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KATHRYN LEE BOYD (SBN 186496) 4582 Calle San Juan Newbury Park, CA 91320 (805) 405-9133 Leeboyd.law@gmail.com Attorney for Plaintiffs Gargi Davé and Giatri Davé

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES GARGI DAVÉ and GIATRI DAVÉ, Plaintiffs, vs.
Crowell and Moring LLP, and the Pan Am Flight 73 Liaison Group,

Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

CASE NO.

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT pursuant to CAL. CIV. CODE PROC. § 1060

INTRODUCTION
1. This action is brought on behalf of Gargi Davé and Giatri Davé (“Plaintiffs” or “Davés”), two sisters and citizens of the United States, who were victims of Libya’s hijack of Pan Am Airlines in Karachi, Pakistan in 1986 in which 20 passengers were killed and over 120 were wounded (“Pan Am Hijacking”). Plaintiffs seek relief from this Court against Defendants, Crowell and Moring LLP (“Crowell and Moring” or “C&M”), an international law firm, and the Pan Am Hijacking Liaison Group which was masterminded by C&M
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(the “LG”)(collectively, “Defendants”), for making wrongful demands on Plaintiffs to forfeit the compensation awarded to the Davés for their terrorism-related injuries which the United States government secured for Plaintiffs through diplomacy with Libya resulting in a bilateral treaty (hereinafter “Plaintiffs’ or the Davé’s Compensation”). No agreement between the Davés and Defendants requires Plaintiffs to forfeit or to share with non-U.S. nationals their Compensation that was awarded under a U.S.-Libya treaty to U.S. victims of terrorism. Further, no agreement that would require Plaintiffs to forfeit their Compensation secured by the United States government from Libya could withstand judicial scrutiny of Defendants’ failure to disclose to Plaintiffs to whom they owed fiduciary duties serious conflicts of interest between the Davés and non-U.S. citizens. Further, no agreement can be enforced against Plaintiffs to forfeit their Compensation to Defendants for attorneys’ fees in direct conflict with the U.S. national interests as codified in the terms of its treaty with Libya on behalf of Plaintiffs, or to compensate Defendants for a political settlement in which they had no part. The fact that Defendants have made such unlawful and unreasonable demands requires immediate judicial determination of the Plaintiffs’ rights to their Compensation. 2. The Davé sisters, who were children at the time of the Pan Am hijacking, were held

hostage, fired upon by grenades and automatic weapons fire, and were severely wounded. In 2008, after years of state-to-state negotiation and diplomacy with Libya, the U.S. government entered into a bi-lateral treaty with Libya for an award of compensation for all U.S. nationals harmed by Libyan terrorism, including the victims of the Pan Am Hijacking. This conduct of foreign affairs by the Executive Branch and implementation of treaty terms compensating Plaintiffs by the Legislative Branch was accomplished politically with no participation whatsoever from Defendants, who were engaged under their own drafted agreements solely to file civil lawsuits on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and virtually all other passengers on the Pan Am Flight 73. Upon the United States’ securing the Compensation under treaty in 2008, the Defendants’ work on behalf of Plaintiffs was terminated, without successful judicial remedy or recovery for Plaintiffs. Defendants’ 1
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agreements to represent Plaintiffs in lawsuits omitted any reference or mention that their terms applied to compensation resulting from state-to-state Libya-U.S.- negotiated political settlements. 3. In 2005, C&M created the Liaison Group (LG) consisting primarily of non-U.S. survivors and/or their heirs of the Pan Am Hijacking for the purpose of soliciting the Davés as clients. At that time Defendants well knew that diplomacy and foreign policy of the U.S. Executive Branch as well as legislative action on behalf of U.S. victims of terrorism historically have been the sole means of actual recovery from terrorist states. Defendants knew at the time there were significant and substantial conflicts of interest between the likelihood of recovery of the U.S. citizens as a result of U.S. diplomacy with Libya, and the virtual impossibility of the non-U.S. citizens ever receiving compensation for terrorism injuries given that the United States could not espouse non-citizens’ claims in treaties with foreign sovereigns, and under law, non-U.S. citizens had no rights to sue a foreign sovereign in U.S. courts. 4. Nevertheless, Defendants solicited all victims of the Pan Am Hijacking, including Plaintiffs, to enter into a Joint Prosecution Agreement (“JPA”), which terms require that each member – the majority of whom were non-U.S. nationals -- to share equally the proceeds of any recovery received by any signatory of the JPA. The JPA incorporated a retainer agreement with C&M (“C&M Retainer”), which would provide C&M with a large percentage of attorneys’ fees (at least 25%) from any recovery based on their work for their clients within the judicial system in a civil action against Libya. 5. Through no work or effort of C&M and/or the LG, in August 2008, the United States and Libya entered into a political settlement codified in a treaty, the Claims Settlement Agreement between the United States of America and The Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” (the “CSA”), and Congressionally approved law, Libyan Claims Resolution Act, Public Law 110-301, (the “LCRA”) “to provide “full compensation to all nationals of the United States who have terrorism-related claims against Libya through a comprehensive settlement of claims by such nationals against Libya pursuant to an 2
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international agreement between the U.S. and Libya as a part of the process of restoring normal relations between Libya and the United States.” The LCRA authorized the Secretary of State to establish procedures for compensating the U.S. nationals pursuant to the treaty with Libya. Further, the President issued an Executive Order, No. 13477 in October 2008 (the “EO”), which recognized the LCRA and the CSA and stated the desire to “continue the process of normalizing relations between the United States and Libya” and ordered all claims of U.S. nationals against Libya settled according to the terms of the CSA. In neither the treaty (CSA), the federal statute (LCRA), nor the EO, did the U.S. mention the Defendants as having been a part of the United States’ conduct in securing compensation for Plaintiffs and the other U.S. national victims of terrorism. Rather, pursuant to the new federal law, any services rendered on behalf of a claimant that relate to a claimant’s compensation award approved by the Secretary of State was not to exceed 10 per centum of the total amount paid on a claim, and any agreement to the contrary shall be unlawful and void. 6. Upon the announcement of the U.S.-Libya agreement to compensate the U.S. victims of the Pan Am Hijacking, C&M and the LG immediately dismissed the 2006 lawsuit they had filed on behalf of all clients, both U.S. citizens and non-U.S. nationals who were parties to the JPA, and under which no compensation for Plaintiffs or any of the signatories to the JPA was secured by Defendants. 7. Under the U.S.-Libya treaty (CSA) and the federal implementing law pursuant to the EO and the LCRA, Plaintiff Gargi Davé was informed by the U.S. Department of Treasury on July 8, 2009, that she is entitled to $3 million for her injuries caused by the Pan Am Hijacking, including a severe head injury that left her in a coma for several days. She may also be entitled to additional amounts of up to approximately $3 million more due to the severity of her physical injury. Plaintiff Giatri Davé’s claims are still being evaluated by the Federal Claims Settlement Commission (”FCSC”); she is entitled to a minimum award of $500,000 as a U.S. national hostage on the Pan Am Hijacking and may be awarded additional injury claims of up to approximately $6 million total. On July 28, 2009, the 3
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Commission issued an award to Gargi Davé in the first installment amount of $3 million USD for the physical injuries that she suffered in the Pan Am Hijacking. 8. Despite the fact that neither the JPA nor the C&M Retainer even mention that the agreements apply to recovery resulting from U.S. diplomatic efforts, including treaty, executive order, or federal law, C&M and the LG immediately demanded that Plaintiffs turn over that politically-negotiated settlement to Defendants for the purpose of sharing those proceeds with all clients of C&M, purportedly under the terms of the JPA, and for the payment of C&M’s attorneys fees of 25% -- rather than 10% set forth in the EO -- under the unlawfully and fraudulently procured retainer agreement which by its terms was only for “C&M to represent them in a civil suit against Libya”. 9. While C&M did ultimately file a lawsuit (as contemplated under the JPA) against

