Get documents about "Theory of the research
Document Sample
Chapter I.3: Theory of the Research: Different Approaches for the Analysis
of the Policy Process
I.3.1: Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to describe the approaches that have been used for
the development of this work. Similarly to the procedure adopted for the discussion of the
methodological framework, the first task to be undertaken here is the definition of the
concepts assigned to a theoretical approach, and particularly when the subjects under
description and analysis belong to the realm of the social and political sciences.
A second task also undertaken is a discussion of the criteria and procedures that have been
used for choosing, from the myriad of theoretical approaches existing in the realm of the
social and political sciences, the one(s) used in the present research.
Finally, a description is provided of the main theoretical frameworks used. An important
comment is that the research draws significantly on the works developed by the main
authors or „fathers‟ of the approaches adopted.
I.3.2: A Conclusive Achievement; Policy Analysis as a ‘Bootstrapping’
Activity
One of the first impressions when analysing policies is the realisation that they concern a
complex and intricate set of social events, framed by actors, ideas, discourses, structures
and so on.
The basic mechanism we have to understand complexities is to try to make them more
comprehensible to our thought capacity. We achieve this by simplifying. When we
simplify, in order to understand the multiplicity of components which shape the social
world, we design maps, models, approaches, or think in terms of a metaphor. It is through
and within these frameworks that we can (start to) describe and explain the complexities
of the world.
Public policy is a realm rich in different approaches, maps, models, and academic
disciplines. This is the result of different processes. One is evolution, where new ideas are
nurtured as a result of a constant exercise to better describe and explain the world of
politics, which not unlike the social world is always in a continuous process of change.
Another is the multiplicity of „environments‟ which the world shelters and the diversity of
people that inhabit them. As already observed, social reality occurs in different
43
environments (natural and consciousness), and involves different structures and agents. In
this sense, how are we to choose, evaluate or test the different approaches we use to
describe and/or explain the social reality?
The first evidence is that we can not frame public policy and the problems with which it is
concerned in a tidy academic box. Taking the environmental area as an example, it is
impossible to take account of the multiplicity of the problems that abound in this area
using only one discipline, or using the different disciplines in the way that scientific
knowledge has conventionally been organised and arranged. In analysing the causes,
effects and policy options for that issue, it is important to bear in mind that the problems
have a multidimensional and multidisciplinary nature. In so being, to understand, and
mainly, to explain this „social reality‟ we are led to the use of multiple frameworks.
Contextualization of problems and processes is the first task of policy analysis. But in so
doing we must be aware that different people will contextualise these problems and
processes in different ways. As already mentioned in the discussion of the methodology
that has shaped this research, „social events‟ are framed by the values and beliefs of the
person who describes or explains them. This „diversity‟ illustrates the construction of the
different methodological approaches used in describing the world and for the construction
of knowledge, and the different theories associated with these methodologies.
But we are left with the question of how, in this context, are we to evaluate and choose
theories. As Parsons (1995) argues,
“...there are a range of approaches on a continuum:
we can choose between theories on the basis of testing them against empirical
evidence or research (a positivist or behaviourist position); or
we can argue that there is no possible way of choosing one theory or another; all
theories are equal in that they are social construction (a relativist position)”.
Actually, none of these „positions‟ has resolved the initial question. We are still left with
the same problem: how to decide on this continuum? How to make a choice, since we can
not say that all theories are equal or right when they postulate very different or opposite
assumptions. On the other hand, our trying to understand or explain the world does not
mean that we are always involved in a permanent exercise of theorising. We can (and we
do) appropriate other people‟s „eyes‟.
44
Rein (1976) suggests an answer to this problem, arguing that theories can be understood
as being like stories. We can compare theories by considering the plausibility of the story
they tell to us (this subject has already been considered when discussing the method of the
research). In this sense, we can compare different stories and choose that (or those) one (s)
which, in our point of view, gives (or give) the best explanation. But here, as well, we
must be aware that one story can work well in one context or situation and not in another.
Also, a story can explain part of the „event‟, but may not explain it as a whole.
