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					Young Europeans and Attitudes toward Immigration in Western Europe

Jennifer Fitzgerald University of Colorado at Boulder jennifer.fitzgerald@colorado.edu
Abstract How do young people in Europe today react to immigration? Are they passionate defenders of the social rights of immigrants, understanding that these new arrivals are only seek a better life for themselves and their families? Or are European youth anti-immigrant fanatics committed to stopping immigration and sending unwelcome newcomers back where they belong? The answer is that they are both, and that they are neither. Youth views on immigration-related topics offer us radical contradictory impressions, but we have little systematic knowledge of young persons‘ attitudes. This paper investigates the correlates of young Europeans‘ orientations toward immigrants in society. Specifically, it seeks to explain the support of young members of the national ethnic majorities for equal opportunities between foreigners and citizens. The alternative is support for superior opportunities for citizens over foreigners. This issue speaks to core democratic values related to tolerance and social equality. The views of individuals under the age of 30 are compared with a 30-and-above sample to determine whether the same factors predict to immigration attitudes in the two age categories. The analysis uses two large scale surveys: the West European sample of the World Values Survey (2000 wave) and the Swiss Household Panel Survey (19992005). The results demonstrate that the standard explanations of tolerance for immigrants rooted in economic competition and cultural threat apply to younger and older Europeans. The results also suggest that associational participation and the ethnic diversity of a respondent‘s social context are essential for understanding youth and older adult attitudes. For young persons in particular, engagement in mainstream social organizations may be an answer to youth anti-immigrant extremism.

Paper prepared for: Multiculturalism and Its Discontents: A Transatlantic Conversation April 23-24, 2007 Boulder, Colorado An International Conference Sponsored by The University of Colorado‘s Center to Advance Research & Teaching in the Social Sciences and the Tocqueville Initiative

In Western Europe, youth attitudes toward immigration and immigrants offer an interesting puzzle. Younger persons in society today are on average more tolerant of ethnic diversity and less threatened by newcomers than are their elders. Public opinion data reveals a consistently negative relationship between age and support for immigration, minority rights, and multiculturalism: younger persons are more likely to embrace ethnic diversity in society. This trend is typically interpreted in inter-generational terms (Inglehart 1997). The story is that over time, higher levels of education, easier entrance into the post-industrial service economy, longerterm exposure to ethnic diversity and a more global outlook have helped to make today‘s youth more tolerant of diversity than their parents‘ and grand-parents‘ generations. However, this image of a tolerant young Europe clashes with the over-representation of twenty-something Europeans among supporters of xenophobic extremists. Anti-immigrant groups in Western Europe have struck a chord with many young people, registering them as members and in the most organized cases, benefiting from their electoral support. Beyond our contradictory impressions of where young people in Western Europe stand on issues related to immigration and multiculturalism, we actually know little about the factors that shape youth attitudes. Most quantitative studies on this topic use age as a control variable,

rather than investigating whether society-wide explanations apply to young cohorts. The dearth of studies into youth opinions on topics related to immigration leaves us with many questions about the attitudes of young Europeans. This paper addresses four of these questions directly. First, are youth attitudes different from those of older members of society? Second, are young persons‘ preferences driven by the same factors as other citizens, or are they influenced through different forces? Third, are youth attitudes more likely to change over time? And fourth, how can

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we understand attitude change when it occurs? Each line of inquiry helps us to better understand youth views specifically, and also attitudes about immigration in general. Theoretically, the analysis in this paper is driven by three different hypotheses related to economic competition, cultural threat and social capital. Starting with the standard explanations of anti-immigrant attitudes, I assess whether economic and cultural explanations are equally applicable to youth and older citizens‘ views. Moving forward, to enrich our understanding of the social processes that shape young people‘s perspectives, I consider the effects of younger and older persons‘ associational participation on attitudes toward immigrants. Finally, I test the effects of the ethnic diversity of an individual‘s social context. Social participation and social context should be expected to influence opinions on issues related to ethnic diversity. Socialization is particularly informative in an individual‘s early years, and its effects are shown to endure into adulthood (Sears and Funk 1999). Therefore, it is essential to ask how a young person‘s social patterns and environment might shape his or her opinions. This paper investigates views on equality of opportunity for immigrants through parallel analyses of young people and their elders in twelve West European countries, and then proceeds with a close examination of attitudes in Switzerland. The analysis proceeds as follows. First, I consider the contradictory impressions of youth attitudes toward immigrant opportunities in Western Europe. Next, I briefly sketch the existing theoretical framework for studying attitudes related to immigration and consider its implications for understanding youth views. Third, I

present a case for studying associational ties and contextual predictors to better understand support for immigrants‘ social equality. The remainder of the paper presents quantitative analysis from two large opinion surveys to gain a better understanding of youth views.