Libya in 2006 on behalf of 186 plaintiffs, 43 of whom were U.S. nationals and 143 of whom were non-U.S. nationals, this suit was unsuccessful in that no judicial recovery was procured by Defendants on behalf of Plaintiffs, rather the lawsuit was dismissed immediately by C&M and the LG pursuant to the U.S. government’s political settlement with Libya. 10. Under the terms of the agreements drafted by Defendants, the dismissal of the lawsuit ends any obligations of the parties, and, as with all contingency agreements, Defendants are entitled to nothing. Defendants’ agreements with Plaintiffs did not provide for any recovery for the parties as a result of the U.S.’ espousal of claims in diplomatic conduct and treaty, and indeed, Defendants did not participate in the on-going political negotiations by the U.S. government on behalf of the Pan Am 73 terrorist victims; by federal law and under the terms of the JPA and retainer agreement, they are not entitled to Plaintiffs’ Compensation or attorneys’ fees for a political settlement of claims. 11. Further, Defendants’ JPA and C&M Retainer are contrary to the terms and intent of the U.S. under the CSA, EO, and LCRA, which explicitly provide for the “fair compensation” for U.S. nationals, such as Plaintiffs in an amount determined pursuant to federal law and administrative procedures under the CSA, EO, and LCRA. 4
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12. Moreover, Defendants’ demands are wrongful because the agreements with Plaintiffs upon which their demands rely were the result of Defendants’ unlawful professional conduct, nondisclosures, fraudulent omissions, and manipulation of Plaintiffs whom they solicited as clients, and if used against Plaintiffs, will cause Plaintiffs serious imminent financial, mental, and emotional harm. 13. Specifically, C&M knew at that time of its solicitation of Plaintiffs that U.S. victims of terrorism had far better chances of recovery of compensation for injuries resulting from terrorist acts than non-U.S. citizens given that (1) they possessed legal causes of action against foreign sovereign governments that non-citizens did not have; (2) and any award that would be recovered would likely not be a result of a lawsuit, but rather the only likely monetary compensation received by victims of terrorist acts would result from the U.S.’ diplomatic action and/or legislation or executive order. These facts were not disclosed to Plaintiffs at the time they were solicited to join as clients of C&M and to be a part of the JPA under which terms they would share their rightful compensation with both non-U.S. citizens and with C&M – nor was any mention of compensation from state –to-state negotiations between the United States and Libya in either the JPA or the C&M Retainer. 14. Neither C&M nor the LG disclosed to Plaintiffs that U.S.-Libya talks were in progress concerning settlement of terrorism claims of U.S. citizens, and that should there be any negotiated settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. legally could only espouse and satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals. Neither C&M nor the LG disclosed that the U.S. government’s negotiations with state sponsors of terrorism and/or legislation had historically been the sole compensation for U.S. victims of terrorism, and that lawsuits and judicial remedies are legally null and void upon a political settlement by the U.S. political branches. 15. Rather, C&M’s Retainer agreement falsely and fraudulently stated that “*b+y joining into the JPA, you agree to waive any potential conflicts regarding the law firm’s joint representation of you and the other Pan Am 73 victims and families. As noted in the JPA, we do not foresee any such conflicts at this time.” Defendants knew or should have 5
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known at that time of the actual conflict between non-U.S. nationals, whose claims could not be espoused by the U.S. in diplomatic settlement, and U.S. nationals, for whom the U.S. government was in active negotiations and for whom Defendants knew would likely recover pursuant to a political action by the government. Defendants instead represented to Plaintiffs that their only hope of recovery for injuries suffered at the hands of Libya was to bring a lawsuit for which they needed Defendants as counsel on a contingency fee arrangement. 16. If Plaintiffs were forced to capitulate to Defendants’ demands to share their fair compensation awarded by the United States in the approximate amount of $4 to $12M million, the Davés would be forced to forfeit approximately 90% of this amount, ultimately receiving approximately $200,000 each under Defendants’ unreasonable and wrongful demands to share with non-nationals and Defendants who were not contemplated by the U.S.-Libya treaty. Accordingly, intervention by this Court is required to adjudicate the rights of Plaintiffs to their fair Compensation as defined by federal treaty, executive order, and federal legislation. 17. Accordingly, Plaintiffs bring this action for a declaratory relief under California’s Declaratory Judgment Act, Cal. Civ. Code. Proc. § 1060 for an order declaring that (1) the U.S. procurement of fair compensation for Plaintiffs’ injuries at the hands of Libya through state-to-state diplomacy as codified in the CSA, LCRA, and EO, and the claims procedure established by the Secretary of State pursuant to treaty, federal statute, and executive order, under which Plaintiffs are entitled to receive compensation as victims of terrorism, falls outside the scope of the terms of the JPA and the C&M Retainer. The JPA and C&M solely relate to and cover only efforts by Defendants pursuant to a civil lawsuit or judicial remedy -- which in this case were never procured by Defendants on Plaintiffs’ behalf, and therefore Plaintiffs owe no obligations to forfeit their rightful compensation to Defendants; (2) that the terms of the CSA treaty, EO, and federal LCRA and intent of the U.S. government were to provide exclusively for “fair compensation to U.S. victims of terrorism” in the amount allotted to Plaintiffs by the federal government to the exclusion 6
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of any non-national victims of the Pan Am Hijacking; (3) that the JPA and C&M Retainer are unenforceable due to the conflict with the terms, intent and policies of the United States. under the CSA, EO, and LCRA to grant Plaintiffs’ entitlements to the “fair compensation” as administered under and in the amount allotted pursuant to the LCRA, the CSA and EO; (4) that the terms and intent of the United States under the CSA, EO, and LCRA were to provide no more than 10% fee for anyone assisting in the processing of claims pursuant to the CSA, EO, and LCRA, and that all contrary terms in the JPA/retainer agreement are null and void under federal law; (5) that the JPA and the C&M Retainer are null and void ab initio due to substantive and procedural unconscionability, unlawful and fraudulent procurement by Defendants who failed to disclose significant conflicts of interest between their U.S. and non-U.S. clients and (6) that the JPA and the C&M Retainer are contracts of adhesion and were induced, formed, and executed in violation of their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. 18. Plaintiffs also seek declaratory relief for an order that any terms requiring non-judicial mediation or arbitration under the JPA and/or C&M retainer agreement are null and void ab initio and unenforceable due to substantively and procedurally unconscionable terms, fraud in the inception and execution, illegality as contrary to federal policy and judicial review, and lack of consideration. 19. Further, Plaintiffs bring claims against Defendant C&M requesting judicial declaration (1) that Defendants breached fiduciary duties toward Plaintiffs in violation of D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4(b) and 1.7; (2) that the LG negligently misrepresented the purposes and negative consequences of the JPA; (3) that Defendants breached the contracts by failing to prosecute the claims of the non-national clients, and (4) that C&M’s demands for Plaintiffs’ Compensation constitute interference with contract and interference with prospective economic advantages of Plaintiffs. 20. A declaration of rights, duties, and obligations is required to remedy the imminent and serious harm to Plaintiffs caused by Defendants’ baseless and unlawful demands for Plaintiffs’ Compensation under the U.S.-Libya agreement and federal implementing law. 7
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If Plaintiffs are compelled to capitulate to Defendants’ demands to forfeit their Compensation to share with non-nationals under the JPA, which did not anticipate U.S. government claims settlement, the amount of Plaintiffs’ Compensation will be reduced by approximately 90%, a loss of approximately $3 million to $11 million dollars, leaving Plaintiffs with compensation of approximately a few hundred thousand dollars each out of a multi-million dollar award for their injuries. PARTIES 21. Gargi Davé is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Sunnyvale, California. Gargi was a resident of Los Angeles from 2003 through 2006. 22. Giatri Davé is a citizen of the United States and at all relevant times has been a resident of Fresno, California. Giatri was a resident of South Pasadena, California from 2006 to 2008. 23. Upon information and belief, Crowell and Moring LLP is a limited liability legal services partnership headquartered in Washington, D.C., with offices in New York, two in California, including one in Los Angeles, and additional offices outside the United States. 24. The LG was masterminded by C&M to consist of five individuals, four non-nationals and one U.S. national who are parties to the JPA, who purported to be representative of the victims of the Pan Am Hijacking, and who have been designated by the Parties to act both as managing agents for the Parties and as the entity authorized to act as liaison with litigation counsel C&M. Upon information and belief, the LG was at all times represented by Latham &Watkins which acted as agent of LG and of C&M. 25. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants acted as authorized agents and/or representatives of each other. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 26. This Court has personal jurisdiction over C&M because C&M is a citizen of California. C&M has several partners who are currently domiciled, and thus have citizenship, in California, including Robert L. Grabarek Jr., and R. Scott Feldman. This Court has