Another similar interpretation for theories is given by Allison (1971), later referred to in
Weale (1992). For him, theories or models are like spectacles that:
“...magnify one set of factors rather than another and thus not only lead analysts to
produce different explanations of problems that appear, in their summary questions,
to be the same, but also influence the character of the analyst‟s puzzle, the evidence
he assumes to be relevant, the concepts he uses in examining the evidence, and what
he takes to be an explanation”(Allison, 1971).
Now the problem we face with this idea of stories or spectacles is related to the criteria we
use to choose them, since the approaches will contain different forms and components for
describing and/or explaining the social and political events. As they have been developed
or „designed‟ for different people, who have lived in different places and at different
times, during their lives they have figured the lens through which they describe and
explain the world to different degrees and with different curvatures. Considering this
diversity, as already mentioned, one of the criteria to be used in choosing between
approaches is the plausibility of the evidence of the story told by a given approach, from
the point of view of the analyst, or - in metaphor - the way the spectacles fit the analyst, or
not.
“In other words, we may evaluate a model, theory, metaphor or map in terms of the
quality of its arguments. The evaluation has greater similarity to the way in which
we judge a case or evidence submitted in a court of law than to a test done in a
laboratory. Our focus is not „proof‟ or „truth‟, so much as how arguments are used or
the case is made” (Parsons, 1995).
Until now it was emphasised that models, maps, and metaphors are not testable in a
positivist way, and that choosing between different approaches or theories is a difficult
task. A reasonable question here is why should we be using different frameworks to
analyse public policies. Why not just tell the „story‟?
45
That question has already been answered in part when pointing out that an important
dimension of the theories is their contextualisation. And the analysis of problems and
policies needs contextualisation. Time, space, values, rules, and beliefs are important
dimensions to be unfolded when describing and also explaining social and also political
events. Moreover, in clarifying the models and metaphors we use to describe and explain
public policy we are providing a way in which the values, assumptions and beliefs with
which we frame the analysis of problems and processes can be made clear and open to
critical understanding.
As pointed out before, we construct models, maps, metaphors, and theories to simplify
and accommodate our understanding of the world. However, what we have now is the
assumption that to understand the realm of public policy we need to bring together several
different approaches or theories, at least those which we consider as plausible. It is
worthwhile now to ask to what extent this complexity, instead of simplification, is an
inherent characteristic of the social sciences domain, making it so „confused‟ from the
positivist point of view; or it is extendible to all sciences, including the positivist one. The
ideas of Geoffrey Chew, a theoretical physicist, suggests that there are no fundamental
laws or constants governing the universe, and that everything exists in an interrelated
web. Any theory is adequate to explain such complex processes, and thus it is important
to accept a more pluralistic approach to models and theories.
“A key discovery of Western culture has been the discovery that different aspects of
nature can be individually „understood‟ in an approximate sense without
everything‟s being understood at once. All phenomena ultimately are interconnected,
so an attempt to understand only a part necessarily leads to some error, but the error
often is sufficiently small for the partial approach to be meaningful. Save for this
remarkable and far from obvious property of nature, scientific progress would be
impossible”(Chew, 1968).
For Chew, „bootstrapping‟ is the process in which we hold on to models and theories with
which we disagree as well as those with which we agree. What is important in the practice
of bootstrapping is understanding the differences that exist between and within the
approaches, since no single explanatory box is enough to express the complexity of the
world.
46
Drawing from this process, Parsons (1995) has developed a concept that seems to me
highly appropriate in the realm of policy analysis, which he considers as being essentially
a bootstrapping activity.
“No one theory or model is adequate to explain the complexity of the policy activity
of the modern state. The analyst must accept the pluralistic nature of the enquiry,
both in terms of the interdisciplinary quality of investigation and the need for a
hermeneutic tolerance of diversity” (Parsons, 1995).
Other authors, such as Ham & Hill (1993), Bührs & Bartlett (1993), March and Olsen
(1989), and Weale (1992) also support this idea of analysing public policies using
different approaches.
For the development of this work many approaches have been followed in order to
describe and to explain the policy process. These approaches have been used not with the
intention of „testing‟ them against a „reality‟, but as guides, or better, maps to give a North
to follow. As mentioned before, the policy process is too complex to be „imprisoned‟ in
an unique approach. Accordingly, what I have done during the development of this work
was to hold different approaches with the purpose of understanding what was going on in
the realm of the policies related to the environment in Brazil, and specifically with respect
to the EIA process and also a tool that may lead to its improvement, the SEA process.
