Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah

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					Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination

2004

Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self - Determination
Prof. Richard Bonney Editor Prof. Richard Bonney First Published by University of Leicester Centre for the History of Religious and Political Pluralism Institute for the Study of Indo-Pakistan Relations Leicester, LE1 7RH, UK

Professor Richard Bonney

All rights reserved to the Author and Centre for the History of Religious and Political Pluralism Institute for the Study of Indo-Pakistan Relations Leicester, LE1 7RH, UK Published in India by: Media House 375-A, Pocket 2, Mayur Vihar Phase-I, Delhi - 110 091, India Ph: 011-22750667, 22751317, Fax: 011-22757040 E-mail: mediabooks@hotmail.com, books@indiancurrents.com website: www.mediabooks.org

Media House Delhi 2004

Printed at: Jyoti Printers, E-94, Sector-6, Noida ISBN:

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Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on SelfDetermination Preface: What’s in a Title?

alphabetical reasons, it has been considered appropriate to order the names in the way that appears on this title. There is no inference that there was a ‘winner’ in the debate on self-determination. There was a difference of opinion, which it is the task of the historian to explain and document, and the legacy of that difference of opinion continues to have profound historical importance.

Professor Richard Bonney
There is a long tradition of controversy about the ordering of names in titles which, in the case of the Independence movement in South Asia, goes back at least to the publication of the correspondence between Gandhi and Jinnah in 1944. Each side put its leader as the first name in the debate: for the Congress, it was the Gandhi–Jinnah Talks, while for the Muslim League, not surprisingly, it was the Jinnah–Gandhi Talks (introduction, vii n 9). In talking in terms of Three Giants of South Asia, it is hoped that a neutral stance is hereby adopted. .or the historian, hagiography can be no part of the process of analysis. It is the contention here that all three men — Ambedkar, Jinnah and Gandhi — deserve to be remembered with respect and honoured by a critical analysis of their writings. Perhaps a purely alphabetical listing of the names in the subtitle might be preferred by some. The order that has been adopted here reflects the fact that there were two main participants in debate (Gandhi and Jinnah, or Jinnah and Gandhi) and one main commentator on the debate (Ambedkar), although he, too, was a participant as the leader of the Dalits. It is an historical fact that in 1944 it was Gandhi who asked for the meeting with Jinnah, and therefore both in terms of the dating of the correspondence on the future constitutional shape for the sub-Continent (Document Seven, 17 September 1944) and in the enunciation of a new ‘spiritual movement’ in politics to which Jinnah took objection in 1920, as well as for purely

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Introduction to the Indian Edition of Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination
Professor Richard Bonney
An Indian edition of this book follows relatively swiftly upon its first publication last year. In Britain, of the three giants of South Asia, the one who is least well known is Dr Ambedkar; in India his name needs no introduction as its post-independence constitutional architect, the leader of the Dalits and the author of the ‘masterpiece’ (A. G. Noorani’s description), Pakistan or the Partition of India (1940 and subsequent editions). Instead, in spite of occasional references to him as one of the hundred statesmen responsible for the making of India,1 Jinnah’s name is the one who is least known in the sense of being understood as the true Jinnah of history. He is vilified as the advocate of what is referred to as the ‘poisonous two nations’ theory’2 and ipso facto therefore held responsible for the partition of the sub-continent. In this preface to the Indian edition, we seek to answer a number of questions which may be summarized thus: why should the real Jinnah of history be
1 Stanley Wolpert’s biography of Jinnah and his article for the icons series entitled ‘Jilted Gentleman’ scarcely help with the opening phrasing: ‘few individuals significantly alter the course of history. .ewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammed Ali Jinnah did all three.’ Even the very well informed and usually dispassionate commentator A. G. Noorani calls it this in part two of his review article of Peter Clarke, The Cripps Version. The Life of Sir Stafford Cripps, 1899–1952 (London: Penguin, 2002), entitled ‘Cripps and the Partition of India’, .rontline, 19/15, 20 July–2 Aug. 2002 and 19/16, 3–16 Aug. 2002. Web versions at: <www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1915/19150860.htm > <www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1916/19160820.htm> Earlier, Noorani had discussed ‘The Partition of India’, .rontline, 18/26, 22 Dec. 2001–4 Jan. 2002: <www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1826/18260810.htm>

so vilified in India today? Was he responsible for the partition of India? If not, who was responsible? Can there be any justification, with hindsight, for the eventual British acceptance of partition in 1947? In considering these questions, the opportunity presents itself to reflect on the study by Peter Clarke, entitled The Cripps Version, which was published in 2002. ‘The true Jinnah of history’ may be difficult to discern behind the façade of negotiating postures and the claim and counter-claim of propaganda. It should be noted, however, that Jinnah did not originate the ‘two nations’ theory’. It is sometimes claimed that Sir Mohammed Iqbal did so instead in 1930 and that his friend Jinnah simply took up this idea and developed it. Neither view is sustainable. No, as is demonstrated in this book, the idea was formulated as a consequence of the practice of demographic distinctions (and subsequently, separate delegations and voting qualifications) by religion within the sub-Continent. By 1906 the Muslims had made a separate delegation to the Viceroy, while in 1911 T. W. Holderness commented that the British administration considered the Indian Muslims ‘for many purposes a nation’. Perhaps none of this quite constituted a ‘theory’ of two nations, but it amounted to a recognition of the reality, a practice of government. This was in turn picked up by the Hindu Mahasabha leader, Lala Lajpat Rai, who wrote in The Tribune on 14 December 1924:
Under my scheme the Muslims will have four Muslim States: (1) The Pathan Province or the North-West .rontier; (2) Western Punjab (3) Sindh and (4) Eastern Bengal. If there are compact Muslim communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a united India. It means a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.

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At various moments during the constitutional discussions after 1940, Congress itself was prepared to accept some form of partition, while it was none other than Vallabhbhai Patel, the Hindu realist and architect of a strong Indian union — though he would have eschewed Peter Clarke’s depiction of him as ‘the self-appointed hammer of the

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Muslims’3 — who commented to Maulana Azad that, ‘whether we liked it or not, there were two nations in India’.4 Azad deduced from this quite incorrectly that ‘it would not perhaps be unfair to say that Vallabhbhai Patel was the founder of Indian partition’. Patel merely recognized what the British had had to deal with for a long period of time, but in a sustained phase of lobbying since 1940. ‘Conciliation and compromise can only be achieved when the desire is mutual’, he wrote to Arthur Henderson in April 1947, ‘but if there is only one-way traffic, only either surrender or a firm stand can bring about the close of this sorry episode.’5 A further criticism of Jinnah is that he was a ‘communalist’ whereas Gandhi, Patel and Nehru were ‘secularists’. The veteran Socialist Prem Bhasin wrote these words in 1998, quoted by Noorani in his review article on the partition of India:
The ease with which a large number of Congressmen and women — small, big and bigger still — have walked into the RSS–BJP boat and sailed with it is not a matter of surprise. .or, there has always been a certain affinity between the two. A large and influential section in the Congress sincerely believed even during the freedom struggle that the interests of Hindu Indians could not be sacrificed at the altar of a united Independent India. Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya and Lala Lajpat Rai had, for instance, actually broken away from the Congress and founded the Nationalist Party which contested elections against the Congress in the mid-[1920s].

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Clarke, The Cripps Version, 420. One of the things that Patel emphatically told General Roy Butcher, the [British] commander-in-chief of the army of the newly independent Indian Union, with whom he was on cordial terms, was that ‘everyone thought that he was anti-Muslim but that was not the case at all. He was quite ready to guarantee the safety and well-being of Muslims all over India’. <www.rediff.com/freedom/03care2.htm> Patel’s tone rather later (6 Jan. 1948) was more threatening: ‘…I want to say a word as a friend of Muslims and it is the duty of a good friend to speak frankly. It is your duty now to sail in the same boat and sink or swim together. I want to tell you very clearly that you cannot ride on two horses. You select one horse, whichever you like best’, that is, India or Pakistan: .or a United India. Speeches of Sardar Patel, 1947–1950 (rev. edn. 1967), 66–7. <www.muslimindia.com/hfm/akalam.htm> Clarke, The Cripps Version, 459.

But they had not all broken away from Congress in the 1920s. Many Congress supporters were either members of the RSS or of the Hindu Mahasabha or shared many of their views. Cripps put it succinctly, if tactlessly, when he pronounced that Congress was ‘predominantly Hindu though with some Muslim members and… controlled by the High Caste or Brahmin Class’.6 This was always the suspicion of Jinnah. It was proven subsequently after Independence. Patel was prepared to outlaw the RSS briefly following the assassination of Gandhi. But the Hindu extreme Right Wing was soon allowed to function once more. Patel did not share Nehru’s view that the RSS was a .ascist organization whose very existence was a threat to India’s secular democracy. He thought, incorrectly it was to prove, that its threat to act as a ‘state within a state’ could be contained by paper agreements. There was a difference, he told the Lok Sabha on 19 March 1949, between attempting to ‘bring about a regeneration of the Hindu community by peaceful and legitimate means’ and seeking to ‘achieve this object by spreading poison and hatred against other communities who are entitled under the law to equal protection from the established Government’. In such circumstances the government must act. He also deplored the tendency of the RSS to suborn the youth from parental control.7 The denial that the RSS was hostile to the Muslim community from inception was, sadly, fanciful. Either the Sardar was being disingenuous or he had not read the writings of Savarkar and Golwalkar. Jinnah was fearful of a permanent Hindu majority, a Hindu Raj as he termed it, it is true; but he was not anti-Hindu. On the contrary, after partition was resolved, when his true private feelings could have been revealed, he
6 7 Ibid. 350–1. ‘Threat to Internal security overcome’: Sardar Patel’s speech in Parliament, New Delhi, 19 March 1949. University of Southampton, Ms 62 Mountbatten Papers MB1 / .5 folder 1 (of 2). Differences between Nehru and Patel over the RSS were ‘a contributory factor in the increasingly strained relations between the two men which nearly ended in total breakdown of cooperation early in 1948: Judith M. Brown, Nehru (Harlow, 1999), 73.

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suppressed an inappropriate Time magazine story caption because it might give offence to the Hindu community.8 Among the Jinnah papers in Islamabad, the indefatigable editor of his oeuvre, Dr Z. H. Zaidi, uncovered and kindly transmitted to the author a hitherto unknown letter from a Hindu admirer named Kanji Dwarkadas from Altamount Road, Cumball Hill, Bombay at a very late date (Christmas Day, 1944: Jinnah’s birthday was 25 December) which casts a very different complexion on Jinnah’s standing within the Hindu community at that time:
My Dear Jinnah I send you very very best wishes. I recall to my mind that I first met you in 1916, and I always consider it a great privilege that I worked with you in close contact during the Home Rule League years and during 1920–1930. My one big prayer is that by the time you celebrate your birthday next year, a healthy settlement will have been arrived at between the two big communities. It is curious but it is a fact that Hindus in this country look to you for leadership — and today you have as many Hindus as Muhammadans as political and personal friends. 9 Your opportunity, as your responsibility is great, and the best wishes of humble friends like we are with you. Once again, with very very best wishes. Yours sincerely Kanji Dwarkardas

In this simple, unsolicited, and deeply personal statement there is implied an important understanding. Jinnah used the terminology of the Pakistan, and was prepared to resort
8 ‘As I think the description, “Mohammad Ali Jinnah: His Moslem Tiger wants to eat the Hindu cow” is offensive to the sentiments of the Hindu community, I cannot put my autograph on the cover page… as requested by you’ (in response to a letter dated 24 July 1947). I. Talbot, Jinnah: Role Model for .uture Generations of Pakistanis (Leicester, 2001), document four. Passage underlined in the original.

to Pakistan if everything else failed; but what he actually sought was agreement at an All India level. His political party, after all, was the All India Muslim League. An agreement for slightly under half the Indian Muslims was better than none; but it would clearly have been preferable to have had an agreement for all the Indian Muslims. Jinnah wanted what he called ‘an equipoise’. By this he meant ‘an adjustment of votes and of territorial division which would give a Hindu–Muslim balance’. Precisely how it would be achieved was a matter for negotiation. No balance, however, would mean no settlement. Everything had to be settled first, not afterwards. .or, once the Constitutional Assembly was in place, it could rewrite all the rules if there was any lack of clarity. The Congress wanted the establishment of a Constituent Assembly first as a solution to the problem. This position was flawed. Noorani quotes a memorandum, prepared by K. M. Panikkar on 10 October 1945, to the effect that no such Assembly could succeed except on the basis of a prior Congress–League accord and unless ‘a procedure of bringing the parties together on some minimum basis of agreement is evolved before the Constituent Assembly meets’. Here we may perceive an important difference in negotiating tactics between Jinnah on the one hand, and Gandhi, Nehru and Cripps on the other. .or Cripps, in the end it all boiled down to a question of faith and trust. If he could only sell a deal to Gandhi by gaining his trust, and if there could be faith in the future arrangements, then there could indeed be a settlement.10 Though Jinnah’s insistence that the Muslims chosen for the interim government should all be nominated by the Muslim League was clearly a difficulty, the real sticking point was the guarantee to be given by Congress on provincial groupings that was required by the Muslim League. As Jinnah informed Cripps on 11 May 1946: ‘if the Congress would agree to Groups of Provinces as desired by the Muslim League, he would seriously consider a Union.’11 Gandhi had declared such grouping as ‘really worse than Pakistan’,12 while Patel was thought by Cripps
10 11 12 Clarke, The Cripps Version, 438. Ibid. 429. Ibid. 426.

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to be ‘anxious to break the thing up’, not wanting ‘anything but a Congress dictatorship with himself as dictator!’13 While in prison during the Quit India campaign, Nehru had in frustration revealed his own lack of confidence in Gandhi’s political leadership. Noorani quotes from Nehru’s diaries the Pandit’s view that ‘with all his very great qualities [Gandhi] has proved a poor and weak leader’ (10 July 1943) and his thought of ‘breaking with Gandhi. I have at present [5 August 1944] no desire even to go to him on release... I suppose I shall see him anyhow...’ Yet in the end, Nehru always did defer to Gandhi, to whom he owed his political ascendancy in the Congress. As Peter Clarke comments, the years in prison after 1942 ‘revealed the rigidity of the Congress mindset’. Nehru blamed the British for separate electorates, ‘the seed of the poisonous tree that has grown to poison all our national life and prevent progress’. ‘The political backwardness of the Muslims was taken for granted; the success of League organization explained as “strikingly similar to the Nazi technique”’ — it was scarcely helpful that by 1947 Krishna Menon was referring to Jinnah as the .ührer both to Mountbatten and Nehru;14 after all, Jinnah had stood by the Indian constitution when Congress had challenged it and, moreover, had shown a commitment to the struggle against the Axis powers which the Congress had refused by putting the Quit India campaign first. The demand for Pakistan was dismissed as ‘a sentimental slogan which they have got used to’. The imposition of a unitary constitution based on majority voting was urged despite the Muslim League’s bluff about resistance.15 Nehru, who also had the wily Patel on his hands, was unwilling and unable to share power with Jinnah, a much older and more experienced politician than himself. Noorani again quotes from Nehru’s diaries while in jail to telling effect: ‘instinctively I think it
13 14 Ibid. 424. Transfer of Power, xii. 255. University of Southampton MS 62 Mountbatten Papers MB 1 / E 104: ‘I found there and everywhere [in Whitehall] that the ‘.ührer’ had overplayed his hand. Mr J’s last effort smells very badly, and even the man in the street begins to understand his business’ (18 July 1947). Clarke, The Cripps Version, 403–4.

is better to have Pakistan or almost nothing [at all] if only to keep Jinnah far away and not allow his muddled and arrogant head from [sic] interfering continually in India’s progress’ (28 December 1943), though he accurately predicted: ‘I cannot help thinking that ultimately the Muslims of India will suffer most.’ The Cabinet Mission’s Plan was wrecked not by Jinnah and the Muslim League but by Nehru and Congress. It had had one of two choices: unqualified acceptance of the Cabinet Mission’s Plan or Partition. It preferred the latter. Can any case be made out for British policy towards India following upon the ‘conditional, deferred and plainly halfhearted offer of Dominion status’ in August 1940?16 Clearly there was a difference between those, like Cripps, who identified with a war for democracy which sought to enlist democratic aspirations in India on the side of the Allies, while in contrast hardliners such as the Viceroy, Linlithgow, thought that the status quo ought to prevail for the duration of the war: ‘India is hopelessly, and I suspect irremediably, split by racial and religious divisions which we cannot bridge, and which become more acute as any real transfer of power by us draws nearer’, Linlithgow observed in January 1942.17 Churchill is often blamed as the wrecker of the negotiations. It is true that Churchill grossly overestimated the importance of the Muslims as the predominant section of the ‘martial classes’ (his estimate was 75 per cent of the Indian troops, while the Viceroy’s was only 35 per cent);18 he was able to bear the news of the failure of the Cripps Mission in 1942 ‘with philosophy’ because he had thought this outcome probable from the outset; 19 his main preoccupation throughout was less to secure a settlement in India than to keep Roosevelt and American opinion ‘on side’. However, the detailed narrative provided by Peter Clarke in The Cripps Version lends no substance to the view that the Cripps mission was deliberately sabotaged from London by Churchill. When Cripps met Gandhi in April 1946 they
16 17 18 19 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 276. 277. 283. 323.

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renewed a conversation over who ought to assume responsibility for the failure of his mission four years earlier. Cripps made it clear that he had ‘always put down the refusal of Congress to his [that is, Gandhi’s] action and influence’, to which Gandhi replied it was ‘his influence but not his action’.20 Yet in practice, if not in law, the executive council proposed by Cripps would have been ‘the supreme government of India’; Cripps contended that ‘had there been an agreement Indians would have had absolute control of the situation’. He had earlier told a reporter on 29 March 1942: ‘you cannot change the constitution. All you can do is to change the conventions of the constitution. You can turn the Executive Council into a Cabinet.’21 Jinnah and the Muslim League had been ready to accept the Cripps offer, but only if Congress did so. The fact that the Hindu Mahasabha was wholly negative, ‘dismissing the nonaccession provisions as a threat to Indian unity’, was not wholly unexpected. What was unexpected was Gandhi’s phrase about a ‘vivisection of India’, which was already in circulation in late March 1942, as was his aphorism that the Cripps offer was ‘a post-dated cheque’.22 The turnaround was extraordinary. .rom being seen by Jinnah and the Muslim League as a friend of Congress at the outset of the mission, Cripps made it clear that there could be no ‘dictatorship of the majority’. ‘Simple government majority’ — he amended the phrase to ‘an irresponsible Majority Government’ — could not rule in a country such as India where communal divisions were so deep. It was not the case of a ‘fluctuating majority and minority’ as in a western democracy; rather, it was ‘a question of a communal minority and a communal majority neither of which can be converted…’ Nehru denounced Cripps as having turned ‘anti-Congress, communal and reactionary’ and knowing ‘nothing about India’. In fact, the
20 Ibid. 354. Cf ibid. 346, Coupland’s comment that ‘it may well have been Mr. Gandhi’s opinions, though he was not there to utter them, that at the last moment turned the scale’ on 9 and 10 April 1942. Ibid. 303. Ibid. 304–5.

British government had, with reluctance, accepted the realism of Jinnah’s position since 1939.23 Attlee as well as Cripps had become suspicious of the ‘totalitarian dictatorship’ which seemed to be inherent in the Congress scheme for the future.24 When events were replayed in 1946, once more the Muslim League was prepared to accept the plan, this time the Cabinet Mission Plan, and actually did so on 16 May 1946. Once more, though without occupying any formal position in Congress, Gandhi enunciated a right to interpret the British proposals unilaterally. In Harijan on 17 May, Gandhi carried the view that ‘provinces were free to reject the very idea of grouping. No province could be forced against its will to belong to a group even if the idea of grouping was accepted.’ On 24 June he told the Cabinet Mission that ‘lawgivers [that is, the Cabinet Mission]… could not interpret their own law’. Once more Nehru bowed to the master. Cripps wrote on 18 June: ‘Nehru who had opposed Gandhi yesterday gave in to him to-day and went round to his side — most disappointingly through, I fear, weakness.’ Rather crudely for one vegetarian describing another, Cripps referred to Gandhi as ‘as stubborn as an ox’ once he was convinced that he was right in an argument.25 PethickLawrence even felt that Gandhi did not care whether two or three million people died provided that he did not have to compromise his views.26 Then, on 6 July, shortly after he took over the Congress presidency from Azad, Nehru declared that there would be no grouping and the Constituent Assembly would be a sovereign body free to decide as it pleased. A united India spelt sharing of power with the Muslim League. On 10 July 1946, Nehru told the Cabinet Mission categorically that ‘the Congress were going to work for a strong Centre and to break the Group System and they would succeed. They did not think that Mr. Jinnah had any real place in the country.’ This statement sits uneasily with Nehru’s later remark, in December 1946, that
23 24 25 26 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. 338–340. 393. 447. 439.

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‘no price was too high for real cooperation from the Muslims, provided it was real’.27 A. G. Noorani criticizes Cripps for a lack of honesty in dealing with the Congress leaders in June 1946. ‘Cripps would have served his friend [Nehru] and India better by being more honest and firm at this time’, he contends. ‘Partition might still have come a year earlier; but without the rancour which “the fudge” produced.’ But in the event the ‘fudge’ was clarified and the Congress rejection of the Cabinet Mission proposals was clear. The rancour was there, as Peter Clarke suggests, ‘basically because Congress failed to evince its willingness to accept the provisions on grouping’. Clarke continues:28
It was now beyond the power of the British Government to secure compliance through an exercise of coercive authority — or through the Cabinet Delegation’s mixture of paternalism, goodwill, ingenuity, pragmatism and bluff. ‘The British’, as Gandhi said, ‘imagining that they can bring the League and Congress together, are attempting the impossible.’ Cripps had realized that this would be astoundingly difficult: it was Gandhi himself who finally made it impossible.

Perhaps blame should not be attached to any one of the three main leaders of Congress, because neither Nehru or Patel saw fit, or had the power, to overrule Gandhi at this critical turning point. Rather lamely, Cripps himself perhaps had the last word on the question of responsibility in his diary on 23 June 1946:29
We feel we have done all that we could but this unfortunate communal issue being imported with wide publicity into the discussions at this last moment has made it well nigh impossible for Congress to arrive at the accommodation that we might otherwise have achieved. It is no good blaming anyone for it — it arises from the long and deep communal division and perhaps it was too much to expect that we should be able to overcome it.

in its wish to negotiate a compromise. Cripps had mused at the outset of his mission in 1946 that ‘the future of 400 million people hangs in the balance’ and prayed for God to ‘give us wisdom to do what is right’. Never had he felt a heavier responsibility on his shoulders. But success had to be achieved somehow: ‘this is our duty and our debt to India…’30 This was much more than divide and rule, or even quit and run. Yet the choice was not a simple one, and much less easy than Gandhi claimed (‘you will have to choose between the two, the Muslim League and the Congress, both your creations’).31 Such a choice could not be made. 80 million Muslims could not determine the outcome of the negotiations; but nor could their interests be completely sacrificed to appease the Congress leaders and to hold the 400 million Indian citizens together in one political unit. The upshot was a judgement of Solomon which, unlike the original judgement in the first Book of Kings (1 Kings 3:24–28), had in the event to be put into practice — with intolerable consequences that still haunt relations between the communities in the sub-Continent. The British could not accept that simple majoritarianism was the way forward without guarantees; they acceded to at least some of the arguments put forward by Jinnah and the Muslim League concerning Muslim rights of self-determination. Above all, they wanted a compromise. At no stage were the British prepared to concede in the new regime a permanent second-class citizenship for as large a section of the population as the Muslims of India.32 (Whether they should
30 31 Ibid. 415. Ibid. 445. In fact, Cripps had earlier reflected (ibid. 431): ‘we can get through I believe without the League if we have Congress with us but not without Congress even if we have the League.’ This was a statement of fact but would have implied the acceptance of simple majoritarianism. Ibid. 287. Churchill’s statement to the House of Commons on 11 March 1942 emphasised the need for ‘the necessary measure of assent not only from the Hindu majority but also from those great minorities amongst which the Muslims are the most numerous and on many grounds pre-eminent’. In fact, since Partition the Dalits have always been more numerous than the Muslims in India; but this was not the case before Partition, and

Cripps was an honourable man. His colleagues in the Cabinet Delegation were also honourable men. There is convincing evidence that most of the British administration was sincere
27 28 29 Ibid. 465. Ibid. 457. Ibid. 450–1.

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have been prepared to concede such a second-class citizenship for the ‘Depressed Classes’ is another matter. Dr Ambedkar had an automatic place in the executive council as far as the British were concerned,33 but far less than a determining voice on this subject, given that Gandhi was making enough noise already about the Muslims and had proven himself obdurate about the Harijans, as he called them.) The British may have been responsible for initiating the policy of distinctions by religion among the population; but they had never implied that there was to be a two-tier citizenship, with the upper tier belonging to the Indian religions and the inferior tier of citizenship belong to those from the non-Indian religions. Regrettably, this distinction has now been endorsed in the last few months by the second most senior member of the Indian government.34 But it was exactly this fear of an inbuilt second-class citizenship that motivated Jinnah and the Muslim League, and the reason why they had sought guarantees first, before the meeting of a Constituent Assembly. Hindsight is a remarkable thing, and can sometimes deceive the historian. But sometimes a long perspective is required. It has taken the rise of the forces of Hindutva since 1992 and the challenge that they have posed to the minority religions of India for a true perspective on the pre-partition debates to be reached. Professor Richard Bonney Leicester, October 2003

Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination. Introduction*
Professor Richard Bonney
A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. (Woodrow Wilson, speech to Congress known as the .ourteen Points, 8 January 1918, point 5.) Between Britain and the Dominions there is a partnership at will on terms of equality and for mutual benefit. What India will finally have is for her and her alone to determine. This power of determination remains unfettered by the existing creed. What therefore the creed does retain is the possibility of evolution of swaraj within the British Empire or call it the British Commonwealth. (Gandhi on Independence, 13 January 1927) Muslims… claim self-determination, as well as fully autonomous administrations, for all racial and linguistic areas — and particularly for those areas which have a majority Muslim population. (Aga Khan III, Speech Broadcast to the USA, London, 27 September 1931) Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the right of national self-determination is unequivocally recognized.

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no doubt Churchill in any case was thinking about the significance of the Muslims as a force within the Indian army. Ibid. 294. A. P. Joshi, M. D. Srinivas, J. K. Bajaj, Religious Demography of India (Centre for Policy Studies, Chennai, 2003). J Sri Raman,‘“Non-Indian’ minorities”’, The Daily Times, 29 April 2003: <www. groups.yahoo.com/group/indiathinkersnet/message/ 3230>

(Jinnah, Presidential Address to the All-India Muslim League, Allahabad, April 1942)

*

Richard Bonney is Professor of Modern History at the University of Leicester and Director of the Centre for the History of Religious and Political Pluralism and the Institute for the Study of Indo-Pakistan Relations.

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‘In the 21st century most conflicts will be between ethnic groups living in the same state. The issue at stake will be the right to self-determination.’ This harsh warning comes from the .irst International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination, which was organized in Geneva by the International Human Rights Association of American Minorities and the International Council for Human Rights. The conference unanimously passed a resolution recommending that the United Nations establish an Office of the High Commissioner for Self-Determination and a SelfDetermination Commission comprising representatives of UN member states.1 At the United Nations on 31 May 2002, the Ambassador of Pakistan once more stated the case for Kashmiri selfdetermination and the need for a plebiscite.2 Earlier, on 22 March 2000, Ambassador Munir Akram had restated the right of peoples to self-determination and its application to peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation.3
1 The Right to Self-Determination. Collected Papers and Proceedings of the .irst International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination and the United Nations, ed. Y. N. Kly and D. Kly (Geneva, 2000). <www.atlasbooks.com/clarity/b0017.htm> ‘The threat to peace will subside only once such de-escalation takes place. Thereafter, further mutual steps could be taken. On the one hand, to end the repression by Indian forces in occupied Jammu and Kashmir and provide access for media and human rights organizations there. On the other, encouraging and enabling for Kashmir a freedom struggle to de-escalate, and its transit to a political process for the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the Kashmir people.’ The Ambassador reminded the Security Council of its obligation stating, ‘The Security Council and the UN Secretary-General, and, indeed, all UN Member States, have an obligation flowing from Article 25 of the UN Charter, to secure the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions relating to Kashmir, adopted from 1949 to 1998. All the modalities outlined in Article 33 of the Charter can be mobilized for this purpose. Pakistan trusts that, at this decisive hour, the Security Council will live up to its Charter responsibilities.’ <www.un.int/pakistan/14020531.html> On the call for a plebiscite: <www.nytimes.com/2002/05/30/ international/asia/30NATI.html?todaysheadlines> <www.mission.itu.ch/pakistan/56%20CHR%20Item%205.htm>

None of these arguments is accepted by the Government of India, which considers that Kashmir is an integral part of the Indian Union rather than ‘disputed territory’. Particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, India is concerned (perhaps even obsessed) with the implications for the Union of accepting any claims to self-determination. The views of Professor Ainslie Embree, a member of the U.S. Kashmir Study Group, were quoted in the U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Adolphus Towns on 12 November 1997:4
…during the early days of independence Nehru defined India’s problems as the communal problem, the caste problem and the language problem, but Nehru failed to mention selfdetermination as India’s biggest problem. He said ironically, India itself was a big supporter of self-determination in those days, and would support all the liberation movements against the colonial powers in Africa, Asia or Latin America. India changed its position on self-determination in 1966… since 1966 India pronounced the self-determination movement as a movement against an alien occupation, foreign occupation or a colonial occupation only; and once a country was independent, no part of that country could claim independence, and thus no self-determination movement was acceptable. …India faces no external threat. The imminent threat to India is [from] the movements for self-determination throughout the subcontinent, he said. [He cited the freedom movement in Kashmir as the most immediate, but also cited the freedom struggles in Nagaland, Tamil Nadu, and Punjab, Khalistan.] India takes the position that self-determination movements are only used legitimately against a colonial power, but that once a country is independent no part of that country can claim its independence, as the Sikh nation did on 7 October 1987, when it reclaimed its freedom, forming the separate, sovereign country of Khalistan. Sikhs ruled Punjab until the British annexation in 1849 and were to receive sovereign power in 1947 when India was made independent, so clearly it is now India that is the occupying colonial power in Khalistan, as well as Kashmir, Nagaland, and many other countries in South Asia. In fact, there was no political entity called India until the British created it in the nineteenth century... [Professor Embree said that] India will have to resolve the Kashmir issue by letting the people of Kashmir exercise their political will through the referendum they were promised in 1948, but which India has never allowed to be held. 4 <www.dalitstan.org/journal/rights/105/021198.html> The two separate reports of Professor Embree’s views have been integrated into one report here.

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Given the contemporary relevance of the debate on selfdetermination, and the continuity and virulence of ethnic conflicts since Independence,5 it is worth pursuing the question in the South Asian context back to its origins in the struggle for independence from British colonial rule. ‘Gandhi and Jinnah appearing from the sky!’6 Students who visited a particular website in early 2002 were invited to imagine what, to the author of the page, would have seemed an improbable conversation. Here we had Gandhi and Jinnah appearing from the sky, with the human tragedy of the Partition shown on the ground. Students were encouraged to imagine the conversation between them. Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam, the father of the Muslim people, stating that he regretted partition. Gandhi, the opponent of the ‘vivisection of India’ appeared to state that he considered that partition was a good thing for Pakistan and was perhaps necessary for India. We are led to suppose that such a conversation was improbable, not to say impossible. Yet this supposition, that Gandhi and Jinnah were inveterate enemies, is false.7 On the cover of this publication is the photograph of the Mahatma and Jinnah, standing together smiling, at the time of their 1944 talks. The Mahatma has his arm around Jinnah. Nothing very remarkable about that one might conclude. Well, for rabid nationalists there is something significant about it: Jinnah and Gandhi were capable of relatively cordial relations. Body language is important, as when President Musharraf recently offered the hand of friendship to Mr Vajpayee, the Indian Prime Minister. Body language has to be turned into deeds, of course. But without some personal rapport agreements between politicians are difficult to achieve.
5 6 7 P. Sahadevan, ‘Ethnic conflict in South Asia’ (Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, June 1999). In January 2002, the page was at the URL <www.youth.sify.com/ scene.jsp?leftnav=yd> but has since been removed. .or Jinnah’s allegedly ‘strong dislike of Gandhi’ in the 1920s: S. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (New York and Oxford, 1984), 76. It may be objected to this view that the disagreement between them was political, not personal. Jinnah objected fundamentally to Gandhi’s ‘spiritual movement’ as against an orthodox political movement for Indian self-government.

We know that, in the end, a political solution could not be struck between Gandhi and Jinnah, or perhaps more accurately between the leaders of Congress and the Muslim League. But though, ultimately, a separate Pakistan state was established, Gandhi bore no malice towards it. In an address on Christmas Day 1947, the Mahatma pleaded for an amicable settlement of the disputes between the new states of India and Pakistan. ‘Religions’, Gandhi wrote, ‘are not for separating men from one another, they are meant to bind them. It is a misfortune that today they are so distorted that they have become a potent cause of strife and mutual slaughter.’ In his speech on the eve of his last fast, on 12 January 1948, Gandhi said: ‘Death for me would be a glorious deliverance rather than that I should be a helpless witness of the destruction of India, Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam. That destruction is certain if Pakistan ensures no equality of status and security of life and property for all professing the various faiths of the world, and if India copies her. Only then Islam dies in the two Indias, not in the world. But Hinduism and Sikhism have no world outside India. Those who differ from me will be honoured by me for their resistance however implacable. Let my fast quicken conscience, not deaden it.’ ‘Not one Muslim’, he said on another occasion, has ‘taught me that Islam was an anti-Hindu religion.’ It was an appeal for peaceful relations between communities that was matched by Jinnah, who on 9 January 1948 called on Muslims to protect their Hindu neighbours.8 We can agree that a human tragedy of enormous proportions resulted from the failure of the politicians on the eve of independence to agree on the political outcome after the withdrawal of the British except for a last-minute partition which contained unfinished business. What needs to be stressed is less the malevolence of politicians on one side or the other, but the nature of the conflicting views on what self-determination meant within the Indian subContinent and how best it might be achieved. It is that
8 These statements are all taken from the sources cited in Ram Puniyani, The Second Assassination of Gandhi? (Leicester, 2002, Studies in South Asian History, 3).

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disagreement which this volume seeks to document. Mushirul Hasan asks the question, ‘Why should any book published in the West be the reference point for a Gandhi–Jinnah debate?’(Document .orty-Three).9 There can only be one answer to that question: ‘because the perspective is somewhat different.’ We believe that by focusing on the debate not just between Gandhi and Jinnah but including the views of Dr Babasaheb (Bhimrao Ramji) Ambedkar (1891– 1956)10 — views which Jinnah on the whole endorsed but Gandhi rejected — a more rounded and balanced interpretation of the self-determination debate of the 1940s is capable of being presented to the modern reader. That, at least, is the intention. In this interpretation, there must be a due place given to two contexts: the first is the Indian context (the extent or otherwise to which India was already polarized and communalised in the 1920s), the second is the international debate on self-determination. On the Indian context, the evidence of communal rioting is discussed below. There was also heightened press and propaganda activity of a communal nature in the 1920s. .or G. R. Thursby, reviewing Hindu–Muslim relations between 1923 and 1928, a ‘“mental
9 Those who subscribe to this viewpoint need look no further than M. Hasan (ed.), India’s Partition. Process, Strategy and Mobilization (Delhi, 1993), though the chapter on Jinnah and the Pakistan demand is written by R. J. Moore. The comment was no doubt related to A. H. Merriam, Gandhi vs. Jinnah: the debate over the partition of India (Columbia, Mo, 1980). This useful book does not reprint the documents published in 1944 (Jinnah– Gandhi Talks, September 1944 [Delhi, All-India Muslim League, 1944]; Gandhi–Jinnah Talks: text of correspondence and other relevant matters, July–October 1944, with a preface by C. Rajagopalachari [Delhi, Hindustan Times, 1944]: note the rival versions had also rival titles!) and does contain some misconceptions. Jinnah did not evince ‘hatred’ for Hindus (Merriam, 52 n 39) but was respectful of them throughout his life. As late as 1947 he refused to countenance publication of a photograph in Time with a caption which would give Hindus offence: ‘As I think the description, ‘Mohammad Ali Jinnah: His Moslem Tiger wants to eat the Hindu cow’ is offensive to the sentiments of the Hindu community, I cannot put my autograph on the cover page… as requested by you’. I. Talbot, Jinnah: Role Model for .uture Generations of Pakistanis (Leicester, 2001), Document .our.

partition” of the united nation already existed’. He cites the evidence of the Arya press as ‘an important force in forging a new prose style in Hindi and with it emotionalism and a tendency to inaccuracy’, which led to acrimonious Arya–Muslim exchanges. Though a Religious Insults Bill was passed on 19 September 1927,11 this could not alter the basic problem which arose from the nature of the audience for the vernacular press: to command a market, newspapers had to attack the government or represent the interests of one particular community (or sometimes both at the same time).12 This is why the banning of publications by the colonial government, evidently an act which could be seen as directed against freedom of speech, might be construed as acting in the public interest and for the maintenance of communal harmony.13 Against such views, which stress the extent to which communal relations were already poisoned in the 1920s, Mushirul Hasan argues that ‘political developments [in India] were not necessarily leading towards a communal impasse’
10 Dr B. R. Ambedkar is probably best remembered today by the Dalits (‘Untouchables’ or Depressed Classes) as their revered leader and would-be emancipator. He was also Law Minister in Nehru’s first cabinet after Independence and the chief influence on the drafting of the Indian Constitution. On 15 October 1956, Ambedkar led 800,000 of his followers in a mass conversion to Buddhism at Deeksha Bhoomi, Nagpur. .or his 22 vows on this occasion: <www.ambedkar.org> This website contains the electronic version of his Pakistan or the Partition of India (Dec. 1940; .eb. 1945; 1946). References to the printed edition are to vol. viii of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar. Writings and Speeches. Pakistan or the Partition of India (Government of Maharashtra, 1990). Ambedkar was a member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council between 1942 and 1946, so the colonial government was in a position to know his views. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 23, quoting M. W. .enton, Punjab Government Chief Secretary on 21 Oct. 1909: ‘in the Punjab religion plays a very prominent part in politics, and official discretion has ever to be on the alert to hold the balance in the rivalries of the three principal sects [sic]. A newspaper, to secure circulation, readers and influence, must either be an organ frankly hostile to Government or be the champion of the interests of the Muhamadan, Hindu or Sikh community.’ N. Gerald Barrier, Banned: controversial literature and political control in British India, 1907–1947 (Columbia, Mo., 1974).

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until the early 1930s. Until then, there was no ‘sharp communal polarization between Hindus and Muslims nor any significant solidarity in the Muslim “community”’. There is, he contends, a ‘facet of communal relations which tends to be overlooked in the face of stark and irrefutable evidence on Hindu–Muslim antagonism. Harking on conflicts alone and turning a blind eye to instances of Hindu–Muslim co-operation and fraternization has not just distorted our perspective but has strained India’s fragile social fabric’. .or Hasan, ‘the Muslim League, in the political wilderness during the Khilafat movement, was needlessly treated by the Congress as its political adversary’. The tragedy was that the Congress ‘could not break the Hindu Mahasabha stranglehold and found itself trapped in the cross-fire between communalists of all shades. It considered the Muslim League as its political adversary, though certain elements in its own ranks, backed by the Hindu Mahasabha and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS], were, in fact, out to wreck all prospects of a Hindu–Muslim rapprochement.’14 We do not see that the two viewpoints expressed above are necessarily mutually exclusive. .or much of India, communal relations may have been reasonably harmonious. There were, however, sufficient regions where conflict took place and numerous issues of contention for the pot to be kept simmering, if not actually boiling over into sustained communal conflict. The problems of the 1930s did not arise in an historical vacuum. The Partition experience of 1947, while not inevitable was not necessarily a mere ‘aberration’ or ‘historical accident caused by a complex configuration of forces at a political juncture.’15 .or example, Attlee was prepared to join a private meeting with Nehru, V. K. Krishna Menon and Cripps at Cripps’ country house ‘Goodfellows’ near .ilkins in June 1938, which discussed specific proposals for the future of the sub-Continent.16 Atlee was extremely well informed about Indian affairs, having served on the
14 15 16 M. Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885– 1930 (Manohar, 1994), 282–93, esp. 288, 292–3. Ibid. 283. R. J. Moore, Escape from Empire. The Attlee Government and Indian Problem (Oxford, 1983), 74, 350.

Simon (or Indian Statutory) Commission between 1927 and 1930 (he had spent eight months in total during two tours of India). The Cripps Offer of 1942 ‘went beyond anything previously considered by any Government’, but in Attlee’s words, it ‘embodied in fact some of the main ideas’ discussed at .ilkins in June 1938.17 This was before the rise of the Muslim League as a mass political party. It should also be noted that, unlike the Conservative party, resolutions at the Labour party annual conference since 1920 had supported self-determination for India.18 The international debate on self-determination was scarcely new. The Resolution of the London International [Socialist] Congress of 1896 contained a commitment to ‘the full right of all nations to self-determination (Selbstbestimmungsrecht)’ and expressed its sympathy for the workers of every country now suffering under the yoke of military, national or other absolutism.’ No lesser writers than Lenin19
17 R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939–1945 (Oxford, 1979), vi. Some of the inferences drawn from this meeting may nevertheless be unwarranted: P. Almeida, Jinnah. Man of Destiny (Delhi, 2001), 119, 130. Since the meeting discussed ‘the means by which the next Labour government would transfer to India’, Almeida deduces that ‘this decided Nehru’s policies… Nehru became a willing instrument of leaders like Cripps and Attlee to derive future advantage vis-à-vis Jinnah. Nehru knew that Jinnah would be an obstacle in the rapid march towards freedom and only Whitehall [could] cut him [down to] size… Significantly this secret meeting was never made known by Nehru (or V. K. Krishna Menon) to any Congressman and to Gandhi, the Mahatma. Was this not betrayal? Was Nehru authorised to undertake such a secret mission?’ Moore, Escape from Empire, 6. V. I. Lenin The Right of Nations of Self-Determination (1918), ch 1: ‘the self-determination of nations means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies, and the formation of an independent national state.’ ‘…“selfdetermination of nations” in the Marxists’ Programme cannot, from a historico-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political self-determination, state independence, and the formation of a national state’: <www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/ ch01.htm> The Communist Party supported the demand of Pakistan on the ground of nationality and argued that there were two national bourgeoisies, one Muslim and the other Hindu. This flawed understanding influenced Lenin’s position at the second

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and Trotsky 20 had written on the question of selfdetermination, while in January 1918 President Woodrow Wilson had committed the United States (and the future League of Nations) to the principle of self-determination (Point 5 of the .ourteen Points, though the term itself was not used). Wilson had earlier written:21
Self-government is the last, the consummate stage of constitutional development... Self-government is not a mere form of institutions, to be had when desired, if only proper pains be taken. It is a form of character. It follows upon the Congress of Comintern, where he defined the Muslim League as the Party of the Muslim Bourgeoisie and the Indian National Congress as the party of the Hindu National Bourgeoisie. The social support of the Muslim League is a complex issue, but in a province such as the Punjab, it expressed the aspirations of traditional landowners (Jamindars) more than the bourgeoisie: I. Talbot, ‘The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937– 46’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 233–57 at 256 notes that ‘the rural elite’s support was crucial to its [that is, the League’s] success’. Trotsky on Black Nationalism and Self-Determination, ed. G. Breitman (New York, 1967). In a communication to the author on 5 November 2002, the specialist on Trotsky, Dr Ian Thatcher, writes: ‘Trotsky was generally supportive of self-determination, but he limited his understanding of it to cultural autonomy. .or Trotsky, the days of the nation state were clearly numbered. The forces of economic production had outgrown national boundaries and had to be governed on a continent-wide and ultimately world-wide basis. The key political organisations that he fought for were a United States of Europe and a Balkan .ederative Republic as bodies that would eventually form a United States of the World. Within these trans-national and global governing structures, however, he thought different groups should enjoy specific cultural guarantees. He also thought that ethnic conflict would be neutralised as a result. It would not lead to local or major wars. Secure in cultural matters, different groups would find it easy to coexist in harmony. However, there would also be limits to the types of differences Trotsky thought humanity would eventually experience. He saw communist society as godless, so much of the religious conflict we see today would simply disappear. Why fight over ‘holy’ land when there is no god, when religion is simply a manifestation of false consciousness?’ The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 18, 1908–1909, ed. A. S. Link (Princeton, NJ, 1974), quoted by D. Heater, National SelfDetermination: Woodrow Wilson and his legacy (1994), 24. <www.mtholyoke.edu/~vpokrent/> <www.usinfo.state.gov/ usa/infousa/facts/democrac/51.htm>

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Thomas Masaryk studied the question in his The Making of a State (1927).22 .or Masaryk, ‘no two minority questions are alike. Each presents peculiarities of its own.’ There were also practical issues involved. If Czechoslovakia ceded two million of its Germans to Germany, the remaining million ‘would have far greater reason to fear Czechization [sic] than the three millions fear it now’. The ‘rights of race’ had to be safeguarded, which could be achieved by local selfgovernment and proportional representation. The ‘language question was also of great moment, politically and educationally’. .or Masaryk it was ‘natural that, as a general rule, nationality should be determined by language, for language is an expression of the national spirit… Conscious fostering of nationality implies therefore a comprehensive policy of culture and education’. However, if every religious, linguistic or ethnic minority were to have the right of selfdetermination, states would be indefinitely subdivided. Placing Masaryk’s agenda in context, Elisabeth Bakke contrasts the experience of western Europe and east central Europe:23
The concept of self-determination is rooted in Kantian philosophy, and comes in three versions. In the American declaration of independence (1776) and the .rench declaration [on the rights of man and the citizen (1789)], the doctrine of self-determination meant the right of people to choose their government without coercion, i.e. sovereignty of the people. This can be interpreted in terms of freedom from external intervention or in terms of internal democracy. The heyday of the third version, ‘the principle of free self-determination of nations’, was the .irst World War and the subsequent peace settlement at Versailles. National self-determination now came to be understood in terms of the right of people to choose their state and their government. National self-determination was meant to remedy two ills: the refusal of the multinational 22 23 Masaryk, The Making of a State, 429–435. <www.ucis.pitt.edu/eehistory/H200Readings/Topic5-R2.html> E. Bakke, ‘The principle of national self-determination in Czechoslovak Constitutions, 1920–1992’: <www.statsvitenskap.uio.no/nfkis/komp/bakke.pdf>

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Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination: Introduction empires of Europe to grant autonomy to national groups and the lack of democratic control within the states. Woodrow Wilson tended to confuse the two issues, and in his mind, national self-determination essentially meant popular sovereignty. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, national self-determination was interpreted as the right of culturallydefined nations to have a state of their own. The confusion arose from different conceptions of nationhood. In the West, the nation concept was political or voluntarist; in Central and Eastern Europe, it was predominantly cultural or ethnic.

