that the authorities remain silent on the issue. 57. Public knowledge about the law is extremely poor28 which makes it possible for public behaviour to be conducted outside the established legal framework. There are also competing legal and judicial systems which complicate the norms of public morality.29 Legal machinery is slow, cumbersome, inefficient, and often corrupt. There is overlapping jurisdiction and a lack of coordination between various anti-corruption institutions.30 5.4 The Minorities It was documented by the Sindh provincial Ombudsman that between 20 March 2001-19 March 2002, there were 328 reported crimes by police officials. This figure rose by approximately one third to 480 for the same period in 2002-2003: see Herald, June 2003 p.47 26 This increase in reported police crime is despite documented threats by the police of repercussions to families of victims if they go to court; and recent allegations of male and female rape by the police in Sindh: see Herald, June 2003 pp. 45-50 27 The example was given of the motorway police, who are properly paid, impartial, polite, and proud of their jobs, having the backing of their senior officers in enforcing the law; and having received proper training and support. 28 Waseem, Mohammed; Burki, Shahid Javed: Strengthening Democracy in Pakistan: A Practical Programme, DFID February 2002: pp16-17 29 These include the Frontier Criminal Regulations, the Federal Shariat Court and Shariat Appellate Bench, the 1968 West Pakistan Ordinance I and II applicable to parts of Balochistan, the 1975 Provincially-Administered Tribal Area Regulations I and II applicable to parts of NWFP, and the 1987 Special Courts for Speedy Trials (later included in the 1991 12th Amendment) as well as the legal framework within which the National Accountability Bureau operates. 30 eg. The Anti Corruption Establishment, Public Accounts Committee, Federal Investigation Agency, National Accountability Bureau, the Ombudsman, and the Anti Corruption Committees of the elected assemblies. 25 19 58. Successive governments have failed to take effective measures to counter prevalent public prejudices against religious minorities, particularly Christians and Ahmadis. The positive acknowledgement of diversity is not a feature of what one interlocutor described as “a monochromatic society”. Lack of -Separation of Religion & Politics 59. The lack of separation of religion and politics in Pakistan was seen as having led to the promulgation of the Blasphemy Laws, and separate electorates – both of which have implications for the socially excluded in particular. These include: • • All blasphemy cases are dealt with by the anti-terrorist courts, which are held without facilities for defence. The blasphemy laws (Section 295(a), the Blasphemy Provision of the Penal Code and subsequent amendments (b) and (c) in 1982, 1986 and 1991 amendments which stipulate the sentence terms for insulting the religion of any class of citizen have been used to intimidate, threaten or punish Ahmadis, Christians in particular, and even Muslims. Certain sections of the Pakistan Penal Code directly target Ahmadis, following a 1974 Constitutional Amendment declaring Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority. Discriminatory legislation adds to an atmosphere of religious intolerance, which in turn leads to acts of violence directed against minority Muslim sects, Christians, Hindus, and offshoot Muslim sects such as Zikris and Ahmadis. Religious minorities experience discrimination in employment and education. Bad (discriminatory) laws & poor application of the law were both singled out as problems leading to laying of false cases and other forms of legalised discrimination, which in some instances had covert economic motives behind them Religion can be a determinant of social mobility in Pakistan. For many, the oppression of minorities emerges from “ignorance and lack of education, including the wrong teaching of Islam”. In addition, some saw the biraderi system as preventing people from deciding for themselves, even where the law allows such a choice: for example, now (following the restoration of joint electorates), a Christian candidate can vote, can stand and contest an election, but it is unlikely that any other biraderi would vote for him/her. The lack of education of the maulvis, the consequent content of their mosque sermons, and their lack of sensitivity towards promoting civil society and inclusion were identified as a root cause of discrimination against minorities; as well as the negative projection and portrayals of Christians by teachers in regular schools which result in Christian children feeling very marginalised. There is a (generational) perception that the pre-71 nationalisation of schools promoted greater tolerance via Christian-run schools such as Forman Christian College, Lahore, which was a centre of excellence. Today, it is reportedly difficult for graduates from minority communities to obtain jobs on merit (in government). In addition, where bribes are required to access jobs, broadly speaking the Christian community is a poor one, and its members tends to lack resources. Though joint electorates have been restored, representation in Parliament is not secured as laid down in the Constitution, since political party representation is present, but religious (eg Christian) representation is absent. Whilst the Christians are the largest minority community, the political parties tend not to make any distinction between communities within minority groups. In the view of some stakeholders, minorities should come together via a joint forum such as the Joint Commission on Minorities, which should have a role more like that of an ombudsman’s office, but with government taking on ownership of the minorities’ problems. This Commission could address issues such as protection of • • • • • • • 20 • • • rights; abuse of minority status; the quota system for allocation of resources for poverty alleviation (such as via the PPAF, which bypass the minority communities). Other suggestions included that the Joint Minorities Commission should have a statutory body status, via an Act of Parliament (as does the Minorities Commission in India). This was seen as increasing the ability to access redress. State ownership of this initiative would be critical, as would the autonomy of the Commission. The exclusion of minorities from politics was followed by economic exclusion, exclusion from access to shelter, and social exclusion. For example, instances cited by stakeholders included: a Hindu in Hyderabad city applies for a plot and finds it repossessed after purchase; an Ahmadi cannot be allocated a plot, which results in their children being unable to go to school in that location (since school registration is tenure-linked). Promotion, employment opportunities are all used to prevent minority community representatives rising beyond a certain level (including, reportedly, in the army). The problems of the minorities are increasing, and interlocutors gave examples of how the development of modern working practices and office structures has not made much impact on the socialised application of (Hindu) custom on today’s society in Pakistan. Access to justice is a key area for addressing exclusion. However, taking on minority rights issues is hazardous and can result in personal vendettas clothed with “ideological” coverings. 