Docstoc

Innovation in Allocation_ A Cautionary Tale

Document Sample
Innovation in Allocation_ A Cautionary Tale Powered By Docstoc
					Policy by Design: Virginia’s NOx Allowance Auction
D. Porter, S. Rassenti, B. Shobe, V. Smith, and A. Winn

June 20, 2005

Why is this interesting?
First time allowances sold for revenue Innovative auction designs Experimental comparisons of auctions Implementation
Timing  Bureaucratic issues  Broker‟s issues


NOx allowances
Nineteen state regional market Allowances have vintages
  

Use on or after vintage year ‟04 and „05 had 1,855 allowances in the set-aside At prevailing prices, vintages would earn about $9 million Subject to “progressive flow control” or discounting if total stock of banked allowances rises above 10% of total allowances

Allowances may be banked at a risk


Criteria for successful auction
Maximize revenues for the state Auction must be completed by June 30 Fair, understandable, and transparent auction process

Results of initial design work
Initial evaluation suggests 3 auction types for evaluation:
Combinatorial sealed-bid  Combinatorial English clock auction  Sequential English clock


Combinatorial sealed bids
For the combinatorial sealed bid “Any/Or” (AO) bids Bids take the form: (p4,Q4 | p5,Q5) Which includes any linear combination:
q4 ≤ Q4;  q5 ≤ (1-)Q 5;  0≤≤1


Combinatorial sealed bids - 2
For example, the bid (100, 10| 90, 20) could result in:
Q4 = 10 or Q5 = 20 or any linear combination such as  4 units of 2004 ( =.4) and 12 units of 2005 for (1- =.6)  Revenue is maximized by solving an integer programming problem in Q4, Q5 , and ij


The “English clock”
Seller has many units to sell Seller announces price, bidders announce quantity Start at low price where demand is high Increase price at set periods Stop when demand equals supply Sell all allowances at ending price

Advantages of the clock
Quick and easy to implement Reduces political risk


Does not reveal WTP of high-value bidder

Combinatorial English clock
Bidders bid on 2 clocks simultaneously Clock increases for any vintage in excess demand Bidders may switch quantities between vintages subject to some limits When both clocks stop, revenue maximizing bids are selected by algorithm

Sequential English clock
Sell one vintage in morning and one in afternoon Each by standard English clock Does the order make a difference?

Experimental results - revenue
Both clocks beat CSB with elas. demand


CEC does a little better than SEC

Clocks fair worse with inelastic demand Differences in vintage prices does not affect relative performance of CEC and SEC For SEC, order of auction does not matter External market probably implies elasticity

Auction timeline
As of mid-April, time pressure appeared to rule out all but the simple sealed bid. RFP for auction brokerage services published May 17 Responses were due on May 27 Contract was signed on June 8 Auction was held on June 24


Light-speed for a state bureaucracy!!

The winning brokerage bid
No mention of clock auctions in the RFP Credible bids from five firms All could do a sealed bid Amerex proposed an English clock auction


This was a surprise as the ICES work had not been publicized.

Virginia chose the risky path to maximize revenue from the auction

Sixteen days
5 days of intense discussion on design detail
Sequential versus joint auction of vintages  Single price or discriminatory pricing  How to select winning bids


Auction design finalized on June 14

Programming and paperwork
Programming the Internet application Writing contract Contacting potential buyers Getting contracts approved Arranging financial assurance
Bond ratings, escrow, or letters of credit  Bids limited to credit amounts


The auction - bidders
Bidders see only two things
The current price  That the auction is still open


Bidders enter only quantity bid Bidding early is important because winning bids are filled in order received Must bid each round to stay in


Can‟t increase bid in later rounds

The auction - seller
Announce schedule of rounds


Time for bidding; time for posting new round

Stay in touch with bidders When quantity bid falls below quantity to sell, auction ends Seller chooses top price or next price down to maximize revenues

Price paid
Bidders at top price get goods at seller’s chosen price


Even if next to last price is chosen

If final price drops down, additional quantity is sold in time order of bids


Bidders who drop quantity in last round may get some units at their last bid price

Auction results: 2004 vintage
Number for sale: 1,855 19 bidders, 10 winners Day before the auction:


Bid: $2,200; Ask: $2,350

Morning of auction over-the-counter sale: $2,250 per ton Auction clearing price: $2,325 3.3% over morning trade price!

Auction results: 2005 vintage
Number for sale: 1,855 17 bidders, 5 winners Day before auction:


Bid: $3,150; Ask: $3,200

Morning of auction over-the-counter sales: $3,200 per ton Auction clearing price: $3,425 7% over the morning trade price!

Revenue exceeds expectations
Total auction revenue: $10,666,250
Auction expenses: under $200,000


Including one-time research costs

Net revenue: $10,466,250


				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Tags:
Stats:
views:6
posted:12/9/2009
language:English
pages:22