The Animal Health Surveillance System and Avian Influenza in by elfphabet9

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									       The Animal Health Surveillance
    System and Avian Influenza in Nigeria
              September 2008




              Brian Brandenburg, DVM, MSc
                Animal Health Consultant

   International Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi




Early Detection, Reporting and Surveillance – Avian Influenza in
                             Africa
                        (EDRS Project)
Table of Contents
Table of Contents                                                                             2

Acronyms                                                                                      4


I.     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                                                                      5


II.    INTRODUCTION                                                                           8

Terms of reference                                                                            8


III.    THE POULTRY SUB-SECTOR IN NIGERIA                                                     9

Pre-outbreak status                                                                           9


IV.    NIGERIAN VETERINARY SERVICES AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE 15
4.1    The Nigerian veterinary services infrastructure                                       15

4.2    Veterinary manpower resources in the public and private sector                        15

4.3    Veterinary education and training                                                     19

4.4    The animal health surveillance infrastructure                                         20

4.5    Evolving database systems used in animal health surveillance and disease reporting.   20

4.6    Animal health surveillance infrastructure and reporting                               22


V. AVIAN INFLUENZA IN NIGERIA                                                                25

5.1    The Outbreaks                                                                         25

5.2    H5N1 virus characterization                                                           27

5.3    Poultry sector biosecurity                                                            28

5.4    Risk assessment against Avian Influenza                                               29


VI.    HPAI-SPECIFIC SURVEILLANCE IN NIGERIA AND UNDERSTANDING
       OF RISKS                                               32

6.1    The HPAI Incident Command and Control system                                          32

6.2    Nigerian surveillance infrastructure                                                  33

6.3    Disease reporting flows                                                               35
6.4     Risk assessment in the disease surveillance infrastructure   37

6.5     HPAI outbreak control measures                               38

6.6     Veterinary quarantine services                               39

6.7     Regulatory framework                                         40


VII.    GIS AND RISK MAPPING CAPACITY                                41

7.1     GIS mapping capacity                                         41

7.2     GIS risk analysis                                            41


VIII.   HPAI PROJECTS IN NIGERIA AND CAPACITY BUILDING GAPS          42

8.1     Donor community support                                      42

8.2     Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)                      43

8.3     United States Agency for International Development (USAID)   43

8.4     The World Bank-funded Avian Influenza Project                44

8.5     Capacity building by the Nigerian Veterinary Services        44

8.6     Gaps in capacity building                                    46

8.7     Priority needs in capacity building in surveillance          46


IX.     TOP FIVE SURVEILLANCE CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS TO BE MET
        THROUGH SHORT-TERM TRAINING                            47

9.1     Priority needs in capacity building                          47


X. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EDRS-AIA PROJECT                          49

10.1    Recommendations                                              49
          Acronyms
AICP      Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Preparedness Project               ILRI     International Livestock Research Institute
APHIS     Animal Production and Health Information system (USDA)                  LBM      Live Bird Market
APIP&CC   Avian and Pandemic Influenza Prevention and Control Centre              LGA      Local Government Area (lowest administrative level)
ARIS      Animal Research Information system                                      LGVO     Local Government Veterinary Officer
ASF       African Swine Fever                                                     MT       Master Trainer
AU-IBAR   African Union - International Bureau for Animal Research                NADIS    National Animal Diseases Information system (operated in Nigeria)
AVO       Area Veterinary Officer (State level)                                   NAFDAC   National Agency for Food, Drugs Administration and Control
                                                                                  NCD      Newcastle disease
CAHW      Community Animal Health Workers (paravets)                              NVMA     Nigeria Veterinary Medical Association
CBPP      Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia                                       NVRI     Nigeria Veterinary Research Institute
CVSN      College of Veterinary Surgeons of Nigeria                               OFFLU    Organization of Avian Influenza Reference Laboratories
DSA       Daily Subsistance Allowance                                             OIE      World Organization for Animal Health
ECOWAS    Economic Organization of West African States                            PACE     Pan African Program for the Control of Epizootics
ECTAD     Emergency Center for Transboundary Diseases                             PAN      Poultry Association of Nigeria
FAO       Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations                 PDSR     Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response
FCT       Federal Central Territory (Abuja)                                       PMU      Project Management Unit
FDL&PCS   Federal Department of Livestock and Pest Control Services               PPE      Personal Protection Equipment
FMD       Foot and Mouth Disease                                                  RAHC     Regional Animal Health Centre
FSA       Fowl Sellers Association                                                SA       Surveillance Agent (LGA level)
GIS       Global Information system                                               SDVS     State Director of Veterinary Services
HACCP                                                                             SOP      Standard Operating Procedure
HPAI      Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza                                       TAD      Transboundary Animal Disease
ICB       Internatioal Competitive Bidding                                        USAID    United States Agency for Internationaql Development
ICCS      Incident Command and Control System                                     VCN      Veterinary Council of Nigeria
INAP      Integrated National Action Plan (agaist avian influenza)                VTH      Veterinary Teaching Hospital
IITA      International Institute for Tropical Agriculture                        WAHIS    World animal Health Information System (operated by OIE)
IDA       International Development Association (World Bank soft loan facility)   ZVO      Zonal Veterinary Officer (Federal level)
I.                     Executive Summary
Introduction
The outbreaks of avian influenza that began in 2006 have severely stressed the under-funded Ni-
gerian Veterinary Services (VS system), further hampered by a largely undefined profile of the
poultry sub-sector, the lack of risk-based GIS mapping and epidemiological risk analysis from
which to develop control strategies, a largely, often uncooperative private veterinary and the lack
of an adequate regulatory framework and the enforcement thereof. Borders are porous and veteri-
nary quarantine is weak, as is poultry farm biosecurity, especially at the lower levels within semi-
commercial enterprises and backyards. The poultry value (marketing) chain is complex and
largely undefined. Although disease surveillance is in the process of shifting from a passive to an
active mode, large numbers of lower-level veterinary and para-veterinary workers remain poorly
trained to effectively carry out proactive surveillance. Live bird markets operations are largely
uncontrolled, without municipal regulations or adequate sites. Animal disease control rests at the
state level, with the Federal level providing facilitation, coordination and diagnostic capacity.

Disease databases: Disease surveillance is evolving from an entirely passive activity which be-
gan in the 1920s until the arrival of the Pan-African Program for the Control of Enzootics
(PACE). PACE was essentially an African passive surveillance support network, implemented
and technically managed by AU-IBAR, with ARIS – the animal health database and reporting
system implemented and owned by IBAR. PACE used the World Animal Health Information
System (WAHIS), the web based interactive information system used by OIE to enter and evalu-
ate livestock disease from disease reports submitted by member countries and WAHID (the
World Animal Health Information Database), the database in which disease surveillance and re-
porting is entered by OIE. WAHIS provides for the entry of four levels of reporting by participat-
ing countries:

     (i) emergency reports following initial disease outbreaks
     (ii) periodic follow up reports until the disease is under control
     (iii) biannual reports providing amalgamated disease information, and
     (iv) annual reports which amalgamate the biannual reports.

WAHIS provides GIS information of outbreak locations, as well as national inventories of geo-
positioned livestock establishments, markets abattoirs and control posts. The WAHID and PACE
database software is being used by the Nigerian Federal Veterinary Epidemiology Unit to config-
ure its own database platform, called the National Animal Disease Information System (NADIS),
on which an active Nigerian veterinary surveillance and disease reporting system will be based.

Surveillance against avian influenza: The surveillance flow is basically similar to that in place
for routine surveillance, with additional HPAI-dedicated teams or stations added. The surveil-
lance is active, beginning with disease reports from the field level to State Area Veterinary Offi-
cers, and from there to the State and Zonal Veterinary Officers (see Fig. 6.1). From there surveil-
lance reports reach the PACE/NADIS National Coordination Unit at the Federal level. Samples
are sent by the Zonal Veterinary Officer to NVRI for diagnosis, which reports the results back to
the PACE/NADIS National Coordination Unit, which in turn advises the State Veterinary Direc-
tor. The Federal level reports to OIE, FAO, AU-IBAR and other relevant organizations. Each
administrative level executes actions boxed on the right hand side of the diagram. Special Detec-
tion Teams (HPAI SDT) are sent by NVRI, to report cases or outbreaks and the NADIS Mobile
Team, mobilized by the HPAI National Coordinating Unit, represents the TAD-dedicated
(NADIS Team) and HPAI-dedicated (HPAI SDT) investigative units that respond to reports of
suspicious HPAI cases. These two teams could be amalgamated into one joint investigation team,
streamlining the surveillance activities. The amalgamated team could be supported to evolve from
one that responds to reports of suspicious HAPI cases into strategic teams that engage in proac-
tive and participatory disease search on a routine basis. Such teams, with members trained in par-
ticipatory epidemiology, could provide the mechanism to implement participatory disease surveil-
lance (PDS) activities that fit into, compliment and use the existing structures of the current
NADIS platform.

Risk assessment capacity against avian influenza is not present in Nigeria, but the most likely
risks identified to guard against, as outlined in the Integrated National Action Plan (INAP)
against avian influenza are migratory birds, trade routes and porous borders. During and after the
avian flu outbreaks, these risks were reassessed to include: absence of a poultry market value
chain study; a weak epidemiological capacity, weak border quarantine, poor poultry farm biose-
curity in sectors 3 and 4 (FAO classification), an incomplete profile of the poultry sub-sector, and
a problematic relationship between the public and private veterinary sectors.

GIS mapping: The HPAI/NADIS Federal Epidemiology Unit (FEU) under FVS, headed by the
Chief FEU and an epidemiology officer, are responsible for GIS mapping. The FEU uses the
WAHIS electronic mapping software to map, in randomized fashion, disease outbreak or occur-
rence locations. The Unit uses a GIS as part of the disease information provided to map disease
data only. These are included in official documents, such as surveillance guidelines and manuals,
and in presentations at workshops or national or international meetings. No risk mapping or risk
analysis is performed. Nevertheless, both FEU staff have been trained in the potential use of GIS
software to produce electronic surveillance maps.

Gaps in capacity building against HPAI: Six major capacity building gaps were identified:
Strengthening poultry farm and live bird market biosecurity. Active live bird market surveillance
for HPAI is presently undertaken by FAO with EU support and will be undertaken by FLS under
AICP. However, the training LBM stakeholders (poultry sellers, transporters, middlemen, poultry
suppliers) in improved biosecurity will only be partly supported under the AICP. Since LBMs are
the responsibility of municipal governments and State VS. Given the scarce manpower resources
at SDVS, the training in behavior of these stakeholders is in jeopardy. Since most poultry sellers
are organized they can receive training in groups. However, the training of other LBM stake-
holders will be a massive and difficult to organize endeavor.

Introduction of risk-targeted PDS: No training has taken place, nor is any scheduled under any
project. This is an important skills gap and needs to be filled urgently. These are:

    1. Capacity building in animal quarantine services: Training in quarantine will need an
       international (regional?) expert to provide a fresh view, for which the FVS will want to
       obtain grant funding. This is an urgently needed skills gap.
    2. Veterinary regulatory review and enforcement is a Federal and State matter and, for
       the urgently needed development of LBM SOPs, a Municipal responsibility. This activity
       will require substantial effort, not only in the upgrading of the existing regulatory frame-
       work, but also in its enforcement. This training has not been scheduled under any donor,
       or VS capacity building program, and will a regulatory statues review as well as training
       of veterinary officers.
    3. Analysis of the poultry marketing chain and marketing dynamics is an important as-
       pect of disease mapping, especially where risk assessment and trace back are concerned.
       An international agricultural economist, working with a counterpart national economist,
       could be supported to develop the poultry marketing chain analysis. Although this is a
       longer term activity to complete, training designated VS in the principles of such an
       analysis and developing a work plan with them, would be an important beginning.
    4. Definition of the poultry industry infrastructure, which goes hand in hand with the
       marketing chain analysis and relates to an updating of the national poultry inventory by
       species, location and production system according to FAO classification. Similar to the
       poultry marketing chain analysis, developing a survey framework this identifies risks
       would be a valuable contribution.

Priority needs in short term capacity building: The five most important priorities responsive
to short-term (3-4 months) training in surveillance activities are:

    1. Training GIS staff would enhance their ability to develop the GIS mapping activities
       and appreciate risk-based spatial spread models.
    2. Training a core of PDS practitioners drawn mostly from the public sector, in active
       surveillance. This activity would provide a valuable resource for downstream training in
       applied surveillance rooted in science-based epidemiological principles.
    3. Developing a framework to assist FVS staff in their future analysis of the poultry
       marketing chain as a contributor to risk-based surveillance and evidence-based risk
       analysis.
    4. Quarantine officer training in regulatory and enforcement activities, involving some
       150 officers from across the country. This significant surveillance capacity gap is in ur-
       gent need of being filled.
    5. Training of State Directors of Veterinary Services, heads of epidemiology units and
       veterinary public health workers in the data management aspects of active field sur-
       veillance programs, to strengthen the management skills of these decision makers in
       guiding active field surveillance programs linked to NADIS and by extension to AU-
       IBAR, OIE.

Recommendations: The following matters should be considered when undertaking short term
capacity building against HPAI:
        Firstly, harmonize the EDRS-AIA training program to the maximum extent possible with
        ongoing AICP training activities, so that capacity building activities on both sides are
        complimentary and mutually reinforcing.
        Secondly, be careful not to overstretch existing absorption capacity of VS staff with
        short-term training that needs to be completed quickly or in quick succession. Spread in-
        dividual training courses—each of the short-term nature indicated—over an agreed
        longer time span.
        Thirdly, be aware that a management cost will be incurred by the recipient VS to imple-
        ment the EDRS-AIA program, and that such a cost should be included into the training
        budget.
        Fourthly, sensitizing State Veterinary Officers might best be done in the form of one or
        more workshops, as these persons do not have the time to undertake continuous training
        over many days or weeks.
        Fifthly, engage with VS and agree on the purpose and goals of PDS and how these might
        best be accomplished within the existing NADIS surveillance framework.
        Sixthly, the bench training of GIS technicians could be done at IITA/ILRI Ibadan with
        inputs from ILRI Nairobi.
II.                     Introduction
This document covers the Nigerian segment of the project entitled Early Detection, Reporting
and Surveillance – Avian Influenza in Africa Project (EDRS-AIA). The existing surveillance sys-
tem in Nigeria is assessed through the review of existing documents and reports and consultation
with key stakeholders, such as government veterinary services, private sector, academic institu-
tions and poultry producers to determine the efficacy of surveillance for Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza (HPAI) in the context of the animal health surveillance system as a whole. The outcome
of the assessment is used to develop plans to address the most important priorities, especially
short-term training needs, to enhance the capacity of existing systems.


Terms of reference
Specifically, the report covers:

      1. A review of pertinent documents on national animal health surveillance in Nigeria, in-
         cluding the PVS reports HPAI national action plan, INAP and SPINAP application.
      2. A review the literature on HPAI surveillance, with reference to surveillance in Nigeria, as
         well as reports on HPAI surveillance in Nigeria produced by international and regional
         organizations such as FAO, OIE, IBAR and ECOWAS.
      3. In collaboration with the Nigeria Technical Coordinator, a detailed plan for the assess-
         ment is presented, to be reviewed and approved by the Project Lead.
      4. Meetings with the Nigeria Technical Coordinator, USAID HPAI Focal Point and national
         veterinary service counterparts, to present the assessment findings and discuss the as-
         sessment, and surveillance training needs in Nigeria.
      5. The preparation of a detailed report on the findings of the surveillance system assess-
         ment, with discussion of HPAI capacity and needs in Nigeria, and identifying the five
         most critical non-laboratory HPAI surveillance capacity needs that can be met through
         short-term trainings.

