Docstoc

lyme

Document Sample
lyme Powered By Docstoc
					OFFICE   OF THE   NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
                  D IVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
                      & SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY




          Lyme
 Central School District
Internal Controls Over Cash
Receipts and Disbursements

           Report of Examination
                   Period Covered:
           July 1, 2007 — August 31, 2008
                      2009M-125




              Thomas P. DiNapoli
                                Table of Contents



                                                                                Page

AUTHORITY LETTER                                                                 2


INTRODUCTION                                                                     3
           Background                                                            3
           Objective                                                             3
           Scope and Methodology                                                 3
           Comments of District Officials and Corrective Action                   4


CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS                                                  5
            Cash Receipts                                                        5
            Recordkeeping                                                        7
            Cash Disbursements                                                   8
            User Access Rights                                                   9
            Recommendations                                                     10


APPENDIX    A   Response From District Officials                                 12
APPENDIX    B   Audit Methodology and Standards                                 17
APPENDIX    C   How to Obtain Additional Copies of the Report                   19
APPENDIX    D   Local Regional Office Listing                                    20




                       DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY          1
                                                                                       1
                                                 State of New York
                                    Office of the State Comptroller


Division of Local Government
and School Accountability

September 2009

Dear School District Officials:

A top priority of the Office of the State Comptroller is to help school district officials manage their
districts efficiently and effectively and, by so doing, provide accountability for tax dollars spent to
support district operations. The Comptroller oversees the fiscal affairs of districts statewide, as well
as districts’ compliance with relevant statutes and observance of good business practices. This fiscal
oversight is accomplished, in part, through our audits, which identify opportunities for improving
district operations and Board of Education governance. Audits also can identify strategies to reduce
district costs and to strengthen controls intended to safeguard district assets.

Following is a report of our audit of the Lyme Central School District, entitled Internal Controls
Over Cash Receipts and Disbursements. This audit was conducted pursuant to Article V, Section 1
of the State Constitution and the State Comptroller’s authority as set forth in Article 3 of the General
Municipal Law.

This audit’s results and recommendations are resources for district officials to use in effectively
managing operations and in meeting the expectations of their constituents. If you have questions about
this report, please feel free to contact the local regional office for your county, as listed at the end of
this report.

Respectfully submitted,



Office of the State Comptroller
Division of Local Government
and School Accountability




   2         OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
                           Introduction
Background         The Lyme Central School District (District) is located in the Towns
                   of Lyme, Brownville, Cape Vincent and Clayton in Jefferson County.
                   The District is governed by the Board of Education (Board) which
                   comprises seven elected members. The Board is responsible for
                   the general management and control of the District’s financial and
                   educational affairs. The Superintendent of Schools (Superintendent)
                   is the chief executive officer of the District and is responsible, along
                   with other administrative staff, for the day-to-day management of the
                   District under the direction of the Board.

                   There is one school in operation within the District, with approximately
                   340 students and 80 employees. The District’s budgeted expenditures
                   for the 2007-08 fiscal year were $6.1 million, which were funded
                   primarily with State aid and real property taxes.

                   The Treasurer shares responsibility for cash receipts and disbursements
                   with two other Business Office employees, the Business Manager and
                   an account clerk. The Board has appointed a claims auditor responsible
                   for auditing claims and certifying warrants. The Superintendent is
                   appointed to certify payrolls.

                   The District’s computerized accounting system is maintained by
                   the Madison-Oneida Board of Cooperative Educational Services
                   (BOCES) at the Mohawk Regional Information Center (MORIC).
                   Accounts payable checks are generated and printed by the District’s
                   Business Office and payroll checks are generated and printed by
                   MORIC. The District records cash transactions first by the use of
                   spreadsheets called cash flow statements and then afterwards by
                   posting to the computerized accounting system.

Objective          The objective of our audit was to determine if District officials were
                   properly safeguarding their financial resources. Our audit addressed
                   the following related question:

                      •   Are internal controls over cash receipts and cash disbursements
                          appropriately designed and operating effectively to adequately
                          safeguard District assets?