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Clearly, the South Asian context was much closer to the ‘predominantly cultural or ethnic’ definition of nationhood in Eastern Europe than the definition in Western Europe, which was political or voluntarist (that is the concept of a nation based on will, i.e. the idea of a ‘pre-political voluntarist nation’). However, careful analysis of the legacy of the .rench Revolution in the west European evolution of national self-determination suggests that ‘the process of national consolidation, even if based on ostensibly voluntarist premises, may end up blurring the classic distinction between civic / inclusive and ethnic / exclusive nations’. Chimène Keitner argues:24
The exclusionary potential of ethnic nationhood is clear and its susceptibility to abuse widely noted; however, even if ethnic nationhood is rejected as a basis for state authority and legitimacy, there remains an important need to harness or to create some kind of social glue among citizens and some basis for attachment to political institutions. On a theoretical level, the nation-state principle only makes sense if nations are assumed to be cohesive and in some sense unitary; otherwise, there is no apparent reason to look to nations as the normative basis for constructing territorially separate and politically independent states… Cultural diversity is not just a matter of eating different foods and celebrating different holidays; it is a matter of preserving different ways of life that, so far, continue to find their highest political expression in the aspiration for, or reality of, a sovereign state.

David Miller defines a nation as ‘a community of people with an aspiration to be politically self-determining’, while Ian Brownlie characterizes self-determination as ‘the right of cohesive national groups (‘peoples’) to choose for themselves
24 C. Keitner, ‘National self-determination: the legacy of the .rench Revolution’, International Studies Association Annual Meeting (Oxford, March 2000).

a form of political organization and their relation to other groups’. There is an assumption that ‘nations are ethically, conceptually and even historically distinct from, and prior to, states’. Clearly language is central to the sense of ‘people’ and ‘nation’: Keitner argues that ‘language became an essential tool for forging unity and concretising identity’. But there remains a fundamental problem about who or what grouping constitute the ‘people’ who become a ‘nation’. As Sir Ivor Jennings wrote on the subject of the UN decolonization debates, ‘on the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people’.25 An illustration of this problem, within the Indian sub-continent, is Muhammad Iqbal’s comment that the expression ‘Indian Muhammadan’ was ‘a contradiction in terms; since Islam is in its essence above all conditions of time and space. Nationality with us is a pure idea; it has no geographical basis.’26 The resonance of the western discussions of selfdetermination in the context of South Asia before Independence becomes clear once we recall that the term Self-determination for India was used as early as 1919 in an Indian Home Rule League pamphlet; that the Congress leader Annie Wood Besant (and President of Congress in 1917) used the term ‘self-determination and selfgovernment’ in chapter eight of her book on The .uture of Indian Politics published in May 1922; and that a furious debate emerged on the respect merits of the English, Hindi and Urdu languages (among others) during the so-called ‘freedom struggle’ against British colonial rule. Both Jinnah and Gandhi were in origin Gujarati speakers but, after a period at Church Mission School in 1892, Jinnah was much more proficient in English than in any of the
25 Ibid. D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford, 1995), 19. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th edn. (Oxford, 1998), 599. I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government (Cambridge, 1956), 56. Quoted in B. R. Nanda, Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India (Delhi, 1989), 385. Nanda talks of a ‘flight from nationalism’ and it is clear that Iqbal’s views had developed considerably by 1930.

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Indian languages. ‘He never became, nor wanted to become, a demagogue because he spoke neither Urdu nor Hindi with facility — and mass audiences in India did not understand English.’27 Even Gandhi, who was no specialist in Urdu, chided Jinnah because of his unwillingness to speak Gujarati.28 Gandhi also wrote to him in their native language: ‘there was a day when I was able to persuade you to speak in our mother tongue. Today I take courage to write to you in the same…’ (Document Seven). In 1938 Jinnah had told Gandhi that Hindi should not be made compulsory in any of the provinces controlled by the Congress (Document Three). Urdu, Jinnah declared on another occasion, ‘is our national language and we should strain every nerve to keep it unharmed and unpolluted and save it from the aggressive and hostile attitude of our opponents’. In Syed Ameer Ali’s formulation, Urdu ‘formed the ordinary vehicle of intercommunication between the diverse races which were brought together by the Muslim conquest’.29 Yet Syed also stated that ‘present-day India is an artificial unit… As yet the only binding force of an “Indian nation” is the English language and the ideas conveyed by its medium, superimposed on the very small proportion of the population who can take advantage of secondary education’.30 Donald Low considers that the British position towards its empire ‘was characterised by a deeply laid ambiguity. They found it exceedingly difficult to reconcile their intense imperial instincts with the liberal political values they held so dear’. The promise of Dominion status was held out by Lord Irwin in his declaration of 31 October 1929, but this would have to be ‘the natural issue of India’s constitutional development’, which might take many years, and India would have to remain in the British Empire, which ruled out the objective of complete independence. Instead, ‘immense efforts were made throughout the 1930s by the British to push the genie of India’s nationalist demands for complete
27 28 29 30 .atima Jinnah quoted in S. M. Burke and S. Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. His Personality and his Politics (Karachi, 1997), 32, 35, 45. Merriam, Gandhi vs. Jinnah, 44. Memoirs and Other Writings of Syed Ameer Ali, ed. Syed Razi Wasti (Lahore, 1968), 158. Ibid. 93.

independence back into its bottle once again’. .or all his sensitivity to Gandhi’s public image and awareness of his potential political role, Irwin was conscious of the need for the Indian government to prepare for a non-co-operation movement much as the British government had prepared for the national strike in 1926: it was his view that the colonial government’s ‘business’ was to show ‘conclusively’ that they those agitating for independence could not make government impossible.31 Low concludes that British policy was ‘deeply and perennially ambiguous’.32 It was this ambivalence or equivocation of British policy which Gandhi’s satayagraha doctrine sought to confront: ‘the double-think at the core of Britain’s imperial posture towards India during the interwar years crucially determined the most substantial nationalist response that was launched against it’.33 In other, more repressive, imperialist systems Gandhi would have been placed under life imprisonment or permanent exile and thus neutralized. 34 Lord Irwin thought the introduction of a ‘Mussolini system of government’ would make ‘the main problem of keeping India within the Empire a hundred times more difficult’.35 After the Jallianwallah Bagh massacre of 1919, the British were reluctant to use military force and live ammunition against nationalist opponents if this could be avoided.36 Instead, the British were interested in the propaganda battle and sought to win the ‘moral high ground’, an impossible task against a figure such as Gandhi, given his growing stature and moral authority, his longevity during the three decades in which he was in effect the political leader of Congress (he was already aged sixty in 1929),37 his iron will and his political
31 32 33 34 J. M. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience. The Mahatma in Indian Politics, 1928–34 (Cambridge, 1977), 60 n. 49. D. A. Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism. The Imprint of Ambiguity, 1929–1942 (Cambridge, 1997), 36. Ibid. 39. Hitler told Lord Halifax (formerly the Viceroy Lord Irwin) in 1937: ‘.irst shoot Gandhi.’ Almeida, Jinnah: Man of Destiny, 259. <www.tribuneindia.com/2001/20010930/spectrum/ main2.htm> Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, 72. Ibid. 117. Gandhi was born in 1869; Jinnah is thought to have been born in 1876 and was thus seven years younger, but his political

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skills in leading a reasonably united ‘but potentially very divided Indian National Congress across an ominous, yawning generation gap. Had he misjudged or spurned his Jawaharlal [Nehru] it could so easily have been otherwise.’38 The colonial government in India made no attempt to destroy the nationalist movement altogether, though it sometimes considered doing so;39 instead, it refrained from proscribing Congress, but sought allies against it; it tried to avoid martial law and sought to adopt a reforming standpoint. It made it clear that if civil disobedience stopped, Congress would be free to operate without hindrance.40 The three great countrywide campaigns mounted by Gandhi in 1919–22, 1929–34 and 1939–44 went through a similar pattern of response and counter-response. Each, writes Low, ‘was prompted by some great insult to the Indians’ amour propre — the Rowlatt Bills of 1919; the Simon Commission of 1927; and the Viceroy’s unilateral declaration that India was at war in 1939.’41 There then followed a pause for negotiations in each case42 and, later still, a further upsurge of agitation.43 The British made concessions to avoid these further waves of agitation, but never conceded more in response to the second upsurge, merely proceeding with the changes already announced. The immense wartime pressures on the British Imperial system led to an apparent offer of home rule in India made in August 1940, apparent because as one contemporary observed it was ‘so non-committal in regard to its being implemented within any reasonable distance of time’ that it could ‘afford
career in India had started earlier. When Gandhi arrived in India in 1915 from South Africa he was little known and viewed with suspicion by many of the western-educated leaders of allIndian politics. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 4. Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, 69. Ibid. 141. Irwin on 6 April 1931 stated ‘no remedy can be found except by… suppressing [Congress] with all the forces at our disposal’. But at this juncture he thought such a course to be ‘unprofitable and unwise’. Ibid., 183. Ibid., 180–1. The Amritsar Congress in 1919; the Gandhi–Irwin Pact in 1930; the Cripps negotiations in 1942. The Khilafat movement of 1920–2, the second Civil Disobedience movement of 1932; the ‘Quit India’ campaign of 1942.

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no satisfaction whatever to the people’ of India.44 Dominion status for India was the objective of the British government, and a representative assembly was to be set up ‘with the least possible delay’ after the end of the war, but neither the date nor the method of introducing self-government was indicated. A guarantee was given to the Muslims that there would be no transfer of power if the authority of the new system was denied ‘by large and powerful elements of India’s national life’.45 This did not go far enough for Chiang Kai-shek, the President of the Chinese Republic, who for reasons of its strategic importance wanted Britain to concede real political power to the Indians ‘as speedily as possible’. His message to Roosevelt warned that ‘if the British government does not fundamentally change their policy towards India, it would be like presenting India to the enemy’.46 Churchill’s parliamentary speech on the Roosevelt–Churchill Atlantic Charter, signed at sea in August 1941, and the foundation stone for the subsequent United Nations, further dashed the hopes of an immediate British recognition of the Indian right of self-determination. Article three expressed ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’. But on 9 September, Churchill told the House of Commons that this applied only to European nations under Nazi rule. It did not apply to India, Burma or other parts of the Empire. The ‘progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples who owe allegiance to the British crown’ had nothing to do with the emancipation of Europe from Nazism.47 The Americans found this attitude difficult to accept or to justify because of the likely ‘repercussions in India which may serve to impede further India’s contribution to the war’.48 In his first public statement on the Indian problem, Roosevelt distanced himself from Churchill’s position and declared that the Atlantic Charter applied to the whole world, including the people of Asia living under European domination.49 The difference of interpretation
44 45 46 47 48 49 Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 43. G. Rizvi, Linlithgow and India. A Study of British Policy and the Political Impasse in India, 1936–1943 (London, 1978), 158. Ibid., 174–5. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 42. Ibid. 49. Rizvi, Linlithgow and India, 175.

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in the wartime coalition could not be wider, but as yet US influence in this theatre of the war was slight. Though Jinnah declared in April 1942 that ‘Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the right of national selfdetermination is unequivocally recognized’ the mode in which such self-determination would operate was by no means pre-determined. Once the principle of the Muslim right of self-determination, as embodied in the Lahore Resolution of 1940, was conceded, the resulting Muslim state or states could either ‘enter into a confederation with non-Muslim provinces on the basis of parity at the centre’ or make, as a sovereign state, ‘treaty arrangements with the rest of India about matters of common concern’. .or Ayesha Jalal, therefore, the Lahore Resolution was nothing more than a ‘tactical move’ and a ‘bargaining counter’.50 Others have argued that Jinnah was ‘hoist with his own petard’: ‘he fell captive to his promise of separate statehood for six provinces and was left by the Partition with the truncated state that was alone consistent with the concept of a nation defined by the religious map of the sub-Continent.’51 Thomas Masaryk had said that ‘no two minority questions are alike’. The partition of the Indian sub-continent suggests that just one minority question — albeit a question involving the largest minority of any state at the time — was potentially capable of a number of different outcomes.

Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on SelfDetermination
Professor Richard Bonney 1 Divide and Rule: the Census in British India and the Growth of Communal Identity
Hitherto [that is, before 1920], the English had ruled over us by playing Hindu against Musulman, and Musulman against Hindu. This was their chief strength and our chief weakness… (Mahomed Ali, 23 July 1921)1

The census, introduced by the British as an all-India phenomenon from 1871, was a catalyst for change. In the words of Kenneth W. Jones:
The census existed not merely as a passive recorder of data but as a catalyst of change as it both described and altered its environment. The act of describing meant providing order to that which was described, and at the same time stimulating forces which would alter that order. A decade later the new modified world would be delineated by the next census which would itself generate further change. This created a cyclical effect, was the census fed back into itself, becoming in the process a crucial point of interaction between the British– Indian government and its subjects...2

Professor Richard Bonney Leicester, 22 November 2002

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A. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, 1985), 57, 241. A. Roy, ‘The High politics of India’s Partition: the revisionist perspective’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 110–111. This is vigorously refuted by R. J. Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan demand’, ibid. 197: ‘that outcome [the eventual Pakistan] lends no support to speculation that the Pakistan demand was Jinnah’s bargaining counter for power in a united India, or that the Partition hoisted him with his own petard.’ Views cited by Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan demand’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 162, but refuted in his chapter.

The theme on which Kenneth W. Jones focuses is that of the census and its relationship to Hindu consciousness. But the same point is equally valid with regard to its relationship to Muslim or Sikh consciousness, or the consciousness of the ‘scheduled castes’ as they were to become. And each of these groups, in turn, had a dynamic
1 2 J. M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power. Indian Politics, 1915–1922 (Cambridge, 1972), 330. K. W. Jones, ‘Religious identity and the Indian census’, The Census in British India. New Perspectives, ed. N. G. Barrier (New Delhi, 1981), 73–4.

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impact on the subsequent development of the census. The census, which from 1871 became an enumeration held each decade,3 focused attention on religious competition between Christians, Sikhs and Muslims as well as on the development of reconversion (suddhi) by Hindus. The Muslim population was computed into percentages of Sunnis, Shi’as and Wahabis. There were accounts of Hindu movements such as the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj, the Dev Samaj and so on. In the words of Kenneth W. Jones, ‘religions became communities mapped, counted, and above all compared with other religious communities. .urthermore this was not a static concept, since each decennial census measured changes for good or ill in the state of the community and might even reshape a community through a new definition. The census thus created a concept of religious community more detailed and more exact than any existing prior to the creation of the census.’4 There were some, such as the Muslim separatist Choudhary Rahmat Ali, who claimed that the census makers were ‘the partisans of “Indianism”, who are past-masters in the manipulation of facts and figures to their advantage’ so that the accuracy of the data could not be guaranteed.5 But this was a distinctly minority viewpoint. The overall impact of the census on literate Indians was to create a state of anxiety. Using census data from 1872 to 1901, U. N. Mukerji described the Hindus as ‘a dying race’ and predicted, province by province, the date at which they would eventually disappear from British India. In so doing, he followed the lead of the British Census Commissioner of Bengal, who calculated ‘the number of years it would take the Hindus altogether to disappear from Bengal if Muhammadan increase went on at the rate it was doing’.6 If traditional hatreds were the fundamental
3 India census, 1872–1951: a check list and index (Zug, 1966). Bibliography of census publications in India, compiled by C. G. Jadhav; with assistance of Charan Singh, Anand Prakash; ed. B. K. Roy Burman (Delhi, 1972). Jones, ‘Religious identity and the Indian census’, 84. C. R. Ali, Pakistan: the .atherland of the Pak Nation (3rd edn, Cambridge, 1947), 153. Jones, ‘Religious identity and the Indian census’, 91.

cause of Hindu–Muslim friction, they were given a new sense of urgency by the age of government-inspired (and apparently government-approved) census statistics. At every stage in the struggle for Muslim autonomy and eventual independence, demographic statistics were adduced to confer legitimacy on an argument resting essentially on a sense of Muslim self-affirmation and, eventually, on the Muslim drive for self-determination. At a lecture in London on 3 July 1911, the Aga Khan, the hereditary Imam and head of the Ismaili sect, recounted that data from the 1901 census showed that there were 62.5 million Muslims and that as a proportion of the total population the Muslim population had risen in ten years from 19 to 21 per cent. He estimated the outcome of the 1911 census to be ‘much nearer 70 millions than 60 millions’. And he noted that rather than building up an Indian nationhood ‘in which religious and racial differences will be largely forgotten and overshadowed by the sentiment of geographical and political or national unity’, ‘on historical, sentimental and moral and religious grounds the Indian Mussulmans are bound to incline to self-organization and self-expression and to the traditions associated with English rule.’7 The British administration was acutely aware that the danger, from the point of view of the colonial power, was the formation of a national bloc of nationalists which the Congress, founded in 1885, threatened to become. If ‘young educated Mohammedans’ could be prevented from joining Congress, there would be clear advantages to the governing authority. The educational mission of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–98), the founder of the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental (MAO) College in 1875 which became Aligarh University in 1920,8 was thus to be encouraged and Syed became a
7 8 Aga Khan III. Selected Speeches and Writings of Sir Sultan Muhammad Shah. I. 1902–1927, ed. K. K. Aziz (London and New York, 1998), 355–7. The fund-raising for this started earlier, as a result of a decision of the All-India Muslim League held at Delhi in January 1910: .. C. R. Robinson, Separatism among Indian Muslims. The Politics of the United Provinces’ Muslims, 1860–1923 (Cambridge, 1974), 199.

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member of the Viceroy’s Council in 1878. There is a case for stating that his views on the need to protect the ‘interests of the smaller [Muslim] community’, while at the same time seeking peaceful relations between Hindus and Muslims, formed the intellectual background to the Aga Khan’s delegation of 1906.9 On 1 October 1906, a memorial was presented to Lord Minto, Viceroy of India (1905–10), by thirty-five Muslims led by the Aga Khan (the so-called Simla Declaration). The address argued that British policy in India had paid ‘deference… so far as possible… to the views and wishes of the people… with due regard always to the diversity of race and religion which forms such an important feature of all Indian problems’. The position of Muslims in the structure of representative government, it was argued, should be ‘commensurate not merely with their numerical strength but also with their political importance and the value of the contribution which they made to the defence of the Empire’. The census of 1901 had demonstrated that there were over 62 million Muslims, a minority ‘amounting to a quarter of the population — and in itself more numerous than the entire population of any first class European Power, except Russia’, and one which could justly lay claim to adequate recognition as an important factor in the State. Hindus and Muslims shared some common interests and ‘it will always be a matter of the utmost satisfaction to us to see these interests safeguarded by the presence in our Legislative Chambers of able supporters of these interests, irrespective of the their nationality. We Musulmans have, however, additional interests of our own which are not shared by other communities and these have hitherto suffered grievous loss from the fact that they have not been adequately represented.’10
9 10 Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 68–74. .or Sir Syed Ahmed Khan: Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind (2nd edn. 1987), 19–45. Aga Khan III, ed. Aziz, i. 249–60, especially 252. P. C. Ghosh, The Development of the Indian National Congress, 1892–1909 (Calcutta, 1960), 155. On the Aga Khan delegation and its dependence on the thought of the thought of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan: Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 74–77.

Here then, was an articulation, albeit a somewhat covert articulation, of a ‘two nations theory’: the Hindus were a ‘nationality’; so, too, were the Muslims (‘we Mohammedans cannot any longer, in justice to our own national interests, hold aloof from participation in the conditions to which their policy has given rise…’)11 Later, in 1928, the Aga Khan rejected the term ‘communal’ or ‘community’ when applied to the Muslims of India. Instead they were ‘in a restricted, special, sense a nation composed of many communities’.12 The Aga Khan addressed this theme much more explicitly in an interview with The Times on 14 .ebruary 1909, entitled ‘The Problem of the Minorities in India’:13
…I hold no less strongly that in framing the new political order of things statesmanship must take account of the wide differences which separate Hindus and Musulmans at the present time. These differences are not only religious, they are historical and physical, and in the latter respect, at least, they soon become marked, even in the case of recent converts to the Moslem faith. The changes of dietary habits, outlook and social life generally consequent upon such conversion soon tell upon body and mind, as has often been pointed out. When I reflect upon the great distinction between the two races [sic] — distinctions more or less known to everyone familiar with India — I have to admit that fulfilment of the ideal of homogeneity lies in a future so distant that it is quite beyond me to predict the date of its arrival… The British Government has hitherto been most careful to maintain a neutral attitude as between one religion and another, and it has thus been in a position, moral as well as physical, to keep the peace when conflict, involving public disorder, has been threatened or has broken out. In this way the Government has created an atmosphere favourable to 11 Aga Khan III, ed. Aziz, i. 251. Wolpert calls this ‘the first use of the words “national interests” by Indian Muslims in appealing to British rulers for help against the “unsympathetic” Hindu majority’: Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 23. In 1930 the Indian Statutory Committee produced a ‘Note on the History of Separate Muhammadan Representation’ which essentially commenced in 1906 with the Aga Khan’s delegation: Report of the Indian Statutory Commission [Cmd. 3568] (London, 1930), i. 183–189. In welcoming the deputation, Lord Minto gave the ‘first official acknowledgement of the Muhammadan claim for separate representation’ but used the term ‘community’ not ‘nation’: ibid. i. 184. Aga Khan III, ed. Aziz, ii. 833. Ibid. i. 288–93.

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Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination the spread of the spirit of real intellectual toleration. But the growth of this spirit is a work of time, and at the present stage, by political machinery provided by the Sovereign power, one element of the population is placed in a position to dictate its will to the other elements. An Act of Parliament cannot weld into one, by electoral machinery, two nationalities so distinct as the Hindus and the Mahomedans. The former is a vast conservative and widely-varying federation, while Islam is a proselytising and unifying faith, so closely corresponding in doctrine and ritual with Judaism that it is much nearer in spirit and origin to Christianity than it is to Hinduism. With such vast differences existing, it is certain that if one element gets excessive political power, or is in a position to dictate its will on the other, it will always not only be liable but compelled by religious and social circumstances to exert that authority. It is not that the leaders of the Hindu majority want to do us injustice, but they will be compelled by religious and social circumstances to exert the full political supremacy over us they may possess… Now is the opportunity for leading Hindus to show a true spirit of patriotism and good will by recognizing that Mahomedan misgivings as to the original scheme are just and reasonable. They should frankly abandon the untenable claim that they speak for the whole of India, and they should recognize that the minority representation to which many of them agree in theory [cannot] be real and effective without the changes for which the Mahomedans have asked…

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platform, and constitutes them in an emphatic sense one nationality’.15 Muslims such as Syed Ameer Ali rejected the accusation that they were separatists. As Muhammad Shafi explained to Syed in a letter dated 22 August 1912:16
As you say we are not separatists in any sense of the term. We are always ready to cooperate with the sister communities in everything calculated to promote the true interests of our country. But the only sound basis of co-operation, the quote a passage from your letter of the 14th November last, is a modus vivendi by which the two Nations (i.e. Hindu and Muslim) may work together for the common good whilst retaining their own communal existence and their communal rights…

There had been earlier recognition of this viewpoint in, for example, the writings of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, as has been seen; but the first organizational result was the formation of the All-India Muslim League on 30 December 1906.17 Muslims, however, were not united behind this body. The Aga Khan noted that Jinnah ‘came out in bitter hostility towards all that my friends and I had done and were trying to do’, a particular setback for him since he counted Jinnah the most remarkable statesman he ever met.18 Jinnah, too,
15 16 17 Ibid. 262–3. Ibid. 92 n 1. M. Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916– 1928 (Delhi, 1979), 50–1 [hereafter referred to as Hasan (1979)]. The objectives of the League were ‘a) to promote amongst the [Muslims] of India feelings of loyalty to the British Government and to remove any misconceptions that may arise as to the intentions of the government with regard to any of its measures; b) to protect and advance the political rights and interests of [Muslims] of India and respectfully to represent their needs and aspirations to the Government; c) to prevent the rise among [Muslims] of India of any feelings of hostility towards other communities without prejudice to the other objects of the league’: Ghosh, The Development of the Indian National Congress, 159. .or the Aga Khan’s esteem of Jinnah, expressed in his memoirs of 1954: Aga Khan III, ed. Aziz, i.170–1, this in spite of the fact that Jinnah was the ‘only wellknown Muslim’ to take the view initially that the League was ‘dividing the nation against itself’ The League wanted to quell hostility to British rule, the continuance of which was seen as essential for protecting Muslim interests: Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 25–6. Ghosh, The Development of the Indian National Congress, 159– 160.

The Aga Khan noted that he had read ‘with keen interest and appreciation’ a letter of Syed Ameer Ali (1849–1928; Syed was also an Ismaili) to The Times. In this letter, dated 9 January 1909, Syed had argued that ‘under the existing conditions and in the present state of feeling among the general body of the two nationalities a system of popular [joint] electorates… would lead to constant friction, heartburning and complaints’. The Muslims, he stated, were over 53 millions; but ‘the importance of a nation cannot always be adjudged by numerical considerations’.14 In an article entitled ‘Dawn of a New Policy in India’, quoting The Times, Syed stated in November 1906 that Muslims had either to join the Congress or ‘set up a second agitation of their own’. ‘Nor ought it to be overlooked’, Syed argued, that ‘the community of language, sentiment and tradition places the Muslims of the different provinces on a common
14 Memoirs and Other Writings of Syed Ameer Ali, ed. Syed. Razi Wasti (Lahdore, 1968), 335–9.

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was an Ismaili or Khoja,19 one reason why his later appeal to the Muslim ‘nation’ had to be constructed in political and not religious terms, at least until there was an overarching rallying cry of ‘Islam in danger’. Since the majority of the Indian Muslims were Sunnis, an appeal in strictly religious terms by a secular20 Shiite was unlikely to unite them. (In the end, in Rajmohan Gandhi’s phrase, ‘that he was a Shia in a qaum with a large Sunni majority did not hurt him. He and the League successfully used the slogan of “One God, One Book one Prophet”.’)21 Jinnah did not join the Muslim League until 1913 and then only on strict terms that it would not prejudice his prior membership of Congress;22 at this stage was heavily influenced by his friend, the moderate Congress leader Gopal Krishna Gokhale. The second consquence was the adoption by the Indian government, in 1909, of the Morley–Minto reforms, which accepted the argument of the Simla Deputation, especially
19 Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 32. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 4: ‘the Khojas of South Asia remained doubly conscious of their separateness and cultural difference, helping perhaps account for the “aloofness” so often noted as a characteristic quality of Jinnah and his family.’ P. Almeida, Jinnah. Man of Destiny (Delhi, 2001), 16. Ibid., 122, noting that the Aga Khan visited Ghandi in 1939 appealing to him to settle with Jinnah if it was at all possible. The Ismailis are known in India as Khojas ‘from the Hindu caste originally converted by a Persian Ismaili, Sadr al-Din’: J. Bowker, Oxford Dictionary of World Religions (Oxford, 1997), 481. .or Jinnah’s willingness to eat pork sausages in 1923, while upbraiding of his wife for bringing him ham sandwiches during his election campaign (‘do you want me to lose my election… if my voters were to learn that I am going to eat ham sandwiches for lunch, do you think I have a ghost of a chance of being elected?): Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 78–9. Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, 184. As evidenced by Sarojini Naidu. Mohomed Ali Jinnah, an ambassador of unity: his speeches and writings, 1912–1917, ed. Sarojini Naidu (Madras, 1918, repr. 1920), 11: ‘his two sponsors were required to make a solemn preliminary covenant that loyalty to the Muslim League and the Muslim interest would in no way and at no time imply even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was dedicated.’ Significantly, the Pakistani edition of Naidu’s introduction omits this passage: Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Quaid-e-Azam as seen by his contemporaries (Lahore, 1966), 158–165.

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the principle of separate electorates for Muslims in recognition of their ‘political and historical importance’. .rom the British point of view, this formed part of a long-term strategy of seeking allies against Congress. Already in 1905, W. E. Curtis had argued that the Muslims were ‘more independent than the Hindus’, while Morley, the Secretary of State for India, told Minto in .ebruary 1909 that Muslims were ‘a strong conservative element… [who would thus be] a substantial support to the Moderate Party in India…’ British policy should be to ‘enlist [them] as allies and auxiliaries on the side of the British Government against the extremists’. Above all, it would be ‘a grave mischance if the Mahomedans were alienated’.23 T. W. Holderness, in Peoples and Problems of India, published in 1911, considered Indian Muslims ‘for many purposes a nation. In administrative matters the British Government has constantly to consider Indian Muslims a separate community, with interests distinct from and conflicting with those of the rest of the population’.24 While Jinnah’s ‘two nations theory’ was the ultimate theoretical model and justification for this sort of reasoning, there seems much to be said for the view that the British administration of India had in large measure established both the theoretical and the practical implications of this approach to the communal problem. Lord Morley, Secretary of State for India from 1905 to 1910, was in no doubt that the gulf between Islam and Hinduism was ‘not a mere difference of articles of faith and dogma. It is a difference of life, in tradition, in history, in all the social things as well as articles of belief that constitute a community.’25 Lord Ronaldshay, Governor of Bengal from 1917 to 1922 and later Secretary of State for India, commented:
The Muslims have their internecine quarrels, but these apart, the solidarity of Islam is a hard fact against which it is futile to run one’s head… It was not always realized by the constitution makers even in India itself how fundamental and far-reaching is the cleavage between the two communities… The division between Muslims and Hindus are not only those 23 24 25 Hasan (1979), 311, n. 5. Ibid., 310–11, n. 4. Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 13.

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Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination due to religious belief and practice, but to a profoundly different outlook on life resulting in social systems which are the very antithesis of one another.26

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The Morley–Minto reforms introduced a profound change into Indian politics, the principle of communal representation. Baron Hardinge, Viceroy of India (1906– 10), was hostile to the idea, but recognized the importance of the transformation, that there could be no turning back: ‘I do not like it’,27 he admitted in 1912, ‘but Minto gave definite pledges to the Muslims, and I do not see how we can possibly go back on them… We shall have to redeem our pledge to the Muslims…’28 With the exception of Curzon’s division of Bengal in 1905, there was probably ‘no deliberate British attempt to foster communal hostility’. As .rancis Robinson contends, ‘the aim was to avoid it’; but there was no denying that the British feared the Muslims and sought to pacify them through special concessions.’29 Moreover, a distinction needs to be
26 27 Loc. cit. Writing in 1821, a British officer under the assumed name of Carnaticus wrote in the Asiatic Review that Divide et impera ‘should be the motto of our Indian administration, whether political, civil or military’. Opponents of the ‘two nations theory’ decry the British policy of divide and rule as one that was deliberately conceived and executed: Almeida, Jinnah. Man of destiny, passim. <www.members.tripod.com/~INDIA_RESOURCE/hist2nation.html> However, Thursby notes that, following the Governor-General’s proclamation in 1849 and the proclamation of Queen Victoria in 1858, the British administration in India was neutral in its standpoint between the different religions; and the British sought to rule primarily by conciliation rather than by repression. On the other hand, the British did facilitate the selfidentity of different groups by classifying their Indian subjects for administrative convenience; moreover, the decentralization of political power and devolution of government had a major impact on inter-communal relations: G. R. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India. A study of the controversy, conflict and communal movements in Northern India, 1923–1928 (Leiden, 1975), 174–6. Hasan (1979), 311 n. 6. M. Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1885– 1930 (Manohar, 1994) [hereafter Hasan (1994)], 224 n. 118. Robinson, Separatism, 131–2. Nevertheless, Robinson concedes ‘the divisions the British fostered were communal ones.

made between the period before World War II and the crisis of the British imperial system that was precipitated by the war. As Sanjoy Banerjee comments, ‘with the outbreak of war in 1939, the British moved swiftly to promote the Muslim League, which was still quite weak, as a counterweight to Congress. Within months they gave unprecedented recognition to the League as a representative of Muslim interests. These policies were consciously intended to manipulate Congress and prevent the consolidation of the movement for a united independent India… The divide and rule policies were reinforced by the growing communal divisions within India and the willingness of the Muslim League to appeal to British authority to attain their goals.’30 The apogee of ‘divide and rule’ came under the wartime leadership of the inveterate imperialist Churchill.31 .or him, the eventual solution of the Indian problem was not decolonisation but an arrangement whereby the British ‘might sit on top of a tripos — Pakhistan [sic], Princely India and the Hindus’, or as Viceroy Linlithgow put it, ‘we shall remain there to hold the balance’.32 .or Churchill, ‘the Hindu–Muslim feud’ was ‘the bulwark of British rule in India’.33 This lay far in the future. In the first decades of the century, the leaders of Congress challenged the British assumptions about Indian Muslims. Hardline Hindu opinion, in the form of the Punjab Hindu Sabha (which eventually evolved into
There can be no doubt that British policy played the main part in establishing a separate Muslim identity in Indian politics by 1909.’ S. Banerjee, ‘Theory of Historical Structures: The Case of the Partition of India’, paper delivered to the International Studies Association (March 1998). It is thus no coincidence that it was in 1941 that the classic Indian nationalist statement of the Divide and Rule theory was published: A. Mehta and A. Patwardhan, The Communal Triangle (Allahabad, 1941). This point is made by Ian Talbot, ‘The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 234. R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India (Oxford, 1979), 138. The idea of the colonial administration holding the balance was wellestablished but did not preclude secret subsidies to the weaker side: Hasan (1994), 245–7. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 28.

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the Hindu Mahasabha), took on a considerable lease of life two years after its formation because of its opposition to the ‘extravagant and unwarranted demands of Muslims regarding representation in the reformed legislative councils’ and the concessions in the Morley–Minto reforms.34 Even moderate Hindu opinion was clear that separate electorates would introduce ‘an invidious distinction and an undesirable precedent whose perpetuation will only accentuate bitterness and irritation’. Surendranath Banerjea, formerly President of Congress in 1895 and 1902, moved a resolution which Congress carried unanimously in 1909, which denounced ‘the excessive and unfairly preponderant share of representation given to the followers of one particular religion [i.e. the Muslims]; [and] the unjust, invidious and humiliating distinctions made between Muslims and nonMuslim subjects… in the matter of the electorate, the franchise and the qualifications of candidates…’35

of minorities.37 In his speech on the budget that year, Gokhale stated:
…it has been argued by some of my countrymen that any special treatment of minorities militates against the idea of the union of all communities in public matters… The idea of two watertight compartments for Hindus and [Muslims] will not promote the best interests of the country, and moreover it is really not feasible. .or there cannot be only two such compartments, unless all minorities other than [Muslims] are to be joined to the Hindus… I earnestly appeal to my countrymen — both Hindu and [Muslim] — to exercise special mutual forbearance at this juncture and meet each other half way. 38

In a speech delivered in London on 19 July 1912, Gokhale detected ‘signs that the worst part of the crisis… was over, and that a distinct change for the better was visible, both on the side of Hindus and [Muslims]’. He contemplated the ‘India of the future’ which could not be only
a Hindu India, or a [Muslim] India; it must be compounded of all the elements which existed at present in India — Hindu, [Muslim], Parsee, Christian, aye, and the Englishman who adopted India as his country. And they could do something for that great cause. Every word they uttered, every action they performed, should help to promote by a continual process greater solidarity among them all, seeking in one way and another to remove those differences which had, unfortunately, kept them so long apart.39

2 Jinnah as Gokhale’s political heir and Ambassador for Hindu–Muslim Unity, 1916–20
.or the long-serving Indian nationalist Sarojini Naidu, Gopal Khrishna Gokhale (1866–1915), the President of Congress in 1905, was a ‘marvellous, great, and complex embodiment of God’s dreams of a splendid patriot: complex he was essentially and many sided and it is his triumph that he focussed all his myriad qualities into supreme and singlehearted achievement of service; he was literally a servant of India and in that he fulfilled the proudest and the highest destiny of man: what can be a more gracious fate than to be allowed to serve?…’36 Only Gokhale among the Hindu Congress leaders was prepared to explain as early as 1909 that under the circumstances then prevailing, separate electorates were the only practicable way of minimizing communal friction between Hindus and Muslims and ensuring the representation
34 35 36 Hasan (1979), 234–5. The Mahasabha took a similar stance against the Lucknow Pact: ibid., 88. Ibid., 66–7. <www.mkgandhi.org/Sarojini/>

Moderate Hindu opinion began to shift in Gokhale’s direction in the years around the outbreak of World War I. Tej Bahadur Sapru, who by 1916 was one of the leading Hindu proponents of Hindu–Muslim unity, had initially condemned separate electorates in 1909. He changed his position on the grounds that it removed ‘one of the several causes of friction’ between the communities. Other members of Congress,
37 Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale, ed. D. G. Karve and D. V. Ambekar (2 vols., London, 1966), ii. 76–8: ‘You cannot take away from the Mohammadan community today what you gave them only yesterday, and I would say to my Hindu brethren, make the best of the situation in the larger interests of the country.’ Hasan (1994), 86–7. But he was hostile to the whole of representation coming from separate electorates; he also deprecated excessive representation to particular groups: Gokhale, ii. 309–12. Gokhale, i. 149–50. Gokhale, ii. 393–4.

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especially Tilak, gradually came to approve the principle enshrined in December 1916 in the Lucknow Pact and thus, in the words of the historian Mushirul Hasan, ‘perpetuated an artificial category created by the Raj’.40 Earlier Muslim leaders such as Badruddin Tyabji had argued that Muslims should ‘make a common cause with their fellow countrymen of all creeds and persuasions’ and, if Congress sought to follow policies prejudicial to their interests, Muslims should oppose ‘from within’ rather than ‘from without’.41 Such a viewpoint was unrealistic until such time as a number of younger Muslim leaders came to have a common educational background in which they had met and formed friendships with Hindus, forming general views which rose above the ‘existence of separate entities and the din of communal claims’. Mazharul Haque declared ‘our interests are practically identical’ with those of the Hindus, and that he would happily be represented by his friend Gokhale.42 While at the Bar at Lincoln’s Inn, London, Jinnah had participated in political discussions held at the residence of Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917), the first Indian to be elected as a British MP. Their Western educational background, and their use of the English language, brought about a degree of cohesiveness in what was otherwise a culturally heterogeneous group of Hindu and Muslim Indian social reformers and nationalists.43 Jinnah went to England in 1905 with Gokhale as a member of a Congress delegation to plead the cause of Indian self-government during the British elections. A year later, he served as Secretary to Dadabhai Naoroji, the then Indian National Congress President, a great honour for a budding politician. At the Calcutta Congress session (December 1906), Jinnah made his first political speech in support of the resolution on self-government proposed by Naoroji as President.44 There were Muslim opponents of the Congress–Muslim League rapprochement, especially the plan of Jinnah and Wazir
40 41 42 43 44 Hasan (1979), 311–12. Ibid., 43. Ibid., 83–4. Ibid., 84–5. <www.cybercity-online.net/quaid.htm#Political Career> Annie Besant, India: Bond or .ree? A World Problem (London, 1926),

Hasan to hold a session of the League in Bombay concurrently with a session of Congress in 1915, but they were unsuccessful and the tide was with Hindu–Muslim unity in 1915 and 1916, culminating in the Lucknow Pact. An entente cordiale between Hindus and Muslims was worked out at Bombay in December 1915. Notwithstanding some internal dissension,45 the All-India Muslim League adopted the ideal of self-government under the ‘aegis’ of the British crown. The Indian National Congress meeting at Karachi adopted a resolution accepting the plan and expressing
complete accord with the belief that the League has so emphatically declared at its last sessions that the political future of the country depends on the harmonious working and co-operation of the various communities in the country… This Congress most heartily welcomes the hope expressed by the League that the leaders of the different communities will make every endeavour to find a modus operandi for joint and concerted action on all questions of national good and earnestly appeals to all sections of the people to help the object which we all have at heart.

At the Bombay Provincial Conference held at Ahmedabad in October 1916, Jinnah’s presidential address ranged widely over the issues of the war and the making of a new India once peace was declared. He quoted Lord Morley’s words on a new spirit abroad in India, with young Indians leaving the Universities ‘intoxicated with the ideas of freedom, nationality and self-government’. Since the Karachi meeting of the Congress, the programme of the League and that of Congress had been more or less the same. Since 1909, the Muslim community had been determined to insist upon separate electorates. Jinnah therefore appealed to his ‘Hindu Brethren’ that they should try to ‘win the confidence and trust’ of the minority Muslim community. Hindus and Muslims should ‘stand united’ and ‘use every constitutional means’
138, quotes Naoroji: ‘the whole matter can be comprised in one word, Self-Government , or Swaraj… Self-Government is the only and chief remedy…’ This was partly political because of the change of direction toward more positive relations with the Hindus, partly religious from orthodox Muslims on account of ‘the European mode of living’ of Jinnah and Mazar-ul-Haq: P. C. Bamford, Histories of the Non-Co-Operation and Khilafat Movements (Delhi, 1925; repr. 1974), 121.