Outputs: A full report on the assessment following standard report format (title page, table of
contents, abbreviations, acknowledgements, executive summary, background, objectives of as-
sessment, methodology, results, discussion, conclusions, references, appendices, consultant daily
timetable). The report draft will be reviewed by the Nigeria Technical Coordinator, Project Lead
and other stakeholders, and revised according to feedback provided by the Project Lead. The re-
port will be considered final upon approval of the Project Lead.

Timeframe: This consultancy will take up to 26 days, including a maximum of (including
travel), inclusive of 21 days in country and 5 days of writing. The consultancy will start on 1 Au-
gust 2008, with fieldwork to be finalized no later than 26 August 2008. The first draft of the full
report will be submitted within 14 days of the completion of fieldwork (or no later than 9 Sep-
tember 2008).
III.             The Poultry Sub-sector in Nigeria
Pre-outbreak status
Between 1990 and 1992, Nigeria conducted a livestock resources census (sometimes referred to
as the RIM survey) which put the poultry population at 150 million; split into 98 million kept in
rural backyards composed of indigenous stock, 6 million in urban (semi-commercial) enterprises
comprising a mixture of indigenous and exotic breeds, and the remaining 46 million in commer-
cial poultry farms that reared exotic breeds (FDL&PCS 1992). Following this survey, Nigeria’s
poultry population could be said to have been distributed as follows; 65% in rural backyards, 4%
in semi-commercial enterprises, and 31% in commercial farms in 1992 compared to a standing
population of 150 million poultry (with 60% in backyards, 15% in semi-commercial enterprises
and 24% in commercial farms) reported in 2006 (FDL&PCS 2006). A comparison of both peri-
ods shows a poultry sub-sector that has undergone structural changes with an expansion of semi-
commercial farms and shrinking of commercial farms probably more adversely affected by
changes in government policies regarding the importation of maize, feed additives, grand parent
stock, and drugs and vaccines. The semi-commercial farms might have coped better because
production in that system is less dependent on intensive, external inputs. The apparent stagnation
of the overall poultry population as corroborated by FAO (2004) is accounted for by the decline
experienced by the commercial segment. In another communication 1 (Adene & Oguntade, 2006)
the total number of subsistence poultry is quoted to be 65.3 million compared to 90 million back-
yard poultry estimated by FDL&PCS 2006 (Table 1).

Another category of workers in the private sector are the Community-based Animal Health
Workers (CAHWs). They are few (mostly limited to about 30 persons trained by ILRI under the
Animal Health Priorities project) and are not organized. They make their income from small fees
charged the clients. Their presence and functions remain controversial with many persons in the
official VS system. However, it is clear from the discrepancies in population estimates and classi-
fications that an accurate standing poultry inventory remains elusive, and that there is an urgent
need to better define these parameters so as to construct a reliable baseline from which to develop
disease control strategies.

                                                                              Based on a standing popula-
Table 1.1- Standing Poultry Population by Species and Region                  tion of 150 million (the fig-
                                                                              ure adopted here), the poultry
                Chickens           Ducks         Guinea fowls Total poultry
                                                                              sector is 25% commercial (12
North East         17,593,679        4,309,104      3,014,417    24,917,201
North West         16,241,331        3,841,416      3,073,410    23,156,157
                                                                              vertical    integrators   and
North              28,285,612        5,053,166      1,231,232    34,570,010   breeder farms in Sector 1
South East         12,264,303          668,441         14,396    12,947,139   with some 37.5 million poul-
South West         28,504,202        2,688,512        450,888    31,643,603
                                                                              try in Sectors 1 and 2); 15 %
South South        18,515,281        3,215,923         63,096    21,794,300
Grand Total                                                                   semi-commercial (22.5 mil-
 Village         114,434,367        18,814,880      7,749,786   140,999,033   lion in Sector 3) and 60%
 Urban             6,970,041           961,678         97,654     8,029,373   backyard (90 million in Sec-
Total poultry    121,404,409        19,776,561      7,847,440   149,028,409
            2
                                                                              tor 4). Between 2000 and
 Density/km        125              20                8            154


1
 The Structure and Importance of the Commercial and Village Based Poultry Industry in Nigeria. Poultry
Production Systems. FAO: Rome Study, Adene and Oguntade, 2006.
2005 (latest recorded data) the standing poultry population increased from 113.2 million to 150.7
million, equivalent to a 5-year growth rate of 24.8%, or an average annual growth rate of 4.96%.
Most of this growth took place in the semi-commercial sector, stimulated by the rapidly increas-
ing urban population. With an annual 2006 Nigerian population growth rate of 2.4% (World De-
velopment Indicator, World Bank), poultry production has grown at twice the rate of human
population growth. Virtually all commercially raised poultry is consumed domestically (in addi-
tion to frozen chicken imports), mostly by urban consumers, and by the large restaurant and hotel
trade 2 . The consumption of domestic (i.e. indigenous) poultry has remained rather static, although
no accurate data is available. Backyard flock sizes range from 8 to 20 chickens, depending on the
season. The keeping of mixed species (chickens, ducks) is common, and daily intermingling of
village poultry takes place. The highest number of village poultry is kept during the dry season
(November to April). Backyard poultry are mostly kept for own consumption, table eggs, or con-
version into ready household cash in times of need. Household poultry production is best charac-
terized as low-input-low-output subsistence production. A market chain study 3 would better clar-
ify the consumption patterns and poultry flow dynamics from households to live-bird markets to
consumers. Live bird markets in northern Nigeria sell almost exclusively backyard poultry while
those in the south sell a mix of exotic poultry from commercial farms in the vicinity and indige-
nous poultry brought in from the north. These markets are high-risk areas for the spread of avian
influenza and other poultry diseases due to their almost complete absence of biosecurity meas-
ures. Identifying the movement dynamics is, therefore, important in developing disease contain-
ment strategies in the large, susceptible segment of poultry production. Previous concerns related
to how to protect backyard flocks from avian influenza originating from semi-commercial and
commercial farms when backyard farmers purchase exotic cockerels to upgrade their stock.
However, as is discussed later in this report, indigenous poultry purchased from live bird markets
have been shown to introduce infection into the other sectors.

About 65% of Nigeria’s commercial poultry is located in the five States of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo,
Osun and Ondo; while another 25% is based in South-South and South-East geo-political zones.
The balance of 10% or less is based in the 15 North-Central, North-West and North-East States.
The 2006 National Bureau of Statistics livestock survey shows that a higher percentage of house-
holds keep subsistence poultry in the southern parts of Nigeria than in the northern zones. In the
Muslim northern parts of Nigeria, fewer households keep poultry and women, children and aged
people are the important stakeholders in family poultry management in the country, although the
men do all of the poultry trading (Abubakar, 2007). In the predominantly Christian south, women
do virtually all the household poultry raising and trading 4 . Demand for backyard poultry has re-
mained steady, even as their price can be as much as 35% higher than commercial poultry. Many
fast food chains use, and advertise, exclusively backyard poultry, whereas urban consumer buy
mostly commercial broilers for household meals.

Poultry sub-sector composition: The poultry sub-sector contributes 9 to 10% to the agricultural
GDP with a net worth of $250 million (FDL&PCS, 2007). About 38 million people are employed
in the agricultural sector (FAO, 2005) but no information is available on the employment pro-
vided by poultry sub-sector. Poultry constitutes the fastest growing segment of the livestock sec-

2
 Personal communication, Manager of Broncho poultry farms, Ibadan
3
 USAID Nigeria considers the completion of a comprehensive poultry marketing chain as one of the one
important interventions to be undertaken,
4
  Abubakar, M.B., A.G. Ambali and T. Tamjdo, 2007. Rural Chicken Production: Effects of Gender on
Ownership, and Management Responsibilities in Some Parts of Nigeria and Cameroon. International Jour-
nal of Poultry Science, 6 (6): 413-416.
tor. Poultry meat is the universal source of dietary protein, most affordable by the poor, and is
consumed regardless of ethnic origin or religious persuasion, and represents about 17% of total
national meat consumption. There are approximately 12 Sector 1 poultry farms, located mostly in
the southern States (Lagos, Osun, Ogun, Oyo, Ekiti, Ondo, Delta and Edo), some with up to
300,000 layers In addition to direct production of poultry meat and eggs, most Sector 1 farms also
produce day-old broiler chicks for commercial Sector 2 farms who sell broilers to the food proc-
essing industry (Big Treat®, Tantalizers®, Sweet Sensation®; meat shops such as UTC,
ShopRite®); hotels and large scale food companies 5 No data is available on the number and output
of Sector 2 or 3 farms. Sector 3 farms (holding between 1,000 and 5,000 birds) are spread across
the six geographical zones of Nigeria, with most located in the south of the country in Lagos and
Ogun States, producing a variety of poultry—broilers, small layer flocks, guinea fowl, turkeys,
ducks and some quail. Eggs and broilers from these farms are usually sold directly to retailers or
through middlemen (wholesalers) who transport these from farmgate to the retail markets (food
outlets, shops and poultry markets). Sector 4 poultry are raised under the low-input-low-output
management system, and mostly scavenge or are fed household wastes, millet of round corn.
These poultry are native breeds and free ranging, exposed to a variety of poultry diseases (mostly
Newcastle disease) and predators (snakes, rats, hawks). Their background mortality from hatch-
ing to table is around 45% (FDL&PCS, personal communication). According to the NBS 2005
National Household Livestock Survey, 5.51 million households keep backyard poultry. When
compared to the calculated 14.9 million of rural households in the country (63.7% of a population
of 140 million, taken at an average 5 persons per household), some 37% of rural households
would keep poultry, and not “virtually all” households, as claimed by Obi et. al 6 .

Again, it is clear from these discrepancies that an accurate poultry census of Sector 4 is highly
necessary, especially since these free-ranging birds are the most vulnerable group to the entry of
avian influenza viruses. According to the 2005 RIM Survey the national standing duck population
is 46.8 million birds, the third most prevalent domestic poultry species after chickens and Guinea
fowl. Most ducks are kept under Sector 4 management conditions near ponds, wetlands and wa-
tershed areas where they may come in contact with wild and/or migratory birds. Since ducks
commonly intermingle with other poultry species, they may become a vector in transmitting
H5N1 virus from wild to domestic birds, a risk enhanced by the Asia HPAI experience in that
ducks can become asymptomatic carriers of highly pathogenic H5N1 virus and become a vast
virus reservoir from which re-infections can, and will, originate. Such evidence has as yet not
been found in Nigeria. Additional information on poultry sector composition, stakeholders and
trade are presented in the paper by Obi et. al 7 .

The commercial industry: The poultry sector has seen is the fastest growing segment of the
Nigerian livestock industry ever since poultry commercialization began some 30 years ago. In
2002, after the government placed an import ban on poultry production inputs (day-old chicks,
equipment, feed concentrates, drugs, vaccines, etc) and poultry outputs (frozen chicken, frozen
turkey) to protect the domestic industry, the poultry sector has expanded rapidly to satisfy domes-
tic demand, especially in the development of Sector 1 and 2 layer and contract broiler farms, and
hatcheries to produce broiler day-old chicks. Other stakeholders, such as feed mills and poultry
production equipment suppliers, have also become established and set up local agencies. Many of
the Sector 1 and 2 farms own and operate their own feed mills and poultry processing plants and
are to a very large extent vertically integrated, and most day-old chicks are produced by the com-

5
 From: Pro-poor HPAI Risk Reduction Strategies – Background to the Study in Nigeria. ILRI, Prof. Timothy
Uzochukwu Obi, Mr. Adewale Olubukola Oparinde, Dr. Garba Ahmed Maina.
6
    Idem.Section 3.2.1.3.
7
    Idem
panies. Many Sector 3 poultry owners in the Lagos area have also benefited from the emerging
poultry markets and have set up contract broiler farms, and serve as middlemen and transporters
and as cross-border traders. Domestic consumption of poultry meat has risen to 17% of total meat
consumption (PAN, 2007). At present, the commercial poultry industry produces 41,000 metric
tons (tm) of dressed spent hen meat; 97,000 tm of dressed broiler meat and 8.2 billion table eggs.
No similar data is available for the non-commercial poultry segment. The main constraints to fur-
ther increases in commercial poultry production and processing capacity, as quoted by commer-
cial industry representatives, are: processing capacity and cold storage facilities. These facilities
are important in times of low consumer demand, as the resulting back up of unsold poultry (broil-
ers, spent hens) and eggs can then be cold-stored (eggs) or deep-frozen (poultry meat) for future
sales.

Although the Government intends to stimulate poultry exports as part of its overall policy of sur-
plus production for export, this has to date not materialized. Aside from constraints in the lack of
modern meat processing capacity, cold storage, and weak meat inspection service and meat han-
dling quality, the recent HPAI outbreaks have stemmed further expansion. Although the Govern-
ment intends rectify the country’s trade balance in favor of exports 8 , this policy has yet to affect
the poultry industry. Relatively small illegal imports of poultry occurs across the southern border
with Benin, and, possibly, across the long, porous north-western border with Niger. The 2006
poultry product trade balance stood at a small, negative US$137,800, comprising dried egg yolk,
fats, skin and assorted poultry parts. Trading countries in poultry products were, in order of trade
value importance, imports from Germany, France, USA, UK and Italy, France and Germany, with
Italy as the only export destination. The most dynamic area for commercial poultry industry de-
velopment has been in the Lagos area with its large, urban population of some 15 million people.
Most Sector 1 and 2 farms are located in the zone surrounding Lagos

Backyard poultry trade and marketing: As indicated, this segment encompasses Sector 4 and
the lower-end of Sector 3 9 , representing the largest proportion of poultry raised and sold in Nige-
ria Sector 4 holds 60% of the national standing flock (90 million birds). There is no information
on the size of the lower-end Sector 3 poultry as the result of its opaque demarcation with Sector
4, but a reasonable estimate would be 10% of the 15% Sector 3 birds, equivalent to 2.1 million
poultry. In total, there may well be 91.1 million poultry raised under backyard, free-ranging con-
ditions, all of which are native breeds. Backyard poultry, if marketed, are exclusively sold
through live-bird markets, present in every community, although their number is unknown. These
markets are under municipal control, even though there are neither municipal nor veterinary regu-
lations governing their management, structure, hygiene or slaughtering practices or waste dis-
posal. None of these markets visited by the consultant, even in large cities, had a water supply so
that adequate disinfection is impossible. Many live-bird markets are located on undefined prop-
erty, with (rarely implemented) municipal plans to relocate them. Although the HPAI crisis has
focused attention to their dismal state and plans are indeed underway in the larger cities (Kano,
Kaduna, Joss, Lagos, Abuja, others) to undertake relocation. The problem is to find suitable land
on the periphery of towns and cities but not too far distant from consumers who must make daily
trips to buy their fresh chicken. Slaughtering may take place inside the market or outside, done by
small household enterprises spread across the cities or towns. This latter arrangement increases
the spread of infection from market to household, should infected poultry be marketed and trans-
ported. In spite of the well-publicized risk that live-bird markets pose and centers of cross-

8
 Idem
9
 Lower-end Sector 3 denotes small poultry holdings of no more than a hundred or so birds, with little or no
biosecurity (often penned in by wire fencing only), that are on the verge of Sector 4. These holdings often
shift back and forth between Sectors 4 and 3, depending on their profitability or lack thereof.
infection, documented outbreaks in such markets are sporadic, and none have been reported or
confirmed in Nigeria, with the exception of two ducks from live-bird markets in Gombe and
Kobe states, which were sampled under the ongoing FAO live-bird market HPAI survey and
found positive for EMA3 H5N1 virus. As indicated before, native poultry command a 15% pre-
mium price ($6.00 equivalent per live bird) over commercial broilers ($6.88 equivalent).

