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					1        RELEVANCE OF THE PROGRAMME
The Eastern Cape Province is situated along the south-east coast of South Africa. It
is bordered by the Western Cape (west), the Northern Cape (north-west), by the Free
State and the Kingdom of Lesotho (north), and KwaZulu-Natal (north-east). It is
home to a population of some 7 million people and it has chosen tourism as one of its
key strategic drivers. The pilot project is located in the Wild Coast between the
Umtamvuna and Kei Rivers (see Annex B). This region supports a population of
approximately 1, 4 million (96 people/km2).


1.1     General Context
There were a number of strategic reasons that led to the identification of the Wild
Coast as a priority area for development intervention within the Eastern Cape. The
most compelling was based on economic assessments done by Development Bank
                                      1
of Southern Africa (DBSA) and others indicating significant agricultural and tourism
potential in an area that had hitherto experienced significant neglect, the result of
which was high levels of poverty. At the same time the South African Government
had identified tourism development as a key sector for economic growth and
development evidenced by the specific attention paid to positioning it within their
Macroeconomic Strategy - GEAR. In this context Government recognised that it has
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a key responsibility to create the necessary conditions / environment to open up
opportunities for investment and development.

Recent figures published in the Herald and Daily Dispatch news papers confirm this
potential. They show that between 1998 and 2001 the Eastern Cape recorded the
fastest growth of all provinces – 13.5% mainly due to the “substantial increase in the
number of game farms (there are obvious tourism links here), as well as growth in
wool, forestry, horticulture and agricultural exports generally”. Tourism however still
needs to position itself to play a part in continuing to assist the province increase its
overall contribution to national GDP which currently stands at 8.5%.

The initial intent behind the SDI decisions on the Wild Coast would appear to still
hold true in that from a socio-economic point of view, the Wild Coast is significantly
underdeveloped relative to its inherent development potential and that previous
political neglect is evidenced in the high rate of unemployment.


1.2     Specific Context
The Programme has been set up to deliver specific programme objectives aligned to
the policy context described above. The following defines the focus and the core
issues impacting delivery.


1.2.1    Programme Objectives


1 Previously identified opportunities hitherto not yet achieved included the construction of a toll road
from Port Edward to Port St. Johns, the development of eco-tourism incorporating Dwesa / Cwebe, and
Mkambati Reserves, and the upgrading of a tourism areas around Coffee Bay, and Port St. Johns.
2 Governments ability to deliver on this responsibility within the Wild Coast Area, including managing
the tensions between National and Provincial Government, remains a moot point.
The pilot Programme has in essence two core strategic objectives. These are to:

         1. Contribute to the implementation of the Government‟s growth,
            redistribution and employment strategy (GEAR)3 and
         2. Unlock the economic potential by way of partnerships between the private
            sector and communities4.

The overall purpose of the project being to increase the level of income and
employment of previously disadvantaged communities (PDCs) through their
improved participation in the tourism industry in the Wild Coast Pilot area.

Towards meeting these core objectives this pilot project was set up to achieve the
following programme objectives:

1.          Tangible economic and social development that increased the level of
    income and employment of previously disadvantaged communities (PDCs)5 along
    the Wild Coast.
2.          Establish a sustainable framework of co-operation between communities,
    private and public sectors in the Wild Coast area and ultimately to
3.          Draw up guidelines for a national programme through the development of
    a model for replication all of which will be articulated around:
     i.             Community business development
    ii.             Resource management and environmental conservation
   iii.             Skills development and environmental awareness
   iv.              Policy and institutional support
    v.              Marketing, promotions and public relations and the development of
          a national programme

These programme objectives are without doubt relevant to the Eastern Cape and
Wild Coast areas. They are also aligned to the goals of the EU and the majority of
interest groups / stakeholders6 involved in tourism development. On the face of it the
programme objectives are well aligned to the key problems that need to be
addressed in the external environment in particular job creation and increased level
of income.

