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					                PCNA Review Phase One: Sudan Case Study Annex

                          Sudan JAM Lessons Learned Mission:
               Summary of observations from JAM participants, July-August 2006

A joint UN/Bank Lessons Learned mission traveled to Nairobi, Juba and Khartoum from 22 July
to 2 August 2006, to review the Sudan JAM process. The mission was part of Phase One of the
UN/Bank global review of Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNAs), which sought to
consolidate lessons learned from the PCNA experience to date and determine what steps need to
be taken to strengthen these tools and their application. Phase One focused on a retrospective
stocktaking for the drafting of case studies based on existing documentation and lessons learned
from Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan, as well as a “real-time” review of the ongoing PCNA in
Somalia. Phase Two of the Review will use the comprehensive base of information compiled
during Phase One to investigate specific central themes that have emerged as priorities for
international and national stakeholders.

In the absence of a formal lessons learned process following the Sudan JAM, the PCNA Review
team conducted a series of field interviews to allow consultations with Sudanese cluster leaders
and focal points from both the North and South JAM teams, UN and Bank cluster leaders,
technical experts and country team members, development partners, and NGO focal points.
Informants who are not now in Nairobi, Juba, or Khartoum were contacted by e-mail and phone
and asked for their inputs, although not all cluster leaders and technical experts responded.

The objectives of these consultations were two-fold: 1) to complete the PCNA Review team's
understanding of the JAM process, validating the existing data and filling in any remaining
information gaps in the Phase One Case Study of the North-South JAM; and 2) to collect lessons
learned and best practices from the stakeholders who were engaged in the JAM process as well
as those who are responsible for or affected by the JAM‟s legacy. Interview questions were
structured around a number of topics, ranging from support needed and provided to carry out the
JAM, to ownership and participation, to the prioritization of cross-cutting issues and inclusion
capacity building measures.

In an attempt to capture a broad picture of the best practices and lessons learned of the Sudan
JAM, the mission team deliberately echoed the participatory approach taken by the JAM itself,
reaching out to a wide group of stakeholders. While there were some themes that emerged
consistently across stakeholders groups, and others within groups, certain themes were even
more apparent based on each of the three locations where informants were interviewed.
   In Nairobi, informants across stakeholder groups felt closely linked during process when
    Nairobi was the coordination hub of the South JAM, but did not feel included in post-JAM
    implementation or post-JAM information sharing, and felt the disconnect and distance
    between Nairobi and Sudan quite keenly.
   In Juba, informants focused heavily on the theme of capacity building, and stressed the need
    for the JAM to have been more explicitly focused on delivering both an early recovery plan
    and a medium-term reconstruction and development strategy. In addition, many respondents
    commented on the need to recognize political changes and their effect on the recovery and
    development timeline.

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   Khartoum informants perceived a lack of political will and feared this was preventing
    forward momentum on implementing the JAM priorities, and also highlighted structural and
    staffing issues in the GNU that may be acting as a de-unifying factor rather than providing a
    link to the South.

Across the locations, best practices and lessons learned centered around three major topics – the
JAM process, the JAM product and legacy, and institutional issues for the PCNA partners.

                                      JAM PROCESS
Best Practices:
 Confidence/Partnership Building, Participatory approaches:
     o Working relationships from the JAM between the international community and national
        partners are still strong, and this continues to influence the process and helps drive
        policy. The JAM built up a network of stakeholders/partners, and established a sense
        of solidarity between individuals and establishments and institutions, not in the least
        changing the way the internationals and North saw the South.
     o JAM provided an opportunity for exposure to different perspectives and different
        expertise (for all stakeholders). The involvement and training of the parties throughout
        the process provided organic capacity building, adding value in having international
        experts share the experience and provide interaction and build a common vocabulary.
     o JAM created a platform for stakeholders (internal and external) to engage in a full year
        of development dialogue. National interlocutors were positive about the experience of
        working with international expertise, gaining insights into global best practice and
        receiving policy guidance and briefs.
     o JAM was overall positive in its approach to NGOs, giving them an opportunity to be
        involved in the process.
 History Making:
     o JAM Retreat and subsequent cluster retreats: Long before the peace process was
        completed, the two parties came together at a technical level in the Nairobi Norfolk
        JAM Retreat (for all cluster teams North and South) and then in the individual cluster
        consultation workshops (also held in Nairobi). A small group of North/South focal
        points were already meeting around the CCG, but these were the first meetings to bring
        the technical team members together, while they were still warring parties. These
        meetings helped to build and regularize working relationships between mid and high-
        level technocrats in the two administrations, inspire consensus building and
        understanding for operational and technical counterparts who would later be called on
        to implement.
     o The JAM‟s link to policy reforms and commitments in the north – especially to
        increased pro-poor spending – was an important achievement and distinguishing
        feature; this was the beginning of a broad dialogue with the authorities on pro-poor
        development that had hitherto been absent.