Scope and          We examined the District’s internal controls over cash receipts and
Methodology        disbursements for the period July 1, 2007 to August 31, 2008.

                   We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted
                   government auditing standards (GAGAS). More information on such

              DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY                  3
                                                                                      3
                           standards and the methodology used in performing this audit are
                           included in Appendix B of this report.

Comments of District       The results of our audit and recommendations have been discussed
Officials and Corrective    with District officials and their comments, which appear in Appendix
Action                     A, have been considered in preparing this report. District officials
                           generally agreed with our recommendations and indicated they
                           planned to initiate corrective action.

                           The Board has the responsibility to initiate corrective action. Pursuant
                           to Section 35 of the General Municipal Law, Section 2116-a (3)(c)
                           of the Education Law and Section 170.12 of the Regulations of the
                           Commissioner of Education, a written corrective action plan (CAP)
                           that addresses the findings and recommendations in this report
                           must be prepared and provided to our office within 90 days, with a
                           copy forwarded to the Commissioner of Education. To the extent
                           practicable, implementation of the CAP must begin by the end of
                           the next fiscal year. For more information on preparing and filing
                           your CAP, please refer to our brochure, Responding to an OSC Audit
                           Report, which you received with the draft audit report. The Board
                           should make the CAP available for public review in the District
                           Clerk’s office.




  4        OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
                Cash Receipts and Disbursements

                      The Treasurer has a critical role in overseeing the cash receipt and
                      disbursement process. The Treasurer is responsible for the collection
                      and custody of cash receipts and for the signing of District checks upon
                      appropriate written authorization. District management is responsible
                      for establishing internal controls to ensure that cash receipts and
                      disbursements duties are adequately controlled and monitored. In
                      general, an effective system of internal controls includes policies
                      and procedures to help ensure the proper segregation of duties1 and
                      to provide reasonable assurance that cash transactions are properly
                      initiated, accurately recorded, and properly approved and documented.
                      When internal controls are not designed appropriately or operating
                      effectively, it increases the risk that errors or irregularities may occur,
                      and not be detected and corrected.

                      The Board has adopted policies for the duties of the Treasurer,
                      signatures on checks and for the Treasurer’s bond. However,
                      the policies and procedures are inadequate because they do not
                      provide sufficient guidance on internal controls over cash receipts
                      and disbursements for District personnel to follow, such as for the
                      segregation of duties and issuing receipts. As a result, cash receipt
                      and disbursement duties are not adequately controlled or monitored.
                      For example, the Business Office does not issue pre-numbered
                      receipts; the account clerk handles most cash receipts duties and the
                      Treasurer signs checks without viewing certified warrants or payrolls.
                      In addition, user access rights are not granted based on position and
                      level of responsibilities, and the Business Manager can transfer funds
                      by phone, wire transfer debt payments by email and phone, and have
                      user access rights changed by calling MORIC without the approval of
                      another District official. Finally, special aid and debt service activity is
                      not fully entered into the computerized accounting system in a timely
                      manner, checks totaling $270,250 were not audited by the claims
                      auditor, and payroll payments totaling $73,010 were not certified by
                      the former Superintendent. As a result, there is an increased risk that
                      errors or irregularities may occur and not be detected and corrected.

Cash Receipts         A good system of internal controls includes policies and procedures
                      for the issuance of pre-numbered receipts, in sequence, for cash
                      collections, the forwarding of deposit receipts to the Business Office,

                      ____________________
                      1
                        When it is not practical to segregate duties because of limited staff resources,
                      it is important to establish compensating controls. Such compensating controls
                      would include a requirement that District officials periodically review the work in
                      question.

                 DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY                           5
                                                                                                  5
                    and for the segregation of duties so that the work of one employee is
                    independently verified in the course of another employee’s regular
                    duties. If it is not practicable to segregate cash duties, compensating
                    controls should be established. These procedures help to ensure that
                    funds are deposited and accounted for properly.

