Get documents about "QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO SHELTER PROGRAM ISSUES
Document Sample
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO SHELTER PROGRAM ISSUES
February, 1998
1. What has been done to improve the shelter survey program since Hurricane
Andrew?
ANSWER: Since Hurricane Andrew, the state’s hurricane shelter survey program has seen
several improvements. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, the Division had two engineers that
performed facility surveys on a statewide basis. However, in accordance with Federal
Emergency Management Agency and State Legislative guidance, their primary duties
focused on surveying buildings for protection against nuclear weapons attack. The
Division and local planners used this information to prepare nuclear civil protection plans
for evacuating and sheltering populations at risk from a nuclear attack. The Division now
has an engineering support staff of six engineers whose duties and responsibilities focus
primarily on hurricane preparedness. The engineering staff provides technical assistance
to state and local governments in performing facility-specific hurricane hazards
identification and vulnerability assessments.
Prior to Hurricane Andrew, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)
Natural Hazards Vulnerability (NHV) program was the only hurricane hazards analysis
procedure available to the Division’s engineering staff. A relatively quick and easy to
perform (about 4 - 8 hours per facility) program, the NHV provided a simple 1 to 5 rating
to represent the “relative” vulnerability of a surveyed facility; 1 meaning “relatively low”
vulnerability, and 5 meaning “relatively high” vulnerability. However, the NHV had
several negative aspects, including: 1) a report with only a 1 to 5 vulnerability rating
could be misinterpreted*; 2) the NHV rating format did not provide sufficient information
to address mitigation; 3) the “relative” rating was not linked to a specific level of
performance; i.e., a facility with an NHV rating of 1 for a 130 mph storm could not
guarantee the facility’s survival (and more importantly, the ability to continue to function);
and the most troublesome aspect, 4) a comparison of NHV program ratings versus post-
storm damage reports and construction industry literature indicated significant
discrepancies. The Division’s engineers investigated another wind hazards analysis
software package, WIND-RITE™, prepared for insurance industry use, but found
concerns similar to those of the NHV program. Based upon its concerns, the Division
discontinued use of the NHV program and the WIND-RITE™ software.
Since abandoning the FEMA NHV program, the Division’s engineers have researched the
effects of hurricanes and other severe wind related disasters on critical facilities and
hurricane shelters. Through this research, they have developed a qualitative procedure to
identify structural defects and hazardous conditions that could affect occupant safety. In
developing the survey and evaluation procedure, they addressed the following objectives:
1) average time required to perform a facility survey of 4 - 8 hours, not including technical
1
report preparation time; 2) technical expertise needed to perform the survey should be
readily available within local governments (e.g., building inspectors, facilities managers,
etc.) 3) information gathered during the survey must be useful for mitigation planning; 4)
survey procedure, and the evaluation of its data, should reflect the best available
information on effects to facilities subjected to the conditions of a major hurricane
(Category 3 +, greater than 110 mph winds). This new survey procedure provides a much
more realistic and useful product than previous surveys. Six other states in the southeast
are adopting and implementing the Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection Guidelines, and
the American Red Cross has agreed to the guidelines with an exception for shelters subject
to inundation.
* - The Division’s engineering staff has found that existing survey procedures and
software programs that produce numerical ratings tend to “average out” (i.e., reduce the
significance of anomalies) the strengths and weaknesses of a particular facility.
Unfortunately, a specific weakness or “soft-spot” could be a limiting factor, and possibly
expose building occupants to hazardous conditions. As a numerical rating program may
not recognize the impact of a specific hazard, a “good” rating could be misinterpreted to
mean that no significant hazard exists.
2. How many counties have been surveyed since Hurricane Andrew?
ANSWER: We have completed, or substantially completed*, seven - Charlotte, Collier,
Gilchrist, Glades, Hendry, Lee, and Suwanee- counties with partial surveys accomplished
in two additional -Bay and Leon- counties. These surveys identified about 1,700
hurricane shelter spaces, and an additional 36,700 spaces if mitigation projects are
undertaken.
* - Substantially completed means a relatively large number of buildings surveyed
compared to the existing inventory of that county.
3. Why are so few counties surveyed when the statute - s. 252.385(1), F.S. - says that
there was to be no shelter deficit by 1998 (Why is it taking so long)?
ANSWER: The primary issue that affected progress toward eliminating the shelter deficit
was the learning curve always associated with developing a new procedure. A
comprehensive procedure for surveying structures for their vulnerabilities to hurricane
conditions had never been prepared before. While parts of the procedure had been
previously developed by different organizations, no one had compiled the pieces into one
unified procedure. The Division’s engineers expended considerable effort to review the
effectiveness of existing procedures, develop incremental steps of a new procedure and
field test them, and make corrections as necessary. The survey procedure and shelter
2
selection guidelines were recently finalized in October, 1997 as part of a gulf states
hurricane shelter identification grant. Currently, the survey procedures and shelter
selection guidelines developed by the Division’s engineering staff are in the initial phase of
implementation in the southeast and gulf coast states.