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Professor Richard Bonney reference to the state of things that obtained only a few years ago, when mutual distrust and suspicion were rampant and communal bigots on either side ruled the roost. Everyone of us can easily recall the frame of Muslim mind and feeling in which the All-India Muslim League was founded at Dacca. To put it frankly, the All-India Muslim League came into existence as an organisation with the main object of safeguarding the Muslim interests… The main principle on which the first AllIndia Muslim political organisation was based, was the retention of Muslim communal individuality strong and unimpaired in any constitutional readjustment that might be made in India in the course of its political evolution. The creed has grown and broadened with the growth of political life and thought in the community. In its general outlook and ideal as regards the future, the All-India Muslim League stands abreast of the Indian National Congress and is ready to participate in any patriotic efforts for the advancement of the country as a whole. In fact, this readiness of educated Muslims, only about a decade after they first entered the field of politics, to work shoulder to shoulder with the other Indian communities for the common good of all, is to my mind the strongest proof of the value and need for the separate Muslim political organization at present…

to effect a speedy transfer of power. Wisdom and caution, nevertheless, should be their watchwords.46 Jinnah was President of the Ninth Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League held at Lucknow in December 1916, the ‘chosen leaders and representatives’ of 70 million Indian Muslims. India had given a ‘free and spontaneous tribute to the ideals of the great British nation’ in its support for the war effort. ‘India’s loyalty to the Empire has set no price on itself. After such colossal upheavals as this War, the world cannot quietly slip back into its old grooves of life and thought’, Jinnah declared. Among the problems awaiting British statesmanship, ‘none is of more anxious moment than the problem of reconstruction in India’. He rejected various arguments that were aimed at justifying ‘the existing methods of Indian governance’. Yet the problems were formidable: ‘we have a vast continent inhabited by 315 millions of people sprung from various racial stocks, inheriting various cultures and professing a variety of religious creeds.’ The only future for India was self-governance. ‘The supreme duty of the men that lead the forces of Indian progress is to insist that India’s rulers should definitely set the ideal before them as the ultimate goal to be attained within [a] reasonable time and should accelerate the pace accordingly… Peace has its victories. We are fighting, and can only fight, constitutional battles.’ The most significant and hopeful aspect of the spirit of patriotism and national self-consciousness was a new-born movement in the direction of national unity
which has brought Hindus and [Muslims] together involving brotherly service for the common cause. Bombay had the good fortune to see the Indian National Congress and the AllIndia Muslim League meet for the first time in the same city last December… [Lucknow was now hosting simultaneous sessions once more.] Indeed, the person who fails to read in the Hindu–Muslim rapprochement within the last few years the first great sign of the birth of united India has little knowledge of the political conditions of a few years ago and has no business to talk of India’s future… What this change really signifies can only be judged by a 46 M. Rafique Afzal, Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 1911–34 and 1947–8 (Lahore, 1966), 26–44.

Jinnah affirmed that he had been a ‘staunch Congressman throughout my public life’ and had been no ‘lover of sectarian cries’. However, the reproach of ‘separatism’ was ‘singularly inept and wide of the mark’ when levelled at the Muslim League, which he saw as a ‘great communal organisation rapidly growing into a powerful factor for the birth of United India’. He continued on the theme of the need for safeguards for minorities:
A minority must, above everything else, have a complete sense of security before its broader political sense can be evoked for co-operation and united endeavour in the national tasks. To the [Muslims] of India that security can only come through adequate and effective safeguards as regards their political existence as a community… It is a matter of infinite gratification to me as well as to all patriotic [Muslims] that the Muslim communal position in this matter has been recognised and met in an ungrudging spirit by the leaders of the great Hindu community… I rejoice to think that a final settlement has at last been reached which sets the seal on Hindu–Muslim co-operation and opens a new era in the history of our country. A few irreconcilable spirits in either camp may still exist here and there, but the atmosphere has on the whole been rid of the menace of sectarian thunder… Let us remember, whether Hindus or [Muslims], that New India wants a wholly different type of

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination public worker, of more generous spirit and ampler mould, free from the egoism of sect and the narrowness of bigotry, one who can resist the temptation to crush the weak and yet would not quail before the aggression of the strong, who can rise above the petty preoccupations of the day to the higher plane of devotion and service which alone can give to a people, faith, hope, freedom and power… Towards the Hindus our attitude should be of good will and brotherly feelings. Co-operation in the cause of our Motherland should be our guiding principle. India’s real progress can only be achieved by a true understanding and harmonious relations between the two great sister communities. With regard to our own affairs, we can depend on nobody but ourselves… We should not lose the sympathy of our well-wishers in India and in England by creating a wrong impression that we, as a community are out only for self-interest and self-gain. We must show by our words and deeds that we sincerely and earnestly desire a healthy National unity. .or the rest, the 70 millions of [Muslims] need not fear… The Renaissance of India really lies in our own hands.47

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Nevertheless, the Muslim viewpoint underlying the Lucknow Pact remained, as Jinnah expressed it in 1941, ‘the fundamental principle of two separate entities’.48 Wolpert comments that ‘unfortunately, the Lucknow Pact was never implemented; its adoption marked the high point of Indian nationalist unity and provided as liberal and rational a constitutional framework for governing the sub-continent of Asia as any subsequent plan devised after years of labo[u]r, vast expenditure and much precious blood had been wasted. British rulers were not quite ready, however, to apply the Wilsonian principle of “self-determination” to their Indian empire.’49 Rather, it was the rise of Gandhi’s Khilafat agitation which struck the death blow to the Lucknow Pact; by the time such matters were reconsidered in the late 1920s, the Congress party had accepted Motilal Nehru’s report and performed a volte-face by rejecting communal electorates. The Report of the Indian Statutory Commission of 1930 made it clear that the .ranchise Committee, reporting in 1918, had accepted communal electorates and ‘thought it wise to abide by the allocation
47 48 49 Ibid. 45–64. K. A. Khan Yusufi (ed.), Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam (Lahore, 1996), ii. 1268. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 48–49.

of seats proposed in the Lucknow Pact’. The Government of India had concurred with its recommendations ‘though not without doubt’, and the position in 1930 was compared to that of the Lucknow Pact proposals in a concluding table in the 1930 Report. The percentage of Muslim members in the Punjab was the same as under the Lucknow pact (50 per cent); elsewhere in almost all the provinces there had been an increase in Muslim representation (in the United Provinces from 30 to 32.5 per cent; in Bengal, from 40 to 46 per cent; in Bihar and Orissa, from 25 to 27 per cent; in Madras from 15 to 16.5 per cent; in Bombay from 33 to 37 per cent; and in the Legislative Assembly from 33.3 to 38 per cent; Assam had had no separate provision under the Lucknow Pact, but had 37.5 per cent Muslim members by 1930; only in the Central Provinces had there been a slight decline, from 15 to 14.5 per cent).50 It was not the British Imperial government which had undermined the practice of separate electorates, whatever its attitude in principle to Muslim (or Indian) selfdetermination. In Jinnah’s personal collection of photographs in the Pakistan National Archives, there is a signed photograph ‘from your friend Sarojini Naidu’. Princess Abida Sultan rejects the idea they were in love: ‘these people were advanced, progressive and they were in the company of men. Such gestures did not mean anything more than what is said.’51 Nevertheless, it was an extraordinary act of friendship that led the Hindu activist and poetess–singer Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949) to arrange for the publication in 1918 of Jinnah’s speeches with a fulsome introductory tribute to the man Gokhale had called ‘the best ambassador of Hindu–Muslim unity’:52
.ew figures of the Indian Renaissance are so striking or so significant… the obvious sanity and serenity of his worldly 50 51 52 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, i. 189. <www.harappa.com/abida/abida24.html> Mohomed Ali Jinnah, an ambassador of unity: his speeches and writings, 1912–1917, ed. Sarojini Naidu (Madras, 1918, repr. 1920), 1–20. The first quotation from Gokhale is omitted by Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Quaid-e-Azam as seen by his contemporaries (Lahore, 1966), 158–165.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination vision effectually disguise a shy and splendid idealism which is of the very essence of the man… it is… his personal triumph and a testimony to his authentic mission that he stands approved and confirmed by his countrymen not merely as an ambassador but as an embodied symbol of Hindu–Muslim unity.

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3 Gandhi, the Khilafat Movement and the rise of Communal Politics
Two deaths profoundly marked Jinnah’s political evolution: that of Gokhale, his mentor, in .ebruary 1915 and that of the Hindu fundamentalist Lokmanya (‘.riend of the people’) Bal Gangadhar Tilak on 1 August 1920. Jinnah had defended Tilak in his trials in 1908 and 1916. The recent Indian biographer of Jinnah, Prakash Almeida, comments: ‘…as far as Gokhale and Tilak were concerned, Jinnah had the most profound admiration and respect for them and their views. This clearly indicates that Jinnah divided politics into two distinct periods, before the death of Tilak and after the death of Tilak (instead, can one say before the rise of Gandhi and after?).’56 Jinnah explained that though Tilak ‘was known in his earlier days to be a communalist… [he] developed and showed [a] broader and greater national outlook as he gained experience… [he] played a very important part in bring about Hindu–Muslim unity which ultimately resulted in the Lucknow Pact in 1916… [Tilak (perhaps he was thinking, unlike Gandhi?)] was a practical politician.’57 Though a conservative Hindu, seeking Hindu revival, Tilak was free of communal bias, and preferred to keep the religious agenda out of politics. At the plenary session of the Congress in December 1916 he dealt with the charge that the Muslim League had succeeded in driving a hard bargain: ‘it has been said… by some that we have yielded too much to our Muhammadan brethren. I am sure that I represent the sense of the Hindu community all over India that we could not have yielded too much. I would not care if the rights of self-government are granted to the Muhammadan community only…’58 Politics, Tilak wrote to Gandhi in 1918, ‘is a game of worldly people and not of sadhus’.59 The British were ‘adept in political warfare. We
56 57 58 59 Almeida, Jinnah. Man of Destiny, 48. Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 24. B. R. Nanda, Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India (Delhi, 1989), 97. Nanda, In Search of Gandhi, 24.

She was prepared to believe that in ‘some glorious and terrible crisis of our national struggle’ the ‘Muslim Gokhale’ (Jinnah’s own self-depiction) might pass into immortality as ‘the Mazzini of the Indian liberation’.53 That Sarojini Naidu remained on good terms with Jinnah in the later 1920s is clear from her letter to Gandhi on 8 November 1929:54
Last evening I was discussing once again with Mr. Jinnah the now all absorbing topic of the Round Table and the pros and cons of such matters as amnesty to political prisoners, the personnel of the Indian delegation, and the desirable date of the Conference. Mr. Jinnah once more reiterated that he believes that on these specific points the Viceroy would be most willing to confer with you and meet you as far as lay within his power. Of course on the hypothesis that the delegation is satisfactory you could be willing to go to the Conference. But the only question that troubled Mr. Jinnah was how to establish a point of contact between you two. I suggested the simple and natural expedient of your being invited by Lord Irwin to come and discuss the things with him. Mr. Jinnah expressed serious doubts as to whether I was correct in assuming that you would respond to such an invitation whereupon I undertook to ascertain your view at once and should you assent he would put himself in touch with the Viceroy and try to arrange for a very small informal conference between His Excellency, yourself, Pandit Motilal, himself, and one or two responsible representative men like Sir Tejbahadur Sapru and others you might name of equal standing who should be included in that private and informal small conference to discuss the specific points.

As late as 27 July 1943 Jinnah received a telegram from Sarojini Naidu rejoicing that ‘death could not touch one for whom life still holds a great duty and a great destiny of service for our beloved motherland’.55

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Naidu, Mohomed Ali Jinnah, 30. Ahmad (ed.), Quaid-e-Azam, 165. <www.mkgandhi.org/Sarojini/> Pakistan National Archives, Islamabad .-512 /3.

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must use against them the same weapons they use against us and as, their tactics change, so must ours’.60 Tilak was of the view that Congress should ‘seek Muslim cooperation on the broad national question of Swaraj. In that, by all means, give them privileges if these will satisfy them and bring them into Congress fold, but never seek to introduce theology into our Politics.’ He had great respect and admiration for Gandhi, but did not like his politics. He should retire to the Himalayas, whereupon Tilak would send him fresh flowers out of respect. Another Hindu contemporary of Gandhi said that, while he might be saint, a saint would be ‘a good guide for the kingdom of Heaven, but not for the Empire of India’.61 Tilak was not the only leading Congress politician who denounced the arrival of Gandhi on the political scene and the sudden intrusion of religion into the political game. Annie Besant was even more direct in her opposition:62
Under the Gandhi Raj 63 there is no free speech, no open meeting except for Non Co-operators. Social and religious boycott, threats of personal violence, spitting, insults in the streets are the methods of oppression. Mob support is obtained by wild promises, such as the immediate coming of Swaraj, when there will be no rents, no taxes, [and] by giving to Mr Gandhi high religious names, such as Mahatma and Avatara, assigning to him supernatural powers and the like.

The Presidents of the two Home Rule Leagues were therefore united against the proposed Gandhian techniques. Tilak died on 1 August 1920, the very day that Gandhi launched the non-co-operation movement as leader of the Khilafatists. Annie Besant was forced to resign as President; Gandhi became her successor and chaired the Home Rule League meeting on 3 October 1920 with the purpose of
60 61 62 63 Ibid. 241. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, 219. Besant, India: bond or free?, 194–5. Gandhi’s early riposte to Annie Besant is at Gandhi, xx. 269. [All references to Gandhi’s writings are to the electronic edition.] Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 80, discussing the situation in 1929–30, comments: ‘He was accepted because of the degree of unity his resolution permitted and because a mass campaign without him appeared impossible. In such circumstances, opposition to him looked not only fatal to individuals’ political careers but positively unpatriotic.’

bringing its policy into line with that of Congress, which at a special meeting in September voted over two to one in favour of his policy.64 Gandhi’s ‘alliance’ with the Muslims was aimed at securing justice via the method of Satyagraha (variously translated as ‘truth force’, 65 non-violent resistance or non-co-operation) ‘and to show its efficacy over all other methods’, to secure Muslim friendship for the Hindus ‘and thereby internal peace’, but also to secure acceptance, even affection, for the British constitutional arrangements in India.66 One of Tilak’s henchmen was of the opinion that the Khilafat movement was a Pan-Islamic question, and as long as the Indian Muslims had ‘one eye towards Turkey and the other to the British Government, their loyalty towards the latter is shaky and they are not fit to be friends of the Hindus’.67 On the Hindu side, the Khilafat movement received little non-Brahmin support.68 While it is probably true that Jinnah was in favour of the Khilafat agitation (though he opposed Gandhi’s unconstitutional methods), he argued that the constitution of the Muslim League forbade it to comment on the foreign policy of the government; a minority of other Muslims were prepared to argue that the agitation amounted to ‘extraterritorial patriotism’ and that Muslims should switch their attention ‘to the internal problems of our motherland…’69 Gandhi disclaimed sainthood but affirmed that ‘the politician in me has never dominated a single decision of mine…’ Politics was a ‘snake’ to be wrestled with.70 .urthermore, he acknowledged on 12 May 1920 that he had been experimenting71
by introducing religion into politics. Let me explain what I mean by religion. It is not the Hindu religion, which I cer64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, 270. Gandhi, xxii. 451. Gandhi, xx. 288, 5 May 1920. Robinson, Separatism, 300. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, 194. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, 226. Ibid. 227. Nanda, Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India, 381–2. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, 251. Gandhi, xx. 304, 12 May 1920. Gandhi, xx. 304, 12 May 1920.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination tainly prize above all other religions, but the religion which transcends Hinduism,72 which changes one’s very nature, which binds one indissolubly to the truth within and which ever purifies. It is the permanent element in human nature which counts no cost too great in order to find full expression and which leaves the soul utterly restless until it has found itself, known its Maker and appreciated the true correspondence between the Maker and itself.

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.or Gandhi, the non-co-operation movement, by reason of its non-violence had ‘become a religious and purifying movement’. 73 If the movement sought to transcend Hinduism, with the Hindus as the majority community taking the lead in cultivating a spirit of mutual harmony,74 the fact was that Gandhi talked in a religious language and with religious imagery which was drawn from his own faith. This was capable of being misunderstood. He was, he said, convinced by events of recent months (here he referred to the atrocities ordered in the Punjab on 13 April 1919 by Brigadier-General Dyer at Jallianwalla Bagh in Amritsar) that the British Empire was ‘utterly Satanic. I call it Ravanarajya’. An oblation was needed, a yajna (that is, sacrifice) of self-purification, which would end Ravanarajya and establish Ramarajya. This Ramarajya, he held, was home rule or
72 B. R. Nanda, In Search of Gandhi. Essays and Reflections (Delhi, 2002), 24. Nanda argues that ‘Gandhian religion was simply an ethical framework for the conduct of daily life. Unfortunately, most intelligent people who concede the value of an ethical framework in domestic and social spheres, are sceptical about its feasibility in politics. Politics is considered to be a game in which expediency must take precedence over morality.’ Gandhi, xxii. 151, 29 Dec 1920 Nanda, Gandhi, Pan-Islamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India, 283. In his In Search of Gandhi, 29, Nanda argues that ‘few people are aware of Gandhi’s great contribution to secularism in India. Deeply religious as he was, he said he would have opposed any proposal for a state religion even if the whole population of India had professed the same religion. He looked upon religion as a personal matter… The resolution on fundamental rights passed by the Karachi Congress in 1931 with Gandhi’s cordial approval, affirmed the principle of religious freedom and declared that “the State shall observe neutrality in regard to all religions”. This doctrine was embodied in the Constitution of independent India even after the Muslim League waged and won the campaign for the partition of the country on the basis of religion.’ The difficulty was for Muslims to know whether they could trust Congress to keep its word.

swaraj: ‘without establishing swaraj we cannot throw off the yoke of this Satanic rule.’75 Or again, ‘if we want to end Ravanarajya, we must have Ramarajya prevail’.76 The Report of the Indian Statutory Commission of 1930 concluded that the bond between Hindus and Muslims during the Khilafat movement was ‘a common antagonism’ to the British government of India which Gandhi had called ‘satanic’.77 Gandhi sought a political alliance with Islam in India, in spite of the obvious distrust between the two main communities:78
I know that there is much too much distrust of one another as yet. Many Hindus distrust Mussulmans honestly. They believe that swaraj means Mussulman raj, for they argue that without the British, Mussulmans of India will aid Mussulman powers to build a Mussulman empire in India. Mussulmans on the other hand fear that the Hindus, being in an overwhelming majority, will smother them. Such an attitude of mind betokens impotence on either’s part. If not their nobility, their desire to live in peace would dictate a policy of mutual trust and mutual forbearance. There is nothing in either religion to keep the two apart. The days of forcible conversion are gone. Save for the cow, Hindus can have no ground for quarrel with Mussulmans. The latter are under no religious obligation to slaughter a cow. The fact is we have never before now endeavoured to come together to adjust our differences and to live as friends bound to one another as children of the same sacred soil…

73 74

Gandhi had introduced religion into politics in a way that had not occurred before. What were the Muslims receiving in return for a request to stop cow-killing? One newspaper complained on 16 April 1921:79
The manner which Mr Gandhi is being worshipped in the country makes it impossible for the Moslem community to pull on with him. We are ready to work with the Hindus as 75 76 77 78 Gandhi, xxi. 449, 4 Nov. 1920. Gandhi, xxi. 455, 6 Nov. 1920. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, i. 248, 252. Gandhi, xxiii. 141–2, 11 May 1921. Nanda, Gandhi, PanIslamism, Imperialism and Nationalism in India, 283. As early as 1908 Gandhi had argued that Muslims and Hindus shared a common citizenship and that ‘India cannot cease to be one nation because people belonging to different religions live in it…’: Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 33. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power, 329.

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Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination their brethren; we can even forego korbani [cow-sacrifice] for their satisfaction; but we will never allow the holy crescent to lie low at the feet of Sri Krishna.

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Professor Richard Bonney man who is trying to discover and follow the will of God cannot possibly leave a single field of life untouched. I came also, in the course of my service, to the conclusion that if there was any field of life where morality, where truth, where fear of God, were not essential, that field should be given up entirely. But I found also that the politics of the day are no longer a concern of kings, but that they affect the lowest strata of society. And I found, through bitter experience that, if I wanted to do social service, I could not possibly leave politics alone.

Gandhi claimed that he had borrowed the phrase ‘spiritualization of politics’ from Gokhale and, for the Mahatma, true spirituality culminated in politics.80 On 5 November 1920 at Calcutta, Gandhi declared that81
…his was a religious movement, that to true Mohammedans, non-co-operation including boycott of councils was an obligation enjoined as their faith, which they may not break. He described the state of excitement in the Mussulman community, such that, for very safety and peace, no less for brotherhood and unity, they should go with them non-cooperating with Government… he was prepared to accept the Das preamble defining the aim of non-co-operation to be the attainment of complete swaraj.

Subsequently, at his trial at Ahmedabad on 23 March 1922, Gandhi proclaimed that ‘non-violence is the first article of my religion’:82
I wanted to avoid violence. I want to avoid violence. Nonviolence is the first article of my faith. It is also the last article of my creed. But I had to make my choice. I had either to submit to a system, which I considered had done an irreparable harm to my country, or to incur the risk of the mad fury of my people bursting forth, when they understood the truth from my lips.

Gandhi’s ‘science of ahimsa’, usually translated as nonviolence although perhaps more accurately as the ‘minimum possible violence’ (since some himsa or harm is inevitable and inherent in human existence),84 was one of his greatest moral achievements and ensures his stature not just as the .ather of the Indian Nation but as one of the greatest figures of the twentieth century.85 Yet in the early 1920s, his was consciously an innovation within the Hindu tradition, drawing upon the insights of other religions;86 Hinduism itself had always comprised both pacific and more aggressive viewpoints.87 Moreover, Gandhi’s theory of ahimsa is open to the criticism that it contained an element of self-contradiction or
84 85 86 87 Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, 125. Nanda, In Search of Gandhi, 249. Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, 127–9. R. Thapar, Cultural Pasts. Essays in Early Indian History (Delhi, 2000), 974–5: ‘Yet ahimsa as an absolute value is characteristic of certain Sramanic sects and less so of Brahmanism. The notion first appears in the Upanisads, but it was the Buddhists and the Janias who first made it foundational to their teaching, and their message was very different from that of the BhagavadGita on this matter. That Brahmanism and Sramanism were recognized as distinct after the period of the Upanisads further underlines the significance of ahimsa to Sramanic thinking. This is also borne out by the evidence of religious persecution.’ [This article, ‘Imagined Religious Communities’, was originally published in Modern Asian Studies, 23 (1989), 209–231.] Ibid, 1042: ‘Gandhiji’s concern with ahimsa is more correctly traced to the Jaina imprint on the culture of Kathiawar. Not that the Sramanic tradition prevented violence, but it was a central issue early on in the ethics of Buddhism and Jainism and only later enters the discussion of some Hindu sects.’ [This article, ‘Syndicated Hinduism’, was originally published in Hinduism Reconsidered, ed. G. D. Sontheimer and H. Kulke (Delhi, 1997), 54–81.]

In many respects, after the collapse of his movement in 1922, Gandhi had to rethink his political role. But what he never rethought was his basic strategy of bringing religion into politics. He told an English audience in September 1931:83
You will be astonished to hear from me that, although to all appearances my mission is political, I would ask you to accept my assurance that its roots are — if I may use that term — spiritual. It is commonly known, though perhaps not believed, that I claim that at least my politics are not divorced from morality, from spirituality, from religion. I have claimed — and the claim is based upon extensive experience — that a 80 81 82 83 B. Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform. An Analysis of Gandhi’s Political Discourse, revised edn. (Delhi and London, 1999), 105. Nanda, In Search of Gandhi, 25. Gandhi, xxi. 238. <www.top-education.com/Speeches/MahatmaGandhi.htm> Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 14–15. Gandhi, liii. 396, 23 Sept. 1931.

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Professor Richard Bonney conditions consider it their highest duty to resort to actual physical violence.93 In fact I hold that [not to do so] would be doing violence to the highest and noblest feelings implanted in man, if we ruled out violence in any shape or form under all conceivable circumstances… [What of preventing an attack on a weaker victim or the right of self-defence?] As for violence in thought it is obvious that one who is prepared to resort to actual violence on certain occasions cannot be entirely free from the thought of it. By joining the movement of non-violent non-co-operation, all I have undertaken to do is to refrain from inflicting, or even contemplating, violence of any kind in carrying out the programme of non-co-operation against the Government… The doctrine of non-violence has, so far as I am concerned, a limited application for the very special purpose for which I have adopted it… There may be some who take the extreme view in theory, but I do not know a single follower of Mahatmaji who acts upon it. It is true that non-violence, even in the limited sense that I give to it, must relate to both word and deed and cannot be confined to abstention from causing physical hurt only. But non-violence in thought must be ruled out entirely as impracticable. Otherwise, we shall be weaving a cobweb of casuistry around us from which it would be impossible to extricate ourselves.

paradox. In the rhetoric of mobilization for satyagraha, he himself used terms such as ‘non-violent warfare’, ‘army for swaraj’ and so on which suggested that non-violence was distinctly militant. Was the launching of a satyagraha justified if violence might result? .or some commentators, notably Bhiku Parehk, ‘Gandhi’s theory pointed both ways. His practice did not help much either.’88 Gandhi’s answer was simply to take personal responsibility for what happened when things went wrong. This happened early on, with his ‘Himalayan Miscalculation’ in 1919; in March 1922, when he abruptly called off of the non co-operation movement following the murders at Chauri Chaura, when some of his leading followers, such as the Nehrus father and son, were in jail (Gandhi affirmed that ‘God spoke clearly through Chauri Chaura’);89 in his statement in court at Ahmedabad on 23 March 1922;90 and in his subsequent hunger strikes beginning in October 1924. Moreover as his Bengali critic, Subhas Chandra Bose commented, Gandhi was also prepared to take ‘strategic retreat(s)’ from active politics in order to regain the initiative at a later date.91 Even more serious in political terms, however, was that many of his leading supporters within Congress did not support his stand on ahimsa. The differences between Motilal Nehru and Gandhi came into relief during long negotiations at Juhu in April–May 1924. Motilal had previously written:92
The doctrine of Ahimsa with all its implications and logical deductions has not been, and cannot be, adopted by the Congress… Whilst Mahatmaji is not prepared to resort to violence under any circumstances whatever in thought, word or deed, many true Congressmen would under certain 88 89 90 Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform, 153. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 76. Gandhi, xxvi. 177, 16 .ebruary 1922. ‘I know that my people have sometimes gone mad. I am deeply sorry for it and I am therefore here not to submit to a light penalty but to the highest penalty. I do not ask for mercy. I do not plead any extenuating act. I am here therefore to invite and cheerfully submit to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is a deliberate crime and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen…’ Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 6 n. 4. B. R. Nanda, Motilal Nehru (Delhi, repr. 1970), 152–4.

Motilal Nehru’s disagreement on principle with Gandhi went further than this. It struck at the core of Gandhi’s spiritualization of politics. The opposing viewpoint was expressed with Motilal’s characteristic bluntness in his presidential address to Congress in December 1928:94
Whatever the higher conception of religion may be, it has in our life come to signify bigotry and fanaticism, intolerance and narrow-mindedness… Its chief inspiration is hatred of him who does not profess it… Can any sane person consider the trivial and ridiculous causes of conflict between Hindu and Muslim, or between sect and sect, and not wonder how anyone with a grain of sense should be affected by them… Religion as practised today is… the greatest separatist force. It puts artificial barriers between man and man and prevents the development of [a] healthy and co-operative national life… Its association with politics has been for the good of neither. Religion has been degraded and politics has sunk in the mire; complete divorce of one from the other is the only remedy. 93 Though not in satyagraha confrontations: Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, 118: ‘Congressmen not only totally eschewed violence. They did everything they could to prevent the city crowd from resorting to it too.’ B. R. Nanda, Gokhale, Gandhi and the Nehrus. Studies in Indian Nationalism (London, 1974), 57.

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Gandhi might have agreed with the analysis but would have rejected the conclusion, on the necessity of a divorce between religion and politics. If there were such divisions of opinion with Congress itself, is it surprising that the 1920s saw a breakdown in relations between the Hindu and Muslim parties. Ultimately, Congress sought to mobilize a multi-caste coalition of Hindus and it rejected orthodox Brahminic conceptions of Hinduism. Gandhi was the charismatic leader and his role was central in reconstructing a more liberal form of Hindu social thought, while the Nehrus, father and son, articulated a non-religious political rhetoric. Nonetheless, precisely because of Gandhi’s radical departure in advocating ahimsa, the Congress was obliged to seek allies with Hindu conservatives and also to use terminology which would appeal widely to the Hindu masses. Gandhi’s term Ramrajya (rule according to Ram’s ideals) and the Congress party’s recourse to the late nineteenth-century song with anti-Muslim references Bande mataram (‘Hail to thee, Mother’, an invocation to the Hindu goddess Kali), were perceived by the Muslim League as evidence of an increasingly exclusivist Hindu stance of Congress (Document Three). The Bande mataram was sung when Gandhi arrived at a Congress session on 31 December 1928 and also when he won a vote on this occasion:95 the song was part of Congress enthusiasm and not confined to Hindu Mahasabha extremism. The previous year, Gandhi admitted that his tactics had failed to bring about Hindu–Muslim unity and the matter had ‘passed out of human hands and has been left to God’s hand alone’; both communities were ‘perhaps entitled to say that my method has failed’.96 In Penderel Moon’s words, ‘The Hinduising of the national movement, which Gandhi’s leadership promoted and symbolised was injurious and ultimately fatal to Hindu–Muslim unity’. Gandhi failed to see the danger: ‘conscious only of his own goodwill towards the Muslims he was obstinately blind to the adverse effects on Muslim opinion of his own pronounced Hinduism.’97
95 96 97 Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 38. Ibid. 24. Gandhi, xl. 476, 1 Dec. 1927. P. Moon, Gandhi and Modern India (London, 1968), 276. Also quoted by Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 155: ‘His basic concepts, his moral values and ideals, even his fads and foibles, were of

Jinnah retained many of his Hindu friends and his successful re-election to the Central Legislative Assembly from the Muslim Constituency in Bombay in November 1926 was secured in part by his Hindu supporters providing him with at least a hundred cars to enable him to get his Muslim voters to the polling booths.98 In tendering his resignation from the All-India Home Rule League along with 19 friends, in October 1920, Jinnah told Gandhi:99
If by ‘new life’ you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them, for I am fully convinced that it must lead to disaster… your methods have already caused split[s] and division[s] in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto; and in the public life of the country not only amongst Hindus and Muslims but between Hindus and Hindus and Muslims and Muslims and even between fathers and sons; …your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganization and chaos… I do not wish my countrymen to be dragged to the brink of a precipice in order to be shattered.

He accused Gandhi both of arbitrary conduct in procedural terms and also of inciting ‘unconstitutional and illegal activities’. Gandhi rejected the accusations but tried to encourage Jinnah’s return to a body ‘which you have hitherto nursed with industrious affection’.100 Jinnah could not accept Gandhi’s ‘spiritual movement’; nationalist politics, in his view, must be ‘a real political movement based on real political principles’; these real principles were political ones, not spiritual ones. ‘Were Gokhale still alive’, Jinnah ventured to surmise that ‘he too would not have endorsed this
Hindu origin; in his writings and speeches he constantly employed language, imagery and symbolism undisguisedly derived from Hindu sources; and he often appeared to evince as much interest in the reform of Hinduism as in the attainment of Independence, and indeed more or less to equate them.’ Merriam comments that when Gandhi claimed to be as much a Muslim or Jew as Hindu, ‘such a contention unmistakably reflected the absorptive and transcendent characteristics typical of Hinduism but largely absent in Islam’. Ibid. 156. 98 Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 147. 99 Ibid. 130. Almeida, Jinnah: Man of Destiny, 71. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 70. 100 Gandhi xxi. 382–4, 25 Oct. 1920

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programme.’101 Jinnah had therefore not reached the same conclusion as Iqbal, that ‘in Islam the spiritual and the temporal are not two distinct domains… all that is secular is, therefore, sacred in the roots of its being.’102 In his presidential address to the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on 24 May 1924, Jinnah concluded:103
Many mistakes have been made, blunders have been committed, [a] great deal of harm has been done, but there has come out of it a great deal of good also. The result of the struggle of the last three years has this to our credit that there is an open movement for the achievement of Swaraj for India. There is a fearless and persistent demand that steps must be taken for the immediate establishment of Dominion Responsible Government in India. The ordinary man in the street has found his political consciousness and… self-respect… [W]e must not forget that [the] one essential requisite condition to achieve Swaraj is the political unity between the Hindus and the Muhammadans; for the advent of foreign rule and its continuance in India is primarily due to the fact that the people of India, particularly the Hindus and the Muhammadans, are not united and do not sufficiently trust one another. The domination by the Bureaucracy will continue as along as the Hindus and the Muhammadans do not come to a settlement. I am almost inclined to say that India will get Dominion Responsible Government the day the Hindus and Muhammadans are united. Swaraj is [an] almost interchangeable term with Hindu–Muslim unity. If we wish to be a free people, let us unite… I have no doubt that if the Hindus and Muhammadans make a whole-hearted and earnest effort, we shall be able to find a solution once more as we did at Lucknow in 1916… In the case of Ireland and Egypt, mark how they have extorted their freedom from the hands of the British Parliament and the British Nation…

The rise in communal tension was a powerful explanation as to why that Jinnah’s call for Hindu–Muslim unity in 1924
101 Almeida, Jinnah: Man of Destiny, 80. Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan, 74. 102 .ateh Mohammed Malik, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Political Thought in Islam (Leicester, INPAREL Studies in South Asian History 6, forthcoming in 2002). 103 Afzal, Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 131–6. Wilfrid Cantwell Smith commented in his Modern Islam in India (rev. edn., 1946; repr. Lahore, 1963): ‘little attention was paid to it [the Muslim League] until after the non-co-operation movement collapsed and the Turkish khilafah (‘Caliphate’) was abolished. Then (1924) the Muslim League was at once revived, and its small militant group ousted.’

failed to raise the response it had achieved in 1916. The vitriol pouring from the vernacular press was a powerful factor in adding to the tension, there being ‘in many newspapers a freedom, indeed a violence of language, which, from time to time, brings within the scope of the criminal law the person put forward as Editor’.104 The United Provinces Deputy Secretary Milner White noted on 29 November 1925 the relationship between offensive communal publications and violent confrontations: ‘the main reason for the increased vigilance of the district officer is, of course, that of late years the Arya Samaj has extended its missionary activities and directed them openly and violently against Muslims. Some very objectionable books issued by them against Islam have come to notice as having been distributed broadcast — e.g. in Bijnor — and in the notes on recent publications submitted to me by the Government Examiner of Books I have been struck by the violence of polemical tracts issued by the society. They have done much to increase communal tension, and cannot — or should not — complain if their attacks sometimes recoil on their own hands.’105 Three pamphlets attacking the Prophet were published in 1923, 1924 and 1927.106 The Arya press took issue with Gandhi’s teaching on ahimsa: ‘to refrain from punishing malignant enemies and allow tyrants to do whatever they like is… tantamount to committing serious violence. The Vedas permit us to kill our enemies, both human beings and animals’.107 In his manifesto Hindutva: who is a Hindu? (1923), V. D Savarkar, the theoretician of the Hindu Mahasabha, blamed the Buddhist community for promoting the philosophy of nonviolence and decried its disastrous effects on Hindus.108 Though denounced by Gandhi and Rajagopalacharya in 1923,109 the shuddhi movement to incorporate into the main body of Hinduism former or marginal members was led by the Arya Samajist Lala Munshi Ram, known as Swami
104 105 106 107 108 109 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, i. 261. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, 34. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 170. Loc. cit. Ibid. 157.

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Shraddhanand. Shraddhanand claimed on 24 July 1923 that ‘Muslim aggression’ was the main reason for ‘enmity’ between Hindus and Muslims, especially at Malabar and Multan: ‘many of the Muslim religious leaders have said in their speeches that the snake and the mongoose can be friends, but there can be no unity between Hindu kaffirs and Muslims.’ Hindus must organize and emerge as ‘the strongest’. When Shraddhanand was assassinated in 1926, there was inevitably a rise in communal tension. Pandit Madan Mohan Malviya proposed Hindu Sabhas in every village to promote Hindu unity and regeneration. He claimed that Hindu weakness had invited assault by the ‘bad elements among the Muslims’; what was needed above all was ‘self-preservation and [the] religious safety of the Hindu community’.110 In its March 1926 resolution at Delhi, the Mahasabha urged Hindus to readmit all converts to their caste fellowship; all non-Hindus who ‘feel reverence for and express faith in Hinduism should be admitted into the Hindu fold’.111 The rallying cry was Sangathan, that is, the acquisition of strength through the consolidation of communal resources.112 Hindu support for the revivalist movement spread because of negative stereotypes and the perception that the Muslim community had gained increased strength acquired from ‘separate communal electorates’. At its session in Calcutta in April 1925, the Mahasabha passed a resolution against separate communal representation as ‘harmful and detrimental’ to the creation of national solidarity. 113 ‘..[S]uch was the hegemonic influence of the Hindu Mahasabha in the late 1920s’, writes Mushirul Hasan, ‘that even the secular-oriented Congress leadership often succumbed to its ideological pressures.’ Madan Mohan Malaviya, the former leader of the Mahasabha was ‘the most communally-minded leader’ in Hasan’s judgement, yet he ‘could assume the nationalist garb and freely sail between the Mahasabha and the Congress. No attempt was ever made to curb this trend.’114 This overlap
110 111 112 113 114 Ibid. 162. Ibid. 167. Ibid. 158. Ibid. 172. Hasan (1994), 280.

of membership between the Mahasabha and the Congress explains in part the gradual alienation of Muslim opinion in the late 1920s and 1930s. In the four-year period between the beginning of 1923 and the end of 1926 there were 72 major communal riots. This contrasted with about 16 in the period from 1900 to 1922. The new Viceroy, Lord Irwin, called Hindu-Muslim tension ‘the dominant issue in Indian life today’. He wanted a ‘new atmosphere of trust’ between Hindu and Muslim leaders and the promotion of a ‘change of soul that India needs’.115 The comments both of Dr Ambedkar116 and the Report of the Indian Statutory Commission of 1930 117 provide evidence for the rise in communal tension:
The Hindu community became disturbed by the growing stress laid by their allies on religious aims, and in August 1921 the Moplah outbreak 118 showed that there was good ground for their apprehensions… non-co-operation opened up new possibilities in the relations between Hindus and Moslems. To many of them it seemed that, if there was a possibility of political control passing before long completely out of the hands of Parliament, it became important for each community to organize and consolidate its forces in preparation for the new situation that would then arise. Movements were set on foot by both Hindus and Muhammadans for the re-conversion of classes which were said to have lapsed to the other faith. Suspicion and bitterness were the inevitable result, and in the excitement of religious festivals occasions for dispute were only too easy to find. By the middle of 1923, communal riots, marked by murder, arson and looting, were of almost monthly occurrence. In 1924 fierce outbursts occurred in many of the greater cities of the North. At Kohat, in the North-West .rontier Province, the entire Hindu population fled the town in terror of their lives. The year 1925 saw a lull in the actual rioting, but the tone of the Press and of public speeches left no doubt about the intensity of communal feeling. In April 1926, there occurred the first of a series of dangerous riots in Calcutta, 115 Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, 118. 116 Ambedkar, Pakistan, ch 7, 163–184. Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 149, quote briefly from this. 117 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, i. 249, 252–3. 118 .or Gandhi’s initial underestimate of the Moplah position (‘in Malabar the Moplahs who were a spirited people had now become disciplined under its influence [that is, the noncooperation movement]’) and subsequent condemnation of the movement: Gandhi, xxiii. 300, 18 June 1921; xxiv. 165–7, 189, 4 and 8 Sept. 1921.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination and the following twelve months saw 40 riots resulting in the death of 197 persons and injuries to nearly 1,600.119

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Subsequently in 1928–9, according to Ambedkar, the number of riots was reduced although the number of casualties actually increased, with 204 people killed in the Bombay riots.120 During the year 1929–30, he noted that ‘communal riots, which had been so conspicuous and deplorable a feature of public life during the preceding years, were very much less frequent. Only 12 were of sufficient importance to be reported to Government of India, and of these only the disturbances in the City of Bombay were really serious.’121 He further commented:122
The year 1930–1 saw the eruption of the Civil Disobedience Movement It gave rise to riots and disturbances all over the 119 Cf. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 10. Ambedkar gives figures of 197 deaths and 1,598 injuries; for 1927–8, he gives the figures of 103 killed and 1084 injured. 27 were killed and 272 in the riots in Lahore in May 1927. 120 Thus Ambedkar, Pakistan, 171–2: ‘The year 1928–29 was comparatively more peaceful than the year 1927–28. His Excellency Lord Irwin, by his speeches to the Central Legislature and outside, had given a strong impetus to the attempts to find some basis for agreement between the two communities, on those questions of political importance, which were responsible for the strained relations between them. .ortunately the issues arising out of the inquiry by the Simon Commission, which was appointed in 1929, absorbed a large part of the energy and attention of the different communities, with the result that less importance came to be attached to local causes of conflict, and more importance to the broad question of constitutional policy. Moreover, the legislation passed during the autumn session of the Indian Legislature in 1927 penalising the instigation of inter-communal hostility by the press, had some effect in improving the inter-communal disturbances. The number of riots during the twelve months ending with March 31st, 1929, was 22. Though the number of riots was comparatively small, the casualties — swelled heavily by the Bombay riots — were very serious, no fewer than 204 persons having been killed and nearly a thousand injured. Of these, the fortnight’s rioting in Bombay accounts for 149 killed and 739 injured. Seven of these 22 riots, or roughly one-third of them, occurred on the day of the celebration of the annual Muslim festival of Bakr-i-Id at the end of May. The celebration of this festival is always a dangerous time in Hindu-Muslim relations [because of Hindu objections to Muslim ritual cow-killing].’ 121 Ibid. 173. 122 Ibid. 174–5.

Ambedkar characterized communal tensions as ‘twenty years of civil war… interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace’.123 Gandhi himself deplored the Hindu–Muslim riots in Kanpur (Cawnpore) in 1931, which made him despair of the possibility of any agreed constitutional progress:124 ‘let it be remembered by those who are in a hurry to achieve India’s freedom that every such strife makes progress
123 Ibid. 184. Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 58. 124 Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, 139. .or the Congress enquiry following the riots: Roots of Communal Politics, ed. N. Gerald Barrier (Columbia, Mo., 1976). This enquiry proposed a a fusion of the ‘so-called “separate” [Hindu and Muslim] cultures’: ibid. 404. It also rejected separate electorates as communally divisive and urged that ‘Congress should on no account agree to its continuance’. Ibid. 414. But there was a minority Muslim report which rejected this idea on the grounds that ‘so long as the general attitude of high-caste Hindus, who have at present almost the monopoly of all that is worth having, does not undergo a radical change…’ He also rejected the report’s idea of a fusion of Hindu and Muslim cultures: ibid. 467, 472. Ambedkar, Pakistan, 177, stated categorically: ‘this communal riot, which need never have occurred but for the provocative conduct of the adherents of the Congress, was the worst which India has experienced for many years. The trouble, moreover, spread from the city to the neighbouring villages, where there were sporadic communal disturbances for several days afterwards.’

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towards the goal more and more difficult.’125 The Report of the Indian Statutory Commission of 1930 stated that ‘in the early months of 1927 it looked as if the communal question would govern political movements throughout India to the exclusion of everything else…’126 Motilal Nehru was particularly gloomy in his verdict:127
The only education the masses are getting is in communal hatred. It is not true today [30 March 1927] as it certainly was a couple of years ago that communal strife was confined to cities128 and was not known in the villages. The latter now are more frequently the scenes of communal riots than the former…

event, the Report of the Committee chaired by Motilal Nehru rejected separate electorates without any compensating guarantees for the Muslim community. Jinnah addressed the All-Parties National Convention at Calcutta on 22 December 1928 in the hope of securing amendments to the Report:131
We are here... for the purpose of entering into [a] solemn contract and all parties who enter into it will have to work for it and fight for it together. What we want is that Hindus and Mussalmans should march together until our object is obtained. Therefore, it is essential that you must get not only the Muslim League but the Mussalmans of India and here I am not speaking as a Mussalman but as an Indian… [Without disrespect to Sikhs, Christians and Parsis, the Hindus and Muslims are the two major communities in India.] Minorities cannot give anything to the majority… Look at the constitutional history of Canada and Egypt. The minorities are always afraid of the majorities. The majorities are apt to be tyrannical and oppressive and particularly religious majorities and the minorities, therefore, have a right to be absolutely secured… If you do not settle this question today, we shall have to settle it tomorrow, but in the meantime our national interests are bound to suffer. We are all sons of this land. We have to live together. We have to work together and whatever our differences may be, let us at any rate not create more bad blood. If we cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to differ but let us part as friends…

.or the Muslim community, the year 1927 was particularly difficult, because its politics was fragmented to an unprecedented extent. The Jinnah Group drafted the Delhi Muslim Proposals of 20 March 1927 which, under certain safeguards, were prepared to envisage joint electorates. Jinnah’s statement to the Associated Press on 29 March denied that the issue was one of principle:129
The question of separate or mixed electorates is after all a method and a means to an end. The end in view is that Mussalmans should be made to feel that they are secure and safeguarded against any act of oppression on the part of the majority, and that they need not fear that during the transitional stage towards the fullest development of national government the majority would be in a position to oppress or tyrannize the minority, as majorities are prone to do in other countries… the real issue is how to give a sense of confidence and security to the minorities.

