Switzerland: Consesus Democracy

“It is astonishing how little the rest of the world knows about the way Switzerland runs its politics. Even its next-door neighbors in Europe, though vaguely aware that it is a deeply decentralized country, do not really understand the other, more important part of the Swiss system --the part that could turn out to be a model for everybody's 21st century democracy.” -Brian Beedham, United Press International, in a book review on Gregory Fossedal's, The road to full democracy. History: Switzerland has a long history of neutrality though, the country underwent quit a journey to obtain the dormant position they are so well known for. Their independence conventionally dates back to August 1, 1291, however; many violent battles were fought to preserve and gain it back. It was not until 1648, under the Treaty of Westphalia, that Switzerland was granted its sovereignty and neutrality from the Holy Roman Empire. Shortly after, the nation experienced tremendous religious conflicts between the Catholics and Protestants which lead to the rigorous Battles of Villmergen, 1656 and 1712. Consequently, the rising incline toward authoritarianism and outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War led the nation into another upheaval, the Swiss Peasant War of 1653. By 1798, The French Revolution annexed Switzerland and the Helvetic Republic established a heavily centralized government, abandoning the individual cantons. Primarily due to popular discontent, another conflict emerged and Austria and Russia decided to invaded Switzerland at the time. It was only through Napoleon’s Act of Mediation in 1803 that Switzerland’s independence was restored, their neutrality was once again recognized, and the Confederation of 19 cantons was re-introduced. From that, Switzerland expanded its region to include Valais, Neuchatel, and Geneva, as the treaty permitted. Peace, however; was short-lived and by 1847 the Sonderbundskreig, another uprising between the Catholics and Protestants, created civil war in the nation. This time, the powers of the cantons were highly respected and as a result, the national assembly was divided into two branches, the Standerat and the Nationarat, from which the inspiration of a Federalist system emerged. The federal constitution was adopted in 1848, in conjunction with the use of referenda. By 1893, the constitution was adjusted in strong correlation to a direct democratic system and such remains highly active today. Though Switzerland was neutral and untouched throughout the World Wars, they did participate in the League of Nations in 1920 and the Council of Europe in 1963. By 2002, Switzerland became a full member of the United Nations and though their application for the European Union was rejected in 1992, they still continued to heavily comply with the EU’s standards. The government signed numerous bilateral agreements with the EU so as not to be regarded as opposition by their neighboring members. (http://www.democracy-building.info/switzerlands-political-system.html) Present Switzerland; Government: Currently, Switzerland is known as the Swiss Confederation with a population of roughly 7.5 million inhabitants. Switzerland is a federal republic with Berne as the capital and established seat for the federal government, allocating Geneva and Zurich as the economic centers of the nation. Switzerland has four national languages including, German, French, Italian, and Romansh. Switzerland’s constitution was adopted in 1848, amended in 1874, and fully modified by 2000 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3431.htm). Switzerland is a direct democracy, giving the people power to amend any current legislation or propose new ones. This initiative requires 100,000 of the 3,500,000 voters, citizens 18 or older, and allows individuals to run their own nation, while making the government accountable for every action. The Confederation is divided into 26 states or cantons, 20 of them being “full” and six equating to “half” so that representation in the legislature can function proportionally. The cantons are then divided further into communal regions, such as villages. These sates have autonomy in directing internal affaires, as well as any other powers not given to the federal government by the Constitution. The national institutions include a bicameral legislature, the Federal Assembly, a mutually respectful executive, the Federal Council, and of course the judiciary branch, or Federal Tribunal. The Federal Assembly consists of two houses with equal powers in all aspects, the Council of States and the National Council. Any house may call upon legislation, though neither the executive nor the courts can veto it. This process can only be initiated through popular referendum, in all respects except the budget. The Council of States has 46 members, two representatives from each canton and one from each half, and every member is directly elected by a majority vote. The National Council consists of 200 members who are directly elected through proportional representation in each canton. Both houses have four years terms. And according to Lijphart’s theory, since the size of the legislature exceeds 100 members, it constitutes a proportional branch of government. The Federal Legislative can only be dissolved if popular vote demands the ratification of the Constitution and adopts such an initiative. The executive branch consists of cabinets, each with seven members, who are individually elected by the Federal Assembly in “joint sessions of both houses at the opening of a new legislature.” They have no term limits. For each cabinet, the Federal Assembly chooses: 1 Christian Democrat, 2 Social Democrats, 2 Free Democrats, and 2 representatives of the Swiss People’s Party. This gives the multi-party nation of Switzerland proportional representation for each of its major parties. There is no formal prime minister, though there is a head of each cabinet. The Counselors must, however; act unanimously on all matters, representing neither their personal will nor their party preference. The cantons authorize local governments, communes, and that is where