The Theory of Failure and the Failure of Theory

Stein Sundstøl Eriksen The Theory of Failure and the Failure of Theory: “State Failure” in Theory and Practice Introduction At the end of the cold war, there was widespread optimism about the prospects of economic development and development of democracy in most parts of the world. However, these hopes have not materialised. Instead of growth, development and democracy, a growing number of states have experienced a severe crisis, and state failure has become a widespread phenomenon in several regions, including parts of the former Soviet Union, Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In some cases, the erosion of the state has proceeded so far as to leading to widespread political violence. Against the background of these developments, it is not surprising that state failure and state collapse have become popular catchwords in recent discourse about political development in “the third world”, (Herbst, 1996-97, 2000, Zartman, 1995, Beissinger and Young, 2002, Rotberg, 2003, 2004, Fukuyama, 2004). Pointing to cases such as Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, several authors have argued that there is a widespread trend towards the disintegration of state institutions (Kaplan, Zartman, Young). Although many (in fact most) third world states are faced by outright state collapse, many states have nevertheless been weakened, as indicated by features such as violent conflict, institutional incoherence, widespread corruption and partial loss of control over state territory. Not surprisingly, the discourse on failed states has clear continuities with earlier analyses of the state in developing countries. In the 1960s, modernisation theory was the predominant theoretical paradigm for the analysis of the third world state. In their original western context, the analytical emphasis in these theories was on how the character of the state depended on, or was a function of, the character of society. But as they were applied to new context, a curious inversion of these theories took place. In a post-colonial setting, the state was no longer seen as an expression of values which already existed in society. Far from being treated as a reflection of society and its existing norms, the state was seen as the main motor of social change and the agent of «development» and «nation building». Instead, the state was seen as responsible for creating the values it was supposed to embody.1 In this period, «statebuilding», «nation-building» and «development» went hand in hand. In the 1980s and 1990s, the assumed links between «state-building», «nation-building» and «development» were broken. In particular, the importance of state-building was downplayed, as the state became identified with chaos, corruption and inefficiency, while civil society was perceived as “a dynamic, emerging bustling assemblage of progressive civic associations that could bring about democracy and development if only the state got out of the way” (Ferguson, 1998:52).2 The almost universal introduction throughout the developing world of neo-liberal programmes of structural adjustment was the clearest expression of this trend. 1 2 See, for instance, Almond & Powell, 1966, Apter, 1965 and Zolberg, 1966. This view is seen in numerous writings, including those found in Diamond, Lipset and Linz, 1988, Hyden & Bratton, 1992, and Harbeson, Rotchild & Chazan, 1994. In one sense, this theoretical development represents a break with modernisation theory, since it abandoned the view of the state as an agent of development and modernisation. At a deeper level, however, there are clear continuities between neoliberalism and modernisation theory. Both represent a kind of teleological liberalism, in which a market economy and political democracy appear as the goals towards which all countries move. Any obstacles to this natural movement are understood as “blockages”, which hinder what would otherwise be the “natural” course of development. What differs is merely the location of blockages. Whereas modernisation theorists saw ”tradition” and the primordial character of local institutions as the main blockage of “development”, modern neoliberals and theorists of civil society see the character of the state and the lack of a vibrant civil society as the principal obstacle to “development”. From the late 1990s, however, the state has again become a key theme in development discourse. There are both economic and political reasons for this renewed focus on the state. On the one hand, the necessity of stronger states and improved government performance has been recognised by proponents of economic liberalism, such as the World Bank.3 Faced with the disappointing results of nearly two decades of structural adjustment, it was recognised that one of the key impediments to growth in third world countries was the absence of effective state institutions. As a result, we have seen a renewed focus on capacity building and good governance. On the other hand, the emergence of international terrorism has, in particular after 9.11., prompted Western countries to emphasise the importance of state building and prevention of state failure for the sake of their own security and for the fight against terrorism. Failed states, it is argued, are a security threat, because they can be used as safe havens for terrorists who seek to attack Western countries. This article analyzes the fast-growing discourse of state failure. The aim is not to discuss particular cases of state failure, or to identify some general causes of failure, or even less to suggest how it can be addressed. Instead, it seeks to identify the assumptions underlying this discourse, and the implications of those assumptions for how we understand the phenomenon referred to as “state failure”. The main aim is to identify the notion of the state underlying the discourse of state failure, and to assess the viability of this conception. Accordingly, the article has three parts. First, I briefly summarise some key contributions to the discourse of state failure, focusing in particular on the notion of the state underlying the analyses and on the implications of these assumptions for how failed states are understood. Second, I discuss some of the underlying epistemological issues raised by the failed states discourse, such as the use of ideal types and the relationship between the concepts of actors and those of social science. Finally, in the last section, I sketch an alternative approach to the study of post-colonial state formation. States and failed states How then, are we to understand the phenomenon of state failure? A first requirement to get some clarification of this issue is to specify the meaning of the terms involved. And since the terms “failure” and “collapse” invariably presuppose a standard in relation to which a given state “fails” or “collapses”, we need to start by exploring the concept of “the state”. We may 3 See in particular, the World Development Report, 1997. distinguish between two different approaches to state failure, based on how their proponents understand the state, which might be called the Lockean, the Weberian, respectively. The first