The Shafi group denounced the Delhi Muslim Proposals as ‘formulated by some Muslims in their individual capacity’; they were unacceptable to the Muslims of India.130 In the
125 Gandhi, li. 302, 26 March 1931. The Aga Khan commented: ‘the dreadful events of Cawnpore and elsewhere in India in March of this year made Muslims more than ever nervous as to their future’. Aga Khan III, ed. Aziz, ii. 864. 126 Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, i. 257. 127 Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 12. 128 .or more recent communal rioting as primarily an urban phenomenon: A. Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life. Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven and London, 2002). 129 Afzal, Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 252. 130 Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 154.

The amendments proposed by Jinnah were all lost. Instead, Congress decided to give a one-year ultimatum to the British government to accept the Nehru Report by the end of 1930 and grant independence (not Dominion status as the Report had suggested) or else face a campaign of non-cooperation.132 .or Jinnah, these decisions and Gandhi’s reemergence as a political leader marked the final parting of the ways with Congress.
131 Afzal, Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 294–5. Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, 279, noted the ‘five communalist amendments to the Nehru Report. Of these, the most important was a proposal to reserve for the Muslim community one-third of the seats in the central legislature. The Congress refused to make any such concession, and nothing came of the suggested alliance.’ .or Jinnah and the Nehru report: Hasan (1994), 273–6. 132 Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 35, 37. Subsequently, the date for independence was brought forward to the end of 1929.

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Professor Richard Bonney relied… Objections from this quarter, more than anything else, accentuated division over the Nehru Report, and this in spite of the very ingenious and persuasive analysis which that Report contained of the distribution of religious opinion in Bengal and the Punjab… All the Muhammadan bodies which appeared before us agreed in demanding the retention of separate electorates. Though a few spoke of the possibility of this system disappearing eventually, none of them was ready to set any time limit or formulate any explicit conditions under which this would become possible. There were some minor variations of opinion on the subject of the number of seats to be filled by Muhammadans, but there was general agreement with the view endorsed at the All-India Muslim Conference of January 1929. As far as we have been able to ascertain, the recommendations of this conference, which, of course, covered a wide range and were not confined to the question under consideration at the moment, have now found very wide acceptance among the Muhammadans in India. The minority of their leaders who were formerly prepared to take a less uncompromising view on the subject of communal representative have recently moved nearer to the majority. We have thought it well therefore to reproduce in an appendix at the end of this chapter the text of the resolutions of 1 January 1929.137 Moderate Hindus, as can be seen from the views expressed by Provincial Committees, are often ready to agree that Muhammadans must not be deprived against their will of separate electorates; but they share (with hardly a dissentient) the view of their co-religionists (who press for the immediate disappearance of this form of representation) that the proper system to adopt is that of joint electorates, with reservation of seats, as long as the need for any such protection is insisted on. There can be no doubt that political Hinduism as a whole is strongly opposed to any separate representation of Moslem interests which goes beyond this point. Most of those who take this view would calculate on the basis of population the number of seats to be reserved.

A few days later, Jinnah participated in the All-Parties Muslim League Conference presided over by the Aga Khan at Delhi on 31 December 1928. The Aga Khan had already denounced the Nehru Report.133 At the conference his call was for a clear rejection of the Nehru Report:134
The changes that must come over India profoundly affecting our future, will not come in a day. They will not come as in Russia like a thief in the night… Whatever our wishes may be, this Conference is but the first of many more that will have to evolve a truly representative body to look after and further the desires of Muslims of India… It is impossible for Muslims to live happily and peacefully in India if friction and suspicion are to prevail between them and the Hindus… India as a whole cannot be a prosperous or self-governing country if such a large and important section of the community as the Muslims remain[s] in doubt as to whether their cultural entity is safe or not… The merits and demerits of separate or so-called communal electorates have been discussed so often that it is unnecessary to re-examine them in detail. In regard to the implications of the term ‘communal’, I may remark in passing that the Muslims of India are not a community, but in a restricted, special, sense a nation composed of many communities and [a] population… outnumbering… even… the pre-war German Empire. The vital and dominant consideration… is the real representation of Muslims in all legislatures and self-governing bodies. How that can be secured is a problem for the Muslim population of this country to consider and solve without any prejudices.

The decision of the Conference on 1 January 1929 was that separate electorates were the law of the land and the Muslim community could not be deprived of them without their consent.135 The Simon Commission rehearsed the arguments for and against communal representation, but noted ‘the indisputable fact that the Muhammadan community as a whole is not prepared to give up communal representation’; indeed, it136
would regard its abolition, without the assent of that community, not only as the withdrawal of a security which it prizes but as a cancelling of assurances upon which it has 133 134 135 136 Aga Khan III, ed. Aziz, ii. 813–24. Ibid. ii. 829–34. Ibid. ii. 835–6. Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, ii. 58–9.

Jinnah argued that the Nehru Report could ‘at best be treated only as Hindu counter-proposals’ to the Delhi Muslim proposals of 20 March 1927.138 His group within the Muslim League settled upon a Resolution containing .ourteen Points of disagreement with the Nehru Report and embodying basic principles to safeguard Muslim rights and interests, including
137 Ibid. ii. 84–5. 138 Afzal, Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 297.

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a federal constitution with the residuary powers vested in the provinces.139 Gandhi received a copy of Jinnah’s .ourteen Points from a Muslim deputation on 4 April 1931. His willingness to concede to the Muslim point of view, to grant them a ‘blank cheque’, was overridden by the relatively small number of Congress Muslims whose allegiance to the party gave it some credence to be more than a Hindu body, yet who vehemently opposed separate electorates.140 In a press statement on 6 April 1931, Gandhi rejected separate electorates since Muslim support for these was not unanimous.141 At the Second Round Table Conference in London on 15 September, Gandhi declared that Congress claimed to represent all Indian communities, classes and interests and that he alone acted as its representative.142 Yet Gandhi’s status as a national leader had already been considerably weakened because, with the exception of the North-West .rontier Province, there had been no significant Muslim support for his campaign of disobedience.143 This had undercut his claim that between the government and the people the Congress
139 Ibid. 302–5. Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 166–7. 140 Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 221. 141 Ibid. 222. Gandhi, li. 352–3. 142 Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 251. Gandhi, liii. 359– 66, 15 Sept. 1931: at the .ederal Structure Committee, Gandhi proclaimed that Congress ‘has had nearly 50 years of life, during which period it has, without any interruption, held its annual session. It is what it means — national. It represents no particular community, no particular class, no particular interest. It claims to represent all Indian interests and all classes… The position the Congress took up in 1920 remains the same today; and so you will see the Congress has attempted from its very beginning to be what it described itself to be, namely, national in every sense of the term... the Congress represents, in its essence, the dumb, semi-starved millions scattered over the length and breadth of the land in its 700,000 villages, no matter whether they come from what is called British India or what is called Indian India.’ Also Gandhi liii. 463, 8 Oct. 1931: ‘Congress claims to represent the whole nation, and most decidedly the dumb millions, among whom are included the numberless untouchables, who are more suppressed than depressed, as also in a way the more unfortunate and neglected classes known as Backward Races.’ 143 Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 137, 139, 145, 148–9.

should be considered the sole intermediary, a claim rejected by the colonial government in India.144 In the minorities committee, the ‘Untouchables’ leader Dr B. R. Ambedkar pressed for separate representation of the Depressed Classes. Gandhi replied that Congress only accepted Muslims and Sikhs as separate political entities. The Muslims had attached other allies to themselves, with agreement on joint proposals reached on the basis of separate electorates and an assured membership of provincial and central cabinets by the representatives of the main minorities.145 Gandhi rejected the minorities’ pact as a mechanism for ‘vivisection’, a term he would later use about partition.146 It is possible to gauge the new self-confidence of the Muslims in view of this informal alliance with other minorities. In a broadcast to the United States form London on 27 September 1931, the Aga Khan anticipated Jinnah’s ‘two nations theory’ by nine years and declared:147
The Muslims of India differ from the Hindus in most matters which can divide one set of people from another. They differ in customs, in habits, in laws, and above all, in their food and in their clothes. They also differ in cultural and economic ideals. In India there is such a thing as the untouchable. The Muslim religion teaches us that all men are created equal. To them it is a sin to consider any human being as untouchable. We believe that one man has as good a right to walk erect on God’s earth as any other man. Our religion gives equal rights to both men and women… The difference between the Muslims and Hindus of India is, therefore, more than religious. It is greater than the difference of Protestants and Catholics in Ireland, or even of .rench Canadians and English Canadians in Canada. We all regret that India should be a house divided against itself. Alas! Recent events in India show that some people fly at the throats of others on the least excuse. The dreadful events of Cawnpore and elsewhere in India in March of this year made the Muslims more than ever nervous as to their future… But the Muslims want such a .ederal Constitution for India as will safeguard their legitimate interests. They want something that will save… their ideals from being submerged. They ask for an adequate share in the .ederal Legislature, as also in 144 145 146 147 Low, Britain and Indian Nationalism, 134, 149. Brown, Gandhi and Civil Disobedience, 247, 249. Ibid. 250. Gandhi, liv. 66, 134, 20 Oct and 9 Nov. 1931. Aga Khan III, ed. Aziz, ii. 863–5.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination the .ederal administration of India, and they claim selfdetermination, as well as fully autonomous administrations, for all racial and linguistic areas — and particularly for those areas which have a majority Muslim population. They want to decide freely for themselves whether they will keep the institution of separate electorates for their protection or not. They do not want the right, borrowed by India from the experience of some European Constitutions, to be forcibly taken from them. They will resist to the last any attempt which, under colour of democracy, places them at the mercy of any other section.

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4 Prelude to the Lahore Declaration: the Search for Pakistan and the Growth of Communal Politics, 1933–1940
Two distinct ideas of a Muslim homeland need to be distinguished at the outset. The first is the idea of a distinct Muslim ‘nationality’ that might (or might not) lead to the call for a separate homeland. The second idea was that certain provinces had a Muslim majority population and that these might act as a bastion for a separate identity: this idea of a homeland might be no more than a support for provincial separatism; taken at its extreme, however, it might lead to the demand for a separate state. The fusion of these two ideas might, eventually, lead to both the demand for a separate state and the justification for the demand. However strongly both ideas had surfaced by 1940, their fusion in the Lahore declaration was by no means complete. Only two months before the Lahore resolution was passed, Jinnah had spoken of a new constitution which might recognize that there were ‘in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland’.148 It is incorrect to argue that Jinnah originated the argument that Hindus and Muslims were two separate ‘nations’. This argument was already projected by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, best known for his theory of Koranic exegesis,149 who was
148 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 57. 149 Ahmad and von Grunebaum, Muslim Self-statement in India and Pakistan, 25–48.

also the founder of Mohammedan Education Congress in 1886 (later, in 1890, renamed Conference, to show that it had nothing to do with the Indian National Congress). It was he who talked of the parliamentary form of government as ‘unsuited to a country containing two or more nations’ which might tend ‘to oppress the numerically weaker’. The few Muslims who had joined Congress did not imply that the whole Muslim nation had joined that organization, he claimed on 14 March 1888.150 The following month, he contested the idea that Congress could be composed of two nations who had such different opinions and only happened to agree on some small points. The divisions shown at the time of the Mutiny, and the damage the repression had caused the Muslim community, still haunted him.151 His determination to oppose Congress led later in 1888 to the founding of the Indian Patriotic Association, which was intended to comprise Muslims and Hindus who were opposed to Congress. Separate nationalities as an idea was thus reconcilable with an all-India position. The idea of creating a separate Muslim homeland was more ambiguous. The term ‘Pakstan’ was formulated by Choudhary Rahmat Ali and first used in a pamphlet published in January 1933 entitled Now or Never. Later, Rahmat Ali recalled its meaning, which was drawn from the first letter of the main provinces which would form a Muslim homeland.152 The ‘i’ was added to make it
150 Ghosh, The Development of the Indian National Congress, 148. Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 52 n. 30. Jalal notes the different context of the late nineteenth-century. 151 Ghosh, The Development of the Indian National Congress, 149. 152 ‘“Pakistan” is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands — “Indian” and “Asian”. That is, Panjab, Afghania (North West .rontier Province), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kach and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks — the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the religious beliefs and ethnical stocks of our people; and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our original .atherland. It has no other origin and no other meaning; and it does not admit of any other interpretation. Those writers who have tried to interpret it in more than way have done so either through the love of casuistry, or through ignorance of its inspiration, origin and composition.’ C. R. Ali, Pakistan: the .atherland of the Pak

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‘Pakistan’ and thus ease pronunciation, which sounded similar to ‘Afghanistan’ and therefore more familiar. The name permitted the formation in 1933 of a party committed to the cause of a national homeland, the Pakistan National Movement. But, as the representatives of the All-India Muslim League expressed it, in evidence before the Joint Select Committee of Parliament on Indian Constitutional Reform, the campaign was condemned at the time as ‘only a student’s scheme, chimerical and impractical’.153 However, though he originated the name, Rahmat Ali was not the originator of the idea of a Muslim homeland. That honour, he claimed, rested with Sardar Muhammad Gul Khan, who in the course of his evidence before the North-West .rontier Committee in 1923 stated:
We [Muslims] would very much rather see the separation of the [Hindus] and Muhammadans, 23 crores of [Hindus] to the south and eight crores of Muslims to the north. Give the whole portion of India from Raskumari [Cape Comorin] to Agra to [Hindus] and from Agra to Peshawar to Muslims.154

The most famous declaration in favour of a Muslim homeland was that of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, ‘the immortal poet of Islam’ as Ali called him, as well as a highly significant political thinker and philosopher, in his presidential speech at the Allahabad session of the All-India Muslim League in 1930:
…The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified… I would like to see the Punjab, North-West .rontier, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, and the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India… The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory… the Muslim demand… is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secur[ing] permanent communal dominance in the whole of India… I, therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. .or India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power…157

The following year Maulana Hasrat Mohani entered into discussions with the Hindus, in which the bi-communal (Hindu–Muslim) basis for the future independent India was recognized; the Hindu and Muslim majority provinces would become states with communal majorities; and there would be a federation under a supreme national government comprising Hindus and Muslims. The idea was a free Islam in a free federal India. Later in the same year, the Hindu Lala Lajpat Rai accepted the idea of partitioning India into Hindu and Muslim states.155 Muslim India would include Afghania, Western Panjab, Sind, Eastern Bengal and other parts of India inhabited by ‘compact Muslim communities’.156 So far as is known, Rai’s was the first Hindu proposal to accept the idea of partition, which won Choudhary Rahmat Ali’s plaudit as ‘a decisive step in the right direction’.
Nation (3rd edn, Cambridge, 1947), 225 note. The first edition was published in 1935. There is a website devoted to Rahmat Ali: <www.slam33.freeserve.co.uk/pakistan.htm>. Ali, Pakistan: the .atherland of the Pak Nation, 231. Ibid. 215. A crore was 10 million or 100 lakhs. Rai, however, was closely associated with Hindu Mahasabha so his viewpoint was one of Hindu communalism. Ibid. 216–17.

153 154 155 156

Iqbal’s aim was to create (or perhaps, more accurately, articulate) a ‘Muslim India within India’. .or Iqbal, ‘we Muslims have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die’, while to Hindus he stated: ‘the unity of the Indian nation must be sought not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many.’ .or Choudhary Rahmat Ali, Iqbal’s demand for an Indian federation was ‘a thing against which we have been fighting since 1933’; but he recalled with gratitude that the speech ‘re-inspired our people to think in terms of the consolidation of our nation, [it] revived the issue of our future, and riveted our gaze on our homelands in the north-west of “India”’.158 In May 1937, Iqbal wrote to Jinnah on ‘the gravity of the situation as far as Muslim India is concerned… a
157 Ibid. 218–20. Muslim self-statement in India and Pakistan, ed. Ahmad and von Grunebaum, 150–1. 158 Ali, Pakistan: the .atherland of the Pak Nation, 220–1.

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political organization which gives no promise of improving the lot of the average Muslim cannot attract our masses’. The enforcement and development of shariat law was ‘impossible in this country without a free Muslim state or states… I still believe this to be the only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims as well as to secure a peaceful India. If such a thing is impossible in India the only other alternative is a civil war which as a matter of fact has been going on for some time in the shape of the Hindu– Muslim riots…’159 There can be no doubt that Iqbal exercised a profound influence on Jinnah. On the news of his death in April 1938, his tribute was fulsome: ‘To me he was a personal friend, philosopher and guide and as such the main source of my inspiration and spiritual support.’ He had played ‘a signal part’ in the unified platform of the All-India Muslim League. He was ‘the staunchest and most loyal champion’ of its policy and programme and one of the greatest Indians who ever lived. No greater blow could have been struck against the Muslim cause than the death of Iqbal.160 Later, when an annual Iqbal day (25 March) had been established, Jinnah paid a further tribute to the man: ‘if I were offered to make a choice between the works of Iqbal and the rulership of the Muslim state, I would prefer the former’. Iqbal ‘was not only a great poet who had a permanent place in the history of the world’s best literature, he was a dynamic personality who, during his lifetime, made the greatest contribution towards rousing and developing [the] Muslim national consciousness.’161 Yet before 1940 Jinnah himself scarcely alluded to Iqbal’s idea of a Muslim India within India or, for that matter, to the idea of creating Pakistan as a Muslim homeland. That task was left to Choudhary Rahmat Ali, who was nothing if not consistent in his statements in favour of Pakistan from 1933 to 1947.
159 Muslim self-statement in India and Pakistan, ed. Ahmad and von Grunebaum, 151–2. 160 Yusufi, ii. 795–6, 21 April 1938. 161 Yusufi, ii. 1188–9. He stated that after April 1936 ‘until the end of his life’ Iqbal had ‘stood like a rock by him’. In 1941 he called him ‘the greatest interpreter of Islam in modern times’: Yusufi, ii. 1340.

Choudhary Rahmat Ali’s speech to Supreme Council of the Pakistan National Movement held at Karachi on 8 March 1940 may be taken as the definitive statement of his minority Muslim viewpoint on the eve of the Lahore Declaration. In it, he stressed a bi-national solution for the sub-continent and the dangers of the ‘great and growing forces of “Indianism”’. The choice for Muslims was between a heroic or even martyr’s fate as against submission, and joining ‘the helots of careerism’.
In the world today it is the territorial unit which defines the position of a nation, the jurisdiction of a state, and the domain of a sovereignty. This is axiomatic, as also is the fact that all our present anxieties and alarms in ‘India’ originate in the mischievous myth of ‘Indian’ territorial unity; and that, unless and until this myth is once and for all exploded, there is no hope for us… [On] the premise of the territorial unity of ‘India’, ‘Indianism’ will create the central government, control its civil administration, and command its military arm; and that if, and when, sure of its power, it will, in the name of democracy and with the help of British bayonets, make use of that power to coerce and crush us — its prey — into complete captivity.162

If ‘bi-nationalism’ was the first half of the fundamental creed of the small Pakistan National Movement, the other half therefore had to be ‘de-Indianisation’. Choudhary Rahmat Ali’s contended that the All-India Muslim League had lost the plot, since it was founded at a time ‘when we foolishly linked our fate to “India”… its very name bears the stamp of “Indianism” and so belies our struggle against “Indianism”’. Instead, Ali pronounced, ‘we must scrap the All-India Muslim League as such and create an alliance of the nations of Pakistan, Bengal and Osmanistan’.163 It was a last cry of despair from the leader of a minority movement which was to be rapidly pushed even further to the margins of irrelevance by the League’s adoption the Lahore Resolution. Though the scheme for ‘Osmanistan’ may be considered to have been unrealistic, Ali at least sought to address the residual problem of the 35 million Muslims he calculated would be left in India, who formed one-third of the Muslim community (millat). Critics of the demand for Pakistan
162 Ali, Pakistan: the .atherland of the Pak Nation, 238–55, at 242–3. 163 Ibid. 253–5. Osmanistan was Ali’s name for a proposed Muslim state of Hyderabad–Deccan in central India.

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Professor Richard Bonney people’ [that is, Choudhary Rahmat Ali] 167… If there is any mischief-maker, who wants to create mischief, God alone can stop him: I cannot stop him. Everybody who has got any intelligence, who is honest, understands perfectly well what we mean when we say Pakistan: we mean the Lahore resolution. 168

autonomy in the Lahore Declaration argued that it failed to address this central issue. Rahmat Ali’s earlier answer to this dilemma had been: ‘as to the future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those safeguards to nonMuslim minorities in Pakistan which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan.’ The internal logic to Choudhary Rahmat Ali’s scheme of 1940 was that ‘minorityism’ was to be avoided at all costs. As he argued in October 1942, ‘we must not leave our minorities in [Hindu] lands, even if the British and the [Hindus] offer them the so-called constitutional safeguards. .or no safeguards can be a substitute for nationhood which is their birthright’.164 This argument led Choudhary Rahmat Ali to develop increasingly complex schemes for the creation of other Muslim homelands which would prevent minorities being left to the mercy of a Hindu majority within an India from which Pakistan had been separated. As these schemes evolved, so the Pakistan National Movement became increasingly isolated as a minority movement within the Muslim separatist agitation. The ‘Pak Plan’ in its definitive form aimed to integrate 100 million Muslims (sic: the highest figure talked of was 90 million by Jinnah165 and others) in ten countries, of which Pakistan would be just one.166 The scheme was too complicated to be easily understood by the masses, who could not easily be mobilized for such a cause. More importantly, the scheme was incapable of realization: it would have been opposed by the British, the Congress and the Muslim League. By so placing himself on the fringe of mainstream Muslim politics, Choudhary Rahmat Ali left the centre ground to Jinnah, for whom the word ‘Pakistan’ after March 1940 became synonymous with the Lahore Resolution. It had the advantage of being readily comprehensible:
It is no use saying this word Pakistan is ‘misused by some 164 Ibid. 267. 165 Yusufi, ii. 1326. 166 Ali, Pakistan: the .atherland of the Pak Nation, 373. The others were Bangistan, Osmanistan, Siddiqistan, .aruqistan, Haidaristan, Muinistan, Maplistan, Safiistan and Nasaristan.

Not only was it readily comprehensible, it could easily be summarized and commented on in the media:
The Lahore resolution inter alia laid down that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to [Muslims] unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign… Some confusion prevails in the minds of some individuals in regard to the use of the word ‘Pakistan’. This word has become synonymous with the Lahore resolution owing to the fact that it is a convenient and compendious method of describing the Lahore resolution quoted above. .or this reason the British and Indian newspapers generally have adopted the word ‘Pakistan’ to describe the Muslim demand as embodied in the Lahore resolution. I really see no objection to it and I fail to understand why some people are making a mountain out of this molehill. 169

However, this lay in the future. Until then, Jinnah was involved in establishing the Muslim League as a viable challenger to the Congress party. Between 1936 and 1942, Jinnah singlemindedly sought to reorganize the Muslim League on a totally new footing, to broaden the organization of the party and to intensify communalist propaganda. Jawalharlal Nehru threw down the gauntlet, stating that the Muslim League’s demands had ‘nothing to do with the masses…’ He claimed that he
167 Moore comments on the diversity of schemes embodying ‘Pakistan’ in 1940: ‘any precise scheme must surely divide the League’. Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan demand’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 185. 168 Yusufi, ii. 1337. Viceroy Lord Linlithgow nevertheless argued as late as 2 May 1943 that ‘half the strength of his [Jinnah’s] position is that he has refused to define it and I am quite certain that he would refuse to define it now if asked to…’: M. Hasan, ‘Introduction’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 27. 169 Yusufi, ii. 1319–20.

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Professor Richard Bonney later insisted on the Hindu Mahasabha’s agreeing also; and on the grounds of the Mahasabha’s non-adherence, the League was able to repudiate the whole business.

was in better touch with the Muslim masses than Jinnah and ‘most members of the Muslim League. There were only two forces in the country, the Congress and the British colonial government.170 Jinnah contended there was a third party, the Muslims,171 and the ‘busybody President’172 of Congress (Nehru), ‘torn between Benares and Moscow’,173 should not ‘poke his nose into everything’. He refuted Nehru’s contention that there was no Hindu–Muslim question and that the minorities’ problem did not exist in India.174 Jinnah specifically rejected the Congress accusation that the Muslim League rejected ‘complete freedom and self-government’ for India; but he asserted that there could not be ‘acquisition first, and distribution afterwards, or in the latest dictum, “possession first and partition afterwards”’.175 There was ‘no communalism or religion involved’ in the demand for the protection of a minority against the tyranny of the majority.176 Wilfrid Cantwell Smith commented on the spoiling tactics of the Muslim League:177
Its method of refusal [to co-operate] was to postulate an utterly impossible ‘condition’ and then to adopt an air of offended generosity when this was not accepted. Its demand was that before any negotiations between Congress and [the] League might even be begun, the Congress must constitute itself [as] a Hindu communalist body, and must pledge itself not to recognize any Muslim who was not member of the League. There was no reason whatever why the Congress either should or could accede to this fantastic proposition… Actually, back in 1935, before the League’s subsequent role had been assumed in its full vigour, a communal pact was reached by Jinnah and the Congress president, Rajindra Prashad.178 The Congress agreed to the pact; but the League 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 Almeida, Jinnah. Man of Destiny, 113–14. Yusufi, i. 461. Ibid. i. 523. Ibid. i. 469. Ibid. i. 495. Ibid. i. 641. Ibid. i. 643–4. Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, 286. Joint statement of Jinnah and Prasad, 1 March 1935: Yusufi, i. 128. Jinnah observed that in 1935 ‘he spent four or five weeks holding conferences with Babu Ranjendra Prasad (then President of the Congress) and trying to get the Muslim viewpoint accepted at least by the Congress leaders if not by the Hindu Mahasabha.’ Yusufi, i. 509.

The Muslim League reorganization was not accomplished in time for the 1937 elections. At this time, less than 4.5 per cent of the Muslim electorate was persuaded to vote for the League, ‘a sorry showing indeed’ in Wilfrid Cantwell Smith’s phrase. The Muslim League’s next move was to persuade ‘a majority of the Muslim members of the provincial legislatures, already elected on some other platform, to join the League’. In this way, it came to have considerable strength in the four non-Congress provinces. In three of these (Assam, Bengal, Sind) there were unstable coalition ministries; in the fourth (the Punjab) there was a Unionist pseudo-coalition, dominated by Sir Sikander Hayat Khan, which was strong. As Smith observed, .azl al Haq in Bengal179 and Hayat Khan in the Punjab were ‘refractory and undependable supporters of the League and its autarchical president. They did not owe their position and power to the League; rather vice versa, for without these two men the League’s claim to represent Muslim India would have been shakier than ever.’180 The rallying cry was given by Jinnah in his presidential address to the annual session of the Muslim League meeting at Lucknow on 15 October 1937,181 in terms which Gandhi referred to as ‘a declaration of war’:182
179 .or Haq: Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, 189–216. 180 Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, 283. The modern overview of these difficult relationships is Jalal, The Sole Spokesman. 181 Alemida, Jinnah. Man of Destiny, 116, called the speech ‘the beginning of the end of the nationalist Jinnah’. 182 Yusufi, i. 645–57. .oundations of Pakistan. All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906–1947. II. 1924–1947, ed. S. S. Pirzada (Karachi and Dacca, 1970), 265–73. Gandhi’s remark is at Gandhi, lxxii. 353, 19 Oct. 1937. Jinnah replied to Gandhi on 5 Nov. 1937: ‘I am sorry you think my speech at Lucknow is a declaration of war. It is purely in self-defence. Kindly read it again and try and understand it. Evidently, you have not been following the course of events of the last twelve months.’ Gandhi, lxxii. 494. Gandhi commented on 3 .ebruary 1938: ‘In your speeches I miss the old nationalist. When in 1915 I

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more, by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu; and since they have formed governments in the six provinces where they are in a majority, they have by their words, deeds and programme shown, more and more that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands. Wherever they were in a majority and wherever it suited them, they refused to co-operate with the Muslim League parties and demanded unconditional surrenders and the signing of their pledges. The demand was insistent: abjure your party and foreswear your policy and programme and liquidate the Muslim League… On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand: that Hindustan is for the Hindus. Only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mince words.183 The result of the present Congress Party policy will be, I venture to say, class bitterness, communal war and a strengthening of the imperialistic hold as a consequence… God only helps those who help themselves… I want the Musalmans to believe in themselves and take their destiny in their own hands… Organize yourselves, establish your solidarity and complete unity. Equip yourselves as trained and disciplined soldiers… a well-knit, solid, organized, united force can face any danger, and withstand any opposition to its united front and wishes. There is magic power in your own hands…

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Professor Richard Bonney The Congressite Musalmans are making a great mistake when they preach unconditional surrender. It is the height of a defeatist mentality to throw yourselves on the mercy and goodwill of others, and the highest act of perfidy 184 to the Musalman community; and if that policy is adopted, let me tell you, the community will seal its doom and cease to play its rightful part in the national life of the country and the government… Do not be disturbed by the slogans and such taunts as are used against the Musalmans, ‘communalists’, ‘toadies’ and ‘reactionaries’… These terms and words of abuse are intended to create an inferiority complex among the Musalmans, and to demoralize them; and are intended to sow discord in our midst and give us a bad name in the world abroad. This is the standard of a propaganda which can only be treated with contempt. The All-India Muslim League certainly and definitely stands to safeguard the rights and interests of the Musalmans and other minorities effectively. That is its basic and cardinal principle. That is the casus belli. That is why the Muslim League and those who stand by it have incurred the displeasure of the Congress… The Congress attempt, under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Musalmans, is calculated to divide and weaken and break the Musalmans, and is an effort to detach them from their accredited leaders. It is a dangerous move but it cannot mislead anyone. All such manoeuvres will not succeed, notwithstanding the various blandishments, catchwords and slogans. The only honest and straightforward course is to give the minorities a fair deal… There are forces which may bully you, tyrannize over you and intimidate you, and you may even have to suffer. But it is by going through this crucible of the fire of persecution which may be levelled against you, the tyranny that may be exercised, the threats and intimidations that may unnerve you — it is by resisting, by overcoming, by facing these disadvantages, hardships and suffering and maintaining your true convictions and loyalty, that a nation will emerge, worthy of its past glory and history and will live to make its future history greater and more glorious not only in India, but in the annals of the world. Eighty millions of Musalmans in India have nothing to fear. They have their destiny in their hands…

returned from the self-imposed exile in South Africa, everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both Hindus and Mussalmans. Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah? Gandhi lxxii. 446. Jinnah replied on 15 .eb. 1938: ‘Nationalism is not the monopoly of any single individual; and in these days it is very difficult to define it: but I don’t wish to pursue this line of controversy any further.’ Ibid. lxxii. 503. Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 59–60. 183 Jinnah had earlier commented (1 July 1937) that ‘at times it is very difficult to say who are Congress leaders and who are Mahasabha leaders, for the line of demarcation between the two with regard to a large number of them is very thin indeed’. Yusufi, i. 513. Subsequently, in December 1938, Congress branded both the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League as communal organizations: Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936–1947 (Delhi, 1987, repr. 1997), 41. However, Viceroy Lord Linlithgow reported that Sardar Patel encouraged Dr B S Moonje, the architect of the Hindu Mahasabha to ‘stand firm on a variety of points in the interest of Hinduism’: Hasan, ‘Introduction’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 13.

Jinnah lamented the fact that Gandhi decided to be ‘guided by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as Dr. Ansari is no more’ (Document One). But while Azad’s credentials in the Khilafat movement were impeccable and his longevity in the
184 Jinnah subsequently referred to nationalist Muslims, including the Mullahs who sided with them or encouraged them, as ‘traitors’ on 5 .ebruary 1938: Yusufi, ii. 727.

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Congress cause led him to become the President of Congress during World War II and immediately after, as well as Education Minister in the independent India,185 Azad was essentially untypical of Muslims who supported Congress. In spite of a flirtation with a Muslim ‘mass contact’ movement in 1937–8, relatively few Muslims transferred to the Congress cause.186 By March 1942, Gandhi recognized just how weak their position was: ‘receiving aid from members of another faith will only expose your own weakness. Besides, other members of your own faith will view it with suspicion and the poison will spread. The matter needs to be viewed with discretion. We come across very few nationalist Muslims who are strong enough. They lack self-confidence. They would not even be able to explain why they are nationalist.’187
185 Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) is studied by Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, 219–53. His speech on 23 October 1947 after Partition reveals Azad’s sense of futility and weakness: ‘Do you remember? I hailed you, you cut off my tongue. I picked up my pen, you severed my hand. I wanted to move forward, you cut off my legs. I tried to turn over, and you injured my back. When the bitter political games of the last seven years were at their peak, I tried to wake you up at every danger signal… Today, mine is no more than an inert existence or a forlorn cry…The Partition of India was a fundamental mistake. The manner in which religious differences were incited, inevitably, led to the devastation that we have seen with our own eyes… the debacle of Indian Muslims is the result of the colossal blunders committed by the Muslim League’s misguided leadership…’ R. Zakaria, The Widening Divide. An Insight into Hindu–Muslim Relations (Delhi, 1996), 87–8. Azad convinced himself that partition would be ‘short-lived’ since ‘the division only on the map and not in the hearts of people’: A. Roy, ‘The High Politics of India’s Partition’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 127. 186 M. Hasan, ‘The Muslim Mass Contacts Campaign: analysis of a strategy of political mobilization’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 133–159. Hasan concludes that Congress let an opportunity slip and allowed Jinnah to ‘take advantage of deteriorating communal relations and rally his community around the divisive symbol of a separate Muslim homeland’. 187 Gandhi lxxxii. 94, 5 March 1942. Gandhi had been advised: ‘a majority of the well-to-do Muslims belong to the League, because they see their interests better served that way. The poorer Muslims are handicapped by paucity of funds in their nationalist activities. If they ask for funds it is assumed that they

A meeting between Jinnah and Gandhi on 28 April 1938 achieved little, although Jinnah kept a note of his demands (Document Three). By December, in his presidential address to the annual Muslim League session at Patna, he denounced the Congress as ‘nothing but a Hindu body’ and singled out Gandhi himself as ‘the one man responsible for turning the Congress into an instrument for the establishment of Hindu Raj in India’. Controversially, he branded Congress as likely to become ‘the only totalitarian organization of the .ascist brand’.188 Nehru had already called such tactics ‘communalism in excelsis’189 and Wilfrid Cantwell Smith was one of the contemporary commentators who denounced the Muslim League propaganda. While, with hindsight, we may reject some of Smith’s comparisons between the Muslim League propaganda and the Nazis (‘as Germans hate Jews, so Muslims have hated Hindus’), there is no doubt that, as he contended, ‘the Muslim League throve on attack’.190 He continued:191
It was anti-Hindu, anti-Congress, anti-‘one free India’. It attacked the Hindus with fervour, fear, contempt and bitter hatred.192 It would seek out, air and emphasize the differences between the two communities; cultural, social, religious and are [in it] for the sake of money, and then they are advised to make their own arrangements for their finances. How can this dilemma be avoided?’ Gandhi’s reply was characteristic but lacked realism: ‘by carrying on your work. All the reformers of the world had sold their shirts to subsist, yet gone ahead with their mission. If the poorer Muslims love their country and do not wish to vivisect it they will withstand any calamity.’ Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 62. Yusufi, ii. 905–18, esp. ii. 914. .oundations of Pakistan. All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906–1947. II, ed. Pirzada, 302–11 (with closing remarks in Urdu here translated). Gandhi seems not to have responded to this personal attack. Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 20 (July 1937) Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, 295. Ibid. 295–300, passim. However Jinnah stated categorically: ‘I am not fighting the Hindu community as such nor have I any quarrel with the Hindus generally for I have many personal friends amongst them’. But the conflict was with the Congress ‘High Command’: Yusufi, ii. 865–6.

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189 190 191 192

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination every other difference on which it could lay its hands… The attack on Congress was closely related. In 1938, the League issued the ‘Pirpur Report’ on atrocities suffered by Muslims at the pitiless hands of Congress provincial governments. On 12 December 1939, when those governments had relinquished office in protest about India’s treatment in the war, the League, supported by other communalists, 193 celebrated a ‘Day of Deliverance’ in the towns of India. In presidential and other speeches, the League would spend a good deal of its time and most of its invective in traducing the Congress. The Pirpur Report194 created a furore among many Muslims. Actually, some of the ‘atrocities’ of which it complained were flagrantly silly… some were simply accounts from the Muslim point of view of the Muslim side of such communal riots as had occurred in provinces with Congress governments and in the years since those governments took office. Some were mild ‘injustices’ which could hardly be grievances to the reasonable… Some were statements of government partiality between the two communities, and of Muslim disabilities (especially relating to dealings in meat), which, if true, merited serious inquiry and adjustment… The report repeatedly stated explicitly that the Muslims were in a worse case under the Congress than under the British. The savage and irrational attacks on the nationalist flag, on the nationalist song, and above all on the theologue-supported ‘Muslim mass contact’ movement of the Congress, are not really surprising when one remembers that the chairman of the Pirpur committee was the ruler of a native state. The anti-Congress campaign was one of utmost defamation… If the Hindus, with little power that they were given in provincial governments, could wreak such horror on the helpless Muslims, what they would inflict in an independent India might well be imagined. Helps to imagining it were profusely distributed by the League. It was suggested that in a united India the strong, even ferocious, Hindu-dominated centre, in its policy of crushing or exterminating Islam, would impose upon the Muslims a foreign language, an alien and caste-ridden social system, an infidel and rather barbarous culture; and of course would place ‘foreigners’ in charge of administering these evils, and all in posts of authority… The threat that was brandished with the greatest of horror was the economic…. The appeal was always to the economically dissatisfied…. We have already said that the movement was negative, and was based on hatred and fear, rather than having a constructive programme and an exact positive ideal. Its hatred and fear motivation made it unhealthy… Leaguers had a religious

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Professor Richard Bonney conviction, which absolved them from rational thought and from meeting rational criticism. By saying that ‘Islam is so different’, they released themselves from the duty of learning anything from history, from the West, from modern sociology. By feeling that outsiders simply did not understand Islam and the Muslims, they avoided the duty of listening tolerantly to objections raised by foreigners, by Hindus — and even by nationalist Muslims, whom they called ‘renegades from Islam’. In fact, they enjoyed being misunderstood; it seemed to them to prove their point. Whatever else it might be, Pakistanism was unlovely….

Dr Ambedkar’s analysis of the Muslim League reports of misdeeds by the Congress provincial ministries is more neutral in tone, but he also concluded that the claims were exaggerated:195
A perusal of these instances, as given in the reports of the Muslim League Committees, leaves upon the reader the impression that although there may be some truth in the allegations there is a great deal which is pure exaggeration. The Congress Ministries concerned have issued statements repudiating the charges. It may be that the Congress during the two years and three months that it was in office did not show statesmanship, did not inspire confidence in the minorities, nay tried to suppress them. But can it be a reason for partitioning India? Is it not possible to hope that the voters who supported the Congress last time will grow wiser and not support the Congress? Or may it not be that if the Congress returns to office it will profit by the mistakes it has made, revise its mischievous policy and thereby allay the fear created by its past conduct?

A departmental enquiry ordered by Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, largely dismissed the Muslim League allegations, but as one recent historian argues, ‘the important point to bear in mind is not whether the Muslim grievances were true or exaggerated, but whether many Muslims believed in them… Anything which widened the rift between the Hindus and Muslims and indicated that the difference between the two communities was unbridgeable proved Jinnah’s thesis that a democratic structure was unsuited for India.196 Another recent analysis has concluded that ‘there was little justification for the charge that the Congress governments discriminated against Muslims’.197
195 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 352, ch. 13: ‘Must there be Pakistan?’. 196 Rizvi, Linlithgow and India, 101–2. 197 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 33.

193 Smith’s so-called ‘communalists’ included the Dalits. 194 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 33–41.

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Professor Richard Bonney the face of them are extravagant and impossible, if not irresponsible. As an instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India…

Ambedkar summarized succinctly the increasing demands of Jinnah and the Muslim League:198
After taking into account what the Muslims demanded at the [Round Table Conference] and what was conceded to them, any one could have thought that the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that the 1932 settlement was a final settlement. But, it appears that even with this the Musalmans are not satisfied. A further list of new demands for safeguarding the Muslim position seems to be ready. In the controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress in the year 1938, Mr. Jinnah was asked to disclose his demands which he refused to do. But these demands have come to the surface in the correspondence that passed between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the course of the controversy and they have been tabulated by Pandit Nehru in one of his letters to Mr. Jinnah. His tabulation gives the following items as being matters of disputes and requiring settlement: (1) The fourteen points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929; (2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism; (3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment; (4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute; (5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Sahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque; (6) The Muslims’ right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way; (7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter; (8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or adjustments; (9) The Bande Mataram song should be given up; (10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged; (11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength; (12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance; (13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims; (14) Coalition Ministries should be formed. With this new list, there is no knowing where the Muslims are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is, between 1938 and 1939, one more demand and that too of a substantial character, namely 50 per cent share in everything, has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands there are some which on 198 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 262–4, ch 11, ‘Communal Aggression’.

Jinnah and the Muslim League were delighted by the resignation of the Congress Party provincial governments following the Viceroy’s unilateral declaration of the participation of India in the war against .ascism. A ‘Day of Deliverance’ was proclaimed for 22 December 1939 to celebrate the escape from the alleged tyranny and oppression of the Hindu ministries.199 Jinnah refuted Gandhi’s claim that the Muslim League was ‘an obstacle to the progress of the country’ and dismissed Gandhi as indulging ‘in a campaign of polemics and metaphysics, ahimsa and truth’.200 But Jinnah’s statement that the Deliverance Day celebrations had seen, for the first time in the history of the Muslim League, ‘the minorities… gathered on the same platform’201 gave Gandhi an opening to try to reverse the growing communal divisions. He referred to Jinnah as ‘an old comrade’ and noted that several anti-Congress Hindu parties had joined the Muslim League in celebrating ‘Deliverance Day’:202
He is thus lifting the Muslim League out of the communal rut and giving it a national character. I regard his step as perfectly legitimate. I observe that the Justice Party and Dr. Ambedkar’s party have already joined Jinnah Saheb. The papers report too that Shri Sa varkar, 203 the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, is to see him presently. Jinnah Saheb himself has informed the public that many non-Congress Hindus have expressed their sympathy with him. I regard this development as thoroughly healthy. Nothing can be better than that we should have in the country mainly two parties - Congress and non-Congress or anti-Congress, if the latter expression is 199 Nehru called this a ‘psychological barrier which effectively prevents mutual approach and discussion’: Yusufi, ii. 1097. He continued to refuse to disassociate or disown Muslim supporters of Congress: ibid. 1092. 200 Yusufi ii. 1067–1071, esp ii. 1068. 201 Yusufi, ii. 1082–3. 202 Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 64–65. Gandhi, lxxvii. 222–3, 15 Jan. 1940. 203 .or the views of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966): Document .orty-Seven. Savarkar’s reputation is assessed in Ram Puniyani, Hindu Extreme Right-Wing Groups: Ideology and Consequences (Leicester, 2002: INPAREL South Asian History Academic Papers Series, 2).

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination preferred. Jinnah Saheb is giving the word ‘minority’ a new and good content… Such an alignment of parties is a consummation devoutly to be wished. If the Quaid-e-Azam can bring about the combination, not only I but the whole of India will shout with one acclamation: ‘Long Live Quaid-eAzam Jinnah.’ .or he will have brought about permanent and living unity for which I am sure the whole nation is thirsting.

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Professor Richard Bonney principles shall be stoutly resisted by the Indian Muslim nation till it has achieved the aforesaid objective.