                    The District’s policies and procedures for cash receipts were not
                    adequate. As a result, pre-numbered receipts were not issued, deposit
                    receipts were not forwarded to the Business Office, cash duties were
                    not segregated and sufficient compensating controls were not in place.

                    Pre-Numbered and Deposit Receipts — The Regulations of the
                    Commissioner of Education (Regulations) require that the Treasurer
                    issue a pre-numbered receipt upon receipt of money, printed in
                    duplicate, to the payer and that the Treasurer retain a copy of the
                    receipt. The Regulations also require that other District personnel,
                    who are authorized to receive money, issue a pre-numbered receipt
                    to the payer printed in triplicate, and that a copy be given to the
                    Treasurer with the money or bank deposit receipt. In addition, General
                    Municipal Law requires that every District officer or employee who
                    receives money on behalf of a district issue a consecutively numbered
                    receipt to the payer, and that a copy be retained by the individual
                    issuing the receipt.

                    The school lunch personnel deposits cafeteria receipts and delivers
                    the bank deposit receipts to the Business Office. We found no other
                    evidence that the Treasurer or anyone else in the Business Office issues
                    duplicate pre-numbered receipts or receives copies of triplicate pre-
                    numbered receipts or bank deposit receipts from District personnel
                    for money they have received. The District’s cash receipts totaled
                    approximately $6 million in the 2007-08 fiscal year. The failure to
                    issue pre-numbered receipts and forward deposit receipts makes
                    it more difficult for District officials to determine if funds received
                    have been properly recorded and deposited. As a result, there is an
                    increased risk that money could be misappropriated and that this
                    misappropriation could remain undetected.

                    Segregation of Duties — To the extent practicable, the division of
                    responsibilities in the Business Office should provide for the work of
                    one employee to be independently verified in the course of another
                    employee’s regular duties. If it is not practicable to segregate cash
                    duties, compensating controls should be established.

                    Cash receipt duties are not segregated and compensating controls
                    are not in place. The account clerk receives cash receipts, prepares
                    bank deposits for the Treasurer to take to the bank, records receipt
                    information from cash flow sheets into the computerized accounting

6   OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
                     system and makes journal entries. The Business Manager provides
                     oversight for the account clerk’s cash receipt duties. However, this
                     does not provide for a sufficient compensating control because it is
                     limited to reviewing the amounts received for certain items purchased
                     and sold for reasonableness, such as review books and sporting
                     goods. The Business Manager informed us that the account clerk
                     has these duties because of the limited number of staff members.
                     However, assigning multiple key cash receipt duties to one individual
                     without providing sufficient oversight weakens internal controls and
                     increases the risk that errors or irregularities may occur and not be
                     detected. For example, the account clerk could take money and not
                     record it or record it for a lesser amount.

                     Due to these control weaknesses, we reviewed cash receipts
                     information from outside sources to ensure that they were properly
                     received, recorded and deposited intact by the Treasurer.2 Except for
                     the failure to record special aid fund receipts and debt service fund
                     interest revenue in the computerized accounting system in a timely
                     manner (see the following discussion in “Recordkeeping”), we did
                     not note any significant exceptions.

Recordkeeping        An accounting system must provide for the timely, accurate, and
                     complete recording and reporting of financial transactions. Information
                     generated from the accounting system provides the basis for decision
                     making. Therefore, it is essential that the Business Office Personnel
                     record all cash receipt and disbursement activity in the computerized
                     accounting system in a timely manner.