A live-bird market study 10 was carried out in 174 live-bird markets in all 36 States and the Fed-
eral Territory, covering with an estimated total market capacity of 2.55 million birds operated by
14,800 bird sellers. Some of the major study findings are summarized here:

     •   57% of live-bird markets are located inside residential areas
     •   Only 12% of markets have an acceptable infrastructure
     •   77% of bird sellers obtain their birds from outside their area, signifying considerable
         overland transporting of backyard poultry
     •   47% of poultry transporters also take along human passengers in their vehicles
     •   One-third of poultry sellers mix new arrivals with already present poultry, but two-thirds
         know this is not good practice
     •   41% of sellers carry out salvage slaughter in case birds are, or become, sick
     •   71% of sellers slaughter 100 or more birds per day
     •   Only 24% of slaughterers disinfect their tools after each bird
     •   55% of slaughterers dump their poultry waste on street refuge dumps instead of burying
         or other means of disposal
     •   50% disinfect their wooden cages each day. Most use detergent instead of disinfectant
     •   56% of surveyed markets reported that veterinary inspection takes place, mostly weekly

It is clear from these findings that live-bird market operations and biosecurity are far below ac-
ceptable standards. Especially with the presence of avian flu in the country. In response to the
observations made in the survey the AICP project is implementing a pilot live-bird market biose-
curity upgrading component in seven major cities. There is a growing need to have municipali-
ties, which derive income from charging market stall fees from poultry sellers, develop enforced
regulatory guidelines to alleviate present conditions.

Poultry sub-sector response to the entry of HPAI: Following the first outbreaks 11 of HPAI in
February 2006, poultry sector growth has virtually stopped and has yet to recover. In the 6
months following the first outbreaks the sub-sector contracted by some 20% from a pre-outbreak
inventory of 150 million poultry as the result of culling and a reluctance to reinvest and lagging
consumer demand 12 . Although this contraction affected all Sectors, the smaller Sector 3 farms
have suffered most as the result of poor biosecurity. Because of their wide distribution across the
countryside many of these fell victim to depopulation (culling) exercises surrounding infected
focal points. Without access to bank credit and relying of own savings and money borrowed from
relatives, the death, or loss of their poultry left them without the ability to repay debts and restart
production. Strict biosecurity measures saved most Sector 1 and 2 farms from infection or culling.
Although assessing the precise economic consequences of the outbreaks is difficult, the tracing of

10
   AICP Animal Health Component – The Development of live bird Markets in Nigeria. Oscar Agricultural
Consultants Ltd, March 2008
11
   Outbreaks denote the infection of a (livestock or human) population with an infectious disease. Occur-
rence denotes the presence of a disease in an individual. Epidemic is defined as multiple outbreaks in
groups of populations.
12
   Information of poultry industry response to HPAI obtained from the Poultry Association of Nigeria, per-
sonal communications.
hatchery outputs is probably the most useful indicator. According to the Poultry Association of
Nigeria (PAN) the number of hatching eggs set declined by up to 50% immediately following the
first outbreaks, and to this day remains 20% below hatching capacity.

Initially, consumer fear of consuming poultry immediately following outbreaks became a nation-
wide phenomenon. Prices for poultry meat and eggs dropped by 25 to 35% in the months follow-
ing each outbreak wave. Rising feed prices (15-20% over normal) have also decreased profit mar-
gins. On the other hand, high beef prices (up from NGN600 to NGN750/kg for grass-fed beef) are
shifting consumer demand away from beef towards poultry and as a result the price of poultry has
increased by some 15%, from NGN450 to NGN520 per kg dressed weight. Even with these
higher prices, producers claim that the higher feed prices and weak demand more than offset prof-
itability. Backyard poultry pricing has been equally affected as many households disposed of their
backyard poultry for fear of getting infected, resulting in a decline of supply and weak consumer
demand. Superimposed on these trends is the increasing rising cost of living, especially of food
prices, which has further dampened consumer demand for meats. Nonetheless, during Ramadan
starting in September, the traditional seasonal consumer demand for meat and eggs (consumed at
higher levels after the day’s fasting) is expected increases, however. These complicated interac-
tions of demand versus price make it difficult to gauge the net effect of HPAI impact on con-
sumer response. A marketing chain study, linked to seasonal demand and supply would be helpful
in clarifying the complicated interactions that prevail in the Nigerian poultry industry. GIS map-
ping to supplement such as study would greatly assist in getting the “bigger picture.”
IV. Nigerian Veterinary Services and Disease Surveillance
4.1        The Nigerian veterinary services infrastructure
The Veterinary Service (VS) of Nigeria comprises 36 States and one Federal Territory which are
divided into 15 Zones and 774 Local Government Areas (LGA). The VS is headed at the Federal
level by the Director, Federal Department of Livestock and Pest Control Services (FDL&PCS –
hereafter referred to as FDL) under the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, and in the
36 States by State Directors of Veterinary Services (SDVS). The FDL is divided into eight Divi-
sions, namely: Animal Health, Quarantine Services, Veterinary Public Health, Livestock Devel-
opment, Planning and Research, Pastoral Resources, Livestock Production and Pest Control Ser-
vices. FDL has field offices at all State capitals while each State Veterinary Service has Area
Veterinary Officers (AVO) overseeing groups of LGAs and Zonal Veterinary Officers overseeing
a number of AVOs. This present structure is designed to enable the efficient and timely collection
of information on trans-boundary animal diseases (TAD), including HPAI. Although by law the
State Directors of Veterinary Services (SDVS) are in-charge of animal disease control, emergen-
cies arising from major TAD such as HPAI, fall under the overall command of FDL.


4.2        Veterinary manpower resources in the public and private sector
Data on veterinary man (and woman) power by State and field of endeavor proved difficult to
compile (Table 4.1). A recent paper describing VS human resources for 30 States 13 presents com-
posite albeit incomplete data. The limited number of private veterinarians listed (240 veterinari-
ans in 30 States) points to their failure to register, so that many are “off the books”. Official num-
bers point to the presence of which most are in the private sector, and many are not registered.
Public sector veterinarians are registered as required by their job SOP.

The country has five accredited Veterinary Faculties, located at Ibadan, Zaria, Maiduguri, Sokoto
and Nsukka Universities. These universities operate Veterinary Teaching Hospitals (VTH) which
undertake diagnostic work, and are being upgraded to undertake HPAI serology. The five univer-
sities offer the Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (DVM) degree, and postgraduate degrees in MSc
and PhD. Combined, they graduate approximately 250 veterinarians per year. At this rate, it
would have taken 18 years to reach the accumulated number of veterinarians presently recorded.
However, government positions are limited and many veterinarians find themselves unemployed
upon graduation and find jobs as sales representatives with agribusiness firms, or engage in dif-
ferent lines of work. The lack of accurate registration of graduate veterinarians compounds the
problem of identifying the exact number of practicing private veterinarians, and in which aspect
of veterinary medicine they are engaged. The veterinary faculties are inspected every two years
by the Veterinary Council of Nigeria (VCN) in order to maintain standards and uniformity in vet-
erinary education. In the public sector, 163 veterinarians are employed at the Federal and 535 at
the State government levels. In addition, there are 7,810 livestock scientists, laboratory technolo-
gists and animal health workers. At an international standard ratio for veterinary surgeons in de-
veloping countries at 1 veterinarian for each 20,000 Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) 14 , the num-
ber of veterinarians registered by the VCN is adequate. However, their skill levels are not always



13
     Idem
14
     OiE Self-evaluation of Veterinary Services report, 2007.
up to accepted standards. An estimated 65% of rural poultry owners have no access to or cannot
afford to pay for qualified veterinary services 15 .

At the Federal and State VS levels, 114 veterinarians are employed in research, complemented by
20 research officers, 46 laboratory technicians (employed at NVRI and the 5 Veterinary Teaching
Hospitals), supported by 178 support staff (laboratory technicians, technical officers, science
laboratory technicians, and technologists). The NADIS/Central Epidemiology Unit (official
name) at Federal VS headquarters employs a chief veterinary epidemiologist and 2 research offi-
cers. NADIS/Central Epidemiology Unit employs 5 laboratory technologists and 7 laboratory
technologists as non-headquarters staff, in charge of conducting field post mortems on suspicious
cases of HPAI. Capacity building under AICP will involve sending two candidates for overseas
2-year MSc Epidemiology programs, likely in the form of sandwich programs.

At present, the only laboratory statutorily charged with livestock disease diagnosis is the National
Table 4.1 - Veterinary Human Resource Base for 30 States                      Veterinary      Research
State                            Veterinarians by Occupation
                      State     Federal     Private Research University Total
                                                                              Institute (NVRI) lo-
                    Services   services      Vets       Institute             cated at Vom, Plateau
Abia                    7          2          10            1      4     24   State. With support of
Adamawa                 31         2           8            1      7     49   FDL, the donor com-
Anambra                 10         -          30            -      1     41
Akwa Ibom               35         1           4            1      5
                                                                              munity and AICP,
                                                                         46
Bauchi                  15         4           3            -      9     31
                                                                              training and diagnostic
Bayelsa                 2          -           -            -      -      2   equipment has been
Benue                   7          2          13            1     14     37   provided to improve the
Borno                   64         -           -            -      -     64   HPAI diagnostic capac-
Cross River              6         2           7            -      5     20
Delta                   21         2          12            -      -     35
                                                                              ity of this facility.
Ebonyi                  9          1           2            2      -     14   NVRI has proven to be
Gombe                   15         -           5            -      -     20   very effective in the
Jigawa                  8          -           -            2      -     10
                                                                              rapid and accurate di-
Kano                    23         6          36            1      4     70
Katsina                 12         4           -            -      -     16   agnosis of all types of
Kebbi                   12         3           -            5      -     20   HPAI viruses and col-
Kogi                    11         2           6            1      -     20   laborates, via FAO
Kwara                   14         -           -            -      -     14
Nasarawa                 5         2           5            -      3     15
                                                                              Emergency Center for
Niger                   23         6           9            -      -     38   Transboundary       Dis-
Ogun                    14         6          21            -      2     43   eases (ECTAD) and the
Ondo                    16         2          13            3      5     39   OFFLU international
Plateau                 10         3          47            6      -     66
Sokoto                                                            26     26
                                                                              avian influenza refer-
Taraba                  32         3           8            -      7     50   ence laboratory in Pa-
Yobe                    18         2           1            1      -     22   dova, Italy on the char-
Zamfara                  8         -           -            -      -      8
Kaduna                                                            70
                                                                              acterization of avian flu
                                                                         70
Oyo                                                               75     75   virus isolates.
Enugu                                                       51        51
Totals            428        55        240       25         288      1036 There are intentions to
Average            16         3        13        2           7        31
                                                                          recruit more Livestock
Superintendents (LS) to serve as Surveillance Agents (SA) at the LGA level. These workers are
not part of the public sector and have graduated with diplomas from vocational and agricultural
schools. They are trained to carry out simple treatments, vaccination, take samples and do first-
aid type of work under the supervision of the State VS. In their function as Surveillance Agents,

15
  From: Pro-poor HPAI Risk Reduction Strategies – Background to the Study in Nigeria. ILRI, Prof.
Timothy Uzochukwu Obi, Mr. Adewale Olubukola Oparinde, Dr. Garba Ahmed Maina.
they respond to calls from local residents concerning diseased livestock which they then report to
their nearest Area Veterinary Officer, a government veterinarian in charge of servicing a group of
LGAs and the CAHWs working therein. In their function as Surveillance Agents, they conduct
simple disease recognition functions, such as sudden die offs of poultry, the presence of sick live-
stock, etc. CAHWs are not organized and make their income from small fees charged by clients.
Their presence and functions remain controversial with many in the official VS system. Refer-
ence is made to the technical capacity of CAHWs under the section Risk Assessment to HPAI, in
which reference is made that “Inadequate early warning and early reaction capabilities including
inadequate experience of most animal health workers in the recognition and diagnosis of
HPAI.’ 16 In the Manual for Field Agents, Disease Surveillance in Nigeria, which describes the
                                                                      tasks of veterinarians at vari-
                                                                      ous administrative levels, it is
                                                                      stated under the heading
                                                                      Agent Tasks, that, “the vet-
                                                                      erinary officer in charge at
                                                                      the [surveillance point] place,
                                                                      or his auxiliary [i.e. animal
                                                                      health worker] under the su-
                                                                      pervision of the veterinarian,
                                                                      shall…”, followed by a de-
                                                                      scription of the instruments
                                                                      and samples the person re-
                                                                      sponsible is to take. A similar
                                                                      description is found under
                                                                      Activities in Abattoirs and
                                                                      Slaughter Houses, relating to
                                                                      “the veterinarian or his auxil-
                                                                      iary carrying out ante-
                                                                      mortem inspection.” LSs
                                                                      graduate from schools under
                                                                      the aegis of the Ministry of
                                                                      Education, which does not
                                                                      sufficiently      communicate
                                                                      with the Ministry of Agricul-
                                                                      ture regarding the number,
                                                                      type of training and functions
to be performed by LSs. At present, 295 LSs are employed as SAs, with a target of 774; one for
each of the LGAs in the country. However, recruitment incentives, such as salaries and field
transportation, are limited, which has constrained additional recruitment.

Distribution of Veterinary Clinics and Facilities: A survey conducted as part of the AICP pro-
ject 17 sheds some light on the number, distribution and veterinary clinics and their reporting ac-
tivities of animal disease data by State (Table 4.2), and parts are quoted here. The survey indi-

16
   Strategies for Prevention of Introduction, Disease Surveillance Networking And Contingency Plan For a
Disease Emergency, Report of the Technical Committee of Expert on the Prevention and Control of HPAI
in Nigeria, Federal Veterinary Services, 2004
17
  Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response Project - National Baseline
Survey, EnvironQuest, December 2007
cated that Kano State had the highest number of 142 clinics as well as the highest number of fa-
cilities reporting animal health data (72.9%). While these findings showed there are 4,968 poultry
farms in Nigeria, with Lagos having the highest number (600) with only 14.5% of farms reporting
animal health data. Available records (PAN Lagos) show that Ogun State has the highest number
of poultry farms (3,250). Oyo and Adamawa States have the highest number (25 each) of veteri-
nary facilities proposed for renovation. Only Osun had no such plan. Delta and Oyo States have
carried out the highest number of VS clinic renovations. Overall, only 30% of a total of 192 fa-
cilities proposed were renovated. A total of 20 States did not have any new equipment installed in
their veterinary clinics while 16 States have different equipment related to animal disease.
Equipment includes: incinerator, PPE, surgical equipment, refrigerators, drug charts, diagnostic
kits, disinfectant sprayers, slaughter slabs, decontamination equipment and autoclaves. This
equipment was used in veterinary work in laboratories, veterinary hospitals, hatcheries, diagnostic
clinics and border control posts. This description highlights the limited cooperation of the private
poultry farms and veterinarians in collaborating with the public sector VS system to provide dis-
ease information, even though this is mandatory. It also indicates that PAN has a comprehensive
inventory of poultry farms, which is of essential value to the VS in constructing poultry farm
mapping as part of GIS.