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personal jurisdiction over the LG as it solicited the JPA and C&M Retainer from eighteen (18) California citizens, including Plaintiffs, out of which this controversy arises. 27. Venue is proper in this district as Defendant Crowell & Moring is a resident and domiciliary of Los Angeles County. Venue is also proper in this Court among other reasons because Plaintiffs did not consent or agree to the purported arbitration clause in the JPA because (1) it is unconscionable as a contract of adhesion, which was forced upon Plaintiffs under fraudulent pretenses in its inception with no meaningful opportunity to negotiate; (2) it was intended to hide and place beyond judicial review Defendants’ fraud and intent to make demands upon Plaintiffs’ Compensation which was not contemplated in the JPA, thereby it fell outside Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations and caused surprise; (3) it was procured knowing that the costs of arbitration to Plaintiffs having to travel out-of state and to pay a three-judge panel would be prohibitive of any meaningful dispute resolution; (4) Defendants provided no meaningful notice of the rules of arbitration to Plaintiffs; (5) the arbitration clause is illegal as a matter of law because it is contrary to a public policy that provides Plaintiffs with compensation pursuant to a U.S. government foreign policy; (6) the JPA is illegal and conflicts with public policy embodied in the federal scheme to compensate Plaintiffs and conflicts with the LCRA, which limits attorney’s compensation and declares any agreement to the contrary unlawful and void; (7) the JPA and C&M Retainer and arbitration clause contained therein are void ab initio because of fraudulent and deceptive statements made at the inception of the agreement, including statements to Plaintiffs that recovery chances are better for non-U.S. nationals, thereby inducing Plaintiffs to enter an agreement which in actuality would reduce their chances of recovery; and (8) lack of consideration. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Incidents of International Terrorism and U.S. Response 28. Giatri Davé was born in the United States and permanently resides in Fresno, California. /// 9
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29. Gargi Davé was born in the United States and permanently resides in Sunnyvale, California. 30. On September 5, 1986, both Davés, children at the time, were held hostage aboard the Pan Am Hijacking Airlines in Karachi, Pakistan (the “Pan Am Hijacking” incident). 31. During the Pan Am Hijacking, 360 passengers were held hostage for 16 hours. Libyan hijackers intended to detonate the plane while mid-flight above Israel with a bomb they carried aboard, and when that plan failed, they threatened to kill all of the passengers, and ultimately sprayed them with automatic weapons fire and threw hand grenades into the trapped crow. As a result of the hijacking, over 120 passengers were wounded. 32. As a result of the Pan Am Hijacking, Gargi Davé sustained severe head injuries leaving her in a coma for several days and hospitalized for months thereafter. 33. As a result of the Pan Am Hijacking, Giatri Davé sustained severe injuries and was hospitalized for months thereafter. 34. In 1988, Lockerbie was bombed over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all passengers aboard (the “Lockerbie bombing”). 35. In January 1988, the U.S. Department of State determined that Libya was implicated in the Pan Am Hijacking. 36. In 2001, Congress directed President Bush to submit, no later than the time he submitted the proposed budget for fiscal 2003, a legislative proposal to establish a comprehensive program to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all U.S. victims of international terrorism (or relatives of deceased U.S. victims of international terrorism) that occurred or occurs on or after November 1, 1979. 37. In 2002, Libya indicated its desire to compensate U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing in order to normalize its relations with the United States. 38. Since the 1980s, Congress has proposed laws to compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism, either through freezing the assets of state sponsors of terrorism, or by other government-directed means. /// 10
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39. Congress has never proposed laws to compensate non-U.S. victims of international terrorism, or under principles of U.S. and international law could it have done so. 40. In 2003, Libya admitted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing. 41. In September 2003, the United Nations lifted sanctions against Libya. 42. On September 20, 2004, President Bush issued Executive Order 13357, lifting most sanctions against Libya, and indicating diplomatic relations had resumed. 43. While numerous lawsuits have been filed in U.S. courts against foreign sovereigns or individuals acting as agents of foreign states for injuries caused by terrorist acts, no victims of terrorism have recovered compensation by judicial remedy until the settlement of the claims of the U.S. victims of the Lockerbie 103 bombing began in August 2003, which was known to Defendants. Rather, the U.S. has settled claims of its nationals against sovereign states through state-to-state diplomacy and state-to-state agreements. 44. As the Defendants well knew, the United States has entered into numerous claims settlement agreements with foreign countries on behalf of its own nationals, including but not limited to Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Iran, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. 45. To provide a procedure whereby such settlements could be distributed, Congress enacted the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. 46. The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, initially called the International Claims Commission, was created to implement this purpose. 47. On May 15, 2006, Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was removed from the U.S. list. 48. The above facts were well-known to Defendants, as well as the fact that under principles of international law the United States could not espouse the claims of non-U.S. citizens, and were never disclosed to Plaintiffs by Defendants. The LG and the Unlawful JPA

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49. Both Davés were contacted and solicited as clients by C&M through a letter dated October 17, 2004, from Prabhat Krishnaswamy, Aneesh Bhanot, Madhvi Bahuguna, Gopal H. Dadhirao, and A. Jay Grantier. 50. The October 17, 2004 letter stated that these individuals had voluntarily formed a Liaison Group (“LG”) consisting of survivors of the Pan Am Hijacking and/or their heirs. 51. Upon information and belief, the LG was represented by the firm of Latham & Watkins, LLP (“Latham and Watkins”). In actuality, C&M was also directing the solicitation of Plaintiffs in conspiracy with Latham & Watkins. 52. The members of the LG purported to serve as representatives of the victims of Pan Am Hijacking and were to act both as managing agents for the victims and as the entity authorized to act as liaison with litigation counsel. According to the terms of the C&M Retainer incorporated by the JPA, the LG was to be “responsible for helping to manage and oversee the direction of the case” and had “authority to act for the entire Pan Am 73 collection of victims and families.” At no time did the LG or C&M discuss or mention that the representation was for the purpose of participating in Libya-U.S. state-to-state negotiations or settlement of claims by diplomatic means, or the fact that only U.S. citizens’ claims for injuries could legally be espoused by the United States. 53. In their letter, the LG stated that through C&M, it sought only to file a civil suit and to represent Plaintiffs in litigation against Libya for Libya’s responsibility for the Pan Am Hijacking. At no time did LG or C&M state that their representation extended to any participation whatsoever in diplomatic espousal of claims by the U.S. government or participation in the diplomatic relations between the United States and Libya. 54. At no time did Defendants mention or disclose the likelihood of a settlement of Plaintiffs’ claims as U.S. citizens by the U.S. government which was in active talks with Libya. Defendants knew or should have known that the U.S. and Libya had resumed relations and a settlement of terrorism-related claims was imminent. Yet these facts were not disclosed to Plaintiffs.

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55. Further, Defendants knew or should have known the United States’ espousal and settlement of claims in a diplomatic effort would preempt and/or nullify all judicial claims brought by LG and C&M, and that no U.S. settlement of claims could have included recovery for non-U.S. nationals, and that due to the exclusive federal executive right to settle Plaintiffs’ claims with Libya, Plaintiffs stood to lose substantial benefit by partnering with non-U.S. nationals and agreeing to attorneys’ fees which the U.S. federal government had no interest in granting and for which Defendants knew or should have known they would not have received in the event of a U.S. government claims settlement through political means. 56. The LG, working in connection with C&M, stated that in order to join it in filing suit against Libya, the Davés were required to sign the JPA. Both the JPA and the letter from the LG state that C&M would handle the prosecution of the lawsuit of all parties who joined the JPA. The JPA incorporated the C&M Retainer agreement. 57. The JPA provided that the “Parties desire to pursue their common interests against the Defendants under any applicable state/federal law . . . in any country or legal system or other available forum . . . to proceed in the most cost-effective manner to maximize any potential recovery for all Plaintiffs.” 58. The LG did not disclose that the vast majority of individuals who had undergone the Pan Am Hijacking were non-U.S. nationals. 59. The LG did not disclose that four of the five individuals who had voluntarily formed the LG were non-U.S. nationals. 60. The LG did not disclose that nationality would play a pivotal role in a Pan Am Hijacking’s victim’s chance of recovery against Libya or its agents, or that the chances of non-U.S. nationals recovering either under U.S. law or from a U.S.-negotiated settlement were virtually nil. Rather, the LG emphasized that regardless of nationality, victims in several terrorist incidents, including the Lockerbie bombing (“Lockerbie bombing”), recovered against Libya. /// 13
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61. Moreover, the LG suggested that being a non-national victim would help one’s chances of recovery by citing to recoveries by non-U.S. victims in the Lockerbie bombing, the Berlin La Belle Disco bombing, the UTA bombing, and the Beirut Embassy bombing and pointing out that in three of these cases, the U.S. victims had yet to be paid. 62. The LG falsely implied/stated that U.S. nationality could in fact harm a U.S. nationals’ chances of recovery by stating Libya had agreed to compensate non-nationals in terrorism related cases against it for specific dollar amounts while pointing out that in those same cases, Libya was refusing to pay the U.S. victims in the same case until U.S. removed Libya from its list of terrorist states. 63. The LG did not disclose that, should there be any settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. would only be able to represent and satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals. 64. The LG did not disclose that the U.S. Congress had been considering bills to compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism. The LG did not disclose that there was a strong U.S. governmental interest in compensating U.S. victims of terrorism. Nor does the JPA mention any possibility of the clients receiving recovery for terrorist-related injuries as a result of the United States’ diplomatic espousal of claims, a bilateral treaty between Libya and the United States, Executive Order, or other federal implementing legislation. The JPA’s terms only cover, relate to, and anticipate a civil lawsuit to be filed against Libya and a judicial remedy by Defendants. 65. The terms of the JPA permit the addition of non-U.S. national parties to the agreement to be added as plaintiffs in any civil action filed. Upon information and belief, Defendants have added without the consent of Plaintiffs approximately thirty non-U.S. citizen parties to the JPA. C&M’s Unlawful Retainer Agreement 66. C&M has a long, advertised experience with and stated expertise in the field of representing victims of international terrorism. C&M’s website boasts an “active,