5.5 Gender 60. The PPA reconfirms that the main cause of poverty lies in the widespread structural inequity that leads to the exclusion of the poorest from both owning and accessing assets and services and having a say in decisions that directly affect them. The other important fact it highlights is that of unequal gender relations whereby women are denied opportunities and restrained from playing a full and meaningful role at the level of the household and community. It further demonstrates that social exclusion is as much a result of poverty as its cause and that women’s social exclusion is systemic and integrally related to the structures of social and power relations at the levels of family, community and state. While poor women are doubly excluded, even the better off can and do experience powerlessness and social exclusion. 61. Within the family, lack of ownership of assets, dependency on male relatives and societal norms prevent women from exercising choices as basic as those of education and profession to more complex ones of marriage and divorce. Any departure from the prescribed path may result in dire consequences ranging from violence to divorce or death. The state was seen by many stakeholders as failing in its duty to provide protection, security and opportunities, with the added result that women have, until recently, been unable to carve out a space at the political level or give voice to their concerns. 62. Reducing poverty by addressing social exclusion alone is not likely to be a successful strategy, unless both (income) poverty and social exclusion are tackled simultaneously. The provision of, and access to, services (health, education, skill development, information, roads and transport), as well as opportunities for income generation (employment, credit, markets), social protection through safety nets (social security, pension schemes, etc.), and access to justice will contribute to the reduction of social exclusion. However these will need to be accompanied by systemic measures to remove discriminatory laws; the creation of a conducive environment to exercise the right to full political participation and representation, affirmative action to draw women into the professional and public mainstream and benefit from services. Above all, legislative and policy action will be required to redress the structural inequity in society that supports gender inequity, and to enable inclusion in political, economic and social decision making. 21 5.6 Caste, Class & Provincial Ethnicity 5.6.1 Caste, Biraderi, Ethnicity & Status Caste 63. Caste-like discrimination is not necessarily religion-based, but rather is a system of hierarchy and social stratification, whereby specific ranks are determined by descent, occupation and work. In Pakistan, caste coexists with, and is sustained by, feudal, tribal and other socially sanctioned structures. Whilst in theory Pakistan has a sufficient international and national framework within which to protect the rights of people vulnerable to discrimination, class, gender, biraderi and caste-based prejudice is demonstrated by lack of will by law enforcement officers to take required action. However, caste and biraderi are far from synonymous: while both have been used as instruments not only of social exclusion but of social and political conflict, neither is either determinant or absolute in these situations. The determinant has always been control of land and other assets and the power to extract surpluses and revenues. Biraderi 64. While some rural biraderis have risen from low status and little power to becoming major players on the national political scene such as the Arains31, others remain low in status such as the various kammi groups (sometimes described as castes). These are deliberately marginalized by more powerful groups anxious to maintain their position in a changing rural environment to the extent that “higher status” groups will try to prevent even educated members of lower status groups from participating in community affairs and especially in decision making.32 The position of lower status groups in rural society has also been weakened by the demise of the feudal jajmani system in which groups accorded control and higher status also had obligations towards members of lower status groups who were their tenants and dependents. The great levellers in this process are urbanisation and wealth. A member of a lower status group who either makes good in the big city or works abroad strengthens not only his own status but, by repatriating wealth and consumer durables and by purchase of land, raises the status of the extended family. Caste-Based Exclusion 65. The remnants of the caste system work to exclude two specific sets of communities. The first are the Hindu Bhils and Kohlis of Sind, still regarded by fellow Hindus in Pakistan to be low caste and further excluded by the majority Muslim community.33 Others in this category are the low-status castes and tribes such as the Domes and the Gujjars, as noted in the PPAs and above. The second group are certain communities (formerly low-caste Hindus) who subsequently converted to Christianity who continue to work in menial occupations such as street cleaning and sanitation. Provincial Ethnicity & Exclusion 66. One way in which anti-democratic regional elites can continue to benefit from the surpluses produced by society while denying basic benefits to the majority of people, is to highlight and exacerbate ethnic and religious differences. This is particularly the case in the smaller provinces. 31 32 33 To which formerly purely agricultural biradari General Ziaul Haq belonged. As noted in the DFID-supported Pakistan and Provincial Participatory Poverty Assessments. The scheduled castes in Mirpur also distinguish between themselves – eg Bhils and Kohlis will not eat together. 