                     We found that Business Office personnel do not fully record cash
                     receipt and disbursement activity timely in the computerized
                     accounting system. Special aid fund cash receipts are not posted until
                     all of the grant budgets for the year are approved. For example, July
                     2008 receipts totaling $7,613 were not posted in the computerized
                     accounting system until January 2009. Although special aid fund
                     cash disbursements are posted, they are placed in a holding account
                     until the grant budgets are approved, and thus they are reflected in
                     the detailed listing of the cash account, but not the trial balance.
                     In addition, the Business Manager informed us that, due to limited
                     activity, the interest earned in the debt service fund is not posted until
                     year-end. As a result, the cash balances in the trial balance reflect
                     the opening balances as of July 1, 2008. As of August 31, 2008, the
                     cash balance in the special aid fund was overstated by $212,000 and

                     ____________________
                     2
                       Our procedures included a review of State and Federal aid receipts totaling
                     $1,196,322, tax receipts totaling $2,829,114, cafeteria receipts totaling $17,503,
                     retiree health insurance premium bills totaling $2,481, and receipts for three
                     sporting events totaling $520.

                DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY                           7
                                                                                                 7
                         the cash balance in the debt service fund was understated by $59,000.
                         Although the Treasurer told us that she relies on a spreadsheet to
                         determine the actual cash balances and reconcile the bank accounts,
                         by producing spreadsheet cash balance reports instead of updating
                         the computerized accounting system and producing cash balance
                         reports from that system, there is a greater risk that data input errors
                         and manipulations could occur. When cash entries are not recorded,
                         inappropriate activity may be more easily concealed and managers
                         do not have accurate information for monitoring District operations.

Cash Disbursements       School districts disburse funds through the use of checks or wire
                         transfers. As the District official responsible for signing checks, the
                         Treasurer has a critical role in the cash disbursement process. The
                         Treasurer must ensure that checks are only signed for authorized
                         payments. With few exceptions,3 the Treasurer must sign checks
                         only after receiving warrants certified by the claims auditor directing
                         her to pay related claims, or after receiving payrolls certified by the
                         approving officer. The Board has appointed the Superintendent as the
                         approving officer. It is important that internal controls include policies
                         or procedures that require the Treasurer to compare the checks to
                         certified warrants or payrolls prior to issuing checks, and that wire
                         transfers be independently confirmed to ensure that the amounts and
                         payees are accurate, consistent and authorized.

                         Internal controls for checks and wire transfers need to be improved.
                         District officials have not established policies or procedures that
                         require the Treasurer to compare checks to certified warrants or
                         payrolls. Consequently, the Treasurer does not receive certified
                         warrants or payrolls, and checks are signed without a comparison
                         to either certified warrants or payrolls. The Business Manager
                         informed us that although the claims approved by the claims auditor
                         are reported to the Board, the Treasurer has never received certified
                         warrants or payrolls. The Treasurer stated that she relies on the
                         Business Manager to ensure that checks have been approved for
                         payment. In addition, the Business Manager transfers funds by phone
                         and wire transfers debt payments by email and phone; however, the
                         bank does not independently confirm wire transfers with a second
                         individual. Therefore, no other District official reviews or approves
                         these transfers. As such, the Business Manager could initiate and
                         conceal inappropriate transactions by, for example, having the
                         Treasurer issue improper checks or by making an improper electronic
                         banking transfer.

                         ____________________
                         3
                           Education Law authorizes the Board to authorize, by resolution, the payment of
                         certain claims in advance of audit, including public utility services, postage, freight
                         and express charges. However, all such claims must be subsequently presented to
                         the Board or claims auditor for audit.

 8       OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
                          We examined and compared the August 2008 bank reconciliation,
                          bank statement, general journal and general ledger cash accounts
                          to each other to verify that they were complete, accurate, and that
                          any adjustments were properly supported. In addition, we tested
                          107 non-payroll checks totaling $1,140,570 selected from the bank
                          statements, 32 checks totaling $3,370 paid to District officials and
                          family members, and eight checks totaling $13,600 selected from the
                          warrants and traced them to the supporting claims to verify that they
                          were for appropriate purposes. We also selected 50 payroll checks
                          totaling $67,745 and six payroll direct deposits totaling $523,910 from
                          the payroll bank statements and traced them to the payroll registers.
                          Finally, we tested transfers for January 2008 totaling $379,388 by
                          reconciling all transfers between District bank statements. We found:

                              •   Eighteen non-payroll checks totaling $270,250 were not
                                  audited by the claims auditor.