Naturally the approaches selected are those which match with the way in this research the
world is described and explained, as already considered in the discussion of the
methodology. In this sense they are the most plausible, and those which could best tell the
stories of environmental policy in Brazil. Another aspect to be stressed here is the
compatibility of the approaches used in the research, in the sense that the components they
use to describe and also explain the social events are, in part or in whole, the same.
Methodologically speaking they are informed by the components of structures, agents and
agency.
After the next heading of this chapter, where the partitioning of the policy process will be
commented, these approaches will briefly be described, pointing out the underlying
concepts that they are based on. This presentation is, for some of the approaches
described, strongly based in the works developed by their designers. The adoption of this
procedure took into account the intention of presenting these approaches according to the
concepts and the structure proposed by their authors, in order to be the more trustworthy.
47
Moreover, in the conclusions of this chapter a discussion will be made in order to
consider where and why the chosen approaches have been used in the development of this
work.
I.3.3: Partitioning the Policy Process. The Validity of the Stages in the
Analysis of the Policy Process
As already discussed the realm of the politics comprises complex and dialectical
interactions of agents and structures producing social and political events. As observed
too, to make possible the understanding of complex social events we construct and use
models, maps, or theories. An additional procedure to simplify the analysis of the policy
process is to divide it in stages which start with the problem definition stage, progress
through the agenda setting, decision making, and implementation and finish with the
evaluation stage.
However, this simplification of the policy process is not accepted by many policy
analysts. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) who are critical to this simplification, argue
that the real world is far more complicated and not reducible to tidy steps or phases. They
point out that the stagist model does not provide any causal explanation of how policy
goes from one stage to another; additionally, they stress that in analysing the policy
process through the stages the analyst is led to lose the view of the integrated process that
characterises the realm of politics.
Although agreeing in part with these criticisms, I do consider that the stagist approach has
its advantages. The main reason for supporting its use in this work comes from the
ontological assumptions that inform the methodology used in this research. As the social
reality occurs producing events which are dependent of the agents, the structures, the time
and the environments where they occurs, the social reality is, as a consequence of these
attributes, multiple. This explains the diversity of frameworks that we use to describe and
explain the realm of politics and permits us to use the stages as contexts within which we
can arrange these different frames using as reference for this arrangement the very nature
of the events under description and/or explanation.
The literature of policy analysis is pervaded with frameworks or approaches which adopt,
although many times without making a clear statement concerning this „adoption‟, the
stagist frame to describe or explain the policy process. The so called „schools‟ of policy
48
analysis (problem definition, agenda setting, implementation, and evaluation) are concrete
examples of the usefulness of the stages.
In the context of this research, all relevant stages of the policy process had been
considered however depending of the setting under analysis certain of them have not been
included. Concerning the international setting of the EIA process, due to the objectives of
the work and also to the availability of data, mainly the analysis focuses on the evaluation
of that process. Regarding the Brazilian setting, a major emphasis is placed on the agenda
setting and policy formation stages, since one of the main objectives was to analyse the
feasibility of the introduction of the SEA process. However, insights are also provided
concerning the implementation and evaluation of the EIA process in Brazil, due to the
importance of these aspects when considering its modification.
I.3.4: Describing the Different Approaches Used in the Research
I.3.4.1: The Rational Choice Approach
The theory of politics as rational choice assumes that individuals enter a political process
with preferences and resources and use personal skills to pursue personal gain. The
rationality of actors is revealed by the way they choose a course of action, when
confronted with a set of options. Rational agents are presumed to be consistent in their
preferences over outcomes. A rational choice enables actors to find the most efficient way
of reaching their desired end.
Key assumptions that characterise this approach are:
that policy making is synonymous with decision making;
that policy making is instrumentalist, concerned with end results;
that rationality is instrumentalist and purely intellectual;
that policy makers are unitary decision makers;
that policy makers and policy analysts have immense information and processing
capacity; and
that available theoretical and empirical policy knowledge is reliable.