Jinnah immediately refuted the suggestion that his politics was about securing the place of the minorities as such. It was partly a case of ‘adversity bringing strange bedfellows together’ and partly of a common interest of Muslims and the other minorities. But he reaffirmed than India was neither a nation nor a country: ‘it is a sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations…’ .or his part, Gandhi professed not to be able to conceive that because Muslims had converted from Hinduism they ceased to ‘belong to their provinces because of their change of faith’.204 In a press statement on 2 .ebruary 1940, Jinnah asserted that ‘the whole constitutional problem should be considered de novo’. The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League had been given a recommendation from a joint meeting of the .oreign Committee and authors of alternative constitutional schemes submitted to the League which stated their view regarding the future of the Indian Muslim nation:205
1. The Muslims of India who constitute 90 millions of people, are a separate nation entitled to the same right of self-determination which has been conceded in respect of other nations. The Muslims of India shall in no case agree to be reduced to the position of a minority on the basis of extraneous and foreign considerations or for the sake of any political convenience or expediency. That in order to make the Muslim right of self-determination really effective, the Muslims shall have a separate national home in the shape of an autonomous state. That the Muslims living in the rest of India shall be treated as the nationals of the aforesaid Muslim state and their rights and privileges shall be fully safeguarded. That any scheme of Indian reforms interfering with these basic

The statement is extremely interesting, because it suggests why at first Jinnah’s two nations theory won more support in Indian provinces where Muslims were in a minority than in Muslim-majority provinces; the Muslims in Muslim-minority provinces believed that they would gain a new nationality from the outcome. Whereas ‘safeguards’ defined only their status as a minority, the two nations theory placed Hindus and Muslims on an equal footing, since nations negotiated as equals. This might be the way for Muslims to reverse any perceived loss of political or economic power.206 The Muslims in the Muslim-minority provinces did not believe, as was later to prove the case, that they would be left virtually as ‘hostages’ within an independent Hindustan. Wilfrid Cantwell Smith commented:207
The League was relatively strongest in the part of India where Muslims are in a minority. (These are the parts of India in which the incidence of urban and bourgeois Muslims is much the highest.)… The Muslim League never at any time tried to convince anybody that it represented all the Muslims of India. It assumed that it did so; and went on to convince people of something that followed from that. In mass psychology, insinuation is more powerful than argument. In brief, the Muslim League was creating enthusiasm for a separate Islamic state for Muslim Indians; and enthusiasm based on many things, including the engendered fear that if Muslims and Hindus lived together in the same state, and that state were independent, the Muslims would be horribly maltreated. Very little attention was given to the nature of the Pakistan to be… [Instead, the Muslim League] said loudly and constantly what it did not want.

2.

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4.

In an interview to the London Daily Mail on 19 .ebruary 1940, Jinnah rejected any tribunal of Gandhi’s conception as the arbiter of the future destiny and fate of Muslim India, and equally rejected any British ‘final arbitrament’: ‘we must and shall be the sole and final judges of what is best for us’, he declared.208
206 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 75. Cf. L. Brennan, ‘The illusion of security: the background to Muslim separatism in the United Provinces’, India’s Partition. Process, Strategy and Mobilization, ed. Hasan, 322–60. 207 Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, 289, 291–2. 208 Yusufi, ii. 1141.

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204 Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 65–66. Gandhi, lxxvii. 247, 23 January 1940. Jinnah blamed the dashing of Hindu–Muslim unity on Gandhi’s two decades of influence on the policy and programme of Congress: Yusufi, ii. 1110. 205 Yusufi, ii. 1112.

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5 The Lahore Resolution and the Transformation of Jinnah: The Two Nations Theory, March 1940
I am not a learned Maulana or Maulvi. Nor do I claim to be learned in theology. But I also know a little of my faith and I am a humble and proud follower of my faith. May I know in the name of Heavens, how is the Lahore resolution against Islam? Why is it against Islam? But this is an argument that has been advanced by a man of no less a position than Mr. Rajagopalacharya. 209

Jinnah was no theologian but a politician. The Pakistan issue was a political and not a moral consideration. He studiously refused to give Gandhi his epithet Mahatma or ‘great Soul’, since to do so would be to confuse Gandhi’s political and religious roles. As Dr Ambedkar stated: ‘the partition of a country is neither moral nor immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place in it’ (Document .orty-.ive).210 .or his part, Gandhi was perfectly prepared to confuse the political and religious issues. He stated on 18 March 1940: ‘to me Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Harijans, are all alike. I cannot be frivolous while I talk of Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah. He is my brother.’211 That a transformation occurred in Mohammad Ali Jinnah between 1936 and 1940, creating the persona deserving the epithet ‘the great leader’ (Quaid-i-Azam) is clear. Gandhi had tended to call him ‘Janab Jinnah Saheb’; suddenly, in 1940, even as he dismissed from Congress ‘minds the impossible and utterly anti-national stand’ taken by him,
209 Yusufi, ii. 1334. Speech of Jinnah, 2 March 1941. 210 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 407. 211 Quoted by Jinnah on 22 March 1940: Yusufi, ii. 1173. Gandhi had used a slightly different formulation: ‘I have never even in my dream thought that I was a maha-atma (great soul) and that others were alpa-atma (little souls). We are all equal before our Maker — Hindus, [Muslims], Parsis, Christians, worshippers of one God. Why then do we fight among ourselves? We are all brothers — even the Quaid-e-Azam is my brother. I have meant all that I have said about him, never has a frivolous word escaped my lips, and I say that I want to win him over…’ Gandhi, lxxi. 352.

Jinnah had become for Gandhi, too, the Quaid-i-Azam.212 Azad, indeed, claimed that ‘it was Gandhiji who first gave currency to the title of Quaid-i-Azam, or great leader, as applied to Mr Jinnah.’ 213 The responsibility for the transformation is less certain. It may have been the spiritual influence of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, ‘the main source of my inspiration and spiritual support’.214 Other explanations were made at the time. In his profound analysis of the significance of the Lahore Resolution, Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar offered a more cynical view, comparing Jinnah to Henri IV of .rance. Henri IV changed religion twice, once in 1572 to avoid possible murder as a Protestant, and once more in 1593 to become a (Catholic) king of .rance. On the second occasion it was claimed later that he had said that Paris (at that time held by his political opponents) ‘was worth a Mass’, in other words that to become king in fact rather than in name it was worthwhile changing religion.
It is difficult to understand how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah’s influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for battle. Never before was Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses. He distrusted them. To exclude them from political power he was always for a high franchise. Mr. Jinnah was never known to be a very devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the Holy Koran as and when he was sworn in as an M.L.A., he does not appear to have bothered much about its contents or its special tenets. It is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of curiosity or religious fervour. Mr. Jinnah was never found in the midst of Muslim mass congregations, religious or political. Today one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a man of the masses. He is no longer above them. He is among them. Now they have raised him above themselves and call him their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only 212 Compare Gandhi, lxx. 318 (‘Janab Jinnah Saheb looks to the British power to safeguard Muslim rights’, 30 October 1939) with lxxi. 190 (‘We may dismiss from our minds the impossible and utterly anti-national stand taken by Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’, 6 .ebruary 1940). 213 R. Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, 243. 214 The correspondence between Iqbal and Jinnah (the replies do not survive) is reproduced in .ateh Mohammed Malik, Iqbal’s Reconstruction of Political Thought in Islam (Leicester 2002), INPAREL Studies in South Asian History 6, immediately forthcoming.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination become a believer in Islam, but is prepared to die for Islam. Today, he knows more of Islam than mere Kalama. Today, he goes to the mosque to hear Khutba and takes delight in joining the Id congregational prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr. Jinnah by name. Today they know him by his presence. No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or ends without Allah-ho-Akbar and Long Live Qaid-e-Azam. In this Mr. Jinnah has merely followed King Henry IV of .rance… As Paris became worth a Mass to Henry IV, so have Dongri and Null Bazaar become worth a Mass to Mr. Jinnah and for similar reason. It is strategy; it is mobilization. But even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition, he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is spreading into all the different strata of Muslim society and is becoming part and parcel of its mental make-up. This is as clear as anything could be...215

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India Muslim League provided Jinnah with the occasion, on 22 March 1940, for one of his greatest speeches:217
The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international one, and it must be treated as such. So long as this basic and fundamental truth is not realised, any constitution that may be built will result in disaster and will prove destructive and harmful not only to the [Muslims] but to the British and Hindus also. If the British Government are really in earnest and sincere to secure peace and happiness of the people of this sub-continent, the only course open to us all is to allow the major nations separate homelands by dividing India into ‘autonomous national states’. There is no reason why these states should be antagonistic to each other. On the other hand, the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of one to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy over the other in the government of the country will disappear. It will lead more towards natural good-will by international pacts between them, and they can live in complete harmony with their neighbours. This will lead further to a friendly settlement all the more easily with regard to minorities by reciprocal arrangements and adjustments between Muslim India and Hindu India, which will far more adequately and effectively safeguard the rights and interests of Muslims and various other minorities. It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits and is the cause of most of your troubles and will lead India to destruction if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and [Muslims] derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have 217 Yusufi, ii. 1166–84. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (ed.), Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah (Lahore, 1960), i. 159–63. A. Ahmad and G. E. von Grunebaum, Muslim Self-Statement in India and Pakistan, 1857–1968 (Wiesbaden, 1970), 153–5. Even this long quotation is still an excerpt from the full speech. Moore notes that Jinnah draw upon Bashir Ahmad’s and the Aligarh group’s condemnation of Linlithgow’s statement of 18 October 1939: Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 176–182.

No Muslim would have made this accusation, and for many Muslims Ambedkar’s viewpoint may be considered as vitiated by the fact that he was a Dalit, an ‘Untouchable’. Nevertheless, in historical terms, Ambedkar’s comparison of Jinnah with Henri IV of .rance was perspicacious, for as the first Bourbon king united a nation behind him that had been torn by civil war, so Jinnah brought about a wholly unprecedented unity in Muslim political opinion. As Viceroy Lord Linlithgow expressed it on 8 September 1941, Jinnah was ‘the one man’ who had succeded in united the Muslims in the last forty years.216 That there was a strategic aspect to Jinnah’s policies and that the consciously mobilized Muslim popular opinion there can be no doubt. The question is where the root of the transformation originated. Rather than taking a mechanistic viewpoint (that of Ambedkar) or that of a spiritual transformation (the primacy of the influence of Iqbal), it is perhaps more realistic to stress Jinnah’s emerging viewpoint as a consequence of Hindu majority rule in those provinces which they controlled from 1936 to 1939. .or the ideas that were subsequently formulated in his Presidential Address to the All-India Muslim League Session on 22 March 1940 are to be found in nascent form in his speeches and reactions to Hindu majority rule in the earlier years. The opportunity of the twenty-seventh session of the All215 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 407–8. 216 Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 66.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and [the] final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state. History has presented to us many examples, such as the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Poland. History has also shown to us many geographical tracts, much smaller than the sub-continent of India, which otherwise might have been called one country, but which have been divided into as many states as there are nations inhabiting them. The Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as seven or eight sovereign states. Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula. Whereas under the plea of unity of India and one nation, which does not exist, it is sought to pursue here the line of one central government when we know that the history of the last twelve hundred years has failed to achieve unity and has witnessed, during the ages, India always divided into Hindu India and Muslim India. The present artificial unity of India dates back only to the British conquest and is maintained by the British bayonet, but termination of the British regime, which is implicit in the recent declaration of His Majesty’s Government, will be the herald of the entire break-up with worse disaster than has ever taken place during the last one thousand years under Muslims. Surely that is not the legacy which Britain would bequeath to India after one hundred and fifty years of her rule, nor would Hindu and Muslim India risk such a sure catastrophe. Muslim India cannot accept any constitution which must necessarily result in a Hindu majority government. Hindus and Muslims brought together under a democratic system forced upon the minorities can only mean Hindu raj. Democracy of the kind with which the Congress High Command is enamoured would mean the complete destruction of what is most precious in Islam. We have had ample experience of the working of the provincial constitutions during the last two and a half years and any repetition of such a government must lead to civil war and raising of private armies as recommended by Mr. Gandhi to the Hindus of Sukkur when he said that they must defend themselves violently or nonviolently, blow for blow, and if they could not, they must emigrate. [Muslims] are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood. One has only got to look round. Even today, according to the British map of India, four out of eleven provinces, where the Muslims dominate more or less, are functioning notwithstanding the decision of the Hindu Congress

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The Lahore Resolution was the definitive early statement for a Muslim homeland, subsequently known as Pakistan. It was, in Jinnah’s concluding words, ‘a landmark in the history of Muslim India because they had defined their goal’:218
1. While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939 and 3rd of .ebruary 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the Scheme of .ederation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India; 2. It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty’s Government is reassuring in as far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is framed with their approval and consent; 3. Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which 218 Yusufi, ii. 1185.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the NorthWestern and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’ in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign; 4. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them; and in other parts of India where the [Muslims] are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them; 5. This Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a Scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communication, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary.219

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hope that organised efforts will be made all over India.’222 Clearly Jinnah recognized that in all probability the 1941 census would be the determining one for establishing the relative regional strength of the religious communities in the sub-Continent and would thus provide the statistical basis for the post-war campaign for Pakistan. Indeed it was the 1941 census that was used by Dr Ambedkar in his analysis of the relative strengths of the religious communities in the second edition (1945) of his Pakistan or the Partition of India (Appendix Two and Tables).

6 The Lahore Resolution and its Effect on Hindu Opinion: Dr Ambedkar’s Analysis, 28 December 1940
The name of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar is not as well remembered today by Hindus and Muslims as it should be.223 A multi-faceted personality, Ambedkar is remembered above all by the Dalits (‘Untouchables’) as their emancipator. Though undoubtedly a social rebel and a bitter critic of the Hindu religion especially in the manifestation of the caste system, he was also a prolific author, educationalist, political philosopher, religious specialist and humanist. The legal and constitutional expertise which made him the ideal person to oversee the drafting of the Indian Constitution after Partition made him a distinguished commentator on the issues which were firmly placed in the public arena by the Lahore Resolution. There are several reasons why Ambedkar’s viewpoint should be regarded as independent of both the Hindu and Muslim positions. The first is that he had cautiously stated the view in December 1932 that Dalits should be prepared to
222 Yusufi, ii. 1309–10. 223 Though there are many publications on Dr Ambedkar. Apart from the inestimable resource provided by the CD Rom of his writings (<www.ambedkar.org>), there are useful introductions on Ambedkar by A. H. Doctor, Political Thinkers of Modern India (Delhi, 1997), ch 10, 123–37 and B. R. Ambedkar. His Political and Social Ideology, ed. S. R. Bakshi (2 vols., Delhi, 2000).

Jinnah’s instructions to Muslims on how to complete the 1941 census return provide the clearest indication of ‘the great importance’ of the statistical outcome in order to underline the separatist claim. With regard to question 3, race, tribe or caste, ‘the answer by every Muslim should be that he is a Muslim’; similarly, with regard to question 43, religion, ‘the answer should be Islam’. The language issue was also critical: on question 18, the mother tongue, though Jinnah admitted that his own knowledge of Urdu was ‘very fragmentary’,220 ‘the answer should be Urdu: but if he or she does not know Urdu at all, then such other language as he or she may know’. .or Urdu, he declared on another occasion, ‘is our national language and we should strain every nerve to keep it unharmed and unpolluted and save it from the aggressive and hostile attitude of our opponents’.221 ‘Lastly’, Jinnah concluded, ‘every head of every household should take every possible care to give the correct number of the members of the household. I
219 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 21–2. .oundations of Pakistan. All-India Muslim League Documents, 1906–1947. II, ed. Pirzada, 340–1. 220 Yusufi, ii. 694. 221 Yusufi, ii. 1318.

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sympathize with Muslims as a similarly oppressed group, while recognizing that there were significant obstacles towards Muslim–Dalit unity (obstacles which, on the whole, remain today).224 In October 1939 Ambedkar has asked Jinnah to act as the spokesman of the Depressed Classes in conversations with the Viceroy.225 Secondly, although the prospects of Gandhi starving himself to death as a martyr in opposition to separate electorates for the Dalits had led Ambedkar to modify his position in the Poona Pact of September 1932,226 he remained resolutely hostile to the position of the Congress as well as the Hindu faith on the issue of caste. He rejected Gandhi’s depiction of the ‘untouchables’ as ‘sons of God’ (Harijans). When Congress
224 ‘When Hindus and Muslims fight among themselves, the Untouchables tend to incline towards Muslims. They feel they would be benefited if they develop friendship with Muslims. But Untouchables should keep in mind that it is not all that true as it appears and so they should be very careful…’ Quoted in K. Jamandas, ‘What is the nature of Dalit–Muslim unity?’: <www. ambedkar.org/culture/What_is_the_nature_of_Dalit_ Muslim_Unity.htm> 225 Yusufi, ii. 1044–5. On 30 June 1940, Jinnah met another leader of the Untouchables, P. N. Rajbhoj, and stated that ‘it was a cardinal principle of the Muslim League to see that the rights and interests of the Harijans and all other minorities were adequately and effectively safeguarded’: Yusufi, ii. 1216. On another occasion, in 1941, Jinnah commented: ‘The Muslim League stood for adequate and full safeguards for all communities. He knew no untouchability. Every human being was his brother. He advised the depressed classes to organise themselves’: Yusufi, ii. 1377. Earlier, in 1938, he had described the untouchables as ‘an outstanding illustration in history [of] how those in power persecute those under their power’: ibid., ii. 695. 226 Ambedkar referred to ‘the success of Mr. Gandhi in getting that part of the Award which related to the Depressed Classes revised by means of the pressure of a fast unto death’. When Jinnah was asked in 1941 to intervene on their behalf, he commented that at the Round Table Conference they had received ‘separate electorates, which they gave up to save the life of Mr Gandhi’. They should now ‘ask Mr Gandhi to save their life’: Yusufi, ii. 1376. On another occasion in 1941, Jinnah referred to 60 million ‘of depressed classes [who were] considered untouchables’. The irony of the situation was that ‘the Hindu caste community which is not only least fitted but unfit for any experiment in the realm of democracy is clamouring for, and is falling head over heels in love with, democracy’: Yusufi, ii. 1354.

introduced a bill renaming them Harijans in January 1938, Ambedkar opposed it on the grounds that a change of name would make no difference to their condition. Already on 13 October 1935, he had caused consternation among moderate Hindus by exhorting the Depressed Classes to leave Hinduism and embrace another religion. He declared with prescience: ‘I was born as a Hindu but I will not die as a Hindu.’227 Thus assuredly in the circumstances of 1940 Ambedkar could not be considered too favourable to the Congress position and has to be seen as an independent viewpoint. Jinnah recognized the following year that ‘Dr Ambedkar had understood the constitutional position in this country and the stand taken by the League in its Lahore resolution on the “Pakistan scheme”’.228 Ambedkar described himself as without ‘popular prejudice’ and having an ‘open mind, though not an empty mind’ about the issues. In the second edition, the preface of which was dated 1 January 1945, Ambedkar stated that Gandhi and Jinnah ‘in their recent talks cited the book as an authority on the subject which might be consulted with advantage’, a commendation which, in his words, ‘bespeaks the worth of the book’.229 The first edition of Pakistan or the Partition of India was completed on 28 December 1940.230 Ambedkar stated the significance of the Lahore Resolution with clarity:
The Muslim League Resolution on Pakistan has called forth different reactions. There are some who look upon it as a case of political measles to which a people in the infancy of their conscious unity and power are very liable. Others have taken it as a permanent frame of the Muslim mind and not merely a passing phase and have in consequence been greatly perturbed… My position in this behalf is definite, if not singular… 227 ‘Important events’ (though his own conversion was delayed until 1956): <www.ambedkar.org/Babasaheb/impevents.htm>. 228 Yusufi, ii. 1377. 229 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 2. 230 <www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/> reproduces the full text. As stated in the introduction, references are to the 1990 Government of Maharashtra published edition, ed. V. Moon (Bombay, 1990), v: ‘Pakistan or the Partition of India is a valuable source of historical material. After more than forty-five years, its value as the record of contemporaneous events has increased.’

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination I believe that it would be neither wise nor possible to reject summarily a scheme if it has behind it the sentiment, if not the passionate support, of 90 p.c. [of] Muslims of India. I have no doubt that the only proper attitude to Pakistan is to study it in all its aspects, to understand its implications and to form an intelligent judgement about it.231

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Ambedkar pointed out that the Pakistan scheme was one which Hindus and Muslims must decide for themselves, for it mattered little to the British ‘whether India remains one undivided whole, or is partitioned into two parts, Pakistan and Hindustan, or into twenty linguistic fragments as planned by the Congress, so long as all of them are content to live within the Empire’. He declared ‘coercion, as an alternative to Pakistan’ unthinkable.232 The Muslims could not be deprived of the benefit of the principle of selfdetermination. Nor could the issue be ignored:233
It will be the greatest folly to suppose that if Pakistan is buried for the moment, it will never raise its head again. I am sure, burying Pakistan is not the same thing as burying the ghost of Pakistan. So long as the hostility to one Central Government for India, which is the ideology underlying Pakistan, persists, the ghost of Pakistan will be there, casting its ominous shadow upon the political future of India. Neither will it be prudent to make some kind of a make-shift arrangement for the time being, leaving the permanent solution to some future day. To do so would be something like curing the symptoms without removing the disease. But, as often happens in such cases, the disease is driven in, thereby making certain its recurrence, perhaps in a more virulent form.

Ambedkar began by discussing the Muslim case for Pakistan and the significance of the Lahore Declaration. What was the Muslim League demanding? In summary, he considered that the Muslim case was (i) the creation of administrative areas which are ethnically more homogeneous; (ii) The Muslims want these homogeneous administrative areas which are predominantly Muslim to be constituted into separate States, (a) because the Muslims by themselves constitute a separate nation and desire to have a national home, and (b) because experience shows that the Hindus
231 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 6–7. 232 Ibid. 10. 233 Ibid. 11.

want to use their majority to treat the Muslims as though they were second-class citizens in an alien State. 234 Ambedkar did not consider the Lahore Declaration particularly original, since the scheme resuscitated that put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal at Allahabad in December 1930, while Mr Rahmat Ali had already given Pakistan its name.235 The League had added one more Muslim state to the east, including Muslims in Bengal and Assam, but barring this ‘it expresses in its essence and general outline the scheme put forward’ by Iqbal and propagated by Rahmat Ali.236 Pakistan, Ambedkar contended, was in one sense no more disruptive than the Congress Party’s idea of creating linguistic provinces: it was ‘merely another manifestation of a cultural unit demanding freedom for the growth of its own distinctive culture’.237 But Ambedkar also saw that the call for Pakistan in the Lahore Resolution was also the call for a national home for Muslims. Congress called the demand ‘a stab in the back’238 because it followed that if the Muslims in India were a separate nation, then India itself was not a nation. Congress had already convinced itself that the demand for selfgovernment for India rested on the claim to nationhood. The Hindus denied that any difference of race existed between themselves and the Muslims. .urthermore, reliance was placed not only racial unity ‘but also upon certain common features in the social and cultural life of the two communities’. But did such common rites and practices
234 Ibid. 19. 235 Ibid. 22–3. 236 Ibid. 23. Ambedkar also mentioned the precedent of the partition of Bengal in 1905 by Curzon, which was reversed in 1912 at the insistence of the Hindus: ibid. 25. ‘The first partition encouraged the idea of a Muslim-majority east Bengal and a Hindu-majority west Bengal, or the division of the province on the basis of community, though the British publicly insisted that the partition was made for administrative reasons only. This partition helped arouse Muslim political consciousness and extensive agitation led by Hindus against it’: L. A. Gordon, ‘Divided Bengal: problems of nationalism and identity in the 1947 Partition’, India’s Partition, ed. Hasan, 286. 237 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 28. 238 Ibid. 30.

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result in a feeling that the two communities wished to belong to each other? Ambedkar concluded that ‘the political and religious antagonisms divide the Hindus and the [Muslims] far more deeply than the so-called common things are able to bind them together. The prospects might perhaps be different if the past of the two communities [could] be forgotten by both…’ But, he argued, ‘the pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in their religion, and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain. In the absence of common historical antecedents, the Hindu view that Hindus and [Muslims] form one nation falls to the ground. To maintain it is to keep up a hallucination…’239 The Muslims claimed that they had plenty of grievances to support their claim, above all that ‘constitutional safeguards have failed to save them from the tyranny of the Hindu majority’. Two years and three months of Congress government in the Hindu provinces have ‘completely disillusioned them and made them the bitterest enemies of the Congress’. Ambedkar’s analysis thus passed on to the causes of this bitterness, which had led the Muslims to celebrate 22 December 1939 as their Deliverance Day, that is the day of deliverance from the Congress majority governments in the provinces they had controlled. In his view, there were two causes of the clash: firstly, the refusal by the Congress to recognize the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims; and secondly, the refusal by the Congress to form coalition Ministries in the Congress Provinces. On the first point, Congress was prepared to accept the Muslim League as one of the many Muslim political organizations, such as the Ahrars, the National Muslims and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. But it would not accept the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims. In Ambedkar’s view Congress must make its decision, and deal with one or other grouping. ‘To deal with neither is not
239 Ibid.37. Ambedkar distinguished between nationality (‘consciousness of kind, awareness of the existence of that tie of kinship) and nationalism (‘the desire for a separate national existence for those who are bound by this tie of kinship’). Ibid. 39.

only stupid but mischievous. This attitude of the Congress only serves to annoy the Muslims and to exasperate them. The Muslims rightly interpret this attitude of the Congress as an attempt to create divisions among them with a view to cause confusion in their ranks and weaken their front.’240 On the second point, Congress agreed to include Muslims in their cabinets, provided they resigned from their parties, joined the Congress and signed the Congress pledge. However, where Congress was in the minority, they were prepared to form coalition ministries without asking the ministers from other parties to sign the Congress pledge. Ambedkar concluded that the Muslims were entitled to ask ‘if coalition is bad, how can it be good in one place and bad in another?’241 He contended:242
the Congress High Command seems to have misunderstood what the main contention of the Muslims and the minorities has been. Their quarrel is not on the issue whether the Congress has or has not done any good to the Muslims and the minorities. Their quarrel is on an issue which is totally different. Are the Hindus to be a ruling race and the Muslims and other minorities to be subject races under Swaraj? That is the issue involved in the demand for coalition ministries. On that, the Muslims and other minorities have taken a definite stand. They are not prepared to accept the position of subject races… It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect the Hindu mind and support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions while the Congress is politic and polite. Apart from this difference of fact, there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha… The Congress is not prepared to share power with a member of a community who does not owe allegiance to the Congress. Allegiance to the Congress is a condition precedent to sharing power. It seems to be a rule with the Congress that if allegiance to the Congress is not forthcoming from a community, that community must be excluded from political power. Exclusion from political power is the essence of the distinction between a ruling race and a subject race; and inasmuch as the Congress maintained this principle, it must be said that this distinction was enforced by the Congress while it was in the saddle. The [Muslims] may well complain that they have 240 Ibid. 44. 241 Ibid. 46. 242 Ibid. 46–9.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination already suffered enough and that this reduction to the position of a subject race is like the proverbial last straw… The British conquest of India brought about a complete political revolution in the relative position of the two communities. .or six hundred years, the [Muslims] had been the masters of the Hindus. The British occupation brought them down to the level of the Hindus. .rom masters to fellow subjects was degradation enough, but a change from the status of fellow subjects to that of subjects of the Hindus is really humiliation. Is it unnatural, ask the Muslims, if they seek an escape from so intolerable a position by the creation of separate national States, in which the Muslims can find a peaceful home and in which the conflicts between a ruling race and a subject race can find no place to plague their lives?

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Professor Richard Bonney The Hindus have a difficult choice to make: to have a safe Army or a safe border. In this difficulty, what is the wisest course for the Hindus to pursue? Is it in their interest to insist that the Muslim India should remain part of India so that they may have a safe border, or is it in their interest to welcome its separation from India so that they may have a safe Army? The [Muslims] of this area are hostile to the Hindus. As to this, there can be no doubt. Which is then better for the Hindus: Should these [Muslims] be without and against or should they be within and against? If the question is asked to any prudent man, there will be only one answer, namely, that if the [Muslims] are to be against the Hindus, it is better that they should be without and against, rather than within and against. Indeed, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished that the Muslims should be without. That is the only way of getting rid of the Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army.

In Part II of Pakistan or the Partition of India, Ambedkar explored the Hindu case against Pakistan. The three principal reasons adduced by the Hindus were firstly that it involved the breaking up of the unity of India; secondly, that it weakened the defence of India; and thirdly, that it failed to solve the communal problem. ‘Before the Hindus complain of the destruction of the unity of India, let them make certain that the unity they are harping upon does exist. What unity is there between Pakistan and Hindustan?’, he asked.243 After an historical account, he concluded that the bitterness between the communities resulted from the Muslim invasions, destruction of temples and forced conversions. Judged in the light of such considerations, the unity between Pakistan and Hindustan was, in his view, a myth.244 The Hindus need have no fear for the lack of a naturally secure frontier. The resources of a Hindustan state were likely to be far greater than the resources of Pakistan, whether in terms of area, population or revenue. The question of the armies for the new states was more complex. The fighting forces available for the defence of India came mostly from the areas to be included in the proposed new Pakistan. Significant changes in the composition of the Indian army after 1919 had reinforced these tendencies. He concluded that military considerations alone were sufficient to justify the creation of Pakistan:245
243 Ibid. 53. 244 Ibid. 66. 245 Ibid. 99.

The third question, whether or not the creation of Pakistan would solve the communal question, was more complex to answer, involving as it did two distinct issues: firstly, the number of seats to be allotted to the Hindus and the Muslims in the different legislatures; and secondly, the nature of the electorates through which these seats were to be filled. The communal problem would continue to exist wherever a hostile majority is brought face to face with a hostile minority. But would not Pakistan, with its proposed borders not aggravate the situation? Ambedkar suggested that it would:246
The rule of the Hindu minorities by the Muslim majorities and the rule of the Muslim Minorities by the Hindu majorities are the crying evils of the present situation. This very evil will reproduce itself in Pakistan, if the provinces marked out for it are incorporated into it as they are, i.e., with boundaries drawn as at present. Besides this, the evil which gives rise to the Communal Question in its larger intent, will not only remain as it is but will assume a new malignity. Under the existing system, the power centred in the Communal Provinces to do mischief to their hostages is limited by the power which the Central Government has over the Provincial Governments. At present, the hostages are at least within the pale of a Central Government which is Hindu in its composition and which has power to interfere for their protection. But, when Pakistan becomes Muslim State with full sovereignty over internal and external affairs, it would be free from the control of the Central Government. The Hindu minorities will have no recourse to an outside authority with overriding powers, to 246 Ibid. 112.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination interfere on their behalf and curb this power of mischief, as under the scheme, no such overriding authority is permitted to exist. So, the position of the Hindus in Pakistan may easily become similar to the position of the Armenians under the Turks or of the Jews in Tsarist Russia or in Nazi Germany. Such a scheme would be intolerable and the Hindus may well say that they cannot agree to Pakistan and leave their coreligionists as a helpless prey to the fanaticism of a Muslim National State.

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This fierce denunciation of the proposed Pakistan, however, arose solely from the proposed borders. Ambedkar stated categorically: ‘…the evils of Pakistan are not inherent in it. If any evil results follow from it they will have to be attributed to its boundaries.’247 Could the boundaries be redrawn in such a way that Pakistan would become an ‘ethnic state’248 composed of one homogeneous community, namely Muslims? He contended that it could: ‘…it is perfectly possible to create homogeneous Muslim States out of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam by drawing their boundaries in such a way that the areas which are predominantly Hindu shall be excluded. That this is possible is shown by the maps given in the appendix.’249 In the case of North-West .rontier Province and Sind there were scattered Hindu populations which did not facilitate a territorial adjustment. In that case, there might need to be a transfer of the population as happened between Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria: ‘that the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal peace is beyond doubt.’250 But would the creation of Pakistan serve the interests of the 45 million Muslims remaining in Hindustan, and how could it do so? In one sense, the Pakistan scheme seemed to concern itself with Muslim majorities who did not need protection, while abandoning the Muslim minorities who did. Rahmat Ali’s answer was cited by Ambedkar: ‘as to the future, the only effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to
247 Ibid. 113. 248 Ibid. 113. However, it may be objected that the proposed Pakistan would in fact include a number of separate ethnicities, e.g. Pathans, Punjabis, Baluchis, and so on. 249 Ibid. 114. 250 Ibid. 116.

give all those safeguards to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan.’251 Jinnah had given similar answers, though his view seems to have been that, if necessary, the minority remaining in India would have to be sacrificed in the interests of the general good of achieving a Muslim homeland.252 In view of the distribution of the Muslim population, Ambedkar was prepared to concede that ‘… if Pakistan does not wholly solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it frees the Hindus from the turbulence of the Muslims as predominant partners. It is for the Hindus to say whether they will reject such a proposal, simply because it does not offer a complete solution.’253 In Part III of his analysis, Ambedkar asked what alternatives could be envisaged if the demand for Pakistan were not conceded. With a degree of prescience about later developments in India, he expounded the philosophy of the Hindu Mahasabha, which proposed to resist the Pakistan claim ‘by all means’. He quoted the words of V. D. Savarkar, President of the Hindu Mahasabha:254
In expounding the ideology of the Hindu movement, it is absolutely necessary to have a correct grasp of the meaning attached to these three terms. .rom the word ‘Hindu’ has been coined the word ‘Hinduism’ in English. It means the schools or system of Religion the Hindus follow. The second word ‘Hindutva’ is far more comprehensive and refers not only to the religious aspects of the Hindu people as the word ‘Hinduism’ does but comprehends even their cultural, linguistic, social and political aspects as well. It is more or less akin to ‘Hindu Polity’ and its nearly exact translation would be ‘Hinduness’. The third word ‘Hindudom’ means the Hindu people spoken of collectively. It is a collective name for the Hindu World, just as Islam denotes the Moslem World.

In Ambedkar’s judgement, ‘the Hindu Mahasabha identifies itself with the National life of Hindudom in all its entirety… we must always keep in view even after Hindustan attains
251 Loc. cit. 252 Yusufi, ii. 1298: ‘Let us the minority provinces, Mr. Jinnah said [on 27 December 1940], “face our fate, but free the Muslim Majority provinces to live and form their own government in independent states in accordance with Islamic laws”.’ 253 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 120. 254 Ibid. 132–3.

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the status of a self-governing country, a powerful and exclusive organization of Hindudom like the Hindu Mahasabha will always prove a sure and devoted source of strength, a reserve force for the Hindus to fall back upon to voice their grievances more effectively than the joint Parliament can do…’ What did the party mean by Swaraj or, as Gandhi had described it in a pamphlet he published in South Africa in 1908, ‘Indian home rule’?255 .or Ambedkar, the first aim was the retention of the name Hindustan as the proper name for India although other cherished epithets such as Aryavarta and Bharat-Bhumi would continue to appeal to the cultured elite. Clearly this was ‘an insuperable mountain’ in the way to Hindu–Muslim unity. The second fundamental was the retention of Sanskrit as the sacred language and Hindi as the national language. What was to be the position of the non-Hindu minorities once Swaraj had been obtained? Savarkar was quoted from a speech he made in 1939:256
When once the Hindu Mahasabha not only accepts but maintains the principles of ‘one man one vote’ and the public services to go by merit alone added to the fundamental rights and obligations to be shared by all citizens alike irrespective of any distinction of Race or Religion… any further mention of minority rights is on the principle not only unnecessary but self-contradictory. Because it again introduces a consciousness of majority and minority on Communal basis… The Moslem minority in India will have the right to be treated as equal citizens, enjoying equal protection and civic rights in proportion to their population. The Hindu majority will not encroach on the legitimate rights of any non-Hindu minority. But in no case can the Hindu majority resign its right which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any democratic and legitimate constitution. 255 M. K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj or Indian Home-Rule (1908). The pamphlet was also famous for its critique of certain features of modernity. Gandhi’s study, The Essence of Hinduism contained a section on Ambedkar’s critiques of Hinduism. Gandhi was not the first to use the term. Dadabhai Naoroji, the President of the Congress in 1906, had declared the goal of the Congress the attainment of swaraj or ‘self-government’: Ghosh, Indian National Congress, 153, 206. Jinnah moved an amendment to this resolution ‘that we are all equal, that there should be no reservation for any class or any community…’: ibid. 154. 256 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 138–9.

Ambedkar’s comments justified the basic position of Jinnah in the years between 1937 and 1940: ‘The Hindus do not want a change of masters, are not going to struggle and fight and die only to replace an Edward by an Aurangazeb simply because the latter happens to be born within Indian borders, but they want henceforth to be masters themselves in their own house, in their own Land. And it is because he wants his Swaraj to bear the stamp of being a Hindu Raj that Mr. Savarkar wants that India should have the appellation of Hindustan.’ The philosophy of the Hindu Mahasabha was thus based on two propositions. The first was that the Hindus were a nation. The second was on the definition of the term Hindu. A Hindu was a person, in the words of V. D. Savarkar, who ‘regards and owns this Bharat Bhumi, this land from the Indus to the Seas, as his .atherland as well as his Holy Land, i.e. the land of the origin of his religion, the cradle of his faith’. .or Ambedkar, ‘this definition of the term Hindu has been framed with great care and caution. It is designed to serve two purposes which Mr. Savarkar has in view. .irst, to exclude from it Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews by prescribing the recognition of India as a Holy Land as a qualification for being a Hindu. Secondly, to include Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, etc., by not insisting upon belief in the sanctity of the Vedas as an element in the qualifications.’257 The categorical assertion that the Hindus were a nation by themselves carried with it the ‘most absolute emphasis’ that the Muslims, too, were a nation by themselves. Ambedkar quoted Savarkar’s speech at the Hindu Mahasabha Session held at Ahmedabad in 1937:
Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organizations. But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When the time is ripe you can solve them; but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing 257 Ibid. 141.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination recognition of them. It is safer to diagnose and treat [a] deepseated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary these are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India.

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Ambedkar’s judgement was thus conclusive: ‘Strange as it may appear, Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Jinnah instead of being opposed to each other on the one nation versus two nations issue are in complete agreement about it. Both agree, not only agree but insist that there are two nations in India — one the Muslim nation and the other the Hindu nation. They differ only as regards the terms and conditions on which the two nations should live.’ .or Jinnah, the consequence was the partition of India and the construction of Pakistan. .or Savarkar, the consequence was that there should be one country and a single constitution under which the Hindu nation would be enabled to occupy a predominant position that was due to it and the Muslim nation made to live in the position of subordinate co-operation with the Hindu nation. Savarkar’s attitude was illogical, because ‘if he claims a national home for the Hindu nation, how can he refuse the claim of the Muslim nation for a national home?’258 However, from the point of view of the Muslims, Savarkar’s scheme had ‘a frankness, boldness and definiteness which distinguishes it from the irregularity, vagueness and indefiniteness which characterizes the Congress declarations about minority rights… [It] has at least the merit of telling the Muslims, thus far and no further. The Muslims know where they are with regard to the Hindu Mahasabha. On the other hand, with the Congress the [Muslims] find themselves nowhere because the Congress has been treating the Muslims and the minority question as a game in diplomacy, if not in duplicity’.259 Savarkar was ‘unconcerned about the Muslim reaction to his scheme’, his attitude being one of ‘take it or leave it’. Not so Gandhi. ‘Mr. Gandhi is never tired of saying that there is no Swaraj without Hindu–Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi did not merely make this slogan the currency of Indian
258 Ibid. 143. 259 Ibid.

politics but he has strenuously worked to bring it about.’ Gandhi’s efforts between 1919 and 1940, years during which he laboured hard to bring about Hindu–Muslim unity, were recorded in detail by Ambedkar, who also documented the communal riots in those years. ‘Placed side by side with the frantic efforts made by Mr. Gandhi to bring about Hindu– Muslim unity, the record makes most painful and heartrending reading.’ Ambedkar concluded, ‘it would not be much exaggeration to say that it is a record of twenty years of civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, interrupted by brief intervals of armed peace’.260 The tempers on each side were the tempers of two warring nations. Ambedkar concluded that the search for Hindu–Muslim unity was the search for a mirage; today, that is in 1940, it was ‘out of sight and also out of mind’.261 Without a consciousness of unity, and a desire for unity, it was impossible for government to bring about unification. Ambedkar quoted the opinion of the Simon Commission262
that the communal riots were a manifestation of the anxieties and ambitions aroused in both the communities by the prospects of India’s political future. So long as authority was firmly established in British hands and self-government was not thought of, Hindu–Muslim rivalry was confined within a narrower field. This was not merely because the presence of a neutral bureaucracy discouraged strife. A further reason was that there was little for members of one community to fear from the predominance of the other. The comparative absence of communal strife in the Indian States today may be similarly explained. Many, who are well acquainted with conditions in British India a generation ago, would testify that at that epoch so much good feeling had been engendered between the two sides that communal tension as a threat to civil peace was at a minimum. But the coming of the Reforms and the anticipation of what may follow them have given new point to Hindu–Muslim competition. The one community naturally lays claim to the rights of a majority and relics upon its qualifications of better education and greater wealth; the other is all the more determined on those accounts to secure effective protection for its members, and does not forget that it represents the previous conquerors of the country. It wishes to be assured of adequate representation and of a full share of official posts. 260 Ibid. 184. 261 Ibid. 187. 262 Ibid. 188–9.

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Without social union, political unity was difficult to achieve and would be precarious. Ambedkar declared nation-building for India to be impossible without a degree of social union:263
…nationalism — the most dynamic force of modern times — is seeking everywhere to free itself by the destruction and disruption of all mixed states. The danger to a mixed and composite state, therefore, lies not so much in external aggression as in the internal resurgence of nationalities which are fragmented, entrapped, suppressed and held against their will. Those who oppose Pakistan should not only bear this danger in mind but should also realize that this attempt on the part of suppressed nationalities to disrupt a mixed state and to found a separate home for themselves, instead of being condemned, finds ethical justification from the principle of self-determination.

Ambedkar went on to argue that Hindus who refused the Muslim demand for Pakistan would do well to study the fate of other countries, such as Turkey and Czechoslovakia, which have harboured many nations and sought to harmonise them. The lessons of these two examples were that264
…whether one calls it an irrational instinct or positive hallucination, the fact remains that it is a potent force which has a dynamic power to disrupt empires. Whether nationalism is the cause or the threat to nationalism is the cause, is a difference of emphasis only. The real thing is to recognize, as does Mr. Toynbee, that ‘nationalism is strong enough to produce war in spite of us. It has terribly proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be reckoned with’.

Would the Hindus really lose out by partition? Ambedkar argued that ‘the loss of her possessions by Turkey [was] the removal of an anomalous excrescence and the gain of a new skin’. The analogy could be applied to the subcontinent:265
The Muslim areas are an anomalous excrescence on Hindustan and Hindustan is an anomalous excrescence on them. Tied together they will make India the sick man of Asia. Welded together they will make India a heterogeneous unit. If Pakistan has the demerit of cutting away parts of India, it has also the merit of introducing harmony in place of conflict. Severed into two, each becomes a more homogeneous unit. 263 Ibid. 193–4. 264 Ibid. 215–16. 265 Ibid. 220.