The Nigerian Veterinary Medical Association (NVMA) has a veterinary membership from the
public and private sector. The NVMA has a mandate to advise the Government on disease control
policy (although little consultation took place during the initial stages of the AI outbreaks), and
advocates with Government on matters related to veterinary affairs. However, the NVMA does
not presently function effectively as an integral professional entity, as many members are de-
faulters in the payment of their annual dues to retain membership. New graduates are automati-
cally registered by the Veterinary Council of Nigeria (VCN) and admitted to the Association and
are required to pay annual membership fees as many of their members are not registered. How-
ever, as they relocate and undertake various aspects of veterinary practice across the country they
fail to update their profiles with the Association, and literally “get lost”. When the payment of
membership dues lapses—a frequent occurrence—such failure to reregister is not enforced by the
withdrawal of the veterinary practice license. Such is not the case with public sector veterinarians,
who, by virtue of working for the government, keep their membership and membership profiles
updated. Attempts to organize private veterinarians at the State level does take place, but is spo-
radic 18 . When the initial outbreaks of avian influenza began in 2006 the Federal and State Veteri-
nary Services were unable to contact the NVMA as a group to assist in disease containment and
reporting, as the whereabouts of its membership was largely unknown. As a result the Govern-
ment initiated, through the VCN, three-yearly continuing education for all veterinarians, which
would require their updating their registration and full membership profile, so that the Govern-
ment will be able to draw locate and draw on private practitioners in case of need. Annual veteri-
nary meetings and education sessions are largely attended by public sector veterinarians, with
very few private practitioners present. In the Animal Disease Control Act of 1988 the Govern-
ment has the legislative power to require private veterinarians and livestock owners to report OiE-
listed animal disease to the veterinary authorities. This law is however not strictly enforced.

This dysfunctional situation has resulted in frequent disconnects between the NVMA and gov-
ernment in harmonizing aims and objectives, and with the regulatory aspects of disease reporting
and public-private partnerships. For example, since the World Organization for Animal Health
(OIE) changed its reportable disease lists to a different reporting format, confusion has reigned in
the private veterinary community as to how and what to report to Government. In another exam-

18
   For example, The Chairman of the State Veterinary Association has managed to register 40 members,
although the state may well have ten times that number.
ple, following the 2006 avian flu outbreaks, individual NVMA members volunteered their ser-
vices to assist in containing the disease, but could not mount a joint effort as an Association. In
yet another example, private veterinarians are reluctant to submit chilled samples, such as poultry
carcasses suspected of avian flu, for examination due to the high transportation costs of sending
such samples. The fact that such samples can be submitted free of charge via public sector veteri-
nary channels is largely unknown.

Private veterinarians should play a significant role in advising poultry farmers on biosecurity and
disease reporting, although operational support for such training is limited. Documentation pro-
vided by VCN confirms that courses are organized in collaboration with the five Faculties of Vet-
erinary Medicine. The mission was not able to determine with precision the number of staff
trained in the past three years and the content of the training program. The VCN has established a
College of Veterinary Surgeons of Nigeria (CVSN) with offices at Zaria, Nsukka and Ibadan
Universities to train its members for admission to membership and fellowship of the College. In-
stitutional support to the private sector should be an important aspect of overall disease control
implementation, and should be better supported.

The Poultry Association of Nigeria (PAN): PAN is probably more attuned to ongoing veteri-
nary affairs and government programs related to the poultry industry than the NVMA. PAN
membership mostly comprises the large Sector 1 and 2 farms, and misses a large part of Sector 3
poultry producers, comprising 65% of the total national poultry flock. PAN is mostly occupied
with import and export licensing, vaccination and the business aspects of poultry production, but
appears more able than NVMA to forge public-private partnerships as their profits and losses are
more directly with prevailing government policies and disease control 19 .


4.3     Veterinary education and training
Most public veterinary personnel at the federal and state levels are familiar with HPAI diagnosis
and control measures, but at the lower levels this knowledge remains weak. This is especially the
case with the regulatory aspects of HPAI prevention and control. Many of the Sector 1 and 2
poultry farms employ private veterinarians on a full-time basis and at that level a considerable
knowledge base exists in poultry disease diagnosis. It is common practice for a number of Sector
3 farms to share a single private veterinarian and for the individual enterprises to also have back-
up arrangements to get help from a public veterinarian when one is close by. The veterinary cur-
riculum offered in the various veterinary faculties in Nigeria (in terms of content and hourly vol-
ume) compares favorably with that of other faculties in Africa and Europe. Diplomas issued by
Nigerian veterinary faculties are recognized elsewhere, since holders of such degrees are em-
ployed in many international organizations such as FAO. Veterinarians from Ghana, Sierra Leone
and Liberia have graduated in Nigeria. During the implementation of the Pan-African Program
for the Control of Enzootics (PACE), a process for the review of curriculum of the Faculties of
Veterinary Medicine was adopted. Some of the Universities have already commenced the review
accordingly. There is a great need to re-evaluate the veterinary epidemiology curriculum, espe-
cially where science-based data analysis, risk management and disease control strategy develop-
ment are concerned. None of the two veterinary faculties visited by the mission has GIS capacity
as part of it disease risk assessment or analysis and this is most likely the case for the other three.
The recent shift of veterinary faculty administration from the Ministry of Agriculture to Educa-
tion has not helped in this matter. The divestment of veterinary education from the Ministry of

19
  PAN strongly advocated with FLS to allow vaccination against avian influenza of their flocks to protect
their investment, although this request was refused.
Agriculture to the Ministry of Education has created disconnects between demand-driven veteri-
nary education needs and priorities and veterinary education needs on the ground.


4.4      The animal health surveillance infrastructure
History: The first attempt at livestock disease reporting in Nigeria started around 1914 when the
veterinary department was established. The Disease of Animal Ordinance of 1917 allocated the
reporting of 17 diseases to provisional veterinary offices until the period between 1967 and 1974
when central collation was stopped. In 1975, the animal disease reporting procedure was given a
boost when the National Livestock Development Council (NLDC) decided to redefine and update
previous reporting procedures. About 113 animal diseases were divided into five categories
(FLD, 1982). Thirty of these diseases were made compulsorily reportable should they occur or
were suspected to occur at any location in the country. This was backed by the Animal Diseases
Act of 1988, CAP 54, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.


4.5 Evolving database systems used in animal health surveil-
lance and disease reporting.
From these early surveillance beginnings, which were entirely passive in nature, evolved the pre-
sent NADIS active surveillance reporting platform which is a hybrid software database, being
developed by the Nigerian Federal Epidemiology Unit using characteristics of PACE and WA-
HIS.

The PACE surveillance infrastructure: The PACE program, funded by the European Commis-
sion, began its operations in Africa in 2001 and was completed in 2006. PACE was essentially an
African passive surveillance support network, implemented and technically managed by AU-
IBAR. PACE was implemented and technically managed by AU-IBAR, with ARIS the animal
health database and reporting system implemented and owned by IBAR. The disease surveillance,
reporting and data management protocols that stem from PACE from the foundation of the na-
tional epidemio-surveillance infrastructure for animal disease control in Nigeria. The disease con-
trol and surveillance format in the Nigeria PACE program had as its objectives the eradication of
Rinderpest, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Peste des Petites Ruminants (PPR), Bovine Conta-
gious Pleuropneumonia (BPP), African Swine Fever (ASF), and the two poultry diseases of New-
castle Disease (NCD) 20 and Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza, of which the latter was a late
entry. Nigeria chose to use PACE to eradicate Rinderpest, from which OiE officially declared
Nigeria free in March 2008. The PACE program has been instrumental in introducing into Nige-
ria the institutional and operational framework used in passive disease surveillance 21 , reporting
and control/eradication policies and programs. PACE has left 179 surveillance posts across the
country, which continue to be used as focal points for area surveillance and disease reporting.

The World Animal Health Information System (WAHIS): WAHIS is the web based interac-
tive information system used by OIE to enter and evaluate livestock disease from disease reports
submitted by member countries. WAHID (the World Animal Health Information Database) is the

20
   Newcastle disease control in Sectors 3 and 4 poultry was introduced under the World Bank-funded Live-
stock II project, completed in the mid-1990s, using a surveillance and vaccination program, parts of which
continue to this day.
21
   In passive surveillance, VS respond to disease reports received from the field to which they then respond.
In active surveillance, VS and other cooperants go out to the field to search, by means or sero-surveys, in-
spections, field investigations, etc. to detect suspected or unsuspected livestock disease.
database in which disease surveillance and reporting is entered by OIE. WAHIS provides for the
entry of four levels of reporting by participating countries: (i) emergency reports following initial
disease outbreaks, (ii) periodic follow up reports until the disease is under control, (iii) biannual
reports providing amalgamated disease information, and (iv) annual reports which amalgamate
the biannual reports. WAHIS provides GIS information of outbreak locations, as well as national
inventories of geo-positioned livestock establishments, markets abattoirs and control posts.

The WAHID and PACE database software is being used by the Nigerian Federal Veterinary Epi-
demiology Unit to configure its own database platform, called the National Animal Disease In-
formation System (NADIS), on which an active Nigerian veterinary surveillance and disease re-
porting system will be based. Aside from tracking disease reporting, WAHIS provides the plat-
form used by OIE to certify countries free of reportable diseases. This process is of great impor-
tance to livestock and livestock product exporting countries as it determines whether or not im-
porting countries will accept or ban commodities, based on the current reportable disease status of
livestock exporting countries. Diagnostic procedures required by importing countries and risk
analysis factors are also entered into WAHID.

The National Animal Diseases Information and Surveillance (NADIS): The NADIS surveil-
lance framework stems from the PACE program. The original disease information data manage-
ment system used by FDL stems from the ARIS software program, developed by AU/IBAR for
passive disease surveillance and reporting in PACE member countries. Data entries were made by
the Zonal Coordinators, downloaded on CDs and sent to the central database at the National Co-
ordinating Officer, where they were keyed in for amalgamation and analysis, using a server lo-
cated in Nairobi. However, ARIS was not designed to enter poultry disease data, such as HPAI,
and lapsed following the closure of PACE.

Following the completion of PACE, FDL has been developing its own active surveillance and
disease reporting software, called the National Animal Disease Information System (NADIS)
which is a hybrid offspring of the ARIS and WAHIS programs. NADIS provides more flexibility
in information entry than the other two programs as it allows for the entry of additional diseases
and syndromes, the attachment of GIS locations, as well as poultry diseases, which could not be
entered into PACE programs. NADIS provides the database platform on which HPAI surveil-
lance data in Nigeria are being accumulated, in accordance with the National Avian Influenza
Control and Eradication Policy, implemented through the Integrated National Action Plan
(INAP), which contains the SOP protocols for HPAI diagnosis, epidemiological manipulation and
reporting. INAP was further refined as part of the World Bank-supported AICP project prepara-
tion in 2006, which was designed in accordance with INAP operational guidelines.

NADIS is operating with inputs from VCN, NMVA, private veterinarians and the Nigerian Agri-
cultural Credit and Rural Development Bank (NACRDB), although most of it inputs come from
State and Federal disease surveillance inputs. It receives information from the Surveillance
Agents at the LGA level and from the 170 surveillance points in the 15 Zones across the coun-
try’s 37 States left by PACE, using the WAHIS reporting format of monthly, bi-annual and an-
nual disease reporting reports. Monthly disease information data originating from the Surveil-
lance Agents (not as yet present in all of the 774 LGAs) were originally submitted by hard copy
and keyed in manually under a cumbersome, time-consuming procedure. With the development
of NADIS software, data are now electronically transmitted to the NADIS server at the NCO of-
fice for electronic entry and automatic amalgamation. Data previously accumulated by ARIS and
PACE are in the process of being transferred to the NADIS server. The quality control of data
submission has significantly improved. In the early stages, manually prepared and transmitted
reports were often received late—with only a 60 to 80% on-time submission rate—and data entry
was often faulty. Submission timeliness and data quality have greatly improved with the shift
from manual to electronic transfer, the imposition of penalties for late submission, and the provi-
sion of training in accurate reporting and data entry.

Table 4.2 – Control Post used for active surveillance in Nigeria




All Surveillance Agents are being provided with GPS, which will improve the mapping of live-
stock inventories and livestock establishments, control posts (Table 4.2), markets and slaughter-
ing facilities. The development of a national geo-positioned poultry and livestock marketing
chain network is being planned, which will greatly improve the forward tracing and back tracing
of diseased livestock and poultry. Training in GIS and mapping is urgently needed.


4.6     Animal health surveillance infrastructure and reporting
Surveillance: As indicated, the Federal VS are responsible for surveillance coordination and
facilitative support, with the prime responsibility for disease surveillance at the State VS level.
The entire Nigerian surveillance system is shifting to active surveillance (Figure 4,3). This en-
tails: disease originating from the LGA level by farmers and/or Surveillance Agents (paravets) is
reported to the nearest Area Veterinary Officer (AVO) who in turn informs his/her Zonal Veteri-
nary Officer (ZVO) in each of the 15 Zones that divide the country into surveillance compart-
ments. The ZVO then informs NVRI and the NADIS Epidemiology Unit at Federal level organ-
ize a Special Detection Team (SDT – inside circle in diagram). This Team (made up of laboratory
technicians, veterinary officers and disease or wildlife specialists when necessary) visits the dis-
ease detection location. Samples or carcasses are taken to the nearest Veterinary Teaching Hospi-
tal (VTH) for post mortem examination, from which pathology samples are sent to NVRI for di-
agnostic procedures, or directly by the SDT to NVRI. The country has 179 Control Points, estab-
lished under PACE, from which AVOs, Quarantine Officers, ZVOs and surveillance agents cover
their areas. These Posts include: overland and airport border as well as internal quarantine sta-
tions, livestock and live-bird markets (inspected by municipal food safety and veterinary inspec-
tors), abattoirs and slaughtering slabs.

Figure 4.3 – National Surveillance and Reporting Infrastructure for TADs.




Reporting: Disease reporting involves thee stages, based on the PACE disease reporting format.
Disease reports are submitted monthly by all States, followed by a 6-monthly and annual compos-
ite reports, the information of which is entered into NADIS. Monthly reports are prepared by the
AVOs, amalgamated reports by the State VS. Until recently, monthly report submissions were
only 60% on time and data entry often faulty. Recent training of field staff in data entry, and pen-
alties imposed for late entry, has improved this situation. Surveillance Agents at the LGA level
fill in laboratory specimen forms for each sample submitted. Suspicious Case form cover infor-
mation on owner, animal, origin of the disease and possible mode of transmission, as well as a
map of the location of the case. Abattoir forms cover pre- and post mortem examination. Species,
sex, age, ante and post mortem signs. There are also OIE reporting forms and OIE Follow Up
Reports, according to OIE reporting formats.