Nevertheless, these assumptions do not match with the real world. Politics is as much
about communication, power, moral action, and the construction of preferences, values
and meaning as it is about problem solving.
49
Policy making may be less about solutions, outcomes, and end results than about
participation and interaction - a process for developing a sense of purpose, identity, and
belonging, and for improving cultural values.
Empirical knowledge is always incomplete, theoretical knowledge is always inadequate,
and available information is never wholly reliable or unbiased.
As observed, it is hard to explain the world of politics through the lens of the rational
approach. The main difficulty is related to the impossibility of identifying the interests
that lead political actors in their actions. These interests are hidden in the minds of these
actors and not accessible to empirical analysis.
Despite these inconsistencies of the rational approach, it will be used mainly to describe
discourses than to describe practices. Firstly, because the rational choice approach has
become the standard conception of what policy analysis is in the minds of most
politicians, citizens, and analysts. For them, a political action is always rational. Secondly,
because the logic of justification for a political action, is usually rational too.
Moreover, although the majority of decisions in the political arena are bounded and
constrained by institutional values and rules (as will be discussed below when considering
the institutional framework), in some circumstances decisions can be taken on a more
rational basis. These are situations that pervades weak or young institutions where values,
rules and meanings are eroded or not yet well consolidated.
I.3.4.2: The Policy Stream Approach
The genesis of a policy involves the recognition of a problem. The issue of whether a
problem even receives attention from policy process may have little to do with the
intrinsic characteristics of the problem itself. What are widely seen as high priority
problems for policy action today may have been just as urgent or more so at an earlier
period, but ignored in the policy process. The matters to which participants in the policy
process pay serious attention at any given time constitute the policy agenda. Only a small
proportion of conceivable problems or issues are ever on the policy agenda, and whether
or not an issue achieves agenda status is politically determined.
A very important question is thus why and how do some issues get on policy agenda,
whereas other ostensibly important issues do not?
50
Drawing upon the “garbage can model ”(Cohen et all, 1972), John Kingdon (1984) has
developed an approach to discuss agenda setting and policy selection. This approach has
also been used in other works concerning environmental policies, as for example Fiorino
(1995), Hoberg (1992) and Rabe (1986).
For Kingdon there are three families of processes in agenda setting and policy selection:
problems, policies (or ideas), and politics. Individuals recognise problems, they generate
ideas and proposals for public policy changes, and they engage in political activities. In
practice, while many participants do cut across the three process streams, there is some
specialisation. Experts, for example are more involved in generating ideas and proposals
than in political activities, and political parties are more involved in the political stream
than in the detailed work of generating ideas. Conceptually, however, any actor can be
involved in any stream, and some of them actually are. Nevertheless, the two roles are
substantially different.
According to Kingdon‟s framework the first stream to be analysed is problem recognition,
that is, how individuals fix their attention on one problem rather than another.
Various mechanisms - indicators, focusing events, and feedback - bring problems to
„individuals‟ attention. They use indicators to assess both the magnitude of and the change
in a problem. Their interpretation of indicators turns out to be a process more complicated
than a sincere assessment of the facts. Focusing events, including disasters, crises,
personal experience, and symbols, are important, but need accompaniment in the form of
pre-existing perceptions which they reinforce, firmer indicators, or combinations with
other such events. Feedback gives information on current performance that may not
square with legislative or higher administrative intent, indicates a failure to meet stated
goals, or suggests unanticipated consequences. Just as a problem can rise on an agenda, it
can also fade from view.
Budgets constitute a special kind of problem. Sometimes budgetary conditions act as an
impetus to the emergence of a set of concerns or proposals into prominence. More often,
the budget acts as a constraint, dampening enthusiasm for expensive proposals or for
attending to problems whose solution would be expensive
In general, not every condition is seen as a problem. For a condition to be a problem,
people must become convinced that something should be done to change it.
51
Sometimes, the recognition of a pressing problem is sufficient to gain a subject a
prominent place on the policy agenda.. But just as often, problem recognition is not
sufficient by itself to place an item on the agenda. Problems abound out there in the
environment of government, and officials pay serious attention to only a fraction of them.