approach, represented by authors such as William Zartman and Robert Rotberg, sees the state first and foremost as a service provider, and define statehood in terms of service provision. According to William Zartman a state has collapsed “when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed” (Zartman, 1995). In other words, a state has collapsed when it is no longer able to provide the services for which it exists. Another alternative, fairly similar to Zartman’s, is to describe states that have not been able to establish the features associated with statehood as “failed states”. Robert Rotberg, a leading authority on failed states, defines state failure as the inability of states to provide positive political goods to their inhabitants.4 Both Zartman and Rotberg distinguish between a variety of services that states may provide, ranging from security to the rule of law, the protection of property, the right to political participation, provision of infrastructure and social services such as health and education. These services constitute a hierarchy, Rotberg argues. The provision of security is the most fundamental service states provide, in the sense that security is a condition for the provision of all other services. This conception is then used as a benchmark, against which given states are measured. Rotberg also argues that failure should be seen as continuum rather than as an either/or, and that we therefore need to differentiate between states that are strong, weak, failing, failed or collapsed. A state may possess some of the features of statehood, but not others. Thus, it may have a monopoly over the means of violence, but be unable to provide infrastructure, or maintain the rule of law, or it may have a functioning military, but an inefficient bureaucracy. While this conception may draw attention to the utter failure of many states to perform the functions assigned to them, it nevertheless runs the risk of neglecting the fact that many of these states never enjoyed anything close to sovereignty, even before their “collapse”. In fact, many of the states that are now described as collapsed have never been able to perform the functions formally assigned to them. Thus, their current ‘collapse’ should be seen as a result of the incompleteness of the initial process of state building, rather than as a breakdown of a system which existed earlier. Moreover, even the so-called collapsed states continue to possess some elements of statehood. Thus, we must be careful to avoid, both the presumption that all states have at some point enjoyed statehood in a substantial sense, and, conversely, that all dimensions of statehood disappear when a state “collapses” or “fails”. Thus, as a result of employing a Lockean definition of statehood, Rotberg and Zartman provide a perspective that is more ideological than analytically useful. This definition of statehood leads to an excessively loose definition of failure, which in fact implies that most, if not all, states must be classified as failed, including western states, on which the model is based. After all, no state is able to fulfil all the functions assigned to it. Moreover, by tying the definition of statehood directly to the provision of services to citizens, all states that do not conform to this liberal ideal are by definition failed states. In effect, this excludes the possibility of non-liberal statehood, since all states that are not liberal are by definition failed The two volumes edited by Robert Rotberg “State failure and state weakness in a time of terror” and “When states fail: Causes and consequences” are the outcome of a large research project at Harvard University about failed states. The books contain twelve and fourteen chapters, respectively, aiming to analyse the political trajectories of weak and failed states (the first volume) and the causes and consequences of state failure and the possibilities of state reconstruction (the second volume). 4 states. Regardless of whether one supports these ideals or not, it seems clear that analytically, such an approach obscures more than it reveals. It also obscures the fact that the emergence of modern states in Europe had little to do with the provision of services. Instead, as has been shown by Charles Tilly (1985, 1990), Michael Mann (1993) and others, it was mainly an unintended effect of military rivalry, driven not by any pressure from below for provision of services but by power struggles between pre-modern ruling classes. The provision of services other than security through internal pacification, such as infrastructure, property rights, health, education, was established much later, after the consolidation of statehood in the sense of a monopoly of violence, territorial control and mutual recognition.5 Inter-state war (or threats of it) contributed to state building in several ways (Mann, 1993, Tilly, 1990). First, geopolitical competition ensured that only those states that were able to defend themselves militarily were able to survive. Others were simply conquered, and incorporated into other states. In this system, states that were weak, seen in relation to their neighbours, would simply cease to exist. Second, in order to survive in this competitive environment, states were compelled to improve their own financial basis. This in turn forced them to improve their administrative capacity, in order to be able to tax their population. One problem with Zartman and Rotberg’s approach therefore, is that their notion of the state is too restrictive, since it is based on a liberal model, and treats all deviations from the liberal ideal as indicating failure. Viewing the state as essentially a service provider also leads to a discourse with clear normative overtones. It is as if a state has to pass or fail a test, consisting of imitating a certain model of statehood (to be administered, we must assume, by states that have not failed in this sense). The limited statehood of weak, collapsed or failed states is considered regrettable, and as a problem to be resolved (through reforms, capacity building and the like). It is also used in a highly normative way, and instead of developing concepts which are better suited to analyse existing states, the gap between liberal ideals and empirical reality is treated as justification for interventions which aim to close this gap, and make empirical reality conform to liberal ideals. The second approach takes Max Weber’s definition of the state as an institution with a monopoly over the means of violence in a given territory as its starting point. According to this definition, a failed state is a state that is unable to uphold its monopoly of violence (Bates, 2005). This approach is represented by, among others, the international relations theorists Robert Jackson (1990) and Stephen Krasner (1990, 2005). By focusing on the institution of sovereignty, Jackson and Krasner combine the Weberian approach with a focus on international relations. With a Weberian concept of statehood as a starting point, the term ‘failure’ does not refer simply to the state’s inability to perform the functions assigned to it. Instead, and much more narrowly, it concerns a specific type of failure, namely the failure to pacify its society and monopolise the use of violence.6 Jackson’s starting point is that after the end of colonialism, all states are recognised as equal participants in the international system. Thus, all states have external, or negative sovereignty, in the sense that they are recognised as states by other states, and participate in international 5 Of course, the provision of security can be seen as one type of service provided by the state, but this does not mean that it came into being as a result of a contract between states and citizens. 