citizenship is obtained. The Federal institutions are superior to local authorities, though their autonomy is preserved through “implementing federal law” (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3431.htm). Consensus Model of Democracy: There are ten elements which correctly describe the consensus model of democracy, according to Lijphart, and each differs significantly with the majoritarian Westminster model (34-41). Rather than allocating all the power to majority parties, the “consensus model tries to share, disperse, and restrain power in a variety of ways.” This implies that delegation is politically relevant to all groups through proportional representation, meaning that each has a fair share in government activities. On this account, Lijphart concurs that the consensus model of democracy is more democratic than the majoritarian version, which is (wrongfully) considered the epitome of democracy. Here, the tradeoff between the trustee version of representation stands against the delegation version. In majoritarian democracies, a representative uses his/her best judgment to represent the majority in Congress. The consensus model, on the other hand, allows the citizens to delegate through popular mandate and at the same time be represented even if they are not part of the majority. There is also an individual versus collective (party) tradeoff in this case, making it harder to account for identifiability in the latter one, while making accountability stronger through the individual option. It is not hard to monitor a party and make them accountable for their actions though, identifying who made the mistake becomes increasingly difficult. In a majoritarian system, however; it becomes easier to punish the individual and not so easy to account for what exactly he/she did. Switzerland serves as a near-perfect example of the consensus model of democracy, fulfilling nine of the ten categories. The first, according to Lijphart, is Executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets. In opposition to the Westminster model’s concentration of executive power in one-party /near-majority cabinets, the consensus version allows the important parties to join together in a large coalition. Switzerland particularly serves as an example with the Federal Council, consisting of seven members to form such a broad coalition. The three largest parties, Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Radical Democrats, each hold approximately onefoort of the seats and the Swiss People’s Party hold about one-eight. They all distribute the powers proportionally “according to the so-called magic formula of 2:2:2:1, established in 1959” (34). Additionally, the linguistic groups are similarly represented according to size, assigning four to five German speakers, one to two French speakers, and often times one Italian one. Both of these partisan and linguistic divides are not in compliance with the constitution, they are simply preserved so as to represent the Swiss citizens with equality and proportionality. This egalitarian representation serves the government beneficially by keeping the citizens from initiating a referendum to overthrow the current power. It’s a system of checks from both ends; the government scratches the back of their citizens by accounting for their needs, while a simultaneous scratch is done through the citizens by restraining from overthrowing the current power. In regards to the Swiss cabinets, a minimal winning coalition occurred only once between 1955 and 1959. A minimal winning coalition predicts that a coalition will form with only those parties necessary to make a bare majority, it’s a size principle. (Lijphart, 92) According to Lijphart’s table 6.3 Switzerland had a minimal winning cabinet 8.2% of the time between 1945 and 1996, with no one-party cabinets. This accounted for the three-party executive cabinet, when the Social Democrats were not yet included in the four-party mix. Switzerland is known for its highest occurrences of oversized cabinets. This demonstrates their dedication to linguistic, religious, and partisan divides among the citizens therefore, allocating policy outcomes according to their preferences. Additionally, The Swiss cabinet is a very egalitarian group; the chair annually rotates amidst the seven members so as not give to much power and seniority to one individual. The second qualification according to Lijphart is the Executive-legislative balance of power. Switzerland cannot be classified as either a parliamentary or presidential system of government. It is hybrid form I, (120), and it stands as the only example of such a mix in all thirty six democracies. This from is parliamentary in two factors and presidential in one. The cabinet, Federal Council, is elected by parliament, but the seven councilors remain in office for standard four year terms. They cannot, however; be dismissed by the legislative vote of no confidence during that period, as in parliamentary systems. A Swiss political scientist, Jurg Steiner concludes that, “…If a government proposal is defeated by Parliament, it is not necessary for either the member sponsoring this proposal or the Federal Council as a body to resign” (35). This official separation of powers allows both the legislative and executive branches to be more independent. Simultaneously it maintains balance in their relationship, more so than the cabinet-parliamentary version is New Zealand, in which case the cabinet is obviously superior. In Switzerland, the Federal Council is authoritative but not greater. Switzerland demonstrates a separation of powers system which is not presidential, as the U.S, but does apply a parallel method of having government head. The constant rotation of Council chairs may be regarded as serving the presidential role. Additionally, it counteracts the notion that cabinet duration increases executive dominance because, again, the Swiss system epitomizes executive-legislative balance (134). This balanced but, separate system prevents against tyranny, as Madison’s dilemma predicted, and allows institutional checks to slow down the government, while simultaneously allowing policy