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Canadian Centre for
Markland Program Newsletter
Treaty Compliance
The Markland Program
The Markland Program on Armaments Treaty Compliance, created in September 2005, is a research
program at the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance funded by the Markland Group.
Research project update
National implementation legislation weapons (CBW). The study will examine the
The Centre has commissioned Aaron Shull and historical evolution of the mechanism and assess
Tracy Carroll to undertake a study of national its technical, operational, financial, practical and
implementation legislation pertaining to treaties political aspects. The study will also suggest how
dealing with weapons of mass destruction it might be revived, updated and used in the
(WMD). Aaron and Tracy are students of the joint event of future allegations of CBW use.
Carleton-University of Ottawa LLB–MA program.
The study has begun by seeking to identify current
research gaps that can be filled by the project. On Review of global compliance monitoring
11 April 2006 the two researchers attended a The Centre has completed a study of current
seminar hosted by the Verification Research, treaty compliance monitoring activities around
Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) and the world. Focusing on the major multilateral
the British mission to the United Nations on arms control agreements, the study identifies
‘Approaches to national legislation for nuclear and organizations and institutions involved in
biological weapons treaties, norms and UN assessing compliance with specific treaty
Security Council Resolutions’ at UN headquarters obligations, evaluates the current coverage and
in New York. nature of monitoring data and identifies
opportunities for future Centre work. The report
is at the final copy editing stage and will be
Integrated safeguards published in the Centre’s Compliance Chronicles.
The Centre has commissioned Jack Boureston of
FirstWatch International to conduct a study on
integrated nuclear safeguards (IS). The study will Compliance conference planned
examine the background, philosophy and The Centre is planning a one-day conference,
application to date of IS. It will look at the ‘Pursuing Compliance with WMD Treaties:
benefits and pitfalls encountered in design and getting from patchy to perfect’, for July 2006 in
application, how improvements might be made Ottawa.
and what should be the overall pace and financial
and material commitment by the International This will be one of the first international
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The study will be conferences to deal exclusively with treaty
published in the Centre’s research report series, compliance. Sessions will explore policy and
Compliance Chronicles. academic perspectives on three themes: the
theory of compliance; its practice; and enhancing
Number 2, April 2006
future compliance and compliance regimes. The
UN Secretary-General's mechanism Centre plans to invite speakers from
The Centre has commissioned Dr Jez Littlewood organizations involved in monitoring, verifying
to conduct a study of the United Nations and helping ensure compliance with treaties
Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigating pertaining to WMD, as well as policymakers,
allegations of the use of chemical and biological academics and non-governmental organizations.
Markland Program Newsletter
Compliance Watch
Iranian nuclear non-compliance on sanctions [….] It’s going to be such a difficult
controversy festers mechanism even with other EU states’.
Following the failure of diplomatic efforts, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on Some analysts suggest that Iran would retaliate
8 March 2006 referred the issue of Iran’s against sanctions by leveraging their position as
continuing non-compliance with the 1968 Nuclear the world’s fourth largest oil exporter. Yet Iran is
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to the UN vulnerable: it currently imports most of its
Security Council. At issue is Iran’s compliance refined oil products as its own capacity is in poor
with Article III of the treaty, which prohibits shape as a result of unilateral US sanctions over
‘diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to the past twenty years.
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices’. The Iranian case is both a test of the Security
Council’s ability to deal with a significant case of
It has become clear that over the past two decades treaty non-compliance and a challenge to the
Iran has been pursuing nuclear activities that it has future of the NPT.
not declared to the IAEA and which could be part
Sources: ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
of a nuclear weapons program. IAEA Director Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Resolution
General Mohamed Elbaradei, has accused Iran of adopted on 4 February 2006,’ IAEA Board of Governors,
withholding documents, denying access to people GOV/2006/14, 4 February 2006; ‘Iran report goes to top
the agency wanted to query, and for failing to UN body,’ BBC News, 8 March 2006. http://news.bbc.uk;
Alistair Lyon, ‘Uphill struggle over Iran awaits Security
clarify allegations of military links to Iranian Council,’ 8 March 2006. http://today.reuters.co.uk; Greg
nuclear research. Iran contends that it is simply Webb, ‘Russian Compromise Plan on Iran Faces Obstacles,’
pursuing its ‘inalienable right […] to develop NTI Global Security Newswire, 7 March 2006.
research, production and use of nuclear energy for http://204.71.60.35; Stephen R. Weisman and John O’Neil,
peaceful purposes’, as guaranteed in Article IV of ‘Iran Warns ‘Harm and Pain’ if U.S. Pushes Sanctions,’ New
York Times, 8 March 2006. www.newyorktimes.com;
the NPT. Christopher Lowe, ‘‘New Urgency’ to Curb Iran – U.S.