Although Division staff began conducting hurricane shelter surveys in 1994, progress was
slow as the survey procedures were often modified and subsequent corrections made to
reports. Altogether, approximately one-third of the engineering staff’s time was regularly
applied to field survey work*. But even under these circumstances, the engineering staff
surveyed 1,071 facilities in nine counties. Of this total, 351 surveys included detailed
technical reports. Another 720 surveys were excluded from the detailed technical reports
due to lack of mass care capability or lack of cost-effective mitigation opportunities.
The Division anticipates a significant increase in shelter survey productivity in the next
two years. “Finalizing” the survey procedures has increased the productivity of the
engineering staff. The Division has initiated a state-wide training program with four
courses completed since October, 1997 and another nine courses scheduled through June,
1998. The Division’s goal is to provide at least one opportunity for each county to have
access to a hurricane shelter survey training program in the next two years. The objective
of the training program is to create a cadre of hurricane shelter evaluators in local
communities. This cadre will support local hurricane shelter programs and assist in
preparation of long-term mitigation strategies. These local surveyors should significantly
increase productivity in surveying potential shelters throughout the State. The Division
will continue to provide these communities with technical support, and continue to
perform shelter surveys for those communities that may not have the needed resources.
* - Also of note, shelter survey program productivity was significantly reduced from July
to November 1995 due to hurricane response and recovery operations.
4. How did you decide your priority order for surveying counties?
ANSWER: The Division prepared the shelter survey schedule consistent with the intent of
s. 252.385(1), F.S., which states that there should be no deficit in “safe” shelter space in
any region of this state. The southwest region of this state has the largest vulnerable
population with a large shelter deficit (170,246 spaces) and very limited evacuation
capabilities. Therefore, the majority of our resources have focused in this region
(Charlotte, Collier, Glades, Hendry, Lee and Sarasota).
Additionally, two other regions received an Emergency Management Preparedness and
Assistance Trust Fund (EMPATF) grant to perform hurricane shelter surveys. The Tampa
Bay Regional Planning Council (TBRPC) received an EMPATF grant in 1996 to survey
potential hurricane shelter facilities in the Tampa Bay region. This region also has a
substantial shelter space deficit (67,577 spaces). The TBRPC surveyed a total of 238
3
buildings (during an18 month period) to identify additional hurricane shelter capacity;
revealing an additional 6,400 new spaces, and an additional 19,400 spaces which could be
made available after mitigation. Also, the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
(ECFRPC) will receive a EMPATF grant this year to perform surveys in the east central
region. The ECFRPC shelter survey grant will be coordinated with an on-going Hurricane
Evacuation Study, and serve as a model for incorporating the Division’s hurricane shelter
evaluation guidelines into future studies.
5. What is your shelter survey strategy (and its rationale)?
ANSWER: The Division is responsible for developing a strategy to eliminate the deficit of
“safe” hurricane shelter space in this state. The Division’s strategy includes four
components that will maximize the availability of relatively safe hurricane shelter space in
existing buildings, identify buildings where mitigation can be used to improve safety and
increase capacity, and construct new buildings to be more hurricane resistant.
The first component is the development and implementation of model guidance for the
survey, evaluation and selection of hurricane shelters that defines the minimum criteria of a
“safe” shelter. This step will help eliminate hurricane shelters that have structural defects
or hazardous conditions that could affect their safety. The guidelines help monitor
progress in elimination of the deficit of “safe” shelter space. This guidance standardizes
the survey, evaluation and selection procedures on a statewide basis; the procedures
followed to designate a hurricane shelter in Jacksonville will be similar to those followed
in Miami.
The second component of our strategy is to develop a shelter survey program that is
consistent with the model guidance. Through the shelter survey program, an inventory of
appropriately designed and located public and private facilities will be identified to serve as
public-assessable hurricane shelters. This inventory must include facilities of the State
University System, Community Colleges, School Boards, and other public-owned
buildings. Within our statutory authority, the Division has been working with the
appropriate agencies to maximize these resources.
The survey program includes both direct technical assistance to local governments and
state agencies by providing shelter studies with in-house engineering staff, and a training
program to provide these agencies with the “tools” necessary to implement their own
programs. When the Division’s engineers perform a shelter study, the approach used is
three-fold: 1) evaluate existing shelter inventory facilities to determine if they meet the
model selection guidelines and, where appropriate, recommend mitigation or retrofit
opportunities, 2) determine actual hurricane shelter space and identify additional un-
utilized space, and 3) identify and evaluate facilities not currently in local inventories. This
approach maximizes the available options to local governments during the shelter selection
process.
4
The Division has also initiated a statewide training program targeted to persons with a
working knowledge in building design and construction. The training program objective is
to create a cadre of hurricane shelter evaluators in the local community. The trained
evaluators can provide the necessary technical expertise historically absent from the shelter
selection process. The course is now approved for professional development continuing
education “contact hours” to provide an additional incentive for local agencies to provide
evaluators for training. The training program will significantly increase the number of
qualified shelter evaluators and, therefore, significantly increase the number of facilities
surveyed in the next few years.