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Young people and immigration politics The widely accepted notion of relative openness among young people in European societies is supported by symbolic gestures. Take for instance, the anti-extremist protests that exploded throughout France in response to the unexpected electoral support for Jean-Marie Le Pen of the Front National in 2002. From Paris to Marseille to Grenoble, hundreds of thousands of French high school and university students flooded the streets in the days between the first and second rounds of the election.1 Another example is the mass of students and other young people who participated in a rally for tolerance in German society at Berlin‘s Brandenberg Gate in 2000.2 Further instances include the 5,000 German youth who marched through the streets of Brunswick in Lower Saxony to protest the rise of right-wing extremism in the country; and the 1,500 young Italians who protested Austrian radical right leader Jorg Haider‘s private audience with Pope John Paul in 2000.3 In recent years young people in Western Europe have spoken out against intolerance and extremism. Public opinion data support this impression that young people feel less threatened than their elders by immigration and the resultant social diversity (Quillian 1995; Citrin and Sides 2004; Dustmann and Preston 2000). We also know, however, that younger members of many European societies are disproportionately supportive of anti-immigrant movements and parties (Norris 2005; Givens 2004; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; Hagan et al. 1999). Extremist groups take several forms, from violent gangs to neo-Nazi organizations to radical political parties, and young people are over-represented among them (Watts 2001). Research on supporters of far right political parties

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―Biggest anti-LePen protests yet sweep France,‖ Agence France Presse April 25, 2002. ―In pictures: German rally,‖ BBC News, Nov. 9, 2000. www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1015952.stm . ―Thousands of German youth hold march against the far right,‖ Agence France Presse, Dec. 20, 2000.

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finds that the correlates of politicized xenophobia are similar across European states. The profile of a radical right supporter is a young male who stems from the working classes and who has a relatively low level of education. His job prospects look grim: either he is currently unemployed or his job status is at risk (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 2002). Though the mechanisms through which each of these factors translates into anti-immigration attitudes are widely debated, the general descriptive picture is often the same. In the Netherlands, where inter-ethnic strain intensified with the murder of the filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, bars and nightclubs set the stage for conflict among young people. Right wing extremism is prevalent in the youth social scenes of Britain and Germany, and is reportedly on the rise. Nightclub owners in many countries have banned patrons decked out in sportswear by Lonsdale and Pitbull, brands that are popular with right-wing radicals throughout Europe. These labels are also forbidden in some schools because they seem to trigger inter-ethnic animosities.4 In Germany, the National Partei Deutschland (NPD) conducts successful recruiting campaigns by targeting university graduates. According to The Times of London, Neo-Nazi recruitment programs at German universities, ―are providing a flow of graduates into the ranks of the NPD youth organization and a shadowy group known as the Young East Prussia Association.‖5

Existing explanations of anti-immigrant extremism Evidence presented in the existing academic literature on attitudes toward immigrants suggests that some mix of economic and cultural concerns underpins negative reactions to immigration at the individual level. Most explanations of attitudes toward immigration involve economic or rational interests. The key hypothesis in explanations of anti-immigrant views is based on the concept of
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―Clothes and Racism: Row Rages in the Netherlands.‖ The Financial Times, Feb. 4, 2005. Boyes, Roger. ―Universities provide foil for thuggish neo-Nazis.‖ The Times (London), Feb. 23, 2005, p. 38. The paper reports that both groups are under observation by German police.

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realistic threat, and posits that as groups compete for scarce resources in society, hostilities arise (Olzak1992; Backer 2000; Blalock 1967; Citrin and Green 1990; Garz and Rivera-Batz 1994; Nagel 1995). Working class nationals with low levels of education clash with immigrants over low-skill jobs, public support and affordable housing. The mechanism hypothesized to be at work here is inter-group competition, which can be real or perceived. To test realistic threat theory at the individual level, indicators of socio-economic status—such as level of education, income and type of employment—are typically analyzed. Generally, lower status individuals with little economic security are expected to view immigration as a greater threat than others (Lipset 1959; Fetzer 2000).6 Interest-based theses as applied to anti-foreigner anxiety among youth in society suggest that young people are disproportionately represented on the bottom rungs of the socio-economic ladder. They are just beginning to situate themselves in the housing and labor markets, increasing the likelihood that they will compete with new, often unskilled, arrivals (Hagan et al. 1999). The second major perspective on the anti-immigrant phenomenon is rooted in theories of nationalist or symbolic politics. People who feel protective of their culture and way of life—and who feel it is threatened by immigrant groups—are in favor of stricter policies toward immigrants. At the individual level, explanations of inter-ethnic hostility stemming from cognitive psychology have gained prominence in studies of anti-foreigner sentiments (Sniderman et al. 2000; Huddy 2001; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004). Socio-cognitive theorists who study inter-group behavior assert that subjective identification with an in-group leads to individual-level hostility toward members of out-groups based on the need for positive

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However, another version of the economic threat hypothesis proposes that individuals from all social strata may also fear the broader economic effects of immigration, due to the sense that newcomers strain the economic system and hamper economic development (Anderson 1996; Lahav 2004).

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differentiation (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979). As Billig and Tajfel (1973) explain, ―…an individual‘s act of categorizing his social world into distinct social groups, into ‗them‘ and us‘, can be, at least in our societies, a sufficient condition for introducing in his behaviour certain forms of ingroup favoritism and of discrimination against the outgroup (27-28).‖ To test these assertions at the individual-level pride in the nation is the standard measure. Linking this perspective to the attitudes of young persons, Lubbers and Scheepers (2002) find that young French citizens who voted for the Front National in 1995 were more likely to identify with the French nation than were others in society. This suggests that national identity may be more closely linked to anti-immigrant attitudes for young people than for the rest of society.