22 67. The effects of ethnic stereotyping have been found by stakeholders to affects commercialindustrial hiring policies, eg in the textile industry (which is a major source of urban formal sector employment). The degree to which these divisions have obtruded on the national consciousness is considered by many stakeholders to be a symptom of the decline of the writ of the state; and its co-option for personal ends by different parts of the Pakistani oligarchy. Ultimately, the armed persecution of one ethnic or religious group by another also shows up the decreasing sphere of rule of law and an abdication by the state of its national responsibilities. This is very much a function of the “crisis of the Pakistan state”, its society and economy, and much less that of the role of biraderi or caste. Biraderi, Feudal Power & Political Exclusion 68. Many stakeholders observed that all points of authority bring in their “own” (tribe, biraderi, caste) to the exclusion of the “other”. A recent study based on field work in Sindh and AJK34 found that landed power and biraderi are the two main factors explaining electoral success; and that there is a complex interplay between them. Structural conditions in rural Pakistan were found to be inadequate to enable political participation via the electoral process, because the concentration of landed power and wealth results in systematic political exclusion even at the local level where the big landlords are not necessarily expected to be players.35 The policy conclusion is that a state concerned with political inclusion needs to find a way to diffuse power. Land reform is one such obvious instrument, though it is clearly politically difficult due to the political “reach” of the large landlords no matter which government is in power. Affirmative action will still be required to ensure the political participation of women, the minorities and the most excluded/deprived - kammis. 5.6.2 Class 69. The overlay between caste, biraderi, class/social stratification and power in Pakistan is a complex one. However, one inhibiting factor in generating social change is the lack of a strong middle class. Worldwide, history indicates that the primary engine of social change has always been the middle class.37 In Pakistan, the Pakistan Freedom Movement was primarily landed and from one province – United Provinces - (except for the Qaid e Azam), and from its creation, Pakistan has suffered from a very weak middle class. Historically, the middle class in Pakistan has been left out of the political process – other than its manifestation in the army – in part because the feudals ensure that other groups do not get access to the political process. In the view of some, the ruling classes have failed to deliver to the people on any front, and rapid population growth has left a massive vacuum which in the view of many is being filled by the religious parties. One expression of this vacuum is the extensive spread of the madrassahs; and the incidence of sectarian violence.39 5.7 Education “There is no institution (schools, universities, student unions) in Pakistan which creates progressive minds” In Larkana and Muzaffargarh. See Shahrukh Rafi Khan, Aasim Sajjad Akhtar, Foqia Sadiq Khan: Investigating the Importance of Landed Power and Other Determinants of Local Body Election Outcomes, SDPI Monograph No. 17, 2002, pp. 2-3 35 op. cit. p. 5 37 For example the Congress Party in India, an agent of social change, emerged as an essentially middle class-based entity. 39 The lack of educational alternatives, together with the fact that students are fed and clothed in madrassahs make them an attractive prospect for a poor large family with insufficient means to support all its members. 34 23 70. Education was singled out by the majority of our interlocutors as an absolutely critical factor in unleashing the potential of Pakistan, and they stressed the importance of establishing a sound educational system within which the talented can rise, irrespective of origins. Education was also seen as the key to addressing social exclusion. Literacy, curriculum content, civics education, and the maintenance of English as a medium of instruction were all identified by stakeholders as critical components of an educational strategy to promote inclusion. Past education policies were seen as having only resulted in the creation of a pool of frustrated educated unemployed. 5.7.1 Changing Attitudes “The number of educated and trained people in Pakistan is greater than ever before, yet so little use is made of that intellect for a social change agenda.” 71. Why have the ruling classes not seriously bothered about education? Some say it is because those who control political power are not touched by its inadequacies, and do not see how it is strengthening the social gap between population groups. For example, the elite has been able to bypass the decline in educational quality in universities by simply going abroad; and the army as an institution has developed its own exclusive school system, which promotes social mobility for the children of officers, offering facilities unknown in government schools. However, some stakeholders identified encouraging signs of a recent shift in attitude towards recognition of the importance of tertiary education, in decisions by the Advisor on Higher Education to promote research, including on the social sciences; and towards increasing resource allocations for universities. The Three-Tier System 72. The type of educational system in which a child is educated has a direct bearing on upward social mobility, through their ability to compete within the broader socio-economic context. The most important step that the government could take to create a merit-based society and economy would be to establish a sound education system within which talent could rise. A major problem in relation to social exclusion identified by our interlocutors was the three-tier education system, which consists of: (i) the English medium elite school system, which has no relationship at all to the government system, with the exam system in the former affiliated to foreign boards/universities; the government system used by the majority of school students, where standards have dropped greatly over the past 20 years; the madrassahs, which mushroomed during the Zia era. (ii) (iii) 73. These parallel educational systems have resulted in class divisions by type of education: the elites attended private schools; middle and lower middle classes went to government schools, and the poor went to the madrassahs. The student intake in the latter are among the most deprived groups of population, and as some stakeholders argued, such schools are an expression of rebellion against the existing educational system. Education, coupled with lack of job opportunities for the educated (and the handicap faced in the current difficult job market by those without a good command of English), has made a major contribution to the rise of conservative thinking and of fundamentalism, including through educational content (in all three school systems). None the less, schools alone cannot modify students’ perspectives in the absence of a more general social transformation: the role of education as an agent of change also depends on the type of education being imparted. 