Nor is solving a problem the only reason government enacts a solution. Several
considerations independent of problem solving induce government to act. Politicians cast
about for ways to make their mark. Bureaucrats propose initiatives designed to help them
to keep their jobs. Prevailing values change, resulting in new problem definition. Simple
interest group pressure or other expressions of preferences may give an issue prominence,
independent of a problem being solved. There are many reasons for agenda status, apart
from the honest impulse to identify problems and solve them
The second stream is the formation and refining of ideas, that is the generation of policy
proposals. The capacity of policy makers to respond to permanent changes in problem
definition depends critically on the availability of a rich stock of ideas and proposals. The
existing stock of ideas shapes their responses to events by defining the conceptual
alternatives from among which they choose. One of the possible loci of conceptual
innovation is the policy community. Policy communities are composed of specialists who
share an active interest in a given policy arena. The members of a policy community
represents different interests, hold different values, and may be developing different
activities, but they all contribute to policy development by generating new ideas and
proposals. They also have in common their interactions with each other. This community
of specialists has its own life, independent of such political events as changes of
administration and pressure from politicians. These specialists are affected by and react to
the political events.
Between policy areas, the communities of specialists vary tremendously in their degree of
fragmentation. Some communities are tightly closed and tightly. Others are more diverse
and fragmented. The first consequence of system fragmentation is policy fragmentation.
The second consequence is that a more closely knit community generates common
outlooks, orientations, and ways of thinking. These common features, a result of the
relatively tight integration of the community, in turn strengthen that integration. As people
have a common language, they can better communicate with one another. Another effect
of fragmentation is the production of instability, since ideas drift in and out in a rate that
do not favour the consolidation of a proposal to be advocated.
52
Another source of conceptual innovation are individuals In that case, one incentive that
prompts advocacy is the promotion of personnel interests. Another is the fact that people
sometimes advocate proposals because they want to promote their values, or affect the
shape of public policy.
The process of idea generation is evolutionary, a selection process in which some of the
ideas survive and grow and others fade. With this reasoning, the origins become less
important than the processes of mutation and recombination that occur as ideas
continuously confront one another and are refined until they are ready to enter a serious
decision stage. Thus the order ideas are tried out sometimes approaches randomness, but
the key to understanding the process is knowing the conditions under which ideas survive.
As any selection system, there is a pattern to the elements that survive. Such of the criteria
for survival are internal to the policy community itself: technical feasibility and value
acceptability. Other criteria are relevant for the political arena, as tolerable cost,
anticipated public acquiescence, and a reasonable chance for receptivity among elected
decision makers. If a proposal initially does not match with one or more of these criteria,
it might be redesigned or mixed with other, and then communicated again.
Independent of the problems and policy stream the political stream, the locus of selection,
flows along according to its own dynamics and its own rules and routines. Composed of
such things as public mood, pressure groups, elections, partisan or ideological distribution
in Congress, and changes in administration, the political stream have a strong effect on
agendas.
An aspect which has important effects on agenda setting is government turnover. A
change of administration, a substantial turnover of congressional seats, or a change of top
personal in an administrative agency all change agendas substantially.
Consensus building in the political arena, in contrast to consensus building among policy
specialists, takes place through a bargaining process rather than by persuasion. Moreover,
the creation of a stable coalition around a particular conceptualisation of a problem under
discussion is the function of political actors, and not for the members of a policy
community.
But, if the streams run separately each with specific dynamics, how do they come together
to a decision agenda.
53
“...the separate streams of problems, ideas, and politics come together at certain
critical moments. Solutions are attached to problems, and both of them are joined to
favourable political forces. This coupling is most likely when a policy window - an
opportunity to push pet proposals or one‟s conceptions of problems - is open.”
(Kingdon, 1984, 204)
These windows are opened either by the appearance of important problems or by relevant
facts in the political stream. For Kingdon, hence, there are „problems windows‟ and
„political windows‟.
A key element for coupling the streams is the introduction of new ideas. Entrepreneurs
who advocate their preferred alternatives are responsible for this coupling. They keep
their proposal ready, waiting or for a problem to which they can attach their solution, or a
development in the political stream, such as a change in administration, that can provide a
favourable environment for their proposal.