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successful and unique practice in obtaining monetary relief for victims of international terrorism and their loved ones.” 67. The C&M Retainer agreement incorporated the JPA and stated that “any recovery [from civil lawsuit] will be distributed in accordance with the terms of the JPA.” 68. In the C&M Retainer agreement, C&M stated that it would represent all the victims of the Pan Am Hijacking who signed both the JPA and the retainer agreement along with a joinder to the JPA in a civil lawsuit against Libya. The C&M retainer stated that the terms of the JPA would govern C&M’s legal representation of those who retain C&M to represent them in a civil suit against Libya. 69. The C&M Retainer did not state that C&M’s representation extended to representation of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to a political remedy executed by the United States government, or to participation in state-to-state diplomacy between Libya and the United States, even though C&M knew full well that such diplomacy was contemplated by the governments and that recovery for terrorist victims had historically resulted only from the U.S. government’s espousal of U.S. citizens’ claims in state-to-state diplomacy. 70. Further, the C&M Retainer stated that “*b+y joining into the JPA, you agree to waive any potential conflicts regarding the law firm’s joint representation of you and the other Pan Am 73 victims and families. As noted in the JPA, we do not foresee any such conflicts at this time.” 71. The retainer agreement further stated that “*w+hile we see no conflict between our representation of your interest and the other Pan Am 73 victims and their families . . . we believe that there are significant benefits to having all the victim and family groups represented by the same counsel.” 72. C&M failed to disclose that Libya was seeking to compensate U.S. victims of terrorism at the time of the retainer and that Plaintiffs’ claims could be espoused by the U.S. while the non-U.S. nationals could not. 73. C&M failed to disclose that the legal causes of action for U.S. nationals included claims against foreign sovereigns while the non-U.S. citizens’ claims did not, or that U.S. citizens’ 15
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claims had a far better chances of success and/or enforcement of judgment than did nonU.S. citizens’ claims against officials of foreign governments. 74. In April 2006, C&M filed a complaint in Washington, D.C., naming Libya and Mohammar Qaddafhi as defendants, and naming 157 people as plaintiffs, 42 of whom, were U.S. nationals and 115 of whom were non-U.S. nationals. This lawsuit was amended to add 28 additional non-U.S. citizen plaintiffs. 75. This lawsuit did not result in a negotiated settlement with Libya or in any judgment by a U.S. court in favor of plaintiffs. 76. Plaintiffs were never informed that Defendants participated in or contributed in any way to diplomatic efforts between the U.S. government and Libya. U.S. and Libya’s Bi-lateral Agreement 77. Weeks after C&M filed its suit against Libya on behalf of the JPA parties, the LG notified the Davés that the United States had decided to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya but stated that “this would have no impact on the case with regard to moving forward” and that this restoration was anticipated. 78. In mid-2008, the LG emailed the Davés stating that Libya was entering into talks with the U.S. for a comprehensive settlement of all claims related to terrorism, despite having this information at the time of the solicitation of Plaintiffs as parties to the JPA and C&M Retainer. 79. At no time did Defendants disclose any conflict of interests between the U.S. citizen parties to the agreement and the non-U.S. citizen parties. 80. At no time did Defendants state that they had any role in the diplomatic efforts on behalf of Plaintiffs. 81. On August 4, 2008, Congress approved the Libyan Claims Resolution Act, Public Law 110-301 (“LCRA”). 82. The LCRA stated, in relevant part, that “Congress supports the President in his efforts to provide fair compensation to all nationals of the United States who have terrorismrelated claims against Libya through a comprehensive settlement of claims by such 16
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nationals against Libya pursuant to an international agreement between the United States and Libya as a part of the process of restoring normal relations between Libya and the U.S..” The LCRA did not require settlement of lawsuits by judicial remedy, but encompassed all claims for U.S. nationals’ injuries related to terrorist acts in a political settlement. 83. The LCRA authorized the Secretary of State “to designate 1 or more entities to provide compensation to U.S. nationals pursuant to a claims agreement.” 84. On August 14, 2008, a Claims Settlement Agreement (CSA) was executed between the U.S. and Libya, settling all claims of victims of terrorism, whether those claims were represented in a lawsuit or not. 85. The purpose of the CSA was “to further the normalization of relations” between the U.S. and Libya. 86. The CSA declared that to further the purpose of normalizing bilateral relations, the agreement was a settlement of each country’s claims against the other on behalf of its nationals for acts of terrorism, acts of torture, or acts of the military that occurred prior to June 30, 2006. 87. The CSA dictated the establishment of a settlement humanitarian fund (the “Settlement Fund”) as the basis for settling and terminating all claims, and precludes suits that can be brought into court against either nation for terrorism incidents. 88. The CSA declared that each nation would accept resources from the Settlement Fund as a full and final settlement of its claims and its suits and those of its nationals. 89. The CSA stated that no funds would be distributed to any claimant until that claimant had terminated its suit against the other country as required by the CSA. 90. On October 31, 2008, the President of the U.S. issued Executive Order 13477, Settlement of Claims Against Libya (“Executive Order” or “EO”), which recognized the LCRA and the CSA and stated the desire to “continue the process of normalizing relations between the United States and Libya.” The Executive Order ordered all claims of U.S. nationals against Libya settled according to the terms of the CSA – it specifically covered all claims 17
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of U.S. nationals for terrorism-related injury, including claims for injury for victims of terrorism who were not parties to any lawsuit in U.S. courts. 91. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs C. David Welch indicated in an October 2008 briefing that the foreign national victims of Libya's terrorism would not be covered by this agreement and instead could appropriately seek remedies through their own governments. 92. On January 15, 2009, pursuant to the authority of the Secretary of State under 22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)(1)(C), the Department of State Legal Adviser referred to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (“the Commission”) six categories of claims of U.S. nationals against the Government of Libya. 93. The Commission is a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the Department of Justice which adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments, under specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress, pursuant to international claims settlement agreements, or at the request of the Secretary of State. Funds for payment of the Commission's awards are derived from congressional appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign assets in the U.S. by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury. Under 22 U.S.C. § 1622g, “the decisions of the Commission with respect to claims shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact, and shall not be subject to review by the Attorney General or any other official of the U.S. or by any court by mandamus or otherwise.” 94. Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f), “*n+o remuneration on account of services rendered on behalf of any claimant in connection with any claim filed with the Commission under this subchapter shall exceed 10 per centum of the total amount paid pursuant to any award certified under the provisions of this subchapter on account of such claim. Any agreement to the contrary shall be unlawful and void. Whoever, in the U.S. or elsewhere, demands or receives, on account of services so rendered, any remuneration in excess of the maximum permitted by this section, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twelve months, or both.” 18
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95. The Davés’ retainer agreements with C&M provide for remuneration substantially exceeded 10% of any settlement award. Thus, these retainer agreements are “unlawful and void” under 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f). 96. Neither the LG or C&M participated in any of the diplomatic talks or negotiations involving Libya and the United States. Neither the CSA, the EO, nor the LCRA mentioned or referenced the lawsuit or the judicial claims brought by Defendants, which were terminated by law. Gargi Davé’s Compensation under Treaty and C&M’s Demand 97. On July 28, 2009, the Commission issued an award to Gargi Davé in the amount of $3 million USD for the physical injuries that she suffered in the Pan Am Hijacking. 98. In a letter dated November 1, 2009, C&M acknowledged the Commission’s issuance of a $3 million award to Gargi and noted that the award had been certified for payment by the U.S. Department of Treasury. The letter stated C&M’s expectation that the Treasury would soon be contacting Gargi to arrange for the method of payment of the award, and requested that upon receiving this communication, Gargi must contact C&M “immediately so that we can assist in making arrangements for the payment, in accordance with your engagement letter with C&M LLP and the JPA.” 99. Defendants have wrongfully demanded that the Plaintiffs forfeit their Compensation awarded pursuant to the U.S.-Libya treaty (the CSA), the Executive Order, and federal law, when such Compensation is not anticipated in nor covered by the JPA, and is in direct conflict with and in violation of those federal laws and federal foreign policy interests, and constitutes a breach of the fiduciary and professional duties owed to Plaintiffs. 100. Upon information and belief, lawyers from Latham & Watkins, counsel to the LG

and drafters of the JPA, strenuously objected to attempts by another signatory to the JPA to argue that the JPA does not apply to that signatory, including threatening that signatory with litigation and excessive costs. 101. Without declaratory action from this Court, Plaintiffs are in continual danger of

C&M and Latham &Watkins’ strong-arm tactics to have Plaintiffs forfeit their rightful 19
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Compensation under the JPA and C&M Retainer that do not apply to Plaintiff’s Compensation, and are in danger of losing approximately 90% of their rightful Compensation for injuries caused by terrorism. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Declaration of Unenforceability of the JPA under Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 1060 102. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-101 as

if set forth fully herein. 103. An actual controversy exists within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 1060 as

to whether the JPA applies to Plaintiffs’ Compensation received pursuant to the bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Libya, the CSA, the implementing legislation, the LCRA, and the Executive Order. Plaintiffs bring this claim for declaratory relief based upon the controversy created by Defendants’ conduct in demanding Plaintiffs’ Compensation under the JPA and/or C&M Retainer. 104. A judicial determination is necessary and appropriate at this time to interpret the

terms and intent of the CSA, EO, and LCRA and to determine that Plaintiffs’ Compensation awarded pursuant to federal law is outside the scope of the JPA and that neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have any obligations or rights under the JPA with respect to the Davés Compensation. 105. The U.S. government’s resolution of Plaintiffs’ claims by state-to-state negotiation,

treaty, executive order, and federal law intended to provide “fair compensation” as defined by the CSA, EO, and LCRA (the Davé’s Compensation). Plaintiffs’ Compensation was not contemplated by and falls outside the scope of the terms of the JPA. Therefore, Defendants have no rights or demands under the JPA, and Plaintiffs have no obligations. 106. A judicial determination is necessary and appropriate at this time to interpret the

terms and intent of the CSA, EO, and LCRA to grant to the Davés rights and entitlement to Plaintiffs’ Compensation under federal law, to the exclusion of C&M and the LG, to avoid future conflict and injury to Plaintiffs anticipated by Defendants’ demands upon them in having to defend their rights to their Compensation. 20
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A. The JPA is An Unenforceable Agreement and Establishes no Obligations on the Part of Plaintiffs or Rights on the Part of Defendants 107. Further, a controversy exists regarding whether the JPA is an enforceable contract,

which Defendants must prove as a condition for enforcement. 108. The CSA, EO, and LCRA provide exclusively for U.S. nationals, including the