3 GEAR is being implemented, in part, through the Government‟s implementation of Spatial
Development Initiatives (SDIs) - Government has determined that tourism is the priority sector for the
Wild Coast SDI.
4SDIs are partnerships with the private sector and communities, aimed at unlocking the inherent and
under-utilised economic potential in specific areas – Government is still pursuing a growth-led economic
policy that seeks to engage private sector in the investment process (Natal Mercury 13 February 2003).
5The means to achieve this is to enable their improved participation in the tourism industry in the Wild
Coast area.
6 What has become apparent is that there are potentially conflicting development philosophies /
ideologies being driven within the programme. On the one hand an approach to set up the community
as full owners of all facets of a tourism project, that is, a wholly community driven approach that then
involves private sector. On the other the approach outlined in the financing agreement that advocates
the use of a private sector driven approach that ensures optimum community involvement. As this is a
pilot project, it should test various options to determine the circumstances under which, which option
would be the most successful in achieving the objectives of the project. Such contrasts can therefore be
viewed positively in that they can encourage diversity of enterprise models needed for a pilot project.
1.2.2 Legislative Framework
Relevance is also measured against the backdrop of the existing policy framework in
South Africa. Community empowerment is a common thread in a host of South
African policy instruments on sustainable development and economic growth some of
which are listed in Annex I.A

Legislation apart the fundamental issue for effective delivery is the willingness and
ability of all the relevant implementing agents to engage the Programme and drive
the deliverables towards successful completion.

1.2.3 Relevance of projects overall objectives
The intent of the South African government to sustainable economic growth and
investment promotion specifically in under developed areas that have sound
economic potential is well documented. This notion is underpinned by a willingness
to engage and encourage private sector investment into areas where they have
traditionally been excluded and / or discouraged from investing. This partnership
approach, aimed at supplementing government resources and empowering PDCs
thus enabling their transition into the mainstream economy is at the centre of the
development philosophy that underpins this approach. The Wild Coast SDI, and by
implication this pilot Programme has been set in motion to support this approach to
development.

The strategic intent therefore behind the development process is to:
1.           Mobilise private sector resources for development and investment
2.           Be guided by the basic human needs / expectations of communities
     affected by investment / developments and to optimise opportunities to empower
     them.
3.           Support such investment by targeted and co-ordinated public sector
     funding / facilitation aimed at providing the physical and social infrastructure /
     services required to leverage development.
4.           Develop the necessary institutional capacity at all levels necessary to
     ensure sustainability of the process7.
5.           Achieve the same aims as were intended for the SDIs:
      i.              Generate sustainable growth and development.
     ii.              Unleash the economic potential inherent in those regions.
    iii.              Generate long term employment for locals.
    iv.               Maximise investment by the private sector.
     v.               Create and exploit spin-off opportunities.
    vi.               Encourage export-orientated growth (e.g. agricultural links).
   vii.               Link provincial and local development strategies within a sound
         framework of national development priorities.
   viii.              Promote the ideal of international competitiveness and regional
           co-operation.
    ix.               Create a more diversified ownership base of development
           initiatives.

7 This presupposes close co-operation between three tiers of government, private sector players and
the communities concerned.
The relevance of the principles embedded in these objectives and their alignment to
the needs in the Wild Coast area cannot be faulted. Having said that there have
been severe criticisms of the SDI in terms of the manner in which it was implemented
in the Province i.e. top down and its approach being to focus on large tourism
investments as the most appropriate approach to be followed in the area. The MTR
team has been led to believe that elements of this top down approach has continued,
making the acceptance of the Support to the Wild Coast SDI Pilot Programme at
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Provincial, District and Local level problematic .

1.2.4 Using Lessons Learnt
The SDI process provided important lessons for the Programme. For example
lessons on land tenure have been documented in work commissioned on using
interim procedures to drive land-based developments (See Annex I.B and paper
prepared by Karl Wiggishof and Margot Pienaar). Notwithstanding these interim
procedures problems and delays around land have been experienced and are
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discussed elsewhere in the report .

Other than that there is little documented evidence of lessons from the SDI being
used. The danger is that the Programme might pay to re-learn lessons that should
already have been learnt and for which there are some defined solutions.

An example of this is the training of Trusts. A training manual was developed within
the Maputo Corridor SDI for the Makuleke and this should be used to inform the
Programme which intends developing a trusts training manual. The MTR team
accepts that the TOR / brief developed for the course developer requires as step one
that work to date must be consulted. However the absence of references to known
previous work might indicate that the lessons / critique of previous SDI work has yet
to be actively used to inform this pilot project. Active pursuance of the programme
objectives by all stakeholders against the background of lessons learnt and unfolding
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changes is necessary because the intention is to inform replicability of potentially
ground breaking work in other areas of the country.