making to be clear and productive, a fair tradeoff for a functional democracy. The third essential aspect of a consensus democracy entails multiparty systems. As Duverger’s law states: single member district pluralities produce two-party systems, while his hypothesis implies that districts with multiple parties, with some form of proportional representation, encourage multiparty systems (Powell, 23). In accordance with Switzerland, Duverger was correct in his assumption, because this nation has a system in which no party even comes close to holding the majority. In the 1995 election, for example, the Swiss National Council allowed 15 different parties to win seats, however; a large portion of the seats (162/200) was won by the four largest parties represented in the Council. For this reason, Switzerland and its many years of stability is known for their four-party structure (Lijphart, 36). This multiparty system can be explained via two reasons. First, due to Switzerland’s pluralist society, the divides along numerous cleavages present a diverse party system. The Swiss face religious separations between the Christian Democrats, who gain support predominantly from Catholics, and the Social and Radical Democrats, who obtain prominence from Protestants and rare-attending church people. This divide, however; is more salient on a national level. Furthermore, the country faces socioeconomic splits which form a battle between the working-class supported Social Democrats and the middle-class supported Radical Democrats. The Protestant farmers, conversely; side heavily with the Swiss People’s Party. The last cleavage in Switzerland is based on language. The Swiss People’s Party is sustained by German speaking members, while the other three dominant groups have fluctuating alliances among cantons. There, the linguistic divergence heavily emerges. In accordance with Lijphart’s scale, the Swiss have high Socioeconomic and Religious divides, allocating one point each, and medium cultural/ethnic and urban/rural divided, constituting one point, giving them a total of three points on dimensions in their party system. Despite the fact that these divisions may be regarded as a negative thing, there is no one nation where all the groups are homogenous. At least in Switzerland, groups have learned to negotiate their differences, omitting conflict and violence. After many civil wars, the nation agreed that the tradeoff for peace and consensus is more advantageous a result than any revolt can bring. The fourth aspect of a consensus democracy is highly essential and heavily associated with this model. Proportional representation (PR) is vital because as the word ‘consensus’ implies that the allocation of power is proportional across the nation. This is the second explanation, in addition to plural societies, for the rise of multi-party systems. In conflict with the plurality method of electoral systems, in which overrepresented large parties dominate and small parties are altogether dismissed. The PR system divides the number of seats a party has in Parliament by the votes they received during the election, assigning proportional numerical values to each. Switzerland uses this electoral method to elect its lower house. Switzerland has a list PR system in which the parties have distinct lists on the ballot “but to formally “link: these lists, which means that their combined vote total will be used in the initial allocation of seats; the next step is the proportional distribution of the seats won by the linked parties to each of the parties” (157). This inter-party connectivity is termed apparentement and it aids smaller parties, by decreasing disproportionality. However, only the effective number of parties is increased keeping extreme and radical groups out of Parliament until they gain sufficient support. According to Lijpahrt, Switzerland falls in average with 2.53% of disproportionality, in a PR system (162). To avoid this problem many nations with PR system initiate thresholds. According to Powell, high thresholds “mechanically reduce the number of parties”, while low thresholds give way for more party competition. Since, the Swiss have a threshold of 8.5% many would argue that the proportionality of votes into seats is heavily reduced, but this could also account for their long term four-party system (Powell, 28). Gallagher’s formula concludes: the smaller the difference between votes and seat share, the less disproportional the electoral system. Even with Switzerland’s seemingly high threshold, they rank 3.1 on the PR scale and fall somewhere in the middle. This measure is definitely better than the multimember districts with threshold ranging from 8.9-17.2, in the middle of Table 2.1, and all the single member districts at the bottom. Lijphart argues that little democracy with a lot of representation is a good thing, as he admires the PR system, though others may very well disagree. The opposition questions the point of party establishment if they remain so minuscule that they are still ignored. This tradeoff between hyper representation and overrepresentation of the majority is destabilizing to some, yet all-inclusive to others. Gridlock and the destruction of democracy to one theorist may equate to stability and functionality to another, though reasonably these issues depend on the situation. Elections are instruments, used by citizens, in democracies to obtain goals. Whether they entail a proportional approach, like Switzerland, employing multiparty systems, little competition and much participation or a majoritarian approach, like the U.S, making competition the pivotal standpoint, both connect citizen preferences and policy outcomes in different ways. In asking which system is better, it is crucial to consider the nation, its social and political circumstance, and its inhabitants. Lijphart’s fifth element of consensus democracy is Interest group corporatism. There is incongruity among scholars on the degree of corporatism in Switzerland, but only because the business unions are highly more organized and influential than the labor unions. Social corporatism is stronger with labor unions, while liberal