Even his wife admits his decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was only a 51:49 call.
But where stands Tony Blair’s case for war now?
There were six linked issues facing the PM – and he had to be sure of each one in turn before he could legally and legitimately commit to military action. Brian Brady investigates
WHAT WE KNEW ON THE EVE OF WAR WHAT WE KNOW NOW AFTER FOUR DAYS OF THE CHILCOT INQUIRY
‘THE NEW EVIL’ Tony Blair’s first response to the attacks
highlighted their far-reaching impact: “This mass terrorism is
01 IRAQ: ‘A GRUMBLING APPENDIX’ Sir Christopher Meyer, British ambassador to
Washington in 2001, told the Chilcot Inquiry that the Bush administration had lost its way
the new evil of the world today,” he said on 11 September. THE WORLD HAS before 9/11 and Iraq was merely “a grumbling appendix”. However, he claimed that senior US
“We, the democracies of the world, have to come together and government hardliners, including Condoleeza Rice, targeted Iraq from 11 September onwards.
CHANGED AFTER
eradicate it.” Later that day, he pledged to stand “shoulder to Sir Peter Ricketts, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee in 2001, confirmed that 9/11
9/11
shoulder” with the Americans in responding: and, at the forced a step-change in the US and UK approach. Prior to the attacks, British officials had
Labour conference in October, he said the trauma had shaken refused to join the Americans in discussing “regime change” in Iraq, concentrating instead on
the “kaleidoscope” of the global order. The warning was a policy of containment. He added: “I think if 9/11 had not happened, we would have
repeated before the Afghan war, and echoed when Mr Blair remained convinced that a strengthened sanctions regime, tightened, narrowed, was the right
put the case for invading Iraq to MPs. way to go and we would have continued to push to get weapons inspectors back in.”
‘A REAL AND PRESENT DANGER’ George Bush was cavalier in
linking “rogue states” and terrorists. Mr Blair was uncomfort-
02 IRAN, NORTH KOREA AND LIBYA MORE OF A WORRY Evidence to the
inquiry reinforced pre-war doubts about Iraq’s status as a rogue state –
able associating Saddam Hussein and 9/11 but, when pressed, and the likelihood that Saddam Hussein would join forces with Islamic
THERE IS A REAL
said there were “unquestionably links between al-Qa’ida and terror groups including al-Qa’ida. Sir William Ehrman, right, the director
RISK THAT ISLAMIC of international security at the Foreign Office, said that strict interna-
Iraq”. Then, in his key speech to MPs on 18 March 2003, he said
the link between rogue states and terrorists — was loose but
TERROR GROUPS tional controls meant his department ranked Iraq behind Iran, North
“hardening”. “The possibility of the two coming together — of
AND ROGUE Korea and Libya in terms of concern.’ Tim Dowse, the head of counter-
terrorist groups in possession of weapons of mass destruction
STATES WILL COME proliferation in the department at the time said that, while Saddam had
or even of a so-called dirty radiological bomb — is now … a real TOGETHER supported Palestinian terrorist groups, “there had been nothing that
and present danger to Britain and its national security.” looked like a relationship between the Iraqis and al-Qa’ida”.
WMD: THE EVIDENCE Mr Blair told MPs on 18 March it
was “palpably absurd” to suggest Saddam had disposed
03 ‘SADDAM HASN’T GOT WMD’ Two government dossiers in the run-up to the war suggested Saddam has
WMD capability. But, 10 days before he sent troops into Iraq, Mr Blair received intelligence suggesting
of tonnes of poisons and chemical weapons, unaccounted that Saddam’s WMD had been dismantled, the inquiry was told. Ministers were also given repeated
for when UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998. In the first
THE INTELLIGENCE warnings that intelligence gathered on Iraq’s weapons programmes was unreliable. But Mr Blair told MPs
dossier on Iraq, in September 2002, he said the “exten-
IS RIGHT THAT the Iraqi leader had chemical and biological weapons two days before the war began. Sir William Ehrman
sive, detailed and authoritative” intelligence showed
SADDAM HUSSEIN said: “On 10 March we got a report saying that the chemical weapons might have remained disassembled,
“beyond doubt” that Saddam had continued to produce HAS WEAPONS OF that Saddam hadn’t ordered their reassembly, and he might lack warheads capable of effective dispersal
chemical and biological weapons, tried to develop nuclear MASS DESTRUCTION of agents.” It also emerged that a secret paper drawn up by Mr Dowse’s staff in the summer of 2002,
weapons and that he had already produced chemical AND IS PREPARED TO highlighting Iraq as a potential threat, was based almost entirely on uncorroborated and outdated
weapons — and used them on his own people. USE THEM information obtained before weapons inspectors were thrown out of the country in 1998.