6 Giddens refers to this process as “internal pacification” (Giddens, 1985). organisations, have established diplomatic relations with other states. They are legal subjects in international law, and they have a right to conduct their internal political affairs without external intervention. At the same time, many states lack what he calls positive sovereignty. They do not control their territory, may be faced with armed insurgents and have very little ability to implement policies or promote economic development. Nevertheless, they do persist, and continue to be recognised as participants in the state system. Jackson and Rosberg (1983) argued that this recognition was the only reason Africa’s weak states continued to exist at all – not least because such recognition gives the state access to substantial resources in the form of aid.7 In terms of state formation, this has meant that international recognition and participation in the system of states has enabled states to continue to exist even if their actual control over their territory has been extremely limited. Jackson describes such states as “quasi-states” (Jackson, 1990). A quasi-state, he says, is a state, which is recognized as a participant in the system of states, yet does not posses the empirical features of statehood, such as a monopoly over the means of violence and control over its territory. While he does not use the term failed state, his concept of a quasi state has much of the same meaning. Like Jackson, Krasner combines a Weberian concept of the state with a focus on international relations and the institution of sovereignty. According to Krasner, modern sovereignty has three components. First, it refers to legal sovereignty, or the recognition of one state by others. Thus, “the basic rule of international legal sovereignty is that legal recognition is accorded to juridically independent territorial entities, which are capable of entering into voluntary contractual arrangements” (Krasner, 2001, 21). In other words, to be a legal sovereign state is to be recognised as one by other states. Second, sovereignty can be understood as the exclusion of external authorities’ right to interfere in the state’s political decision-making. This means that a sovereign state is independent of all external authority structures, and that no external actors have a right to intervene in a sovereign state’s decision-making. This is what is often called the principle of non-intervention. The last meaning of the term concerns the state’s relations to society within the territory defined by the state’s borders. Here, sovereignty can refer to the state position as the highest political authority within its territory. Krasner calls this domestic sovereignty. A sovereign state defines the rules, which all members of society must follow and is able – at least more or less- to enforce those rules. To be sovereign in this sense, a state must have monopoly over the means of violence and control over its territory. It follows that, for Krasner, state failure is defined by the absence of one or more of these features (Krasner, 2005). In practice, however, since external recognition and formal acceptance of the principle of non-intervention can be taken more or less for granted, failure takes the form of breakdown of domestic sovereignty. Similar arguments on the importance of external funds for African states have been made by many others, including Bayart (1993), Clapham (1996) and Reno (1999). 7 The Weberian approach to the state undoubtedly represents an improvement compared to the Lockean approach. The term ‘failed state’, in this sense, does not imply that something like an ideal-typical state existed prior to the collapse, or that failure to perform any of the functions assigned to it would imply that a state has failed. Compared to the notion of the state as a service provider, this concept also has the advantage of pointing to the close interrelationship between a particular state and the system of states of which it is a part. A given state is not an object, constituted prior to its relations with other states. It does not first exist and then interact with other states. As Giddens says: ‘International relations are not connections set up between pre-established states, which could maintain their sovereign power without them, they are the basis upon which the nation state exists at all’ (Giddens, 1985, 263-264). Moreover, its notion of failure is not so wide that most states would have to be classified as failed. However, by using the western ideal-typical notion of the state as the standard of measurement, the implication of both the Lockean and the Weberian approach is that any deviations from this ideal-type can only appear as a lack. It is the absence of the specified criteria (service provision, a monopoly of violence) that constitute failure, and not the actual properties of the states concerned.8 It is well known that most of the world’s states are nowhere near to possessing such features. This applies to almost all states in the so-called developing world. Thus, it should come as no surprise that those states that serve as the basis for the construction of the ideal fit it more closely than others. Showing that some states fit the ideal more closely than others merely amounts to documenting that the ideal itself is based on those states that come closest to fitting it. Nothing is explained if one through comparing actual states with this ideal type comes to the conclusion that other states exhibit a lack of stateness. In this line of reasoning, the conclusion (that many states are lacking in stateness) follows directly from the premise (that stateness is defined in terms of an ideal-type based on certain existing states). Thus, using the terms “quasi-states” or “failed states” runs the risk of obscuring the significant differences between states. Such an approach does not get us very far in terms of understanding what a particular failed state actually looks like. Failed states and quasi-states can then only appear as “a flawed imitation of a mature Western form” (Hansen and Stepputat, 2001, 6). Compared to an ideal, reality is bound to appear as incomplete, even in the cases that served as the basis for the construction of the idea in the first place. Moreover, this may give the impression that states that have not failed (western and others) do in fact posses sovereignty in the sense described by the ideal – something which Krasner, among others, has shown that is not the case (Krasner, 1990). If it is known that most states are far from possessing the properties