Some windows open largely on a schedule; others are quite unpredictable. But a
window closes quickly. Opportunities come, but they also pass. If a chance is
missed, another must be waited. (Kingdon, 1984, 204)
While the agenda is set by events in either the problem or political streams, the setting of
a decision agenda requires, in addition, an available alternative. A well structured and
viable proposal, available in the policy stream, enhances the probability that it will rise on
a decision agenda. In other words this means that the likelihood of a proposal rising up the
decision agenda is dramatically enhanced if the three elements - problem, proposal, and
political receptivity - are wrapped in a single package.
I.3.3.3: The Institutional Approach
To explain politics it is not enough to unfold the actors involved and the ideas and
interests they bear. Besides the individuals‟ perspective, it is also fundamental to identify
the locus where politics is made, that is the structures that constrains and/or enable their
actions. Political institutions is this locus and they have a major role to stability and
change in the political life.
The first task to be undertaken in analysing the role of institutions in politics is to define
them. According to Levi (1990) this is not a simple task. Following her rules is one of the
aspects that has been emphasised for defining institutions. But, as she also stresses, the
emphasis on rules begins to get at what an institution is and not just what it does.
54
In analysing the consequences of institutions for economic performance North (1990)
develops an adequate definition which asserts that an institution is mainly characterised
by its capacity to delimit choices and its possession of enforcement mechanisms.
Moreover, according to him - in bringing to the discussion his economic views -
institutions are structures that reduce the uncertainty that arises from otherwise
unpredictable behaviour and, therefore, make it easier to identify appropriate trading
partners and to write contracts that take into account most eventualities.
For March and Olsen (1989), to understand the role of political institutions three broad
clusters of ideas are significant.
“The first emphasises the way in which political life is ordered by rules and
organisational forms that transcend individuals and buffer or transform social forces.
The second emphasises the endogenous nature of reality, interests, and roles, and so
a constructive vision of political actors, meaning and preferences. The third
emphasises the history dependent intertwining of stability and change” (March and
Olsen, 1989).
Acting in the appropriate way
Different from being organised by a logic of consequentiality, through which behaviours
are driven by preferences and expectations about consequences (rationality), politics is
ordered by a logic of appropriateness.
“In a logic of appropriateness behaviours are intentional but not wilful. They involve
fulfilling the obligations of a role in a situation, and so of trying to determine the
imperatives of holding a position. Action stems from a conception of necessity,
rather than preferences. Within a logic of appropriateness, a sane person is one who
is „in touch with identity‟, in the sense of maintaining consistency between
behaviour and a conception of self in a social role. Ambiguity or conflict in rules is
typically resolved not by shifting to a logic of consequentiality and rational
calculation, but by trying to clarify the rules, making distinctions, determine what
the situation is and what definition „fits‟.” (March and Olsen, 1989).
A major role of political institutions is transforming individuals into knowledgeable
citizens, in the sense of acting through rules of appropriate behaviour and acknowledging
the moral and intellectual virtues of the polity. A knowledgeable citizen knows the
institutional reasons for behaviours, and can justify them by reference to the requirements
of a comprehensive order.
55
But the logic of appropriateness does not only establish the rules for adequate action. It
also establishes the rules for justifying these actions. Usually, after acting through a logic
of appropriateness individuals justify the action (appropriately) by a logic of rationality.
This kind of procedure results in one of the most common behaviour in the decision
making process, where the elaboration of reasons for an action is performed after the
decision has been made.
Forging Actors, Meanings, and Interests
Political institutions are not dependent variables. They do not only respond to their
environments but forge these environments at the same time. This phenomena is not
accommodated by modern political theory, which makes political outcomes a function of
preferences (interests) among political actors, the distribution of resources (power), and
the constraints imposed by rules of the game (constitutions). Each of these is considered
as exogenous to the political system.
The development and change of preferences and meanings is an attribute of politics as
well as of the rest of life. In considering this process as exogenous to the political
institutions is to say that education and experience are practices excluded from them.
The distribution of resources is also partly defined by endogenous factors. Power is an
attribute not only brought to the institution by the political actor. The outcomes of the
political process modify reputations for power, which in turn modify political outcomes.