WHAT ABOUT BRITAIN? The dossier concluded that
Iraq had extended-range versions of the Scud ballistic
04 ‘INTELLIGENCE WAS SPORADIC AND PATCHY’ Although reaction to the September 2002 dossier
concentrated on the potential threat to British forces in Cyprus, it emerged this week that figures
missile, capable of reaching Cyprus. On the day the within the Foreign Office doubted whether Iraq had a large number of long-range missiles. A
document was published, Mr Blair told MPs: “There is no
THE INTELLIGENCE series of memos from Whitehall officials described the intelligence coming out of Iraq regarding
way this man, in this region above all regions, could SHOWS THAT WMD and ballistic missiles as “sporadic and patchy”. It was queried as having limited value as
begin a conflict using such weapons and the BRITISH INTERESTS late as September 2002. More generally, it quickly emerged that Saddam was far weaker than
consequences not engulf the whole world, including this ARE POTENTIAL even the “patchy” intelligence suggested, and was unlikely to pose any threat, direct or indirect,
country.” Robin Cook left the Government on the eve of TARGET to British interests. The inquiry was told how officials within the Foreign Office had become
the war because the public was not convinced Saddam convinced the regime in Baghdad was developing chemical and biological weapons. When it
was “a clear and present danger to Britain”. received intelligence contradicting the claim in March 2003, this was discounted.
THE LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY OF WAR Mr Blair persuaded the President to go to
the UN in November 2002 and secure Resolution 1441, giving Saddam a “final 05 DID BLAIR ‘SIGN IN BLOOD’? The invasion was of “questionable legitimacy”
because the US and UK had failed to persuade other countries of the need for
opportunity” to disarm and warning of “serious consequences” if he failed. Amid war, one of the most senior British diplomats involved in the negotiations told
French threats of a veto in February, he said Britain would support a war on Iraq THE THREAT the Chilcot Inquiry. The lack of “democratically observable” international
without UN backing if any countries imposed an “unreasonable blockage” on a new JUSTIFIES ACTION, backing – or support at home – chimes in with the reservations expressed by
resolution. So, was his action legal? At Westminster, amid rumours that the WITH THE EXPLICIT the Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith. Sir Jeremy Greenstock also complained
Attorney-General had warned about the legality of the war, Foreign Office lawyer AUTHORITY OF THE that he had been frozen out of a key meeting at the President’s ranch in
Elizabeth Wilmshurst resigned, claiming the Government’s original legal guidance UNITED NATIONS Crawford, Texas, in April 2002 – where the former UK ambassador to
had said it should obtain a second UN resolution. Home Office minister Washington, Sir Christopher Meyer, believes Mr Blair may have “signed in
John Denham quit over the lack of international consensus. blood” Britain's support for regime change.
PLANNING FOR THE AFTERMATH By October 2002, White
House aides were considering “scores” of scenarios for 06 ‘ON RECONSTRUCTION, WE DIDN’T INSIST ENOUGH’ The inquiry heard
that the Americans failed to “get their act together” early enough, and did
governing post-Saddam Iraq, including an occupation and not create their Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
military-style government similar to Japan in 1945. “The YOU TRUST THE US (ORHA) until a month before the invasion. Recalling British officials asking
United States will not cut and run,” spokesman Ari Fleischer TO HAVE AN ADEQUATE the President about reconstruction arrangements in Washington in late
pledged. On the eve of war, Mr Blair told the Commons Iraq’s PLAN FOR RUNNING January, 2003, Sir Christopher Meyer added: “The response was, ‘Oh, it's
oil revenues would be put in a trust for the Iraqi people, IRAQ AFTERWARDS, all in hand’, and that was it. So officials did try to engage but the heart of
administered through the UN. International Development AND FOR THE the matter was, at the political level we didn't insist enough and on the
Secretary Clare Short quit two months later, accusing Mr Blair RECONSTRUCTION American side they didn’t get their act together until very late in the day
of breaking promises about the UN role in postwar Iraq. OF THE NATION and it then turned out the act wasn't good enough anyway.”
GRAPHIC — CATH LEVETT
ON 20 MARCH WE FOUND NO AT LEAST 100,000 IRAQIS – MUSLIM ANGER AROUND THE THE DIVERSION OF THE TALIBAN INSTABILITY AL-QA’IDA IS NOW THE WORLD
2003, THE WAR WMD, BUT SADAM AND UP TO 630,000 IN ONE WORLD SPARKED RETALIATORY RESOURCES TO IRAQ HAS ARE AGAIN A HAS SPREAD ESTABLISHED IN IRAQ, FEELS A MUCH,
IN IRAQ BEGAN SADDAM HUSSEIN
WAS DEPOSED
ESTIMATE – AND 4,500
COALITION TROOPS HAVE
TERRORIST ATTACKS, INCLUDING
THE LONDON BOMBINGS OF JULY
CONTRIBUTED TO FAILURE
IN AFGHANISTAN
FORCE THERE TO PAKISTAN WHERE IT NEVER WAS
BEFORE
MUCH MORE
DANGEROUS
WHAT NEXT?
PERISHED 2005, IN WHICH 52 WERE KILLED PLACE