The third component of our strategy is to perform cost-effective mitigation and retrofit
projects for those facilities that can provide a significant quantity of additional shelter
capacity. The objective of the mitigation and retrofit projects is, at a minimum, to bring
the facility into compliance with the model selection guidelines, and if practical, into
compliance with current codes and standards. Performance of hurricane-resistant
mitigation projects on appropriate buildings improves the relative safety and enhances its
ability to continue to function after a major hurricane. Section 252.385(3), F.S. requires
the Division to annually submit a list of facilities recommended to be retrofitted using state
funds. Since 1994, the Division has submitted this list annually to the Governor, President
of the Senate and Speaker of the House. To date, no retrofit projects specified in the
report have been funded, initiated or completed because a dedicated and adequate funding
source has not been identified. There have been at least 14 different retrofit projects (not
specified in the retrofit list) funded by the EMPATF grants (see Question 14).
The fourth component is an enhanced hurricane resistance standard for construction of
any new public facilities which can provide significant hurricane shelter capacity. As
required by s. 235.26(9), F.S., the Department of Education (DOE) developed a public
shelter design and construction standard for new public school facilities. DOE
promulgated the Public Shelter Design Criteria by rule in the 1997 edition of the State
Requirements for Educational facilities (SREF). Unless exempted, all new public school
and community college facilities are subject to this standard after April 28, 1997. The
Division recommends the use of this standard for all new public facilities that can provide
hurricane shelter space. As also required by s. 240.295(4), F.S., the State University
System developed and adopted a similar criteria for new construction. Unfortunately,
both criteria are in their initial phases of implementation so little progress has been
achieved. As it is typically more cost-effective to construct new buildings to an enhanced
hurricane resistance standard than to retrofit older buildings, this component of the
Division’s strategy should provide a viable long-term solution to the “safe” shelter deficit
situation.
In conclusion, while Florida’s deficit in “safe” hurricane shelters could not be alleviated in
a 5-year period, the Division’s strategy, as described above, does provide an aggressive,
multi-faceted program for eliminating the hurricane shelter deficit over the long term.
5
6. What is the guideline being used to survey these facilities?
ANSWER: The guidelines used by the Division when surveying and evaluating facilities
for use as hurricane shelters are based on the American Red Cross’ Guidelines for
Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection (ARC 4496, July 1992). Since these guidelines
are presented in a generic format, the guidelines developed by the Division are an
interpretation of ARC 4496. These guidelines include: giving preference to interior
corridors and rooms, avoiding areas under long span roofs, avoiding areas near
unprotected glass, avoiding rooms adjacent to unreinforced masonry walls, etc. These
guidelines are consistent with studies and reports of building performance and failures
after major hurricanes and tornadoes.
7. Don’t our building codes already include hurricane resistant design standards?
ANSWER: With regard to the wind design provisions of building “codes”, there are three
key factors that influence design and construction requirements: 1) state-of-knowledge of
wind effects on the built environment, 2) the process used to establish minimum wind
design loads, acceptable construction practices and enforcement, and 3) use of
assumptions in the design process that may be invalid during a major hurricane.
The state-of-knowledge of wind design standards have significantly improved over the
past several decades. Though early wind codes were considered state-of-knowledge at
the time, subsequent research indicated significant areas for improvement to the standards.
As an example, early wind design standards calculated wind pressures to be uniformly
distributed over exterior surfaces of structures; the current state-of-knowledge standards
do not use this assumption. Instead, current standards employ increased pressure
coefficients at zones of building surfaces where research indicates higher wind loading
exists, such as at corners, eaves and ridges.
The second factor is the building code adoption process, which also includes development
of building construction practices and enforcement to comply with adopted building
codes. In the United States, the development of building codes and standards for wind
loads is primarily a private sector enterprise involving participation of federal, state and
local governments. This process often leads to codes that address not only state-of-
knowledge about wind loads, but also economic and political issues facing geographic
regions. This process often leads to codes less stringent than the state-of-knowledge
standards. As an example, the current state-of-knowledge standard for wind design is
ASCE 7. However, for buildings 60 feet or less in height, the Standard Building Code
permits an option with a 20 percent reduction in wind load coefficients for exterior
components and cladding. A structural evaluation performed on a modern building (a
1988 or more recent design) that compared the wind design performance of a building
6
constructed to the low-rise option versus ASCE 7-88 would indicate a lower design
capacity. This difference in design performance is exacerbated when comparing a modern
standard, such as ASCE 7-88, to a building designed to a 1960's wind design standard.
The progress of building construction practices in conforming to evolving codes and
standards often causes a delay in improvements to building wind performance. With the
exception of South Florida, in the 1950s through the early 1970s, unreinforced masonry
construction was common in the building construction industry. Forensic evaluations of
masonry buildings, after exposure to high wind events, indicated that unreinforced
masonry tends to perform poorly (including catastrophic failures). Based upon these
findings and further research, the applicable construction industry standards and practices
were modified. Since many existing public buildings were constructed of unreinforced
masonry, their calculated wind design capacities are relatively low when compared to
modern reinforced masonry construction.
The third factor includes windborne debris impact and building design assumptions. While
current codes address wind loads on buildings, they do not address the effects of
windborne debris impact on the building envelopes. Historically, buildings are designed to
a prescribed wind speed based on the assumption that the envelope or shell or the building
remains intact (i.e., an “enclosed” structure). Thus we have buildings designed to “100+
mph” with large areas of unprotected glass in their exterior envelopes. Unfortunately,
windborne debris is common during hurricane conditions. Once a windborne object
breaks open a window, the building is no longer an “enclosed” structure and the wind
design is invalid. Under hurricane conditions a large breach (possibly as small as one
percent of wall surface) results in rapid pressurization of the building’s interior. The roof
and wall connections are severely tested, often resulting in cascading sequences of failures.