The third exogenous factor in modern theories of politics, the rules of the game, is not
really exogenous either. The constitutions, laws, contracts, and the usual rules of politics
constrain the development of many potential actions or proposals by considering them
illegitimate.
Values and therefore value change can be seen as perceptibly influenced by the
institutional structure within which politics occurs. Values are not moulded or altered
through some automatic reaction to exogenous conditions or new ideas. Rather,
institutions define the framework within which ideas and external conditions have
meaning and values are constructed. Within political institutions, and in response to other
political institutions, individuals come to attribute meaning and value to their pasts and
futures (Bührs. and Bartlett, 1993).
Stability and Change
56
Although they provide important elements of order and stability in the changing arena of
politics, political institutions themselves also change. The process of change can be the
normal, incremental transformation of every day as well as, although rare, through a
radical shock - when a society‟s values and institutions are challenged or broken.
Before discussing the changes in political institutions it is appropriate to consider aspects
of their stability. It is a common thought to consider that historical processes are efficient.
This argument suggest that history moves quickly and inexorably to a unique outcome
which is dictated by environmental conditions. Such theories presume that regardless of
the process or the time path of history, its outcomes are implicit in the environment.
These evolutionary equilibrium arguments were made as a justification for assuming that
surviving institutions and institutional rules reflected implicit solutions to an optimisation
problem. Surviving rules, whatever their apparent source, intention , or character, would
be optimal.
Despite the appeal of this argument, the fact that political institutions encode experience
into standard operating procedures, professional rules, and identities, does not imply that
the rules necessarily reflect intelligence. The adjustments of political institutions to
changes in their environments are neither immediate, nor guaranteed.
“Extensive adjustments periods may be required during which diverse, conflicting,
and inefficient solutions survive. Institutions develop a character that discourages
arbitrary structural changes, and sometimes they change their environments rather
than adapt to them.” (March and Olsen, 1989).
Political institutions preserve themselves, in part by constraining the changes, and in part
by developing their own criteria of appropriateness and success, resource distributions,
and legal rules.
Concerning the process of changes it is relevant to point out some difficulties associated
with making sensible, intentional changes in complex political institutions. The first
difficulty is the complex character of the political institutions. Complexity obscures the
causal structure of the system being changed. If the causal relations are ignored because
they are new, because they are unknown, or because the world is inherently too complex,
then changes that seem predicted may produce unpredictable or confusing consequences.
Another difficulty in changing political institutions concerns the problem of making the
demands of organisations and individuals consistent. An institution can be seen as an
57
intermeshing of three systems: the individual, the institution, and the collection of
institutions that can be called as the environment. The way those three systems intermesh
produces pitfalls in institutional changes. The main issue associated with this problem is
the different requirements that lead individuals, institutions, and systems of institutions
for change. There is no particular a priori reason for assuming that individual desires for
change will be mutually consistent or will match the requirements for institutional
survival. Moreover, the survival of an institution is more compelling requirement for the
institution than it is for a system of institutions.
Considering these difficulties the evidences regarding intentional changes in political
institutions does not encourage unlimited confidence in the possibilities for deliberated
controlled change. There is, however, some room to produce intentional changes. Firstly,
there is considerable common adaptiveness in institutions that can be influenced.
Although the course of the transformation can not be precisely predicted, it is possible to
influence the gradual change by stimulating or constraining predictable adaptive
processes. Secondly, although the rules and routines of institutions are relatively stable,
they are incomplete. It is possible to influence the definition of ambiguity surrounding the
rules. Thirdly, it is possible to change the political institutions through radical shocks.
Although the change cannot be precisely predicted, as in the case of ordinary changes, the
transformation can be produced intentionally.
The Role of Intention in the process of change
The process of institutional change rarely satisfies the intentions of those who initiate it,
since change cannot be controlled precisely. Although, this perspective is itself
misleading, because it presumes that intention is clear, fixed, and singular.
“Understanding the transformation of political institutions requires recognising that
there are frequently multiple intentions, that intentions are often ambiguous, that
intentions are part of a system of values, goals, and attitudes that embeds intention in
a structure of .other beliefs and aspirations, and that this structure of values and
intentions is shaped, interpreted, and created during the course of the change in the
institution.” (March and Olsen, 1989).