24 5.7.2 Exclusion through Education Educational Systems & Linguistic Exclusion 74. The focus of education in the madrassahs is Islam as interpreted by a sect or sub-sect41. Attempts under Ayub Khan to reform, and under Zia to integrate, the madrassah system of education had limited success. The state’s emphasis on Islamic texts in government schools has resulted in vernacular-educated urban Pakistanis becoming more receptive to the ideas of the madrassahs than ever before, because it has been argued that spreading literacy via the madrassahs makes people more open to “orthodox” opinions than before.42 75. The curricula and textbooks in secular schools reportedly contain as much hatred, untruth and encourage as much violence, as those in the religious madrassahs, according to a recent study.43 Four themes were found to emerge from the bulk of the curricula and text books of three compulsory subjects: (i) that Pakistan is for Muslims alone; (ii) that Islamic studies, including the reading of the Koran is to be forcibly taught to all students, irrespective of their religion; (iii) that the “ideology of Pakistan” is to be internalised as faith, and hate to be created against Hindus and India; and (iv) that students are to be urged to take the path of jihad and shahadat (martyrdom). There is a virtually total absence of sensitivity to the presence of non-Muslims in the country portrayed in the curricula and text books. However, a recent potentially positive development is that in July 2003, the Wafaq e Madaress (Federation of Seminaries) run by the JUI, and representing the heads of the Deobandi (the most influential) madrassah boards accepted that in principle the syllabi of the madrassahs should be modified to introduce modern subjects.44 5.8 Labour 76. Labour-related issues of social exclusion centre on three groups: informal sector labour; formal sector labour; and bonded labour. The main labour-related problems were identified as: workers’ wages are insufficient for their daily needs huge job insecurity major, and growing unemployment inadequate coverage and implementation of existing legislation Stakeholders identified three other areas where change is required: (i) redressing the unionmanagement balance; (ii) addressing the bias in the law courts; and (iii) the introduction of merit-based hiring and firing. 77. The informal sector, and addressing the rights of the many women who work in it, were singled out as critical areas to address in relation to removing the non-income barriers to poverty reduction. Issues identified include trade union rights of association; registration of employment; wage levels; sexual harassment; poor working conditions; lack of transport facilities for women in particular; enforcement of legislation on equal work for equal pay; and See Jamal Malik, Colonialisation of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan, Vanguard Books 1996 The question of “whose Islam” and the superimposition of a “neo-Wahhabi” version of Islam on the Indo-Persion Islam of the Subcontinent following the rise of the petro-dollar has been discussed earlier in this report. 43 See A. H. Nayyar & Ahmed Salim: The Subtle Subversion: the State of the Curricula & Textbooks in Pakistan, SDPI 2003. 2003. 44 See Hasan Mansoor: “Groundwork to Modernise the Seminaries Begins”, The Friday Times Aug 1-7 2003. The Wafaq has also formed committees to devise ways to capitalise on the government’s US$255 million Madrassah Reforms Scheme for the transition. 42 41 25 lack of voice, once again particularly for women. Application of the labour laws, the minimum wage, appointment letter or contract, raising women’s awareness on their rights are key issues identified by stakeholders. 78. For formal sector labour, critical issues identified during the Scoping Study centre on developing facilitation and trust, which in turn will depend on political will. These include: • • • • • • • • • facilitation of conditions for secure employment, including the right to work; cooperative (rather than conflict-based) frameworks for negotiation and acceptance of ILO convention the extension of labour legislation to cover farm workers, the informal sector, homebased workers and individual (vs family) labour generation of accountability in the appeals system and labour directorate widening of coverage of social security to cover all workers, including bonded labour, agricultural workers, home-based workers registration of mines and brick kilns as industrial establishments, within the purview of industrial relations registration of business enterprises, to facilitate adequate monitoring of conditions of employment; the implementation of laws in the work place (including occupational health and safety, and welfare legislation)l and the extension of group insurance accessing employment, via an unemployment and skills availability register with electronic linkages and sufficient outlets across the major cities apprenticeship programmes to be established in collaboration with employers. Bonded Labour 79. Pakistan has ratified 34 international labour conventions, including Convention 105 on the elimination of forced labour. Several national laws, including the 1992 Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act, have been enacted to provide legal penalties for those engaging in discriminatory practices. The Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act 1992 made bonded labour illegal, cancelled all existing bonded labour debts, and forbade law suits for the recovery of existing debts. However, the provinces effectively do not recognise the existence of bonded labour; and successive provincial governments responsible for enforcement of the law have failed to do so, with the result that considerable numbers of people remain in bond. Key issues include: • disagreement in Sindh as to whether landlord-tenant relations are covered by the Bonded Labour (Abolition) Act. Landlords consider that debt disputes should be addressed under the Tenancy Act which states that “a tenant, if he is indebted to the landlord, shall be liable to pay off his debt before leaving” poverty forces people into taking cash advances on wages from landlords or brick factory owners (eg in Punjab). High interest rates and low wages prevent these debts from being repaid, which, together with lack of access to alternative employment opportunities, and lack of sufficient education to enable people to calculate their debt, – inter alia – perpetuates a cycle of poverty and discrimination: see National and Sindh PPAs for a discussion of the impact of bonded labour on poverty debts are commonly handed down from generation to generation on the death of the head of the household throughout Pakistan employers forcibly extract labour from adults and children, restrict their freedom of movement, and deny them the right to negotiate the terms of their employment. Employers coerce such workers into servitude through physical abuse, forced confinement, and debt-bondage. There is apparent state complicity in these abuses, both by the direct involvement of the police and through the state's failure to protect the rights of bonded labourers, whereby employers who hold • • • 26 workers in servitude are rarely prosecuted or punished; and workers who contest their exploitation are often imprisoned under false charges. 