Ambedkar’s argument was both prescient and correct. But it has taken moderate Hindu opinion over fifty years to recognition both the logic and the inevitability of it. Rajmohan Gandhi, one of the grandsons of the Mahatma, published his Revenge and Reconciliation: Understanding South Asian History in 1999 with the thesis that ‘nothing so good as partition ever happened to the Hindus in India’, in that otherwise the Muslim population would have grown too large and created division in India.266 But whereas some Hindu leaders, such as Sardar Patel, eventually became realistic advocates of partition, Rajmohan Gandhi has acknowledged that his grandfather continued ‘to see partition as a sin’. His grandson recalls that Mahatma Gandhi had said, ‘I would sooner have you vivisect me than India’. On 1 April 1940, Gandhi answered the question: ‘Do you intend to start general civil disobedience although Quaide-Azam Jinnah has declared war against Hindus and has got the Muslim to pass a resolution favouring [the] vivisection of India into two? If you do, what becomes of your formula that there is no swaraj without communal unity?’ Gandhi replied:267
I admit that the step taken by the Muslim League at Lahore creates a baffling situation. But I do not regard it [as] so baffling as to make civil disobedience an impossibility… [But] the Muslims will be entitled to dictate their own terms. Unless the rest of India wishes to engage in internal fratricide, the others will have to submit to Muslim dictation if the Muslims will resort to it. I know of no non-violent method of compelling the obedience of eight crores of Muslims to the will of the rest of India, however powerful a majority the rest may represent. The Muslims must have the same right of self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a division. 266 R. Gandhi, Revenge and Reconciliation: Understanding South Asian History (New Delhi; London [Penguin Books], 1999). 267 Gandhi, lxxi. 387–390.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination Thus, so far as I am concerned, my proposition that there is no swaraj without communal unity holds as good today as when I first enunciated it in 1919… I do not believe that Muslims, when it comes to a matter of actual decision, will ever want vivisection. Their good sense will prevent them. Their self-interest will deter them. Their religion will forbid the obvious suicide which the partition would mean. The ‘two nations’ theory is an untruth. The vast majority of Muslims of India are converts to Islam or are descendants of converts. They did not become a separate nation as soon as they became converts. A Bengali Muslim speaks the same tongue that a Bengali Hindu does, eats the same food, has the same amusements as his Hindu neighbour. They dress alike. I have often found it difficult to distinguish by outward sign between a Bengali Hindu and a Bengali Muslim… [As for Quaide-Azam Jinnah] his name could be that of any Hindu. When I first met him, I did not know that he was a Muslim. I came to know his religion when I had his full name given to me. His nationality was written in his face and manner… Sir Mahommed Iqbal used to speak with pride of his Brahminical descent… Hindus and Muslims of India are not two nations. Those whom God has made one, man will never be able to divide. And is Islam such an exclusive religion as Quaid-e-Azam would have it? Is there nothing in common between Islam and Hinduism or any other religion? Or is Islam merely an enemy of Hinduism? Were the Ali Brothers and their associates wrong when they hugged Hindus as blood brothers and saw so much in common between the two?… Quaid-e-Azam has, however, raised a fundamental issue [here Gandhi quotes Jinnah’s address on the ‘real nature of Islam and Hinduism, and their different religious philosophies, social customs and literatures as well as different sources of history]… He does not say some Hindus are bad’ he says Hindus as such have nothing in common with Muslims. I make bold to say that he and those who think like him are rendering no service to Islam; they are misrepresenting the message inherent in the very word Islam. I say this because I feel deeply hurt over what is now going on in the name of the Muslim League. I should be failing in my duty, if I did not warn the Muslims of India against the untruth that is being propagated against them. This warning is a duty because I have faithfully served them in their hour of need and because Hindu–Muslim unity has been and is my life’s mission.

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feel that they are not one nation with their Hindu and other brethren, who will be able to resist them?’268 Jinnah objected strongly to the term ‘vivisection’ for the partition of the sub-Continent: ‘it gives you at once a feeling of horror. Is it really to frighten the Muslims not to commit the vivisection of India? Is it really to frighten the Hindus that their motherland is vivisected by these wretched Muslims!… May I know when India was one? Was it ever one? Why use the word “vivisection”?’269 ‘…The Hindu nation, which is in the majority in India, cannot but give expression to its will, faith, culture and social order’, he stated in June 1941. ‘Hence the Muslims ask that where they are in a majority they should be allowed to have their own way of life and that where the Hindus are in [a] majority they should continue to have their way of life, each nation according to its own philosophy, faith and culture. To describe such a proposal as vivisecting India is to poison the minds of the people.’270 India, he declared on another occasion, was not a nation state but ‘a state of nationalities’.271 And on yet another occasion, he quoted the speech of Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons in 1940:
India cannot be unitary in the sense that we are in this island, but she can still be a unity. India’s future house of freedom has room for many mansions.272

Gandhi’s disciple Chakravarti Rajagopalacharya went further than the Mahatma and, in an allusion to the judgement of Solomon,273 described the Lahore Resolution as a proposal
268 Ibid., lxxi. 372. However, Gandhi contended that it was ‘permissible to dispute the authority of 50,000 Muslims who listened to Quaid-e-Azam to represent the feelings of eight crores of Indian Muslims’. 269 Yusufi, ii. 1333–4. 270 Yusufi, iii. 1424–5. 271 Yusufi, ii. 1295. 272 Yusufi, ii. 1272. Amery’s speech, somewhat perversely in the context of Hindu–Muslim relations, alluded to John 14:2 in the King James’ Bible (‘in my .ather’s house there are many mansions…’). 273 Yusufi, ii. 1193: ‘Mr Rajagopalacharya’s arguments of dividing the baby and the parable of King Solomon have gone beyond the zenith of his intellectual powers… Surely India is not the sole property of the Congress…’

Earlier, on 26 March, Gandhi had rejected the idea that his Hinduism demanded pacts. ‘I can never be party to the coercion of Muslims or any other minority… Do they not realize that any Muslim demand made by the Muslim delegates’ at a Constituent Assembly, he asked rhetorically, ‘will be irresistible? If the vast majority of Indian Muslims

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to cut the baby into two. In another analogy, he described the proposal in a speech, reported on 7 April 1940, as if ‘when two Hindu brothers are quarrelling, one wants to cut the mother cow into two halves’. Jinnah took great exception to the remark, on the grounds that such an analogy was intended to ‘rouse… the religious feelings of the Hindus’; his own position was that he had always had ‘very great respect for the religious feelings and sentiments of any community’; any such language, by implication, would be avoided.274
This could only be intended or undoubtedly is calculated to incite the highest passions of the Hindu community against me. It is a most wicked thing for a man like Mr. Rajagopalacharya, who occupies such a high position in the Congress hierarchy, to have resorted to such an analogy. I have always had every respect for the Hindus as a community and for their religious feelings, sentiments and beliefs… 275

Jinnah, however, retorted to the sort of argument advanced by Sathyamurthi by quoting Amery’s words in the House of Commons on 14 August 1940:278
Agreement by consent is, indeed, the foundation of all free government, of all true democracy. Decision by majority is not so much of the essence of democracy as a practical convenience which presupposes for its proper working an antecedent general consent to the constitution itself. It has, indeed, in most federal constitutions been limited in various ways in order to safeguard the separate interests of the federating elements. To describe the need for such agreement as a veto on constitutional progress is, I think, to do an injustice to the patriotism and sense of responsibility of those concerned. Agreement means not veto by any element but compromise, and willingness to compromise in India as elsewhere is an essential test of the sense of responsibility on which a free government must be based.

Two other Hindu statements on the Lahore Declaration are particularly noteworthy. Dr Moonje and Savarkar of the Hindu Mahasabha, who respectively commended the Italian .ascist and German Nazi governments, declared that ‘the Muslims were like Jews in Germany and should be treated as such’.276 Even before the Nazi policy of the Holocaust was public knowledge in the west, the allusion to the loss of all civic rights by Jews in Nazi Germany was particularly unfortunate. Jinnah was not slow in responding, and condemning the remark as the wish to impose slavery on the Muslims:277
[The Muslim League] wanted freedom and self-government, freedom for Hindus as well as Muslims and not freedom for the Hindus and slavery for the Muslims. Hindu policy was clear and Mr Savarkar and Dr Moonje had not minced matters when they had openly declared that the Muslims of India were like the Jews of Germany. The only difference between the Hindus’ Sabha and the Congress was that the former did not mince matters while the latter said the same thing in a subtle way. Mr. Sathyamurthi also in one of his recent speeches has said: 274 Yusufi, ii. 1334. 275 Yusufi, ii. 1196. Statement of Jinnah, 11 April 1940. 276 Yusufi, ii. 1279. .or the .ascist and Nazi interests: Ram Puniyani, Hindu Extreme Right-Wing Groups. 277 Yusufi, ii. 1294.

In a statement on 25 .ebruary 1942, quoted by Jinnah on 11 March, Ambedkar denounced the principle of Hindu majoritarianism as .ascist in inspiration:279
278 Yusufi, iii. 1414–15. 279 Yusufi, iii. 1537–8. Jinnah commented: ‘this statement was printed and broadcast through all the Hindu- and British-edited papers. But none of them has been taken to task by Mr Gandhi yet, as far as I know.’ This statement was in response to Gandhi, lxxxii. 85, 2 March 1942 (published 8 March in Harijan): ‘What will be the state of Hindus under Pakistan? Will they be suppressed as barbarians? There is no attempt in the papers at looking at the other side. The policy adopted in the papers must lead to the promotion of bitterness and strife between the two communities. If the end is to be attained through strife and force and not by persuasion and argument, I can have nothing to say. But I observe from Quaid-e-Azam’s speeches that he has no quarrel with the Hindus. He wants to live at peace with them. I plead, therefore, for a juster estimate of men and things in papers representing the policy and programme of the Muslim League.’ There is no evidence in this volume of Gandhi’s correspondence of a rebuttal of Ambdekar’s statement. Instead, Gandhi denounced Jinnah’s rebuttal as defending the indefensible (‘I do not hesitate to criticize any party or person whenever the occasion demands criticism. I have more than once criticized unbecoming writings in the non-Muslim Press’): Gandhi lxxxii. 125, 17 March 1942 (published in Harijan, 22 March).

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination The Congress cannot expect any sane person who knows anything about the conditions in India to agree to the government of the country being placed in the hands of the Hindu majority, simply because it is a majority. The Congress chooses to forget that Hinduism is a political ideology of the same character at the .ascist or Nazi ideology and is thoroughly anti-democratic. If it is let loose — which is what [a] Hindu majority means — it will prove a menace to the growth of others who are outside Hinduism and are opposed to Hinduism. This is not the point of view of Muslims alone. It is also the point of view of the depressed classes and also of the non-Brahmins.

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Ambedkar tried to clarify the issues of self-determination in relation to the demand for Pakistan:280
The idea underlying self-determination has developed along two different lines. During the nineteenth century selfdetermination meant the right to establish a form of government in accordance with the wishes of the people. Secondly, self-determination has meant the right to obtain national independence from an alien race irrespective of the form of government. The agitation for Pakistan has reference to self-determination in its second aspect.

Ambedkar referred to Jinnah’s speech at Jullundur on 15 November 1942, in which he stated:282
Now the latest trick — I call it nothing but a trick to puzzle and to mislead the ignorant masses, and those playing the game understand it — is, why should the right of self-determination be confined to Muslims only and why not extend it to other communities? Having said that all have the right of selfdetermination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many bits, likewise the North-West .rontier Province and Sind. Thus there will be hundreds of Pakistans. Who is the author of this new formula that every community has the right of self-determination all over India ? Either it is colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give them a reply, that the [Muslims] claim the right of self-determination because they are a national group on a given territory which is their homeland and in the zones where they are in a majority. Have you known anywhere in history that national groups scattered all over have been given a State? Where are you going to get a State for them? In that case you have got 14 per cent Muslims in the United Provinces. Why not have a State for them? Muslims in the United Provinces are not a national group; they are scattered. Therefore, in constitutional language, they are characterized as a subnational group who cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civilized government to a minority. I hope I have made the position clear. The Muslims are not a subnational group; it is their birthright to claim and exercise the right of self-determination.

He was clear that the politicians were playing fast and loose with the concept of self-determination for their own party aggrandizement:281
In the first place, self-determination must be by the people. This point is too simple even to need mention. But it has become necessary to emphasize it. Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha seem to be playing fast and loose with the idea of self-determination. An area is claimed by the Muslim League for inclusion in Pakistan because the people of the area are Muslims. An area is also claimed for being included in Pakistan because the ruler of the area is a Muslim though the majority of the people of that area are non-Muslims. The Muslim League is claiming the benefit of self-determination in India. At the same time the League is opposed to selfdetermination being applied to Palestine. The League claims Kashmir as a Muslim State because the majority of people are Muslims and also Hyderabad because the ruler is Muslim. In like manner the Hindu Mahasabha claims an area to be included in Hindustan because the people of the area are non-Muslims. It also comes forward to claim an area to be a part of Hindustan because the ruler is a Hindu though the majority of the people are Muslims. Such strange and conflicting claims are entirely due to the fact that either the 280 Ambekdar, Pakistan, 371. 281 Ibid. 371–2.

Ambedkar’s contention was that Jinnah had ‘completely missed the point’.
The point raised by his critics was not with regard to the nonMuslim minorities in general. It had reference to the nonMuslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal. Does Mr. Jinnah propose to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy a compact and an easily severable territory by his 282 Yusufi, iii. 1648–9. Quoted by Ambedkar, Pakistan, 375. His comments, ibid. 375–6.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination theory of a sub-nation? If that is so, then one is bound to say that a proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any political literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an ingenious concept but it is also a preposterous concept. What does the theory of a sub-nation connote? If I understand its implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must not be severed from the nation to which it belongs even when severance is possible: it means that the relations between a nation and a sub-nation are no higher than the relations which subsist between a man and his chattels, or between property and its incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a sub-nation goes with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah’s argument. But does Mr. Jinnah seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal are only chattels so that they must always go wherever the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal choose to drive them? Such an argument will be too absurd to be entertained by any reasonable man. It is also the most illogical argument and certainly it should not be difficult for so mature a lawyer as Mr. Jinnah to see the illogicality of it. If a numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation in relation to a numerically larger nation and has no right to territorial separation, why can it not be said that taking India as a whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a sub-nation they have no right to self-determination or territorial separation?

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between the British authorities, the Hindus and the Muslims which provided Jinnah and the Muslim League with their political opportunity between 1941 and 1947.

7 Harmonious Disagreement? The Gandhi– Jinnah Talks, 1944
The fourteen interviews which took place at Bombay between Gandhi and Jinnah from 9 September to 27 September 1944 were held amid a glare of publicity and heightened expectations that the two men would be able somehow to extract an elusive settlement of the rival claims to self-determination where others had failed. In particular, Gandhi used the media as an instrument for helping to achieve his political objectives. The meetings took place as a result of Gandhi’s initiative (Document Seven) and the correspondence which took place between them during the interval between meetings was published shortly afterwards with their agreement. There were differences between the two men at the outset in terms of their objectives and, as Jinnah insisted, their respective status. .or Gandhi had no official standing with the Congress Party (although he had immense influence because of his personal relationship with Nehru and Patel). Gandhi, moreover, was at first insistent on discussing the political formula of Chakravarti Rajagopalacharya (Document Six), not the Lahore Resolution. But Rajagopalacharya (also known as Rajajai) had had to resign from the Congress Party Working Committee on 30 April 1942 because of opposition to his draft political formula and his willingness to acknowledge the Muslim League’s claim for separation.284 Even had the formula been acceptable to Jinnah, therefore, which it was not, he would have had misgivings as to the capacity of Gandhi and Rajagopalachari to win the Congress Party over to their viewpoint. .or his part, Jinnah claimed he was at a disadvantage because of his Presidency of
284 Gandhi–Jinnah Correspondence and the Communal Question, ed. Amalendu De (Calcutta, 1999), unpaginated introduction and n 29.

Clearly, Jinnah was not prepared to concede to minorities in the future Pakistan the status of ‘sub-nations’, and thus Ambedkar was correct in observing a measure of inconsistency in his approach to the minorities problem. Overall, however, he conceded the basic position of the Muslims (as indeed did Gandhi):283
It is beyond question that Pakistan is a scheme which will have to be taken into account. The Muslims will insist upon the scheme being considered. The British will insist upon some kind of settlement being reached between the Hindus and the Muslims before they consent to any devolution of political power. There is no use blaming the British for insisting upon such a settlement as a condition precedent to the transfer of power. The British cannot consent to settle power upon an aggressive Hindu majority and make it its heir, leaving it to deal with the minorities at its sweet pleasure. That would not be ending imperialism. It would be creating another imperialism. The Hindus, therefore, cannot avoid coming to grips with Pakistan, much as they would like to do.

It was precisely the trilateral aspect of the negotiations
283 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 9.

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the Muslim League. If he committed himself to an agreement, there was the risk that the League itself would be implicated in the agreement before it had had the opportunity to discuss the issue. Above all, however, for Jinnah the Rajaji formula ‘mutilated’ the Lahore Resolution (Documents Ten and Eighteen), which provided ‘the only solution of India’s problem’ by dividing India into Pakistan and Hindustan. He considered that the Rajaji and Gandhi .ormulas were ‘calculated completely to torpedo the Pakistan demand of Muslim India’ (Document Thirty-Seven). At the annual session of the Muslim League in Delhi in April 1943 he had already criticized Gandhi and his tactics, accusing him of ‘wanting to turn the whole of India into his Hindu ashram’.285 Acceptance of the Congress Resolution of August 1942 would involve the ‘immediate grant of Complete Independence [and the] setting up immediately of a .ederal Central Government on the basis of a united, democratic Government of India with federated units or Provinces, which means establishing a Hindu Raj’ (Document TwentyNine). Gandhi had expressed his opposition to the Lahore Resolution on 1 April 1940. In the Bombay negotiations he returned to theme of the Resolution: ‘I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children’. Were there to be referendums under the terms of the Lahore Resolution? What of the rights of the many Muslims who dissented from the Muslim League position? (Document Twenty-Two). Jinnah in turn dismissed Gandhi’s claim to represent all the people of India (Document Twenty-.ive):
As I have said before, you are a great man and you exercise enormous influence over the Hindus, particularly the masses, and by accepting the road that I am pointing out to you, you are not prejudicing or harming the interests of the Hindus or of the minorities. On the contrary, Hindus will be the greater gainers. I am convinced that true welfare not only of the 285 Yusufi, iii. 1689. However, in fairness to Gandhi, while the ashram had a Hindu ethos, he was insistent that it should have a place for other faiths.

‘Hindus will be the greater gainers.’ The argument was expressed clearly by Jinnah, who also by cited Dr. Ambedkar’s book (Documents .orty-.our and .orty-.ive) and ‘M. R. T.’s’ Nationalism in Conflict in India (Document .orty-Seven):286 ‘we maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation’ (Document Twenty-.ive). Numerically the total Muslim population of British India was simply too large to be absorbed by a Hindu-dominated state after Independence. By no means all of the Indian Muslims could enjoy an equal right of self-determination, because much would depend on their geographical location and the precise details of any partition. .or Gandhi, ‘Dr. Ambedkar’s thesis, while it is ably written, has carried no conviction to me’ (Document Twenty-Six) — presumably because the conclusions he reached were diametrically opposed to those of the Mahatma. .or Ambedkar’s verdict was that, ‘separated, each can become a strong and well-knit state. India needs a strong Central Government. But it cannot have it so long as Pakistan remains a part of India.’ The status of the princely states was of critical importance for the future demarcation between the two states. Gandhi had posed the question: how are the Muslims under the Princes to be disposed of as a result of this scheme? What did the Lahore Resolution intend to do with them? (Document Twenty-Two) Jinnah had correctly inferred that ‘the Lahore Resolution is only confined to British India. This question does not arise out of the clarification of the Resolution’ (Document Twenty-.ive). But this was a crucial weakness for, as the Working Committee of the Congress had remarked on 2 April 1942 (Document .our):
The complete ignoring of the ninety millions of the people of 286 Published in Bombay in 1942 with Jinnah’s introduction, this work went into a second impression in 1943.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination the Indian States and their treatment as commodities at the disposal of their rulers is a negation of both democracy and self-determination. While the representation of an Indian State in the constitution-making body is fixed on a population basis, the people of the States have no voice in choosing those representatives, nor are they to be consulted at any stage, while decisions vitally affecting them are being taken.

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The Lahore Resolution failed to address this problem, and it was not until 30 July 1947 that Jinnah reiterated the Muslim League position that it had no intention of ‘coercing any state into adopting any particular course of action… The Muslim League recognizes the right of each state to choose its destiny.’287 This contrasts with the basic position of Nehru and Patel, which was that all the states should merge into the new ‘secular’ India, and if necessary they would be compelled to do so. Whether or not the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Indian union before the arrival of Indian troops has been contested; what is without doubt is that the plebiscite promised by Nehru on several occasions (for example, in his radio broadcast of 2 November 1947, in his telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan the following day and to the Constitutent Assembly on 25 November) was never carried out. Hyderabad’s pretensions to separate status were ended by force in September 1948. Once Partition occurred, there was plenty of Indian propaganda, led by Patel himself in his speeches, that the Muslims in India could not ‘ride two horses’ at the same time (that is, they could not support the Pakistan cause while remaining as Indian citizens).288 What is clear is that none of the leading Congress politicians who gained power in the newly-Independent India was prepared to subscribe to the ‘two nations’ theory. Acceptance of the British terms for gaining Independence was purely tactical. The aspiration of the Indian governing elite was to choke the independent Pakistan at birth and correct the ‘historical injustice’, as it was perceived, of partition. What Gandhi had aspired to in 1944, that partition should take place ‘as between two brothers, if a division there must be’ (Document Twenty287 Afzal, Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 427. 288 .or a United India. Speeches of Sardar Patel, 1947–1950 (rev. edn. 1967), 66–7.

Eight) was no more than a forlorn hope given the scale of the human tragedy at the time of partition and the enduring enmities it produced. Had the Mahatma’s emphasis on a plebiscite proved acceptable to all sides and capable of implementation, perhaps some of the bitterness would have been prevented. However, at his press conference at the end of the negotiations, Gandhi ruled out the voluntary migration of peoples as impracticable, while on the general proposition he ruled that if acceptance of the Lahore Resolution ‘means utterly independent sovereignty so that there is to be nothing in common between the two, I hold it is an impossible proposition. That means war to the knife. It is not a proposition that resolves itself into a voluntary or friendly solution’ (Document Thirty-Nine). Thus there was some truth to Jinnah’s proposition that ‘the question of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips and it does not come from your heart…’ (Document Thirty-Three). .or Jinnah, it was essential that, once partition had occurred, the two states should be seen as ‘independent, equal, sovereign states’; there could be no talk of restoring a single India, let alone by war; as for the two-nations theory, it was ‘not a theory but a fact’ and had to be accepted as such. In his view, the Indian Union was no more than a federation of Hindu national states, but in any case both states were committed to their solemn declarations giving a fair deal and safeguards for their religious minorities (Document .orty-Two). Jinnah’s argument that India was a Hindu state had some substance in the era between the granting of Independence and the acceptance of the Constitution in 1950. How could it be said, with confidence, that India had a ‘secular’ constitution enshrining the rights of Muslims and other minorities before that constitution was drawn up? (The point was equally true of the rights of Hindus and other minorities in Pakistan before the adoption of the first Pakistan Constitution, which declared it an Islamic Republic, in 1956.) Jinnah admitted that undertakings had been given by both sides (Document .orty-Two):
In accepting the [partition] Plan, even before then, solemn declarations were made both by the Congress and the Mus-

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination lim League that the minorities of both states would be given a fair deal and that safeguards for them should be secured specially for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights in consultation with them and that position is not seriously questioned even now by any responsible person.

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The Liaquat–Nehru Pact of 8 April 1950 was an attempt to fill the constitutional void in the two countries and provide a ‘bill of rights’ for the minorities of India and Pakistan. It was divided into three parts, which attempted a) to put to rest the fears of the religious minorities on both sides; b) to establish communal peace; and c) to create an atmosphere in which the two countries could resolve their other differences. According to the agreement, ‘the government of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its territories, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion; a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour’. It also guaranteed the fundamental human rights to the minorities, such as freedom of movement, speech, occupation and worship. The pact also provided for the minorities to participate in the public life of the country, to hold political or other office and to serve in their country’s civil and armed forces.289
289 <www.storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A096> With regard to possessions, the agreement determined that migrants could take all immovable properties and up to 150 rupees for adults and 75 rupees for children. The agreement provided that migrants could leave jewellery and cash which could then be transferred. In cases of return by 31 December 1950, immovable property would be returned except in ‘exceptional cases’ in which cases migrants would be compensated. In cases of non-return, the immovable property would continue to be owned by the migrant and placed in the ‘trusteeship’ of a committee ‘consisting of the minority and presided over by a representative of Government’. This trust was ‘empowered to recover rent’. The provincial and state governments were to enact supporting legislation and also ‘provide all possible assistance for the discharge of the Committee’s functions’. The agreement also included clauses addressing the protection of minorities. According to section D of the agreement, the minority protection clauses (section C) extended to the entirety of both countries. However, the property administration clauses appear to be specifically limited in scope (East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura, and in certain cases Bihal). Section

There can be no doubt that it would have been preferable for the Indian sub-Continent had the talks between Gandhi and Jinnah not failed in 1944 and had such a pact been signed. The evils of partition might not have been completely avoided, but the human suffering would have been lessened, the transition to two independent states could have been achieved in a more orderly manner and there would have been a prospect of reasonably harmonious relations between the two states in the future. Gandhi stated after the breakdown in the talks: ‘I want to make it clear that I believe Mr. Jinnah is sincere, but I think he is suffering from hallucination when he imagines that an unnatural division of India could bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned’ (Document .orty). .or his part, Jinnah was firm but without rancour. He commented:
I have placed before him everything and every aspect of the Muslim point of view in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence, and we discussed all the pros and cons generally, and I regret to say that I have failed in my task of converting Mr. Gandhi. We have, therefore, decided to release to the Press the correspondence that has passed between us. Nevertheless, we hope that the public will not feel embittered, and we trust that this is not the final end of our effort.

The areas of difficulty remained considerable, however, and could not be easily surmounted. They are most accessibly summarized in Allen Hayes Merriam’s table of the main points of disagreement.290 Allen Hayes Merriam: Main Points of Disagreement between Gandhi and Jinnah (1980) Jinnah 1 The Congress Party stands for Hindu rule. Gandhi The Congress Party is a national body standing for Indian independence.

G specifically states, ‘except where modified by this agreement, the inter-Dominion Agreement of December 1948 shall remain in force’: ‘Agreement Between India and Pakistan on Minorities’, reprinted in Middle East Journal, 4.3 (July 1950), 344–346. <www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/biblo2.html> 290 Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 149–50.

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2

The Muslim League is the sole representative of Indian Muslims. Gandhi speaks only for Hindus. The communal issue must be settled before independence or else the Hindu Congress would subject Muslims to slavery. Indian unity is a myth resulting from the imposition of British rule. The myth of a united India can only lead to endless strife, giving the British an excuse to stay. Hindus and Muslims are irreconcilably antagonistic. Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations. Both groups could progress better if in charge of their own destiny (‘selfdetermination’) The creation of Pakistan would lead to peace by ending communal competition within a single state.

The League is only one among many Muslim political parties. Gandhi speaks for all Indians. Independence must be achieved first and then any domestic problems can be solved by Indians themselves. India is a united nation. The British presence has caused the present divisiveness. Muslim communalism is weakening the nationalistic efforts of Congress, thus prolonging British rule. Indian Muslims are merely converted Hindus. A person’s nationality does not change just because he changes religion. Partition would not materially benefit Muslims.

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Ireland–Britain and Burma–India are precedents for partition Government and religion cannot be separated in India. Gandhi does not understand the yearnings of Muslims. Gandhi must first accept the principle of partition and then the details will resolve themselves. Pakistan must be a totally independent, sovereign nation. Muslims have an inherent right to a homeland. No non-Muslims can have any say in determining the future of the Muslim nation.

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There are no historical precedents for a religious group to call itself a nation. Secular government is not concerned with matters of faith. Partition is opposed to the spirit of Islam. Various details can be discussed but the principle can never be agreed because it is an untruth. A separate Muslim state can exist as long as it remains within the Indian nation. India is the homeland of all religious groups. Any separation must have the approval of all the people in the affected areas.

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Two communally-based nations could go to war against each other.

It was not the final end of the effort at an agreed solution. This came on 10 July 1946, when Nehru refused to accept any restrictions on the power of Congress in the Constituent Assembly in contravention of the Muslim League’s acceptance of an agreed distribution of powers between the centre, the provinces and the three sections in which the provinces would be grouped. It was a mutilation of the Cabinet Mission plan to which Gandhi and Nehru were active

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participants and Azad a passive participant. After this, hopes of a Muslim League–Congress agreement were dashed (Document .orty-One). As Azad admitted, ‘Mr Jinnah took full advantage of his [that is, Nehru’s] mistake’.291 Instead, there was no choice but partition. After 1942, the key figure in matters relating to the transfer of power was Vapal Pangunni Menon, the Reforms Commissioner. When the Prime Minister of Bikaner State, Sardar K. M. Panikkar, presented a partition plan, this was handed over to V. P. Menon, who submitted to the Viceroy, Wavell, his own statement on the nature and mechanics of partition. Menon produced a further plan in consultation with Sir Benegal Rau, one of Wavell’s chief advisers on constitutional law. The Menon–Rau plan of 23 January 1946 was, in the words of Alistair Lamb, ‘in many respects a blueprint for what actually took place in the summer of 1947’.292 ‘Both the Punjab and Bengal would be partitioned, generally on a District by District basis (actually Menon and Rau tended to think in terms of Divisions, that is to say, groups of Districts: in practice the result was the same), but not
291 M. A. H. Ispahani, Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah as I knew him (Karachi, 1966), 172–5. Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 302–3, call what Azad called Nehru’s ‘unfortunate statement’ a ‘godsend to Jinnah. It furnished him with a legitimate excuse for withdrawing the League’s acceptance of the scheme’. Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, 176. Ayesha Jalal argues: ‘the singular nationalism of the Indian National Congress got the better of both the Muslim claim to “nationhood” and the majoritarian provincialism of Muslims in the north-western and [north-] eastern extremities of the sub-Continent. The Congress leadership, keen on grasping the centralized apparatus of the colonial state, was prepared neither to share power with Muslim League at the all-India level nor accommodate Muslim majoritarian provincialism within a loose federal or confederal structure. It was ready instead to wield the partitioner’s axe — in concert one might add with the Hindu Mahasabha — to exclude both the League and the Muslim-majority areas from the horizons of the secular Indian nation state…’ Jalal, ‘Exploding communalism: the politics of Muslim identity in south Asia’, Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India, ed. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal (Delhi, 1997), 94–5. 292 A. Lamb, Incomplete Partition. The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute, 1947–1948 (Hertingfordbury, 1997), 33.

always so…’, Lamb writes. ‘In the Punjab the Gurdaspur District, or at least the three eastern tehsils of it, would, despite the District’s Muslim majority and its contiguity with other Muslim-majority Districts, remain in India.’ A draft telegram was prepared for Wavell by George Abell on the basis of this plan, and after consultation with V. P. Menon, the plan was forwarded to London by Wavell on 6 .ebruary 1946.293 .or Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, writing in 1946, ‘a careful reading of the published correspondence summarizing the [September 1944] talks makes it evident that Jinnah was not working for a settlement’. In his opinion, neither Gandhi nor Jinnah ‘was able to understand the other’s point of view’.294 The main points at issue, Smith judged, were three: a plebiscite, the powers of a provisional government and the machinery for dealing with matters of common interest between Pakistan and Hindustan. Smith continued:295
Regarding the first, Gandhi insisted that there must be a plebiscite of all the adult inhabitants in the regions to be separated; Jinnah refused to hear of any plebiscite that would include non-Muslims. (Perhaps the Muslims of whom a plebiscite might, according to the League, be taken, are all the Muslims of India, not merely those of the Pakistan area. ‘We claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit.’) Secondly, Gandhi wanted a provisional government to be set up on India with full powers, independent of Britain (except in military matters as long as the war should last), which government would subsequently hold a plebiscite, demarcate Pakistan, and realize partition; Jinnah apparently felt that such a government, if full powers were transferred to it and the British departed, could not be trusted to carry out whatever pledges it might have previously made to the Muslims. Presumably he therefore visualized that the whole matter of demarcation and division should not only be agreed upon but actually carried out before the British left the country — though he did not say so. Thirdly, Gandhi insisted that the agreement to partition India must include arrangements for joint dealing with matters of common interest between the two states, such as defence, foreign affairs, internal communications, etc; Jinnah was rather self-contradictory about whether there might be such matters of common 293 Ibid., 85. 294 Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India (rev. edn., 1946; repr. Lahore, 1963), 319. 295 Ibid. 319, 321–2.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination interest, but anyway insisted that they must be agreed upon by the two states after they had become separate and sovereign, not before. There was also a difference of geographic interpretation; though the total lack of agreement on other matters kept this point from being effectively discussed. Previously, it had been impossible to discover what, geographically, the Muslim League had meant by Pakistan. Gandhi in these talks envisaged it as embracing such administrative Districts (they are all contiguous) as have more than 50 per cent Muslim population. Such a District-wise Pakistan296 would include Baluchistan, Sind and the .rontier Province, one District in Assam, and those parts of Bengal and the Punjab that have Muslim majorities. Jinnah had ridiculed this suggestion as ‘a shadow and a husk, maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan’; and he now told Gandhi that if this concept were accepted, ‘the present boundaries of these provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only with the husk’ [Document Thirty-Three]. In other words, the League, in demanding the partition of India, was refusing to consider the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. (This question is liable to become the essential geographic issue.) .or the first time (September 1944), the League now put forward a demand that was specific: Jinnah insisted that Pakistan should embrace not only the solidly-Muslim provinces (Baluchistan, Sind and the .rontier), but also the whole of Assam and the whole of Bengal and the Punjab297 ‘subject to territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon’.

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of the world’s religions, not a constitutional specialist. The most searching analysis of the Gandhi–Jinnah talks was provided by the man who, as we have seen, had already provided the most penetrating discussion of the Lahore Resolution and its significance: Dr B. R. Ambedkar, the future chief architect of the Indian Constitution, who added a new, fifteenth, chapter to his study of the Pakistan scheme in a second edition of his publication (Document .orty.ive).298 Ambedkar was clear that the Gandhi–Jinnah talks had not addressed the correct issues (leaving aside the ‘Rajaji .ormula’, the errors of which he also demonstrated):
It would have been a great gain if straight questions had been put to Mr. Jinnah and unequivocal answers obtained. But instead of coming to grips with Mr. Jinnah on these questions, Mr. Gandhi spent his whole time proving that the C. R. [= Rajaji] .ormula is substantially the same as the League’s Lahore Resolution — which was ingenious if not nonsensical and thereby lost the best opportunity he had of having these questions clarified. After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have retired to their pavilions as players in a cricket match do after their game is over, as though there is nothing further to be done. There is no indication whether they will meet again and if so when. What next? is not a question which seems to worry them. Yet it is difficult to see how India can make any political advance without a solution of the question which one may refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions about which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which solution will have to be found. How? It must be by agreement or by arbitration.

However profound the analysis of Wilfrid Cantwell Smith, he was a lecturer in Islamic History and a future theologian
296 Smith published a map to illustrate the point: ibid. 320. 297 Merriam contends that ‘the rhetoric of partition advocates exhibited a West Pakistan bias’ even though Bengal contained the larger population. The omission of the letter ‘b’ for Bengal in the original ‘Pakstan’ acronym is significant. In Merriam’s judgement, the ‘roots of the conflict which led to secession and war over East Pakistan can be traced directly to the partition movement of the 1930s and 1940s’: Merriam, Gandhi vs Jinnah, 161. It is true that on 24 April 1943 Jinnah declared that the Punjab was ‘the cornerstone of Pakistan’: Yusufi, iii. 1692. However, he had stated on 24 December 1942 that ‘the Muslim homelands are in the North Western and Eastern zones of the sub-continent where they are in a solid majority with a population of nearly 70 millions and they desire that these parts should be separated from the rest of India and constituted into independent sovereign states [sic]’ (Document .orty-Seven). Note that this preface is not published at the date of 24 Dec. 1942 in the Yusufi edition of Jinnah’s writings.

What is striking is the extent to which Dr Ambedkar succeeded in encapsulating the potential pitfalls of the partition proposal. Had Ambedkar’s work been studied by the British government and had the colonial government been given the time and the resources to work out a more satisfactory arrangement instead of adopting a position, determined by Mountbatten, of ‘partition and run’ in 1947,299
298 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 385–416. 299 Merriam, Gandhi vs. Jinnah, 158, criticizes Jinnah for portraying Partition ‘as the cure-all for India’s problems without offering specific plans for its efficient execution… the hasty preparations for division in the summer of 1947 further indicated a lack of realistic planning and foresight’. However, it was the colonial

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then most of the enduring damage inflicted by the partition experience could have been avoided and the hostility evinced between the two newly independent states might have been kept in check. .irstly, Ambedkar correctly assumed that since the British had presided over the partition of Ireland, which had involved their own kith and kin, they were perfectly capable of presiding over a partition of the Indian sub-continent which did not. Secondly, Ambedkar correctly envisaged that the delineation of boundaries was likely to prove a fundamental issue (Document .orty-.ive):300
If the Majority of the Muslims are in favour of separation and a majority of non-Muslims are against separation, steps must be taken to delimit the areas wherever it is possible by redrawing provincial boundaries on ethnic and cultural lines by separating the Muslim majority districts from the districts in which the majority consists of non-Muslims. A Boundary Commission is necessary for this purpose. So a Boundary Commission is provided for in the Act [that is, the draft Act which Ambedkar included in his proposals]. 301 It would be better if the Boundary Commission could be international in its composition.

Boundary Commission been accepted. However, the British government clearly regarded Partition as an internal matter for the British Empire to resolve and clearly an international Boundary Commission would have worked in a more deliberate manner than at the breakneck speed determined by Mountbatten’s timetable for the transfer of power. Ambedkar’s second proposal concerned the nature of the proposed referendums, especially the avoidance of coercion by a majority, and also a suggested trial period of ten years before a permanent constitutional arrangement was determined:302
The scheme of separate referenda of Muslims and non-Muslims is based on two principles which I regard as fundamental. The first is that a minority can demand safeguards for its protection against the tyranny of the majority. It can demand them as a condition precedent. But a minority has no right to put a veto on the right of the majority to decide on questions of ultimate destiny. This is the reason why I have confined the referendum on the establishment of Pakistan to Muslims only. The second is that a communal majority cannot claim a communal minority to submit itself to its dictates. Only a political majority may be permitted to rule a political minority. This principle has been modified in India where a communal minority is placed under a communal majority subject to certain safeguards. But this is as regards the ordinary question of social, economic and political importance. It has never been conceded and can never be conceded that a communal majority has a right to dictate to a communal minority on an issue which is of a constitutional character. That is the reason why I have provided a separate referendum of non-Muslims only, to decide whether they prefer to go in Pakistan or come into Hindustan... [Proposed ten-year period to determine permanent arrangements.] Such is my scheme. It is based on a community-wise plebiscite. The scheme is flexible. It takes account of the fact that the Hindu sentiment is against it. It also recognizes the fact that the Muslim demand for Pakistan may only be a passing mood. The scheme is not a divorce. It is only a judicial separation. It gives to the Hindus a term. They can use it to show that they can be trusted with authority to rule justly. It gives the Musalmans a term to try out Pakistan.

The evident wisdom of this proposition has sometimes escaped attention. .or an international boundary commission would not have been the rushed job that the Radcliffe Commission proved to be; nor could it have been regarded with the deep suspicion in which the Radcliffe Award has been held since 1947. Justice might have been done and have been seen to be done. Some of the subsequent quarrels between India and Pakistan might have been averted. As the last Viceroy of India, charged with presiding over Partition, Earl Mountbatten of Burma has been accused of partiality towards India and in particular of influencing the boundary commission to alter the frontier in India’s favour (Document .orty-Six). Such accusations of partiality and interference with the Boundary Award would have been averted had Ambedkar’s proposal for an international
administration which presided over Partition; Jinnah had recommended Ambedkar’s analysis to Gandhi in their 1944 talks and that analysis was clear on how the process should operate in practice. The advice was known, but rejected. 300 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 392.

Ambedkar distinguished his proposal from the ‘Cripps Offer’ of 1942:303
301 Ibid. 386–92. 302 Ibid. 393. 303 Ibid. 396. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India is the basic account, which uses Cripps’ diary. .or the draft declaration and

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination The main difference between my plan and that of Sir Stafford Cripps is quite obvious. .or deciding the issue of accession or secession which is only another way of saying, will there be or will there not be Pakistan, Sir Stafford Cripps took the Province as a deciding unit.304 I have taken community as the deciding unit. I have no doubt that Sir Stafford adopted a wrong basis. The Province can be a proper unit if the points of dispute were inter-provincial. .or instance, if the points of dispute related to questions such as distribution of taxation, of water, etc., one could understand the Province as a whole or a particular majority in that Province having the right to decide. But the dispute regarding Pakistan is an intercommunal problem which has involved two communities in the same Province. .urther, the issue in the dispute is not on what terms the two communities will agree to associate in a

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Professor Richard Bonney common political life. The dispute goes deeper and raises the question whether the communities are prepared at all to associate in a common political life. It is a communal difference in its essence and can only be decided by a community-wise plebiscite.

Ambedkar was also mindful of the precedent of the Partition of Ireland. But he was clear that this was not a desirable precedent, and his words were not only full of foreboding but also an accurate prediction of the dangers of a rushed, or even botched, Partition with an inevitable highly damaging post-Partition experience for the Indian sub-continent:305
Can His Majesty’s Government be depended upon to repeat in India what it did in Ireland? I am unable to answer the question. But two things I will say. The first thing is that His Majesty’s Government knows full well what have been the consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish .ree State has become the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The enmity knows no limits. The wound caused by partition will never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact…306 The partition of Ireland is not a precedent worthy to be followed. It is an ugly incident which requires to be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very much if His Majesty’s Government will partition India on its own authority at the behest of the Muslim League… The other thing I would like to say is that it would not be in the interests of the Muslim League to achieve its object by invoking the authority of His Majesty’s Government to bring about the partition of India. In my judgement more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be adopted in bringing about Pakistan if the object is that, after partition, Pakistan and Hindustan should continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other. What is the procedure which is best suited for the realization of this end? Everyone will agree that the procedure must be such that it must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to the other. The method must be of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another solution better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people…

statement of 30 March 1942: <www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420330a.html> 304 Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, 75, argues that ‘by offering a provincial not a communal option, Cripps hoped to provide a powerful incentive for those very constituents on whom Jinnah’s strategy depended to unhitch their wagons from the League’s train’. She argues that ‘the provincial leaders had no urgent reason before Cripps came to India to challenge and deny Jinnah’s purposes. Cripps hoped to give them reason to do so’. Moore argues that Jinnah and the League had initially seen the Cripps Offer as recognizing the principle of Pakistan: Moore, ‘Jinnah and the Pakistan demand’, India’s Partition, ed Hasan, 187 (Resolution of the League Working Committee, as late as 11 April 1942). On 4 April 1942, Jinnah stated that ‘Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the right of national self-determination is unequivocally recognized’: Yusufi, iii. 1556. .inally, in his statement on the League’s rejection of the Cripps Proposals, Jinnah stated on 13 April: ‘we examined the whole of the proposal as one document and came to the conclusion that, as regards the future, the principle of partition (Pakistan) was not conceded, but there was possibility for a province or provinces to stand out… In effect Pakistan was not conceded unequivocally and the right of Muslim self-determination was denied’: Yusufi, iii. 1561–2. Moore, Churchill, Cripps and India, 87, on Muslim non-accession. In his broadcast to CBS on 26 July 1942, Cripps stated: ‘The Moslems, of whom there are at least 80 million, are deeply opposed to Congress Party domination, as are also the tens of millions of depressed classes. To have agreed to the Congress Party’s or Mr. Gandhi’s demands would have meant inevitable chaos and disorder. This is not merely my assertion. It has been stated by Mr. Gandhi himself. Quite recently he has said: “Anarchy is the only way. Someone asked me if there would be anarchy after British rule. Yes, it will be there. But I tell the British to give us chaos”.’ <www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/420726a.html>

The error of granting independence to two new states without settling some of the outstanding issues, such as
305 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 401–2. 306 Only the joint peace-making efforts for Northern Ireland by the British and Irish governments have truly begun to heal the wounds, containing as they have done a provision for north– south interaction on issue of mutual interest.

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the accession of the Princely States, which carried with it the seeds for future conflict, were implicit in Ambedkar’s words. The Kashmir dispute has proved intractable precisely because it contains some of the basic ingredients of conflict arising from a flawed or incomplete Partition. There was too much concentration in 1946–7 on the competition for power rather than on the mechanics of the transfer of power and the way in which the transfer was achieved. Was it to be a ‘prompt and decisive’ transfer of power with reasonable consent and satisfaction to both sides? Ambedkar concluded in late 1944:307
What next? I don’t know what else [there] can be. All I know is that there will be no freedom for India without an answer. It must be decisive, it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the parties concerned.