                              •   Five payroll checks totaling $5,785 and one direct deposit
                                  totaling $67,225 for 67 employees were paid from payrolls
                                  that were not certified. The Business Manager informed us
                                  that this occurred because the former Superintendent did not
                                  always certify payrolls.

                          We reviewed documentation attached to the 18 claims to verify
                          that the payments were for proper District purposes. In addition,
                          we verified that the five employees paid by check were paid at the
                          proper rates. We also selected ten employees from the uncertified
                          payroll and ten employees from one of the five certified payrolls who
                          were paid a total of $20,705 by direct deposit and verified their gross
                          salaries paid. Although our testing did not reveal any other significant
                          exceptions, the failure to compare checks to certified warrants and
                          payrolls increases the risk that unauthorized or inappropriate cash
                          disbursements could be made and remain undetected.

User Access Rights        Employees should have access to only the specific computer
                          applications that are necessary for them to perform their job duties.
                          Access controls are used to prevent users from being involved in
                          multiple aspects of financial transactions. It is important that District
                          officials establish policies or procedures to ensure that user access
                          rights are granted based on the requirements of properly segregated
                          job responsibilities, and that the ability to change user access rights
                          is reserved for, and documented by, a District official independent of
                          the Business Office.

                          Although the applications in the computerized accounting system
                          provide the ability to restrict access levels for different users, District

                     DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY                     9
                                                                                                9
                          officials have not implemented policies or procedures for granting
                          user access rights based on each individual’s position and level of
                          responsibilities. In addition, the Board does not require that an
                          individual outside of the Business Office authorize changes to user
                          access rights and that documentation of such approval be retained
                          on file. As a result, the Business Manager has full access rights to
                          the accounting system with the exception of payroll, makes wire
                          transfers without independent verification, and can have user access
                          rights changed by calling MORIC and verbally requesting changes,
                          without any approval from outside of the Business Office.

                          The failure to establish policies or procedures to limit user access and
                          require authorization and documentation of changes to user access
                          increases the risk that individuals could inappropriately gain access
                          to the computerized accounting system and change, destroy, or
                          manipulate financial data. Without adequate oversight, the Business
                          Manager could initiate and conceal inappropriate transactions. For
                          example, the Business Manager could have the Treasurer issue an
                          improper check that has not been audited by the claims auditor, or
                          make an improper electronic banking transfer, and alter the accounting
                          records to prevent detection.4

Recommendations           1. The Board should ensure that policies and procedures are
                             established so that, to the extent practicable, the division of
                             responsibilities in the Business Office provides for the work
                             of one employee to be independently verified in the course of
                             another employee’s regular duties. If it is not practicable to
                             segregate duties, compensating controls should be established.

                          2. The Treasurer should issue duplicate pre-numbered receipts for
                             all moneys received. All other District personnel should issue
                             triplicate pre-numbered receipts. The Treasurer should receive
                             and retain a copy of each triplicate receipt.

                          3. The Board should direct that all funds collected by District
                             personnel be turned over directly to the Treasurer or deposited
                             directly into District bank accounts. Copies of the bank deposit
                             receipts and the triplicate receipts issued should be delivered to
                             the Treasurer.

                          4. Business Office personnel should record all special aid fund cash
                             receipts and disbursements, and all debt service fund interest in
                             the computerized accounting system in a timely manner.


                          ____________________
                          4
                              See related testing in “Cash Disbursements”

 10      OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
     5. District officials should establish policies or procedures that
        require the Treasurer to compare checks to warrants certified by
        the claims auditor, or to payrolls certified by the Superintendent,
        prior to issuing the respective checks.

     6. The Board should direct that the bank confirm all bank transfers
        with an individual other than the District officer or employee who
        made the original transfer request.

     7. District officials should establish policies or procedures for
        granting user access rights based on each individual’s position
        and level of responsibilities.

     8. The Board should direct that an appropriate District official
        outside of the Business Office authorize all changes to user access
        rights and that documentation of such approval be retained on
        file.




DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY              11
                                                                    11
                                          APPENDIX A

                      RESPONSE FROM DISTRICT OFFICIALS

The District officials’ response to this audit can be found on the following pages.




  12        OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY   13
                                                         13
14   OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY   15
                                                         15
16   OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
                                           APPENDIX B

                     AUDIT METHODOLOGY AND STANDARDS

Our overall goal was to assess the adequacy of the internal controls put in place by officials to safeguard
District assets. To accomplish this, we performed an initial assessment of the internal controls so
that we could design our audit to focus on those areas most at risk. Our initial assessment included
evaluations of the following areas: financial oversight, cash receipts and disbursements, purchasing,
payroll and personal services, and information technology.

During the initial assessment, we interviewed appropriate District officials, performed limited tests
of transactions and reviewed pertinent documents, such as District policies and procedures manuals,
Board minutes, and financial records and reports. In addition, we obtained information directly from
the computerized financial databases and then analyzed it electronically using computer-assisted
techniques. This approach provided us with additional information about the District’s financial
transactions as recorded in its databases. Further, we reviewed the District’s internal controls and
procedures over the computerized financial databases to help ensure that the information produced by
such systems was reliable.

After reviewing the information gathered during our initial assessment, we determined where
weaknesses existed, and evaluated those weaknesses for the risk of potential fraud, theft and/or
professional misconduct. We then decided upon the reported objective and scope by selecting for
audit those areas most at risk. We selected cash receipts and disbursements for further audit testing.
To accomplish the objective of the audit, we performed the following procedures:

   •   We interviewed District officials and employees, and reviewed Board minutes, Board
       policies and District procedures to obtain an understanding of the District’s cash receipts and
       disbursements operations.

   •   We tested two months of State and Federal aid receipts during out audit period totaling
       $1,196,322 and tax receipts for the 2007-08 school year totaling $2,829,114 to ensure that they
       were properly recorded in a timely manner. In addition, we examined $17,503 in cafeteria
       receipts for February 2008 by comparing the point-of-sale system daily reports to recorded
       receipts in the computerized accounting system and to deposits listed on the bank statement.

   •   We reviewed the July 2007 and June 2008 retiree health insurance premium bills using copies
       of letters sent by the Business Manager to retirees. In addition, we selected eight of the 14
       retirees who owed money for health insurance to verify that the $2,481 due was received and
       deposited.

   •   We tested receipts for three sporting events totaling $520 from ticket count sheets to bank
       statement deposits and to recorded receipts in the accounting system.
   .
   •   We examined the August 2008 bank reconciliation, bank statement, general journal and general
       ledger cash accounts to verify that they were complete, accurate, and that any adjustments
       were properly supported. In addition, we tested 107 non-payroll checks totaling $1,140,570


                           DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY                   17
                                                                                                    17
       selected from the bank statements, 32 checks totaling $3,370 paid to District officials and
       family members, and eight checks totaling $13,600 selected from the warrants and traced them
       to the supporting claims to verify that they were for appropriate District purposes.

   •   We tested 50 payroll checks totaling $67,745 from the bank statements, reviewed the front
       and back of the checks, and traced them to payroll registers. In addition, we selected six
       payroll direct deposits totaling $523,910 from payroll bank statements and traced them to the
       payroll registers. We also tested transfers for January 2008 totaling $379,388 by reconciling
       all transfers between District bank statements.

   •   We traced cancelled checks to warrants and payrolls to verify certification by the claims auditor
       and Superintendent, as applicable. In addition, for the 18 checks that were not on certified
       warrants, we examined the claims for appropriateness, and for the five checks that were not on
       certified payrolls, we verified that the employees were paid at the proper rates. We also selected
       10 employees from an uncertified payroll and 10 employees from a certified payroll who were
       paid a total of $20,705 by direct deposit and verified that their gross salaries paid were correct.

We conducted our performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards (GAGAS). Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objective.