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   Timing and Linkages:
     o JAM was linked to the broader development process/dialogue and got people thinking
         about poverty reduction, decentralization, pro-poor spending and attention to needs in
         the war-affected areas. Also linked to the national budget and South Sudan budget.
     o Because the JAM was linked to the timing of the peace process, it ended up stretching
         over a 12+ month time period instead of being able to “speed ahead” on a more usual
         rapid-reaction schedule. This ended up allowing extended room for room for dialogue,
         relationship building, understanding of the conflict and envisioning a peace culture, and
         created time and space for a more inclusive JAM process unique amongst PCNAS to
         date, which built knowledge and ownership on both sides.
   Decision Making:
     o The two CPA parties saw themselves as key leaders of JAM, guiding vision, presenting
         findings in Oslo as owners of the development future and vision of peace in Sudan.
     o The Core Coordination Group (CCG) provided a platform for joint decision-making on
         technical issues, directed by the two parties and chaired by Norway. It benefited from
         the presence of the IGAD partners forum (IPF), which provided a strong linkage with
         Naivasha oversight. Proved critical as a facilitator of sensitive discussions (e.g. on the
         three areas, security etc.), actually enabling the JAM to proceed where otherwise there
         would have been bottlenecks. Also proved to be a useful sounding board or informal
         second track forum for the peace talks – ideas could be tried out on the CCG before
         being put on the table in Naivasha. The CCG treated the two parties as equals, over a
         year before the peace agreement was signed.

 Expectations and objectives
     o Critical to achieve clarity among all parties of the overriding objectives, the inputs
         required of the parties, the deliverables expected, and the possible outcome scenarios.
         Many informants felt that there was confusion vertically in their own participating
         institutions about what was expected of them in specific and of the international
         community as a whole.
     o Clarification of objectives is especially important when weighing the goals of assessing
         the needs, resource mobilization, and recovery planning. While these are not
         necessarily conflicting, interlocutors noted that there was some confusion in the JAM
         process over which objectives were the overriding ones – and it is critical to explicitly
         state what the JAM is not.
     o Financing figures and requirement take on a life of their own. The challenge is to base
         the analytical presentation of needs in the “needs assessment” not only on the
         achievement of the MDGs but also on capacity to absorb. This is hard but necessary in
         order to manage expectations. Absorption capacities can be increased if existing
         capacities are used, such as NGOs and UN agencies (or in the case of the South where
         little capacity existed, a centralized implementation agency is created). However,
         discussion about implementation modalities generates a dynamic around power and
         resource allocation that may mean it is unrealistic to expect to get true clarity on these
         important issues during the JAM.
 Pre-JAM preparation

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      o Interlocutors noted that the period before the JAM starts can generate value, investing
          upstream in knowledge management (collection of existing literature, desk review,
          organizing data), knowledge creation (upstream analysis targeting sources of conflict,
          institutional capacity, human capacity, social/historical/cultural factors) and
          identification of valuable players.. This include analyses of „what exists, what works,
          what doesn‟t work‟ to ensure that recommendations are not counter to historical
          experience or social/cultural norms and are aligned with formal and informal
   Coordination & Timing:
      o Need better understanding from the beginning (by all stakeholders) of the agreed
          objectives of the JAM and the capacity needed to deliver on those objectives – in terms
          of time, money, logistics, etc.
      o Build in more time/space/money for clusters to meet within clusters and across clusters,
          to ensure cross-cluster linkages and divide responsibilities where overlaps are
          identified. The JAM retreat was very expensive, but very useful and the cost of not
          building these kinds of bridges would have been far greater. The drafting of the
          synthesis report could to a greater extent have been used to create the strategic cross-
          cluster linkages. (Regarding cross-cutting specifics, see Technical Changes below)
      o Need to develop a communication strategy for the JAM. This is partly linked to
          expectation management where many unrealistic assumptions about the scale and speed
          of future peace dividends are based on misinformation. The population is often mainly
          informed about the size of pledges made at the donor conference. The communication
          strategy would also provide a chance to explain the role of the national authorities
          during implementation and thereby increase accountability – “Who are the
          stakeholders? Why are we talking to them? What is expected to come out of this?”
      o A particular challenge is communications around key events, such as the failure to
          distinguish between humanitarian and development funding at and after the Oslo
          conference; the headline of “4.6 billion pledged “ is still being mentioned now by ley
          stakeholders as if all of that money was available for development and recovery needs,
          but about 60 percent of those pledges were for humanitarian initiatives, while
          development funding for the needs identified in the JAM were under-funded in both the
          north (especially) and south.
      o Build more “reality” into the budget – “it costs money to do a JAM „right‟”: allow for
          more meetings within and cross clusters, additional missions and consultations for both
          information gathering and sharing, validations, etc.; probably needed a sizeable
          “contingency” in the budget for this to be used as the JAM process evolves.
      o The cluster groups should have been more narrowly defined. Within such a core group
          responsibilities could have been designated to all participants, both international and
   Staffing/Capacity (more on this under Institutional Lessons):
      o Reliance on local expertise is critical, whether in line agencies, universities, civil
          society. Take the time to find out the local experts and resources, both people and
          knowledge. Also need national champions to push the process and explain the
          objectives and expectations. If you bring in outsiders, make sure they are partnered
          locally with people who will remain after the JAM. International guidance needs to be