corporatism prevails with business organizations. Peter J. Katzenstein stated that Switzerland is heavily the case in which liberal corporatism dominates (38). There are three universal aspects of corporatism: “tripartie concentration, relatively few and relatively large interest groups, and the prominence of peak associations” (38). Gerhard Lehmburch adds that Swiss interest associations surpass their political parties and though in many European nations the effectiveness of corporatism in declining, Klaus Armingeon argues that Switzerland’s still remains strong (38). The corporatist model suggests that interest groups are closely associated with the formal policy making process and play a critical role in both the formulation and the implementation of major political decisions. This means that large and powerful interest groups monopolize the representation of interests according to a particular population sector. In a PR system this could be beneficial, but more so in a Plurality one where a large portions of the population are unrepresented. Though, in both cases, it could lead to corruption and monopolization of power, if the system is monitored correctly and the interest groups collaborate to represent the will of the people, they can forcefully evoke needs into policy. Another obvious and significant aspect of the consensus model is Federal and decentralized government. “Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and central governments in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Lijphart, 186). The Switzerland is a federal state in which the power is dispersed among the 20 cantons, six halfcanttons and the federal government. This establishes three united and equal sectors, where the half-cantons only receive one representative in the Council of States. In order for proportionality to be intact, these half-cantons carry half the weigh when it comes to legislation or Constitutional amendments, as the full cantons, represented by two individuals, carry full weight. Switzerland is considered one of the world’s most decentralized governments, in which regional authorities have direct influence over policy making and its implementations (38). To demonstrate this, government centralization can be calculated as the federal authorities’ “total central and noncentral tax receipts,” placing Switzerland at a low 41.9%, indicating its low level of centralization (192). The key distinctions between federalism unitary systems of government are: local governments have constitutionality protected powers and those states can prosecute federal governments for infringing. The beneficial aspect of this model is that decision can be made at the lowest level, the closest to the people, and to some extent the national level of governance remains separate from the local ones. This leaves larger/national issues for the federal government while allowing citizens’ needs to be met at the local level, where they are more understood. Federalism is predominantly used in plural societies or large nations. Switzerland categorizes as the least populated federation that gives a great degree of autonomy to its ethnic minorities due to its pluralistic society (195). As previously stated, Switzerland has a hybrid form of parliamentarypresiddentia system, though it diverges at the federal level because executives are elected by popular vote. The framers of the constitution suggest that the new canton of Jura was considered to resemble the British parliamentary system, but ultimately “they stuck to accepted Swiss norms” (199). It is difficult for a well-developed and long-lasting system to change their underlying mechanisms, though for Switzerland’s case it doesn’t present much of a problem, as the nation is impressively stable. Almost all federal democracies are bicameral, in which the lower house represents the citizens and the upper house represents the cantons. Strong Bicameralism is labeled the seventh point in Lijphart’s consensus model. This institution allows minorities, including smaller cantons, to be more heavily represented through the upper house. The standard for bicameralism is that both houses must be elected on different terms, though each should have a equal array of powers. Switzerland conventionally fits both descriptions as the National Council stands for the people and the Council of States corresponds to the states. Because of the allocation of representatives in the cantons, two for regular cantons and one for half, the smaller segments of the population are more heavily accounted for by the Council of States. Wolf Linder correctly adds, “The absolute equality of the two chambers is a sacrosanct rule in Switzerland” (39). As an exception factor of bicameralism, a few second chamber officials in Switzerland are elected for slightly shorter than four years, as in the upper chamber. In all other bicameral legislatures the second house has equal or longer terms than the first house, but because Swiss federal chambers are selected in staggered and irregular intervals, this divergence is classified as ‘incongruent’. Additionally, the Swiss popularly-elected second house is also symmetrical, implying that the formal powers of the two chambers are highly to moderately equal in terms democratic legitimacy and constitutions authority (206). On the semi-negative side, Switzerland, like the U.S, is malapportioned. This implies that certain areas of the population are more represented than others and this is difficult to avoid unless the whole nation is the district. Israel, for this example, constitutes the most apportioned option. But this factor only slightly degrades the proportionality of the entire system, as it is quit difficult to make the country one district. Unless the population and its regional, ethnic, religious, and other divides allow for it, the choice is not even logical. Though Switzerland is malapportioned, it represents all their citizens evenly in accord with its inherent cleavages. Constitutional rigidity classifies the next qualification. Switzerland has an established and detailed constitution which can only be altered by a special majority greater than 2/3. Amendments