In conclusion, just because a building is built to “code” does not necessarily indicate a high
level of hurricane-resistance. Not all codes cover windborne debris impact, some codes
allow less stringent criteria for certain buildings, and not all codes are based on the same
level of wind design knowledge. Though designed and constructed to meet local codes
and standards during the applicable time-frame, the current state-of-knowledge does
indicate that these buildings may not perform as originally intended (i.e., a 100 mph design
in 1963 may not be equivalent to a 100 mph design in 1993). This should be considered
when making a decision on the use of buildings as hurricane evacuation shelters. The fact
that a building has been built “to code” is not a sufficient reason to overlook known
deficiencies or hazardous conditions in the shelter selection process.
8. How has the implementation of this guideline affected the shelter deficit?
ANSWER: The implementation of this guideline has had significant effects in some
regions of the state. As an example, the majority of citizens in the southwest region of
7
Florida live in a hurricane evacuation zone due to a coastal storm surge hazard.
Unfortunately, the facilities that would normally be designated to provide hurricane shelter
space are also located in the same evacuation zone as their homes. The guidelines state
that hurricane shelters must be located outside of hurricane Category 4 inundation zones.
The American Red Cross will not sponsor hurricane shelters with any inundation potential
(i.e. “wet feet”). One-hundred percent of the hurricane shelters in Charlotte County are
affected by this criteria; eighty-two percent are affected in Lee County, and a similar
percentage are affected in Collier County.
Although the location of hurricane shelters in evacuation zones may be the limiting factor
for some communities, there are several other criteria that have a significant impact upon
the shelter deficit. For example, the use of pre-engineered metal buildings, facilities with
lightweight long span roofs, unreinforced masonry exterior walls, and unshuttered
windows. The following table provides an overview of non-compliance issues.
Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Survey Non-Compliant Issues Comparison By County
(* - Numbers below indicate percentage of buildings surveyed that were impacted by each issue)
County Number Storm Inland Built Unreinforced Unshuttered Open
of Surge Floodplains Prior to Masonry Windows / Span
Buildings (> two feet (site / 1986* Walls* Skylights* Roof*
Surveyed of surge in access
building)* roads)*
Bay 17 0 11.7 70.5 52.9 100 17.6
Charlotte 29 100 44.8 51.7 48.2 72.4 86.2
Collier 23 73.9 13 52.1 39.1 73.9 86.9
Gilchrist 13 0 0 61.5 30.4 92.3 23
Glades 15 13.3 26.6 66.6 73.3 80 33.3
Hendry 19 0 68.4 73.6 68.4 68.4 84.2
Lee 123 82.1 30.9 5.7 21.1 88.6 46.3
Leon 86 0 9.3 53.4 25.5 20.9 41.8
Suwanee 12 0 0 50 50 100 58.3
Average / N/A 23 54 45 77 53
Mean %
Based upon data from the Division’s hurricane shelter studies, only two percent of pre-
survey shelter capacity fully complies with the criteria. Minor retrofitting, such as window
shutters, or other mitigation efforts improves this to about 29 percent. Other hurricane
shelter studies reveal similar results. The following table provides an overview of pre- and
post-survey changes in hurricane shelter capacity.
8
Pre- and Post- Survey Summaries for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Spaces
County Pre-survey Post Survey Post Survey Post Survey Post Survey
Capacity As-Is Capacity - Capacity - Totals
(spaces*) Capacity After Minor After Major (spaces*)
(spaces*) Retrofit Retrofit
(spaces*)* (spaces*)
Leon 950 1,050 10,768 2,967 14,785
Suwanee** 0 0 784 0 784
Collier 7,860 207 1,114 2,143 3,464
Hendry 7,098 182 297 5,094 5,573
Gilchrist** 0 0 1,538 0 1,538
Charlotte 0 0 0 0 0
Glades 0 0 0 0 0
Bay 100 0 2,671 2,085 4,756
Lee 52,440 0 2,453 7,014 9,467
Total 68,448 1,439 19,625 19,303 40,367
Percentages of N/A 2.1 28.7 28.2 59.0
Pre-survey
Spaces
*”spaces” are based on 20 square feet per person
Note: Pre-survey spaces are based on listed spaces for sites that were both listed in county shelter
inventories and also surveyed by State Engineers
Considering the current situation, this reduction in shelter capacity should not be a
surprise. Our engineers find that many hurricane shelters are located in relatively old
public school gymnasiums and cafeterias. The pre-survey shelter capacity of these
buildings is often about 500 persons or more. After our engineers evaluate the campuses,
the non-mitigated (i.e., no hurricane shutters on windows) shelter space is often reduced
to interior corridors of newer classroom buildings with a capacity of 50 persons.
The current inventory of “shelters” was developed using established survey procedures
that considered only the mass care characteristics of a structure and not the vulnerabilities
of a given building to hurricane conditions. Local surveyors only recently (fortunately just
before Hurricane Andrew in the case of Dade County) began considering the structural
characteristics of potential shelters. In much of the State, the necessary knowledge was
simply not available for local emergency management to adequately review their potential
shelters for structural defects and hazardous conditions. For this reason the Division has
developed the Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Guidelines manuals and survey procedures
9
and has begun training local officials and volunteers in the evaluation of hurricane shelters.