5.9 Land 80. In Pakistan, access to land ownership rights has a direct correlation with poverty. Land ownership in rural areas represents rights associated with livelihood: (food, income, access to formal credit, to confer legal identity; and in urban areas, shelter and security). Access to land ownership rights also has a gender dimension in the denial of land inheritance rights to women. 81. Despite Prime Minister Jamali’s recent categorical public statement that there would be no land reform, this – or at minimum, improved administrative implementation of existing legislation – was seen by many stakeholders as a critical issue in addressing exclusion and promoting sustainable growth. In this regard, while there is considerable evidence that targeted government investment in quality education (with emphasis on equal access for girls and boys) makes a big difference in the degree to which poor men and women share in growth45 comparisons of the performance of certain East Asian countries with that of Latin America indicate that land reform can also help – though the way in which this is carried out appears to make a big difference. In many contexts market-based land reforms that strengthen, rather than undermine, property rights and long term security of tenancy and thus create incentives for productive investment, have been found to be the most successful. 5.9.1 Issues in Land Interventions 82. Land fragmentation further contributes to impoverishment of disadvantaged groups: smaller land holdings mean owners till their own land, and do not hire the landless to work on it for them (and the rich get the poor to work for free). Denial of land rights leads to the curtailment of other rights, such as registering the birth of children, and voting rights. 83. While distribution of land ownership has remained relatively stable since the 1960s, there has been a decline in tenancy and a corresponding increase in owner-cultivation, due to demographic, technological political-economic and institutional reasons. For example, changes in the land-labour ratio as a result of demographic change can make landlords choose to farm more of their land themselves and offer less land to tenants. Technological change allows production to become more capital-intensive at a time when labour is becoming more abundant. Under conditions of highly unequal distribution of land ownership, tenancy acts as a way of facilitating access to land, for the landless poor. The decline in tenancy therefore has led to a sharpening of inequality in access to land. Some feudal landlords have argued that a more equitable distribution of land would do little to improve agricultural productivity.46 Experience in East Asia suggests they are wrong. If Pakistan is to enjoy higher economic growth and social development, then it needs a meritocratic middle class. There are few countries in today’s world, and no economically successful ones, where local landlords wield such power. Many of our interlocutors spoke of the need for land reform. 5.8 Disability 84. Disability represents another manifestation of social exclusion. An estimated 11-14% of the population of Pakistan is disabled, according to WHO estimates, of whom 60% are physically challenged (including from malnutrition or lack of iodine); and some 90% of whom are from poor backgrounds.47 However social stigma around disability is such that 45 See for example the World Development Report 1990 on poverty reduction, which remains valid at the beginning of the 21st century. 46 See Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, Vanguard 2002, pp 248-249 47 Bilal Khan, DG, Department of Special Education, personal communication July 2003. 27 people do not disclose the presence of a disabled family member to authorities, making precise estimates difficult. 85. A new policy for the disabled was launched in June 2003, which aims to bring Pakistani practice up to the standard of international norms. Inclusion of the disabled into the mainstream of society is primarily being addressed through attempts towards inclusive education; alliances with institutions such as the National Council and the National Institute; and a new law specifying that either 2% of a workforce of 50+ must be drawn from the disabled; or a sum of money can be paid in lieu, one third of which is then retained at district government level for expenditure on the disabled within the district; one third goes to the provincial government for the same purpose; and one third to the federal government. 5.11 Micro Credit 86. Micro-credit has been found to have a strong positive impact on the poor in urban and peri-urban settings. Since families of successful users of micro-credit register sustainable income increases, the impact is not confined to greater consumption or investment in the micro-enterprise. These households also show significant improvement in such social indicators as children’s education, family nutrition and improved hygiene. Returns on successful micro-credit use by poor and lower middle class households have typically been 30 to 50 percent annually in times of economic growth, substantially higher than in medium or large-scale industry. 87. Rural use of micro-credit is important both for agricultural and non agricultural use, particularly for poorer farmers, whose requirement for agricultural inputs, seeds, fertilizer, pesticide, etc. tends to be cyclical as does their income. Unfortunately the two cycles do not always coincide. The poorer the farmer, the greater the proportion of his produce that is diverted towards household consumption. In the case of poorest, those with the smallest or least productive land holdings, their consumption requirements will exceed their production of basic food items. 