Context and perceptions of threat The micro-level variations of realistic and cultural threat theories have been developed and tested through increasingly sophisticated large-n survey analyses. Of course, individuals are embedded within broader social environments, and such context can have strong effects on political preferences and behavior. Some quantitative research has moved beyond looking exclusively into micro-level correlations, and through multi-level modeling they have demonstrated that local-, regional- and national-level factors can have independent and interactive effects on immigration attitudes (Quillian 1995; Clarke and Legge 1997; DeVos and Duerloo 1998; Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers 2002; Weldon 2006). Some qualitative case studies also highlight the importance of regional or local contextual factors for immigration politics (Karapin 1999; Money 1999; Valentine and McDonald 2004). In particular, aggregate measures of unemployment and immigrant presence have been found to influence attitudes about immigration. Unemployment levels may signal a growing economic threat perceived to be linked to immigration (Anderson 1996; Golder 2003). Furthermore, research on inter-

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racial or inter-ethnic contact demonstrates that such interactions can help explain views towards minorities, or immigrants in particular (Allport 1954; Fetzer 2000; Wagner et al. 2003; Bilodeau and McAllister 2007). Therefore, where possible in this analysis, I also consider the role of aggregate

measures of two key factors: unemployment level and the presence of foreigners.

Social capital and attitudes on immigrants This existing body of research offers insight into how individual and contextual factors influence attitudes related to immigration. However, these studies cannot tell us whether and how an individual‘s connections to society affect these views. Missing is systematic analysis of the nexus between individuals and their surroundings. Estimating the relative impact of people‘s micro- characteristics, on one hand, and societal factors, on the other, cannot fully elucidate the social mechanisms through which individuals develop preferences about political issues. This paper improves our understanding of such processes by investigating whether an individual‘s connections to society affect his political views.7 We have little empirical evidence of whether and how general patterns of social interaction and participation influence the perception of immigrants and immigration. This socio-structural perspective on immigration attitudes is rooted in explanations of political extremism which emphasizes the role of intermediary institutions to enfold individuals into the structures of society. Institutional incorporation is hypothesized to counteract the drift

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There is reason to think these factors should matter due to the social contexts that they create. A growing stock of social science research demonstrates that social ties shape individuals‘ political perspectives. Mechanisms proposed to connect social interaction with the political behavior of individuals include interpersonal influence (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz 1998; Stoker and Jennings 2004), position within a defined social setting or group (Huckfeldt, Plutzer and Sprague 1993; Burns, Schlozman and Verba 1997), learning about conflicting viewpoints via heterogeneous social networks (Mutz 2002; Scheufele et al. 2004) and production of externalities and social contexts through social interaction or participation (Putnam 1993; Conover 2002; Walsh 2004). These recent studies contribute to our growing knowledge of the social processes that condition political preferences.

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toward anomie in mass society (Durkheim 1947 [1893]),8 and to make people less prone to antidemocratic tendencies and extremism (Arendt 1951; Kornhauser 1960). The argument is that traditional institutions in society have become less effective in terms of socializing individuals into democratic behavior, and that the resulting social fragmentation has negative political consequences. At the individual level, persons who are not connected to society through intermediary institutions are expected to be especially prone to anti-democratic attitudes and behavior. The insights of disintegration theory have been drawn on to account for disproportionate youth support for xenophobic platforms (Falter and Schuman 1988). The logic is that young people are particularly susceptible to political radicalism because they are less attached to society‘s organizations—traditionally, labor unions, political parties and churches—than preceding generations. The traditional perspective of disintegration is theoretically complementary to more modern notions of social capital. As Coleman (1988) laments, the social structures that once bound people together and generated communal social resources, have withered. This, it is argued, will deplete the social goods once produced by meaningful interpersonal interaction within defined communities. Putnam (2000), too, considers the implications of decreasing levels of participation in civil society, evoking his now iconic image of a lone bowler passing his leisure time outside organized participatory structures. Putnam connects this trend to a lack of involvement in civil society and a threat to democratic norms.

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Durkheim first introduced the concept of anomie, which is a state where norms are unclear, brought about by rapid societal change. This confusion, he hypothesized, leads to deviant and extreme behavior.

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The implication is that organizational connections can have attitudinal consequences that are generally viewed as positive for democracy.9 Engagement in social networks—broadly defined—is also found to have attitudinal effects. The resources generated through social ties are generally known as social capital, an individual-level resource created through interpersonal networking and routine cooperation (Coleman 1988, 1990). And social capital is linked theoretically and empirically to pro-democratic values (Tocqueville 1862; Newton 1997; Grix 2000; Putnam 2000; Krishna 2002; Paxton 2002; Bowler et al. 2003). However, with few exceptions (Hagan, Merkins and Boehnke 1995; Hooghe 2003), the variants of social capital are not represented in the academic debate over the roots of attitudes related to immigration. If the benefits of social capital investment include generalized feelings of trust and tolerance, as the theory goes and many empirical studies demonstrate, then it stands to reason that it should promote interest in societal equality. Social capital is an under-examined concept in studies of youth orientations.10 Stolle and Hooghe (2002) review the literature on social capital and make a strong case for the importance of adolescent experiences on social capital investment in adulthood. Based on a growing body of evidence supporting the claim that civic attitudes and actions are formed early in life, Stolle and Hooghe cite family, school, peer group and local associations as contexts through which prosocial patterns are developed. They specify two mechanisms that translate youth social capital into adult social capital years later: networking, which integrates young individuals into lasting participatory networks, and attitude formation, defined by the creation of civic attitudes and
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The link between pro-democratic norms and social ties, however, is not straightforward. Social scientists who study interpersonal ties often dissect social engagement into different components that correspond with either a more traditional vision of community based on dense, informal interactions (gesellschaft) or a more modern conceptualization based on organizational links or broad social networks that connect individuals from different parts of society (gemeinschaft) (Toennies 1887; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Putnam 2000). Granovetter‘s work (1974, 1985) on the access to social resources via strong versus weak social ties provides a complementary dichotomy for varieties of social connections. 10 For initial insights see: Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke 1995.

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interpersonal trust. Specific to immigration attitudes, Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke (1995) argue that social control enforced by German parents generates social capital, which disinclines youth to become involved with right wing extremist groups. Kracke et al. (1998) cite Fend‘s (1994) finding that anti-foreigner tendencies among German and Swiss adolescents are correlated with low levels of social integration (Fend 1994). The analyses below examine the role of economic competition, cultural threat and social integration in shaping the views of young and old on the rights of immigrants in Western Europe.

The dependent variable The data analyzed in this paper permit investigation into a core democratic value: equality of opportunity (Feldman 1988). Specifically, the surveys measure whether an individual believes that natives and immigrants should be afforded equal opportunities, or whether members of the national majority should be given priority over minorities. The two surveys used here, the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP), pose this basic question in slightly different ways. The question in the WVS cross-national study proposes: ―When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [BRITISH] people over immigrants.‖ And respondents are asked to note whether they ―Agree‖ (coded 1) or ―Disagree‖ (coded 0). This produces a variable indicating a person‘s preference for better opportunities for co-nationals over immigrants in the job market. In the SHP, the question is somewhat broader: ―Are you in favor of Switzerland offering foreigners the same opportunities as those offered to Swiss citizens, or in favor of Switzerland offering Swiss citizens better opportunities?‖ Possible responses are ―In favor of better

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opportunities for Swiss citizens‖ (coded 1), or ―In favor of equality of opportunities‖ (coded 0).11 This yields a measure of an individual‘s views on equality for foreigners in general—rather than simply in the labor market. Across Western Europe and in Switzerland, age is positively related to support for privileged opportunities for citizens. The WVS records that 56 percent of under-30 respondents prefer extra consideration for natives, compared to 64 percent of the 30-plus sample. In the SHP the pattern is the same though the distinction is smaller: 40 percent to 42 percent for the younger and older samples, respectively (from 1999). In general, the older an individual, more likely he is to reject the notion of immigrant equality. This fits with existing research into attitudes on immigration policies, support for minority rights, and inter-ethnic tolerance in general. Figures 1 and 2 provide graphics of the linear predicted relationship between age and support for native priority across Western Europe and in Switzerland. The lines tell a familiar story.

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For both data sets, responses of ―neither‖ and ―don‘t know‖ are coded as missing data.

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Figures 1 and 2
Preference for nationals over foreigners in Western Europe
.84 .5

Preference for Swiss over foreigners

.82

Preference for Swiss

.8

.78

.76

.3

.35

.4

.45

20

40 Age

60

80

20

40 Age

60

80

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2001

Source: Swiss Household Panel Survey 1999

If we relax the linearity assumption, however, a somewhat different picture emerges. In figures 3 and 4, a quadratic prediction reveals that the association between age and preferences for unequal opportunities is more complicated than the linear relationship suggests. Around the thirty-year-old mark, in both data sets, there is a change in the direction of the relationship. From the mid-teens to the late twenties, the correlation between age and unequal preferences is negative.12 Only after the thirty-year point does the expected trend between older age and intolerance surface. These figures beg the question: Why are the youngest persons in society not demonstrating the expected levels of tolerance? How is this related to the contrasting views of youth attitudes toward immigrants discussed above? Using the theoretical framework of rational interests, cultural reflexes and associational ties, the analyses below seek to understand youth views in general and also to make sense of this puzzle presented by the data.

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Or using the most conservative interpretation, there is no clear relationship for the WVS youth.

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Figures 3 and 4
Preference for nationals over foreigners in Western Europe
.86 .6

Preference for Swiss over foreigners

.84

Preference for Swiss

.82

.78

.8

.3

.4

.5

20

40 Age

60

80

20

40 Age

60

80

Source: World Values Survey 1999-2001

Source: Swiss Household Panel 1999

Data and methods The cross-national data come from the 1999-2001 pooled wave of the World Values Survey. The Swiss longitudinal data are from the 1999-2005 annual waves of the Swiss Household Panel,13 a national panel that annually interviews all individuals over the age of sixteen in each sampled household. While the WVS data allows identification of broad cross-national behavioral trends, the SHP allows for a more detailed investigation into the roots of social attitudes. The SHP‘s longitudinal nature also enables examination of attitude change over time. For this analysis I use two samples from the WVS. The European 30+ sample is made up of citizens who are age 30 and above in twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland and Sweden (n ≈ 9,000). The European youth sample is the younger counterpart to the European adult sample, meaning the respondents are the people who are under the age of 30 when they participate in the WVS (n ≈
13

Source: Swiss Household Panel www.swisspanel.ch.

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2,000). The SHP, too, is divided into two main samples for analysis. The adult sample includes all respondents age 30 and older in 1999 (n ≈ 4,200), and the youth sample is comprised of young persons, defined as 29 or younger in 1999 (n ≈ 1,100). When the analysis progresses to consider change in attitudes over time, the youth and adult samples are divided by age in the same way, yet respondents are any persons who have participated in the sample for at least two consecutive years (between 1999 and 2005). Throughout the analysis, young respondents are defined as age 29 and younger, and members of the older group are at least 30-years-old. This is based on the notion of life phases—persons in their teens and twenties have generally not yet assumed full adult roles. Over time, young people in Europe have been waiting longer to step into independent adulthood. A major factor is the necessity and cost of education, which keeps young people in the parental household longer than in the past. Statistical figures on the timing of life transitions in Europe estimate that the average age at which young people leave their parental homes is in the late 20s or early 30s in most countries (Blanco and Kluve 2002). Another relevant set of statistics is average marriage age, which for a young German in 1999 was 29.14 And according to the OECD the average age of first marriage for Swiss males from 1970-1998 was 26.15 A relevant question at this point is, how stable are the views of young people when it comes to attitudes about immigrants? Given that youth are likely in a more intense period of flux and uncertainty than are their elders, a reasonable concern is that their views have not yet fully matured. Unstable attitudes among youth would render their survey responses less reliable, and findings would

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Eurostat 10/08/2002. ―The life of women and men in Europe: A statistical portrait of women and men in all stages of life.‖ Reference STAT/02/121. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=STAT/02/121&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&gui Language=en 15 http://www.dataranking.com/table.cgi?LG=e&TP=po08-1.

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be less conclusive. Taking advantage of the panel nature of the SHP and the fact that the same question on opportunities for foreigners versus natives is included in the survey every year from 1999 to 2005, figure 5 presents the mean response for each age group by year. Figure 5
Support for better opportunities for Swiss by age group over time
35

under 30

30+

30

percent
25 20 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Figure 5 shows that in the aggregate, the younger generation is less predictable from year to year than are older respondents. However, the range of mean scores is not very large—less than ten percent from the lowest to the highest point of the dotted line. Of course, looking at aggregate statistics can often give the impression of relative stability or instability while concealing individuallevel dynamics over time. The SHP allows investigation of intra-individual changes in opinions over time with over 1,400 individuals who answer the preference for Swiss priority question in every wave from 1999 to 2005. Calculations on the number of times each person changes his or her opinion on this topic during the seven years (meaning there are six chances to change) reveal that individuals in

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the younger cohort change an average of .77 times, and the older individuals change an average of .73 times. This underlines the stability of youth views of studying youth views as reliable indicators of political opinions in society. Independent variables For the West European analysis, realistic threat is measured through four variables: whether the individual is registered as unemployed, whether he or she is categorized as working class, income (pre-established scale) and degree completed (pre-established scale).16 Cultural threat is measured in two ways. Belief that immigrants should adopt customs of new host country measures expectations of the out-group to shed their distinguishing cultural traits. Secondly, level of pride in the nation indicates identification with the national in-group. Associational membership is a summary index of membership in a wide range of organizations.17 The expectation for the substantive variables is that their coefficients will be negative in the model. Control variables are age, gender and dummy variables for each country (with Sweden as the reference case).18 Table 1 presents the results of the WVS analysis. The first two columns are the results of youth models, and the second two columns represent analyses of the 30-and-over sample. For each cohort, there is a full model (columns 1 and 3) followed by a model without the cultural threat variables (columns 2 and 4). There are three main messages to take from this set of models. First, unemployment and working class occupation are more predictive of youth values than of older adult values when cultural identity attitudes are controlled for. Second, cultural identity attitudes have stronger coefficients for the younger sample than the older sample, meaning that attitudes about in16

Education may be an indicator of much more than inter-group competition. The cognitive effects of education may shape a person‘s sense of cultural threat or even enhance his appreciation for core democratic values. Socially, the educational context may bring individuals into contact with individuals from minority groups, enhancing tolerance and understanding. This analysis cannot unpack the effects of education, but can measure its relationship to preferences for unequal opportunities in society. 17 The organizational types asked about are: elderly, religion, culture, union, political party, local politics, human rights, environmental, professional, youth, sports, women, peace, health. 18 Control variables for each country are not included in presentation, but full models are available from author.

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groups and out-groups are more predictive of youth preferences for priority for nationals. Third, though associational belonging has negative, significant coefficients for both adult models, membership only becomes significant for young persons when the attitudinal variables are removed from the model. This suggests that for youth, these two sets of factors are related in a meaningful way, and that they are not so closely linked for adults. Over all, we see some differences in the predictive patterns of youth attitudes compared to the preferences of older persons in society. It is also clear, looking at the Chi-square scores for these models, that the independent variables over all are much more effective predictors of adult attitudes than youth views.

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Table 1
Predicting preference for better opportunities for nationals Western Europe
Logit models Under 30 Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Unemployed 0.13 ** 0.09 (.06) (.05) Income 0.02 0.03 (.02) (.02) Degree -0.17 ** -0.21 ** (.03) (.03) Working class 1.22 ** 0.87 (.59) (.54) Immigs adopt customs 1.10 ** (.13) Pride in nation 0.47 ** (.08) Assoc. membership -0.18 -0.23 ** (.13) (.11) Age 0.14 0.28 (.26) (.24) Age squared 0.00 -0.01 (.01) (.01) Male -0.04 0.03 (.11) (.10) Constant -4.88 -4.76 * (3.14) (2.81) * p<.1 N=1677 N=1959 **p<.05 Chi2=421.2** Chi2=409.1** (Robust standard errors in parentheses) 30 plus Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 0.05 * 0.03 (.03) (.03) -0.05 ** -0.04 ** (.01) (.01) -0.21 ** -0.24 ** (.01) (.01) -0.57 * -0.35 (.34) (.31) 0.95 ** (.06) 0.34 ** (.04) -0.32 ** -0.33 ** (.06) (.06) -0.01 0.00 (.01) (.01) 0.00 0.00 (.00) (.00) -0.02 -0.02 (.06) (.05) -1.52 ** -0.42 (.43) (.38) n=7852 N=8964 Chi2=2281.2** Chi2=2433.6**

Swiss analysis The WVS helps to identify broad, general trends in attitudes toward equality for foreign born individuals. Using the SHP, there is a greater opportunity to examine the effects of context and change. Furthermore, the companion question to the dependent variable—direction of preference for equality of opportunity for foreigners—is an intensity question, which allows an examination of the strength of the respondent‘s opinion. Though only asked in 1999, this intensity question enables a distinction not only between an individual who prefers priority for Swiss and another with an interest

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in equality of opportunity, but it also offers a sense of how much an individual cares about the issue. Therefore, the dependent variable for the next analysis is a four-category measure that ranges: Strong commitment to equality, Commitment to equality, Preference for Swiss priority, and Strong preference for Swiss priority. The scale ranges from 1 to 4, with 4 indicating strongest preference for Swiss advantage. The quadratic predictive relationship between age and this index is shown in Figure 6, and the descriptive frequencies for this variable are presented in Figure 7.

Figure 6
Preference for Swiss over foreigners
Scale incorporates strength of preference
2.8 2.2 2.4 2.6

20

40 Age

60

80

Source: Swiss Household Panel 1999

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Figure 7
Preference for Swiss Priority Includes consideration of intensity
40

Under 30
35

30 Plus
30

25

percent

20

15

10

5

0

Strong pref. equality

Pref. equality

Pref. Swiss priority

Strong Swiss priority

Independent variables Realistic threat is measured through unemployment (whether individual is currently unemployed or has been unemployed in the past year), an education scale (pre-established), whether or not the individual is currently in school, and whether the individual is a member of the working class. Cultural threat is measured with an out-group and an in-group component as in the WVS analysis: level of religious tolerance for women who wish to cover their heads, and a preference for Swiss traditions.19 Associational memberships are measured with a dummy variable indicating

19

The survey items are: ―Girls should be allowed to cover their heads at school if this is part of their religious tradition (0=completely disagree, 10=completely agree).‖ ―Are you in favor of Switzerland opening towards other countries, or in favor of Switzerland defending its traditions (1=defending traditions, 0=opening towards other countries)?‖ These questions are only asked in the 1999 wave.

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whether an individual is a member of any social organizations.20 Each of these variables, with the exception of religious tolerance, should be negatively related to the dependent variable. Religious tolerance is expected to be positively associated with a preference for better opportunities for Swiss over foreigners. Age and gender are used as control variables. Table 2 shows the results of the SHP analysis for the 1999 wave. The models are multinomial logits, which predict a separate logistic regression equation for each value of the dependent variable. Therefore, the table is separated into three sets of rows: one predicting Strong preference for equality of opportunity (y=1), the second predicting a (not strong) Preference for Swiss priority over noncitizens (y=3), and at the bottom another set predicting Strong preference for Swiss priority (y=4). The reference category of the dependent variable is a (not strong) Preference for equality (y=2). The columns are divided by age, with the first three models representing youth analyses, and the last three columns displaying the results of the 30-plus models. For each age group, the first two models parallel the WVS analyses, with a full theoretical model followed by a model excluding the cultural threat variables. The third model for each cohort includes a contextual variable: the percent of residents in the respondent‘s canton who are not citizens.21 Four main themes emerge from these models. First, education level is especially important for preventing strong preferences for Swiss citizen priority (y=4) in the under-30 sample. And for young people in general, the socio-economic variables are on the whole important determinants of their attitudes. Second, as in the WVS analyses, cultural threat variables are particularly strong predictors of youth views. Consider the likelihood of a young person feeling strongly that immigrants and Swiss citizens should be given equal opportunities (y=1). The coefficient for

20

The types of organizations asked about are: local or parents, sports or leisure, culture, syndicate, political party, environmental, charitable, women, or tenants‘ rights. 21 Unemployment rate in the canton was also tried in these models. It is very closely related to the foreign population (.92 is the pairwise correlation), but when used in the model without the foreigner variable, it is not significant.

82

religious tolerance is .13 (compared to adult coefficient of .08), and the coefficient for defense of Swiss tradition is -.54 (compared to .45). Looking at predictions for strong preferences for Swiss priority (y=4), the signs are flipped as expected and the youth coefficient for religious tolerance is larger than that for the adult sample. A third point to take from these models relates to the role of associational membership. As with the West European WVS data, associational membership is significant only in the absence of the cultural threat variables. In the Swiss case, this pattern holds for the older sample as well as the younger one. Associational membership, however, is not significant for the first outcome, Strong preference for equality (y=1). Where it has the strongest effects is in its negative impact on Strong preferences for Swiss priority (y=4). Belonging to at least one organization is negatively and significantly associated with a strong preference for unequal opportunities for citizens and immigrants. This suggests that institutional inclusion may, indeed, prevent anti-foreigner extremism. Furthermore, this result is especially strong for young persons. See tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for a visual representation of the importance of associational membership for determining attitudes toward foreigners. A final message to take from these Swiss models is the role of foreign presence in the resident‘s canton. The larger the foreign population, the more supportive of equality is the respondent. Likewise, the larger the foreign population, the less likely respondents are to claim a Strong preference for Swiss priority. These effects are consistent across both samples. I consider these last two points about associational membership and context in the discussion section below.

83

Table 2
Predicting preference for better opportunities for Swiss citizens Multinomial logit models Under 30
Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE)

30 plus
Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE)

Unemployed Education

0.66
(.54)

0.48
(.49)

0.43
(.49)

0.22
(.25)

0.35
(.23)

0.33
(.23)

0.05
(.04)

0.05
(.04)

0.04
(.04)

0.06 **
(.02)

0.07 **
(.02)

0.06 **
(.02)

Strong preference for equality (y=1)

In school Manual worker Religious tolerance Prefer Swiss tradition Assoc. membership Foreigners in canton Constant Unemployed Education

0.70 *
(.41)

0.56
(.38)

0.53
(.38)

0.50
(.54)

0.75
(.53)

0.80
(.54)

0.40
(.37)

0.28
(.35)

0.28
(.34)

0.34 **
(.12)

0.30 **
(.11)

0.32 **
(.11)

0.13 **
(.03)

0.08 **
(.01)

-0.54 **
(.27)

-0.45 **
(.16)

0.01
(.21)

0.03
(.18)

0.06
(.19)

-0.06
(.11)

0.04
(.10)

0.08
(.10)

0.03 **
(.01)

0.03 **
(.01)

-1.59 *
(.87)

-0.60
(.78)

-1.13
(.83)

-1.13 **
(.30)

-0.58 **
(.25)

-1.13 **
(.29)

0.78
(.49)

0.65
(.47)

0.70
(.47)

0.13
(.28)

0.10
(.25)

0.11
(.25)

-0.13 **
(.05)

-0.12 **
(.04)

-0.11 **
(.04)

-0.12 **
(.02)

-0.13 **
(.02)

-0.13 **
(.02)

Preference for Swiss priority (y=3)

In school Manual worker Religious tolerance Prefer Swiss tradition Assoc. membership Foreigners in canton Constant Unemployed

-0.57
(.40)

-0.65 *
(.36)

-0.63 *
(.36)

-1.16
(1.05)

-1.42
(1.04)

-1.44
(1.03)

0.12
(.34)

0.08
(.32)

0.08
(.32)

-0.12
(.12)

-0.18 *
(.10)

-0.18 *
(.10)

-0.09 **
(.03)

-0.03 **
(.01)

0.67 **
(.22)

0.81 **
(.12)

0.03
(.22)

-0.15
(.19)

-0.18
(.19)

-0.15
(.11)

-0.19 *
(.10)

-0.20 **
(.10)

-0.03 *
(.02)

-0.01
(.01)

1.55 *
(.90)

1.06
(.76)

1.56 *
(.83)

0.26
(.29)

0.30
(.25)

0.46
(.29)

-0.69
(.71)

-0.26
(.56)

-0.19
(.55)

0.08
(.31)

0.13
(.26)

0.14
(.26)

Strong preference for Swiss priority (y=4)

Education In school Manual worker Religious tolerance Prefer Swiss tradition Assoc. membership Foreigners in canton Constant

-0.25 **
(.07)

-0.30 **
(.06)

-0.29 **
(.06)

-0.17 **
(.02)

-0.22 **
(.02)

-0.21 **
(.02)

-1.19 **
(.49)

-1.33 **
(.41)

-1.31 **
(.41)

-31.70 **
(.39)

-29.36 **
(.38)

-33.40 **
(.37)

0.01
(.40)

0.04
(.34)

0.04
(.34)

-0.15
(.13)

-0.20 *
(.11)

-0.21 *
(.11)

-0.11 **
(.03)

-0.06 **
(.01)

1.63 **
(.24)

1.75 **
(.12)