For instance Caroline Ashley in her research on “Private Sector and Community
Involvement in Tourism and Forestry Development on the Wild Coast” succinctly
summarises some of the criticisms of the original SDI.




8 The top down approach started in the SDI‟s should have been remedied within the EU programme.
Whilst the SDI did focus on developing medium to large tourism investments, it did not discount
community driven approaches. Rather it was looking to nurture projects of scale. As a pilot project the
EU programme should use both scenarios to inform approaches that would enhance replicability.
Results to date provide limited opportunity to make such a call at this time.
9 Despite the lessons learnt the „system‟ does not seem able to provide the necessary support to
overcome the problems. The truth behind this must be tempered by another lesson i.e. having the
political and operational buy-in at strategic level which is a necessary prerequisite to obtain and sustain
cooperation within government.
10 The Programme is being pushed towards legislation yet to be improved e.g. Community Land Rights
Bill, which requires for example land holding in administrative areas. Delivery within existing legislation
that also makes provision for delivery in future legislation is ground breaking and must inform this pilot
programme.
“The SDI approach has been widely criticised and many explanations given for its
failure to deliver. The most common, detailed by provincial government staff and well
argued in Kepe 2001 [Kepe et al 2001], and stated during several interviews, are:
      It sought to transplant a model for an urban industrial zone to an
         underdeveloped rural area. For example, the N2 highway wasn‟t
         commercially or physically appropriate in the geography of the Wild Coast.
      It pursued a top-down technocratic plan without adapting to local conditions,
         or garnering support from local institutions – such as Provincial Government.
         Thinking was removed from reality‟ (local development consultant, December
         2001).
      Specifically, it sought fast-track, large scale approach to investment which is
         not suitable or commercially viable for the Wild Coast.          For example,
         Provincial Government staff criticise the proposal at Port St Johns - for a high-
         tech computerised development with a golf course, and the planned R110 mn
         investment at Dwesa Cwebe – as a big bang high profile approach that risks
         giving away concessions for something that can‟t be done. Even if the money
         could be raised, they would be inappropriate for the Wild Coast.
      It tried to by-pass land issues, thus ignoring a key issue for communities, and
         failing to resolve a key source of uncertainty and risk for investors. As one
         official described it: „the question of land ownership was a major stumbling
         block… various people [investors] have turned back at the eleventh hour
         because the land situation wasn‟t clear. Enquiries with the Land Claims
         Commission were done at a late stage.‟
      The underlying assumptions were wrong: that a small public investment
         would leverage in a large one, and that the private sector would fund
         infrastructural development.       It was argued (by a leading Provincial
         Government analyst, October 2001) that expecting the private sector to build
         infrastructure „is only possible under special conditions – when the sums add
         up‟ (i.e. not in the Wild Coast)). The failure of the N2 highway proposal,
         which had reached an advanced stage of planning, is the key example –
         though this has now come back to the drawing board.
      It was incapacitated by institutional failings, management weakness, and
         competition within and between parts of government. During the DTI era,
         observers report there was „gross incompetence – things happened that
         shouldn‟t have‟. When DEAT took over, it reportedly did not have the
         capacity to deliver, provincial government was ignored, cross-departmental
         co-ordination was lacking.
      To make matters worse it caused disruption in the process. „DTI promised
         communities all sorts of things. Communities divided according to which
         consortium they favoured, according to the benefits they were promised‟.
         Kepe (2001) documents how it severely disrupted the livelihoods of those that
         invested in hanging on to land or other assets that they expected to be
         involved in the developments that never materialised.

1.2.5 Structural characteristics / linkages
Notwithstanding the relevance of the objectives the key question that must be
considered in this regard is this: Are all stakeholders focussed on and supportive of
the same collective vision that is needed to achieve the objectives?