Diagnostic procedures, especially those requiring advanced technology, are almost completely
confined to NVRI, which has sections of bacteriology, virology, mycology, parasitology, pathol-
ogy and toxicology. The NVRI diagnostic capacity is considerable and operated under a BSL-2
biosafety level with infectious agents. Diagnostic capacity at the VTHs is limited to basic serol-
ogy (hemagglutination-inhibition, some ELISA), post mortem and parasitology. Live virus isola-
tions are only carried at NVRI.
Constraints: Although this infrastructure has the potential to operate effectively, several con-
straints prevail, many of which are related to a shortage of operating funds. The cost of sending
samples, and making telephone calls to report disease often prevents timely action. Field trans-
portation has been very limited, although the AICP project has provided pickup trucks and mo-
torcycles. Surveillance agents may make mistakes in taking, preparing or sending samples. Not
all LGAs and control posts are staffed, so that gaps in the reporting system do exist. As indicated
before, enforcement of veterinary regulations is very weak, and sometimes absent. Quarantine
stations are not very effective in impounding illegally transported livestock and poultry. Knowl-
edge of regulatory laws and regulations is generally weak, and many regulations are outdated and
in need of review. The 5 VTHs do not have a defined budget line for operating costs, and are of-
ten without laboratory consumables or electricity (for lack money to buy fuel to run their genera-
tors). As indicated, timely and accurate reporting has been a problem, but is improving.
V                          Avian Influenza in Nigeria
5.1                        The Outbreaks
Highly Pathogenic Avian influenza (HPAI) was officially first confirmed in Nigeria on 16 Janu-
ary 2006 and confirmed by the OFFLU laboratory in Padova, Italy 3 February 2006 with the
                                                                H5N1 Profile PQGERRRKKRGLFG.
                                                                With this outbreak the country became
      C omparis m of No of Outbreaks                            the first in Africa to report the occurrence
                         2006/2007                              of the disease. In total, three outbreak 22
                                                                waves have struck the country. The first
     80                                                         wave struck with multiple outbreaks be-
 O
     60                                                         tween January 2006 and mid-May2007.
 u
 t
   a
     40                                                    2006 The first outbreaks of HPAI (H5N1 type)
   k
 b                                                              were confirmed in 84 Local Government
   s 20                                                    2007
 r                                                              Areas (LGAs) in 25 states across the
 e    0
        J AN F E BMARAP RMAY J UN J UL AUGS E POC TNOVDE C
                                                                country. Of 858 suspicious cases sam-
                                                                pled, 248 were found positive for H5N1.
                            MONTHS                              By May 2007 the outbreaks had declined
                                                                to seven states (Lagos, Kaduna, Kano,
Katsina, Yobe, Borno, Oyo, and Bauchi). Of these seven states, Lagos state remained active, with

                                                    Monthly HPAI outbreaks from January 2006 - 11th May 2007.


                      70

                      60

                      50
     No.of oubreaks




                      40

                      30

                      20

                      10

                      0
                            JAN   FEB   MAR   APR    MAY     JUN    JUL   AUG     SEP    OCT   NOV     DEC      JAN   FEB   MAR    APR   MAY

                                                                2006                                                        2007

                                                                              Month/Year



a recurrence of outbreaks in early May 2007.
The second wave struck with two initial outbreaks in April and May 2007 in 8 States and 17
LGAs infected. The last of these outbreaks occurred in Lagos (16 March 2007) and Zamfara (12
May 2007). A 22-year old fowl seller in Lagos died of the disease, the only person to date re-
ported to have been affected. The outbreak profile of these first two waves is shown above.

The third wave struck two villages in Kano and Katsina States and were reported on 16 July
2008, and confirmed positive for H5N1 by the national Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI) on
23 July 2008. Two H5N1 positive samples collected from ducks in live bird markets in Gombe
and Kebbe States. Two H5N1 positive samples collected from ducks in live bird markets in

22
     Outbreaks denote the occurrence a disease in a group of livestock or poultry.
Gombe and Kebbe States. The H5N1 profile of this duck isolate was EMA3, which had not been
encountered before in Nigeria. A duck H5N1 virus study is planned o further investigate the
emergence of this new strain. Accumulative outbreak data from the first through third wave are
presented below. It is apparent from the small incremental increases in events posted that between
February 2006 and July 2008 the incidence of HPAI has increased very little, as measured by the
number of suspicious and positive cases and the number of States infected. Why the number of
States with confirmed infection actually dropped from 33 to 27 is not clear, unless further diag-
nostic work reversed earlier work from positive to negative.

     Parameter                           7 Feb 2006       30 July 2008    % Change
     Total Number of suspicious cases    1,342            1,346           +1.0%
     Total Number of HPAI cases          298              302             +1.3%
     States with HPAI infection          33               27              -18.2%
     States with suspicious infection    25               25               0.0%
     LGAs with HPAI infection            97               99              +0.2%
     Total depopulated birds             1.3 million      1.4 million     +7.1%
     Compensation paid                   N623 mln         N630 mln        +1.1%
     Compensation beneficiaries          2,735            2,737           0.07%

Compensation: During the first two waves, a total of 1,250,425 birds were culled to confine the
virus, at a cost of over N623 million ($5.4 million) paid out to over 2,000 affected farmers. Dur-
ing the third wave, some 7,000 birds were culled, for which compensation has yet to be paid. The
World Bank AICP project earmarked $5 million in compensation contingency which, together
                                                                 with a Government contribution
                                                                 of $5 million-equivalent, created
                                                                 a compensation fund of $10 mil-
                                                                 lion. With claims processed and
                                                                 payments still ongoing, this fund
                                                                 has to date drawn down to $4.6
                                                                 million. The World Bank esti-
                                                                 mates that some 80% of compen-
                                                                 sation funds have been paid out
                                                                 to Sector 1 and 2 farms, suggest-
                                                                 ing that small farmers (Sectors 3
                                                                 and 4) were disproportionately
                                                                 neglected. The Government
                                                                 counters that the largest claims
                                                                 by far have come from Sector 1
and 2 farms, so that compensation amounts paid mostly went to the commercial sector. Although
timeliness, transparency and equitability are the fundamental criteria for compensation payments,
the first and third criteria leave room for improvement. Compensation rates for layers and broilers
are detailed above.

Outbreak response timeline: The first occurrence of the first outbreak wave occurred on Sam-
bawa Farms in Kano State. It was diagnosed on 19 January 2006 and confirmed by the OFFLU
reference laboratory in Padova, Italy on 3 February 2006, for a time lapse of 15 days. Outbreaks
during the third epidemic were first reported on 16 July 2008, with samples confirmed positive by
NVRI on 23 July 2008 for a time lapse of 7 days. In both the third-wave outbreaks, birds from
another farm and from a live bird market were introduced to the infected farms about a week ear-
lier. Both response times are impressive, and point to an effective response and diagnostic support
system. It can be argued that even 7 days is far too long, as the minimum infective cycle (virus
spread from one bird to the next) of H5N1 is 24 hours, so that within a 7-day lapse time, 7 infec-
tive cycles could take place. NVRI staff reports that they are able to diagnose live virus presence
in egg inoculation (by means of cell mortality) in 24 hours, and can characterize the virus within
the 12 hours following. Delays from sampling to final diagnosis are due not so much to labora-
tory procedures but to the time of transport of cold-chained samples from farm to NVRI. In many
LGAs, money to send samples by bus was not available, and reporting infected farms or holdings
to the nearest Area Veterinary Officer (responsible for a group of LGAs) can be delayed. Further
fine-tuning of this step in the response phase of surveillance is necessary.

5.2      H5N1 virus characterization
A virus reassortant study conducted on H5N1 isolates from the 2006 outbreak 23 showed that 10
of 12 strains obtained over a 39-day period were EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07 reassortant viruses, and
that these were circulating in at least 7 Nigerian states. The findings also suggest that an influenza
virus (H5N1) with new genetic characteristics has emerged in <7 months and is widespread in
Nigeria. The emergence of at least 2 reassortant viruses in Nigeria shows that co-infection with
viruses of different sub lineages has occurred presumably in poultry. This evidence is most likely
a result of poor biosecurity measures implemented by the poultry industry, particularly the live-
bird market system, which is known to facilitate mingling of infected birds. In non-industrialized
countries, live bird market systems sometimes allow birds of different species and of unknown
health status to share limited space, often the same cage. Birds in the incubation stage or breeds
that show a reduced clinical susceptibility may not appear overtly ill and therefore, may be traded
in live bird market systems. The movement of infected birds across neighboring regions could
explain the genetic relatedness found between influenza virus (H5N1) isolates obtained from 7
Nigerian states. The predominance of a reassortant virus in Nigeria mimics the previously re-
ported predominance of the Z genotype virus in Asia, although this genotype is believed to con-
tain internal genes originating from non-H5N1 influenza viruses. The introduction of influenza
virus (H5N1) of different clusters in 2005 in Vietnam, also resulted in the emergence of a reassor-
tant strain. Unlike the Nigerian situation described here, the Vietnamese reassortant influenza
virus (H5N1) did not become predominant in Vietnam.

It should be pointed out that factors other than the intermingling of poultry species in live bird
markets, as quoted in this paper, can result in reassortment. Infection by asymptomatic virus car-
riers such as ducks, fomites contacting poultry during transport (unwashed poultry crates, trans-
port trucks). Intensive risk assessment, not now a source of expertise at the NADIS/FVS Epide-
miology Unit, could have closed in on the cause of reassortment. The virus isolates discussed in
this paper are presented below.

List of influenza virus (H5N1) samples analyzed in poultry, Nigeria, 2007

Virus                                              Group              State of isolation   Date of isolation

A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-1/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07                 Plateau            Jan 2
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-3/2007                    EMA2                        Sokoto             Jan 5
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-4/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07                  Borno             Jan 5
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-5/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6–R07                 Plateau            Jan 6
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-7/2007                    EMA2                        Sokoto            Jan 10
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-9/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07                 Bauchi            Jan 12
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-10/2007             EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07                Anambra            Jan 13


23
  Excerpted from: Reassortant Avian Influenza Virus (H5N1) in Poultry, Nigeria, 2007, by Isabella
Monne, Tony M. Joannis, et.al., Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 14, No. 4, April 2008
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-15/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07               Kaduna               Jan 23
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-22/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07                Kano                Jan 31
A/duck/Nigeria/1071-23/2007                 EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07                Borno               Feb 1
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-29/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07                Lagos               Feb 9
A/chicken/Nigeria/1071-30/2007              EMA1/EMA2-2:6-R07               Kaduna               Feb 10

The H5N1 virus isolated from two ducks in two live bird markets during the July 2008 outbreaks
were characterized by Padova as EMA3, a strain not previously found in Nigeria, and stemming
from Europe, which is suggestive of wild bird introduction. The strain was isolated from ducks in
two live bird markets in Gombe and Tebbe States may point to the possibility that H5N1 viruses
be crossing, possibly in both directions, the border between Nigeria and Niger, which share a
long, porous border. The two farm outbreaks in this third wave resulted from the recent introduc-
tion of poultry purchased in live bird markets. These events point to the danger of lax farm biose-
curity and also to the dangers of transboundary introduction of infected poultry. Regardless of the
causes of reassortment, it will be necessary to strengthen the biosecurity in live bird markets, and
separate species to prevent intermingling. This is, given the present live-bird market structure
quite impossible to achieve. A pilot program to upgrade live bird market biosecurity is underway
to rebuild such markets in line with strict biosescurity measures.


5.3      Poultry sector biosecurity
Farm biosecurity is generally weak and decreases substantially from Sector 1 (vertically inte-
grated poultry agribusiness) through Sector 4 (backyard poultry), in which virtually no functional
biosecurity measures exist. Although many households keep poultry, an estimated 75% to 90% of
rural poultry householders lack any information on biosecurity measures to protect their flocks.
Rural poultry farmers often engage unqualified animal health service providers, who have been
implicated in the spread of HPAI from one location to the other. Alternatively, rural poultry
farmers patronize ethno-veterinary medicine 24 . One major identifiable gap is the provision of
community-based animal health services in rural extensive poultry production. Live bird markets,
jointly or wholly owned by municipalities and/or private poultry sellers, practice little or no bio-
security, nor are there municipal regulatory guidelines for the location, construction and man-
agement of such markets. Market inspection is cursory and not enforceable. Free ranging domes-
tic ducks raised near ponds that also serve as resting or breeding habitats for migratory birds pose
a significant biosecurity risk, given the propensity of this species to harbor sub- or non-clinical
H5N1 virus.

As indicated above, substantial behavior change training needs exist to improve biosecurity and
live bird market biosecurity. These include: intensified live bird market surveillance by LGA
Surveillance Agents and municipal live bird market inspectors (especially in the enforcement of
biosecurity), behavior change training for poultry sellers and suppliers, and awareness training of
municipal governments in the human safety aspects of operating below-standard live bird mar-
kets. The latter is hampered by the absence of municipal SOPs and regulations in the operation
and enforcement of biosecurity standards in such markets.




24
  These observations from: Pro-poor HPAI Risk Reduction Strategies – Background to the Study in Nigeria. ILRI,
Prof. Timothy Uzochukwu Obi, Mr. Adewale Olubukola Oparinde, Dr. Garba Ahmed Maina.
5.4       Risk assessment against Avian Influenza
Priorities in Risk Assessment: The Technical Expert Committee for the Control of Avian Influ-
enza was convened in 2003 by the Federal Department of Livestock and Pest Control, as part of
the preparatory phase before the first entry of the H5N1 virus into the country in 2006. The
Committee developed a national avian influenza control and containment strategy and integrate
national action plan (INAP), in which the most likely risk factors conducive to the introduction of
HPAI into Nigeria were postulated. In the original INAP a risk assessment is referred to of routes
and factors conducive to the entry of HPAI into the country. These are:

      •   Migratory birds – Nigeria lies below the East Africa/West Asia flyways and the North
          Atlantic migratory flyway. The characterization of H5N1 virus isolates from the second
          and third outbreak waves indicated that several HPAI virus isolates indeed originated
          from locations in Europe and may have been introduced by migratory birds.

      •   Trade routes and increased human traffic from South East Asia (the epizootic epicen-
          ter of HPAI) and South Africa, resulting from the relative ease of movement and trans-
          portation of travelers and poultry and poultry products. With a weak quarantine system,
          the danger of HPAI virus introduction via such routes of entry is a realistic possibility.

      •   Long, porous borders and informal livestock movement trans-border trading. With the
          neighboring countries of Cameroon and Benin, together with several other West African
          countries (Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Togo, Ghana) now infected, this risk factor, potentiated by
          the above risk factor of transboundary virus entry through trade, has substantially in-
          creased.

Based on the events that unfolded during the HPAI outbreaks that followed, these three risk as-
sessments have turned out to be less than accurate. There is no firm evidence of the role played
by migratory birds in transmitting H5N1 to domestic poultry in Nigeria. Nevertheless, protecting
farms against the possibility of contacting domestic poultry is a prudent measure and has been
adopted by many of the largest Sector 1 and 2 farms. There is no evidence that “human traffic
from Asia’ has been implicated in the entry of H5N1 into the country. If trade routes can be in-
cluded into the third risk, long, porous borders, there is a potential risk of transboundary infec-
tion, especially where Benin and Cameroon are now infected.