to the Swiss system require a referendum of a nationwide majority and majorities in the predominance of cantons. This clearly depicts the direct democracy aspect of Switzerland and allows much of the power to lie in the hands of the people, a very desired facet for many citizens. As previously mentioned, the half-cantons carry half the weight in the inter-canton elections, though if there is no majority vote among the cantons and the overall population, the constitutional change may be vetoed. This allows the smallest cantons, with less than 20% of the population, to disband the popular amendments (Lijphart, 222). The constitution quite difficult to amend, however; this is not necessarily a negative. The citizens who reside in the nation, but constitute the minority, have the chance to speak out against any offer that may impair or offend them if they gain enough support. Additionally, constitutions are made to set a framework for the nation, if they are continuously ratified the nation will be left with a very unstable nature, full of citizens who live in confusion and chaos. It is an alternate story if the super majority of the nation is discontent, then amendments are fair game, but being able to alter the framework of the nation on account of something miniscule will benefit none other than a few members and should be disregarded. On the other hand, this popular referendum allows minorities to challenge and suppress the majority. Even if their referendum is voided, the majority still pays the costs for this initiation and therefore, gives strong incentive for majorities to account for minorities. Every coalition made in Switzerland must consider parties or groups which could possibly call upon a referendum and challenge their notions. This “referendum-plus-initiative” encourages the four party coalitions in the Federal Council and simultaneously directions majorities toward unanimous consent on specific bills. This claim “supports the conclusion that [Switzerland] can be seen as a strong consensus-inducing mechanism and the very opposite of a blunt majoritarian instrument” (231). The final aspects of the consensus model include Judicial review and Central bank independence. Judicial review is the one manner in which Switzerland strays from this model, omitting judicial review power from the Federal Tribunal. When such an initiative was proposed in 1939, it was shut down by popular vote and remained dormant since. Switzerland’s central bank is one of the strongest and most independent of the Consensus democracies. Its supremacy can be measured with the Federal Reserve System in the U.S, a prominent example in the opposing, Westminster model (Lijphart, 41). Conclusion: Switzerland has a stable government along with a very diverse culture, two elements which are rarely compatible. The inhabitants of Switzerland have religious and linguistic divides, though through their direct participation in policy outcomes and accurate representation in the political arena, these cleavages simply play out via parties, not violent revolutions and genocides. Though both institutional and cultural traditions may present fierce opposition to consensus democracy and such a system would only be allowed to flourish if accepted by the political culture, Switzerland places a sturdy stamp of approval on all three realms. Switzerland satisfies nine out of ten characteristics of the consensus model and it is in large part the culture which allows for such institutions to thrive. For example, PR systems lead to multiparty districts, which foster multiparty coalition cabinets, and so on in the executive dimension. However; it is none other than the peoples’ culturally united preferences that allow for interest group corporatism and a strong economy, this already has little to do with PR. Additionally, though federalism, decentralization, and bicameral systems institutionally function accordingly, there is no such structural connection between the Swiss independently strong central bank system. Although the system of government was chosen for the individuals of the nation, it is they who run and maintain its powerful structure. A part of this can be explained by the highly relevant position citizens take in a PR system. Voter turnout is constantly higher in a consensus democracy because the people, especially in Switzerland’s direct democracy, feel that their preferences and votes will actually make a different, as opposed to either voting with the majority or simply wasting their time. In this manner, culture, policy, and government structure can be regarded in terms of cause and effect with much needed integration. Switzerland has not always been a consensual democracy; in fact, it fought numerous civil wars to obtain its stable position today. What this means is that the culture united in its preferences and adopted institutional changes which are more consensual than adversarial. They were simply exhausted from the conflict and ready to settle down with compromise. Though Switzerland has a fairly desirable system, with obvious cleavages and settled boundaries for each, the nation still is far from ideal. As their Constitution abridges federal influence in the conduction of domestic policy, encouraging only private enterprise and the local governments to take actions, amendments may be on the way to alter this. Switzerland has been constrained to enlarge the authority on the federal level to manage national problems of education, agriculture, energy, environment, organized crime, and drugs. Though most nations must deal with similar issues, at least Switzerland’s strong and coherent government can better take on the role better than any institution on the brinks of collapse. References Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performances in Thirty-Six Countries. London: Yale University Press, 1999. Powell, G. Bingham Jr. Elections as Instruments of Democracy. London: Yale Univeristy Press, 2000. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/sz00000_.html http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3431.htm http://www.democracy-building.info/switzerlands-political-system.html