8 Epilogue. The Kashmir Dispute: Contrasting Theories of Self-Determination and National Identity
The commitment of Jawaharlal Nehru to the cause of Kashmir’s accession to India is attested from some of the pre-partition documents in the last months of British rule.308 Mountbatten’s predecessor as Viceroy, Wavell, dismissed Nehru’s account of the troubled Kashmir body politic in early 1947 as exaggerated.309 Nehru’s long memorandum to Mountbatten dated 17 June 1947, allegedly produced at the new Viceroy’s request, is full of important details on pre-partition Kashmir, but argued overtly for Kashmir’s incorporation into India. The rationale had nothing to do with the religious balance of the population, for Nehru did not seek to conceal the result of the 1941 census, which produced the figures of 77 per cent Muslims and 21 per cent Hindus for the state as a whole. Instead, Nehru sought to make Kashmir the cornerstone for an attack on the ‘two nations theory’ according to which the sub-continent was to be partitioned.
307 Ambedkar, Pakistan, 416. 308 Note that Wilfrid Cantwell Smith’s map, published in 1946, shows Kashmir as a Muslim-majority princely state. 309 The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, ix. 541, 625.

Nehru advanced the argument that Kashmir was special because it had Muslim support for an anti-Muslim League position, the Kashmir National Conference of Sheikh Abdullah. It was a point of honour that the Sheikh should be released from prison and resume his ‘rightful’ place as the political leader of Kashmir who was closely associated with Congress. Kashmir’s accession to India was thus in the interests of economic and social reform within the state itself. In contrast, Nehru dismissed the Muslim League position as communalist and one which appealed to vested interests. Once Sheikh Abdullah was back at the helm of affairs, he considered that India would win the Kashmir plebiscite if one were held.310 Of course, Nehru made no mention of the rumoured family relationship with Sheikh Abdullah.311 Professor Judith Brown comments that ‘to Nehru, Kashmir was a much-loved ancestral homeland. But, even more important, the future of Kashmir as a part of India [it would become its only Muslim majority state] was a vital part of his project of creating a non-communal nation in which Muslims would be secure. If Kashmiri Muslims became Pakistanis under duress then India’s claims about her own secular national identity would become a hollow mockery…. [Kashmir’s] presence within the union was a challenge to the two-nation theory’ that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct and separate nations.’312 At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in January 1951, Nehru rejected the two-nations theory, stating that India was unwilling to accept this as the basis for a Kashmir settlement. Attlee refuted Nehru’s contention, arguing that
310 Ibid., xi. 442–8. M. Rahman, Divided Kashmir. Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri People (Boulder, Col., 1996), 81. 311 That is, that Abdullah was the bastard son of Nehru’s father Motilal Nehru. The rumour is cited by an impeccable Indian source: P. Gupte, Mother India. A Political Biography of Indira Gandhi (New York, 1992), 270 note. Uniquely among Indian provincial leaders, Abdullah regularly stayed in Jawaharlal Nehru’s house. However, there is no suggestion of this in Nanda’s biography of Motilal Nehru, and the rumour was kept well under wraps. 312 J. M. Brown, Nehru (Harlow, 1999), 77.

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India had been partitioned in 1947 on religious grounds in accordance with the two-nations theory. 313 Attlee commented in 1964 in an article entitled ‘Nehru in Retrospect’:314
I can recall many long discussions with Mr Nehru on the vexed question of Kashmir, sometimes between the two of us, sometimes with other prime ministers, but they proved fruitless. Although we proposed every possible variant in order to have a fair plebiscite, to which he had already agreed in principle, we could not get acceptance from Mr Nehru. I have always considered this the blind spot of a great statesman.

Secondly, the well-known writer and broadcaster on India, Mark Tully comments:317
Kashmir is where the two principles — secularism and the two nations theory — directly conflict. Pakistan, not without reason, considers that it has been cheated out of Kashmir. But Kashmir’s inclusion in India is seen by India as crucial to secularism: if India were to allow Kashmir to go to Pakistan because of its Muslim majority, it would be an acceptance of the two nations theory with all that could entail for India’s cohesion and stability. It is this conflict above all which makes Kashmir such a bone of contention, and which makes it so difficult for India to compromise or accept external mediation…

By 1951, the status of Kashmir had already become nonnegotiable for the Indian government, and one which, in the words of Judith Brown had ‘deepened Hindu anxieties about the identity of their nation and suspicions about the loyalties of their Muslim fellow-citizens. Kashmir, the touchstone of Nehru’s envisaged nation, thus became a source of national instability through his life and beyond.’315 And so it has remained ever since. The ongoing conflict, and the threat it poses to world peace, is so well known that analysis of the sources for the continuance of this ideological conflict is almost superfluous. However, we end with the views of just two of the many authorities who have written on the subject. .irstly, Sumanatra Bose writes:316
Both countries have chosen to make possession of Kashmir central to their respective national ideologies — ‘secular’ nationalism in the case of India, Muslim nationalism in the case of Pakistan. The results of this competition are maximalist claims to Kashmir which are fundamentally irreconcilable. In their present form, they leave no scope for any kind of compromise… While most political disagreements are amenable to some sort of resolution through negotiation and bargaining, there is one type of disagreement which is usually not — differing conceptions of national identity and basic state allegiance. In societies that are divided along this highly intractable fault-line, attempts to impose forcibly the 313 Rahman, Divided Kashmir, 92, citing The Times 17 Jan. 1951. In general terms this is borne out in the Pakistan account: <www.pak.gov.pk/public/kashmir/Kashmir_freedom.htm> 314 Burke and Al-Din Quraishi, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 360. 315 Brown, loc. cit. 316 <www.fp.kashmir.f9.co.uk/editorial12.htm>

Just as in the era of Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah, selfdetermination remains one of the most contested of political issues.

317 Mark Tully, ‘The “ifs” over Kashmir’, The Tablet, 22 June 2002, 8.

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Three Giants of South Asia: Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on SelfDetermination Documents Appendix One The One-nation versus the Two-nations Theory: the Gandhi–Jinnah Talks of 1944 and their background
Document One M. A. Jinnah to Gandhi, 3 March 1938
I have received your letter of the 24th .ebruary, 1938. I am sorry for the delay in replying as I was not well. In your letter I missed the note of response, first whether you are of opinion that you see light now and the moment has come, and secondly, if so, whether you are prepared to take the matter up in right earnest, and thirdly, I find that there is no change in your attitude and mentality when you say you would be guided by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as Dr. Ansari is no more. If you pursue this line you will be repeating the same tragedy as you did when you expressed you helplessness because Dr. Ansari, holding pronounced and die-hard views, did not agree and you had to say that although you were willing, but what could you do? This happened, as you know, before you went to the Round Table Conference. At the Round Table Conference the tragedy was repeated by you when you seemed to be willing to accept provisionally certain terms: but you there also expressed that you were helpless as the Hindus were unwilling and you, as a representative of the Congress, would have no objection, if the Hindus and Mussalmans came to an agreement. We have reached a stage when no doubt should be left that you recognize the All-India Muslim League as the one

authoritative and representative organization of the Mussalmans of India and on the other hand you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis that we can proceed further and devise machinery of approach. Of course, I shall be glad to see you, although I shall be equally glad to see Pandit Jawaharlal or Mr. Bose, [as] you may desire. The matter as you know will not be clinched without reference again to you by either of them. Therefore, I will prefer to see you first. In any case, I am sorry to say that I cannot come to Segaon to see you before the 10th March. I have to go to Bombay and also I have fixed various other engagements of my tour. But we can fix up the time and place that may suit us both.
Source: Gandhi lxxiii. 454.

Document Two Gandhi to C. Rajagopalachari, 21 May 1938
I had two hours and a half with friend Jinnah yesterday. The talk was cordial but not hopeful, yet not without hope. I must not enter into the details of the conversation, but he complained bitterly of Hindi having been imposed in particular areas of Madras in primary schools. What is exactly the position? Are Mussalman boys affected? Please send me as early a reply as possible and one that I could publicly use...
Source: Gandhi lxxiii. 185.

Document Three M. A. Jinnah, Notes on a Discussion with Mr Gandhi, 20 May 1938, 2.30 to 5 pm
1 The Congress must recognize the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality as the authoritative and representative organization of the Musulmans of India.

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2 That Muslim mass contact movement on behalf of the Congress should cease. 3 The League cannot recognize any other Muslim organization or individual Musulman as representatives of the Musulmans. 4 Bande Mataram should be abandoned in all public institutions. 5 Bande Mataram should not be sung in mixed gatherings. 6 Hindi should not be made compulsory. 7 Congress flag should not be forced on any public institution. 8 The Muslim members of the Congress should not be considered to represent the Muslims. 9 Stop persecution of the Muslim press and the members and workers of the [Muslim] League.
Source: Pakistan National Archives, Islamabad. Jinnah Papers, .– 20 / 20–22.

Document .our Resolution of the Working Committee of Congress, 2 April 1942
The Working Committee have given their full and earnest consideration to the proposals made by the British War Cabinet in regard to India and the elucidation thereof by Sir Stafford Cripps. These proposals, which have been made at the very last hour because of the compulsion of events, have to be considered not only in relation to India’s demand for independence, but more especially in the present grave war crisis, with a view to meeting effectively the perils and dangers that confront India and envelop the world. The Congress has repeatedly stated, ever since the commencement of the War in September 1939, that the people of India would line themselves with the progressive forces of the world and assume full responsibility to face the new problems and shoulder the new burdens that had arisen, and it asked for the necessary conditions to enable

them to do so to be created. An essential condition was the freedom of India, for only the realization of present freedom could light the flame which would illumine millions of hearts and move them to action. At the last meeting of the All-India Congress Committee, after the commencement of the War in the Pacific, it was stated that: ‘Only a free and independent India can be in a position to undertake the defence of the country on a national basis and be of help in the furtherance of the larger causes that are emerging from the storm of war.’ The British War Cabinet’s new proposals relate principally to the future upon the cessation of hostilities. The Committee, while recognizing that self-determination for the people of India is accepted in principle in that uncertain future, regret that this is fettered and circumscribed and certain provisions have been introduced which gravely imperil the development of a free and united nation and the establishment of a democratic State. Even the constitution-making body is so constituted that the people’s right to self-determination is vitiated by the introduction of non-representative elements. The people of India have as a whole clearly demanded full independence and the Congress has repeatedly declared that no other status except that of independence for the whole of India could be agreed to or could meet the essential requirements of the present situation. The Committee recognize that future independence may be implicit in the proposals but the accompanying provisions and restrictions are such that real freedom may well become an illusion. The complete ignoring of the ninety millions of the people of the Indian States and their treatment as commodities at the disposal of their rulers is a negation of both democracy and selfdetermination. While the representation of an Indian State in the constitution-making body is fixed on a population basis, the people of the States have no voice in choosing those representatives, nor are they to be consulted at any stage, while decisions vitally affecting them are being taken. Such States may in many ways become barriers to the growth of Indian freedom, enclaves where foreign authority still prevails and where the possibility of maintaining foreign armed forces has been stated to be a

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likely contingency, and a perpetual menace to the freedom of the people of the State as well as of the rest of India. The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of nonaccession for a province is also a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the provinces, and which may well lead to further difficulties in the way of the Indian States merging themselves in the Indian Union. The Congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break in that unity, especially in the modern world when people’s minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federations, would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established will. While recognizing this principle, the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create conditions which would help the different units in developing a common and co-operative national life. The acceptance of the principle inevitably involves that no changes should be made which result in fresh problems being created and compulsion being exercised on other substantial groups within that area. Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible autonomy within the Union, consistently with a strong national State. The proposal now made on the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and will lead to attempts at separation at the very inception of a Union and thus create friction just when the utmost co-operation and goodwill are most needed. This proposal has been presumably made to meet a communal demand, but it will have other consequences also and lead politically reactionary and obscurantist groups among different communities to create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country. Any proposal concerning the future of India must demand attention and scrutiny, but in today’s grave crisis, it is the present that counts, and even proposals for the future are important in so far as they affect the present. The Committee have necessarily attached the greatest importance to this aspect of the question, and on this ultimately depends what advice they should give to those who look to

them for guidance. .or the present the British War Cabinet’s proposals are vague and altogether incomplete and it would appear that no vital changes in the present structure are contemplated. It has been made clear that the Defence of India will in any event remain under British control. At any time defence is a vital subject; during wartime it is allimportant and covers almost every sphere of life and administration. To take away defence from the sphere of responsibility at this stage is to reduce that responsibility to a farce and a nullity, and to make it perfectly clear that India is not going to be free in any way and her Government is not going to function as a free and independent government during the… of the War. The Committee would repeat that an essential and fundamental prerequisite for the assumption of responsibility by the Indian people in the present is their realization as a fact that they are free and are in charge of maintaining and defending their freedom. What is most wanted is the enthusiastic response of the people which cannot be evoked without the fullest trust in them and the devolution of responsibility on them in the matter of defence. It is only thus that even at this grave eleventh hour it may be possible to galvanize the people of India to rise to the height of the occasion. It is manifest that the present Government of India, as well as its provincial agencies, are lacking in competence, and are incapable of shouldering the burden of India’s defence. It is only the people of India, through their popular representatives, who may shoulder this burden worthily. But that can only be done by present freedom, and full responsibility being cast upon them. The Committee, therefore, are unable to accept the proposals put forward on behalf of the British War Cabinet.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 457–459

Document .ive Resolution of the All India Committee of Congress on the limits of self-determination, 2 May 1942

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The AICC is of [the] opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component state or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or .ederation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different states and provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal.
Source: Amalendu de, 85. Known as the Jagat Narain Lal proposal.

5 Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis. 6 These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.
Source: Amalendu De, 93–4. Ibid., 95–8, for the publication of Rajaji– Jinnah correspondence April–July 1944.

Document Six The Rajaji (Rajagopalachari) .ormula, 8 July 1944
Basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League to which Gandhiji and Mr Jinnah agree [sic] and which they will endeavour respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve: 1 Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for [a] free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with [the] Government for the transition period. 2 After the termination of the War, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the NorthWest and East of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice of the right of districts on the border to choose to join either state. 3 It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held. 4 In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding Defence and Communication and for other essential purposes.

Document Seven Gandhi to Jinnah, 17 September 1944
Brother Jinnah, There was a day when I was able to persuade you to speak in our mother tongue. Today I take courage to write to you in the same. I had invited you to meet me while I was in jail. I have not written to you since my release. But today my heart says that I should write to you. We will meet whenever you choose. Don’t regard me as an enemy of Islam or of the Muslims of this country. I have always been a friend and servant not only of yourself but of the whole world. Do not disappoint me. Your brother Gandhi
Source: Pakistan National Archives, Islamabad, Jinnah Papers .-98 / 57. Ibid. / 54 for the Urdu and Gujarati letters, the Gujarati version signed, and / 58 for Jinnah’s reply of 14 July (proposing Bombay mid-August). The text of Gandhi’s letter is substantially different from that in Gandhi, lxxxiv. 199, where he asks Jinnah to reply in Urdu.

Document Eight Gandhi’s answers to questions, 20 July 1944
Regarding Pakistan there is a tendency here to interpret your last contact with Mr. Jinnah as indicating your acceptance of Pakistan. Is this so?

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Mr. Rajagopalachari’s .ormula indicates my way of meeting the communal difficulty. I am indifferent whether it is called Pakistan or not.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 221.

Document Nine Gandhi, Interview to the Press, 30 July 1944
Asked when he expected to meet Mr. Jinnah, Mahatma Gandhi said: I expect to meet the Qaid-e-Azam as soon as he wants me, of course, health permitting. The publication of the .ormula is in pursuit of negotiations for a communal settlement. It is not an idle effort. It is conceived in all sincerity. It is unfortunate that the criticism that has been levelled against it, so far as I can see, has been conceived out of prejudice or careless study of the .ormula. Nor is it an offer on the part of any party. It is a contribution from two life-servants of the nation towards the solution of the communal tangle, which has hitherto defied solution. It is in open invitation to all parties to apply their minds to the solution. The Rajaji .ormula is intended as a help to all lovers of the country. It is the best we could conceive, but it is open to amendment, as it is open to rejection or acceptance.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 253–4.

Document Ten Speech of Jinnah at the Meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, Lahore, 30 July 1944
‘At last and it is to the good and conducive to further progress that Mr. Gandhi has at any rate in his personal capacity accepted the principle of Pakistan’, declared Mr. M.A. Jinnah.

Mr Jinnah said: ‘Since the release of Mr. Gandhi there has been a flood of statements, press reports, comments, and I have tried to follow all this carefully as is possible for me to do so particularly with reference to what is called by C. Rajagopalachari, his formula for Hindu-Muslim settlement and for the moment I wish to deal with that matter. Burying the past, and starting from a point let me examine the position. On 18 May 1943, Gandhi’s letter to me from prison, dated 4 May 1943, was released, because it was stated that the Dawn had asked for its publication and that it was owing to public that the letter should see the light of the day. Hence the release of the letter is under Mr. Gandhi’s instructions. In that letter Mr. Gandhi says: ‘I have followed the proceedings of the Muslim League as reported in the Dawn columns. I welcome your invitation. I suggest our meeting face to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I am in your hands. I hope that this letter will be sent to you and if you agree to my proposal that Government will let you visit me. One thing I had better mention. There seems to be an ‘if’ in your invitation. Do you say I should write only if I have changed my heart? God alone knows man’s hearts. I would like you to take me as I am’. I knew the substance of this letter, because the Government had furnished me with it at the time; and in my statement I pointed out that it was not the kind of letter that I expected from Mr. Gandhi in response to the appeal which I made in my speech in April 1943 in my presidential address to the Muslim League. It has now been fully borne out without shadow of doubt that Mr. Gandhi understood that there was an ‘if’ about my invitation which was evaded, but nevertheless as usual the entire Congress press accused me of having gone back on my word and did everything in their power to misrepresent, vilify and mutilate my speech. That ‘if’ still remains and the letter still remains undelivered to me. While Mr. Gandhi was busy and there had been a plethora of correspondence between him from Agha Khan Palace and the Viceroy and since his release he has been well enough to see numerous prominent men from day to day and carry on correspondence with Viceroy and

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others, he has not however thought it proper to send me even a copy of that letter, I being the addressee of the original, but thought fit to release it to the press. League by-passed Then comes the next chapter. After all his efforts had failed to establish contact with Lord Linlithgow to negotiate with him over the head of the Muslim League, completely ignoring and by-passing it, he sought interview with Lord Wavell, his dear friend, conveying to him ad nauseam that he was a friend of the British nation and loyal son of the British Empire and that he should be allowed to meet the members of the Congress Working Committee in prison or they should be released, and for that purpose he said: ‘I plead now as a free man for such permission. If you will see me before deciding, I shall gladly go whenever you want me to’. This request of his was refused by the Viceroy by his letter of 22 June. This ‘no’ to Mr. Gandhi, it was reported, cast gloom over the Poona. But even the final effort of Mr. Gandhi through the British journalist, Mr. Gelder, as gobetween to link him and Lord Wavell was only a misfire. At this psychological moment, Mr. Rajagopalachari was at Poona, and suddenly I received a telegram from him on 30 June as another go-between complaining without any reason that his letter of 8 April remained unanswered; although he knew perfectly well that it required no answer as answer had already been given to him in April, and threatening me that he would like to publish the formula and my rejection. He said he had sent the telegram with Mr. Gandhi’s approval and further warned me that he would like me at this juncture to reconsider my rejection. In my reply I pointed out to him that his version that I had rejected the formula was wrong, and I am glad that he does not contradict the true facts as stated by me but confirms them. The correspondence was however abruptly released to the press, so that I should stand on my trial before the bar of public opinion of the world and India, and especially of Mussalmans. Immediately the word had passed and the Congress press framed various grave charges against me.

This Hindu Press To give a few instances, in some of the so-called responsible newspapers — irresponsible and ill-considered reply from one who claims to speak for his community is nothing short of a betrayal of his community and country at large… ‘It is now up to the Muslim community to judge the offer on its merits and find the leader who will play the game…’ ‘Intoxicated with ego and vanity…’ ‘Uncompromising attitude…a block in the way of freedom of India…’ ‘Mr. Jinnah should be sacked or made to retire by Muslim India’ and so on and so forth. It is surprising that even Mr. Gandhi at this juncture has encouraged this propaganda both in this country and abroad by enemies of the Muslim League by stating in his interview on 13 July that the British Government is using me as a cloak and that this ‘diabolical conspiracy to stifle India’s aspirations must be broken’. This is the background of the so-called negotiations for Hindu-Muslim settlement started by C. Rajagopalachari with the approval of Mr. Gandhi; and from the varying statements and contradictions today only one essential issue emerges that I am put on my trial and I have now to defend myself. My only sin, to use Mr. Gandhi’s own words, was that I requested C. Rajagopalachari to allow me to place his proposal before my Working Committee and that as Mr. Gandhi was no longer in prison I requested that he should directly communicate to me whatever proposals he may choose to put forward, assuring him that I would place them before my Working Committee. What was the objection to such a course? I fail to appreciate the line adopted by Mr. Gandhi and C. Rajagopalachari, and I am willing to face the verdict of the Muslim League and any other independent and impartial men in India or abroad. This is so far as the procedure adopted is concerned. Now we come to the form of the formula. These proposals were not open to any discussion or modification. It was on the basis of ‘take it or leave it’. It seems that Congress philosophy goes better than British Imperialism. Even the Cripps’ proposals had the sanction behind them of His Majesty’s Government and His Majesty’s Government

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had sent one of the members of the Cabinet all the way to India to personally approach the Congress and the Muslim League. Not only that, Cripps was closeted with the Congress Leaders and the Working Committee for more than two weeks in explaining and clarifying whatever points were raised by the Congress and the Muslim League. True, there also was that rigidity that the fundamentals of Cripps’ proposals were not open to any modifications, and that was the reason why he failed. But Mr. Gandhi and C. Rajagopalachari are out-heroding Herod. Pure Dictation This is pure and simple dictation and not sincere desire to negotiate. In the first place, C. Rajagopalachari is the expelled member of the Congress, and whatever individual effort he may have made were by virtue of approval of Mr. Gandhi to his proposals during Mr. Gandhi’s incarceration. But once Mr. Gandhi is released and is a free man, it is up to Mr. Gandhi personally to deal with this grave problem of settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question, and there is no need of any go-between. But Mr. Gandhi is too ill and in his recent interview, when any question was put to him, he directed the question to C. Rajagopalachari, and the press representatives have been told that he personally subscribed to C. Rajagopalachari’s offer when he was fasting in prison camp. It is now 16 months old and for the rest of the offer I must carry out the contract between C. Rajagopalachari and myself. He is to bear the brunt of all criticisms that might be made about that offer. It is a pity that he gives no indication of this in his famous letter of 4 May 1943, which still remains undelivered to me; and it has got a new name now, it is not a formula but an offer. As regards Mr. Gandhi, who says he has subscribed to this offer (according to C. Rajagopalachari, it is ‘a joint contribution and formula’) the question arises in what capacity can Mr. Gandhi’s association be judged, for he not even a four anna member of the Congress. He has got so many capacities — his personal capacity, his capacity as a dictator of the Congress, and above all his Mahatmic divine authority which is guided by his inner voice and he is a satyagrahi and sole interpreter of what it means and

stands for. He is not Hindu but Sanatanist and he follows Hinduism of his own. It is rather difficult to know as to what capacity Mr. Gandhi will use at the given time. Study League Constitution Mr. Gandhi, I hope, will be good enough to study the constitution, rules and regulations of the All-India Muslim League, and then he will better understand my position as the President of a really well-organised and democratic body namely, the All-India Muslim League. I remember when Mr. Gandhi met Lord Linlithgow in September 1939 after the outbreak of war, he broke down and tears rolled down from his eyes when he visualised the possible destruction by bombing of Westminster Abbey and the Houses of Parliament and said: ‘What was the use of the Indian freedom if England and .rance were defeated’, and in a statement declared his whole-hearted and most enthusiastic support for the prosecution of war. But, hardly a week thereafter, the Congress Working Committee decided to non-co-operate if their demand for immediate independence was not met and, as a first step, the Congress members of the Central Assembly were ordered to withdraw. Mr. Gandhi turned round and said they were right; he was only in a minority of one and advised Lord Linlithgow to come to terms with the Congress approving their decision. Now we come to the merits of the proposals. In this case we are told by C. Rajagopalachari, to quote his own words, of series of telegrams which were released by him, ‘Mr. Gandhi, though not vested with representative or special capacity in this matter, definitely approved by my proposal and authorised me to approach you on that basis. The weight of his opinion would most probably secure the Congress acceptance’. Mr. Rajagopalachari in his statement of 16 July from Panchgani starts with an absolutely untrue and misleading statement. He says: ‘It is now two years since I started work, even though I had secured Mr. Gandhi’s unqualified support to the scheme and it conceded all that the Muslim League had ever demanded in its resolution of 1940’. If this is so, why not say we accept the League resolution of 1940. Grossest Travesty

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His formula is a parody, a negation of, and intended to torpedo the Muslim’s League resolution of March 1940, and when he says that his formula concedes all that the Muslim League had ever demanded by its resolution, it is the grossest travesty. .irst of all, where does he find any mention of plebiscite of any kind in that resolution? Then why this ridiculous proposal of a plebiscite district-wise? But let me take, clause by clause, some of the important points of Mr. Rajagopalachari’s formula. .irst, take the preamble basis of the terms which if accepted will completely bind the Muslim League, whereas the Mahatma may withdraw his blessings as he is not speaking, according to C. Rajagopalachari, with the authority of the Congress or his representative capacity whatever that may mean. Then we come to the first clause, ‘subject to terms set out below as regards the constitution’, I do not see ‘the constitution’ in this formula. Which constitution does he refer to? Then comes the demand for our endorsing the Indian demand for independence. It implies that we are against the independence of the peoples of India, and both Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Rajagopalachari know that it is an uncalled for insinuation to make and they are casting an unwarranted reflection on the Muslim League. Next comes the condition that we will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period, thereby arrogating to the Congress a dominant and superior position and requiring our co-operation as a subordinate body with this leading organisation. As to kind of provisional interim government for the transitional period that is to be formed, no indication is given as to its form, character, personnel, its powers, etc. After the termination of the war, commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in northwest and east of India, and a plebiscite of all the inhabitants would be held district-wise where Muslim population is in absolute majority. It is not stated who will appoint the Commission, what will be its personnel and its powers and who will enforce its findings. Really, how can Mr. Rajagopalachari stand unabashed and make a public

statement that his formula concedes all that the Muslim League’s resolution of March 1940 demanded. .reedom to parties! It would be open to all parties to advocate their point of view before the plebiscite is held, although this agreement is intended to be only between the Congress and the League. Next, in the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, commerce, and communications and for other essential purposes. The question arises, safeguarding these matters from whom and what does it mean? These mutual agreements are made obligatory, and it is not very easy to understand the significance of this clause. Then comes the last clause which is the height of ingenuity. ‘These terms shall be binding only in the case of transfer by British of full power and responsibility for the governance of India. But it does not say to whom, how and when. According to the latest statement of Mr. Gandhi, the August resolution is ‘absolutely innocuous’, that, while his authority has lapsed, the August resolution has not lapsed. Let it now collapse, for Mussalmans do not regard it as innocuous, as both the demand and the sanction for it to force this demand are inimical to the Muslim ideal and demands. Let Mr. Gandhi join hands with the Muslim League on the basis of Pakistan in plain and unequivocal language, and we shall be nearer independence for the peoples of India which is so dear to the heart of not only Mr. Gandhi but of the millions in this country. Mr. Gandhi and C. Rajagopalachari are putting the cart before the horse when they say that all these clauses can have any value or can become effective only if Great Britain transfers powers to India. There is no chance of it unless Hindus and Muslims unite and by means of a united front wring it out from the unwilling hands of rulers of Great Britain. I am sorry if, by expressing my view honestly and freely and in self-defence, I have hurt anybody’s feelings. I purposely did not wish to say anything when Mr. Gandhi was good enough to release to press his famous letter to me dated 4 May 1943. I refused to say a single word throughout the period commencing from the release of Mr.

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Gandhi. I refused to say anything when abruptly the correspondence was closed and released to the press by Mr. Rajagopalachari as I had expected along with the millions of people in this country that Mr. Gandhi would review and revise the entire situation and give a correct lead, having regard to the realities and conditions prevailing in India. But I think in fairness to the Muslim League and to myself I must now put our case before the bar of the world opinion, particularly the public opinion of Hindus and Mussalmans in this land, as by the tactics of Mr. Rajagopalachari, approved by Mr. Gandhi, I am forced to do so. But out of evil cometh good. Pakistan accepted I do not mind all vilification and misrepresentation and base campaign that is carried on against me. But at last and it is to the good and conducive to further progress that Mr. Gandhi has, at any rate, in his ‘personal capacity’ accepted the principle of Pakistan. What remains now is the question of how and when? This has got to be carried out. Mr. Gandhi knows and understands the position better than any living man, for in one of his articles in Harijan he put the question of Pakistan demand in a nutshell. This is what he said: ‘I hope the Quaid-e-Azam does not represent the considered opinion even of his colleagues. Pakistan, according to him, in a nutshell is the demand for carving out of India portions to be wholly treated as independent and sovereign states’. I am glad the Mr. Gandhi realises that 1944 is not 1942. It is so in more senses than one, and he may further take into consideration that 1939-40-41 is not 1944. I hope that I have made it clear that the procedure and method adopted is hardly conducive to friendly negotiations, and the form is pure dictation, as it is not open to any modification. This is not calculated to lead to fruitful results or a solution and settlement of the problem, which concerns the destiny of a nation of 100 millions Muslims and their posterity. As regards the merits of the proposals, Mr. Gandhi is offering a shadow and a husk, maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten Pakistan, and thus trying to pass off as having met our

Pakistan scheme and the Muslim demand. But since all these happenings I have received a letter from Mr. Gandhi, dated 17 July, and I replied to him on 24 July from Srinagar before my departure. They are as follows. Let us therefore, wait and see, hoping for the best… [Mr Jinnah then read out the English translation of Mr. Gandhi’s letter, written in Gujarati. The League President then proceeded to read his own reply, which is as follows:] I received your letter dated 19th of July on the 22nd of July and I thank you for it. I shall be glad to receive you at my house in Bombay on my return, which will probably be about the middle of August. By that time I hope that you will have recuperated your health fully and will be returning to Bombay. I would like to say nothing more till we meet. I am very pleased to read in the press that you are making very good progress, and I hope that you will soon be all right. ‘I ask you to pray and give me your blessings. God willing, we may come to honourable settlement’.
Source: K. A. Khan Yusufi (ed.), Speeches, Statements and Messages of the Quaid-e-Azam (Lahore, 1996), iii. 1917–27.

Document Eleven Interview of Gandhi with Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Working President, Hindu Mahasabha, 5 August 1944
Gandhiji says that his association with the Rajaji .ormula is personal and is meant to commit nobody but himself. He is, therefore, anxious that people should express their opinion freely and fearlessly. I gathered from our conversation that he welcomed such criticism for he was open to conviction. If he discovered any flaw in the .ormula he would have no hesitation in correcting the error. In his opinion the .ormula is intended to be just to all. If, therefore, any community was likely to be unjustly affected by the .ormula being given effect to, the flaw should be brought to his notice.

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He was also anxious that people should remember that if an agreement was reached between Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah and himself it would be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held and the plan would come into effect only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility in the governance of India. There was, therefore, ample time for a calm and dispassionate discussion. He also said that the Rajaji .ormula was a way of reducing to a concrete form the Congress resolution on self-determination and nothing could operate without the consent of all sections… He assured me that he had always welcomed criticism and that he had flourished on it and that his influence could not be weakened by it.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 271–2. Mookerjee commented: ‘I had a long interview with Mahatmaji yesterday in my individual capacity and fully explained why I and those who think like me are so strongly opposing Mr. Rajagopalachari’s .ormula from the point of view of India as a whole. The discussion was full and frank…’

know my present attitude has puzzled and pained many people. I have not revised the opinion quoted by you. At the same time that I made the statement you refer to, I was also a party to the self-determination resolution of the A. I.C. C. I hold that the Rajaji .ormula gives effect to that resolution. I would however urge critics not to mind my inconsistencies, so-called or real. Let them examine the question on merits and bless the effort if they can. Q. What is your reaction to Mr. Jinnah’s speech? If Mr. Jinnah does not accept your proposal or your talks with him end in failure, will you withdraw your support to Rajaji’s proposals or will the proposals stand? A. I do not believe in dying before my death. I do not approach the forthcoming visit with the expectation of failure. I always hope for the best and prepare for the worst. I would therefore ask you not to anticipate failure. Ask me when failure stares you and me in the face.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 276.

Document Twelve Gandhi’s interview to the United Press of India, 7 August 1944
QUESTION: You said in Panchgani: ‘All my recent declarations are quite consistent with all my previous declarations on the communal problem.’ But in the past you had said: ‘Partition means a patent untruth. My whole soul rebels against the idea… To assent to such a doctrine is for me denial of God (Harijan, 13-4-1940). ‘The partition proposal has altered the face of the Hindu-Muslim problem. I have called it an untruth. There can be no compromise with it… It cannot come by honourable agreement’ (Harijan, 4-5-1940). ‘I consider vivisection of India to be a sin…’ (Harijan, 24-5-1942) Would you kindly enlighten me how they are consistent? The Mahasabhaites seem to argue in the above style and hence clarification is sought. ANSWER: Though I would avoid answering all questions on the subject before the forthcoming meeting between Quaide-Azam and me, I must not postpone answering yours. I

Document Thirteen Gandhi’s Note concerning the views of Jagdish K. Munshi, on or before 12 August 1944
1. Division of India is like poison to my mind; because I am also of the view that it is sinful to do so. 2. The Delhi Resolution of 2 April [1942] was concerned with self-determination. After this on April 30, Rajaji’s Resolution was turned down and Jagat Narayan’s Resolution about not partitioning India was adopted. In my view this was a highly inappropriate and hasty step and due to this alone Jinnah has been able to spread poison in the Muslim masses. 3. I had discussed this matter with Maulana [Azad] also. According to him, in spite of Jagat Narayan’s Resolution, I still retain the authority to discuss the matter with Jinnah because the Resolution of April 2 still stands. 4. Later on when I had negotiations with Jinnah I had asked him whether he would accept help from a foreign

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Power if he was granted a sovereign State. To this he said: ‘Yes.’ I then asked him if, after securing that help, he would invade India. To this (also) he said: ‘Yes.’ Then I told him: ‘It would be a sin to do such a thing and I cannot be a party to it.’… 6. Rajaji’s offer does not seem to have the virulence of his earlier talk and hence I am in agreement with it. According to this offer if there can be a separate treaty regarding Defence, .oreign Affairs and Communications, I do not see any harm in giving him the rest. And after this, Pakistan seems to have no meaning at all. 7. It is not that everybody has been in agreement with me about everything from the beginning of [my] life. There is bound to be a difference of opinion and it is good that it is there. But nobody has ever told me that I have done anything in bad faith… 8. Jinnah too has complete faith in me. He knows that I have no axe to grind in these negotiations. And he seems to have somewhat softened by my last letter, and hence, my only advice can be that at such a time nobody should create any obstacle. Jinnah has hated me since the day I asked him in a meeting to give up English and speak in Gujarati. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad also feels the same way about me from that day and it has not changed to this day. 9. Jinnah is definitely not unselfish. He is prone to be easily led by others because of his vanity. (Just) because I am going to meet him I am not led away by him. I have not accepted everything that he has said. Otherwise it would mean that he has won me round. That is why even when I meet him it will be with some misgivings. 10. Munshi has raised a new cry, and I cannot stop him. And it would not befit me even if I did it. 11. But Munshi very much loves to dominate everywhere and become a leader. I know that everybody hates him for that reason. Everybody believes that even in the Congress he wants to set up his own protagonists. But how can one prevent a person if he is capable of spreading his influence because of his own power? Only the person who has all his teeth intact can crack a betel-nut and so, there is no

need to be scared of him. He seems to be much perturbed. Hence, at such a time we should do only that which we feel is correct. If he shows me the statement, I shall certainly go through it.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 287-9.

Document .ourteen Gandhi’s Answers to Questions from Lala Brijlal, 23 August 1944
QUESTION: Mahatmaji, you have been during your whole political career a strong supporter of the integrity of India and an opponent of vivisection. How do you reconcile your present position in giving support to Rajaji’s proposals ? ANSWER: There is no change in my views. I am even today as much against vivisection of India as ever before. Rajaji’s formula concedes [the] right of self-determination, but it does not concede Pakistan — an indefinite and undefined expression. As a believer in non-violence I cannot use force in keeping people of a particular area inside India if they want to separate. All I can do is to persuade them. Q. Whatever be the result of your negotiations with Mr. Jinnah, don’t you think that the British statesmen taking advantage of Rajaji’s offer, which has your support, will divide India into two parts and establish two rival federations instead of one and thereby find an additional reason for the continuance of British control ? A. I do not think the British statesmen will do it, unless they want it themselves and have independently so decided. They know that forty crores of people cannot be kept under permanent bondage. The world forces are moving so fast that whether the British Government will or not India must be free at no distant date. .urthermore, Rajaji’s formula definitely lays down that the exercise of the right of selfdetermination can only accrue after independence. Q. The non-Muslims of the Punjab and of Bengal feel panicky about Rajaji’s formula because they are afraid that under this formula the non-Muslims in the separated areas will be

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thrown into Pakistan. A. .rom the reports that I receive it is evident that so far as the Punjab is concerned there is already Pakistan in action. The religious and cultural rights of the non-Muslims they say are denied to them. My informants say that undue restrictions are placed on non-Muslim leaders and their womenfolk cannot even move about freely for fear of molestation. If this is a true picture I don’t think the position will be in any way worse in ‘Pakistan’ if ever it is established. The people of the Punjab and Bengal need entertain no false fears, as I am not going to sell them off. I have no right to do so. No individual can barter away rights of brave people endowed with self-confidence. Today I enjoy the confidence of the people because they believe that their interests are safe in my hands and I cannot betray them. If tomorrow I act against their wishes and interests I shall be stoned by these very people who now trust me. I am rather pained at the nervousness exhibited by the Sikhs who are a brave community. Unless they have lost the chivalrous spirit and bravery which the Gurus infused in them, they need entertain no fear about my coming talks with Mr. Jinnah. I have already explained in my Press statement and I repeat again that nothing will be done by me or us to the prejudice of any section of the Indian population and whatever proposals are agreed to between Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah and myself will be open to confirmation, amendment and rejection by the representatives of various communities and interests. There is no idea of forcing anything on anybody against his will. Q. If Pakistan ever comes into existence don’t you think, Mahatmaji, the existence of a rival independent state in the north-west will be a constant danger to the independence of India ? A. Thirty crores and over of inhabitants living in India have nothing to fear from two crores of Muslims living in the north-west. If the former are so weak as not to be able to defend themselves against two crores in the north-west, then they have no right to ask for independence. I have no doubt in my mind that if India becomes independent, Indians will be able to defend themselves against any

outside aggression with the resources at their disposal. Q. Mahatmaji, all your attempts during the last twenty years or over for bringing about Hindu-Muslim unity have gone in vain and Hindu–Muslim relations today are as much strained as ever before. Don’t you think that India has been put on the wrong track and communal electorates are the bane of the Indian constitution? The Muslim demand for Pakistan and Mr. Jinnah’s propounding of the two-nation theory are the natural sequences of separate electorates and communal reservations and so long as the principle of separate electorates on religious basis continues to disfigure the constitution of our country, there is no chance of the Hindus and Muslims living at peace as members of the great Indian nations? If you agree with the above contention why don’t you give a right lead to the country by pressing for joint electorates as the basis of political rights ? A. I do believe that separate electorates have done more harm than good.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 318–19.

Document .ifteen Gandhi to Rajaji (Rajagopalachari) on talks with Jinnah, 9 September 1944
It was a test of my patience… I am amazed at my own patience. However, it was a friendly talk. His (Jinnah’s) contempt for your .ormula (the Rajaji .ormula) and his contempt for you is staggering. You rose in my estimation that you could have talked to him for all those hours and that you should have taken the trouble to draw up that formula. He says you have accepted his demand and so should I. I said, ‘I endorse Rajaji’s .ormula and you can call it Pakistan if you like.’ He talked of the Lahore Resolution. I said, ‘I have not studied it and I do not want to talk about it. Let us talk about Rajaji’s .ormula and you can point out any flaws that you find there.’ In the middle of the talk he came back to the old ghost: ‘I thought you had come here as a Hindu, as a representative

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of the Hindu Congress.’ I said, ‘No, I have come here neither as a Hindu nor as a representative of the Congress. I have come here as an individual. You can talk to me as an individual or as the President of the League, whichever way you prefer. If you had agreed with Rajaji and accepted his .ormula, you and he would have gone before your respective organizations and pleaded with them to accept it. That is why Rajaji came to you. You would then have placed it before other parties, too, in the same way. Now you and I have to do it.’ He said he was the President of the League. Where was the basis for a talk if I was there representing nobody except myself? Who was to deliver the goods? I was the same man as he had found me in 1939. There was no change in me. I almost felt like saying, ‘Yes, I am the same man and since you think it is no use talking to me, I will go away.’ But I resisted the temptation. I told him, ‘Is it not worth your while to convert an individual? I am the same man no doubt. You can change my views if you can and I will support you whole-heartedly.’ ‘Yes, I know, if I can convert you, you will be my Ali,’1 he said. He said I should concede Pakistan and he would go the whole length with me. He would go to jail, he would even face bullets. I said, ‘I will stand by your side to face them.’ ‘You may not,’ he said. ‘Try me,’ I replied. We came back to the .ormula. He wants Pakistan now, not after independence. ‘We will have independence for Pakistan and Hindustan,’ he said. ‘We should come to an agreement and then go to the Government and ask them to accept it, force them to accept our solution.’ I said I could never be a party to that. I could never ask the Britishers to impose partition on India. ‘If you all want to separate, I can’t stop you. I have not got the power to compel you and I would not use it if I had.’ He said, ‘The Muslims want Pakistan. The League represents the Muslims and it wants separation.’ I said, ‘I agree the League is the most powerful Muslim organization. I might even concede that you as its President represent the Muslims of India, but that does not mean that all Muslims want Pakistan.
1 A cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet. He was among the first to accept the Prophet’s message.

Put it to the vote of all the inhabitants of the area and see.’ He said, ‘Why should you ask non-Muslims?’ I said, ‘You cannot possibly deprive a section of the population of its vote. You must carry them with you, and if you are in the majority why should you be afraid?’ I told him of what Kiron Shankar Roy had said to me ‘If the worst comes to the worst, we in Bengal will all go in Pakistan, but for goodness sake do not partition Bengal. Do not vivisect it.’ ‘If you are in majority,’ I said, ‘you will have your choice. I know it is a bad thing for you, but if you want it all the same you will have it. But that will be an adjustment between you and me. It cannot occur while the Britishers are here.’ He began to cross-examine me on the various clauses of the .ormula. I said to him, ‘If you want clarification of those things, is it not better to have it from the author of the .ormula?’ ‘Oh, no’, he did not want that. I said, ‘What is the use of your cross-examining me?’ He recollected himself. ‘Oh, no. I am not cross-examining you’, and then added: ‘I have been a lawyer all my life and my manner may have suggested that I was cross-examining you.’ I asked him to reduce to writing his objections to the .ormula. He was disinclined. ‘Must I do so?’ he asked. ‘Yes, I would like you to.’ He agreed. In the end he said, ‘I would like to come to an agreement with you.’ I answered, ‘You remember that I have said that we should meet not to separate till we had come to an agreement. He said, yes, he agreed. I suggested, ‘Should we put that also in our statement?’ He said, ‘No, better not. Nevertheless that will be the understanding between us and the cordiality and friendliness of our talk will be reflected in our public utterances, too.’
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 369–71.