In December 2005, FGN set up a Technical Committee of Experts on the prevention and control
of HPAI. The Committee completed the updating of the 2003 INAP in 2006 as part of the World
Bank-funded Avian Influenza Control and Pandemic Preparedness Project. The new INAP identi-
fied the following nine strategies:

      1. A ban on importation of poultry and poultry products from countries where the disease
         (HPAI) is known to exist;
      2. Effective animal disease surveillance involving high risk areas, such as, poultry markets,
         wet lands and poultry located along known migratory birds routes, poultry abattoirs, bor-
         ders and targeted farms;
      3. Improved and functional National Veterinary Quarantine Services (NVQS), including
         immediate rehabilitation and revitalization of existing veterinary quarantine infrastruc-
         ture, control posts and enhanced manpower capabilities;
      4. Community-based training of rural backyard poultry farmers in various aspects of HPAI
         recognition and control, including bio-security procedures;
      5. Enforcement of the requirement for import permits for poultry and poultry products;
    6. Development of a traceability mechanism for animals and strict monitoring of movement
       of poultry and poultry products through registration and licensing of poultry farms,
       hatcheries and other poultry enterprises;
    7. Development of a community based, participatory rural livestock and poultry disease
       surveillance system and integrating it into the existing epidemio-surveillance network;
    8. Training of veterinarians, auxiliaries, other categories of poultry farmers on HPAI pre-
       vention and control strategies, including aspects of bio-security; and
    9. Effective public enlightenment and awareness programs on HPAI.

This list effectively quotes virtually all possible response measures, rather than surveillance lead-
ing to a response that can be taken to guard against the entry of a transboundary disease. A poul-
try value chain study to precede the drafting of a revised INAP would have provided a better fo-
cus on which priority risks emerged and what type of surveillance strategy would counter these
risks, given the existing surveillance capacity.

Based on the information and experience gathered from avian influenza outbreaks in Nigeria, the
six most critical risk assessments are identified as follows:

    1. Absence of a poultry market value chain study which clearly defines risk nodes and
       focal points, poultry flow dynamics, geo-positioned poultry farms, infection foci, poultry
       and human population densities. From these, epidemiological risk assessment, HPAI
       modeling and control strategies can be developed. Compounding this risk is the absence
       of a clear profile of the poultry sector structure by species, location and type of manage-
       ment.

    2. Weak epidemiological capacity of Federal and State epidemiology staff with the capa-
       bility to develop science-based risk assessment, and manipulate raw databases into dis-
       ease modeling exercises from which to develop disease containment strategies.

    3. Weak border quarantine service, compounded by long, porous borders surrounding, in-
       fected countries and countries, lack of quarantine enforcement and limited quarantine
       post facilities.

    4. Weak poultry farm, market, processing and trade biosecurity in the smaller poultry
       farms and non-existing biosecurity in all backyard poultry, live bird markets, slaughter
       facilities, border and internal quarantine services.

    5. Lack of an updated regulatory framework and enforcement for poultry industry
       operations: This is a two-pronged risk assessment, combining outdated or absent regula-
       tory statutes with the failure to enforce them. There are presently no regulatory statutes to
       guide the establishment of poultry farms, live-bird markets, poultry transport and poultry
       slaughtering. Many veterinary staff were found to be unfamiliar with existing laws and
       regulatory statutes that should guide their work.

    6. Problematic working relationships between public sector VS and private sector vet-
       erinarians and poultry industry stakeholders: There are serious misunderstandings
       between these groups which (re)emerged during the HPAI crisis, which hampered the
       deployment of sufficient man (woman) power to counter such a crisis with less than op-
       timal cooperation from poultry stakeholders.
Some of the cited risk assessment constraints are in the process of being, or are planned to be,
mitigated. Work is underway to begin mapping poultry farms and GIS-positioned disease out-
breaks, using the NADIS database software. Epidemiology staff is being identified to for overseas
university MSc programs. Improving poultry farm biosecurity will be a vast, long term process
which has barely begun. The lack of enforced regulatory statues and laws is a major institutional
problem which prevails across other sectors in the country. Many factors underlie this situation,
which are not within the scope of this report. Working relationships with the private VS and poul-
try industry can improve quickly if effort were only made 25 .




25
   The consultant found that his visits wit poultry farmers often came as a surprise but was well appreci-
ated, with the hope that more such exchanges would follow. .
6. HPAI-Specific Surveillance in Nigeria and Understanding
of Risks
This section describes the HPAI surveillance infrastructure and its response to surveillance find-
ings. The infrastructure developed to provide effective counter measures the threat of avian influ-
enza involves the Federal, State and Local Government levels. The Federal level oversees and
coordinates the overall response; the State level implements counter measures; and the Local
Government level liaises with at-risk populations and provides grassroots surveillance.


6.1     The HPAI Incident Command and Control system
A Federal Avian Influenza Crisis Management Center was set up in Abuja following the initial
HPAI outbreaks in 2006. The Center is headed by the President and provides strategic decision-
making with efficient communications and information dissemination to ensure a timely opera-
tional response and effective management across all sectors. However, the Center, comprising the
lead Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Information, lacks the necessary funds to become fully
operational as they cannot agree to a cost sharing mechanism to support the Center. Because of
this lack of joint collaboration, donor support has not been forthcoming. The Incident Command
and Control System (ICCS) is the policy framework for fulfilling the functions of the Center dur-
ing avian influenza outbreaks in poultry and in human influenza pandemic containment, mitiga-
tion and recovery. The ICCS consists of the Avian and Pandemic Influenza Prevention and Con-
trol Centre (APIP&CC), which operates a national hotline, and the organizations which the
APIP&CC oversees to ensure a coherent and well-coordinated response to avian and human pan-
demic influenza. The Federal APIP&CC structure is replicated at State level. This system is
shown in the diagram below.
The Federal Department of Livestock and Pest Control Services under the Ministry of Agriculture
and Water Resources is the first-responder agency to counter avian influenza outbreaks. The De-
partment has oversight and facilitatory functions and is responsible for carrying out the following
actions:

Federal level: The Director FDL, (i) coordinates surveillance, laboratory testing, and rapid re-
sponse regarding influenza outbreaks in poultry and other potential zoonoses affecting livestock,
pet animals and wildlife that present a threat to human and livestock health; (ii) in collaboration
with NVRI Vom, the FDL provides laboratory technicians to support diagnostic procedures and
clinical analysis; (iii) activates communication protocols for the early notification of the Human
Health and Information ministries of any unusual zoonoses that may present a threat to humans or
animals; (iv) oversees and/or implements destruction and safe disposal of livestock, domesticated
or exotic animals that may be required to protect human health and the animal population; estab-
lishes and strengthens quarantine facilities and movement controls; sets restocking policies and
guidelines; ensures prompt and adequate compensation of animal owners as required; and moni-
tors and evaluates the implementation of these measures.

State level: The State Director of the Department Veterinary Services has the principal responsi-
bility for disease detection, surveillance and response, with facilitation and diagnostic oversight
by the Federal VS. In this sense, the Nigerian VS are rather decentralized in their operational
structure The Director, SDVS , (i) implements national plans and standard operating procedures
(SOPs); (ii) notifies the health and information sectors at the state level of any unusual zoonoses
that may represent a threat to humans or animal population; (iii) executes the culling, disposal and
decontamination of livestock, pet animals and any wildlife that may present a threat to human and
animal populations; (iv) ensures compliance with strict bio-security measures at infected and non-
infected farms and animal markets; and (v) ensures availability of equipment and materials
needed by the various teams, where necessary with support from NEMA and its State-level coun-
terparts.

Local Government Level: The Local Government Veterinary Officer (LGVO), (i) liaises with
the community; (ii) collaborates with the Local Government health and information officers to
exchange information; and (iii) undertakes disease surveillance and reporting. LGVOs are not
available in many LGAs and this manpower gap needs to be filled as soon as feasible.


6.2     Nigerian surveillance infrastructure
The organogram of the INAP that describes the infrastructure and policies that govern the Gov-
ernment’s HPAI surveillance is presented in Figure 6.1. It comprises a three-tiered surveillance
and reporting structure from the LGA level to State and Federal levels. The State VS have the
primary responsibility of disease reporting and control, with the Federal level providing over-
sight, facilitation and coordination. Black arrows denote the disease reporting flow; brown arrows
the feedback flows from NVRI to field level and actions required, with orange arrows the report-
ing information flows from the National Coordinating Unit (NCO) to actions to be taken and to
participating national and international agencies.

Surveillance: The surveillance flow is basically similar to that in place for routine surveillance,
with additional HPAI-dedicated teams or stations added. The surveillance is active, beginning
with disease reports from the field level 26 to State Area Veterinary Officers, and from there to the
State and Zonal Veterinary Officers (Fig. 6.1). From there surveillance reports reach what has
been coined the PACE/NADIS National Coordination Unit at the Federal level. Samples are sent
by the ZVO to NVRI for diagnosis, which reports the results back to the PACE/NADIS National
Coordination Unit, which in turn advises the State Veterinary Director. The Federal level reports
to OiE, FAO, AU-IBAR and other relevant organizations. Each administrative level executes ac-
tions boxed on the right hand side of the diagram.

In the HPAI surveillance diagram (Fig. 6.1) the Special Detection Team (HPAI SDT), sent by
NVRI, and the NADIS Mobile Team (inside oval), mobilized by the HPAI National Coordinating
Unit, actually represent the TAD-dedicated (NADIS Team) and HPAI-dedicated (HPAI SDT)
investigative units that respond to reports of suspicious HPAI cases. These two teams could be
amalgamated into one joint investigation team, streamlining the surveillance response.




26
  The term “index case” in the upper left hand box was inserted when the surveillance system was initially
designed. Obviously, the time for index cases (initial disease occurrence) is long past.
Figure 6.1 – Integrated National Action Plan against HPAI




6.3     Disease reporting flows
Information concerning disease incidence reporting flows vary somewhat by report and those in-
terviewed, but in general follows the reporting flow tabulated below 27 :

Table 6.1 – Schematic Disease Reporting Flow
Actions Taken                                 Team and/or Agency(ies)             Available Re-
                                              Responsible                         sources
Step 1. Report of a suspicious case           • Private veterinary practitioner   Based in 774
                                              • Poultry farmer/ owner             LGAs
                                              • Wildlife or Park rangers
                                              • Animal health/ extension
                                                officers
                                              • Surveillance agents/animal
                                                health service provider
                                              • Community leader.
Step 2. Local Government Veterinary Officer   • location of index case/cases,     LGVOs in most
collects information                          • clinical features                 of the 774 LGAs
                                              • collect specimens
                                              • impose such immediate
                                                movement restrictions
                                              • inform State Director of Vet-

27
  Integrated National Avian and Pandemic Influenza Response plan - 2007 -2009, Federal Department of
Livestock and Pest Control Services
                                                   erinary Services (SDVS)
                                                 • informs Zonal Coordinating
                                                   Officer
                                                 • Dispatches collected samples
                                                   to NVRI.

Step 3. State Director VS informs Zonal Co- •       Zonal VO informs Director,        15 Zonal Coor-
ordinating Officer, on receipt of positive di-      (DFDL&PCS) and NADIS              dinating Officers
agnosis and:                                        Coordination officer.             (Federal level)
• Analyzes the information provided by
    the LGVO,
• Takes further steps to limit possible
    spread,
• Advises DFDL&PCS on the
outcome of investigation
• Advises LGVO to declare false
    alarm progression to the Alert
    phase.

Step 4. ZVO sends out Specialist Diagnostic      SDT consists of:                     NVRI and 4
Teams (SDT) to:                                  - Poultry/veterinary virologist, -   VTHs provide
• Carry out clinical examinations                Veterinary epidemiologist            the SDT special-
• Collect histories                              -Veterinary pathologist              ists
• Make preliminary investigations                -Poultry clinician
• Collect diagnostic specimens                   - Laboratory diagnostician

Step 5. Diagnosis by NVRI confirmed              NVRI Reports to Director, Federal    By email, tele-
                                                 DVS&PC                               phone
Step 6. Inform NADCC                             National Animal Disease Control      National hotline
                                                 Centre (NADCC)
Step 7. Report to OIE, FAO, WHO,                 Director, Federal DVS&PC             OIE Emergency
FAO/ECTAD                                                                             report form
Step 8. Control measures -stamp out and          State and LGA veterinary teams,      State and LGA
depopulate farms                                 supervised by AVO, ZVO               manpower re-
-deep burial of culled poultry                                                        sources
-disinfect infected farms
-road black to ban animal movement
-intensive active surveillance
-public awareness
Step 9. Pay compensation of affected poultry     AVO records no. of culled poultry    Compensation
owners                                           and owners                           forms

Reporting: Table 6.1 provides a simplified overview of the actual reporting and feedback flows
presently in place for the reporting and containment of HPAI. The detection of HPAI (red solid
arrows) at the LGA level is reported by poultry farmers to their Surveillance Agents, who in turn
report to their Area Veterinary Officer (AVO). The AVO is a State officer who oversees groups
of LGAs and mobilizes an investigation team which takes samples within 24 hours of detection,
for submission to the National Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI) HPAI laboratory located in
Vom, Plateau State. This laboratory was set up for the purpose of the diagnosis and virus charac-
terization of HPAI virus isolates. NVRI is now able to provide a diagnosis within 48 hours, and
virus characterization 24 hours later. NVRI periodically sends batches of duplicate samples to the
OFFLU avian influenza reference laboratory in Padova, Italy for quality control, the cost of
which (some $5000 per batch) is supported by the FAO Emergency Center for Transboundary
Diseases (ECTAD) in Rome. Diagnostic accuracy of virus characterizations submitted by NVRI
has been 98%. This diagnostic system works extremely well, and the NVRI avian flu laboratory
is working towards OIE accreditation as a regional HPAI reference laboratory for West Africa.
The feedback of diagnostic information (orange (Federal) and green (State) stippled arrows) from
NVRI to Federal and from Federal to State and international organizations (OIE, FAO) works
well, although the feedback of negative samples (just as important) from Federal VS back to State
VS and from State to LGA needs improvement. The reporting flow described may to too labora-
tory-dependent, but the system errs on the cautious side and no chances are taken that field work-
ers might make the wrong initial diagnosis.


6.4       Risk assessment in the disease surveillance infrastructure
The constraints to optimal human resource utilization in disease surveillance are common to
many developing countries and reflect on underfunding, capacity building and, often, job secu-
rity. The risks inherent in the present surveillance system are outlined below:

      •   Weak coordination and limited involvement by other partners (VTH laboratories, private
          veterinarians, poultry industry stakeholders) in disease surveillance. This increases the
          possibility of missing disease events that may either go unnoticed or are not reported.
      •   Heavy reliance on surveillance agents at the grassroots level who are not always ade-
          quately trained to make the initial diagnosis of suspicious cases. This may lead to initially
          missed or faulty diagnoses, which may delay a response during which infections may
          spread.
      •   Infrequent inspection visits to Control Posts by State or Federal VS officers, which are
          necessary to maintain morale, inspect performance and answer queries.
      •   Delays in the collection and transport of samples from field to laboratory, often the result
          of inability to pay for transportation costs, which can delay or prevent the submission of
          samples for rapid diagnosis and response.
      •   Incomplete and late monthly disease report submissions leave the NADIS system incom-
          plete and not up to date, thereby negating an important function of providing timely, ac-
          curate disease information.
      •   High veterinary staff turnover resulting from limited employment incentives, an institu-
          tional constraint that can lead to below-par performance of duty officers.
      •   Insufficient notification and understanding of rules and regulatory matters related to dis-
          ease surveillance, a serious problem in regulatory enforcement and in the understanding
          by veterinary officers of the guidelines, rules and procedures that veterinarians should
          follow.
      •   Inadequate incentives for livestock owners to participate in surveillance, a serious risk as
          disease events may be missed, left unreported, or hidden.
      •   Limited funds available for surveillance training, a chronic underfunding problem which
          limit human capacity building and thereby limits VS capability and optimal performance.
      •   Weak epidemiological skills in risk analysis (hazard identification, risk assessment, risk
          management, & risk communication), which leave disease information data un-analyzed,
          thereby reducing the final objective of developing disease control strategies for decision
          makers.
      •   Weak diagnostic performance of VTHs, which places an undue load on NVRI, especially
          where random surveys and post-vaccination sero-monitoring are concerned.