The MTR team has noted that a visioning workshop was held between the 3 NGOs
to agree on a collective vision for the Programme. The outcome was as follows:
          The Program vision is to inject life into the local economy by
          supporting and initiating the meaningful participation of
          communities in responsible tourism projects, which highlight
          and respect the environmental and cultural uniqueness of the
          Wild Coast


A set of objectives were then set for the project and these are listed below:

1.         Increase income levels and job opportunities in local communities through
     responsible tourism development and improved participation in existing initiatives
2.           Improve skills levels of community members to maximise the employment
     of local labour
3.           Improve the business capacity of local community structures and
     individual community members
4.          Improve environmental awareness of the affected communities, business
     organisations and government structures
5.            Improve capacity of local, regional and provincial government structures
     to facilitate the ongoing process of community based tourism development after
     the Programme ends
6.           To establish a more cohesive and effective management structure and
     policies for the natural areas which should be protected for conservation and
     tourism development reasons
7.            The program is a structured learning experience aimed at addressing the
     problems hindering local economic development of PDCs in the tourism industry.
     It is essential that a framework / model are developed for roll-out to other regions
     of the country.
Visioning is a necessary process and even now it seems there is a need to ensure all
have the same vision for the Programme. However there needs to be careful
management of such processes because although aligned to the overall programme
goals and objectives there is always a danger of confusion or the creation of a new
set of programme goals. The common denominator has been the synchronisation of
these with the log-frame.

Tourism is driven by a myriad of role players in the Eastern Cape. The Department
of Economic Affairs, Environment and Tourism (DEAET) are directly responsible for
Government‟s tourism programme in the Province. As a department it forms part of
the provincial planning network that supports the Cabinet Committee and Provincial
Legislature as regards the strategic direction for economic development in the
province. Towards delivering on these responsibilities it has created links to its two
key parastatal organisations, namely Eastern Cape Tourism Board (ECTB) and the
Eastern Cape Development Corporation (ECDC).              The operational approach
suggests that DEAET drives the policy and planning agenda along with ECTB who in
turn gives expression to this by way of managing the provinces tourism marketing
function. The ECDC is the delivery agent charged with the responsibility to drive
tourism development and investment in the province and to give impetus to the
socio-economic imperative of growing tourism as one of the economic engines in the
province. The district and municipal councils, responsible for the Integrated Planning
Programmes (IDPs) at local level are informed by and linked to the provincial
planning process.

Our assessment suggests that there is disconnect between the Programme and the
economic, developmental and spatial planning initiatives at provincial level. As
stated, the provincial and local planning cycle(s)11 are responsible for the broader
socio-economic prioritisation of effort and is aligned to political processes in the
Eastern Cape. Whilst the role players accept and acknowledge the Programme, they
have not as yet taken it on board in a serious and meaningful way. The notion of the
Programme having been “parachuted” in from the national level creates operational
tensions that diminish ownership and acceptance.           This suggests that the
Programme is somewhat isolated and operating in a vacuum from a provincial
perspective12.

The assessment undertaken by the MTR team suggests that this is one of the major
shortcomings of the current Programme. We are of the opinion that collective buy-in
from all stakeholders is lacking, the result of which is an inability to deliver within the
time frames originally envisaged. Unless addressed, the intended delivery is unlikely
to be a complete success. The approach at provincial level to secure buy in might
include:
1.          Engage the political structures to position the Programme at a political
    level via a Cabinet sub committee / relevant economic cluster.
2.          Allow the cabinet process to allocate the responsibility / ownership to the
     relevant department.
3.           Engage that Department in terms of formulating implementation plans.
4.           Support them in securing relevant linkages at:
     a.              Provincial Level
     b.              District Level and
     c.              Municipal Level
5.           Support the Province to align with relevant Parastatals.
6.           Ensure incorporation within the broader IDP process.




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   Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) are the means by which to engage municipal structures and
inform provinces pf bottom up development initiatives. To date none of the projects from the
Programme have been included in the IDPs which are a further requirement to overcome the land
tenure issue.

12 This must be tempered by the fact that the composition of stakeholders has and continues to change
constantly. Continuity is generally speaking critical to development.
1.2.6   Project Assumptions – Real or Flawed


The assumptions listed in the log-frame include:

       National political stability
       Favourable economic environment
       Private sector encouraged
       Crime under control
       PDCs want to participate in tourism industry
       Private sector committed to training PDCs
       Communities support individual enterprises
       Implement relevant Cabinet legislation.

At a global level, some of these assumptions are valid for this project. For example,
national political stability and favourable economic environment are to be expected.
Others are non-committal and although valid, they don‟t address the core issues that
have determined the success of the project.