that are associated with a certain conception of statehood (provision of services, sovereignty, monopoly of violence or whatever), one has to ask how useful it is to start with such a conception. If statehood is defined on the basis of an idealized conception of western states, which does not even adequately describe these states, why should this concept be used as the benchmark against which all other states are measured?9 It seems clear that unless one is able to demonstrate that Although it is often assumed - e.g. in “realist” theories of international relations - that states actually possess the properties associated with liberal statehood, the starting point for the discourse of failed states is that many states do not. 9 Using a limiting case as a standard is similar to what is done in the application of rational-choice theory. Here too, one starts from an idealized conception of rationality, and assesses actions in terms of their degree of 8 something close to the kind of state described in the theory actually exists, the concept is of limited analytical use. It may still, of course be used as a normative ideal – as describing what one thinks a state should look like. As shown above, this is what Rotberg and Zartman do, albeit implicitly. The lack of correspondence between idea and reality is taken to indicate a lack – not in our concept, but in the object to which it refers. Thus, what we need to do, according to this line of reasoning, is to change the world to make it fit the concept. With this move, one leaves the domain of theory as a tool of understanding and enters the realm of normative theory. In the case of empirical statements, a lack of fit between a statement and reality constitutes a reason for revising the statement. Thus, the statement ‘the sun revolves around the earth’ should be revised if we discover that in fact, the earth revolves around the sun. In the case of normative statements, however, the reverse applies. Here, a lack of fit between a statement and the world constitutes a reason for changing the world, not for revising the statement or theory. Similarly, for Rotberg and Zartman, the absence of certain features associated with statehood constitutes an argument for changing the world to make it fit the concept of statehood. It might very well be the case that such a state is desirable and that good reasons can be given to justify this. However, this leaves unanswered the analytical issue of how existing states that deviate from the ideal should be understood. The failed state discourse, both in its Lockean and in its Weberian form, therefore represents a return to the classical modernisation approach. Like the modernisation school of thought, it considers the establishment of a modern liberal state as the natural end point of, or condition for, development. It therefore represents what Mahmood Mamdani calls “history by analogy”, in which the experience of non-western states can only be understood as deviations from the “normal” development experienced by western states (Mamdani, 1996, 9). By implication, the absence of anything like a modern state in many countries is seen as a problem to be addressed, in order to enable a “normal” state to emerge. However, unlike the modernisation school, it does not see the development of such a state as inevitable. Failure is, quite simply, the absence of a liberal or Weberian state, and theories of “failed states” can therefore be considered as a version of modernisation theory, albeit stripped of teleology. Ideal Types, Categories of Practice and Categories of Analysis How then, should we analyse states in the third world? An unstated assumption in the literature on state failure is that the same concept of statehood can and should be employed to analyse all states. This raises the following question: Can the general framework developed on the basis of the European experience serve as a starting point for a study of states elsewhere? Given the wide divergence between the idea of the modern state and actual states in the third world, it might be tempting to reject the use of the concept of the modern state altogether. However, this is a temptation that should be resisted. There are three main theoretical reasons why theories of western states are relevant for understanding non-western states as well, in spite of their deviation from the European concept of statehood. First, it is an indisputable fact that the formal institutions of the all states correspondence with this ideal. In this case, as in the case of an idealized concept of statehood, the usefulness of the concept depends on the degree to which the phenomenon it describes corresponds to the theory. are modelled on the European model of statehood. Every single person on earth lives in a state, and is, at least formally, subject to a state’s laws and regulations. Thus, the state is a universal form of political organization. Postcolonial states are based on institutions such as courts, parliaments and bureaucracies, and on principles such as popular representation, sovereignty and separation between the private and public domains. These principles and institutions are “imported”, in the sense that they originated in Europe. Nevertheless, they remain the basis of all contemporary states. Second, all states, western and non-western, are parts of a global system of states, in which the modern state form is universally recognised as the fundamental political unit. As a consequence, all states have certain characteristics, which derive from their “systemness”, such as formal sovereignty (both internally and externally). Given the universal acceptance of this notion of “stateness”, even states, which are far from possessing these defining features of “stateness”, are recognized on the presumption that they do posses them. They are therefore compelled to struggle to approach this ideal, and to pretend possessing a form of statehood quite remote from what they actually possess. The idea of the state, therefore, has become what Balakrishnan calls “an objectively operative fiction”- an idea which forms the basis for the design of formal state institutions, even if the states in question are nowhere near corresponding to it (Balakrishnan, 2004). Third, at the level of social scientific analysis, one has no choice but to use the language of that science and this language happens to be western on origin. This does not mean that there are no differences between western and non-western states, or that theoretical models based on western conceptions of the state can be used uncritically in all contexts. Consequently, our general model of the state must be based upon the concepts developed within social scientific discourses. At the same time, our concepts must remain open enough to allow for empirical variations within this basic conception. As argued by Sudipta Kaviraj, we must simultaneously use and mistrust this terminology (Kaviraj, 1997:227). Thus, the western notion of statehood is indispensable, and the problem with the failed states discourse is not that it employs concepts derived from theories of western origin. The question rather, is which western concepts we should apply and