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        country-based to understand the context. Should be experienced technically but also
        politically – chairing/facilitating clusters between previously warring parties requires
        character, negotiation skills and patience (need to be explicit in the TORs).
     o Technical experts had very small slots of time available and were often distant from the
        process. Need to have full time focus during critical moments of JAM (not necessarily
        the full length), rather than being expected to negotiate and draw conclusions via email.
     o Longer time is needed on the ground during the assessments and analysis; 2-3 day
        missions do not lend themselves to building national capacity (or even to understanding
        local context or national vision).
     o Throughout the course of the JAM, there should be consistency in the core
        group/secretariat to help weave together the many players.
   Technical Lessons:
     o While some participants felt that the costing process was important and enabled critical
        conversations about priorities to be based on “hard numbers”, other informants from
        both UN and Bank sides remarked that the costing of proposed interventions took too
        long and was not very useful Critics of costing encouraged a candid effort to measure
        the time and effort of costing against the expectations among donors that the final
        document will have been built from a bottom-up costing approach, wondering if donors
        require a „legitimized‟ number, although it might not have much practical value.” As
        an alternative, for sectors where standard per capita benchmark estimates exist (as
        within health), participants encouraged those to be used, emphasizing a skepticism that
        the costing figures had an impact on resource allocations by most agencies during the
        post-Oslo implementation.
     o There is a common concern that the Sudan JAM Matrix is so detailed that it loses value,
        and that a more effective matrix would be important milestones.
     o Provide trainings on what the JAM is and what it‟s meant to accomplish, provide clarity
        on objectives and end product with partners at beginning of process, then organized on
        how to meet those expectation. This should be followed by technical specialized
        sectoral training focused on best practices for clusters.
     o Better quality assurance of the cluster reports should have been incorporated the
        process. Although the time line was short in the final stages of the JAM, a short review
        phase should have been included.
     o Cross-cutting issues:
           By treating issues or themes as cross-cutting, there is a risk of limiting the scope
              for the detailed analytical work which is needed to underpin their findings. The
              Sudan JAM had the problem that some cross-cutting specialists brought in to
              undertake the work were not properly briefed by their organizations as to how to
              best make appropriate and useful contributions, while other cross-cutting
              interventions were more successful in terms of both process and impact, due to
              the dedicated and tailored engagement of the individuals involved.
           Cross-cutting issues would benefit from better definition in the conceptual
              framework for the PCNA. In particular, more explicit choices at the start to be
              either more comprehensive or more strategic in the approach would help cluster
              leaders and cross-cutters understand their role. A more comprehensive approach
              would mean ensuring all clusters were accountable for the substantive integration

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               of the issues (up to and including costings), with modification to their ToR
               accordingly. A more strategic approach, it was suggested, would allow cross
               cutters to make strategic alliances with clusters where there was an identifiable
               entry point, leading to uneven coverage of the issue – but equally a more in-depth
               treatment where it counted.
            Need to identify, define and empower the cross-cutting issues from the beginning
               of the exercise. Including training and sensitizing the cluster leaders on the
               language and topics of the cross-cutting issues.
            There was a need expressed for quality assurance to ensure that cross-cutting
               issues are visibly integrated by cluster teams. There should be room for progress
               reviews built into the process to monitor the inclusion of cross-cutting issues, in
               addition to reviewing and auditing final reports.
            While agencies complained that they had to commit their own resources, where
               they did this appears to have led to high quality inputs.
            In the case of gender, the approach of “mainstreaming gender” rather than
               focusing on specific actions to support women‟s empowerment and equality is
               seen as having marginalized the needs of women in the Sudan JAM by not
               providing a way to follow up, implement and see results in critical sectors.
            Build from the expertise available in the country for lower costs, valid context and
   Peacebuilding, state-building, political awareness, and conflict sensitivity:
     o An important element of the JAM was the challenge of linking humanitarian, recovery
         and development, in particular security sector actions and their linkages with the peace
         process(es). Peace-building was intended to be a filter that would guide the recovery
         plan – but ongoing political tensions and the predominance of technical expertise meant
         peace-building as a lens was not used as much as it could have been. Likewise,
         inclusion of conflict analysis was good (on paper) but weak in practice. It appears that
         there needs to be a clearer understanding of how to use conflict analysis within a
         PCNA; is it just a “polish” or should the PCNA focus investments on peace-building
     o The influence of the death of John Garang (and political externalities in general)
         highlighted the fluidity and instability that characterizes these environments. For
         PCNAs that means political analysis is as important as conflict analysis, and thus
         upstream analysis informing all participants of the fundamentals, updates of shifting
         alliances during peace processes would be helpful.
     o The vision of the Sudanese for their post-conflict society was captured in several
         discussions between the JAM team and the GOS/SPLM leadership (including the late
         Chairman), and refined through joint exercises like the PES workshop, JAM retreat,
         and sector workshops. The vision reflected in the JAM document was firmed up in
         January 2005 through several days of intense discussions between the JAM team and
         the SPLM in Rumbek, and with the GOS in El Medani, and both cabinets signed off on
         the final document, and pointed out that the JAM represents a shared vision of poverty
         eradication, sustainable growth and peace building. However, the JAM document does
         not reflect consideration of various institutional options for core state functions that
         would have characterized a systematic statebuilding approach.

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     o Questions related to issues such as governance structures, decision-making procedures,
       and resource distribution will always be politically very sensitive. An enhanced state-
       building approach will not guarantee that political obstacles can be overcome, but it
       may embed an increased level of realism and awareness among the key national
       stakeholders and sensitize them about the future demands and options.
     o In post-conflict environments with more established institutional and governmental
       structures, an enhanced state-building perspective can help identify key focus areas and
       entry points for increased reform dialogue.
     o Many questioned if the JAM was too ambitious – Sudan‟s needs are vast, so you need
       to contain the temptation to include everything and go towards modest, while keeping
       perspective of what needs to be done. Also need a better understanding of capacity
       (and capacity variations between parties) and access issues.
     o Can‟t address post-conflict reality without addressing immediate needs. This raises the
       question of the integration of humanitarian / recovery / development planning tracks.
       More attention should be given to the early recovery activities which largely can be
       implemented with existing capacities.
     o National ownership was difficult in reality since the North/South teams of counterparts
       were very small parts of the political landscape. The two parties were very vocal about
       feeling ownership of the JAM process, but that does not ensure ownership of the JAM
       across the wider group of national stakeholders.
     o In retrospect, a number of informants felt that security sector reform should have had a
       more central role in the JAM, especially for the South; while it was linked to Naivasha
       and was seen as “part of political process, not the JAM process”, attention to these
       issues would have provided a more consistent linkage between the CPA and the
       recovery planning. To do this would, of course, have required different kinds of
       representatives (i.e. military) and different timing.

In general regarding the JAM process, expressions of dissatisfaction focused on the legacy or
“implementation” of the JAM, not the JAM process or the product. Most interviewees said they
wouldn‟t change the actual assessment but rather they would change its link to the
implementation process to be more explicit, including attention to institutional aspects of
monitoring the matrix through implementation.

                          JAM PRODUCT AND LEGACY
Best Practices:
 JAM document is still used as the master plan/vision, tool for planning [and giving], by
   interviewed donors and validated by donors at the Sudan consortium. Keeping the JAM
   report unified cost effort and time, but was worth it.
 The matrix was used at the first Sudan Consortium meeting and a second SC is planned for
   November 2006, which will again report on progress against the matrix including key
   commitments like increases in pro-poor spending. In late 2005 (after Oslo) there was a
   directive at the Presidential level in the national government that the JAM document should
   be used for policy and program planning; the document has been actively utilized in

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    government budget preparation in Southern Sudan. Operationally, the matrix has also been
    used as foundation for project and program preparation, and is an important decision making
    tool at the meetings when MDTF funding is agreed to.
   Document guides the priorities in MDTF and allocating of MDTF resources, thanks to the
    strong sense in the document that the strong government ownership established in the JAM
    process should also drive resource allocation decisions through implementation. In addition,
    the JAM specified the role that the MDTF would play in building the capacity of government
    counterparts to design and implement programs. Finally, the JAM report highlights the
    important role the MDTFs will play in terms of integrating transparent procedures for
    financing flows into government systems.
   Opened opportunities for dialogue and political priorities: For example, before the JAM,
    couldn‟t discuss rule of law in the North. Following the JAM, it has risen much higher on
    the national agenda; the JAM provided a vehicle for interaction on a politically sensitive
    subject. The JAM was not used as a vector for strong international criticism of the Northern
    authorities, but rather provoked conversations and dialog; in drafting and negotiating the
    rule-of-law cluster report, parties learned a lot about each other, built positive working
    relationships based on dialogue and compromises of the JAM.
   JAM report led to accepted framework and road map for all stakeholders. Being a consensus
    based roadmap ensures it has the big-picture legitimacy it needs to guide national planning.
   The JAM report was a good fundraising tool: successful at Oslo and useful for programming
    since Oslo in terms of providing the content, analysis and context for TORs, concept notes
    and project documents.
   UN‟s decision to make an integrated work plan (WP) instead of CAP was a good choice, and
    bringing Government on board has been very important. The WP tries to bring humanitarian
    together with recovery and development needs; within the WP framework, there are no
    recovery and development projects that are inconsistent with the JAM priorities. That said,
    there is relatively weak formal linkage between WP 2006 and the JAM, with some UN
    agencies claiming to pay lip-service to the JAM by citing it “only when creating project
    proposals”. Even agencies who proactively would have liked to re-orient or refine their
    programs are tied in by multi-year frameworks with little room for flexibility.
   Inheritance from the JAM
      o Milestone in Sudan for recovery and development planning and vision
      o Common entry point for all stakeholders to work in recovery and development.

Lessons Learned:

   JAM should not just describe what the needs are but should also tackle how to approach
    those needs. Interlocutors noted that a greater emphasis on how would have ensured a
    logically greater focus on sequenced and prioritized activities – currently lacking in the JAM
    report, leading to an overambitious vision of development relative to the capacity and
    willingness available in the country.
   The JAM report appears to assume that sufficient capacity is available to carry out the
    recommended actions. Interlocutors highlighted this was a critical failing in the JAM process
    as well as the documents. The need to establish a functional and legitimate national decision-
    making structure should more clearly have been identified as an immediate priority. This

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    would require careful mapping of institutional steps and the basic public administrative
    capabilities needed, including where targeted external technical assistance should be utilised.
   While almost all interlocutors were concerned at the slow rate of program implementation in
    Sudan following the Oslo conference, there was debate about how implementation can be
    better supported by the JAM process or document. While some argued for an Implementation
    or Recovery Plan to carry out the JAM‟s vision, consolidate peace, define roles and
    responsibilities and accountability, others noted that other vehicles were better placed to
    drive programming and implementation and that the objective of the JAM was to outline the
    “parameters of the possible” for the nation and not the details of the implementation. The
    latter group, however, did note that PCNAs needed to proceed with a strong vision of how
    such parameters would facilitate the more detailed planning process (structure of clusters,
    continuity of personnel, link with the budget etc).
   Although the need to strengthen national capacity is emphasized throughout the JAM,
    including having been the main focus of cluster one, a more precise definition of the term
    should have been agreed between the various stakeholders – what does “capacity building” in
    this context entail?
   Capacity building constraints and priority actions should be more clearly articulated within
    each sector. In a situation with drastically limited initial capacity there will be difficult trade-
    offs between the speed of project implementation and the need to involve and work through
    national institutions. A key issue becomes the need to calibrate project size and complexity to
    absorptive capacity rather than to total needs. In addition, project design should ensure
    suitable incentives for effective knowledge transfer from internationals to counterparts.
   A zero generation capacity-building effort should have been to get the basics in place: civil
    service (headcount, registration and payroll functions); providing the hardware (office space,
    transport, communications); providing the software (policy advisers reporting in line
    positions to ministers/undersecretaries on long-term contracts). Several interlocutors
    highlighted that the JAM had not laid the foundation for these types of efforts.
   Unrealistic expectations about the pace of national capacity building should be avoided and
    early recovery programs – often implemented by international organizations or NGOs – are
    likely to be necessary in post-conflict environments to ensure quick service delivery.
    However, the national authorities should to the extent possible be involved in defining these
    early recovery programs, to build ownership and strengthen national capabilities even though
    they are not implementers.
   While informants were universally agreed on the need for greater explicit attention in the
    JAM product to identifying early recovery priorities and then building mechanisms to deliver
    them, there is less agreement on how this would optimally be done. While some Sudan JAM
    participants currently working on the Darfur-JAM point to the “track 1 – track 2” model as
    the solution to the earlier failure, others are concerned about a possible lack of coordination
    between early recovery and medium-term reconstruction. Certain sector teams who worked
    on both JAMs (such as health) have worked to develop explicit mechanisms for coordination
    and information-sharing that exploit comparative advantage and avoid disconnects.
   A JAM champion/advocate needs to be identified to push it forward as a key tool for
    planning and coordination and accountability. Ownership “post-JAM” also needs to be
    established, by building upon the champions to formalize the JAM documents within the

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    government processes and structures, with national leaders saying “this JAM report is our
    policy document and you should use it in your ministries.”
   Monitoring and review of progress (and capacity) needed: A “post-JAM” forum was needed
    to meet and validate assumptions: Where are we? Have the priorities changed? Can we
    adjust? And to also acknowledge and react to political changes. A mechanism for ongoing
    monitoring, with a semi-annual or annual review of what‟s happening against agreed with
    benchmarks, would help keep all sides accountable. There was some debate amongst
    interviewees over what the right institution/body was to perform this. It was noted that the
    JAM report itself had both a monitoring matrix and the outline of the JNTT – both of which
    were proving to be weak instruments: therefore just because it‟s in the document doesn‟t
    mean it will work. Many noted that the best placed body to drive accountability was the
    government (and where capacity was limited then there was a need to build that capacity, not
    build a parallel institution).
   Part of the difficulty in monitoring the progress in the JAM arises from the fact that there is
    considerable inter-linkage and overlap between the CPA and the JAM matrix, a situation
    which allows accountability for implementation and monitoring to be diffused and also raises
    sensitive political issues in a forum (JAM) that is supposed to be technical.
   Regarding the TRM: matrix needs to be SIMPLE, linked to easy to follow indicators,
    creative and flexible and recognize that it takes time to build things up and get things right
    and not always make your deadlines. Need to have a monitoring mechanism that is proactive
    enough to enforce the process and still be flexible. The matrices in the Sudan JAM
    documents are not used as widely or as effectively as other PCNA matrices have been, and
    this is seen as due both to the matrices complexity and to the lack of an institutionalized
    monitoring mechanism.
   Need to staff up a core permanent group within the UN system with strong PCNA expertise,
    and contribute resources to the process to think about how we operationalize and implement.
    Make sure the agencies are committed to it and will support it – this takes strong leadership
    from the UN side (see section on institutional lessons).
   Need consistency of partners (on both sides) to the extent possible. After JAM, the
    international experts should still have been involved while the GNU and GOSS formed, to sit
    and have practical meetings after Oslo to move the JAM forward.
   On the UN side, the work plan should be based on fairly explicit references to the JAM at
    sectoral level, with authors looking at how proposed programs accord with the JAM and if it
    doesn‟t relate to the JAM –why not? (Possibly for humanitarian reasons or because new
    needs have been identified by the Government.)
   Future JAMs should have mechanism for bringing online recovery programs soon after the
    JAM‟s completion.
   Several informants felt that donors didn‟t understand what the MDTF would be in Sudan,
    that they thought it would be “operationalizing the JAM”, rather than being one of several
    mechanisms (of which bilateral funding is three times as large as the MDTF resources). This
    has generated perception problems: people only think of JAM now as MDTF, which is not
    seen as delivering results.