A secondary problem has been a historical tendency to use the overall dimensions (i.e.
“footprint”) of a building to determine the available shelter space. Unfortunately this does
not allow for areas in a building that cannot be used for shelter space (restrooms, utility
rooms, closets and storerooms, etc.). Though inadvertent, the use of floor areas of
building footprints tended to overinflate the usable space available in our shelter
inventories. When our engineers perform their surveys, they survey and calculate the
actual usable space (and also allow for walkway space in shelter areas). This often
significantly reduced listed shelter space. If these trends prove consistent across the state,
many regions of the state that currently have hurricane shelter “surpluses” on paper, may
in reality have a deficit.
9. Why should public hurricane shelters be located outside of hurricane evacuation
zones?
ANSWER: Storm prediction experts cannot accurately forecast hurricane track or
intensity (category) prior to landfall. Should a storm suddenly intensify once hurricane
shelters are open, movement to a safer shelter becomes an almost impossible task to
accomplish due to logistical constraints, communications, weather conditions, and possibly
roadway gridlock. As ninety percent of hurricane-related deaths (historically) are due to
storm surge, facilities located within hurricane evacuation zones should be abandoned in
favor of safer shelters outside of the evacuation zone.
10. If so many shelter spaces are being lost, doesn’t this indicate that the guideline is to
stringent?
ANSWER: Hurricane Andrew verified what engineers and public safety officials had
feared for years; in many cases, our hurricane shelters are not designed to withstand the
forces of a major hurricane. Fortunately in the case of Miami-Dade County, many highly
vulnerable buildings were excluded from the shelter inventory prior to Hurricane Andrew.
The hurricane shelter selection procedure used by Miami-Dade County was the
predecessor of ARC 4496. The experiences of Miami-Dade County clearly indicate that
use of appropriate and sound guidelines can in fact provide a relatively safe sanctuary for
our vulnerable citizens. Unfortunately, the majority of other counties in this state have not
conducted a similar shelter evaluation initiative.
Many of the guidelines in ARC 4496 represent common-sense, and are consistent with
public safety messages broadcast through the media as a major hurricane approaches a
community. As an example, citizens who are outside of hurricane evacuation zones or
inland flood-prone areas are given the recommendation to retreat to a small (i.e., short
10
span roof) windowless room or corridor in the interior of their homes. Though the house
around them may be damaged, injuries and deaths can be minimized. The guidelines of
ARC 4496 state that a designated hurricane shelter area should be located in an interior
space, and that long span roofs and areas exposed to unprotected glass should be avoided.
There are clearly parallels to these two protective action procedures.
In the case of a public hurricane shelter located in an area that is directly impacted by a
major hurricane, it is virtually impossible to crowd 500 people into a small closet or
interior corridor. Therefore, additional criteria are needed to reduce the risk exposure of
those persons seeking shelter. A good example is the criteria for avoiding areas adjacent
to unreinforced masonry walls. In Hurricane Andrew (and other well documented severe
wind events), unreinforced masonry walls failed (collapsed) with alarming regularity.
Those persons who took shelter in interior areas of their homes, were protected from the
collapse of the surrounding structure and from windborne debris. In public hurricane
shelters where larger spaces are required, often adjacent to exterior walls, the presence of
unreinforced masonry can be a significant risk. Collapse of masonry walls will expose the
shelter’s occupants to being buried under the wall’s rubble, crushing injuries due to
collapse of the roof structure or roof deck materials, and subsequent exposure to the full
force of the hurricane’s winds and windborne debris.
The guidelines used to evaluate hurricane shelters represent common sense considerations
based upon advances in the state of our knowledge. The fact that so many of our
hurricane shelters do not comply with the ARC 4496 guidelines should be considered a
wake-up call. In the case of Miami-Dade County, for example, guidelines similar to ARC
4496 were applied just prior to Hurricane Andrew. As a result, most of the shelters were
shifted from older buildings south of Kendall Drive to newer structures north of Kendall
Drive. In one shelter south of Kendall Drive, a gymnasium was used as a shelter. Though
an error, approximately 300 persons sheltered in the gymnasium area (versus the area of
the building that was the designated hurricane shelter). When Andrew damaged the long
span roof, the occupants took refuge in the restrooms, standing shoulder to shoulder for
hours. While no lives were lost, the potential for serious injuries was certainly present.
If this state is to eliminate its deficit of “safe” hurricane shelter space, we must recognize
that a problem exists and quantify the extent of the problem. A comprehensive strategy
can then be developed that will correct this situation.
11. What guidelines were used prior to the publishing of the American Red Cross
guideline?
ANSWER: The guidelines used varied markedly between communities and, based upon
today’s knowledge, were often inadequate for selection of hurricane shelters. It was often
11
assumed that buildings were “built to code” and therefore would provide a safe and
habitable environment during hurricane conditions. The persons that surveyed and
designated the shelters rarely had significant knowledge of the effects of a major hurricane
on buildings. Typically, the primary consideration was the mass care function; the
presence of cooking and feeding capabilities, an adequate number of commodes, showers
and washbasins, etc. Unfortunately, some mass care features used in the previous shelter
selection process are actually contrary to historical wind damage data and good
engineering judgement; such as, use of rooms under large open roof spans for crowd
control and security reasons, presence of windows in the shelter area for lighting if power
is disrupted, etc.
12. Isn’t an evacuee safer in a building that may not comply with the American Red
Cross guideline than in a mobile home or in a vehicle stuck on an evacuation route?
ANSWER: In the absence of known structural deficiencies (e.g., lack of appropriate
hurricane connections), the majority of public buildings in this state should be capable of
performing adequately if subjected to the conditions of a minor hurricane (Category 1 or 2
hurricane, less than 110 mph winds). Under these conditions, buildings may sustain some
damage but should not fail catastrophically; injuries resulting from building damage, if any,
should be minor. On the other hand, mobile homes and vehicles must be evacuated for
even minor hurricanes. So in a practical sense, evacuating people from a mobile home (or
a vehicle) to a hurricane shelter that does not comply with the ARC 4496 guidelines may
provide them with a one to two category increase in “safety”. This increase in “safety”
assumes that the facility is outside of any storm surge inundation zones, inland flood-prone
areas, path of tornadoes, etc.
However, there are several other factors that must be considered when making a statement
that “you are safer in a building that doesn’t comply with the guidelines than in a mobile
home or vehicle.” To begin with, storm prediction experts can not accurately forecast the
track or intensity of a hurricane. When selecting hurricane shelters, it can not be assumed
that conditions will not exceed the wind forces of a Category 2 hurricane. A person
occupying a non-compliant hurricane shelter, under the conditions of a major hurricane, is
still at risk, regardless of what may happen to their evacuated mobile home or vehicle.
The final two factors are the most troublesome. When public safety officials designate a
facility as a hurricane shelter, there is often an implied trust by the public that the building
is “safe” – or at least found to not have any known structural defects or hazardous
conditions. This trust may influence the behavior and decisions of citizens (or families)
when faced with the critical decision of when to evacuate and where to go. If citizens
believe that a particular hurricane shelter is “safe”, and decide not to evacuate in a timely
manner, they may be placed at greater risk than if they had evacuated early.
12
The last factor is that there may be a perception by public officials that mitigation or other
corrective actions are not necessary, or that there is no need to identify an alternative
facility. If public officials do not recognize a problem, no resources will be allocated to
find a solution. This state will continue to have a deficit of “safe” hurricane shelter space
unless the true vulnerabilities of our “shelters” are determined and corrective actions
planned and implemented.
13. How many people have been injured or killed in a hurricane shelter?
ANSWER: It does not appear that records have been kept that separate injuries and
deaths due to hurricane-related effects or building damage from those caused by other
means (i.e., records are maintained that include falls due to slippery floors, heart attacks,
etc.) However, there are situations on record where the potential for injuries or loss of life
was present. For example, Lincoln High School of McClellanville, South Carolina.
During Hurricane Hugo in 1989, Lincoln High School was used as a hurricane shelter.
Unfortunately, due to an error in determining the storm surge hazard, the occupants
literally found themselves up to their necks in storm tide inundation, with children placed
in roof joists to get them above the rising waters. Fortunately, the water stopped rising in
time (approximately 6-feet in depth). While lives were not lost in this case, the potential
was certainly present.
14. How many hurricane shelters have been retrofitted to meet the guideline?
ANSWER: To date, no hurricane shelter retrofit projects listed in the Division’s Shelter
Retrofit Report have been accomplished. However, the Division has provided funding,
through its Emergency Management Preparedness and Assistance (EMPA) Trust Fund
competitive grant program, to other hurricane shelter retrofit projects and hurricane
shelter survey studies. In the first four cycles of the EMPA Trust Fund competitive grant
program, the Division has funded 14 projects for shelter retrofits, totaling approximately
$1,354,962. The Division has also funded four shelter surveys or studies that were
performed by local government agencies to increase county/regional hurricane shelter
capacity. Total funds expended for the hurricane shelter studies were approximately
$212,945.
15. What is your strategy to improve hurricane shelters to meet this guideline?
ANSWER: The Department of Community Affairs has embarked on an ambitious
initiative to make mitigation the centerpiece of a long-term program to save lives and
reduce property damage. In August, 1997 the Department launched “Breaking the Cycle”
13
– an initiative designed to assist communities to develop realistic local mitigation
strategies (LMS). Through the development of these LMSs, vulnerable structures and
public facilities will be identified and prioritized for future funding through a mixture of
local, state and federal funding. As hurricane shelter retrofitting and mitigation projects
are a high priority for this state, funding allocations will be commensurate with this high
priority.
The State Hazard Mitigation Strategy also identifies the elimination of the statewide
shelter deficit as a high priority with respect to allocation of federal hazard mitigation
funds. Therefore, there is a strong incentive for local jurisdictions to identify hurricane
shelter enhancement as a high priority objective of their LMSs. This will ensure that
future hazard mitigation funds are earmarked for the construction of enhanced hurricane
resistant shelters and for cost-effective improvements to existing shelters. Additionally,
the pre-identified hazard mitigation projects identified in the LMSs will be assigned
priorities for future funding under various other grants and programs administered by the
Department of Community Affairs and the Division.
16. Won’t the costs to construct school facilities to the new SREF public shelter design
criteria be an excessive burden to local school districts?
ANSWER: Based upon the experiences of Broward County’s school district, the
construction premium for the enhanced hurricane protective design is about two to five
percent. The typical construction premium is about three percent and represents only the
cost of constructing the building, landscaping, etc. If the cost of furnishings and
equipment are added to the construction costs, the actual percent increase in cost is
further reduced. Broward County has constructed six new school facilities that include
the enhanced hurricane shelter criteria, and two additional facilities are in the planning
phase. This will provide additional square footage of “safe” hurricane shelter capacity to
the county’s shelter inventory.
Broward County is constructing its hurricane shelter areas to a higher standard than the
minimum required by the SREF. The SREF minimum design wind speed in Broward
County is 115 mph; the enhanced hurricane shelter areas were actually designed to meet a
150 mph wind design. Broward County has found that the facilities can meet the
hurricane shelter criteria without major disruption to its standard architectural design
considerations; such as, floor plan schematic, quantity and location of toilets and
washbasins, increase in cooking facilities or seating requirements, etc.
However, if you set aside the fact that construction of new facilities to the SREF public
shelter design criteria will reduce the county’s (and ultimately the region’s and state’s)
deficit of “safe” hurricane shelter space, there are three additional factors that enhance the
value of this requirement. The first factor is improvements to security at school campuses.
14
By installing windows, doors and louvers that meet the SREF wind and debris impact
standards, school campuses will be more resistant to theft and vandalism.
The second factor is that the enhanced hurricane resistance provides a refuge for students
in the event of a tornado warning or actual impact. There have been at least three schools
impacted by tornadoes in just the past few months in Pinellas, Polk, and Volusia Counties.
Fortunately, most of the tornado impacts were after school hours so there were no
reported casualties. However, Clearwater High School in Pinellas County had four
injuries when the gymnasium roof was damaged by a glancing blow from a tornado. As
Florida ranks second in the United States for reported tornadoes, the construction of
hurricane resistant shelters on public school campuses could provide refuge to vulnerable
students.
The third factor is that after a tornado or major hurricane impact, the school facilities will
receive less damage and normalization of the community can be expedited. In the wake of
Hurricane Andrew, many schools in south Dade County received major damage or were
destroyed. This placed a tremendous burden on both the school district, parents and
children. In particular, parents need the “child care” that a functioning school provides to
begin the process of repairing their homes and rebuilding their lives, and children need to
return to the daily routine that school provides to begin emotional recovery after a major
disaster.
In addition, proposed changes to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act could change
the state and local cost share from the current 25 percent to 50 percent. This proposed
change could dramatically increase the burden on local governments in recovering from a
disaster. However, a community that develops and implements a local mitigation strategy
could see the cost share reduced to 10 percent. Construction of public buildings to the
SREF hurricane shelter criteria could be credited to local governments as pre-disaster
mitigation.
Given these advantages, clearly the additional three percent in construction premium is not
an excessive burden to local school districts. If this state is to eliminate its deficit of “safe”
hurricane shelter space, constructing new public schools, and possibly other public
buildings, to the SREF shelter criteria must be an integral component of our long-term
strategy.
17. What else is being done to address the shelter deficit problem?
ANSWER: Given the severity of the shelter deficit in many regions of the state, the
Division is considering an alternative strategy to increase the number of facilities available
15
for use as public hurricane shelters. The Division, in conjunction with the American Red
Cross, is developing an approach which classifies all shelter facilities into either a “Risk”
or a “Host” category, depending on the National Hurricane Center forecast storm track.
Generally, the Risk/Host sheltering strategy is designed to allow shelter facilities in
Category 1, 2, and 3 storm surge areas to be used in counties not expected to be impacted
by a specific hurricane event. For instance, if a major hurricane is predicted by the National
Hurricane Center to traverse the State in an area confined to the south and southwest
Florida regions, the shelter facilities in each of the counties expected to be impacted by the
hurricane, both its’ storm surge and high winds, which also comply with ARC 4496
guidelines, would be designated as "Risk" shelters. The shelter facilities in all other
regions would be classified as "Host" shelters. Because excessive storm surge conditions
would not exist in those areas outside the predicted impact area, all shelter facilities in
Category 1 through 4 hurricane evacuation zones could be used to accommodate the out of
county evacuees from the impacted counties. This is a relatively simple concept, but one
not available to emergency managers in the past.
In the above scenario, for those counties predicted to experience hurricane conditions, only
the "Risk" shelters will be opened. The "Host" facilities will be opened in counties not
predicted to be impacted by a particular hurricane event. The "Host" shelter facilities
would be opened to accommodate those evacuees not able to find shelter in their own
impacted counties.
Obviously, stringent guidelines relative to which counties are designated as “Risk” or
“Host” during a particular hurricane event must be developed and carefully applied.
Nonetheless, the above shelter classification procedure, especially when employed as part
of the statewide evacuation and sheltering strategy, will have an important role in solving
the state's considerable sheltering and evacuation dilemmas.
Utilizing current technologies, the Division proposes to designate “Risk” and “Host”
sheltering counties as follows:
1. As an approaching storm reaches a point approximately 48 hours from land fall of
tropical storm force winds, technicians with the Division will plot its forecasted
storm track as provided by the National Hurricane Center, calculate and add to that
track the average forecast error cone (lateral movement potential), and then add
half the wind swath to the error cone. Should a county be bisected by the error
cone/wind swath, the entire county will be considered at “Risk” and only shelters
which fully comply with ARC 4496 guidelines will be opened. This will provide
distinct “Risk” and “Host” sheltering and evacuation planning areas.
2. These two planning areas will facilitate the communication of clear messages to the
public regarding which areas are at risk, and which residents should consider
16
evacuation. Outside of the forecast area any shelter can be opened, regardless of its
location in a hurricane evacuation zone or its compliance with other aspects of
ARC 4496.
3. As the storm approaches, the average forecast error and its error cone will become
better defined and reduced in size. More hurricane shelters that may be non-
compliant with ARC 4496 can be opened outside of the predicted impact areas, in
what may have been earlier considered a potential impact or “Risk” area.
Though this procedure may provide some additional hurricane shelter capacity in the short-
term, it must be considered a contingency plan that will be implemented only if necessary to
protect the lives of Florida’s citizens. This plan has two major shortfalls: 1) if the entire
peninsula of Florida is predicted by the National Hurricane Center to be impacted, there
will be no regions of the state available for “Host” sheltering; and 2) as the states
population continues to grow, the state’s transportation system is unlikely to have sufficient
capacity to move citizens from “Risk” areas to “Host” areas. In the long-term, this state
must both reduce shelter demand, and also develop sufficient capacity of “safe” hurricane
(“Risk”) shelters within relatively short distances of vulnerable populations.
18. Doesn’t the Division already have the authority to survey public buildings?
ANSWER: Through revisions to Chapter 252, Florida Statutes, in 1993, the Division
received the responsibility and authority to “... administer a program to survey existing
schools, universities, community colleges, and other state-owned, municipally owned, and
county-owned public buildings to identify those that are appropriately designed and located
to serve as shelters.” With the exception of some State University System facilities*, this
statute provides the Division with the authority to survey all publicly owned buildings for
use as public-assessable hurricane shelters.
* - The Division has the authority to survey facilities that will provide public-assessable
hurricane shelter space. State University System facilities that are intended for the sole use
of local students, staff and faculty, as provided in s. 240.295(4), F.S., are not considered
public-assessable hurricane shelters.
19. What impact will the additional authority of this proposed legislation have upon the
hurricane shelter deficit?
ANSWER: This proposed legislation will provide three additional tools that will assist in
reducing the deficit of “safe” hurricane shelter space. This legislation primarily focuses on
opening up the wider “universe” of hurricane shelter options. The first proposed legislative
17
change is that State University System facilities must provide public-assessable shelter
space. University facilities that have an excess of suitable space, after meeting the needs of
its own students, faculty and staff, must provide this space at the request of the local
emergency management agency. This change places equal hurricane shelter responsibilities
upon university facilities as those of other state and local government facilities.
The second proposed legislative change broadens the scope of state buildings available for
survey and hurricane shelter use to those that are leased by the Department of Management
Services (DMS) and other state agencies; not just state-owned facilities. In a practical-
sense the buildings will be designated as hurricane shelters by the following procedure: 1)
prior to entering into the lease, the “suitability” of the building would be evaluated by the
Division’s engineers, local officials and/or DMS facilities inspectors; 2) if the building is
suitable, and local emergency management requests the use of the building, then a clause is
placed in the lease permitting the facility’s use as a shelter; 3) a shelter agreement must
then be reached between the facility manager and local emergency management
officials/Board of County Commissioners.
The third proposed legislative change provides additional tort limitations for facility owners
that volunteer their facilities for use as hurricane shelters. There are two benefits to
providing the additional tort limitations: 1) this will provide an incentive to private facility
owners to volunteer their facilities for use as public-assessable shelters. Many religious,
fraternal, and other organizations would like to be good citizens and provide shelter space,
but are concerned about possible liability exposure; and, 2) the second benefit is that
private sector sponsors could “adopt” a shelter and provide resources (e.g., shuttering,
generators, etc.) with reduced liability exposure.
20. What is the role of the American Red Cross in these surveys?
ANSWER: Historically, the American Red Cross (ARC) has supported both hurricane
preparedness, response and recovery actions in conjunction with public safety agencies.
With respect to hurricane shelter operations, the ARC has performed mass care surveys of
shelters, staffed and funded shelter operations at the request of local emergency
management agencies, and provided food, water, personal supplies and counseling to
disaster victims.
As a partner in the state’s program to eliminate the statewide hurricane shelter deficit, the
ARC provides mass care specialists to assist in evaluating hurricane shelters. The ARC
prepared and published Guidelines for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection (ARC
4496, July 1992) which served as the basis for the Division’s hurricane shelter survey and
evaluation procedures. The ARC is also providing support in the preparation and
implementation of a Risk-Host evacuation and sheltering plan. The Risk-Host evacuation
and sheltering plan will serve as a contingency until the county and regional deficits of
“safe” hurricane shelter space are eliminated.
18
Related docs