Plaintiffs, to receive compensation from Libya for acts of terrorism, precluding the recovery of non-nationals. Plaintiffs seek a determination by this Court regarding whether the intent of the United States as a party to the CSA and whether federal laws through terms of the federal program for settlement established by the EO and the LCRA for “fair compensation” for Plaintiffs precludes the enforcement of the JPA which provides terms for payment of compensation for Plaintiffs as victims of the Pan Am Hijacking in direct conflict with the terms of the CSA, LCRA, and EO. 109. Plaintiffs seek declaration by this Court that the federal public policies and intent of

the U.S. government underlying and codified by the CSA, EO, and LCRA render the JPA unenforceable by Defendants against Plaintiffs because the JPA provides that all parties to the JPA—including non-U.S. nationals—will “share in the recovery” arising from the pursuit of the Parties’ legal claims with respect to the Pan Am Hijacking. In stark conflict, the LCRA, the CSA, and the Executive Order all provide that the settlement fund shall compensate U.S. nationals only. The JPA conflicts with international and federal law by purporting to require U.S. citizens to share their settlement fund awards with non-U.S. citizens. Given this conflict, international and federal law will control and the JPA is unenforceable under federal preemption as required by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 110. A declaration that the JPA is unenforceable will directly further the federal policies

underlying the interest in fully compensating U.S. victims by preventing the U.S. victims from being forced to share their individual recoveries with non-U.S. citizens, who have no right to recovery in U.S. courts, and protect Plaintiffs’ rights to their compensation in resolution of the threatened controversy caused by Defendants’ demands on Plaintiffs. 21
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111.

Further, the JPA makes repeated reference to the C&M Retainer which provides for

a contingency fee of “twenty-five percent (25%) of the amount recovered by settlement.” However, the governing law of the Commission, 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f), provides that “*n+o remuneration on account of services rendered on behalf of any claimant in connection with any claim filed with the Commission under this subchapter shall exceed 10 per centum of the total amount paid pursuant to any award certified under the provisions of this subchapter on account of such claim. Any agreement to the contrary shall be unlawful and void.” Accordingly, because C&M seek remuneration of 25% via the retainer agreement, and because the JPA makes reference to and incorporates the retainer agreement, the JPA is in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f) and is thus unenforceable against Plaintiffs. 112. Further, there is no discernible public policy interest in allowing C&M to collect the

excessive fees it claims, or in forcing U.S. terrorism victims to share their statutory recoveries with individuals barred by federal law and treaty from sharing in the recoveries. Once the LCRA, the CSA, and the Executive Order were executed via political means, C&M no longer had any legitimate expectation of such fees, and cannot now assert any legitimate right to them. Accordingly, to prevent harm to Plaintiffs’ rights to Compensation and to resolve a conflict with strong federal policies embodied in the CSA, EO, and LCRA, a declaration that the JPA is unenforceable in a contract action by Defendants is necessary at this time. A. The JPA is Invalid for Lack of Consideration 113. Pursuant to the JPA, Plaintiffs are obligated to share their settlement fund recovery

monies with the other Parties to the JPA—including the non-nationals—in consideration for a share in the monies recovered by the other Parties. 114. The consideration for Plaintiffs’ obligation under the JPA has wholly failed in light

of the total lack of any recovery obtained by C&M on behalf of the non-national Parties to the JPA. /// /// 22
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115.

This lack of consideration occurred through the fault of C&M who, at the time of

execution of the JPA, lacked any intent to pursue the non-nationals’ claims in any jurisdiction outside of the U.S. 116. Upon information and belief, this lack of consideration also occurred through the

fault of the LG who, at the time of execution of the JPA, had knowledge of C&M’s lack of intent to pursue the non-nationals’ claims in any jurisdiction outside the U.S. 117. Due to this lack of consideration through the fault of Defendants, Plaintiffs seek a

declaration that Plaintiffs have the right to rescind the JPA as to the Defendants. C. The JPA is Void Ab Initio On Grounds of Fraudulent Inducement of Contract 118. The consent of Plaintiffs to the JPA was obtained by Defendants’ fraudulent

representations, that they would pursue the claims of non-nationals in jurisdictions outside the U.S. in an effort to maximize recovery for all Parties to the JPA. 119. The consent of Plaintiffs to the JPA was also obtained by fraudulent representations

by the LG that, inter alia, non-U.S. victims had equal or better chances of recovery against Libya or its agents, and by failing to disclose that should there be any settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. would only be able to represent and satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals. 120. The consent of Plaintiffs was also obtained by Defendants’ fraudulent omissions

that the Plaintiffs’ claims could and would likely be espoused by the U.S. government without the involvement of the LG and/or C&M, and the false and fraudulent representation that any possible recovery for Plaintiffs would arise solely from the filing of a civil suit by Defendants. Due to this fraudulent inducement of Plaintiffs by Defendants, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they may rescind the JPA as to the Defendants. SECOND CAUSE OFACTION Declaration of Unenforceability of the C&M Retainer Agreement under Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 1060

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 121.

A.

The C&M Retainer Agreement Terms Do Not Extend to Plaintiffs’ Compensation Received Pursuant to Bilateral Diplomacy between Libya and the U.S.

Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-120 as

if set forth fully herein. 122. Plaintiffs bring this claim for declaratory relief based upon the controversy created

by Defendants demanding Plaintiffs’ Compensation under the JPA and/or C&M Retainer as enforceable agreements. 123. A judicial determination is necessary and appropriate at this time to interpret the

terms and intent of the CSA, EO, and LCRA and to determine whether Plaintiffs’ Compensation is outside the scope of the C&M Retainer, and that consequently, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have any obligations or rights under the JPA with respect to the Davés’ Compensation. 124. The LCRA, the CSA, the Executive Order, 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f), and the federal public

policies and intent and interests of the U.S. government underlying these treaties and statutes to give “fair compensation” to Plaintiffs clearly provide that Plaintiffs’ Compensation falls outside the scope of the C&M Retainer, and Defendants have no rights to Plaintiffs’ Compensation under the C&M Retainer. 125. The C&M Retainer’s provision for a contingency fee of “twenty-five percent (25%)

of the amount recovered by settlement” is in direct conflict with the governing law of the federal Commission, 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f), which provides that “*n+o remuneration on account of services rendered on behalf of any claimant in connection with any claim filed with the Commission under this subchapter shall exceed 10 per centum of the total amount paid pursuant to any award certified under the provisions of this subchapter on account of such claim. Any agreement to the contrary shall be unlawful and void.” 126. Accordingly, because C&M seek remuneration of 25% under the retainer

agreements, the C&M Retainer is unenforceable as it conflicts with federal law, and violates 22 U.S.C. § 1623(f). Defendant C&M has no rights to collect under the C&M 24
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Retainer and Plaintiffs have no obligations in light of the conflicting federal law embodied in the LCRA , the CSA, and the Executive Order. B. 127. The C&M Retainer Agreement is Unenforceable for Lack of Consideration

Pursuant to the C&M Retainer agreement, which incorporates the JPA and governs

distribution of recovery in accordance with the terms of the JPA, Plaintiffs are obligated to share their settlement fund recovery monies with the other Parties to the JPA—including the non-nationals—in consideration for a share in the monies recovered by the other Parties. 128. The consideration for Plaintiffs’ obligation under the retainer agreement has wholly

failed in light of the total lack of any recovery obtained by C&M on behalf of the nonnational Parties to the JPA. 129. This lack of consideration occurred through the fault of C&M who, at the time of

execution of the retainer agreement, lacked any intent to pursue the non-nationals’ claims in any jurisdiction outside of the U.S. 130. This lack of consideration also occurred through the fault of the LG who, at the time

of execution of the retainer agreement, had knowledge of C&M’s lack of intent to pursue the non-nationals’ claims in any jurisdiction outside the U.S. 131. Due to this lack of consideration through the fault of Defendants, Plaintiffs seek a

declaration from this Court that rescission of the C&M Retainer is appropriate. C. 132. The Retainer Agreement is Invalid on Grounds of Fraudulent Inducement

The consent of Plaintiffs to the retainer agreement was obtained by fraudulent

representations by C&M that C&M would pursue the claims of non-nationals in jurisdictions outside the U.S. in an effort to maximize recovery for all Parties to the JPA. 133. The consent of Plaintiffs to the retainer agreement was also obtained by fraudulent

representations by the LG that, inter alia, non-U.S. victims had equal or better chances of recovery against Libya or its agents, and by failing to disclose that should there be any settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. would only be able to represent and satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals. 25
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134.