                                INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

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Lessons Learned:
 Staffing/Capacity in general:
     o Need to focus on national experts to be more involved and also involving more people
        in the field, with ownership and leadership from the ground.
     o International guidance needs to be country-based to understand the context and
        relationships; didn‟t use enough people on the ground in NGOs and agencies who knew
        the context and the players. Experts need to be experienced technically but also
     o Need to think of the JAM as a part of the process of recovery and have continuity of
        thought and staff. During the JAM, make sure the technical people will still be there
        after the peace (on all sides, at all levels, to the extent possible) to help implement.
     o Both the UN and the Bank need to think about the capacity needed to lead a PCNA, to
        recognize how political it is, not just technical. Need skills in team management,
        conflict sensitivity, conflict analysis, etc.
     o Consider also using regional players in the process (countries who are aiding the peace
        process, not supporting only one side). Look for the right people since the region is
        also affected by politics.
 Institutional comparative advantage or conflicts
     o The element of competition between UN and Bank was a problem that should have
        been resolved much more cooperatively, and not left unchecked; the “battle” over
        financing mechanisms became so narrow that somewhere in between it got lost that we
        needed something between emergency and MDTF.
     o Deep institutional contradictions between UN and Bank left its mark on the JAM, and
        some of this legacy continues to be a major obstacle to effective program
        implementation in Sudan. Need to collectively study and better understand this divide
        to overcome it.
     o Conflicts were fed by different signals coming publicly from UN and Bank during
 UN/Bank institutional changes:
     o Many informants noted differences between the Bank and the UN, some of which were
        seen as avoidable, but informants also recognized that there are substantive differences
        in approach between Bank and UN that are not only about institutional rivalries, but
        differences in thinking about development: it is not possible to overcome these so easily
        in an exercise of this nature. However the deeper question is how these can be
        addressed in a way that capitalizes on respective comparative advantages to enhance
        the overall process and results.
     o Relationship between UN and Bank was a challenge at times because of both cultural
        differences and institutional incentives, and many erroneous impressions were formed
        and fostered. UN says that Bank doesn‟t talk to players on the ground; Bank says that
        UN doesn‟t work with Government. Neither is true or helpful. Need to better articulate
        division of labor, and to be more predictable as institutions and more explicit about our
        relative strengths.
     o UN interviewees urged a “rethink” of how the UN engages in PCNAs. Never had
        proper resources to follow the process all the way through. Needed consistent

October 2006
      substantive thinking on the clusters throughout the process. The UN has to restructure
      itself at the center. Surge capacity needed – how can the UN gear up fast to do the
      JAM and then to delivery recovery in a seamless way? The Bank had more consistent
      people, though they had nothing on the ground. But the Bank was more powerful in the
      JAM, because they used their own staff, where the UN mostly used consultants, who
      did not have the institutional background.
    o Both sides need to invest in people who can be in the JAM for the time needed to
      complete the exercise, and provide meaningful engagement in the process. Technical
      consultants sometimes came in with no knowledge of Sudan, focused on technical
      theory and “global best practice” information only, not country context. They could
      have been used very usefully if a more robust effort were made (by the UN on the
      ground) to orient the teams better.
    o A PCNA needs to be locally driven exercise, not with decisions being made from HQ;
      however, the UN JAM team was led by external consultant, without influence over the
      UNCT; and the RC/HC position vacant for 6 months of the JAM, leaving a void in UN
      leadership. Ideally the RC/DSRSG coordinates and enforces the UNCT‟s participation
      and buy-in to the PCNA process to ensure accountability and responsibilities are
      identified, expectations are managed and there is no second guessing (for both resident
      and non-resident agencies). At country level, the ExCom should take a critical and
      coordinated role behind the JAM, and include regional directors. In-country country
      team support should also help build bridges from humanitarian to early recovery and
      longer term development, so that links are established and any perceptions of
      competition, duplication or overlap are avoided.
    o United vision is needed from the Bank-UN partnership, speaking with one voice, so
      they are seen as a team from the international side, not sending conflicting messages to
      national partners and other stakeholders. Need to create mutual internal understanding
      between partners, with semi-formal internal consultation process needed on both sides
      (so it‟s not entirely dependent on personalities and serendipity).