how. Zartman, Rotberg, Jackson and Krasner all use a specific idealized notion of statehood, which is used as the basis from which deviations are measured. In Zartman and Rotberg’s case this is the notion of the state as a service provider, while Jackson and Krasner focus on sovereignty and the monopoly of violence. An alternative approach is to consider the concept of statehood against which a given state is assessed as an ideal type. The notion of the ideal type, as developed by Max Weber,10 is a simplification of a complex reality, but in order to be useful, it must capture what is seen as the most important aspects of empirical reality. Although this is not entirely clear in Weber’s writings, I think the most useful way of understanding the ideal type is to see it as emerging from a continuous movement between the empirical cases and the researcher's model of reality, during which both are assessed and reassessed. As elements of the framework through which a researcher interprets his/her cases, ideal types are constitutive in the sense that empirical reality is interpreted through them. At the same time, they do not produce the empirical facts they are about. The relation between empirical cases and the categories This section is based on Weber's essay on "Objectivity in the Social Sciences" (Norwegian edition 1971). See also Rose (1981). 10 through which it is interpreted should be seen as a dialectical one. On the one hand, the cases are interpreted through the categories and assumptions of the researcher, thus shaping his interpretations of them. On the other hand, the interpretations of the cases can make the researcher question and revise some aspects of his model. The researcher’s model shapes the interpretation of the cases, but at the same time, the interpretation of the cases shapes the researcher’s model. Thus, when using ideal types, our concepts are continuously adjusted and revised in the light of empirical cases. The ideal types should therefore be seen as both the outcome of empirical research and a means for guiding further research. The ideal type helps the researcher in understanding his cases, but at the same time, his cases help him to further develop his ideal types. The process of empirical social science should be seen as such a continuous movement between theoretical concepts and different empirical cases, in which both the cases and the theoretical framework are continuously assessed and reassessed. This means that the construction of ideal types should not be seen as ends in themselves. Instead, it should be considered as a means, which can enable the researcher to give better interpretations and explanations, and therefore to understand the social world better. As stated by Weber: [The importance of concept formation] should not be seen as indicating that the real objective of social science is an eternal quest for new conceptual construction..... Nothing should be emphasised more than that knowledge of the cultural meaning of concrete historical circumstances is the ultimate and only goal, to which concept formation and critical research will contribute (Weber, 1971:219, my translation from Norwegian) The use of ideal types can, if it is done well, enable (or at least help) the researcher to avoid projecting his/her own model onto the case, or using his own pre-existing model as a standard, from which other cases deviate to varying degrees.11 What does this mean for how one should analyse “failed states”? It means that if we are to use ideal types, an ideal type of the modern state derived from the properties of western states cannot be used as a starting point to analyse states that are known to deviate significantly from this ideal type. Since the ideal type is nowhere near corresponding to most of the objects it refers to, this amounts to taking the exception as the rule, and to using the extreme case as the norm. Instead, if ideal types are to be useful for the analysis of states that diverge significantly from the ideal type of the modern state, one needs, as a first step, to develop a different ideal type (or perhaps several different ideal types), based on the properties the states in question are known to have. One such alternative ideal type is that of the neo-patrimonial state. Analysts seem to agree that many third world states have strong elements of what is often called patrimonialism.12 In development studies, there is a widespread tendency to see developing countries in this way. The question one seeks to answer is why they are different from us. Why are third world states corrupt and inefficient, why are they not democratic and so on. 12 The literature on this topic is massive. Central works include the following: Bayart, 1993, Berman, 1998, Beissinger and Young, 2002, Boone, 1994, Bratton and van de Walle, 1996, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Mamdani, 1996, Mbembe, 2002, Medard, 1982, Migdal, 1988, Sandbrook, 1985. 11 This term, originally used by Weber, refers to a system where there is no clear separation between private and public interests, and where public resources are used for private purposes. For Weber, patrimonialism is one form of traditional domination, together with feudalism and patriarchy. As a form of traditional domination, patrimonialism is based on the belief in the sacred character of immemorial institutions. What distinguishes patrimonialism as a form of domination from patriarchy and feudalism is first, that power is exercised beyond the domestic group of the family, clan or village, and second, that power is relatively centralised. At the same time, what separates a patrimonial state from a bureaucratic-rational one is that state officials are not separated from the means of administration. As a result, patrimonial states have a built-in tendency to become fragmented, because lower-level state officials tend to undermine central control, and exploit their control over state resources for personal purposes. Starting from this ideal typical conception of patrimonialism, Medard (1987, 1991, 1995) and Sandbrook (1985) proceed to compare African states with this ideal type. The main means by which most weak post-colonial states have sought to maintain control has been through patronage. In a neo-patrimonial system, there is no clear separation between the private and the public, or between the personal interests of officials and the interests of the institution to which they belong. Although the separation between the private and the public is officially recognised, and presupposed in the formal set-up of state institutions, the actual practice of office holders is characterized by a widespread ability and willingness to break the state’s formal rules. The government is forced to promote the interests of its clients, and scarce public resources are diverted from state budgets. Thus, patrimonial states secure the support they need not through the pursuit of state policies, but by using state resources to offer material rewards in return for political support. While the construction of an ideal type of the neo-patrimonial state represents a necessary step and a significant improvement compared to the failed state discourse (although it emerged much earlier), it is not entirely satisfactory. The main reason is that it does not account for – at least not adequately - the modern or western dimensions of neo-patrimonial states. In this comparison, the patrimonial aspects of the state are highlighted, and the modern formal institutions of the state appear as a kind of empty shell, within which the “real” patrimonial character of African politics is revealed. It is a fact that all modern states, in Africa and elsewhere, present themselves as representing the community as a whole, claim to follow formal procedures, accept the principle of the rule of law, acknowledge citizens’ rights, presents itself as promoting development etc. These are specifically modern features. In order to understand these aspects of post-colonial states, it is necessary to take more seriously the fact that they are hybrids, with distinctly modern as well as patrimonial features.13 Thus, we need to account for both the patrimonial and the modern aspects of the neopatrimonial state. On the one hand, one can start with the assumption that all states in the contemporary world have a territory with a population, are recognised by other states and have a government. Moreover, they have institutions such as laws, armies, police and an administration. These can therefore be considered constitutive features of what it means to be a state in the contemporary world (Sørensen, 2000). Medard acknowledges this, and distinguishes between patrimonialsm and neopatrimonialism, which are characterised by a modern formal institutions and patrimonial practices. However, in his analyses of how the neopatrimonial state operates, he tends to emphasise its patrimonial rather than its modern aspects (Medard, 1987, 1991, 1995). 13 On the other hand, states do not necessarily have a monopoly over the means of violence, control over their territory or population or the ability to provide services to their citizens. However, while not necessarily having these properties, it remains a fact that all states claim a monopoly over the means of violence and control over its territory and a responsibility to provide services (at least in the form of security). Moreover, both the neo-patrimonial states themselves and other states are drawn into a “politics of pretending”, assuming in practice that all states actually have the properties associated with modern statehood. Claiming to have these features, or pretending to have them, can therefore be seen as constitutive of modern statehood. The forms and degrees to which different states have been able to achieve a monopoly of violence, control over territory and provision of services can then be used as a basis for developing ideal types of different kinds of states. This does not mean that the failed states discourse and the notion of statehood on which it is based is irrelevant for understanding weak or “failed states”. Far from it. In addition to being predominant in academic writings, this perspective has in fact significantly influenced real events in the world. Many actors, both domestic and international, have to a large extent accepted this analysis, and designed their policies on the basis of it. Thus, it is notable that in the self-understanding of officials in post-colonial states, something like the ideal type of the modern state is presupposed. Their understanding of themselves, their own political activity and the institutions of the state are based on modern western conceptions of politics and statehood. “The practices of state agents assume a general understanding of state authority, a kind of common wisdom of norms and expectations that inhere in stateness” (Munro, 1996:115). Officials, even at the local level, see the state as sovereign, as representing society as a whole, promoting the common interest, and appeal to ideals of citizenship and bureaucracy. They justify their policies and action in the language of “stateness” and claim to be acting on behalf of society’s common interests when they seek to “develop” their societies. Thus, the state’s self-understanding, and the official language of the state presupposes a state which more or less corresponds to the ideal type of the modern state. And since actors’ perspectives are a constitutive element of social reality, the fact actors recognise the idea of stateness, and understand themselves in the light of this idea, is an important aspect of these states. Actors’ understanding of the state shapes their behaviour, and the logic of state practices. But since these practices depend on, and are generated by, actors perceptions, their reality is an achievement which must be constantly reproduced. That important actors have an understanding of the state that closely resembles the ideal type does not, of course, in itself mean that a given state fits the ideal type in ”reality”. Although the fact that state representatives see it in this way is important, the states may differ quite substantially from the ideal type. One major reason for this is that in spite of having a concept of ”stateness” which more or less corresponds to the ideal type of the (western) state, the practice of the officials themselves often contradicts it. By not acting according to bureaucratic rules or democratic procedures, officials contribute to make the state less like their own concept of it, even if they are not explicitly aware of this themselves. Faced with the lack of fit between ideal type and reality, state officials often admit that they have ”not yet” reached the stage where a full-fledged state has been established. This response reveals that the ideal typical modern state has been accepted as the norm of statehood, and that any gap between idea and reality is seen as an argument for changing social reality, rather than for changing the concepts through which reality is interpreted. At the level of practice, therefore, the ideal type of the modern state has been accepted as a norm. This also shows that many actors have internalised a teleological perspective, in which they find themselves at a low stage of ”development”. In such a perspective, the establishment of something like an ideal typical state is seen as the end point of ”development”. Thus, certain features of modern states (western and non-western) are universal. They rule over a territory, have a government and an administration, are recognised by other states and claim a monopoly of violence, control over their territory and responsibility to provide services. Other features vary, such as the form of government, the degree of monopoly of violence and control over territory and the kind of services they provide. Instead of regarding one form or model of the modern state (the western), as more natural or normal, and analysing others in terms of their divergence from this model, as in the failed states discourse, we should refrain from privileging any particular model. As argued by Bilgin and Morton, “presenting the experience of developing countries as deviations from the norm does not only reinforce commonly held assumptions about ideal statehood but also inhibits reflection on the binary opposition of “failed” versus “successful” states (Bilgin and Morton, 2004, 173-174). The combination of analytical weakness and practical impact, I suggest, makes it reasonable to treat the failed states discourse and the notion of the state that it is based on mainly as data rather than as a tool of analysis - as a category of practice rather than as a category of analysis, to use Bourdieu’s concepts. As such, it constitutes an interesting example of the interrelationship between theories on the one hand and the objects to which they refer on the other. On the one hand, it shows that the development of theories is affected by events in the real world. On the other hand, by shaping the world views and the self-understanding of actors, socialscientific theories in turn contribute to changing social reality. This is so even if theories are wrong, in the sense of not corresponding to how the world really is. Theories can alter people's perceptions and action, sometimes even creating the phenomena they are about. By acting on the basis of theories (true or false), the state and other actors change the existing state of affairs, perhaps also altering the distribution of resources between groups. If policies are developed on the basis of false assumptions, they may in turn shape the perceptions and actions of those affected by them. In this sense, the effects of false theories may be as important as the effects of true ones.14 In the case of failed states, this means that the model of the modern state, while being far from an actual description of how these states really are, still profoundly shapes them, both because their formal institutions are based on this model and because they must strive to emulate this model (or at least pretend to do so). Understanding state formation and “failed states”: An alternative approach Rather than asking why their state is different from ours, or why the development of a “normal” state has not taken place, an attempt to understand the nature of post-colonial states should start by asking what kind of conditions produce what kind of states? (Centeno and Lopez-Alvez, 2001, 10-11). 14 See, for instance, Ranger (1983) on how the colonial state's ethnic classifications came to help constitute ethnic identities in Zimbabwe. To come to grips with this question, we need a political economy of state formation (Donor, Richie and Slater, 2005, Slater, 2003). One possible starting point for such an analysis is to focus on the relationship between states and regimes. States, then, are understood, in the sense described above, as institutions with a government claiming authority over and a monopoly of violence in a territory with a population, which claims responsibility for society as a whole and is recognised by other states. Regimes are understood as the government that rules a particular state. Given the fact that all contemporary states have a territory, a government, and an administration, the relationship between states and regimes is a feature shared by all states. And since all states also exist in an international system of states, both states and regimes are also recognised by other states. The state is a universal institution, in the sense that it sees itself, and is seen by its citizens and by external actors, as representing society as a whole (Giddens, 1985, Jessop, 1990). This applies even in states whose practices have little to do with the promotion of any common interests. By contrast, regimes, understood as the group of people who occupy the leading positions in the state and controls state resources, are located at the intersection between the universal and the particular. Regimes are faced with the dual task of promoting general state interests, while at the same time serving the particular interests of the regime and its constituency. This duality shapes regime power as well as its interests. Regimes are managing states. Thus, maintaining regime power presupposes maintenance of the state itself. Seen from the perspective of the regime, the state apparatus is a means, or an instrument, to be used to promote what the regime sees as its interests. At one level, therefore, regimes have an interest in a strong state, since it can be used to serve regime interests. At the same time, they have particular interests, both as private individuals and as representatives of specific social forces. If we assume that regime survival will be a, if not the, primary concern of rulers, it follows that state formation depends on the compatibility of regime interests and power on the one hand, and state formation on the other. If regime interests are best served by strengthening state institutions, it is quite likely that such a policy will be attempted. Conversely, if there is a real or perceived contradiction between regime interests and state building, it will not. We may distinguish between the political and the economic interests of a regime. Politically, a regime needs to garner sufficient support, or at least to prevent significant resistance, in order to remain in power. In principle, this can be achieved in various ways, including the promotion of growth, provision of social services, appeals to nationalism or the distribution of patronage. In the absence of domestic political forces that have an interest in building strong state institutions and are powerful enough to push through a programme of state building, regimes are most likely to reproduce their power through patronage. This will lead to weak state institutions, and vulnerability in terms of violent conflict and breakdown. This has been the normal development path in most parts of the world. Thus, if any particular model of statehood should be considered as “normal”, it should be the neo-patrimonial model rather than the ideal type of the modern state (Lockean or Weberian). At the same time, since all states are based on the model of the modern state, with its principles of sovereignty and universality, the pursuit of patronage must take place within a formal frame of statehood which is incompatible with patronage politics. This means that while regimes in many states, as holders of state power, must continue to claim to represent society as a whole, promote development, control their territory etc, they are compelled, in order to survive in power, to pursue policies that undermine their ability to realize those claims. However, unless one defines failure in terms of deviations from the ideal type, states that are unable to approach the ideal type on which their formal institutions are based are not doomed to break down (fail, collapse). Indeed, weak neo-patrimonial states may very well be stable over long periods of time. Some equilibrium may be found, in which ruling regimes, while depending on the distribution of patronage, are able to limit the corrosive escalation of demands, while at the same time preserving a façade of formal institutions in accordance with the idea of the modern state. Economically, regimes have an interest in obtaining revenue to fund the state. Regimes may acquire economic resources through taxation of their own population (including custom fees and taxes on exports and imports); or through external assistance (aid). Variation