  18        OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER
                                           APPENDIX C

           HOW TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COPIES OF THE REPORT


To obtain copies of this report, write or visit our web page:




                                    Office of the State Comptroller
                                    Public Information Office
                                    110 State Street, 15th Floor
                                    Albany, New York 12236
                                    (518) 474-4015
                                    http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/




                           DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY   19
                                                                                    19
                                                    APPENDIX D
                             OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER
                              DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
                               AND SCHOOL ACCOUNTABILITY
                                            Steven J. Hancox, Deputy Comptroller
                                            John C. Traylor, Assistant Comptroller

                                      LOCAL REGIONAL OFFICE LISTING
BUFFALO REGIONAL OFFICE                                      GLENS FALLS REGIONAL OFFICE
Robert Meller, Chief Examiner                                Karl Smoczynski, Chief Examiner
Office of the State Comptroller                               Office of the State Comptroller
295 Main Street, Suite 1032                                  One Broad Street Plaza
Buffalo, New York 14203-2510                                 Glens Falls, New York 12801-4396
(716) 847-3647 Fax (716) 847-3643                            (518) 793-0057 Fax (518) 793-5797
Email: Muni-Buffalo@osc.state.ny.us                          Email: Muni-GlensFalls@osc.state.ny.us

Serving: Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie,            Serving: Clinton, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Hamilton,
Genesee, Niagara, Orleans, Wyoming counties                  Montgomery, Rensselaer, Saratoga, Warren, Washington
                                                             counties

ROCHESTER REGIONAL OFFICE                                    ALBANY REGIONAL OFFICE
Edward V. Grant, Jr., Chief Examiner                         Kenneth Madej, Chief Examiner
Office of the State Comptroller                               Office of the State Comptroller
The Powers Building                                          22 Computer Drive West
16 West Main Street – Suite 522                              Albany, New York 12205-1695
Rochester, New York 14614-1608                               (518) 438-0093 Fax (518) 438-0367
(585) 454-2460 Fax (585) 454-3545                            Email: Muni-Albany@osc.state.ny.us
Email: Muni-Rochester@osc.state.ny.us
                                                             Serving: Albany, Columbia, Dutchess, Greene,
Serving: Cayuga, Chemung, Livingston, Monroe,                Schenectady, Ulster counties
Ontario, Schuyler, Seneca, Steuben, Wayne, Yates
counties

SYRACUSE REGIONAL OFFICE                                     HAUPPAUGE REGIONAL OFFICE
Eugene A. Camp, Chief Examiner                               Jeffrey P. Leonard, Chief Examiner
Office of the State Comptroller                               Office of the State Comptroller
State Office Building, Room 409                               NYS Office Building, Room 3A10
333 E. Washington Street                                     Veterans Memorial Highway
Syracuse, New York 13202-1428                                Hauppauge, New York 11788-5533
(315) 428-4192 Fax (315) 426-2119                            (631) 952-6534 Fax (631) 952-6530
Email: Muni-Syracuse@osc.state.ny.us                         Email: Muni-Hauppauge@osc.state.ny.us

Serving: Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Madison,                Serving: Nassau, Suffolk counties
Oneida, Onondaga, Oswego, St. Lawrence counties

BINGHAMTON REGIONAL OFFICE                                   NEWBURGH REGIONAL OFFICE
Patrick Carbone, Chief Examiner                              Christopher Ellis, Chief Examiner
Office of the State Comptroller                               Office of the State Comptroller
State Office Building, Room 1702                              33 Airport Center Drive, Suite 103
44 Hawley Street                                             New Windsor, New York 12553-4725
Binghamton, New York 13901-4417                              (845) 567-0858 Fax (845) 567-0080
(607) 721-8306 Fax (607) 721-8313                            Email: Muni-Newburgh@osc.state.ny.us
Email: Muni-Binghamton@osc.state.ny.us
                                                             Serving: Orange, Putnam, Rockland, Westchester
Serving: Broome, Chenango, Cortland, Delaware,               counties
Otsego, Schoharie, Sullivan, Tioga, Tompkins
counties



  20            OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER