20020903_verizon_opposition

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Inre: VERIZON INTERNET SERVICESINC. Subpoena EnforcementMatter RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 1330ConnecticutAvenue,N.W., Suite 300 Washington,D.C. 20036 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) MiscellaneousAction CaseNo.1 :O2MSOO323 Oral Argument Requested v. VERIZON INTERNET SERVICESINC. 1880CampusCommonsDrive Reston,Virginia 20191 OPPOSITION OF VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES TO MOTION TO ENFORCE EX PARTE SUBPOENA ISSUED JULY 24, 2002 Of Counsel ThomasM. Dailey SarahB. Deutsch LeonardCharlesSuchyta VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES INC. Eric H. Holder, Jr., D.C. Bar No. 303115 William D. Iverson,D.C. Bar No. 88872 Timothy C. Hester,D.C. Bar No. 370707 COVINGTON & BURLING 1880CampusCommonsDrive Resto~ Virginia 20191 JohnThome,D.C. BarNo. 421351 1515N. Courthouse Road,Fifth Floor Arlington, Virginia 22201 1201Pennsylvania AvenueN. W. Washington,D.C. 20004-2401 (202) 662-6000 Bruce G. Joseph, D.C. Bar No. 338236 WILEY REIN & FIELDINGLLP 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 719-7000 Counsellor VerizonInternet ServicesInc. Table of Contents INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The RIAA Subpoena "Notification" and Verizon's InternetAccessService Peer-toPeerApplications , The Process Identifying Subscribers the BasisoflP Addresses of on 1 6 6 6 7 8 9 ARGUMENT 1. """"""""""""""",."".""".""",., THE DMCA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A SUBPOENA WHEN THE OFFENDING MATERIAL IS NOT STORED ON THE SERVICE PROVillER'S SYSTEM BUT IS MERELY PASSIVELY TRANSM11-TED THE PROVillER BY A. Title II Of The DMCA Was Carefully NegotiatedLegislation IntendedTo Protect ServiceProvidersFrom Liability And From Unreasonable Burdens,Particularly When Acting As A PassiveConduit Transmitterof Materials. A Subpoena Under Subsection 512(h) Is Not Available In ConnectionWith The PassiveConduit Function Of A ServiceProvider; It Is Limited By The Express TemlSOf The StatuteTo Infringing Material StoredOn A ServiceProvider's SystemOr Network 9 9 B. 14 18 19 25 C. RIAA's Attempt To ReadThe Requirement An Effective For Subsection 512(c)(3)(A) Notification Out Of Subsection 512(h) Is Unavailing. 2. RIAA'S ATTEMPT TO RADICALLY EXPAND THE EX PARTE SUBPOENA POWER OF SUBSECTION512(h) WOULD HAVE DRAMAllC IMPLICATIONS CONCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA In re: VERIZON INTERNET SERVICESINC. Subpoena EnforcementMatter ) ) ) ) ) ) MiscellaneousAction CaseNo.1 :O2MSOO323 Oral Argument Requested RECORDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 1330ConnecticutAvenue,N.W., Suite 300 Washington,D.C. 20036 v. VERIZON INTERNET SERVICESINC. 1880CampusCommonsDrive Reston,Virginia 20191 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OPPOSITION OF VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES TO MOTION TO ENFORCE EX PARTE SUBPOENA ISSUED JULY 24, 2002 The RecordingIndustry Associationof America ("RIM") hasmoved to enforcea subpoena issuedto Verizon mtemet Servicesmc. ("Verizon"). The subpoena doesnot pertainto any casependingin this or any other court, but ratheris basedon an ex parte notification of claimedinfringementRIAA submittedto the Clerk of the Court underthe purportedauthority of subsection I 2(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C. § 512. 5 Because RIAA subpoena the relatesto conductoutsidethe limited scopeof the extraordinary subpoena authority createdby the DMCA, it is invalid and shouldnot be enforced. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY Section512, enactedaspart of Title II of the DMCA, was the product of extensive, Congressionally supervised negotiatio,ns betweenInternetserviceproviders who provide -2millions of citizenswith access the Internetandrepresentatives copyright ownersconcerned to of aboutinfringementof their rights in variousways involving the Internet. The goal of Section512 was to limit the possibleliability of Internetserviceproviders for infringing activities in order that "the efficiency of the Internetwill continueto improve and that the variety of andquality of serviceson the Internetwill continueto expand." S. Rep.No.1 05-190,at 8 (1998). Reflectingthe fact that Internetserviceprovidersoffer a variety of servicesusing different functions,Congress defined four separate distinct functionsunder Section512. At and one end of the spectrum,Congress recognizedin subsection 512(a)that Internet service providersacting merely aspassiveconduitstransmittinginformation from one userto another, with no involvementin the users'possibleinfringing activities, shouldnot be liable for those activities and shouldnot be requiredto monitor them. At the other end of the spectrum, Congress specifiedin subsection 512(c)that serviceproviderswho storematerial on their systems networksat the direction of usersshouldhave greaterobligations,including the or obligation (as a condition to limited liability) to removeoffending material if a copyright holder submits a notification of claimed infringement as specified in subsection (c )(3)(A). Other subsections address situationssomewhatsimilar to subsection but with different (C), requirements obligationsfor thosedifferent functions. and Congress alsoprovided for an extraordinaryex parte subpoena power in subsection 512(h),underwhich copyright ownerscould obtain a subpoena certain limited circumstances in to compelInternetserviceproviderswhich haveinfringing materialson their networksor systems identify personsasserted be engaged infringing activities. An essentialcondition to to in -3of a valid subpoena under subsection 512(h) is a notification to the serviceprovider that complieswith subsection (c)(3)(A). RIAA claims to be proceeding under that subpoenapower. It assertsthat one of Verizon's subscribers who was online one day in mid-July, using what is called "peer-to-peer" software, offered to share various sound files containing music copyrighted by RIAA members. It is clear from RIAA's assertion, however, that Verizon did not store any of the challenged sound files on its system or network. Verizon thus was not involved with the subscriber's activities except, at most, as a passive conduit within the meaning of subsection 512(a). The subpoenapower set forth in subsection 512(h) of the DMCA does not apply when the service provider acts as a passive conduit. The statute strictly confines the subpoenapower to circumstances where the assertedly infringing material is stored on the service provider's systemor network. Specifically, subsection 512(h) mandates that a subpoena must be supported by a notification of claimed infringement that "satisfies the requirements of subsection (c)(3)(A)" -that is, a notification issued under subsection (c) of Section 512, which is limited to service providers who have stored offending material on their own system or network. Subsection (a) -the provision of Section 512 for Internet service providers acting merely as passive conduit transmitters, as Verizon was here -- contains no provision for any notification of claimed infringers,much lessfor a notification that "satisfiesthe requirements (c)(3)(A)." Because of therewas no valid 512(c)(3)(A) notification, the DMCA doesnot authorizethe subpoena. RIAA is seekingto expandthe subsection 512(h) subpoena power to reachall futemet users,not just thosewho storeinfringing material on a serviceprovider's systemor network. RIAA proposes dazzlingly broad subpoena a power that would allow any person~ without filing a -4complaint,to invoke the coercivepower of a federalcourt to force disclosureof the identity of any userof the Internet,basedon a mereassertion a fonn submittedto the court's clerk that in the useris engaged infringing activity. Sucha broad-ranging in invocation of federaljudicial authority,as a pure investigativetool outsidethe contextof a pendingcase,raisessubstantial questions to whetherit exceeds power of an Article ill COurt.1 as the Further, a procedurethat would give private partiesunfetteredauthority to force disclosureof the identities of persons usingthe Internet,not tied to any infringing material residingon the serviceprovider's systemor network,raisessubstantialFirst Amendmentconcernsin light of the well-establishedfreedomto engage anonymous in speech-- a generalprinciple2that hasbeenspecifically appliedto protect anonymous speech over the Internet.3Thesesubstantialconstitutionalquestionsare yet a further I ~ UnitedStates MortonSaltCo.,338U.S.632,641-43(1950)(because v. "[t]hejudicial subpoena power. . . is subjectto thoselimitations inherentin the body that issuesthem because of the provisionsof the Judiciary Article of the Constitution, federalcourts are"reluctant ifnot " unableto summonevidenceuntil it is shownto be relevantto issuesin litigation"); United States Catholic Conference Abortion Rigbts Mobilization. Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1988) ("the v. subpoena power of a court cannotbe more extensivethan its jurisdiction"); HoustonBusiness Journal.Inc. v. Q.C.c, F.3d 1208, 1212-13(D.C. Cir. 1996)("[t]he federalcourts arenot free86 standinginvestigativebodieswhosecoercivepower may be brought to bear at will in demanding documents from others"). 2~ y., McInme v. Ohio ElectionsComm'n. 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995) (the right to speak anonymously "exemplifies the purposebehind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendmentin particular"); ~ v. Californi~ 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (striking down ordinancerequiring persons who distributehandbills to identify themselves name). by 3~ ~ v. 2TheMart.com.Inc., 140F. Supp.2d1088, 1097(W.D. Wash.2001) ("the constitutionalrights of Internetusers,including the First Amendmentright to speak anonymously, must be carefully safeguarded"); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com. F.R.D. 185 573, 578-79(N.D. Cal. 1999)(given "the legitimate andvaluableright" to speakanonymously on the Internet,the court held that a plaintiff seekingthe identity of personswhoseInternet domainnamesallegedlyinfringed the plaintiffs trademarks to "establishto the Court's had satisfactionthat plaintiffs suit againstdefendant could withstanda motion to dismiss"); Dendrite Int'l. Inc. v. Doe No.3. 775 A.2d 756,760 (N.J. Super.Ct. App. Div. 2001) (given the "wellestablished First Amendmentright to speakanonymously,"court would not requiredisclosureof the identity of a userwho allegedlyposteddefamatorymaterial on the Internetwithout first determiningwhetherthe complaint stateda "prima facie causeof action"). 5reasonfor rejecting RIAA's overly expansive readingof the DMCA subpoena power, underthe settledprinciple that statutes shouldbe construed, possible,in a mannerthat avoidsor if . minimizesconstitutionalconcerns. Contraryto RIAA's suggestion, properconstructionof the subsection a 512(h) subpoena power -- which avoidsor minimizes thesesubstantial constitutionalconcerns-- would not leave copyright ownerspowerlessto pursueinfringementclaims on the Internet. For example,if RIM believesthat the Internetuserwho was online at the IP address the specifiedtime at identified in its subpoena a seriousinfringer, it can initiate a "John Doe" lawsuit againstthe is persondescribed its presentex partesubpoena, issuean orthodox Rule 45 subpoena in and to Verizon for information sufficient to identify the asserted infringer. A judge presidingover that action (or a judge in the court wherethe subpoena was issued)could carefully weigh the 5 constitutionalimplications and detenninethe propriety of sucha subpoena. Verizon proposedthis alternativeto RIAA here,but RIAA rejectedit and choseinstead to file this motion asa test case. But the filing of an Article ill lawsuit, as an alternativeto the approach RIAA haschosen,is more than a fomlality or technicality. The filing of a complaint ensures the allegations"have evidentiarysupport" or "are likely to have evidentiarysupport that " after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation. Fed.R Civ. P. 11(b)(3).Pennitting 4 ~ lli£ v. St. C~. 533U.S.289,299-300 (2001)(if oneproffered interpretation a federal of statutewould raisesubstantialconstitutionalquestions, this is "additional reinforcement"for a narrowingconstruction);New York v. Ferber,458 U.S. 747,769 n.24 (1982) (a statuteshouldbe construed avoid constitutionalproblems,if the statuteis subjectto sucha limiting "to construction")(citing cases). SSuchsubpoenas havebeenapproved,after careful scrutiny, in other casesinvolving alleged violations of intellectualproperty rights involving the Internet. ~ y., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com. F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)(approvinglimited discoveryin 185 trademarkinfringementsuit againstInternetpseudonyms). -6 forced disclosureof the identities of Internetusers,without a "caseor controversy"in the form of a filed lawsuit, would posea gravethreatof widespreadabuseof this Court's subpoena power basedon flimsy assertions copyright infringement including by marketers,pornographers, of and otherswho could invoke the DMCA procedures underthe unfetteredsubpoena authority positedby RIAA. ~ Part 2 below). That is not what the statutesays,and it cannotbe what Congress intended. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS The RIAA Subpoenaand "Notification" On July 24, 2002, RIM serveda subpoena issuedunderthe purportedauthority of subsection 512(h)of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(h),directing Verizon to disclosethe identity of a subscriber Verizon' s Internetaccess to servicewho was online at the "IP address: 141.158.104.94 7/15/02at 5:26 p.m. (EDT)." (AttachmentA to RIM Motion). The on subpoena was accompanied a July 24, 2002 letter from RIM to Verizon statingthat the by subscriber was believedto be "offering for download[by other Internetusers]files containing copyrightedsoundrecordingsthrougha peerto peer application" without the authorizationof the copyright ownersrepresented RIAA. (AttachmentB to RIAA Motion). Attachmentsto the by letter makeit appearthat the peer-to-peer file-sharingwas being donethrough softwareprovided by KaZaA, a popularprovider of suchapplications. The letter also demanded that Verizon "removeor disableaccess"to the files "via your system"althoughRIAA did not assert-- and could not assert-- that the files resideon Verizon's system. (AttachmentC to RIAA Motion). Verizon's Internet AccessService Verizon is an Internetserviceprovider that providesInternet access over one million to subscribers.With respectto the subscriber described the RIAA subpoena, by Verizon served solely asthe subscriber'sserviceprovider and in that capacityprovided only transmission -7servicesto the subscriberin connectionwith transmittingassertedly offending material that the subscriber may havereceivedfrom or sentto other Internetusers. There is no business relationshipbetweenVerizon and KaZaA. Any transmission the material to and from the of subscriber was initiated by and at the direction of the subscriber.Verizon carriedout the requested transmissionthrough an automatictechnicalprocessin which Verizon neither selected the materialthat was sentnor selected recipientsof the material. During the transmission the of any materialto or from the subscriber, copy of the materialwas maintainedon Verizon's no systemor network. Further,in transmittingthe assertedly offending material to and ftom the subscriber, Verizon did not modify its content. (Declarationof Scott E. Lebredoin Supportof Oppositionby Verizon Internet Servicesto Motion to EnforceEx ParteSubpoena IssuedJuly 24, 2002, at' 5) ("Lebredo Decl."). As a passiveprovider of transmission servicesto the subscriber, Verizon did not store, cacheor otherwisemake any intermediateor temporarycopy of material the subscriber received from or transmittedto other locationson the Internet. (1.4. 1 6). Nor did Verizon storeany at materialon its systemor network at the direction of the subscriber. @. at , 7). With regardto the activities of the subscriberat issue,Verizon also did not refer or provide a link to any online locationthroughthe useof any information location tools. (M. at 1 8). Peer-to Peer Applications Millions of Internetuserscommunicate with eachother on the Internetthroughpeer-topeerfile-sharing softwareprogramsthat allow a group of computerusersto shareinformation storedon eachother's computers. Peer-to-peer file-sharinghasmany presumptivelylawful applications. Suchsoftwareallows usersto locateand sharefiles containing,for example speeches variousAmerican presidents political activists. In other uses,somecompanies by and employpeer-to-peer sharingas a way for employees sharefiles without the expense a file to of -8centralizedserveror as an inexpensiveway for companies exchange to information with other companies.Many individuals usepeer-to-peer file-sharingto exchange infonnation (e.g., photographs takenwith digital cameras) with otherswho sharelike interests. (LebredoDecl. at 19). A variety of entitiesprovide specialized peer-to-peer file-sharing software. This software allows an Internetuserto sharefiles with other usersof the softwareby permitting eachuserto review a list of availablefiles maintainedby other usersor to requestfiles of a particular descriptionmaintainedby other users. The softwarethen attemptsto identify other usersof the softwarewho are alsoonline andwho havethe requested files availableto share. Oncethe requested is locatedon anothercomputer,the softwareallows the files to be transferred file between the two computers. ago at 1 10). KaZaA providesa popular versionof this specializedsoftwarefor peer-to-peer filesharing. According to KaZaA's Internethomepage, more than 100million copiesof its peer-topeerfile-sharingsoftwarehavebeendownloaded,andmore than two million of its usersare commonlyonline at any given time. (14.at' 11). The Processof Identifying Subscribers on the Basis of IP Addresses The RIAA Motion to Enforce asserts» without explanationor evidentiary support» that Verizon could comply with the subpoena identifying the subscriber"in a matterof seconds" by andthat compliancewith suchsubpoenas "will requireonly a simple and ministerial act by " Verizon, putting virtually no burdenon them. (RIAA Motion II, 12). This is incorrect. As set forth in the Declarationof Scott E. Lebredoaccompanying Opposition, this substantial time and effort is requiredfor Verizon to determinethe identity of evenone of its subscribers basedonly on information that the subscriber was operatingat a particular IP addresst a particular timet on a particular day (most Verizon subscribers at normally receivea -9different IF address frequentlyor eachtime they access Verizon service). To detentlinea the subscriber'sidentity basedon this infontlation, Verizon must employ a softwaretool to searchits recordsandthen go through a second process verify the identity of the subscriber. to While the amountof time necessary identify a subscriber to varies,on averageit takes between15 and 25 minutesto identify a single subscriber.Thus, if Verizon were askedto identify five subscribers, process the could take a Verizon employeeover two hours. IfVerizon were askedto identify 1,000subscribers, processof identifying the subscribers the could take Verizon employees more than 400 hours. (LebredoDecl. at' 12). The task of respondingto requests provide this infonnation to third-partiessuchasRIM would take substantialtime to and effort over and abovethe 15 to 25 minutesper requestdescribedabove. RIAA hasnot said how frequentlyit intendsto issuesubpoena requests its interpretationof Section512(h)is if adopted, Verizon understands RIM usesInternetrobots,or "hots," to searchfor but that possibleinfringements. These"bots" arecapableof automaticallygeneratingan unlimited numberof subpoena requests. ARGUMENT 1. THE DMCA DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A SUBPOENA WHEN THE OFFENDING MATERIAL IS NOT STORED ON THE SERVICE PROVIDER'S SYSTEM BUT IS MERELY PASSIVELY TRANSMITTED BY THE PROVIDER A. Title II Of The DMCA Was Carefully Negotiated Legislation Intended To Protect Service Providers From Liability And From Unreasonable Burdens, Particularly When Acting As A PassiveConduit Transmitter of Materials. Title II of the DMCA was enacted ensurethe continuedgrowth of Internet services to by, amongother things,providing assurance Internetserviceprovidersthat they would not be held to liable for copyright infringementas a result of the conductof third parties,including their subscribers.As the legislativehistory explains,"by limiting the liability of serviceproviders,the DMCA ensures the efficiency of the Internetwill continueto improve and that the variety that -10andquality of serviceson the Internetwill continueto expand." S. Rep.No.1 05-190,at 8 (1998).6 Title n also ensures that Internetserviceprovidersarenot subjectedto unreasonable burdensrelatedto the enforcement copyrightsby their owners. Thus, Section512 makesclear of that serviceprovidersare not obligatedto monitor their servicesor seekfactsthat may indicate infringing activity. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m). The scopeof injunctive relief availableagainstservice providersis specifically limited, and beforean injunction is issueda court must considerwhether the injunction (either aloneor in combinationwith other injunctions issuedunder subsection 512(j» "would significantly burdeneitherthe provider or the operationof the provider's system or network.." 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1) & (2). Section 512 is based throughout on a careful delineation of four different, specifically defined functions performed by service providers, each of which is subject to different liability limitations, procedures, and obligations. As the SenateReport explains, "[I]n the beginning, the Committee identified the following activities (1) digital network communications, (2) system RIAA turns the legislativehistory on its head,leaving the impressionthat the primary purpose of Title II was to protect copyright owners. Thus, for example,RIAA quotesout-of-context language from page8 of the Senate Report for the supposed propositionthat "Congresswas concerned that, unlesscopyright ownershavethe ability to identify andpursuethosewho infringe their copyrightsin the digital world, they would 'hesitateto maketheir works readily availableon the Internet.'" (RIAA Motion 2-3). But RIAA createsthe concernabout"the ability to identify and pursue"out of whole cloth; the quotedpassage from the Senate Report saysnothing of the sort. Rather,the Report'sreferenceis to a concernaboutthe "easewith which digital works can be copiedand distributed," andthe solution positedby the Senate Judiciary Committeeis "[l]egislation implementingthe [World Intellectual Property] treaties," which is addressed Title I of the DMCA. S. Rep.No.1 05-190,at 8; seealso1.4. 9 ("Title I in at implementsthe WIPO Copyright Treaty"). In largepart, Title I createsliability for the circumventionof technologicalmeasures control access copyrightedworks. See,e.g., that to §§1201(a), (b). In contrastTitle II, Online Copyright InfringementLiability Limitation, asits namesuggests, createssafeharborsthat limit liability. In short,RIAA relies on legislative history that hasnothing to do with Section512, which was part of Title II of the DMCA. 6 -11caching,(3) infon11ation storedon services providers,and (4) infon11ation location tools." S. Rep.No. 105-190,at 19. Theseactivities are the subjectof subsections 512(a),(b), (c) and (d), respectively. As Section512 itself makesclear,"Subsections (b). (c). and (d) describe (a). separateand distinctfunctionsfor purposesof applying this section. 17 U .S.C. § 512(n) tt (emphasis added)! The conduit function at issuehereis the subjectof subsection 512(a),captioned "Transitory Digital Network Communications," which applieswhere the serviceprovider is simply "transmitting, routing, or providing connections for" material through its systemor network. Congress recognizedthat serviceproviderscannotreasonably held responsible be for the conductof their userswhen they perform suchconduit functions,andprovided them the greatest scopeof virtually unconditionalprotection,with no obligations. Thus, contraryto RIAA's implication (RIAA Motion 6 & n.2, 9, 14), undersubsection the knowledgeof the (a) serviceprovider is iITelevant, financial interestof the serviceprovider in the transactionis the irrelevant,and thereis no "takedown" obligation "to remove,or disableaccess offending to" material. ComDare U.S.C. § 5l2(a) ~ 17 17 U.S.C. § 5l2(c). Similarly, subsection 5l2(a) has no provision for a copyright owner to provide a notification of claimed infringementto a service provider acting within the conduit function. ~ iQ.§ 512(a).8 7 ~ Hendrickson eBay.Inc., 165F. Supp.1082,1088(C.D.Cal.2001)(observing v. that subsections through (d) describe"four separate (a) categories"of "service provider's activities"); A&M RecordsInc. v. Napster.54 U.S.P.Q.2d1746,1749-50(N.D. Cal. 2000) (RIAAmember companyplaintiffs successfullyurge court to rely on separate function doctrine to hold that particular subsection not apply to defendant'sactivities). did 8RIAA ignoresthesestatutorydistinctionsby suggesting, contraryto the plain language of subsection that serviceprovidershavean obligation to disableaccess infringing materials (a), to underall the safeharborprovisionsof subsections to (d). (RIAA Motion 9, 14). (a) - 12At the other end of the spectrumis subsection 12(c),captioned"Infonnation Residing 5 on Systems Networks at Direction of Users." The limitation of liability provided by this or subsection appliesonly wherethe provider doesnot have actualknowledgeof infringing activity. anddoesnot receivea financial benefit from infringing activity that it can control. Further, subsection createsan elaboratelydefined"notice andtakedown"process,by which a (c) copyright owner can submit a notification of claimedinfringementto the serviceprovider requesting provider to removeor disableaccess infringing materialresiding on the system the to or network of the serviceprovider. Subsection 512(c)(3),on which RIAA basesits argument, definesthe elementsof a notification necessary trigger the takedownprocessundersubsection to 512(c). Subsection 512(b), captioned"SystemCaching,"providesspecific rules governingthe temporarycachingby a serviceprovider of material on its systemor network in certain circumstances. The subsection includesa specific descriptionof the cachingfunction and affords serviceprovidersan intennediatelevel of liability protectionbetweenthe high level of protectionfor the conduit function and the more limited protectionfor material "residing" on the serviceprovider's systemor network. For example,subsection conditionsprotection from (b) liability upon severalrequirements, doesnot include the provisions of subsection that the but (c) provider must not haveactualknowledgeof infringing activity nor receiveany financial benefit from it. Subsection containsa form of notice and takedownprocess,"modeledon the (b) procedure undersubsection (c)." S. Rep.No. 105-190,at 43. However,the cachingservice provider's takedownobligation is more limited and appliesonly if the copyright owner notifies the serviceprovider that cachedmaterialwas removedfrom the originating location (or is subject to a court order of removal). -13 Finally, subsection 512(d), captioned"lnfonnation Location Tools," addresses the function of the serviceprovider using or hosting"infonnation locationtools" suchasdirectories, indexes,or hyperlinks on its systemor network. This subsection includesa knowledgeand financial benefit standard. It also containsnotice and takedownprocesses basedon the procedures describedin subsection but modifies the requirednotification of claimed (c), infringementto confonn with subsection by requiring an identification of the "referenceor (d) link" to be removedfrom the serviceprovider's system. This carefully articulatedstatutoryframeworkwas the product of extensivenegotiation andcollaborationbetweenindustry groupsand Congress, processaimed at devising fair a solutionsand compromises an areaof competingandpotentially divergentinterests.9In such in circumstances, languageof the statuteshouldbe closely followed and given a strict the construction. ~ United Statesv. Sisson.399 U.S. 267, 291 (1970) (the "compromiseorigins" of an act ')ustify the principle of strict construction");Rodrigyezv. ComRass ShiDDing Co., 451 U.S. 596,617 (1981) (wherea legislativecompromisehasoccurred"the wisest courseis to adhereclosely to what Congress written"). has 9 ~, y., S.Rep.105-190 9 ("Title II, for example, at reflects3 months negotiations of supervised ChairmanHatch and assisted SenatorAshcroft amongthe major copyright by by ownersandthe major asps and ISPs."). 14- B. A SubpoenaUnder Subsection512(h) Is Not Available In Connection With The PassiveConduit Function Of A Service Provider; It Is Limited By The Express Terms Of The Statute To Infringing Material Stored On A Service Provider's SystemOr Network. Although RIAA arguesthat the plain language Section512 must governthis case of (RlAA Motion 9-10), it asksthis Court to ignore an express condition imposedby Congress on the issuance ora subpoena under subsection 512(h). Specifically, subsection 512(h) requiresthat the subpoena requestbe accompanied a "copy of a notification describedin subsection by (c)(3)(A)" ~., a "notice and takedown"request)andprovidesthat the subpoena may only be issued"[i]fthe notification filed satisfiesthe provisionsof subsection (c)(3)(A)." 17 V.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A) & (h)(4). Subparagraph (c)(3)(A) of Section512 specifically definesthe requirements a for notification of claimedinfringement"[t]o be effective underthis subsection." 17 V.S.C. § S12(c)(3)(A). The referenceto "this subsection"meanssubsection which addresses (c), only materialresiding on a serviceprovider's systemor network. A notification suchasthat submittedby RIAA, which addresses peer-to-peer activities wherethe serviceprovider acts file asa passiveconduit undersubsection 512(a)transmittingmaterial that doesnot resideon its systemor network, simply cannotbe "effective" undersubsection (c). RIAA's notice therefore cannot"satisf[y] the provisionsof subsection (c)(3)(A)" asrequiredby subsection512(h)(4)for the issuance a valid subpoena.Indeed,asnoted earlier,there is no provision for any forDl of of notification of claimedinfringementin subsection 512(a),which governsthe conduit function at issuehere. Thus, thereis no suchthing as a meaningfulor "effective" notice with respectto the conduit function. RIM asserts paragraph(3)(A) of subsection shouldbe viewed as a that (c) "freestanding" provision of Section512. (RIAA Motion 4, 17). But it is not. It is an integral 15part of subsection (c). Had Congress intendedthe notification requirementto be "freestanding' it could easilyhavemadeit so, as a separate subsection. Instead,Congress to includedthe notification requirementin subsection and emphasized importanceof that placementby (c) the expresslyinstructingcourtsthat "Subsections (b), (c), and (d) describeseparate distinct (a), and functionsfor purposes applying this section." 17 U.S.C. § 512(n). of The subsection (c)(3)(A) notification requiredby subsection expresslymust include (h) identification of the material "to be removedor access which is to be disabled"and to infonnation allowing the serviceprovider "to locatethe material." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). Theserequirements only refer to materialresiding on the serviceprovider's systemor can network. Verizon cannot"locate" infringing materialwithin the meaningof subsection (c)(3)(A) if the material is not storedon Verizon's systemor network. Presumably, soundfiles that the RIAA asserts subscribersharedwith other KaZaA usersarelocatedon the subscriber's the personalcomputer,but Verizon doesnot know that andhasno ability to reachinto its subscriber's personalcomputerto check. Nor can Verizon disableor remove"the material" ifit is not storedon Verizon's computers. The only way Verizon could "disable access"to material storedon a subscriber'scomputerwould be by terminating the subscriber'sentire Internet access account(including applicationshaving nothing to do with the allegedinfringement,such asthe user's email). However,that is not the way Congress usedthe term "remove, or disable access the material" in subsection to, (c)(I)(C), wherethe referenceis plainly to specific infringing "material" on the serviceprovider's systemor network. Congress was not speaking 10 cr. 17U.S.C.§ 512(i),whichestablishes threshold requirements anISPmustmeetto that qualify for all four of the safeharbors. ~ S. Rep. 105-190,at 41 n.23 ("Thesethresholdcriteria apply to all of the liability limitations containedin section512"). 16of requiring the serviceprovider to terminatea subscriber'sentire access the h1temet to merely on the basisof a copyright owner's assertion infringement. of When Congress wantedto speakof requiring a serviceprovider to cease providing "access a subscriber" (emphasis to added)by "terminating the accounts the subscriber."it of plainly knew how to do so, as it did in describingpossibleforms of injunctive relief -- which could only be awardedif the copyright owner filed an actualcasein court - under subsections 512(j)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i) (pemlitting the issuance "an order restrainingthe serviceprovider of from providing access a subscriber accountholder of the serviceprovider's systemor to or network. . . by tenninatingthe accounts the subscriber accountholder that are specifiedin of or did in the order"). Congress not usesuchlanguage describingthe requiredcontentof a valid subsection (c)(3)(A) notification identifying the "material" on the serviceprovider's system"that is to be removedor access which is to be disabled." to It would be a severeremedy,and a severe burdenon free speech, allow a copyright to ownerto bar an individual from any access the Internetbasedmerely on an assertion to of copyright infringement. The language the statutedoesnot supportthis outcome,and Congress of could not haveintendedit. RIAA attemptsto arguethat subsections and (d) provide for takedownnotifications, (b) and that this must meanthat Congress intendedthe subpoena power to apply where the service provider wasnot storing materialson its systemor network. (RIAA Motion 18). But contraryto RIAA's arguments, thosesubsections only apply to situationswherethe serviceprovider is storingoffending materialon its systemor network-- cachedmaterialsthat the proViderhas placedin "intennediateand temporarystorage... on [its] systemor network" in subsection (b), 17and inforn1ationlocation tools including an actual"referenceor link" on the systemor network in subsection (d). I I More fundamentally,thereis no needhereto decidewhethera notification under subsection or (d) could be regardedasa "(c)(3)(A)" notification justifying a subpoena (b) under subsection (h). The decisivepoint for purposes this motion is that there is no provision at all of for any takedownnotification with respectto the conduit function describedin subsection (a), which is the situation at issuehere. Thereis indeedno referencewhateverin subsection to (a) any materialthat is to be "removed" or "accessto which is to be disabled"by a passiveconduit serviceprovider. In addition, the reasonwhy Congress requiredthat an "effective" subsection (c)(3)(A) notification must include an "identification of the material. . . that is to be removedor access to which is to be disabled"doesnot apply to passiveconduit activity under subsection (a). The "goal of this provision" requiring "infonnation reasonably sufficient to pennit the service provider to identify and locatethe allegedlyinfringing material" is to allow the serviceprovider "to find and examinethe allegedly infringing material expeditiously" if it chooses detennine to whetherthe requested action is appropriate.H.R. Rep.No.1 05-551,pt. 2, at 55 (1998). A purportednotification directedto a passiveconduit serviceprovider under subsection does (a) not accomplishthis goal of allowing the provider "to find and examinethe allegedly infringing )) In addition, notices the prescribed subsections and(d) differ from thenotification by (b) requiredby subsection (c)(3)(A) in key respects.Subsection (b)(2)(E) imposesthe further requirement that the notification canrequestremovalof the cachedmaterial storedin the service provider's systemor network only if the primary materialhaspreviously beenremovedfrom the originating site (or is subjectto a court orderrequiring removal). Subsection (d)(3) modifies the requirednotification to include identification not of the location of the infringing material (which is somewhere else)~ of the "referenceor link~~ the infringing material) that is on the but (to serviceprovider~ network or system,which is to be removedor access which is to be s to disabled. -18material" on its systemor network, sincethe infringing material is not on the serviceprovider's network or systemand cannotbe examinedby the serviceprovider. The requirementin subsection (c)(3)(A)(iii) that a valid notification must include infonnation sufficient to allow the serviceprovide to "locate the material" in order to be ableto examineit thus underscores the subsection that (c)(3)(A) notification required for a subpoena appliesonly to allegedly infringing materialresiding on a serviceprovider's network or system undersubsection and not to a provider acting merely as a passiveconduit under subsection (c), (a). c. RIAA's Attempt To Read The Requirement For An Effective Subsection S12(c)(3)(A)Notification Out Of SubsectionS12(h)Is Unavailing. RIAA arguesthat Verizon "confusestwo totally different things" (RIAA Motion 9) when Verizon points out that subsection 512(h) explicitly providesthat a subpoena only be issued can if the subpoena requestis accompanied a notification of claimed infringementthat "satisfies by the provisionsof subsection (c)(3)(A)." 17U.S.C. § 512(h)(4). RIAA asserts that a notification of claimedinfringementrelatesonly to a serviceprovider's duty to removeinfringing material upon notice "in order to maintain limitations on its own liability," while the subsection512(h) subpoena power supposedly addresses separate the matter of the serviceprovider's "obligation to provide the inforDlationthat copyright ownersneedto address infringementbeing committed by others." (RIAA Motion 9). The difficulty with this argumentis that Congress wrote the statutedifferently. It made the requirementfor a valid and effective notification satisfyingthe requirements subsection of (c)(3)(A) an explicit preconditionfor the issuance a subpoena.Indeed,Congress of referenced -19the needfor a subsection (c)(3)(A) notice not oncebut threeseparate times in defining the ex partesubpoena power in subsection 512(h). 17U.S.C. § 512(h)(2)(A), (4) and (5).12 RIAA also suggests the decisionin ALS Scan.Inc. v. Rem~ that Communities.Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620 (4th Cir. 2001),which concludedthat a DMCA notification of infringement was properly drafted,is somehowcontrolling here. But ALS Scanaroseunder subsection 512(c) of the statute,asthe court explicitly noted. .1.4. 623. ALS Scaninvolved "an online Internet at serviceprovider that provide[d] access its subscribingmembers. . . to over 30,000 to newsgroups which cover thousands subjects," m. at 620, comprisingmaterial that was of actuallyresiding on the serviceprovider's systemor network. ALS Scanthereforesimply does not address propriety of a subpoena the involving passiveconduit activity describedby » subsection 512(a),the issuehere. 