The major aspect concerning intentions is the fact that political institutions develop and
redefine goals while making decisions and adapting to environmental pressures. During
this process, initial intent can be lost. This aspect is particularly significant to studying
58
institutional change, because institutional change usually takes time, and the control and
maintenance of intention during this time depends on persistence. In this sense, to affect
the process of change in a consistent way, intention must be stable and pervasive, rather
than changing.
I.3.5: Conclusions
The main issue to be addressed in this conclusion is the discussion of the approaches that
have been used in this research, in order to explain the why and the where of their use.
However, before considering these questions with respect to the three basic approaches
described in this chapter, an initial comment is needed.
At the time that the initial objective of this research was changed from a technical
perspective - the identification and discussion of feasible mechanisms for improving the
EIA process in Brazil - to a more political perspective - the analysis of the possibility for
introducing the SEA process in the country - the necessity became apparent for adopting
political and social approaches for describing and analysing events in Brazil regarding the
environmental domain.
To an engineer that requirement represented a real difficulty, since I was much more
familiar with Cartesian approaches, than with the ones from the social sciences. In that
sense I expended a significant time in „discovering‟ the different approaches that have
been developed with the objective of analysing and explaining the different aspects of the
social and political domains. This exercise has been extremely positive, since I had first
the opportunity to realise that in the realm of the social and political events any
framework or approach is sufficient for integrally explaining them, and also to learn that
even in the realm of the physical sciences (positivists), as explored by Chew (1968), there
are also no fundamental laws or constants governing the universe, and that everything
exists in an interrelated web.
With these concepts recognised, the next task was the identification, taking also into
account the adopted methodology, of the approach(es) to be used for describing and
explaining the social and the political events. Different approaches have been selected,
taking into account that the scope of this research crosses the policy process from the
formulation to the evaluation phase. For each of these phases social and political
approaches abound, according to the contexts and also the purpose for which they have
been developed. Between them are the rational, the temporal sorting, the policy design,
59
the agenda control, the implementation - with its different branches - the evaluation, the
advocacy coalitions, and the streams approaches; only to mention some of them. The
work developed by Parsons (1995) makes clear the profusion of models/approaches
developed for dealing with policy analysis. Moreover, taking into consideration the
„bootstrapping‟ procedure advanced by Chew (1968), the initial perspective was to keep
all these approaches present.
Nevertheless, during the development of the field work, and also during the drafting of
this thesis, it has become clear that while a range of different approaches had been
initially chosen to describe and to explain the events under consideration, in effect three
of them could be considered as attending the requirements of the research. The rational,
the policy stream (temporal sorting) and the institutional approaches, the ones described
in this chapter, are the ones that remained as the most appropriate. In effect these three
approaches are used to describe and to discuss the decision-making process, being the
second, the temporal sorting, also adequate to analyse the process of agenda setting.
However, they have the property of progressively adding to their framework, the different
components that are the fundamental parts of the social and the political events: a) actors;
b) actors, problems and solutions (ideas); and c) actors, problems, solutions, and
institutions.
Now I turn to the context of the two questions posed in this chapter with respect to the
choice of the theoretical frameworks that have informed this research. In part I do
consider that the why question has already been answered. As mentioned, the main
objects of analysis in the context of this work are the political and the social events. As
the social process basically concerns the agents (capacities for actions), the structures
(capacities for operation) and their meeting point agency, these are elements considered
and included in the three mentioned approaches. Moreover, these approaches have also
the advantage of accommodating the different conditions encountered in the context of
the institutions, taking into account the degree of consolidation of their rules, norms, and
procedures. As will be extensively discussed during this research, the spectrum of
consolidation of these factors in an institutional context - from weak to strong - is an
important component for defining how the individuals that inhabit them behave or
according to a logic of appropriateness (fulfilling obligations of a role in a situation) in the
consolidated institutions, or according to a logic of consequentiality (through which
behaviours are driven by preferences and expectations) in non-consolidated institutions.
60
On the other hand, with respect to the where question, it is difficult to be precise,
principally because the three mentioned approaches were used as a guide and as a
reference for the description and analysis of the different social, political and institutional
contexts that were visited in this work.
61
Related docs