As described, the surveillance and reporting system still relies on a large, often complicated, in-
frastructure of players at various levels, which increases the chances of mishaps, disconnects and,
perhaps, unnecessary alarms. Capacity building through training, more effective communication
from the higher to lower VS levels, the importance of working under existing regulatory rules and
regulations, and improving participation by the private sector should be long term goals to im-
prove VS field efficiency. Given the limited VS financial and human resources available to Nige-
ria, as is the case in any developing countries, capacity building programs need to be imple-
mented within the established institutional structure of the VS and emphasize the soft skills that
individuals at all levels need to critically evaluate systems, influence decision makers and create
sustainable change. When making these assessments, it is worthwhile remembering that the Nige-
rian VS had been starved of adequate funds for decades and was suddenly faced, as the first-
responder agency, with the crisis of a rapidly spreading zoonotic disease that overwhelmed its
resources, seriously damaged a developing poultry industry, and had (perhaps still has) the poten-
tial of affecting the lives and livelihoods of untold numbers of people.


6.5       HPAI outbreak control measures
The 2006 Nigeria Prevention and Emergency Plan against Avian Influenza states the following
regarding protocols to be used to contain outbreaks:
Where the disease is discovered in limited populations and has not spread beyond the immediate
vicinity, the recommended action should be:

      •   Modified stamping out which involves quarantine and slaughter of infected poultry with
          full compensation;
      •   Sanitary disposal of destroyed poultry and contaminated poultry products according to
          standard operating procedures;
      •   Quarantine and movement control on poultry and poultry products in the infected areas or
          zone;
      •   Decontamination of facilities, products and equipment to eliminate the virus on infected
          premises and prevent spread to other areas;
      •   Active disease surveillance to determine the source and extent of the infection;
      •   Effective public awareness campaign to elicit cooperation from large scale commercial
          and back yard poultry owners.

Where modified stamping out failed and HPAI becomes established in the country, a different
policy involving the under listed would be adopted:

      •   Ring or Mass Vaccination of poultry as the case may be;
      •   Movement restriction of poultry and poultry products;
      •   Depopulation of clinically infected farms with payment of compensation;
      •   Sanitary disposal of dead and destroyed poultry and contaminated poultry products ac-
          cording to standard operating procedures;
      •   Disinfection and decontamination of affected premises according to the standard operat-
          ing procedures;
      •   Active disease surveillance to determine the source and extent of the infection;
      •   Effective public awareness campaign to elicit cooperation from large scale commercial
          and back yard poultry owners.

These guidelines have been implemented to control outbreaks, including the mention of carrying
out active surveillance (underlined). ”To determine the source and extent of infection”, as quoted,
has been problematic, especially where trace back is not presently possible due to a lack of ani-
mal or farm-of-origin identification. These interventions are presently under discussion, and may
follow the completion of GIS mapping and livestock identification. Although trace back will
work with commercial poultry, the large number of backyard poultry sold locally or in live-bird
markets will hamper trace back investigation.

The decision to vaccinate against HPAI, mentioned as a potential control tool, is controversial.
Avian flu vaccination is presently forbidden, in line with FAO recommendations that non-
infected countries or countries without repeated outbreak despite stringent control measures,
should not vaccinate. There are reports of illegal vaccination and many in the commercial poultry
industry have requested the VS to allow vaccination. Given the enormous logistical resources and
costs (as the author experienced personally in Vietnam and Indonesia) the decision to hold off has
been a wise one.

Table 6.1 presents the array of diagnostic tests performed in the diagnosis of HPAI. ABU, Ibadan,
Nsukka, Sokoto and Maiduguri denote the locations of Veterinary Teaching Hospitals. NVRI is
the National Veterinary Research Institute, the principal institution in which the national veteri-
nary laboratory is located.

Table 6.1 – Diagnostic tests for HPAI and virus characterization.




6.6     Veterinary quarantine services
An Act to establish a National Animal and Plant Quarantine Agency has been promulgated by the
National Assembly. Supported by this regulatory framework, the Agency should now be in a po-
sition to make fresh provisions in the control, prevention and spread of infectious livestock and
poultry diseases, hatcheries and other breeding facilities; and to better regulate the importation
and exportation, sale, distribution and movement of trade animals, biologics and animal products
of biotechnology. However, institutional constraints remain. The Agency is now an entity inde-
pendent from the Ministry of Agriculture, which continues to pay staff salaries, but no operating
budget, until such time that the Agency receives its own budget. It is, in fact, presently operating
under an unfunded mandate. Quarantine Officer skill levels are low and require significant train-
ing inputs, and regulatory enforcement remains weak. As the risk of HPAI re-infection is consid-
ered very high 28 , the technical upgrading of the border and internal Control (i.e. quarantine) Posts
commands high priority. The upgrading of the four key inland Control Posts at Jebba, Makurdi,
Katsina Ala, and Lokoja and quarantine staff training for an estimated 150 quarantine staff will be
undertaken under AICP.

Given the above-noted constraints, the Quarantine Agency has not been able to exert its mandate
to control border traffic to maximum effect. Lack of transportation further stifles active border
control, and illegal smuggling takes place, especially in the south-west and northern border areas.
Although there is no refutable evidence to date that cross-border incursion of H5N1 has taken
place, the danger of this happening or continuing (if it is happening) is real.


6.7         Regulatory framework
Although there are no specific laws and regulations directed strictly to the poultry sector in Nige-
ria there are policies, laws and regulations relating to animal disease and production of which the
poultry sector is part of these. These include the Meat Inspection and Hygiene Act of 2002, the
Meat Hygiene Legislation of 1969 and the Animal Disease Control Act of 1988. With respect to
Food Safety, production and standardization, regulations and laws are covered under the National
Agency for Food, Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC) established in 1993, the Food
and Drugs decree of 1999, the Standard Organization on Nigeria which is vested with the author-
ity to specify, elaborate standards and provide quality assurance for commodities imported from
outside Nigeria. There is also the National Biosafety Guidelines of 1994. Overall none of the
above laws is specifically targeted to the poultry industry and no attention is paid to the rural
poultry sector which forms the greater part of Nigerian poultry. Enforcement of the laws is gener-
ally poor and sometimes non-existent 29 .

Regulatory enforcement of markets, slaughtering and farm biosecurity is weak due to the poor
enforcement of existing laws. Two major migratory flyways cross the country, with wild birds
settling on rivers, watersheds, wetlands and creeks, posing an exposure risk to free ranging back-
yard poultry. The country borders, Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Benin, of which the latter two
countries reported HPAI in March 2006 and December 2007, respectively, although no recurrent
infection has been reported since then. Border controls are weak and smuggling takes place, espe-
cially across the border with Benin near Lagos (for outward movement of DOC and eggs), and
along the long northern border points with Niger (for entry of local poultry), aiming for wholesale
markets in northern cities. This illegal trans-border traffic poses a significant risk to the entry as
well as spread of H5N1.




28
     At the tine of writing this report, neighboring Benin announced new outbreaks in live bird markets.
29
     Idem
VII.              GIS and Risk Mapping Capacity
7.1      GIS mapping capacity
The only location in the VS system of Nigeria that undertakes GIS is the HPAI/NADIS Federal
Epidemiology Unit (FEU) under FVS. This unit is headed by the Chief FEU and an epidemiology
officer. The FEU completed the Assessment of GIS capabilities questionnaire, from which the
information provided here was taken. The FEU uses the WAHIS electronic mapping software and
                                                                         PowerPoint presentations to map, in
 Table 7.1 - Staff involved in GIS Mapping in Nigeria
 GIS-Related Activity          Name                           Department randomized fashion, disease out-
 Data Collection               15 Zonal Coordinators          NADIS, FDL break or occurrence locations. The
                               37 State Epidemiology Officers            Unit uses a GIS as part of the disease
 Data Management               Dr. Gashash                    NADIS, FDL
                                                                         information provided to map disease
 Provide electronic            Dr. I.G. Ahmed
 geographic data               Dr. O. Alabi                   NADIS, FDL data only. These are included in offi-
 Use GIS software to display Dr. I.G. Ahmed                              cial documents, such as Surveillance
 disease data                  Dr. O. Alabi                   NADIS, FDL guidelines and manuals, and in pres-
 Use GIS software to perform Dr. I.G. Ahmed                              entations at workshops or national or
 spatial analysis              Dr. O. Alabi                   NADIS, FDL
 Use electronic maps by
                                                                         international meetings. No risk map-
 decision makers               n/a                                       ping or risk assessment is performed,
                                                                         but both FEU staff have been trained
in the potential use of GIS software to produce electronic surveillance maps. Two laptop com-
puters, of 512 MB and 1GB are used to create maps with a >1GHz processor, using broadband
internet. Mapinfo® and Arcview® mapping software is used, stored on Excel and Dbase. The
disease data used to create maps are the geographical coordinates of infected farms and holdings.
Entries are made when disease data become available. The electronic maps created use State
boundaries, markets and abattoirs on the territory of Nigeria only. The FEU produces its own and
uses maps prepared by others. Maps are produced weekly, and used to report current disease
status to local authorities, international organizations (OIE) and to inform surveillance staff of
disease control activities. These are inserted into documents and published on websites. GIS maps
shown only disease prevalence per area (State), but no calculations are made. Outside the FEU,
laboratory staff at NVRI is involved in data collection and sends its information to FEU for entry.


7.2      GIS risk analysis
As indicated above, risk analysis is not undertaken at the present time as VS staff have not been
trained. Training is planned under AICP by sending two FEU staff to IITA/ILRI Ibadan for short
term bench training, and two others for overseas MSc epidemiology programs. The risks involved
in this lack of capacity relates to the present inability to convert raw field data into analytic con-
clusions related to disease prevalence, and transmission dynamics as required to develop spatial
spread models. With GIS mapping now underway, albeit in its early stages, and geographic coor-
dinates being included in disease incidence reports, the potential for introducing comprehensive
GIS risk analysis is good.
VIII     HPAI Projects in Nigeria and Capacity Build-
ing Gaps
This Section provides a description of donor-assisted HPAI support projects and an analysis of
existing capacity building gaps in the Government’s ability to most effectively address measures
to counter the incursion of avian influenza. The analysis takes into account ongoing capacity
building by the Government and the technical international organizations FAO and OIE as well as
assistance from USAID and the World Bank, and remaining gaps.

8.1     Donor community support
Many donors and development partners have given support and aid to the Government for the
HPAI control and eradication efforts since the outbreak of the disease in 2006.

 Table 7.1 - International donors assisting the Government for AI Prevention and Control 30
Types of Assistance to Government of Nigeria

 Donor/Development          Technical           Material          Financial         Capacity
       Partners                                                                     Building
ADB                                                                  Xxx
AU-IBAR                         XXX
CDC                             XXX
China PR                                          XXX
DfID                                              XXX
EU                                                XXX               XXX                XXX
Israel                                            XXX
FAO                             XXX               XXX                                  XXX
France                          XXX                                                    XXX
OIE                             XXX
South Korea                                       XXX
UNDP                                                                XXX
UNICEF                          XXX
USAID                                             XXX               XXX                XXX
USDA-APHIS                      XXX               XXX                                  XXX
World Bank                                                           Xxx

Sixteen donors have provided, or are continuing to provide, various types of assistance to the
Government (Table 7.1). This assistance has come in various forms: technical, material, financial
and through capacity building. Material and financial support has been mainly in the form of pro-
viding equipment with which to counter HPAI, such as PPE, disinfectants, sprayers, and, in some
instance, laboratory consumables. Some of these (PPE, disinfectants) are kept in storage for pos-
sible future use, and have been distributed mainly to quarantine service Control Posts. Donors
who provided technical support and capacity building are especially relevant to this report, and
are covered in detail.
USAID, FAO and the European Union (through AU-IBAR) have been the most important con-
tributors to the past and current surveillance studies that are in progress within the FAO ECTAD
projects. Each has contributed approximately $1 to $1.5 million.


8.2     Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
FAO is engaged in Nigeria through a regional Technical Cooperation Project (TCP), covering the
West African countries. In Nigeria, FAO has provided NVRI with diagnostic reagents and labora-
tory materials to perform rapid test Avian Influenza virus detection, and with capacity building
through training. FAO is currently conducting an active survey of live bird markets in infected
and uninfected States of Nigeria 31 . Funds for this program were obtained principally from the
USAID and the European Union at the national level, and from Canada and Sweden at regional
level. Recent contacts with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) indi-
cated that it has plans to reactivate its commitment towards the HPAI control and prevention
through the Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC) in Bamako, and elsewhere. The Japan Inter-
national Cooperation Agency (JICA) has focused mainly on the communication aspect of HPAI
control program in association with UNICEF. However, its future plans indicate that it may con-
sider the other strategies.

The FAO live-bird market active surveillance program will harmonize well with the upcoming
live-bird market biosecurity upgrading, to be undertaken the World Bank’s AICP. FAO will be
training market stakeholders (bird sellers, slaughterers, transporters, suppliers) in behavior change
maintaining market biosecurity and the safe handling of poultry and hygienic poultry slaughter-
ing.


8.3     United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Just prior to the first outbreak in 2006, USAID donated close to US$6 million to aid the Govern-
ment of Nigeria in its quest to prepare and respond to the deadly pathogen, part of which is ear-
marked for the EDSR-AIA program. In both didactic and hands-on designs, this money has been
utilized by the USAID implementing partners (International Livestock Research Institute, Food
and Agriculture Organization, Development Alternatives Inc., Academy for Educational Devel-
opment) to enhance and improve activities including surveillance, detection, reporting, diagnosis,
response/mitigation measures, and disease containment. Training of hundreds of pertinent per-
sonnel under the auspices of a train-the-trainer format has taken place covering subjects including
risk communication, biosecurity, decontamination, laboratory diagnosis, and personal protective
measures. In addition, USAID has contributed numerous laboratory sampling kits, hundreds of
decontamination kits, and over 40,000 sets of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to aid in the
control and containment of Avian Influenza.