Due to this fraudulently obtained consent, the C&M Retainer is unenforceable by

Defendants. D. 135. The C&M Retainer Agreement is Invalid Ab Initio and Unenforceable

The C&M Retainer is an unenforceable agreement because it directly conflicts with

the CSA, LCRA, and EO 136. The C&M Retainer is also void ab initio due to the lack of any consideration for

Plaintiffs at the time of execution. 137. The C&M Retainer is void ab initio because the Plaintiffs’ consent was procured by

fraudulent statements and omissions on the part of Defendants, namely that there were no conflicts of interest between the clients of C&M being represented by them in the civil action brought for victims of the Pan Am Hijacking, which Defendants knew or should have known was false. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION Declaration of Unenforceability of the Arbitration Agreement 138. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-137 as

if set forth fully herein. 139. The arbitration clause contained in the JPA is inapplicable to disputes surrounding

the Plaintiffs’ Compensation because Plaintiffs’ Compensation did not arise out of the relationship between C&M and the Plaintiffs, as defined in the JPA and C&M retainer, but from the bi-lateral political and diplomatic relations between the U.S. government and Libya as evidenced by the CSA, EO, and LCRA. 140. Plaintiffs did not consent or agree to the purported arbitration clause in the JPA as it

was a contract of adhesion, which was forced upon Plaintiffs under fraudulent pretenses in its inception with no meaningful opportunity to negotiate. The purported arbitration clause is unconscionable because it was drafted at the direction of C&M—the party with superior bargaining strength—and relegated to Plaintiffs on a “take it or leave it” basis with only the opportunity to adhere to the arbitration agreement or reject it.

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141.

The purported arbitration agreement was intended to hide and place beyond

judicial review Defendants’ fraud and intent to make demands upon Plaintiffs’ Compensation which was not contemplated in the JPA, thereby falling outside the Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations and causing surprise. 142. The purported arbitration agreement was procured by Defendants knowing that

the costs of arbitration to Plaintiffs having to travel out-of state and to pay a three-judge panel would be prohibitive of any meaningful dispute resolution 143. Defendants provided no meaningful notice of the rules of arbitration to Plaintiffs at

the time of the purported arbitration agreement. 144. The arbitration clause is illegal as a matter of law because it is contrary to a public

policy that provides Plaintiffs with compensation pursuant to a U.S. government foreign policy. 145. The JPA is illegal and conflicts with public policy embodied in the federal scheme

to compensate Plaintiffs and conflicts with the LCRA, which limits attorney’s compensation and declares any agreement to the contrary unlawful and void 146. The JPA and C&M Retainer and arbitration clause contained therein are void ab

initio because of fraudulent and deceptive statements made at the inception of the agreement, including statements to Plaintiffs that recovery chances are better for non-U.S. nationals, thereby inducing Plaintiffs to enter an agreement which in actuality would reduce their chances of recovery. 147. The purported arbitration agreement lacked consideration in that at the inception of

the JPA arbitration clause, Defendants attempted to elicit a promise to arbitrate without providing consideration in that the Defendants had no intention of performing under the JPA, in that they knew or should have known that political remedies would foreclose judicial remedies, and also they intended to use the arbitration agreement as a means of concealing their fraud. 148. Further, the arbitration agreement is invalid for being contrary to the policy of the

law pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §1668 because its object was to perpetuate the fraud C&M 27
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committed by requiring Plaintiffs to enter into an arbitration agreement knowing at the time of execution that Plaintiffs did not understand that the arbitration would be costprohibitive for them to dispute Defendants’ actions which are in direct conflict with known and anticipated federal interests in compensating Plaintiffs to the exclusion of nonnationals, and which were not disclosed to Plaintiffs at the time of execution of the arbitration agreement. 149. To avoid serious harm to Plaintiffs caused by the unconscionable and illegal

arbitration clause in an illegal contract attempting to be enforced by Defendants, Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this Court that the purported arbitration clause in the JPA is inapplicable to the dispute related to the Davés’ Compensation and unenforceable as unconscionable, fraudulent at its inception, and illegal as against public policy and as part of a contract that is void ab initio. FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION Declaration of Breach of Fiduciary Duty Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 1060 (against C&M and LG) 150. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-149 as

if set forth fully herein. 151. An actual controversy exists within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 1060 in

that Plaintiff Gargi Davé has received a demand from Defendants to forfeit her rightful compensation, a demand which rests upon unenforceable rights because they are based on tortious breaches of fiduciary duties toward Plaintiffs. 152. Defendants solicited and pursued an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiffs in

order to form a joint representation of U.S. victims and non-U.S. victims of the Pan Am Hijacking without fully disclosing the existence and nature of the inherent conflict between the different classes of victims—namely, that the classes of victims had vastly differing prospects for recovery which C&M knew or should have known were far greater for Plaintiffs than non-U.S. victims based upon U.S. law, international law, and the law of foreign relations incorporated into U.S. law. 28
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153.

C&M and LG pursued and solicited joint representation without making full

disclosure of the possible adverse consequences of the representation—namely, that the U.S. victims would be forced to forfeit settlement fund awards with the non-U.S. plaintiffs, who added nothing to the overall recovery, and whose claims under U.S. law were far less likely to be successful. Defendants’ failure to obtain from Plaintiffs informed consent of such conflicts after full disclosure and their failure to even disclose any of these conflicts constitute a violation of fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs as attorneys and as representatives in legal actions, including a violation of D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.0(e) and 1.7 under both of which C&M is bound. 154. Defendants knew or should have known that the possibility of recovery from Libya

under FSIA actions would likely be due to state-to-state political settlement by the Executive and Legislative Branches, not a judicial remedy which Defendants represented they would pursue on behalf of Plaintiffs; and that indeed, the U.S. government and Libya were engaged in diplomacy for settling Plaintiffs’ terrorism related claims, thereby making it likely that Plaintiffs would not be successful in any lawsuit. Despite this knowledge, C&M did not include this fact in any of its agreements with Plaintiffs, in either the JPA and/or the C&M retainer, because they intended to mislead Plaintiffs and benefit their own interests at the expense of Plaintiffs’ interests. 155. Whether the CSA, LCRA, and EO provide rights and entitlement for Plaintiffs to

their Compensation pursuant to claims espoused by the U.S. government, created serious actual conflicts of interest between the Plaintiffs and the non-U.S. national clients of C&M, which C&M and the LG failed to disclose to Plaintiffs. 156. Without a declaration by this Court regarding the breach of fiduciary duties,

Plaintiffs stand to suffer imminent and serious harm, economically, emotionally, and mentally if they are forced to forfeit and/or share their rightful Compensation with nonU.S. victims, without any consideration from those victims, without notice, and in violation of federal law and international treaty.

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157.

Defendants’ conduct would be the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ harm because, had

Plaintiffs received full disclosure, they would not have signed the JPA or the retainer agreement and their obligations under the JPA would not be an issue creating substantial harm to Plaintiffs. 158. Further, Defendants failed to fully disclose the actual conflict of interest when it

arose in August 2008, upon execution of the U.S.-Libya treaty, and therefore should not benefit from such wrongful conduct. Defendants did not inform Plaintiffs that the treaty provided for recovery only for U.S. nationals. Neither did C&M disclose its own conflict with respect to attorneys’ fees, given that the treaty capped such fees at 10%. Failure to make the required full disclosure with respect to these issues and obtain Plaintiffs’ informed consent thereto constitutes breach of C&M’s ethical duties and the fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs as representatives in a civil lawsuit. 159. Further, Defendant C&M’s attempt in the C&M Retainer agreement to obtain

Plaintiffs’ waiver of any potential conflicts regarding C&M’s joint representation of Plaintiffs and the other Pan Am 73 incident victims and families violates the D.C. rules of professional conduct, and should not be interpreted to immunize Defendant from liability. 160. Under the terms of the JPA, which governed C&M’s legal representation of the Pam

Am Flight 73 victims, C&M represented that it would file lawsuits “under any applicable state/federal law . . . in any country or legal system or other available forum . . . to proceed in the most cost-effective manner to maximize any potential recovery for all Plaintiffs.” 161. C&M and the LG failed to file lawsuits anywhere other than in the U.S. and thus

failed to seek the lawful objections of Plaintiffs through reasonably available means permitted by the law as required by D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3. 162. By failing to seek recoveries abroad that would contribute to the overall JPA

recovery amount, C&M prejudiced and damaged Plaintiffs, who are now expected to share their settlement fund awards despite receiving nothing in compensation from the non-U.S. plaintiffs.

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163.

Therefore, because Defendants are attempting to enforce and bully Plaintiffs’ into

complying with agreements procured through Defendants’ breaches of fiduciary duties, agreements which would cause serious harm to Plaintiffs, who were owed duties by the Defendants, Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that Defendants’ actions constituted breaches of their fiduciary duties toward Plaintiffs in order to prevent Defendants from profiting from their wrongful conduct and to prevent imminent harm. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Fraudulent Misrepresentation (against Defendants Crowell & Moring and Liaison Group) 164. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-163 as

if set forth fully herein. 165. An actual controversy exists within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 1060 in

that Plaintiff Gargi Davé has received a demand from Defendants to forfeit her rightful compensation, compensation against which Defendants’ assert unenforceable rights based on intentional, tortious, and fraudulent misrepresentations toward Plaintiffs. 166. Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiffs in the course of

unlawfully soliciting their representation for the purpose of benefitting themselves at the expense of Plaintiffs. Specifically, C&M made false representations that the non-U.S. victims had similar prospects for recovery as the U.S. victims. Under the terms of the JPA, which governed C&M’s legal representation of the Pam Am Flight 73 victims, C&M further represented that it would file lawsuits “under any applicable state/federal law . . . in any country or legal system or other available forum . . . to proceed in the most costeffective manner to maximize any potential recovery for all Plaintiffs.” Further, the LG falsely represented to Plaintiffs that U.S. citizens have equal or lower chances of recovery from Libya, which was false and misleading, and upon which Defendants intended Plaintiffs to rely to their detriment. 167. Defendants’ representations and omissions were false, deceptive and misleading

and intended to harm Plaintiffs for the benefit of themselves. 31
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168.