2. RIAA'S ATfEMYf TO RADICALLY EXPAND THE EX PARTE SUBPOENA POWER OF SUBSECTION 512(h) WOULD HAVE DRAMATIC IMPLICATIONS. RIM characterizes caseas"a straightforwardsubpoena this enforcementaction." (RIAA Motion 2). By downplayingthe issuepresented, however,RIAA masksthe dramatic 12 RIM alsocharacterizes legislative the historyof theDMCA inaccurately this regard. in Citing a HouseCommitteereport, RIM asserts that Congress "explained that subsection 512(c)(3)(A) establishes 'procedures,'not substantive limitations." (RIAA Motion 15). The report actually statesonly, "New Section512(c)(3)setsforth the procedures underwhich copyright ownersand their agentsmay provide effective notification to a serviceprovider of allegationsof infringementon the provider'ssystemor network." H. Rep. No.1 05-551(II) at 55. The report doesnot saythat subparagraph (c)(3)(A) doesnot impose"substantive limitations." And the plain language both subparagraph of 512(c)(3)(A) ("To be effective under this subsection, notification of claimedinfringementmust [contain the enumerated a infomtation]") andparagraph512(h)(4)("If the notification filed satisfiesthe provisionsof subsection )(3)(A) ... the clerk shall expeditiouslyissue... the proposed subpoena is to (c ...") the contrary. 13 Nimmer concludes that the "odd facts" in the ALS Scancase"mean that it has little applicationto any circumstance otherthan a domainconsistingsolely of self-proclaimed infringing items." Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Con.Yright §12B.04[B][4] at 12B-44.2(2002). -20impact that its expansiveinterpretationof the subsection 512(h) subpoena power would haveon serviceprovidersand,evenmore importantly, the Internetusercommunity. If serviceproviders were forcedto comply with subsection 512(h) subpoenas whenevera copyright holder asserts a "good faith belief that infringementis occurring" (RIAA Motion 3), the predictableresult would be to uncork a tidal wave of subpoenas every instancewhere a copyright owner suspected in that a subscriber had infringing materialon his or her personalcomputer,or had transmitted infringing material. RIAA arguesthat the language subsection of 512(h)(I) is exceptionallybroad, and canbe readin isolation from the requirementfor a valid subsection SI2(c)(3)(A) notification andthe otherprovisionsof Section512. If readin this fashion,subsection 512(h)(1)might be arguedto commanda serviceprovider to provide any availableinfonnation regardingany userwhom a copyright owner believedit had reasonto suspect any fonn of copyright infringementthat of somehowinvolves the Internet. Even if only usersof the KaZaA peer-to-peer file-sharing softwareareconsidered, RIM's proposedconstructionof subsection 512(h) would allow RIM to obtain subpoenas requiring serviceprovidersto identify any or all of the more than 100 million userswho havedownloaded KaZaA software,one million of whom areVerizon subscribers.And KaZaA is, of course,only one of a numberof popularpeer-to-peer file-sharing softwareprograms. In bringing this as a test caseto establisha precedent, RIAA hasissueda subpoena askingfor the identity of only a single Verizon subscriber.But identifying a single subscriber out of, apparently,tensof millions ofKaZaA userswould be meaningless RIAA. Nothing for could be more certainthan that future subpoenas would demandthe identity of subscribers for much longer lists oflP addresses. Contraryto RIM's suggestions (RIAA Motion 11, 12), -21 identifying userson the basisof an IP address useat somedatein the past is time-consuming in ~ LebredoDeclaration1 12),andcouldimpose crushing a burden service on providers, depending the numberof IF addresses on RIAA or other copyright ownersor their representatives decidedto include in future subpoenas.Thereis nothing underRIM's interpretationof the subpoena power to limit thosenumbersor the potentially overwhelming burdenson serviceproviders. Evenmore importantly, thereis nothing underRIAA's interpretationof the subpoena power to limit suchsubpoenas attemptsto obtain the identity of suspected to usersof peer-topeerfile-sharingsoftwaresuchasKaZaA. If all that is requiredis an assertionof suspected infringementand a "freestanding"notification of infringement(RIAA Motion 4, 17), any copyright owner could issuesucha subpoena.The extraordinary scope ofRIAA's desired constructioncan only be appreciated when it is understood that (i) everyonecan be a copyright owner; and (ii) every transmissionon the Internetimplicatesactivities within the scopeof the exclusiverights of copyright owners. A copyright subsistsautomaticallyin any "work of authorship"fixed in any tangible mediumof expression. 17 U.S.C. § 102. If someone writes an article, a letter, or evenan e-mail, the authorowns a copyright; if someone creates commercialor personalweb page,thereis also a a copyright. Essentiallyeveryoneis or can easily be a copyright owner. The requiredelementof "originality" is met by only a "minimal degreeof creativity." Feist Publications.Inc. v. RYrnl Telephone ServiceCo., 499 U.S. 340,345 (1991). Thereis no obligation to registera copyright or to include any notice in order to own a copyright. 17U.S.C. §§ 401, 405, 408. A copyright grantsthe owner a broad rangeof exclusiverights, including the rights to authorizethe making of copiesof the work, the public distribution of the work, the public performanceof the work, -22andthe public display of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. In virtually every instance when a work is transmittedover the Internet,a copy is made,and often stored,in the receiving computer. In addition,althoughthe law is not settled,copyright ownersarguethat many Internettransmissions implicate rights to control the public distribution,public perfonnance,and public display of copyrightedwork. Serviceprovidersact aspassiveconduitsfor much more, of course,than the transmission of files at the requestof personsusingpeer-to-peer file-sharingsoftware. A serviceprovider acts as a conduit whenevera usersendsor receivese-mail, or downloadsmaterial from a web site. Nothing in RIAA's proposedconstructionof the subsection 512(h) ex parte subpoena power would limit suchsubpoenas the situationof peer-to-peer to file-sharing. IfRIAA were correctin its constructionof subsection 512(h),the potential for uncontrollableabusewould be enonnous. It would not be difficult for any copyright owner ~, virtually anyone)to contrive asserted copyright infringementsin order to obtain identifying information aboutprivate citizens using the Internet. To offer but a few examples,a marketer could createa web site, include an "agreement"prohibiting