USAID is currently funding the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) to engage with
the Government of Nigeria to strengthen HPAI surveillance in the country under the project Early
Disease Reporting and Surveillance for Avian Influenza in Africa (EDRS-AIA). USAID remains
committed to assisting the Government of Nigeria in the battle against AI and would ultimately
like to see Nigeria become certified by the World Organization for Animal Health as an “AI-free”
country. This would not only diminish the threat of a human pandemic, it would also drastically

31
 It was this survey in which the H5N1-positive ducks in live-bird markets in Gombe and Tebbe States
were discovered in July 2008.
improve food security as well as allow Nigeria to legally export poultry and poultry products,
thereby advancing the economic development of all who are involved in the poultry industry.

8.4     The World Bank-funded Avian Influenza Project
Following the first outbreaks of HPAI in Nigeria in early 2006, the Government requested assis-
tance from the Bank. A $50 million project, entitled the Nigeria Avian Influenza Control and
Pandemic Preparedness and Human Response Project (AICP) was activated as an emergency
operation under the GPAI initiative in June 2006 32 . As its name implies, the project addresses the
animal and human side of avian influenza and has 4 components: Animal Health, Human Health,
Communication & Public Awareness, and Project Management. The project was restructured in
April 2008 and extended as a standard operation to July 2011. The AICP Animal Health Compo-
nent has 4 sub-components: (i) strengthening laboratory services, (ii) expanding national disease
surveillance, (iii) strengthening biosecurity in the poultry market chain, and, (iv) workshops and
strategic studies. The sub-component addressing surveillance is of relevance here, and has two
groups of activities: strengthening active central and field surveillance, and capacity building in
advance epidemiology and risk assessment at the NADIS/FVS Epidemiology Unit (FEU).

Field Surveillance remains the weakest link in the existing surveillance system, and the project
would support training for State and LGA agents. This would involve the training of up to 774
LGA Surveillance agents, about 179 Area Veterinary Officers manning Control Posts, 15 Zonal
Veterinary Officers and 37 State Veterinary Officers assigned to surveillance. Training should
focus on active surveillance, carried out within the contexts of the framework and infrastructure
established by PACE, using the NADIS database software. Some (about 150) Surveillance
Agents have already been trained. A TOT training system would be set up under which Federal
and/or State (not decided) Master Trainers (to coin a USAID term) would be trained to train State
Master Trainers, which would in turn train LGA staff. In a PDSR setting (a concept viewed with
some misgivings by VS because of its apparent failure in Indonesia) Area Veterinary Officers
trained as Master Trainers would in turn train Surveillance Agents at the LGA grassroots level. It
is felt by Bank AICP supervision mission staff that surveillance training should be provided by
outside trainers so as to provide trainees with “fresh insight instead of with more-of-the-same”.
Training to improve disease reporting has improved the quality of monthly disease report submis-
sions, but more (or refresher) training may be needed to more firmly entrench quality reporting
habits. (Brian: please provide link to INAP PDS statement and NADIS mobile/SDT)

Capacity building in epidemiology at the Federal level will involve science-based, advanced
epidemiology overseas MSc programs (2 persons) and the technical attachment of 4 FEU GIS
technicians to a qualified institution. A phased MSc sandwich program would avoid long term
leaves by two FEU staff which cannot be missed at FEU for 2-year periods. AICP support has
been committed to this activity.

8.5     Capacity building by the Nigerian Veterinary Services
Capacity building activities are tabulated in Table 5.2. Many of the activities compiled have been
completed, but some may require re-enforcement by refresher training.




32
   The Nigeria AICP, at $50 mln, remains the largest investment project in the GPAI portfolio The second
largest GPAI project was Vietnam-1 (there is now a second Vietnam GPAI project), completed in Decem-
ber 2007 at $8 mln IDA funds and a $1.8 million JICA grant for smallholder poultry restocking.
Table 5.2 – Ongoing or Completed Capacity Building in HPAI Control
Activity           Government                        USAID                             FAO                              World Bank/AICP
Epidemiology and Short term national training by
Risk Analysis    FAO-ECTAD, FAO Technical                                                                            Train 2 MSc candidates in
                 Cooperation Project, of Zonal                                                                       epidemiology risk analysis.
                 Vet Officers. Completed.            None                              None                          Proposed.
Live Bird Market Nationwide disinfection program     Health and Safety training        Training 26 Team Leaders for AICP Pilot to upgrade LBMs in
Bioseurity       of major LBMs in all States.        workshop on Avian Influenza       the targeted HPAI             Lagos (2), Kaduna (2), Kano
                 Upgrading of several LBMs.          commodities for 48                surveillance in the Live Bird (1), Abuja (2), Jos (1) In
                 Poultry market Chain Analysis.      veterinarians and para-vets.      Markets. Completed.           progress .
                 Ongoing.                            Completed.
Regulatory       INAP 2006. Requires revision        None                              None                             None
framework        to allow for emergency
                 disease interventions . Meat
                 Inspection and Hygiene Act of
                 2002. Meat Hygiene Legislation
                 2004. National Biosafety Act
                 1987. Veterinary Surgeons Act
                 1987. Requires update to
                 enforce veterinary licensing
                 and continuing education .
                 Animal Diseases Control Act 10
                 of 1988 - under review .
                 Need municipal regulationd
                 for establishment of LBMs
                 and poulry farm SOP.
Animal Quarantine Provide PPE and disinfectants    None                                None                             Train all animal quarantine
Service           for all control posts. Train                                                                          inspectors. Assist in
                  Quatrantine officers. Reorganize                                                                      establishing integrated
                  Quarantine Service. Ongoing.                                                                          quarantine database linked to
                                                                                                                        NADIS for forward/back tracing,

Laboratory         Capacity building at NVRI;        Provide laboratory equipment, Training of 10 laboratory            Upgrade the 5 VTH with
Services           attendace at HPAI conferences     PPE and consumables.          technicians in Advanced HPAI         diagnostic equipment. Upgrade
                   and technical meetings. Lab       Completed.                    Diagnostic Techniques.               NVRI lab to BSL3
                   training of VTH staff in basic                                  Completed.                           status.Completed.
                   HPAI serology. Completed.

Active             Establish 774 surveillance posts, Recruitment of 7 Field Liaison    Nation-wide active HPAI
Surveillance       one in each LGA. To date 285      officers who were posted to 7     disease surveillance training.
                   established. In progress.         NADIS zonal offices (Lagos,       Completed.
                                                     Minna, Ilorin, Makurdi, Bauchi,
                                                     Yenogoa and Yola).
                                                     Completed.
Passive            Train 774 LGA Surveillance        Support for surveillance          Support for surveillance
Surveillance       Agents - to date 564 trained. In training.                          training.
                   progress.
Disease Risk -     Development of NADIS              None                              None                             National and overseas training
Targeting          database and transfer of                                                                             in GIS, mapping, modelling.
Database           databases from ARIS and PACE                                                                         Planned.
                   to NADIS. In progress.


Other interventions, especially technical support to NVRI, do not require further inputs. As out-
lined earlier, the USAID/ILRI project will train and mobilize members of the national VS in par-
ticipatory epidemiology and create a small core of animal health personnel introduced to and
practicing PDS.. This program will be scaled out, under the World Bank-supported AICP. Dis-
ease response policies, plans and mechanisms to be evaluated in terms of efficacy and disease
situation evidence provided by the participatory epidemiology activities supported by the
USAID/ILRI project and in collaboration with ILRI and GoN experts.
8.6     Gaps in capacity building
Strengthening poultry farm and live bird market biosecurity. Active live bird market surveil-
lance for HPAI is presently undertaken by FAO with EU support and will be undertaken by FLS
under AICP. However, the training LBM stakeholders (poultry sellers, transporters, middlemen,
poultry suppliers) in improved biosecurity will only be partly supported under the AICP. Since
LBMs are the responsibility of municipal governments and State VS. Given the scarce manpower
resources at SDVS, the training in behavior of these stakeholders is in jeopardy. Since most poul-
try sellers are organized they can receive training in groups. However, the training of other LBM
stakeholders will be a massive undertaking and difficult to organize endeavor.

Introduction of risk targeted PDS: No training has taken place nor is any scheduled under any
project. This is an important skills gap and needs to be filled urgently to engender efficient use of
scare resources through better-targeted disease search.

Capacity building in animal quarantine services: Training in quarantine will need an interna-
tional (regional?) expert to provide a fresh view, for which the FVS will want to obtain grant
funding. This is an urgently needed skills gap.

Veterinary regulatory review and enforcement is a Federal and State matter and, for the ur-
gently needed development of LBM SOPs, a Municipal responsibility. This activity will require
substantial effort, not only in the upgrading of the existing regulatory framework, but also in its
enforcement. This training has not been scheduled under any donor, or VS capacity building pro-
gram, and will a regulatory statues review as well as training of veterinary officers.

Analysis of the poultry marketing chain and marketing dynamics is an important aspect of
disease mapping, especially where risk assessment and trace back are concerned. An international
agricultural economist, working with a counterpart national economist, could be supported to de-
velop the poultry marketing chain analysis. Although this is a longer term activity to complete,
training designated VS in the principles of such an analysis and developing a work plan with
them, would be an important beginning.

Definition of the poultry industry infrastructure goes hand in hand with the marketing chain
analysis and relates to an updating of the national poultry inventory by species, location and pro-
duction system according to FAO classification. Similar to the poultry marketing chain analysis,
developing a survey framework this identifies risks would be a valuable contribution.


8.7     Priority needs in capacity building in surveillance
The ten most important priorities in generic (i.e. surveillance and other skills) capacity building
are listed below:

    1. Capacity building at FEU in advanced epidemiological principles and the ability to ma-
       nipulate field data into risk-based disease control strategies.
    2. GIS mapping and risk analysis at FEU.
    3. Strengthening active surveillance capacity in the field by introducing sustainable and par-
       ticipatory approaches to disease surveillance to a core of practitioners; backed by field
       evaluation and TOT for trickled down and scaling out.
    4. Analysis of the poultry marketing value chain.
    5. Strengthening biosecurity at poultry farms and live bird markets.
    6. Review of the regulatory framework related to quarantine and emergency disease control
        measures, and regulatory enforcement of existing regulations.
    7. Upgrading Quarantine Services in the knowledge and understanding of regulatory statues
        and enforcement.
    8. Registration, definition and mapping of the poultry industry infrastructure by population,
        species, and location of farms, hatcheries, slaughter establishment, control posts and
        poultry (livestock) trade flows.
    9. Targeting communication and public awareness capacity to civil society groups.
    10. Establishing sustainable public-private partnerships for livestock owner compensation.



IX Top Five Surveillance Capacity Building Needs to be Met
through Short-Term Training
9.1     Priority needs in capacity building
From the priority needs outlines in Section VIII, the five most important priorities responsive to
short-term (3-4 months?) training in surveillance activities are:

    1. Training GIS staff would enhance their ability to develop the GIS mapping activities
       and appreciate risk-based spatial spread models.

    2. Training a core of PDS practitioners drawn mostly from the public sector, in active
       surveillance. This activity would provide a valuable resource for downstream training in
       applied surveillance rooted in science-based epidemiological principles.

    3. Developing a framework to assist FVS staff in their future analysis of the poultry
       marketing chain as a contributor to risk-based surveillance and evidence-based risk
       analysis.

    4. Quarantine officer training in regulatory and enforcement activities, involving some
       150 officers from across the country. This significant surveillance capacity gap is in ur-
       gent need of being filled.

    5. Training of State Directors of Veterinary Services, heads of epidemiology units and
       veterinary public health workers in the data management aspects of active field sur-
       veillance programs, to strengthen the management skills of these decision makers in
       guiding active field surveillance programs linked to NADIS and by extension to AU-
       IBAR, OIE.

The combined capacity building support for these five priorities would provide FDL with an inte-
grated package of skills and knowledge in enhanced active surveillance capacity, with which FDL
would be able to continue to build its national surveillance program at all levels. The training pri-
oritized would fill existing gaps in GIS mapping, risk analysis at the Federal Level. At both Fed-
eral and State levels, initial PDS master training capacity would provide the necessary skills to
conduct cascade training to State and LGA-level veterinary officers. It is important to introduce
to State VS Directors the concepts of how best to manage and oversee the enhanced surveillance
capacity for which they will be responsible. It is of paramount importance to get State Veterinary
Directors, the decision makers with the most impact on the quality of active surveillance pro-
grams in their States, on board with the management skills to implement their surveillance pro-
grams as best as possible. Quarantine services remain one of the weakest links in the surveillance
system and need basic and refresher training in epidemiological concepts and the regulatory as-
pects of veterinary quarantine.
X       Recommendations for the EDRS-AIA Project
10.1 Recommendations
The Nigerian poultry industry is a major player in West Africa. It is an industry that was growing
rapidly until the entry of HPAI. The arrival of HPAI has, in one aspect, been a boon for the long
underfunded VS, and funds suddenly became available from a variety of sources. The VS is fully
aware of this sudden “windfall” and is sparing no effort to utilize the fund available to upgrade its
national veterinary infrastructure, in the full knowledge that this plethora of support will not last
forever. The combined workload of having to deal with the suddenly emerging HPAI crisis, car-
rying on with existing responsibilities, and handling the influx of donor-supported projects and
activities, have left the VS’s absorption capacity considerably overstretched.

Subject to VS concurrence, the introduction of the EDRS-AIA project should implement the ca-
pacity building package as outlined in Section IX, and should, if at all possible, do so without
creating additional infrastructure that would further stress absorption capacity. At present, VS
staff is fully occupied with the World Bank’s AICP which is now shifting from initial procure-
ment activities to the more complicated aspects of organizing and implementing capacity building
activities. The short-term nature of the EDRS-AIA training program would help mitigate this con-
cern. On the other hand, its time span must be sufficiently long to allow recipient VS staff to ade-
quately absorb what is being offered.

There is ample opportunity to link several of the priority training activities recommended above
into the AICP training programs. Examples include quarantine training, GIS capacity, risk analy-
sis capacity, and developing a poultry value chain study framework, Discussions with senior VS
officers should explore the how-and-when possibilities of such a linkage. The actual implementa-
tion of a poultry value chain study would be a very valuable contribution of the EDRS-AIA pro-
ject.

Some uncertainly prevails amongst senior VS staff as to the exact purpose and use of PDS to
strengthen surveillance in a sustainable manner, and this matter should be further discussed, clari-
fied and agreements reached with senior VS staff on how best to implement PDS in the country
given the existing and active NADIS surveillance program. Perhaps ILRI can present African
success cases that are working.

It is the consultant’s opinion that sensitizing/training State Directors of Veterinary Services in
surveillance program management skills is an important objective, which can be undertaken as a
stand-alone exercise.

In summary, the following steps are recommended:

    •   Harmonize the EDRS-AIA training program to the maximum extent possible with ongo-
        ing AICP training activities, so that capacity building on both sides are complimentary
        and mutually reinforcing
    •   Be careful not to overstretch existing absorption capacity of VS staff with short-term
        training that needs to be completed quickly or in quick succession. Spread individual
        training courses—each of the short-term nature indicated—over an agreed longer time
        span
•   Be aware that a management cost will be incurred by the recipient VS to implement the
    EDRS-AIA program, and that such a cost should be included into the training budget
•   Sensitizing State Veterinary Officers might best be done in the form of one or more
    workshops, as these persons do not have the time to undertake continuous training over
    many days or weeks
•   Agree with VS the purpose and goals of PDS and how these might best be utilized within
    the existing NADIS surveillance framework
•   The bench training of GIS technicians could be done at IITA and ILRI Ibadan with con-
    tributions from ILRI Nairobi.

								
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