88. A critical issue in relation to the use of micro-credit as a tool to address social exclusion in provision of rural credit for agricultural and other use is its potential role in lessening dependency on landlords and in reducing debt bondage.48 Other issues in provision of microcredit include group formation, credit discipline, guarantee, size of loan, developing business management skills. However, good poverty targeting has been found to be critical. This will be particularly important in order to incorporate the socially-excluded in accessing microcredit schemes. 5.12 Devolution Devolution & Power “Devolution is inclusion” 89. Experience to date indicates that considerable expectations have been generated by the devolution process.49 Meeting them remains a challenge. The implementation of this system should mark a massive change in Pakistan’s political and social landscape, overturning a system that has evolved very slowly to the degree that it has evolved at all, for over a century, but the very complexity of the changes requires time; and not all the support structures to replace the civil service are yet in place. Elections have been carried out at district level but the transfer of authority is still snarled in detail. To take one very major example, the 48 49 See Gazdar, op. cit. Individual and group discussions with Sarwar Bari, Farzana Bari (Patan) and Musharraf Cyan, consultants on devolution. 28 dismantling of civil service control and oversight of police has left a vacuum that no statutory body has filled. 90. Three difficulties that immediately confront the process of change are: (i) (ii) determining the exact functions and procedures of work of each new functionary or body; developing the capacity of persons elected to these positions to discharge their functions (bearing in mind that the structures are new and the incumbents inexperienced); and monitoring the whole process to ensure that these functions are discharged not only efficiently but fairly. (iii) The key issues of district revenue generation; exercising supervision over administration, magistracy and law enforcement remain as yet unresolved, and have considerable implications for training new local administration staff. Devolution & the Creation of an Enabling Environment 91. The poor face markets, state institutions and local structures of power that discriminate against them, and deprive them of a large proportion of their actual and potential incomes. The challenge is to empower the poor, particularly poor women, to actualise their potential for a sustainable increase in incomes; and to have a greater voice in various tiers of government. Overcoming poverty thus means: • • • • empowering the poor to acquire greater control over their use of productive resources, including their own labour; and keeping their incomes and savings in their own hands enabling the poor to organise themselves, and have institutionalised access over local government participation of the poor (and the poorest) in decisions regarding the allocation of government resources at the local level; and in the design and implementation of local government projects targeting the poor shifting the location of the poor within local power structures from being victims to active subjects in achieving equitable access over markets and over institutions providing credit, health and education services 92. The importance of the emergence of a modern, tolerant democratic polity; the reestablishment of the writ of the state to control violent extremist tendencies as a precondition for investment and growth; the empowerment of women and removing the bias against them in law, public policy and social norms, to unleash the creative potential of society were all singled out by the Pakistan National Human Development Report 2003 (NHDR). It particularly stresses the need to change the structure of power at the local level in favour of the poor, as well as stabilising population growth; increasing the literacy rate and coverage and quality of education, and introducing an administrative mechanism for ending child labour in hazardous industries. There are preliminary indications from the PPAs and elsewhere that people have improved access to local councillors compared with before the devolution plan, with a greater number of councillors being more available to the people. However provision of support to make them more effective will be crucial. 5.13 Generating Awareness on Social Exclusion 29 93. Using the media as one component of a focused effort to generate more information and more informed debate on exclusion (through research, discussion fora etc) can yield significant benefits, in the light of the opening up of new communications channels. 94. Pakistan is a news-hungry society across all levels of education and literacy: for instance, there are a very high number of people who listen to radio news broadcast by the BBC in Urdu and Pashto; as well as the English language media. Many women rely on TV plays and serials as a key source of information on women-related issues (education, marriage, divorce, inheritance, discrimination). Amongst rural women, TV is reportedly the most important source of information after the family. For urban women, it is the most important source.51 However, stakeholders also noted the role of the media in trivialising important issues. 95. A recent positive development in terms of addressing pro-poor social change, particularly in the light of low literacy levels, is the opening up of satellite communications and the electronic media, and the rise of private TV channels. According to Gallup, there are approximately 43 million TV viewers in Pakistan out of a total population of about 145 million. This includes 24 million urban viewers and 19 million rural viewers.52 TV viewing among adults (approximately 55%) is now much greater than radio listening (32%). Satellite channels include GEO, ARY, Indus Vision and the Sindhi language channel KTN. The private channels GEO and ARY both regularly air discussion programmes on political and economic issues, women’s rights, and education. Audience participation in debates, discussions and interviews has added a new dimension to civil society. Satellite TV has created its greatest ethical and cultural ripples as a result of a new series of soap operas which broke with the traditions of cinema and offered the public bolder themes, franker treatment of personal relations, and fewer happy endings. 96. However, at present, some 90% of the TV owning population still uses cable rather than satellite; and PTV therefore still has the greatest reach of all television channels. It is in the urban and peri-urban areas of Pakistan where satellite TV channels like GEO are now serious competitors for state-run PTV and are regarded as more credible by many viewers. The low costs of satellite receiver instalment, and low cable rents have meant that the numbers of viewers are growing by the day. The July 2003 decision by the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to deregulate the media is likely to impact radio stations, terrestrial private TV stations, and represents a large window of opportunity to use the media to address the barriers to getting out of poverty, including issues of social exclusion. 6. Conclusions & Recommendations 6.1 The Way Forward: Strategies to Address Social Exclusion 97. The overall conclusion of the Scoping Study is that both the debate and the agenda on social exclusion in Pakistan can be moved forward. A suggested strategic way forward addressing social exclusion is presented below. However, a number of key contextual issues should be borne in mind: (i) Time Farida Shaheed, Imagined Citizenship: Women, State & Politics in Pakistan, Shirkat Gah 2002, p. 60. At the time the study was carried out, satellite television as a source of information accounted for no more than 5% of the sample. However, at that time satellite broadcasting in Urdu and focusing on Pakistan had not been launched. 52 TV has reportedly had a strong role in promoting familiarity with Urdu: before TV became widely available, it took students for whom Urdu was not their mother tongue, three to four years to become familiar with it, but now because they hear it all the time, the learning period is much shorter. 51 30 Sufficient lead time will be required to generate ownership and buy-in by policymakers and to show results. Generating ownership of new processes, by all (including the nazims at the district level), takes time: • There is a tendency to expect too much, too fast, where social sector or related interventions are concerned. The time frame for social change is long. A realistic programme time frame will be important. Some initiatives can be started soon, but will take time to yield outputs. It will be important to allow sufficient programme time for social exclusion interventions. Lessons learned from the past (negative) experience on time frames and the SAP should be used to shape donor interaction with PRSP, including on social exclusion.The demand side will require time to generate awareness; and expectations should not be raised until possible entry points are clearer, and more fully identified. A typical three-year programme time horizon is insufficient for addressing issues of social change, though some initiatives may be expected to yield outcomes during this time frame. A 5-10 (or even 20) year horizon - depending on the initiative) would be more realistic and would prevent frustration by both policymakers and beneficiaries at “unrealised” anticipated outputs. The MDGs had a staged time horizon to 2015; and used only big picture indicators – for example, in the area of gender, the only direct indicators were education- and health-related). • (ii) The Contextual Framework • • The framework within which efforts to address social exclusion should take place is one of the political economy of change; and rights-based poverty reduction. Addressing social exclusion will require lessening the focus on the “big picture” in order to get to the smaller components that make it up: for example, budget support should reflect rights-based poverty indicators; meeting the MDGs will require “unpacking” of the implications down the line. (iii) Assessment • Monitoring and benchmarking the social exclusion impact of specified initiatives within the four areas identified above (eg land, labour, child rights, media coverage, etc) will be critical in determining progress towards identified goals. (iv) Advocacy Advocacy will be a key factor in both raising awareness on exclusion, and in generating ownership of the means to address it: • • • Partnerships should be fostered between the donor community and government to address social exclusion. This will require raising issues and facilitating people and interest groups to rally around them, as well as creating links to the formal systems. Empowerment from below needs to be supported by complementary efforts at the system level to make institutions and policies more inclusive. Build civil society in terms of both institutional network and social capital, to go beyond the identity-based primary groups, to interest-based voluntary institutions to lay the foundations for representative, responsive, and responsible government in the country. Develop strategic alliances (regional as well as national) • (v) Enabling Mechanisms 31 • Generating informed debate on social exclusion at the national, regional, district and community levels will be an important element in moving forward the agenda, via methods such as information generation through research and its dissemination towards targeted audiences; the establishment of independent “thinktank” networks (electronic and physical) and discussion fora; journalism training for informed media coverage of social issues and as a step towards promoting a more inclusive social ethos; and using the electronic and other media as a tool for generating pro-poor social change 6.2 Specific Interventions 98. The Scoping Study has identified four critical areas of intervention for addressing social exclusion in Pakistan – democracy; access to justice & the rule of law; pro-inclusion institutional change; and education & capacity-building. A number of the Study’s recommendations in these areas will involve “adjusting” or complementing existing initiatives to enable them to include means of addressing social exclusion (and ultimately, structural change). Others will consist of new interventions. Proposed complementary support measures to create an enabling environment for addressing social exclusion are grouped under a fifth area, the enabling process. 99. Empowerment through regular, repeated elections give people a stake in the system; and forces the state to come back to them. Support for democracy needs to be coupled with largescale, compulsory (and enforced) education, and rights-oriented functional literacy. However, without the ability to provide jobs, these two focuses alone will be insufficient to address poverty reduction as well as exclusion. It will be important not to lose sight of the income dimension of poverty, but to deepen and enhance measures to address it, through targeted interventions in the area of social exclusion. 