-0.13
(.24)

-0.38 **
(.20)

-0.40 **
(.20)

-0.17
(.12)

-0.23 **
(.10)

-0.26 **
(.10)

-0.03 **
(.02)

-0.03 **
(.01)

0.59
(1.05)

0.82
(.84)

1.39
(.89)

0.17
(.32)

0.53 **
(.26)

1.03 **
(.30)

N=920 N=1123 N=1123 Chi2=198.4** Chi2=82.11** Chi2=89.8**

N=3519 N=4255 N=4255 Chi2=13841.5** Chi2=11261.7** Chi2=13498.2**

84

One final step of the analysis looks more closely into change in views on Swiss priority over time. A dynamic model allows for an understanding of the factors that may precipitate change in preferences for Swiss citizens over foreigners. For this analysis, only the base question of whether Swiss should have better opportunities (y=1) or whether foreigners should be afforded equal opportunities (y=0) is used. This is because the intensity companion question is not asked beyond the first survey in 1999, but the base question is asked every year through 2005. The analysis is set up to measure whether an individual changes his or her view from one year to another, and also the direction of their change. If there is no change, the dependent variable is coded 0, if there is a change toward equality of opportunity the variable is coded -1, and if there is a change toward unequal preferences, the variable is coded 1. Across all year pairs, most respondents do not change their view: 81 percent of under-30 respondents and 83 percent of older Swiss do not change from t-1 to t. Ten percent of youth versus nine percent of older individuals become more supportive of equality, and in both samples approximately nine percent change to more unequal views from one year to the next. A multinomial logit is used here to predict the existence and direction of change.22 The sample is individuals who answered the foreigner equality measure in any two consecutive years of the panel. The sample is not divided by age, as the youth model did not produce significant results for any of the predictors. Also, because the cultural threat variables are only asked in 1999, the analysis is limited to realistic threat variables and associational membership. Table 3 presents the results of the change model, which are not difficult to summarize. None of the predictors can account for Change toward equality (y= -1), but moving from not being in school to school enrollment is a negative predictor of an increasingly unequal orientation. The main

22

The multinomial logit cannot be used as a time series model. However, this same analysis was conducted dividing the sample into those who changed toward equality versus all others, and then into those who changed toward inequality versus all others. Each of these new dependent variables allowed for an xtlogit. The results of these xtlogit models are almost exactly the same as those for the mlogit.

85

result, however, is that a change in associational membership—joining an organization of some sort—negatively impacts an individual‘s likelihood of changing from a preference for equality to one of inequality.23 Table 3
Predicting change In preference for better opportunities for Swiss citizens
Multinomial Logit Model (All ages) Coeff. (S.E.) -0.56 (.42) 0.01 (.02) 0.02 (.05) -0.37 (.28) 0.00 (.00) 0.05 (.08) -2.17 (.13) -0.34 (.54) 0.03 (.02) -0.07 (.07) -0.49 (.27) 0.00 (.00) -0.29 (.09) -2.28 (.14) N=14,333 Chi2=24.96** Sig.

Change unemployment Change job scale

Change toward equality

Change education scale Change in school Age Change assoc. membership Constant Change unemployment Change job scale

**

Change toward inequality

Change education scale Change in school Age Change assoc. membership Constant

*

** **

*p<.1 **p<.05 Robust standard errors in parentheses
23

However, because the timing of change in preference for Swiss priority cannot be separated from change in associational membership, there is a clear question of causal direction.

86

Discussion Analysis of West European and Swiss data reveals several key findings on attitudes related to immigration. First, the insights of economic competition and cultural threat theories apply to younger and older cohorts. Young people may be particularly influenced by factors related to education and unemployment. Their attitudes also seem tightly tied to in-group affinity and outgroup bias. Also, foreign presence in the area (in the case of Switzerland, the area is the canton), is associated with egalitarian viewpoints on opportunities. Another important result of the analyses is that associational membership is negatively related to preferences for unequal opportunities between citizens and foreigners. In particular, associational membership is a strong and significant negative predictor of feeling very strongly that natives‘ needs should be prioritized over immigrants‘ interests. This applies to adults and especially to young people. Furthermore, the findings presented in this paper suggest that joining an association may promote more egalitarian outlooks. This is an area for further investigation. Certainly the raison d‘être and social context of any organization that a person belongs to will influence whether the involvement promotes democratic or anti-democratic values. And of course, young persons are likely to be involved with different types of groups than their elders. Radical right extremist organizations are just that—organizations. So this relationship is certainly complex. However, if social capital theorists are correct in positing that trust and tolerance accrue from routine involvement in societal institutions in general, then this is an area of research than can have positive societal benefits for young and old, and citizen and non-citizen alike.

87

Appendix Table A1

Predicting preference for Swiss versus equality of opportunity with associational membership
0.35

0.3

predicted probability

0.25

0.2

0.15

Strong preference equality W eak preference equality W eak preference Swiss priority Strong preference Swiss priority

0.1

No memberships

At least one membership

Table A2
Predicting strong preference for Swiss priority with associational membership
0.22 Under 30 30 Plus

0.2

predicted probabilities

0.18

0.16

0.14

0.12

0.1

No memberships

At least one membership

88

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