downloadingby any web userthat did not voluntarily provide their nameand address, then demandfrom a serviceprovider the and identification of every subscriber that usedthe serviceto access web site and download the copyrightedmaterial without providing the requested information. A blackmailer could demand the identification of any subscriberthat accessed "copyrighted" pornographicsite or a site with a "copyrighted" material dealingwith a socially-sensitive disease, then threatenthe person and with public disclosure. A personseekingthe identity of Internetusersfor improper purposes (suchas a stalker,pedophileor private detective)could demandthe identity of a userwho exchanges e-mailswith that personand storescopiesof those"copyrighted" messages her/his on - 23computer. RIM is, of course,a bona fide organizationpursuingbusiness endsit believesare legitimate,but its constructionof the statutewould openup theseopportunitiesfor abuseof the subpoena power. Requiring serviceproviderswho are merely acting aspassiveconduitsunder subsection 512(a)to respondto any and all suchsubpoenas would at bestturn the serviceprovidersinto an Internetpolice force (and in the processimposea complianceburden stretchingfar beyondwhat Congress contemplated when it enactedsubsection 512(h)'s ex parte subpoena power). And at worst, it would force the disclosureof identifying infonnation that would exposeprivate citizens usingthe Internetto harassment more. Sucha broad-ranging or power to force disclosureof the identitiesof Internetuserswould posegravethreatsto their legitimateFirst Amendmentinterests in privacy and anonymity. ~ pages andnotes and3, ~. 3-5 2 But, asthe precedingdiscussionhasshown,the requirementfor a valid subsection (c)(3)(A) notification confinesand limits the subpoena power to thosesituationsin fact contemplated Congress, minimizes the potential for suchabusivesubpoenas.An by and applicationfor a subsection 512(h) subpoena must be supported "(A) a copy of a notification by describedin subsection (c)(3)(A); (B) a proposedsubpoena; (C) a sworn declarationto the and effect that the purposefor which the subpoena soughtis to obtain the identity of an asserted is infringer and that suchinforDlationwill only be usedfor the purposeof protectingrights under this title." Requirements and (C) canbe satisfiedperfunctorily in any caseof asserted (B) copyright infringement. But clause(A) of subsection 512(h)(2),mandatinga notification authorizedby the statuteand in compliancewith subsection512(c)(3)(A), preventsthe subpoena power from being extendedto every suspected occurrence copyright infringement involving of the Internet. -24RIAA arguesthat its unboundedlyexpansive readingof the subpoena power is justified because hasno other way to obtain the identitiesof personswho it believesare infringing its it members'copyrights. But, as discussed the outsetof this Opposition,that is simply not so. at RIAA hasthe alternativeof filing an actuallawsuit, which it hasdeclinedV erizon's invitation to do, andto seekthe identity of asserted infringers through an orthodox Rule 45 subpoena under the supervisionof a court that can assess RIAA' s needandjustification for suchprivate infonnation. The filing of a lawsuit, asthe meansfor RIAA or other copyright ownersto detemtinethe identity of Internetuserswith allegedlyinfringing materialson their personalcomputers.is far more than a technicaldistinction in comparison the vast-rangingsubpoena to authority urgedby RIAA. First, sucha lawsuit avoidsthe severe Article III concernsthat arepresented allowing by a private party to invoke the coercivepower of the federaljudiciary for purely investigatory purposes outsidethe context of a pendinglawsuit. ~ page4 & note 1,~. Further,any suchlawsuit is subject to the protectionsof Rule 11, ensuringthat the allegationsof copyright infringement"have evidentiarysupport" or "are likely to have evidentiary support" after a "reasonable opportunity for further investigation,"andthat sanctionsare availablefor violation provisionsto of thesestandards.Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3)& (c). The DMCA hasno comparable ensureevidentiarysupportfor assertions copyright infringement,or to imposesanctions of if suchassertions not well-founded.14 To the contrary,RIAA's proposedconstructionwould are 14 Subsection 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requiresa mereassertion"that the complainingparty hasa good faith belief' that copyright infringementis occurring,but it imposesno requirementof any evidentiarysupportfor that belief or any sanctionif the statement later provesto be falseor unfounded. The only statement that must be made"under penalty of perjury" is that "the complainingparty is authorizedto act" on behalf of the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(vi). The statuteprovidesfor damages a person"knowingly misrepresents.. . if (continued...) 25allow for robot-generated noticesof infringementwhenevera computerdetectsInternet activity involving peer-to-peer file-sharing of music files, or other automaticprocesses would flood that serviceproviderswith subpoenas, without any sanctionsfor robot-generated errors. Without any requirementof evidentiarysupport,or any power to imposesanctionsfor ill-founded assertions of copyright infringement,the potential for widespread abuseof the coercivesubpoena powersof the federalcourtsis apparent. CONCLUSION For the foregoingreasons, motion by RIM to enforcethe ex parte subpoena the issuedto Verizon on July 24, 2002 shouldbe denied. In view of the significant legal issuespresented, Verizon respectfullyrequests oral argument. Dated:August 30, 2002 Respectfullysubmitted, Eric H. Holder, Ir., D.C. BarNo. 303115 Of Counsel: ThomasM. Dailey SarahB. Deutsch LeonardCharlesSuchyta VERIZON INTERNET SERVICES INc. William D. Iverson,D.C. Bar No. 88872 Timothy C. Hester,D.C. Bar No. 370707 COVINGTON & BURLING 1880CampusCommonsDrive Reston,Virginia 20191 John Thome, D.C. BarNo. 421351 1515 N. Courthouse Road, Fifth Floor Arlington, Virginia 22201 1201Pennsylvania AvenueN.W. Washington,D.C. 20004-2401 (202) 662-6000 Bruce G. Joseph, D.C. Bar No. 338236 WILEY REIN & FIELDING LLP 1776K Street,N. W. Washington,D.C. 20006 (202) 719-7000 Counsel VerizonInternet ServicesInc. for that materialor activity is infringing,",ig. § 512(f), but only for damages "incurred by the alleged infringer. . . asthe result of the serviceprovider. . . removingor disabling access the material to or activity claimedto be infringing." 14. That damages provision is available,therefore,only when the material is locatedon the serviceprovider's system. .#'~~~I""\