Official,’ Reuters, 19 April 2006. http://today.reuters.co.uk;
Although it failed to agree on a resolution, which ‘Iran Enriched Uranium on April 9, Ahmadinejad Says
would be legally binding on Iran, the Council on (Update1),’ Bloomberg, 11 April 2006. www.bloomberg.com.
29 March did issue a Presidential statement giving
Iran a month to halt uranium enrichment and
resolve questions raised by the IAEA about its BWC review conference: inspections out?
activities. Iran does not seem fazed by the Twenty-six countries, including the G-8, India
Council’s pronouncements: it staged an official and Pakistan, met in Tokyo, Japan, on 14 and 15
celebration of what was purportedly the February 2006 for an informal seminar to
production of the country’s first grams of (low) prepare for the Sixth Review Conference of the
enriched uranium. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) to take place in Geneva in November.
If Iran fails to comply with the Council’s demands The seminar involved ‘lively’ discussions focused
the United States is planning to have the Council on the review of major articles of the BWC,
ratchet up the pressure. It has already mentioned proposals for strengthening the treaty and the
the possibility of sanctions, including targeted preparatory work required by each country in the
Number 2, April 2006
sanctions against Iran’s leaders and personnel lead-up to the conference. The Japanese hosts
involved in the nuclear program. However, hoped to reach consensus on key issues to assist
sanctions currently do not seem to have wide the President of the Review Conference,
support. China, Russia and the nonaligned Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, in
movement oppose them and many European drafting a Final Declaration. Although no major
Union (EU) members are wary. According to an agreement was reached, state parties were close
EU diplomat in Brussels: ‘The s-word is not to consensus that on-site inspections are not an
pronounced here […] we have had no discussion efficient way to control materials covered by the
Page 2 1
Markland Program Newsletter
treaty. This would appear to rule out any countries, to exempt India from rules against
breakthrough on reviving the negotiations on a nuclear exports to a non-NPT state. Such a
verification protocol that collapsed in 2003 due to change requires consensus. Canada, which is an
US opposition. The US confirmed that it would NSG member, could in theory veto any change,
not negotiate any verification mechanism at the but it has also agreed to resume nuclear
Review Conference, but is open to other cooperation with India, ending a thirty-year
proposals. boycott.
Sources: ‘Talks to Prepare for BWC Negotiations Conclude’, Sources: ‘Text of the document titled ‘Implementation of
Global Security Newswire, 15 February 2006, www.nti.org; the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005:
‘Consensus Sought at Biological Weapons Talks’, Global India's Separation Plan’ tabled in Parliament on March 7,
Security Newswire 17 February 2006, www.nti.org; ‘BWC 2006’, Office of the Prime Minister, New Delhi, 7 March
Tokyo Seminar’, Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 2006, www.indianembassy.org; ‘India Civil Nuclear
Japan, www.mofa.go.jp; ‘The BWC Tokyo Seminar: Future Cooperation: Responding to Critics,’ Press Release, White
Measures for Strengthening the BWC Regime – Summary of House, Office of the Press Secretary, 8 March 2006,
Discussions’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 20 www.whitehouse.gov; Wade Boese and Daryl Kimball,
February 2006, www.bwpp.org. ‘Seeing Through the Spin: ‘Critics’ Rebut White House on
the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Plan,’ Press Release,
India-US nuclear deal finalized Arms Control Association, 9 March 2006,
www.armscontrol.org.
After months of negotiations, the details of the
US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement were Russia opens second CW disposal plant
finalized during President Bush’s visit to New Russia commenced operations at a second
Delhi on 2 March 2006. The deal has been chemical weapons (CW) disposal plant on 1
plagued by controversy because India is not an March 2006 in order to meet its obligations
NPT party. While it does have selected facilities under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
and materials under IAEA safeguards and has (CWC) to destroy all of its chemical weapons.
complied with these, India violated its bilateral Testing had begun at the Kambarka plant in
agreement with Canada in the 1970s by using the December 2005. The plant currently houses
CIRUS reactor supplied by Canada to produce 6,350 tons of lewisite designated for destruction.
fissile material for its 1974 nuclear test. The Russian Federation is in the process of
destroying its 40,000 metric ton chemical
Under the deal the US will assist India with weapons arsenal―the world’s largest―although
nuclear power technology, under safeguards, in there are serious doubts that it will meet the 2012
return for India dividing its nuclear facilities into extended deadline set by the Organization for the
military and civilian categories and applying IAEA Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
safeguards to the latter. India has listed 14 out of
its 22 thermal power reactors as civilian, including Russian officials have blamed delays on the
4 currently under IAEA safeguards (but not the West’s failure to provide the promised funding.