Further, C&M and the LG failed to disclose to Plaintiffs that Libya was already

intending to compensate the U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing; that the vast majority of victims of the Pan Am Hijacking were non-U.S. nationals; that four of the five individuals who had voluntarily formed the LG were non-U.S. nationals; that nationality would play a pivotal role in a Pan Am Hijacking victim’s chance of recovery against Libya or its agents; that the chances of a non-U.S. national recovering from a U.S.-negotiated settlement were virtually nil; that should there be any settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. would only be able to satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals; that the U.S. Congress had been considering bills to compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism; or that there was a strong U.S. governmental interest in compensating U.S. victims of terrorism. These material omissions constitute intentional misrepresentations by Defendants. 169. When Defendants made the material omissions and misrepresentation concerning

prospects for recovery for U.S. nationals versus non-U.S. nationals, C&M knew or should have known that the different classes of victims had dissimilar prospects for recovery. In light of Congress’ past settlement of claims, for example with Iran related to the hostage crisis on behalf of U.S. victims only, Libya’s 2002 initiative to compensate only U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing in order to normalize its relations with the U.S., the complete lack of congressional precedent for compensating non-U.S. victims of international terrorism, and C&M’s long, advertised experience with and stated expertise in the field of representing victims of international terrorism, C&M knew that the U.S. victims had a much greater chance of recovery than the non-U.S. victims. 170. When C&M made the misrepresentation concerning its intent to file lawsuits in

foreign countries on behalf of the non-U.S. nationals, Defendants had no intention of doing so, as evidenced by the fact that four years have passed since the JPA and retainer agreement were executed, yet C&M has not filed a foreign suit, and in response to such an inquiry by Plaintiffs, C&M stated it has no intention of filing a suit in a foreign jurisdiction.

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171.

C&M intended that Plaintiffs rely on the false representations in deciding to join the

JPA, as any overall recovery—and therefore C&M’s contingency fee—was likely to be much higher if U.S. victims were included in the JPA. 172. JPA. 173. Plaintiffs were harmed as a proximate result of joining the JPA to the extent that Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on C&M’s representation in joining the

they should not be required by Defendants expected to share their settlement fund awards with the non-U.S. victims, without any consideration whatsoever and in violation of international treaty and federal law. 174. Plaintiffs’ reliance on C&M’s representations would cause Plaintiffs’ substantial

harm if the JPA and C&M Retainer are enforced in that Plaintiffs would not have signed the JPA had C&M not made the representations. 175. If forced to proceed under the terms of the JPA, Plaintiffs will be robbed of

approximately ninety percent (90%) of their rightful Compensation under federal treaty and Executive Order, given the JPA’s requirement that Plaintiffs both share their settlement award recovery with non-U.S. plaintiffs and pay an excessive rate of 25% in attorneys’ fees to C&M. 176. Further, Plaintiffs have been harmed, and without judicial remedy, they will

continue to suffer more harm by the LG’s fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiffs in the course of soliciting their participation in the JPA. The individuals comprising the LG purported to serve as representatives of the victims of the Pan Am Hijacking and were to act both as managing agents for the victims and as the entity authorized to act as liaison with litigation counsel. The LG had authority to act on behalf of all of the Pan Am Hijacking victims and was responsible for helping to manage and oversee the direction of the case. As such, the LG had a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs not to make material omissions of fact that constitute misrepresentations. 177. The LG failed to disclose to Plaintiffs several material facts, including the following:

that Libya was already planning to compensate the U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing; 33
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that the vast majority of individuals who had undergone the Pan Am Hijacking were nonU.S. nationals; that four of the five individuals who had voluntarily formed the LG were non-U.S. nationals; that nationality would play a pivotal role in a Pan Am Hijacking victim’s chance of recovery against Libya or its agents; that the chances of a non-U.S. national recovering from a U.S.-negotiated settlement were virtually nil; that should there be any settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. would only be able to satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals; that the U.S. Congress had been considering bills to compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism; or that there was a strong U.S. governmental interest in compensating U.S. victims of terrorism. 178. 179. The LG’s material omissions constituted intentional misrepresentations. When the LG made the misrepresentations described above, the LG had no

reasonable grounds for believing that the different classes of victims had similar prospects for recovery. In light of the U.S. government’s past settlement of claims, for example with Iran for the hostage crisis, on behalf of U.S. victims only, Libya’s 2002 initiative to compensate U.S. victims of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing in order to normalize its relations with the U.S., and the complete lack of Congressional precedent for the U.S. compensating non-U.S. victims of international terrorism, the LG should reasonably have foreseen that the U.S. victims had a much greater chance of recovery than the non-U.S. victims. 180. The LG intended that Plaintiffs rely on the material omissions and

misrepresentations in deciding to join the JPA, as overall recovery—and therefore the recoveries of the individual members of the LG—was likely to be much higher if U.S. victims were included in the JPA. 181. JPA. 182. Plaintiffs were harmed when they joined the JPA to the extent that they would be Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on the LG’s representation in joining the

expected to share their Compensation awards under the CSA, EO, and LCRA with the

34
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non-U.S. victims, without any consideration and in violation of international treaty and federal law. 183. Plaintiffs’ reliance on the LG’s misrepresentations was a substantial factor in

causing Plaintiffs’ harm because Plaintiffs would not have signed the JPA had the LG not made the material omissions. 184. If forced to proceed under the terms of the JPA, Plaintiffs will be robbed of a

substantial part of their recovery, given the JPA’s requirement that Plaintiffs share their settlement award recovery with non-U.S. plaintiffs and pay an excessive rate of 25% in attorneys’ fees to C&M. 185. Accordingly, to prevent Defendants from capitalizing upon their actions and

causing serious harm to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants made fraudulent representations upon which Plaintiffs relied to their detriment. FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION Negligent Misrepresentation (against Defendants C&M and the LG) 186. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-185 as

if set forth fully herein. 187. An actual controversy exists within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code Proc. § 1060 in

that Plaintiff Gargi Davé has received a demand from Defendants to forfeit her rightful compensation to which Defendants’ assert unenforceable rights based on tortious, negligent, and fraudulent misrepresentations toward Plaintiffs. 188. Defendants made fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiffs in the course of

unlawfully soliciting their representation for the purpose of benefiting themselves at the expense of Plaintiffs. Specifically, C&M made false representations that the non-U.S. victims had similar prospects for recovery as the U.S. victims, and that Plaintiffs would be benefitted by the JPA. Under the terms of the JPA, which governed C&M’s legal representation of the Pam Am Flight 73 victims, C&M further represented that it would file lawsuits “under any applicable state/federal law . . . in any country or legal system or 35
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other available forum . . . to proceed in the most cost-effective manner to maximize any potential recovery for all Plaintiffs.” Further, the LG falsely represented to Plaintiffs that U.S. citizen have equal or worse chances of recovery from Libya, which was false and misleading. 189. Defendants’ representations and omissions were false, deceptive, and misleading

and Defendants knew or should have known they had no reasonable basis in law or fact. 190. Further, C&M failed to disclose to Plaintiffs that Libya was already planning to

compensate the U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing; that the vast majority of victims of the Pan Am Hijacking were non-U.S. nationals; that four of the five individuals who had voluntarily formed the LG were non-U.S. nationals; that nationality would play a pivotal role in a Pan Am Hijacking victim’s chance of recovery against Libya or its agents; that the chances of a non-U.S. national recovering from a U.S.-negotiated settlement were virtually nil; that should there be any settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. would only be able to satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals; that the U.S. Congress had been considering bills to compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism; or that there was a strong U.S. governmental interest in compensating U.S. victims of terrorism. These material omissions constitute misrepresentations by Defendant C&M which Defendant knew or should have known had no reasonable basis in law or fact. 191. When Defendants made the material omissions and misrepresentation concerning

prospects for recovery for U.S. nationals versus non-U.S. nationals, C&M had no reasonable grounds for believing that the different classes of victims had similar prospects for recovery. In light of Congress’ past settlement of claims on behalf of U.S. victims only, Libya’s 2002 initiative to compensate only U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing in order to normalize its relations with the United States, the complete lack of Congressional precedent for compensating non-U.S. victims of international terrorism, and C&M’s long, advertised experience with and stated expertise in the field of representing victims of international terrorism, C&M should reasonably have foreseen that the U.S. victims had a much greater chance of recovery than the non-U.S. victims. 36
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192.