The MTR team has concluded (in addition to the concerns raised in 2.2.4 and 2.2.5
above) that some of the assumptions that would have presumably been made ahead
of implementation do not appear in the log-frame. These assumptions would
reasonably include:

1.          The project design was based on a sound assessment of the socio-
    economic realities and that an appropriate investment / development approach
    was defined, that is:
     i.                 The notion of private partnerships as a key driver was
        accepted and embedded OR
    ii.                 Tourism development and ownership was to be driven
        exclusively from a rural community business enterprise approach / philosophy
        OR
   iii.                 There would be a mixture of the two approaches and that
        these would be carefully managed to ensure one did not receive added
        attention at the expense of the other.
2.          The funding requirements needed for detailed facilitation in this complex
    environment and the four-year implementation time frame it was aligned with,
    was a direct outcome of assessing the realities and needs on the ground. We
    believe that four years might be too short and that this programme should have
    been phased over a number of periods13.
3.          The tourism market / market potential had been assessed and that there
    was clarity in terms of the absorption capacity along the Wild Coast for the
    intended projects forming part of the Programme. In other words there was:
     i.                 Clear areas of focus agreed for the Wild Coast area – spatially
        and from a product point of view.


13 The rural livelihoods programme took 2 years to plan and is being implemented in just 2 municipal
areas over a 9 year period of 3 x 3 year time frames. The GEF programme took 18 months to get sign
off in the Province to locate it in an institution.
     ii.                The rationale for the Programme to be designed around core
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        anchor areas was understood and accepted by all .
   iii.                 How and what significant benefits would accrue to PDCs over
        the longer term.
4.           The setting up the Programme under the auspices of three appointed
    Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) was correct and each of the institutions
    had the requisite capacity to deliver on the predefined requirements.
5.           The three NGOs and the management structures within the PMU had the
    combined capacity to deliver a programme in a complex environment over a
    280km coastline crossing the boundaries of seven municipal areas15 and two
    district areas16.
6.          The three tiers of government involved in the Programme had all bought
   into the process and assumed ownership to ensure collective delivery i.e.:
    i.                 Strategic guidance would be forthcoming from DEAT via the
       Project Steering Committee (PSC), the Province and the PMU in driving the
       process forward;
   ii.                 There would as a result be strong political leadership and
       effective management / oversight of the project.
7.          The PMU and the NGOs would be able to integrate and coordinate all
   activities in a way that would ensure optimal delivery i.e.;
    i.                 Roles and responsibilities would be clear and accepted /
       understood by all, and
   ii.                 Effective project management would underpin the Programme
       delivery.

The reality three years down the line is that these basic assumptions are probably
flawed given that the Programme is being implemented in an overall operating and
development environment that is extremely complex. One has therefore to question
whether the design team and/or the person(s) responsible for developing the log-
frame for this Programme fully appreciated these underlying issues or could foresee
the difficulties that lay ahead for the Programme more especially around key issues
relating to:

1.           Governance responsibilities – significant energy required to work across
     three tiers
2.          Institutional arrangements – definite tensions between different role
     players (National and Provincial) with different agendas
3.          Policy and procedures impacting on implementation e.g. land tenure.
4.          Community dynamics.
5.          The tourism market itself.



14 The team was led to believe that the document “Development Plan for the Five Anchor Areas of the
Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative Programme - March 2001” that was developed during the 1st
AWP was the framework plan to be implemented by the EU programme. The almost exclusive focus on
the Horse and Hiking Trail is therefore somewhat confusing .
15 Mbizana; Quakeni; PSJ; Nyandeni; KSD; Mbashe; Mnuquma
16 OR Tambo; Amotole
Clearly the “Annual Work Plan” processes whilst recognising some of these issues
has hitherto not put in place specific actions to overcome the problems.


1.2.7   Developmental Rationale / Ideology
The MTR team detected ideological differences in thinking about delivery of the
tourism ventures within the Programme. This is partly as a result of operating within
a complex and unfriendly investment environment and partly as a result of ideological
differences driving the operations of the respective implementing agencies. The
following issues are provided as framework guidelines that the team believes might
direct thinking aimed at creating synergy between approaches that will ultimately
provide improved opportunities for replication.

   1. Responsible tourism has been identified as a key focus for tourism
      development on the Wild Coast. The concept presupposes a balance
      between economic development requirements, social dynamics and
      environmental management practices. The importance of the need to create
      employment, increase levels of income and address the social imperative
      means that the implementation of environmental management must be about
      the responsible use of resources, not their non-use. The implications being
      that in terms of this Programme, solutions to the problems of environmental
      management are to be developed within the process of tourism development
      and not outside of it. The call by PondoCrop and WWF for an integrated SEA
      up front to examine the cumulative environmental impacts rather than
      separate EIAs on a project by project basis would have been a more useful
      intervention.
   2. The community driven approach has been successful in the area more
      especially in Amabiba and Ufudu. There is an argument that the pilot project
      should test the various models in the context that benefit flows in such
      projects are by definition based on smaller community-based activities that
      deliver smaller social benefits all of which are difficult and time consuming to
      establish, manage and market. The notion of establishing some larger key
      anchor projects that provide a core economic activity around which smaller
      projects can flourish should be implemented and measured in terms of
      impact.
   3. The community driven approach is laudable. It must however be recognised
      that benefit flows will be by definition based on smaller community-based
      activities that deliver social benefits all of which are difficult and time
      consuming to establish, manage and market. The notion of establishing
      some key anchor projects that provide a core economic activity around which
      smaller projects can flourish should not be ignored.
   4. If tourism is regarded as the important economic driver that is capable of
      delivering meaningful social impacts, then the scale of tourism development
      also needs to be significant. If not it is unlikely that the Programme will be
      able to reduce environmental impacts by way of co-management agreements
      or any other means.
    5. It is important to understand the “catch 22 syndrome” associated with tourism
       development along the Wild Coast. Significant tourism development also
       requires significant infrastructure development which can only be warranted if
       the returns from tourism are also significant. This in turn might mitigate
       against a community driven approach on the Wild Coast. In other words:


    a.             Infrastructure investment will only be warranted if reasonable
       returns are made;
    b.             Development needs to be of a scale to justify the cost of
       infrastructure;
    c.             Community driven tourism on its own will not drive viability at a
       regional level;
    d.             The net result is a need for larger development areas that require
       larger infrastructure to be developed and to drive specific tourism
       programmes linked to support for community tourism. Having said that local
       government would need to buy-in to the provision of infrastructure.

    In stating this, it is not suggested that tourism development should emulate that
    seen along the Kwazulu Natal South Coast. In addition, one cannot ignore the
    fact that the topography of the Wild Coast isolates some coastal communities.
    This isolation may make it difficult for benefits of anchor projects to flow into
    these communities, while smaller community-based projects will bring some
    relief. It is clear that a balance is called for. In the case of Amadiba the project
    went ahead because it made little sense to sit back and wait for infrastructure, a
    reality which would affect the likes of developing Mkambati.


    In this regard, the project has yet to test different models of tourism development
    and as such, has seemingly not recognised the fact that this is a pilot project.
    This is despite the fact that several options were recognised in the “Development
    Plan for the Five Anchor Areas of the Wild Coast Spatial Development Initiative
    Programme - March 2001” developed at the start of the Programme.


    The fact is that this Programme is trying to do two difficult things. One to create
    tourist flows in an area has limited traditional tourism interest (i.e. a destination)
    and secondly a type of tourism that benefits people who have traditionally not
    participated in the sector (PDCs / equity ownership).
    6. With regard to land tenure, it is recognised that land rights are central to the
       opportunity and power that enable constructive negotiations around
       development projects. Failure to address this will limit opportunities17 for
       communities to share benefits of any real significance. In particular:


17 The land issue has impacted not only on green field development but also on brown field
development. Even where efforts are being made to resuscitate / refurbish existing tourism plant such
as camp sites on the old trails the process to secure access is continually delayed by departmental
obstacles / blockages / delays. DLA in East London have indicated that the interim procedures available
can / will facilitate movement. However experience to date from an implementation / delivery
perspective has been different.
   a.            Land rights and the right to negotiate resource use agreements
      must be given to communities;
   b.            Investors need security of tenure if they are to invest;
   c.            Investors also need a legal entity with whom to engage;
   d.            Government support for infrastructure development is a pre-
      requisite.

Given that the greater portion of enterprise development is to be rolled out in the
coming year, attention must be given to detailing the various tourism development
models with concomitant indications of approaches to achieve them and defining the
benefits that flow from them.

Clearly DEAT, the EU and the PMU need to provide the necessary leadership to
ensure that there is a collective vision shared by all stakeholders in the Province and
on the Programme.

				
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