6.2.1 Democracy 100. Specific measures to create an enabling environment for changes in the political culture include: • • Support democracy via empowerment; through facilitating regular elections, coupled with large-scale compulsory education especially of women and functional (rightsaware) literacy initiatives Undertake measures to support the demand side from within the private sector, public opinion and civil society organisations; to build coalitions and find agents for change within government; support technical improvements in public administration and financial accountability to strengthen the impetus for change, by highlighting feasible reform tracks and improving transparency through heightening availability of information Undertake interventions to make local government (nazims, councillors etc) more effective Support and help female elected representatives Provide support for the reform and strengthening of political parties to organise, to become more democratic, less individual-dominated, and to bring in elected members (at least at the lower levels) Strengthen the capacities of politicians and the Assembly on development issues, particularly the young new intake and topic-based task forces, through focused briefings and provision of reference material Provide support for the extension of the provision of identity cards (ID), especially to women and pockets of the marginalised; and address the issue of who attests ID, which has particular implications for the latter two groups • • • • • 32 6.2.2 Access to Justice 101. The media and the judiciary are both critical tools for promoting social change. The judiciary spells out principles and norms via its judgements. The lack of a judiciary which is independent from the state/the executive and a media which is independent of social bias is a key element impeding both development and inclusion. A second critical area is addressing law and order, including the police. Supporting interventions might include: • • • • • Building on existing activities such as the Access to Justice programme, to incorporate the social exclusion perspective Addressing the incomplete law & order aspects of the devolution structure including the lack of restraints on police strengthening the Joint Commission on Minorities Explore possibilities for minorities to receive the equivalent of zakat from the Evacuees Property Board Trust Board (whose structure should be corporatised and run like any other corporation). 53 Educate the private sector on issues of social exclusion through the proposed media strategy; and build on, and expand, existing initiatives such as on existing publicprivate partnerships such as the Police and Public Safety Commission’s CommunityPolice Liaison Committee 6.2.3 Pro-Inclusion Institutional Change 102. Measures identified centre on facilitation of inclusive institutional change in key institutional processes and structures that support social inclusion, such as the inclusion of more women; and merit-based entry. Other sector-specific suggestions include: • • Labour: address issues of exclusion around formal and informal sector labour (urban and rural) Land: Support interventions centring on empowerment, tenure rights and improved implementation, through: addressing land tenure rights, improved land administration, agricultural and rural labour, initially through a focus on improved implementation, and expansion in the coverage of existing legislation; a land survey and land settlement study (title, consolidation of holdings, demarcation) in selected provinces; creation of an International Panel on Land Law to work on cadastral and land registration issues Gender: Support interventions in the four critical areas above, specifically, through building the capacity of women in local bodies to play a comprehensive role in identifying and implementing development programmes and take up women’s issues in their forums; placing the issue of women’s exclusion onto the political agenda by women parliamentarians; a national community education programme on rights; addressing employment issues; provide quality schooling for both boys and girls through post-primary level; and undertake rights-based literacy initiatives especially for the 18-25 age group. Credit: Work with existing agricultural, enterprise development and credit institutions to improve access to credit for opening up off farm employment opportunities; for improved access to on-farm credit overall, and particularly for women; and for improved targeting. • • 53 Hindus and the Scheduled Castes in particular have a right to zakat-type assistance because of their status under the Evacuee Trust. This would benefit the Hindu and Sikh poor. 33 6.2.4 Education & Capacity Building 103. Education: • • • • Support educational measures which address social exclusion including rights-based literacy; civics education in school curricula; promotion of a more tolerant ethos in both curriculum content of all schools, and in teacher training Take forward rapidly the use of educational activities via the web, which also has strong potential for youth inclusion. Develop a strategy to use the media and curricula content for education to facilitate inclusion and meritocracy Support efforts to mainstream the disabled in schools, and into society; support measures to raise awareness on disability 104. Capacity Building: • • • • Build capacity on social exclusion at the National Defence and National Administrative Staff College on national development issues, to sensitise bureaucrats Support journalism training in universities that includes exposure to development issues, short term attachments to development organisations as part of the course Support capacity-building for research on social exclusion Support and facilitate the creation of independent fora for intellectual leadership on social exclusion, and build up genuine debate 6.2.5 Enabling Environment 105. To support these proposed interventions, creating an enabling environment will be a critical factor. This can be assisted and supported through deepening the understanding of exclusion and its consequences for all, via measures such as: lobbying, advocacy, and capacity building with a range of partner institutions; support for democratic processes; and generating awareness. One way of contributing to the creation of such an enabling environment is through use of the media as a tool for pro-poor social change, by developing a holistic, focused, multi-pronged media campaign for promoting social inclusion incorporating print media, local FM radio, TV (PTV, Geo and satellite channels), and local communications mechanisms. Lastly, identifying and building on the positive aspects of Pakistani society and the opportunities it offers for social inclusion via the extended family and other informal mechanisms of social protections and support will form important supporting strategies. 34