When C&M made the misrepresentation concerning its intent to file lawsuits in

foreign countries on behalf of the non-U.S. nationals, C&M had no intention of doing so, as evidenced by the fact that over 4 years after the JPA and retainer agreement was executed, C&M still has not filed a foreign suit and has indicated that they have no intention of doing so in the future. 193. C&M intended that Plaintiffs rely on the false representations in deciding to join the

JPA, as any overall recovery—and therefore C&M’s contingency fee—was likely to be much higher if U.S. victims were included in the JPA. 194. JPA. 195. Plaintiffs were harmed as a proximate result of joining the JPA to the extent that Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on C&M’s representation in joining the

they should not be required by Defendants to share their settlement fund awards with the non-U.S. victims, without any consideration whatsoever, and in violation of international treaty and federal law. 196. Plaintiffs’ reliance on C&M’s representations would cause Plaintiffs’ substantial

harm if the JPA and C&M Retainer are enforced in that Plaintiffs would not have signed the JPA had C&M not made the representations. 197. If forced to proceed under the terms of the JPA, Plaintiffs will be robbed of

approximately ninety percent (90%) of their rightful Compensation granted through federal treaty and Executive Order, given the JPA’s requirement that Plaintiffs both share their settlement award recovery with non-U.S. plaintiffs and pay an excessive rate of 25% in attorneys’ fees to C&M. 198. Further, Plaintiffs have been harmed, and without judicial remedy, they will

continue to suffer more harm by the LG’s fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiffs in the course of soliciting their participation in the JPA. The individuals comprising the LG purported to serve as representatives of the victims of the Pan Am Hijacking and were to act both as managing agents for the victims and as the entity authorized to act as liaison with litigation counsel. The LG had authority to act on behalf of all of the Pan Am 37
COMPLAINT

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Hijacking victims and was responsible for helping to manage and oversee the direction of the case. As such, the LG had a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs not to make material omissions of fact that constitute misrepresentations. 199. In violation of its fiduciary duty, the LG failed to disclose to Plaintiffs several

material facts, including the following: that Libya was already planning to compensate the U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing; that the vast majority of individuals who had undergone the Pan Am Hijacking were non-U.S. nationals; that four of the five individuals who had voluntarily formed the LG were non-U.S. nationals; that nationality would play a pivotal role in a Pan Am Hijacking victim’s chance of recovery against Libya or its agents; that the chances of a non-U.S. national recovering from a U.S.-negotiated settlement were virtually nil; that should there be any settlement agreement between Libya and the U.S., the U.S. would only be able to satisfy the claims of the U.S. nationals; that the U.S. Congress had been considering bills to compensate U.S. victims of international terrorism; or that there was a strong U.S. governmental interest in compensating U.S. victims of terrorism. 200. 201. The LG’s material omissions constituted misrepresentations. When the LG made the misrepresentations described above, the LG had no

reasonable grounds for believing that the different classes of victims had similar prospects for recovery. In light of the U.S. government’s past settlement of claims on behalf of U.S. victims only, Libya’s 2002 initiative to compensate U.S. victims of the Lockerbie bombing in order to normalize its relations with the U.S., and the complete lack of Congressional precedent for the U.S.’ compensating non-U.S. victims of international terrorism, the LG should reasonably have foreseen that the U.S. victims had a much greater chance of recovery than the non-U.S. victims. 202. The LG intended that Plaintiffs rely on the material omissions and

misrepresentations in deciding to join the JPA, as overall recovery—and therefore, the recoveries of the individual members of the LG—was likely to be much higher if U.S. victims were included in the JPA. 38
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

203. JPA. 204.

Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on the LG’s representation in joining the

Plaintiffs were harmed when they joined the JPA to the extent that they would be

expected to share their Compensation awards under the CSA, EO, and LCRA with the non-U.S. victims, without any consideration and in violation of international treaty and federal law. 205. Plaintiffs’ reliance on the LG’s misrepresentations was a substantial factor in

causing Plaintiffs’ harm, because Plaintiffs would not have signed the JPA had the LG not made the material omissions. 206. If forced to proceed under the terms of the JPA, Plaintiffs will be robbed of a

substantial part of their recovery, given the JPA’s requirement that Plaintiffs share their settlement award recovery with non-U.S. plaintiffs and pay an excessive rate of 25% in attorneys’ fees to C&M. 207. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants made negligent

misrepresentations upon which Plaintiffs relied to their detriment in order to prevent Defendants from capitalizing upon their actions and causing serious harm to Plaintiffs. SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION Breach of Contract (against C&M) 208. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-207 as

if set forth fully herein. 209. Under the terms of the JPA, the parties hired C&M to, inter alia: (a) “pursue their

common interests against the Defendants under any applicable state and/or federal law, in any court having jurisdiction, in any country or legal system or other available forum and that to pursue those common interests they desire to proceed in the most efficient, cost effective manner to maximize any potential recovery for all the Plaintiffs”; (b) “coordinate and oversee all collection matters and satisfaction of any judgments against potential Defendants in this case both under U.S. law and/or the law of foreign states as well as international law”; (c) 39
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“interact with international organizations and foreign governments and courts, as well as any contacts . . . in connection with other international avenues available for collection of a judgment”; and (d) coordinate “media and any other legal, political or administrative bodies outside of Washington or outside of the U.S..” 210. 211. To date, Plaintiffs have performed their obligations under the JPA. Defendants C&M and the LG have breached the terms of the JPA by failing to

protect the interests of Plaintiffs, and failing to pursue the Parties’ common interests against the Libyan defendants in any foreign country, legal system, or other available forum outside of the U.S. in which non-U.S. nationals possess rights to recovery. 212. As a result of Defendants’ breach, Plaintiffs have been damaged to the extent that

the potential recovery of the Parties to the JPA has not been maximized, and to the extent that Plaintiffs are now expected to share their settlement fund monies with the other Parties to the JPA without receiving the benefits of any recovery from pursuit by C&M of the Parties’ common interests in foreign forums. 213. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants’ have breached their promises made

under the JPA and C&M Retainer with Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs have no obligations under said agreements. SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION Intentional Interference with Contract (against C&M) 214. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-213

as if set forth fully herein. 215. Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiffs possess valid rights and

entitlements under the CSA, EO, and/or LCRA to their Compensation. Nevertheless Defendants intentionally directed their demands toward Plaintiffs after the passage of the CSA, EO, and LCRA to induce a breach of the relationship created by the CSA, EO, and LCRA.

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216.

Defendants’ actions have resulted in an actual breach or disruption of the legal

relationships created by the CSA, EO, and LCRA granting “fair compensation” to Plaintiffs, because the actions of Defendants threaten Plaintiffs and interfere with their enjoyment of their rights to the Compensation created by the CSA, EO, and/or LCRA. 217. 218. Defendants’ conduct is not legally justified or privileged. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek a declaration of rights under the CSA, EO, and the

LCRA to their fair Compensation, to the exclusion of non-U.S. nationals in order to prevent Defendants’ future interference with Plaintiffs’ known expectations to benefit from their relationship with the U.S.’ compensation scheme. EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantages (against C&M) 219. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference each allegation in paragraphs 1-218

as if set forth fully herein. 220. The CSA, EO, and LCRA create an economic relationship between the Plaintiffs

and the U.S. and Libya, from which the Plaintiffs’ rights and entitlements to “fair compensation” under those agreements originate. 221. The Defendants knew or should have known of the relationship created by the

CSA, EO, and LCRA that were for the benefit of individuals such as Plaintiffs. 222. Nevertheless, the Defendants intentionally demanded and manifested intent that

Plaintiffs forfeit those rights pursuant to unenforceable agreements, the JPA, and C&M Retainer. 223. As a result, Defendants have disrupted the relationship created in part for Plaintiffs’

benefit, and caused the resulting economic harm to Plaintiffs. 224. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek a declaration of rights under the CSA, EO, and the

LCRA to their fair Compensation, to the exclusion of non-U.S. nationals in order to prevent Defendants’ future interference with Plaintiffs’ known expectations to benefit from their relationship with the U.S.’ compensation scheme. 41
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Date: January 4, 2010 9. 10. 8. 4. 5. 6. 7. 3.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore, Giatri Davé and Gargi Davé pray judgment against C&M and the LG as follows: 1. 2. For a declaration that the JPA is unenforceable in its entirety against Plaintiffs; For a declaration that the C&M Retainer and fee agreement is unenforceable against Plaintiffs; For a declaration that the arbitration agreement as stated in the JPA is unenforceable against Plaintiffs; For a declaration that Defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs; For a declaration that Defendants made false and fraudulent representations. For a declaration that Defendants made negligent misrepresentations to Plaintiffs; For a declaration that C&M has breached the JPA, and interfered with Plaintiffs’ economic and contractual rights under the CSA; and For compensatory and punitive damages and all other forms of relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled for the harm done them as a result of Defendants’ tortious actions; For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and appropriate. For attorneys’ fees and costs. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff demands jury trial of all issues raised by this Complaint which are subject to trial by jury.

Kathryn Lee Boyd, Esq. By: ___________________________________________ Kathryn Lee Boyd (SBN 189496) Attorney for Plaintiffs Giatri Davé and Gargi Davé

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 43
COMPLAINT

VERIFICATION I, Gargi Davé, am a plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing Complaint and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true.

declaration was executed in Pasadena, California.

DATED: _________________

___________________________________ GARGI DAVÉ

1 2

VERIFICATION I, Giatri Davé, am a plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing

3 Complaint, and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own knowledge, except 4 as to those matters which are therein alleged on information and belief, and as to those 5 matters, I believe it to be true. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 44
COMPLAINT

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed in Pasadena, California.

DATED: _________________

___________________________________ GIATRI DAVÉ


				
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