in terms of the origin of its sources of revenue will affect the structure of regime interests and therefore its policy in terms of state building. Regimes in states that depend mainly on internal taxation will have an interest in developing the system of tax collection (Moore, 1998). They could also have an interest in promoting overall economic development, though this is not necessarily the case. Regimes that depend mainly on economic resources obtained from abroad, by contrast, do not, in economic terms, have an interest in promoting domestic growth. When funds are easily available elsewhere, state leaders do not need to focus on the hard task of strengthening its own capacity for revenue collection. Since they do not depend on funds obtained through revenue collection, they have no incentive to strengthen their administrative capacity in order to improve their own financial basis.15 In the short run, the availability of funds from outside the country (whether through aid or through plunder or crime) may strengthen the state in relation to society and improve its chances of political survival. In the long run, however, it prevents the state from developing its administrative capacity and its ability to raise revenue. Thus, external economic dependence is an obstacle to the development of strong states. Contemporary weak states typically gain access to economic resources through their dealings with the external world. In addition to obtaining funds through formal channels (aid, military assistance) state funding is also achieved through crime (smuggling) and warlord politics, in which the state, often in collaboration with international capital and private security firms, secures rents that provide funding for regimes, but in ways that do not strengthen the state.16 This is one aspect of what Bayart calls extraversion (Bayart, 1993, 2000). African politicians, he argues, have become experts at manipulating international organisations, foreign governments and aid agencies. Resources acquired in these dealings and through such devices as trade policies, export taxes and the manipulation of exchange rates, have funded the reciprocal assimilation of elites through the use of patronage. In some cases, regimes may not even want to (re-)establish the state’s monopoly of violence. In the absence of geopolitical pressures that threaten the survival of the state, state leaders can secure their own position through the use of plunder and patronage instead of seeking to In fact, to the extent that access to aid depends on assessments of need, they may have an interest in not promoting growth, since a lack of growth will ensure that they continue to be considered worthy of assistance. 16 This is what has been described as warlord politics (Reno, 1998), or the criminalisation of the state (Bayart et.al. 1996). 15 establish the state’s monopoly of violence and build strong state institutions. Although such “warlord politics” presupposes the formal existence of the state, it also depends on the absence of a real monopoly of violence. In such countries, strong vested interests have developed, which include Western companies as well as state officials and local warlords. These groups see continued conflict as being in their interest, since it enables them to continue their business. While “state failure” may discourage investment in general, there are certain types of activities that do not depend on general stability and a well-functioning state. This particularly applies to the mining sector and to oil. In these sectors, it may be possible to profit from a chaotic situation, as long as security can be provided at the sites of extraction. Such security can easily be provided by private security firms, private armies or mercenaries, as has been the case in Congo, Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone. It follows that, from an economic perspective, regimes which depend on revenue collected from their own society (but not in the form of mineral exports) would be most likely to pursue a strategy of state building – quite simply because they, as regimes, have the most to gain from it (Moore, 1998). Conversely, in states which do not depend on taxation, the interests of the ruling regime may be better served by pursuing policies that do not strengthen the state as such. They have access to funding from elsewhere, and their control over the state depends on maintaining patronage networks that undermine the capacity of the state. In such cases, there is a contradiction between the interests of the regime (in maintaining power) and the interests of the state (in collecting revenue and strengthening state institutions). As long as regime survival does not depend on strengthening the state, and may in fact be threatened by it, while regimes have alternative strategies for political survival (patronage, crime, corruption, aid, mineral extraction), state building is not likely to be pursued. Concluding remarks Two main conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. First, many states have “failed” to emulate the model of statehood on which their formal institutions are based, and on the basis of which they have been recognised by other states. Second, the theories of state failure have failed to explain this, by taking the model of the modern state for granted, and by analysing all states in terms of their degree of correspondence with or deviation from this ideal. The discourse on failed states, collapsed states and quasi-states is of limited use analytically. It does not help us understand the nature of the states in question, or the processes that lead to strong or weak states. We should therefore reject the use of an idealized concept of statehood as a standard when analysing post-colonial states. This model can perhaps, serve as a normative standard (although as such, it requires a normative justification not provided by theorists of failed states), but it does not help us to understand how these states really are. Further, while we may use ideal types to analyse all states, different ideal types must be constructed to analyse different types of states. And since the western ideal type is used as a basis for formal institutions and is adopted by many actors, this model should be treated as a category of practice rather than as a category of analysis. These reflections on state failure point towards the need to question the very model of the state, whose normality is taken for granted, but whose conditions of existence have not been recognised, and have turned out to be more specific than both theorists and practitioners have imagined. Failed states are an expression of the absence of the conditions of the possibility that made the establishment of modern states possible in Europe. Instead of starting with an idealised conception of the modern state, we should approach the study of non-western states by asking what kinds of conditions produce what kinds of state. To answer this question, we need a political economy of state formation. One possible starting point for such an analysis is to focus on the relationship between states and regimes, and to analyse the social foundations of state power.