CIRUS). This will bring the fraction of India’s Although donor countries had pledged a total of
nuclear thermal power generation capacity under US$1.8 billion, Russia has reportedly received
safeguards from 19% to 65% in 2014. India also only US$264.8 million. However Russian
agreed to conclude an Additional Protocol for its tardiness, mismanagement and local
safeguard agreements with the IAEA. However environmental opposition have all played their
India will retain its weapons program and will not part.
end its production of fissile material for weapons
purposes. It has undertaken to continue its Sources: ‘Russia to Open Second CW Disposal Facility,’
Number 2, April 2006
moratorium on nuclear tests but will not sign the NTI Global Security Newswire, 1 March 2006. www.nti.org;
‘Russia Blames CW Disposal Delay on the West,’ NTI
1999 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Global Security Newswire, 20 January 2006. www.nti.org;
(CTBT). ‘Supporting Chemical Weapons Destruction in the Russian
Federation,’ OPCW Press Release, 21 February 2006.
President Bush now faces the challenge of getting www.opcw.org; ‘Russian Federation Begins Chemical
the deal through the US Congress. The US must Weapons Destruction at New Site in Kambarka,’ OPCW
Press Release, 7 March 2006. www.opcw.org.
also convince the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), the informal group of nuclear exporting
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Markland Program Newsletter
Brazil set to enrich uranium under safeguards that states with questionable motives, like Iran
Brazil is about to begin production of enriched and North Korea, will cite Brazil as a precedent.
uranium at a new facility at Resende, making it the According to Laurence Scheinman, a former US
ninth country to produce industrial-scale arms control official, Brazil’s nuclear fuel needs
quantities of the nuclear material―joining China, do not warrant an industrial enrichment facility.
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Given the current availability of global supplies,
the UK and the US. The facility will produce 60 Brazil could simply buy what it needs.
percent of the nuclear fuel needed for Brazil’s two Sources: Jack Chang, ‘Brazil poised to join the world’s
nuclear reactors. Brazil hopes to increase nuclear elite,’ Knight Ridder Newspapers, 10 February 2006.
production to eventually meet all of its reactors’ www.realcities.com; ‘Safeguards approach at INB’s uranium
needs, as well as having enough to sell abroad. enrichment plant,’ ABACC News, No.4 January-September
Brazil has for years also been planning to acquire 2005. www.abacc.org; ‘Brazil Overview,’ NTI Country
Overviews, January 2006. www.nti.org; ‘Safeguards and
nuclear-powered submarines. Verification,’ International Atomic Energy Agency, 17 February
2006. www.iaea.org; Marco Marzo, ‘The Denuclearization
Initial concerns over Resende arose from Brazil’s Agreements and the Future,’ ABACC Publications and
efforts from the 1970s to the 1990s to acquire Speeches, September 2005. www.abacc.org.
nuclear weapons. However Brazil transparently
terminated the program in 1996 and acceded to Compliance Quotes
both the NPT and the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty, ‘The issue before us is not an administrative
which created a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin matter. It is a security matter, and a matter of
America and the Caribbean. New concerns arose treaty compliance. The credibility of this
from Brazil’s dispute with the IAEA in 2004 over Convention is on the line’.
access to Resende. It refused to let inspectors view US Assistant Secretary of Commerce Peter Lichtenbaum,
centrifuges used in the enrichment process on the 10th Session of the Conference of States Parties to the
Chemical Weapons Convention, 8 November 2005, calling
grounds of protecting purported Brazilian for stronger measures to ensure universal compliance with
innovations from industrial espionage. After the CWC.
months of negotiations, Brazil agreed to a
confidential inspection regime: IAEA inspectors ‘…compliance with regulations such as
could examine material going in and out of the disclosure standards will enable the market to
centrifuges but not the equipment itself, which differentiate a company with good versus bad
would be covered by opaque panels. Indirect governance, thereby enhancing the
visual access to the space surrounding the panels competitiveness of a good company and
would be provided by portable video cameras or facilitating easier access to tap funds and
digital photographs, whichever was considered resources at lower cost’.
more convenient for verification. Brazil has still ‘Corporate Governance: Bangladesh scenario and the role of
not concluded an Additional Protocol, which Human Resources’, Daily Star, 10 April 2006.
would strengthen IAEA safeguards on all
Brazilian nuclear activities, but it does have a ‘I think the difference here…that I would
bilateral nuclear agreement with Argentina which point out―if you’re talking about Brazil versus
permits mutual inspections of each country’s Iran―is one of trust’.
White House spokesman Scott McClellan, contrasting
respective facilities. Brazil’s current nuclear program with Iran’s during a White
House press briefing, 13 February 2006.
While there is no question of Brazil now seeking
to acquire nuclear weapons, some observers worry
Number 2, April 2006
Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance
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