October 2006
                           22 JULY TO 3 AUGUST 2006

Mission Team Members:
Shani Harris, UNDGO (
Hugh Riddell, WB Fragile States/LICUS Group (
Anders Tang Friborg, UNDP, BCPR (
Laura Bailey, WB Fragile States/LICUS Group ( (Khartoum only)

                                        NAIROBI MISSION ITINERARY
                                             22 JULY TO 26 JULY

 Time               Contact                       JAM Role                           Contact Info
 Sunday, 23 July
 9:30 AM – 12 PM    Team Breakfast & Planning Meeting
 12:30 –            Dr. Christoph Jaeger       UN Cluster Leader                     In Kenya: +254-20-387-2966
 5 PM               Programme Coordinator      (Governance and Rule of Law)          Mobile: +254-722-20.62.76
                    Max Planck Institute for   Former RC-Sudan             
                    International Law
 Monday, 24 July
 10 AM – 12 PM      David Campbell                Media focal point (overall, plus   mobile + 254 722 720 235
                    Director                      clusters 2 & 8)          ;
                    The Media Company                                      
 1:30-3:15 PM       Dan Lewis                     Reference group focal point        +254 (0)20623 826
                    Chief, UNHABITAT              and general resource/context
                    Disaster, Post-Conflict and   person for JAM-South
                    Safety Section                (Infrastructure)                   +254 (0)20762 4062
                    with Jaana Mioch, Human                                
                    Settlements Officer for the
                    Disaster, Post-Conflict and
                    Safety Section
 3:30 – 5:30 PM     Nyaradzai Gumbonzvanda        Senior Gender Advisor, drafted     + 254-20-624383
                    Regional Director,            gender guidance for JAM(s)         nyaradzai.gumbonzvanda@u
                    UNIFEM                        and JNA                  
                    with Hendrica Okondo and                               
                    Ayoo Odicoh                   JNA focal points on Gender
 7:30 – 9:30 PM     Dr. Christoph Jaeger          See above                          See above
 Tuesday, 25 July
 9:30 – 11: 30      Buzz Sharp                    NGO focal point (for               0733-391-324
                    Save the Children UK          Livelihoods and for Info &
 12:30 – 2 PM       David Bassiouni and           Somali JNA: UN Senior    
                    Louise Cottar                 Technical Coordinator and JNA
                                                  Coordination Officer     
 2 – 3:30 PM        Luca Zampetti                 Then: CCG member and Italian
                    RCO - Juba                    representative for peace talks     Tel.:     +254.20.7621045
                    Donor Relations Officer       in Naivasha. Now in RCO-Juba       Mobile +254.734.600031
 3:30 – 5:30 PM     Tove Bruvik Westberg          CCG member, development            0733-621-981
                                                  partner focal point for  
                                                  Macroeconomic policy cluster

     October 2006
                                         JUBA MISSION ITINERARY
                                            25 JULY TO 29 JULY

Time             Contact                       JAM Role                          Contact Info
Wednesday, 26 July
10 to 12         Travel to Juba
2:30 – 3 PM      Anselme Sadiki and            Post-JAM programme      
                 Caroline Mueke                specialists for Governance
                 Programme Specialists         Programmes in UNDP      
3 – 4 PM         Chris Johnson                 REFERENCE GROUP FOCAL   
                 Head of Governance            POINT (CDD), and acting head
                 Programmes, UNDP              of UNDP South during the JAM
4:30 – 5:30 PM   H.E. David Deng               SPLM Cluster Leader,    
                 Minister for Labor, Public    Capacity Bldg and Institutional
                 Service and Human             Development
                 Resource Development
6:30 – 9 PM      Chris Johnson                 See above                         See above

Thursday, 27 July
9 AM – 11 AM      Ron Isaacson                 Senior Operations Officers and
                  Waheed Lor                   Operations Advisor-Quality
                  Surendra Agarwal             Assurance Group         
                  MDTF-SS Office of the
                  Technical Secretariats
12:30-2 PM        Melissa Phillips             Post-JAM role: Work Plan and
                  Coordination & Information   coordination issues               Sat: +8821643338072
                  Officer, UN Deputy RC/HC                                       Mobile: +249 (0)912501652
                  Office - Southern Sudan
2:00-3:00 PM      Dr. Daniel Wani              SPLM Cluster Leader,    
                  GOSS Undersecretary of       Infrastructure
                  Ministry of Transport and
3:15-3:45 PM      Majok Dut                    Minister for Physical
                  State Minister for           Infrastructure for Warab State
                  infrastructure, Warab        & SPLM Technical Team
                                               member for Infrastructure
3:45 PM – 4:45     Dr. Bellario Ahoy           SPLM Cluster Leader for Basic
PM                 GOSS Commissioner for       Social Services and Social
                   HIV/AIDS                    Protection
7:30-9:30 PM       Emily Oldmeadow             Then, NGO stakeholder group.
                   EU South Sudan              Now, post-JAM donor.
                   Programme Manager
Friday, 28 July
9 – 11 AM          Luka Biong Deng             SPLM Cluster Leader, Info &
                   WB MDTF Officer             Statistics (also served as day
                                               to day focal point)     
11 AM – 1 PM       UNCT
                   South Sudan Senior
                   Management Team
1 PM – 2 PM        Florence Lado & Jackson     JAM-South Secretariat   
                   MDTF-SS Office of the                               
                   Technical Secretariats
2:15 – 3 PM        James WM Ellery             Post-JAM, UNMIS         
                   UNMIS Regional
                   Coordinator Southern

    October 2006
3:15-4:15 PM       Fiona Davies                  Post-JAM, capacity     
                   Aid Management adviser,       implementation
                   Ministry of Finance
3:30-4:00 PM       H.E. Agnes Lasuba             SPLM Gender Focal Point
                   Member of Parliament,
                   Chair for International and
                   Regional Cooperation
5:00-7:00 PM       Paul Savage                   NGO Focal Point for    
                   PACT                          Governance and Rule of Law
7:30 – 10 PM       Chris Johnson & Luca          See above                        See above
Saturday, 29 July
9 – 10 AM         Simon Strachan                 Acting Deputy RC/HC    
                  Head of UNICEF, South
1-2 PM            Mona Duale                     During JAM – OLS Coordinator
                  Coordination & Information     Post-JAM – Work Plan
                  Officer, OCHA – South          coordinator for humanitarian
                  Sudan                          issues in the South

                                       KHAROUM MISSION ITINERARY
                                           29 JULY TO 2 AUGUST

Time               Contact                       JAM Role                         Contact Info
Sunday, 30 July
09:00 – 10 AM      Yasmine Sherif                Rule of Law Technical Expert
                   UNDP, Head of Rule of Law     for Cluster 2
10:00 – 11:30 AM   Abda Yahia El-Mahdi           GOS Cluster Leader,    
                   Managing Director             Macroeconomic Policy
11:45 – 12: 30PM   Andrew Cox & Tom              Post-JAM UNCT recovery and
                   Hockley                       development coordination (also
                   Head of RCO                   D-JAM)                 
                   and Deputy Head of RCO
2:30 – 3:30 PM     H.E. Kosti Manibe             SPLM Overall Focal Point, also,
                   GNU Minister of               Education focal point and CCG    Office: 0183780675
                   Humanitarian Affairs

                   and Hassaboo Mohamed
                   Abdelrahman, HAC
                   General Commissioner                                           Office: 0183778389
4:30 – 5:30 PM     Dr. Taj El Sir Mahjoub        GOS cluster leader, Capacity
                   Chair, National Strategic     Bldg & Institutional
                   Planning Board, also          Development, also overall
                   member of JNTT                GOS cluster team coordination
                                                 and CCG
9:30 – 11 PM       Vivek Srivastava              Co-Cluster Leader, Capacity
                                                 Bldg & Institutional
                                                 Development (also in D-JAM)
Monday, 31 July
10 AM – 12 PM      Ruth Kibiti                   Cross-cutting focal point for
                   UNIFEM Programme Officer      Gender in the South

    October 2006
                   Amel Hamza                                           
                   UNIFEM M & E Officer
2:00-3:00 PM       Manuel Aranda da Silva       Sudan UN DSRSG/RC/HC    
3:30-5:15 PM       Fridtjov Thorkildsen         CCG Chair               
                   Norwegian Ambassador to                              
Tuesday, 1 August
10:30 – 12:30 PM UNCT

3:00 – 4:00 PM     Elizabeth Schwabe            Reference Group member for        elisabeth.schwabe-
                   Hansen                       Governance & Rule of Law,
                   First Secretary- Norwegian                           
4:30 – 5:30 PM     Patrick Mullen               Health cluster team member
                                                (both N/S JAM and D-JAM)
6:30 – 7:30 PM     John Fox                     Three Areas cluster member
                                                (also involved in D-JAM)
8 PM – 10 PM     John Clarke and Tom            Post-JAM coordination and
                 Hockley                        work plan linkages
                 Field Coordination Officer                             
                 and Dep. Head of RCO
Wednesday, 2 August
9 AM – 10 AM     H.E. Anne Itto                 SPLM Cluster Leader,    
                 GNU Ministry of Agriculture,   Productive Sector                 Tel : +2499912307431
                 JNTT Political Committee
10:30 – 11:30 AM Mrs. Amal Eltinai              GOS cluster leader, Gov. &
                 GNU Ministry of Justice        ROL                               Tel: +249912166116
12:00- 12:45 PM  Manuel Aranda da Silva         Sudan DSRSG/RC/HC       
1 – 2 PM         Philippe Chichereau            Aid Coordination &                philippe.chichereau@undp.or
                 Senior Aid Adviser,            Management assessment             g
                 Governance unit, UNDP          (during JAM), now working on
                                                coordination with the MIC         Tel: +249912150892
8 PM               Jack Van Holst Pellekaan     Mission and cluster member,       jvanholstpelleka@worldbank.
                                                Productive Sector (also cluster   org
                                                leader in Somali JNA & D-JAM)

                                            PHONE INTERVIEWS

Date               Contact                      JAM Role                          Contact Info
7 August           Ishac Diwan                  Country Director        

7 August           Jon Bennett                  UN Team Leader          

8 August           Jeni Klugman                 WB Team Leader          

8 August           Sigrid Kaag                  UN Senior Advisor       

    October 2006

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