Document Sixteen Jinnah to Gandhi, 10 September 1944
With reference to our talk yesterday, September 9th, I understood from you that you had come to discuss the Hindu–Muslim settlement with me in your individual capacity, and not in any representative character or capacity on

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behalf of the Hindus or the Congress, nor had you any authority to do so. I naturally pointed out to you that there must be someone on the other side with authority holding a representative status with whom I can negotiate and, if possible, come to a settlement of the Hindu–Muslim question, and that for the position you had adopted there was no precedent, and that this raises great difficulties in my way. As you know, I can only speak on behalf of Muslim India and the All-India Muslim League, as the President of the organization which I represent, and as such I am subject to and governed by its constitution, rules and regulations. I think you realize and will admit that the settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question is the foremost and the major hurdle, and unless the representatives of these two nations put their heads together, how is one to make any headway with it? Nevertheless, I explained to you the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, and tried to persuade you to accept the basic and fundamental principles embodied in that resolution, but you not only refused to consider it but emphasized your opposition to the basic position indicated in the resolution, and remarked that there was ‘an ocean between you and me’, and when I asked you what is then the alternative you suggest, you put forward a formula of Mr. Rajagopalachari, approved of by you. We discussed it, and as the various matters were vague and nebulous, and some required clarification, I wanted to have a clear idea of what it really meant, and what were its implications, and asked you for explanation and clarification regarding the proposals embodied in that .ormula. After some discussion, you requested me to formulate in writing my points that I thought required or called for explanation and clarification, and to communicate with you and that you would reply in writing before our next meeting on Monday, September 11th, at 5.30 p.m. I am, therefore, submitting to you the following points which required clarification: 1. With regard to the preamble: in what capacity will you be a consenting party if any agreement is reached between you and me? 2. Clause 1: With regard to ‘the constitution for free India’ referred to in this clause, I would like to know first, what

constitution do you refer to, who will frame it, and when will it come into being? Next, it is stated in the .ormula that ‘the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for independence’. Does it mean the Congress demand for Independence as formulated in the August Resolution of 1942 by the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay or, if not, what is the significance of this term, for you know the Muslim League has made it clear not only by its resolutions but also by its creed, which is embodied in its constitution, that we stand for the freedom and independence of the whole of this subcontinent, and that applies to Pakistan and Hindustan. Next, it is stated that the Muslim League ‘will co-operate with the Congress in the formulation of a Provisional Interim Government for the transitional period’. I would like to know the basis or the lines on which such a Government is to be set up or constituted. If you have a complete and definite scheme, please let me have it. 3. Clause 2: Who will appoint the Commission referred to in this clause and who will give effect to their findings? What is the meaning of ‘absolute majority’ referred to in it? Will the contemplated plebiscite be taken district-wise, or, if not, on what basis? Who will determine and decide whether such a plebiscite should be based on adult franchise or other practicable franchise? Who will give effect to the decision or verdict of the above mentioned plebiscite? Would only the districts on the border which are taken out from the boundaries of the present provinces by delimitation be entitled to choose to join either State or also those outside the present boundaries would have the right to choose to join either State? 4. Clause 3: Who are meant by ‘all parties’ in this clause? 5. Clause 4: I would like to know between whom and through what machinery and agency will the ‘mutual agreements’ referred to in this clause be entered into? What is meant by ‘safeguarding defence and commerce, communications and for other essential purposes’? Safeguarding against whom? 6. Clause 6: ‘These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the Government of India’. I would like to know to whom is this

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power to be transferred, through what machinery and agency, and when? These are some of the important points that occur to me for the moment, which require explanation and clarification, and hope that you will let me have full details with regard to the various points that I have raised, in order that I may be better able to understand and judge your proposals before I can deal with them satisfactorily.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 461–463. Amalendu De, 2–5.

Document Seventeen Gandhi to Jinnah, 11 September 1944
I received your letter yesterday at 3.30 p.m. I was in the midst of appointments. I hasten to reply at the earliest opportunity. I have said in my letter to you, it is implied in the Rajaji .ormula and I have stated publicly that I have approached you as an individual. My life mission has been Hindu–Muslim unity, which I want for its own sake, but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling power being ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too. I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together. I am glad, therefore, that you did not break off our talks when I refused to assume or accept a representative capacity. Of course I am pledged to use all the influence I may have with the Congress to ratify my agreement with you. May I remind you that the Rajaji .ormula was designed in the first instance for your acceptance, and submission thereafter to the League? It is true that I said an ocean separated you and me in outlook. But that had no reference to the Lahore Resolution of the League. The Lahore Resolution is indefinite. Rajaji has taken from it the substance and given it a shape.

Now for the points raised by you: 1. I have already answered this in the foregoing. 2. The constitution will be framed by the Provisional Government contemplated in the .ormula or an authority specially set up by it after the British power is withdrawn. The independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands. The basis for the formation of the Provisional Interim Government will have to be agreed to between the League and the Congress. 3. The Commission will be appointed by the Provisional Government. ‘Absolute majority’ means a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or the .rontier Province. The form of plebiscite and the franchise must be a matter for discussion. 4. ‘All parties’ means, the parties interested. 5. ‘Mutual agreement’ means agreement between contracting parties. ‘Safeguarding defence, etc.,’ means for me a central or joint board of control. Safeguarding means safeguarding against all who may put the common interests in jeopardy. 6. The power is to be transferred to the nation, that is, to the Provisional Government. The .ormula contemplates peaceful transfer by the British Government. So far as I am concerned I would like the transfer to take place as early as possible.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 373–4. Amalendu De, 6–8.

Document Eighteen Jinnah to Gandhi, 11 September 1944
I received your letter of September 11 at 5 p.m. today. I note that you have approached me as an individual, and I have already expressed my views about it. Please do not take it that I acquiesce in the position that you have adopted, for which there is no precedent. Nevertheless, I proceeded to discuss matters with you naturally because I am anxious to convert you to my point of view, if possible. I urged you that the only solution of India’s problem is to

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accept the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan, as briefly laid down in the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, and proceed to settle the details forthwith. You say the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. You never asked me for any clarification or explanation of the terms of the Resolution, but you really indicated your emphatic opposition to the very basis and the fundamental principles embodied in it. I would, therefore, like to know in what way or respect the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. I cannot agree that Rajaji has taken from it its substance and given it shape. On the contrary, he has not only put it out of shape but mutilated it, as I explained in my speech which I delivered at the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on the 30th of July 1944. 2. You say the ‘first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then, too, I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together’. This in my opinion is, as I have repeatedly said, putting the cart before the horse, and is generally opposed to the policy and declarations of the All-India Muslim League, and you are only holding on firmly to the August Resolution of 1942. In order to achieve the freedom and independence of the peoples of India, it is essential, in the first instance, that there should be a Hindu–Muslim settlement. Of course, I am thankful to you when you say that you are pledged to use all the influence that you have with the Congress to ratify your agreement with me, but that is not enough in my judgement, although it will be a very valuable help to me. I once more ask you, please, to let me know what is your conception of the basis for the formation of a Provisional Interim Government. No doubt it will be subject to agreement between the League and the Congress, but I think in fairness you should at least give me some rough idea of the lines of your conception, for you must have thought it out by now, and I would like to know what are your proposals or scheme for the formation of a Provisional Interim Government, which can give me some clear picture to understand it.

3. You have omitted to answer my question as to who will give effect to the findings of the Commission, and also it is not clear to me what you mean by absolute majority, when you say it means ‘a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or the .rontier Province’. You have not even replied to my question as to who will decide the form of the plebiscite and the franchise contemplated by the .ormula. 4. The answer does not carry any clear idea when you say ‘all parties’ means ‘parties interested’. 5. You say ‘mutual agreement means agreement between contracting parties’, who are the contracting parties once a Provisional Interim Government is established of your conception? Who will appoint the Central or Joint Board of Control, which will safeguard defence, etc., and on what principle, through what machinery and agency, and subject to whose control and orders will such a Central or Joint Board be? 6. You say ‘the power is to be transferred to the nation, that is, to the Provisional Government’. That is all the greater reason why I would like to know full details of the Provisional Government as contemplated by you and of your conception.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 464–5. Amalendu De, 9–11.

Document Nineteen Speech by Gandhi at a Prayer Meeting, 11 September 1944
All that he could say at the present stage was that Jinnah Saheb and he had met as old friends on Saturday (September 9), and again that day (Monday). He added that they would be meeting again the next day from 10.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 5.30 to 7 p.m. This would leave them a little time to attend to other work and to digest the substance of the talks. They fully realized what a heavy responsibility rested on their shoulders. They knew that millions were watching the talks and were anxious that a settlement should be arrived at which would serve the

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interests not of any particular group or community, but of the whole of India. Gandhiji said: Our goal is the attainment of independence for the whole of India. It is for that we pray and are pledged to lay down our lives. Jinnah Saheb and I have only God between us as witness. My constant prayer these days is that He may so guide my speech that not a word might escape my lips so as to hurt the feelings of Jinnah Saheb or damage the cause that is dear to us both. I am sure the same is the case with Jinnah Saheb. He told me today, ‘If we part without coming to an agreement, we shall proclaim bankruptcy of wisdom on our part.’ What is more, the hopes of millions of our countrymen will be dashed to pieces. Today the eyes of all the oppressed people of the world are on us. We therefore are fully alive to our responsibility and are straining every nerve to come to a settlement. But we realize that ultimately the result lies in God’s good hands. You should therefore all pray that He may guide us and give us wisdom to serve the cause of India…
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 375.

Document Twenty Gandhi to Jinnah, 14 September 1944
I have your letter of the 13th instant. I understood from our talks that you were in no hurry for my answer I was, therefore, taking the matter in a leisurely fashion, even hoping that as our talks proceeded and as cordiality increased, mutual clarification would come of itself and that we would only have to record our final agreement. But I understand and appreciate the other viewpoint. We should take nothing for granted. I should clarify your difficulties in understanding the Rajaji .ormula and you should do likewise regarding yours, i.e., the Muslim League Lahore Resolution of 1940. With reference to the Lahore Resolution, as agreed between us I shall deal with it in a separate letter. Perhaps at the end of our discussion, we shall discover that Rajaji not only has not put the Lahore Resolution out

of shape and mutilated it but has given it substance and form. Indeed, in view of your dislike of the Rajaji .ormula, I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am concentrating on the Lahore Resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement. So much for the first paragraph of your letter. As to the second, I do hold that unless we oust the third party we shall not be able to live at peace with one another. That does not mean that I may not make an effort to find ways and means of establishing a living peace between us. You ask for my conception of the basis for a provisional interim government. I would have told you if I had any scheme in mind. I imagine that if we two can agree it would be for us to consult the other parties. I can say this, that any provisional government to inspire confidence at the present moment must represent all parties. When that moment arrives, I shall have been replaced by some authoritative person, though you will have me always at your beck and call when you have converted me or I you, or by mutual conversion we have become one mind functioning through two bodies. As to the third point, the provisional government being the appointing authority, will give effect to the findings of the Commission. This I thought was implied in my previous answer. Rajaji tells me that ‘absolute majority’ is used in his .ormula in the same sense as it is used in ordinary legal parlance wherever more than two groups are dealt with. I cling to my own answer. But you will perhaps suggest a third meaning and persuade me to accept it. The form of the plebiscite and franchise must be left to be decided by the provisional interim government unless we decide it now. I should say it should be by adult suffrage of all the inhabitants of the Pakistan area. As to the fourth, ‘all parties’ means you and I and everyone else holding views on the question at issue will and should seek by peaceful persuasion to influence public opinion as is done where democracy functions wholly or in part. As to the fifth, supposing that the result of the plebiscite is in favour of partition, the provisional government will draft the treaty and agreements as regards the

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administration of matters of common interest, but the same has to be confirmed and ratified by the governments of the two States. The machinery required for the settlement and administration of matters of common interest will, in the first instance, be planned by the interim government, but subsequently will be a matter for settlement between the two governments acting through the agencies appointed by each for that purpose. As to the sixth, I hope the foregoing makes superfluous any further reply.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 379–81. Amalendu De, 13–15.

Document Twenty-One Jinnah to Gandhi, 14 September 1944
I received your letter of September 14 [sic] at 4.45 p.m. today in reply to my letter of September 11 (and not of September 13 as you state, which seems to be a mistake) and I thank you for it. Please let me have as soon as you can your promised letter indicating in what way or respect the Lahore Resolution is ‘indefinite’. With regard to the provision in the Gandhi–Rajaji .ormula that ‘the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence’, I asked you in my letter dated September 10, ‘does it mean the Congress demand for independence, as formulated in the August 1942 Resolution by the All India Congress Committee in Bombay or, if not, what is the significance of this term?’, to which you replied by your letter of September 11, ‘The Independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands’. Hence I again ask, does it mean on the basis of a United India? I find that you have not clarified the point satisfactorily. As regards the next part of the clause, the .ormula proceeds to lay down that ‘the Muslim League will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of the Provisional Interim Government for the transitional period’. I requested you by my letter of September 10 to let me know ‘the basis or the lines on which such a Government is to be set up or

constituted. If you have a complete and definite scheme, please let me have it’, to which you replied by your letter of September 11 under reply that ‘the basis for the formation of the Provisional Interim Government will have to be agreed to between the League and the Congress’. But that is not meeting my request for clarification, or giving me at least the outlines of such a Government. And that is what I have been asking for. I hope that you do appreciate my point when I am requesting you to let me have rough outlines of the proposed Provisional Interim Government according to the .ormula, so that I may have some idea. Of course, I can quite understand that such a Provisional Interim Government will represent all the parties and would be of a character that will inspire confidence at the present moment of all the parties. I can quite understand that when the moment arrives, certain things may follow but before we can deal with this .ormula in a satisfactory manner, I repeat again that as it is your .ormula, you should give me a rough idea of the Provisional Interim Government that you contemplate and of your conception. What I would like to know would be, what will be the powers of such a Provisional Interim Government, how it will be formed, to whom it will be responsible, and what will be its composition, etc. You, being the sponsor of this Gandhi–Rajaji .ormula, should give me some rough idea and picture of it, so that I may understand what this part of the .ormula means. In your letter of September 14 in reply to my letter of September 11, you inform me that you would have told me if you had any scheme in mind. ‘I imagine that if we two can agree it would be for us to consult the other parties’, but that is just the point. Unless I have some outlines or scheme, however rough, from you, what are we to discuss in order to reach any agreement? As regards the other matters which you have further explained, I have noted the explanation, and I do not think I need press you further, although some of them are not quite satisfactory.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 466–7. Amalendu De, 16–18.

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Document Twenty-Two Gandhi to Jinnah, 15 September 1944
This is in terms of our talks of Wednesday the 13th instant. .or the moment I have shunted the Rajaji .ormula and with your assistance am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League. You must admit that the Resolution itself makes no reference to the two nations theory. In the course of our discussions, you have passionately pleaded that India contains two nations, i.e., Hindus and Muslims, and that the latter have their homelands in India as the former have theirs. The more our argument progresses, the more alarming your picture appears to me. It would be alluring if it was true. But my fear is growing that it is wholly unreal. I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children. You do not claim to be a separate nation by right of conquest, but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam? Will Bengalis, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamilians, Maharashtrians, Gujaratis, etc., cease to have their special characteristics if all of them become converts to Islam? These have all become one politically because they are subject to one foreign control. They are trying today to throw off that subjection. You seem to have introduced a new test of nationhood. If I accept it, I would have to subscribe to many more claims and face an insoluble problem. The only real, though awful, test of our nationhood arises out of our common political subjection. If you and I throw off this subjection by our combined effort, we shall be born a politically free nation out of our travail. If by then we have not learnt to prize our freedom, we may quarrel among ourselves and, for want of a common master holding us together in his iron grip, seek to split up into small groups or nationalities. There will be nothing to prevent us from descending to

that level and we shall not have to go in search of a master. There are many claimants to the throne that never remains vacant. With this background, I shall present you with my difficulty in accepting your Resolution. 1. Pakistan is not in the Resolution. Does it bear the original meaning Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan, out of which the name was mnemonically formed? If not what is it? 2. Is the goal of Pakistan pan-Islam? 3. What is it that distinguishes an Indian Muslim from every other Indian, if not his religion? Is he different from a Turk or an Arab? 4. What is the Connotation of the word ‘Muslims’ in the Resolution under discussion? Does it mean the Muslims of India of geography or of the Pakistan to be? 5. Is the Resolution addressed to the Muslims by way of education, or to the inhabitants of the whole of India by way of appeal, or to the foreign ruler as an ultimatum? 6. Are the constituents in the two zones to constitute ‘Independent States’, an undefined number in each zone? 7. Is the demarcation to take place during the pendency of British Rule? 8. If the answer to the last question is in the affirmative, the proposal must be accepted first by Britain and then imposed upon India, not evolved from within by the free will of the people of India. 9. Have you examined the position and satisfied yourself that these ‘Independent States’ will be materially and otherwise benefited by being split up into fragments? 10. Please satisfy me that these Independent Sovereign States will not become a collection of poor States, a menace to themselves and to the rest of India. 11. Pray show me by facts and figures or otherwise how the independence and welfare of India as a whole can be brought about by the acceptance of the Resolution? 12. How are the Muslims under the Princes to be disposed of as a result of this scheme?

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13. What is your definition of ‘minorities’? 14. Will you please define the ‘adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards’ for minorities referred to in the second part of the Resolution? 15. Do you not see that the Lahore Resolution contains only a bare statement of the objective and does not give any idea as to the means to be adopted for the execution of the idea and the concrete corollaries thereof? .or instance: (a) Are the people in the regions falling under the plan to have any voice in the matter of separation and, if so, how is it to be ascertained? (b) What is the provision for defence and similar matters of common concern contemplated in the Lahore Resolution? (c) There are many groups of Muslims who have continuously expressed dissent from the policy of the League. While I am prepared to accept the preponderating [sic] influence and position of the League and have approached you for that very reason, is it not our joint duty to remove their doubts and carry them with us by making them feel that they and their supporters have not been practically dis[en]franchised? (d) Does this not lead again to placing the Resolution of the League before the people of the zones concerned as a whole for acceptance? As I write this letter and imagine the working of the Resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India. Believe me, I approach you as a seeker. Though I represent nobody but myself, I aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India, for I realize in my own person their misery and degradation, which is their common lot, irrespective of class, caste or creed. I know that you have acquired a unique hold on the Muslim masses. I want you to use your influence for their total welfare, which must include the rest. In this hastily written letter, I have only given an inkling of my difficulty.
Source: Pakistan National Archives, Islamabad. Jinnah Papers, .– 98 / 79–85. Gandhi, lxxxiv. 381–4. Amalendu De, 19–23.

Document Twenty-.our Gandhi to Jinnah, 15 September 1944
I have yours of the 14th instant, received at 9.40 a.m. I woke up at 3 a.m. today to finish my promised letter on the Lahore Resolution There is no mistake about the date, for I wrote in answer to your reminder of the 13th instant. Independence does mean as envisaged in the A.I.C.C. Resolution of 1942. But it cannot be on the basis of a united India. If we come to a settlement, it would be on the basis of the settlement, assuming, of course, that it accrues general acceptance in the country. The process will be somewhat like this. We reach by joint effort independence for India as it stands. India becoming free will proceed to demarcation, plebiscite and partition if the people concerned vote for partition. All this is implied in the Rajaji .ormula. As to the provisional interim government, I am afraid I cannot carry my answer any further than I have done. Though I have no scheme for the provisional government, if you have one in connection with the Lahore Resolution, which also, I presume, requires an interim government, we can discuss it. The .ormula was framed by Rajaji in good faith. I accepted it in equal good faith. The hope was that you would look at it with favour. We still think it to be the best in the circumstances. You and I have to put flesh on it, if we can. I have explained the process we have to go through. You have no objection to it. Perhaps, you want to know how I would form the provisional government if I was invited thereto. If I was in that unenviable position, I would see all the claimants and endeavour to satisfy them. My cooperation will be available in that task. I can give you full satisfaction about your inquiry, ‘What I would like to know would be, what will be the powers of such a provisional interim government, how it will be formed, to whom it will be responsible.’ The provisional interim government will be responsible to the elected members of the present Assembly or a newly-elected one. It will have all the powers less that of the Commander-in-Chief during

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the war and full powers thereafter. It will be the authority to give effect to the agreement that may be arrived at between the League and the Congress and ratified by the other parties.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 384–5. Amalendu De, 24–25.

Document Twenty-.ive Jinnah to Gandhi, 17 September 1944
I have your letter of 15 September, and I thank you for it. I note that you have for the moment shunted the Rajaji .ormula and are applying your mind very seriously to the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League. It is my duty to explain the Lahore Resolution to you today and persuade you to accept it, even though you are talking to me, as you have often made it clear, in your individual capacity. I have successfully converted non-Muslim Indians in no small number and also a large body of foreigners, and if I can convert you, exercising as you do tremendous influence over Hindu India, it will be no small assistance to me, although we are not proceeding on the footing that you are carrying on these talks in your representative character or capacity, and my difficulties remain until you are vested with a representative status and authority in order to negotiate and reach an agreement with you. You have stated in your letter dated September 11 that the Lahore Resolution is ‘indefinite’. I, therefore, naturally asked you to please let me know in what way or respect the Lahore Resolution is indefinite, and now I have received your letter of September 15 under reply. The third paragraph of your letter is not seeking clarification, but a disquisition and expression of your views on the point, whether the Mussalmans are a nation. This matter can hardly be discussed by means of correspondence. There is a great deal of discussion and literature on this point which is available, and it is for you to judge finally, when you have studied this question thoroughly, whether the Mussalmans and Hindus are not two major nations in this sub-continent. .or the moment, I would refer you to two

publications, although there are many more — Dr. Ambedkar’s book and ‘M. R. T.’s’ Nationalism in Conflict in India. We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions; in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation. Now I shall reply to your various points: 1. Yes, the word ‘Pakistan’ is not mentioned in the Resolution and it does not bear the original meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the Lahore Resolution. 2. This point does not arise, but still I reply that the question is a mere bogey. 3. This point is covered by my answer that the Mussalmans of India are a nation. As to the last part of your query, it is hardly relevant to the matter of clarification of the Resolution. 4. Surely, you know what the word ‘Muslims’ means. 5. This point does not arise by way of clarification of the text of the Lahore Resolution. 6. No. They will form units of Pakistan. 7. As soon as the basis and the principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution are accepted, the question of demarcation will have to be taken up immediately. 8. In view of my reply to (7), your question (8) has been answered. 9. Does not relate to clarification. 10. My answer to (9) covers this point. 11. Does not arise out of the clarification of the Resolution. Surely, this is not asking for clarification of the Resolution. I have in numerous speeches of mine and the Muslim League in its resolutions have pointed out that this is the only solution of India’s problem and the road to achieve freedom and independence of the peoples of India.

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12. ‘Muslims under the Princes’: The Lahore Resolution is only confined to British India. This question does not arise out of the clarification of the Resolution.2 13. The definition of ‘minorities’: You yourself have often said minorities mean ‘accepted minorities’. 14. The adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities referred to in the Resolution are a matter for negotiation and settlement with the minorities in the respective States, viz., Pakistan and Hindustan. 15. It does give basic principles and when they are accepted, then the details will have to be worked out by the contracting parties. (a & b). Does not arise by way of clarification; (c) The Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative organization of Muslim India; (d) No. See answer (c). As regards your final paragraph, before receiving clarifications from me you have already passed your judgement and condemned the Lahore Resolution, when you say, ‘As I write the letter and imagine the working of the Resolution in practice I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India’. I understand that you have made clear to me that you represent nobody but yourself, and I am trying to persuade you and to convert you that this is the road which will lead us all to the achievement of freedom and independence, not only of the two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, but of the rest of the peoples of India, but when you proceed to say that you aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India, I regret I cannot accept that statement of yours. It is quite clear that you represent nobody else but the Hindus, and as long as you do not realize your true position and the realities, it is very difficult for me to argue with you, and it becomes still more difficult to persuade you, and hope to convert you to the realities and the actual conditions prevailing in India today. I am pleading before you in the hope of converting you, as I have done with many others successfully. As I have said before, you are a great man and you exercise enormous
2 A significant weakness of the Lahore Resolution, it was to prove, because it left for example the status of Kashmir unresolved at the time of Partition in 1947.

influence over the Hindus, particularly the masses, and by accepting the road that I am pointing out to you, you are not prejudicing or harming the interests of the Hindus or of the minorities. On the contrary, Hindus will be the greater gainers. I am convinced that true welfare not only of the Muslim but the rest of India lies in the division of India as proposed by the Lahore Resolution. It is for you to consider whether it is not your policy and programme, in which you have persisted, which has been the principal factor of ‘ruin of the whole of India’ and of misery and degradation of the people to which you refer and which I deplore no less than anyone else. And it is for that very reason I am pleading before you all these days, although you insist that you are having talks with me only in your individual capacity, in the hope that you may yet revise your policy and programme.
Source: Pakistan National Archives, Islamabad. Jinnah Papers, .– 98 / 86–90. Gandhi, lxxxiv. 467–9. Amalendu De, 26–30.

Document Twenty-Six Gandhi to Jinnah, 19 September 1944
Many thanks for yours of the 17th instant. I am sorry to have to say that your answers omitting 1, 2 and 6 do not give satisfaction. It may be that all my questions do not arise from the view of mere clarification of the Lahore Resolution. But I contend that they are very relevant from the standpoint of a seeker that I am. You cannot expect anyone to agree to or shoulder the burden of the claim contained in the Lahore Resolution without, for instance, answering my questions 15 (a) and 15 (b)2 which you brush aside as not arising by way of clarification. Dr. Ambedkar’s thesis, while it is ably written, has carried no conviction to me. The other book mentioned by you, I am sorry to say, I have not seen. Why can you not accept my statement that I aspire to represent all the sections that compose the people of India? Do you not aspire? Should not every Indian? That the aspiration may never be realized is beside the point. I am beholden to you, in spite of your opinion about me,

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for having patience with me. I hope you will never lose it, but will persevere in your effort to convert me. I ask you to take me with my strong views and even prejudices, if I am guilty of any. As to your verdict on my policy and programme, we must agree to differ. .or, I am wholly unrepentant. My purpose is as a lover of communal unity to place my services at your disposal. I hope you do not expect me to accept the Lahore Resolution without understanding its implications. If your letter is the final word, there is little hope. Can we not agree to differ on the question of ‘two Nations’ and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination? It is this basis that has brought me to you. If the regions holding Muslim majorities have to be separated according to the Lahore Resolution, the grave step of separation should be specifically placed before and approved by the people in that area.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 398–9. Amalendu De, 31–2.

Document Twenty-Seven Jinnah to Gandhi, 21 September 1944
I am in receipt of your letter of September 19, and I have already given you my answers to all your questions relating to clarification of the Lahore Resolution or any part of it, and I am glad that you admit when you say it may be that ‘all my questions do not arise from the view of mere clarification of the Lahore Resolution’, but you particularly emphasize your points 15 (a) and 15 (b). I regret to say it has no relation to the context of the Resolution or any part thereof. You have brought so many matters into our correspondence, which are entirely outside the matter requiring clarification, so I have perforce to deal with them. Let me first deal with your letter of September 11. You say, ‘My life mission has been Hindu–Muslim unity, which I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling power being ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all the

parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together’. The gist of your letters up to date is that you are wedded to this policy and will pursue it. In your next letter of September 14, while you were good enough to furnish me with the clarification of the Gandhi–Rajaji .ormula, you were pleased to observe: ‘I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now concentrating on the Lahore Resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement.’ In your letter of September 15, you say ‘Independence does mean as envisaged in the A.I.C.C. Resolution of 1942’. It is, therefore, clear that you are not prepared to revise your policy and that you adhere firmly to your policy and programme, which you have persisted in and which culminated in your demand, final policy, programme and the method and sanction for enforcing it by resorting to mass civil disobedience in terms of the 8 August 1942 Resolution, and you have made it more clear again by stating in your letter of September 19 as follows: ‘As to your verdict on my policy and programme, we must agree to differ. .or, I am wholly unrepentant.’ You know that the August 1942 Resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India. Then again, in the course of our discussion when I asked you for clarification of the Gandhi–Rajaji .ormula, you were pleased to say, by your letter of September 15 as follows: ‘.or the moment I have shunted the Rajaji .ormula and with your assistance am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League’. We discussed it in its various aspects, as you told me you were open to be persuaded and converted to our point of view. I discussed the Resolution at great length with you, and explained everything you wanted to understand, even though you have emphasized more than once that you are having these talks with me in your personal capacity, and in your letter of September 15 you assured me in the following words with regard to the Lahore Resolution: ‘Believe me, I approach you as a seeker, though I represent nobody but myself’, and that you were open to conviction and conversion.

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You had informed me by your letter of September 11 as follows: ‘It is true that I said an ocean separated you and me in outlook. But that had no reference to the Lahore Resolution of the League. The League Resolution is indefinite.’ I naturally, therefore, proceeded in reply to ask you by my letter of September 11 as follows: ‘You say the Lahore Resolution is indefinite. You never asked me for any clarification or explanation of the terms of the Resolution, but you really indicated your emphatic opposition to the very basis and the fundamental principles embodied in it. I would, therefore, like to know in what way or respect the Lahore Resolution is indefinite’, and I sent you a reminder on September 13, to which you replied by your letter of September 15, not confining yourself really to matters of clarification, but introducing other extraneous matters, with some of which I had already dealt, in reply to this letter of yours of September 15, by my letter of September 17 and furnished you with all the clarifications, informing you that you had introduced several matters which could hardly be discussed in a satisfactory manner by means of correspondence. I have already given you all the clarifications you require so far as the Lahore Resolution goes and its text is concerned. You again raise further arguments, reasons and grounds and continue to persist in a disquisition on the point, amongst others, whether Muslims of India are a nation, and then you proceed further to say: ‘Can we not agree to differ on the question of two nations and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination?’ It seems to me that you are labouring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word ‘selfdetermination’. Apart from the inconsistencies and contradictions of the various positions that you have adopted in the course of our correspondence, as indicated above, can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which is our birth-right? Whereas you are labouring under the wrong idea that ‘selfdetermination’ means only that of ‘a territorial unit’ which, by the way, is neither demarcated nor defined yet; and there is no Union or .ederal Constitution of India in being,

functioning as a sovereign Central Government. Ours is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign States by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession from any existing union, which is non-existent in India. The right of self-determination which we claim postulates that we are a nation, and as such it would be the selfdetermination of the Mussalmans, and they alone are entitled to exercise that right. I hope you will now understand that your question 15(a) does not arise out of the Lahore Resolution or of any part thereof. As to 15(b), again it does not arise as a matter of clarification, for it will be a matter for the constitutionmaking body chosen by Pakistan to deal with and decide all matters as a sovereign body representing Pakistan visà-vis the constitution-making body of Hindustan or any other party concerned. There cannot be Defence and similar matters of ‘common Concern’ when it is accepted that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent sovereign States. I hope I have now given all satisfactory explanations, over and above the matter of clarification of the Lahore Resolution, in the hope of converting you as an individual ‘seeker’.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 469–71. Amalendu De, 33–37.

Document Twenty-Eight Gandhi to Jinnah, 22 September 1944
Your letter of yesterday (21st instant) so disturbed me that I thought I would postpone my reply till after we had met at the usual time. Though I made no advance at our meeting, I think I see some what clearly what you are driving at. The more I think about the two-nation theory the more alarming it appears to be. The book recommended by you gives me no help. It contains half-truths and its conclusions or inferences are unwarranted. I am unable to accept the proposition that the Muslims of India are a nation, distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of India. Mere assertion is no proof. The consequences of accepting such a proposition are dangerous in the extreme. Once the principle is admitted

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there would be no limit to claims for cutting up India into numerous divisions, which would spell India’s ruin. I have, therefore, suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be. You seem to be averse to a plebiscite. In spite of the admitted importance of the League, there must be clear proof that the people affected desire partition. In my opinion, all the people inhabiting the area ought to express their opinion specifically on this single issue of division. Adult suffrage is the best method, but I would accept any other equivalent. You summarily reject the idea of common interest between the two arms. I can be no willing party to a division which does not provide for the simultaneous safeguarding of common interests, such as Defence, .oreign Affairs and the like. There will be no feeling of security by the people of India without a recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity. Your letter shows a wide divergence of opinion and outlook between us. Thus you adhere to the opinion often expressed by you that the August 1942 Resolution is ‘inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India’. There is no proof for this sweeping statement. We seem to be moving in a circle. I have made a suggestion. If we are bent on agreeing, as I hope we are, let us call in a third party or parties to guide or even arbitrate between us.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 403–4. Amalendu De, 38–39.

Document Twenty-Nine Jinnah to Gandhi, 23 September 1944
I am in receipt of your letter of September 22 and thank you for it. I am sorry that you think I have summarily rejected the idea of common interest between two arms, and now you put it somewhat differently from 15(a), when you say there will be no feeling of security by the people of India without a recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity. My answer, already given, is that it will be for the constitution-making

body of Pakistan and that of Hindustan, or any other party concerned, to deal with such matters on the footing of their being two independent States. I am really surprised when you say there is no proof of what you characterize as a sweeping statement of mine, that the August 1942 Resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India. The Resolution in its essence is as follows: (a) Immediate grant of Complete Independence [and the] setting up immediately of a .ederal Central Government on the basis of a united, democratic Government of India with federated units or Provinces, which means establishing a Hindu Raj. (b) That this National Government so set up will evolve a scheme for a Constituent Assembly, which will be chosen by adult franchise, which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India, which means that the Constituent Assembly chosen will be composed of an overwhelming majority of the Hindus, nearly 75 per cent. (c) To enforce this demand of the Congress the August Resolution decides on and sanctions a resort to mass civil disobedience at your command and when ordered by you as the sole Dictator of the Congress. This demand is basically and fundamentally opposed to the ideals and demands of Muslim India of Pakistan, as embodied in the Lahore Resolution, and to enforce such a demand by means of resort to mass civil disobedience is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India, and if you succeed in realizing this demand it would be a death-blow to Muslim India. I see from the correspondence and talks between you and me that you are still holding fast to this fateful resolution. .rom the very first day of our talks, you made it clear to me, and you have repeatedly said in the course of our correspondence and talks that you have approached me in your individual capacity, and you assured me that you were a seeker of light and knowledge and that you seriously and earnestly wanted to understand the Lahore Resolution and were open to conviction and conversion. Therefore, in deference to your wishes I made every effort all these days and in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence to convert you, but unfortunately it seems

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I have failed. And now you have made new suggestions and proposals by your letter under reply: 1. You say, ‘I have, therefore, suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be’. I really do not know what this means, and I would like you to elaborate this proposal and give me some rough outlines of this new idea of yours, as to how and when, the division is to take place, and in what way it is different from the division envisaged by the Lahore Resolution. 2. You say, ‘Let us call in a third party or parties to guide or even arbitrate between us’. May I point out that you have repeatedly made clear to me that you are having these talks as an individual seeker? How can any question of a third party or parties to guide or arbitrate between us arise?
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 472–3. Amalendu De, 40–42.

yourself with representative capacity and are vested with authority. We stand by, as I have already said, the basic and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution of March 1940. I appeal to you once more to revise your policy and programme, as the future of this sub-continent and the welfare of the peoples of India demand that you should face realities.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 406 n. Amalendu De, 44.

Document Thirty-Two Gandhi to Jinnah, 24 September 1944
…With your assistance, I am exploring the possibilities of reaching an agreement, so that the claim embodied in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore may be reasonably satisfied. You must, therefore, have no apprehensions that the August Resolution will stand in the way of our reaching an agreement. That Resolution dealt with the question of India as against Britain, and it cannot stand in the way of our settlement. I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations, but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the northwest zones, i.e., Baluchistan, Sind, North-West .rontier Province and that part of the Punjab where they are in absolute majority over all the other elements and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India. Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore, 1940, on my basis and on the following terms: (a) The areas should be demarcated by a commission, approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the area demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method. (b) If the vote is in favour of separation, it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate State as soon as

Document Thirty Gandhi to Jinnah, 23 September 1944
Last evening’s talk has left a bad taste in the mouth. Our talks and our correspondence seem to run in parallel lines and never touch one another. We reached the breaking point last evening but, thank God, we were unwilling to part. We resumed discussion and suspended it in order to allow me to keep my time for the evening public prayer. In order that all possibility of making any mistake in a matter of this great importance may be removed I would like you to give me in writing what precisely on your part you would want me to put my signature to. I adhere to my suggestion that we may call in some outside assistance to help us at this stage.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 406. Amalendu De, 43.

Document Thirty-One Jinnah to Gandhi, 23 September 1944
…I may say that it is not a case of your being asked to put your signature as representing anybody till you clothe

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possible after India is free from foreign domination and can, therefore, be constituted into two sovereign independent States. (c) There shall be a treaty of separation, which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of .oreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Communications, Customs, Commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties. (d) The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights of minorities in the two States. Immediately on the acceptance of this agreement by the Congress and the League, the two shall decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of the independence of India. (e) The League will, however, be free to remain out of any direct action, to which the Congress may resort and in which the League may not be willing to participate. If you do not agree to these terms, could you let me know in precise terms what you would have me to accept in terms of the Lahore Resolution and bind myself to recommend to the Congress? If you could kindly do this, I shall be able to see, apart from the difference in approach, what definite terms I can agree to. In your letter of 23rd September, you refer to ‘the basis and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution’ and ask me to accept them. Surely, this is unnecessary when, as I feel, I have accepted the concrete consequence that should follow from such acceptance.
Source: Gandhi, lxxxiv. 407–9. Amalendu De, 45–7.

3. You do not accept that they alone are entitled to exercise this right of theirs for self-determination. 4. You do not accept that Pakistan is composed of two zones, north-west and north-east, comprising six Provinces, namely, Sind, Baluchistan, North-West .rontier Provinces, Punjab, Bengal and Assam, subject to territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon, as indicated in the Lahore Resolution. The matter of demarcating and defining the territories can be taken up after the fundamentals above mentioned are accepted, and for that purpose, machinery may be set up by agreement. You do not accept the provisions embodied in the Lahore Resolution for safeguarding the minorities, and yet in your letter under reply you say: ‘With your assistance, I am exploring the possibilities of reaching an agreement so that the claim embodied in the Muslim League Resolution of Lahore may be reasonably satisfied’ and proceed to say: ‘You must, therefore, have no apprehensions that the August [1942] Resolution will stand in the way of our reaching an agreement.’ I have already clearly explained to you that the August Resolution, so long as it stands, is a bar, for it is fundamentally opposed to the Lahore Resolution. You, then, proceed to say: ‘That Resolution dealt with the question of India as against Britain, and it cannot stand in the way of our settlement.’ I am not at present concerned with Britain, but the August Resolution, as I have already stated, is against the ideals and demands of the Muslim League. .urther, there is the resolution of Jagat Narain Lal, passed by the All-India Congress Committee in May 1942 at Allahabad, which in express terms lays down as follows:
The AICC is of the opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the India Union of .ederation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different States and Provinces and the Country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal.

Document Thirty-Three Jinnah to Gandhi, 25 September 1944
I am in receipt of your letter of September 24, and I thank you for it. You have already rejected the basic and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution. 1. You do not accept that the Mussalmans of India are a nation. 2. You do not accept that the Mussalmans have an inherent right of self-determination.

These two resolutions, so long as they stand, are a complete bar to any settlement on the basis of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan. It is open to the Congress to revise and modify them, but you are only

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speaking in your individual capacity and even in that capacity you are holding fast to the August Resolution, and you have given no indication of your attitude regarding Jagat Narain Lal’s Resolution. I have repeatedly made it clear after we had discussed the Gandhi–Rajaji .ormula, as you maintained that, to use your language, ‘Rajaji not only has not put the Lahore Resolution out of shape and mutilated it, but has given it substance and form’ and proceeded to say: ‘indeed, in view of your dislike of the Rajaji .omula, I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now finding a ground for mutual agreement.’ When I asked for further clarification, which you furnished me by your letter of September 15, you stated by saying: ‘I have shunted the Rajaji .ormula and with your assistance I am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League.’ And thenceforward the Gandhi–Rajaji .ormula was not discussed any further, and the question of your representative character and authority, which I had pointed out from the very commencement, therefore, did not arise, as you had given me the task of converting you to the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution, and ever since we discussed the Lahore Resolution only at great length and examined the pros and cons, and finally you have rejected it. As a result of our correspondences and discussions, I find that the question of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips and it does not come from your heart, and suddenly at the eleventh hour you put forward a new suggestion, consisting of only two sentences, by your letter of September 22, saying: ‘I have, therefore, suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be.’ I naturally asked you what this new suggestion of yours mean, and wanted you to give me rough outlines of this new idea of yours as to how and when the division is to take place and in what way it is different from the division envisaged in the Lahore Resolution, and now you have been good enough to give me your amplification, in your letter of September 24 under reply, in which you say: ‘Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim to separation contained in the

Muslim League Resolution of Lahore, 1940, on my basis and on the following terms.’ The terms clearly indicate that your basis is in vital conflict with, and is opposed to, the Lahore Resolution. Now let me take your main terms: (a) ‘I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations, but as one family consisting of many members, of whom the Muslims living in the north-west zones, i e., Baluchistan, Sind, North-West .rontier Province and that part of the Punjab where they are in absolute majority over all the other elements and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India.’ If this term were accepted and given effect to, the present boundaries of these Provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only with the husk, and it is opposed to the Lahore Resolution. (b) That even in these mutilated areas so defined, the right of self-determination will not be exercised by the Muslims but by the inhabitants of these areas so demarcated. This again is opposed to the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution. (c) That if the vote is in favour of separation, they shall be allowed to ‘form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination’, whereas we propose that we should come to a complete settlement of our own immediately and by our united front and efforts do everything in our power to secure the freedom and independence of the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan. (d) Next you say, ‘There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of .oreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Communications, Customs, Commerce, and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties.’ If these vital matters are to be administered by some central authority, you do not indicate what sort of authority or machinery will be set up to administer these matters, and how and to whom again that authority will be responsible. According to the Lahore Resolution, as I have already explained to you, all

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these matters, which are the life-blood of any State, cannot be delegated to any central authority or government. The matter of security of the two States and the natural and mutual obligations that may arise out of physical contiguity will be for the constitution-making body of Pakistan and that of Hindustan, or [any] other party concerned, to deal with on the footing of their being two independent States. As regards the safeguarding of the rights of minorities, I have already explained that this question of safeguarding the minorities is fully stated in the Lahore Resolution. You will, therefore, see that the entire basis of your new proposal is fundamentally opposed to the Lahore Resolution, and as I have already pointed out to you, both in the correspondence and in our discussions, it is very difficult for me to entertain counter-proposals and negotiate and reach any agreement or settlement with you as an individual, unless they come from you in your representative capacity. That was the same difficulty with regard to the Gandhi–Rajaji .ormula, and I made it clear to you, at the very outset, but the .ormula was discussed as you asserted that it had met the Lahore Resolution in substance. But while you were furnishing me with the clarification of this .ormula, you shunted it and we confined ourselves to the Lahore Resolution, and hence the question of your representative capacity did not arise regarding this .ormula. But now you have, in your letter of September 24, made a new proposal of your own on your own basis, and the same difficulties present themselves to me as before, and it is difficult to deal with it any further unless it comes from you in your representative capacity. I cannot agree with you when you finally wind up by saying: ‘In your letter of 23rd September, you refer to “the basic and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore Resolution” and ask me to accept them. Surely, this is unnecessary when as I feel I have accepted the concrete consequence that should follow from such acceptance.’ This is obviously far from correct. Why not then accept the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution and proceed to settle the details?
Source: Gandhi lxxxiv. 473-5 (extract only). Amalendu De, 48–53.

Document Thirty-.our Gandhi to Jinnah, 25 September 1944
Yesterday’s talk leads me to inflict this letter on you, which I trust you will not mind. Our conversations have come about as a result of your correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his .ormula and your consultations with the League Working Committee thereon, and my own letter to you suggesting a meeting between you and me. My proposal of yesterday is an earnest effort to meet the essential requirements of the Lahore Resolution. I would like you, therefore, to think fifty times before throwing away an offer which had been made entirely in the spirit of service in the cause of communal harmony. Do not take, I pray, the responsibility of rejecting the offer. Throw it on your Council. Give me an opportunity of addressing them. If they feel like rejecting it, I would like you to advise the Council to put it before the open session of the League. If you will accept my advice and permit me, I would attend the open session and address it. You are too technical when you dismiss my proposal for arbitration or outside guidance over points of difference. If I have approached you as an individual, and not in any representative capacity, it is because we believe that if I reach an agreement with you, it will be of material use in the process of securing a Congress–League settlement and acceptance of it by the country. Is it irrelevant or inadmissible to supplement our efforts to convince each other without help, guidance, advice or even arbitration?
Source: Gandhi lxxxiv. 412. Amalendu De, 54–55.

Document Thirty-.ive Jinnah to Gandhi, 26 September 1944
I am in receipt of your letter of September 25. It is entirely incorrect and has no foundation in fact, for you to say that our conversations have come about as a result of my correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his .ormula. It is equally baseless to say ‘and your consultations with the League Working Committee thereon’. It was entirely

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in response to your letter of July 17, 1944, which I received while I was at Srinagar, with a fervent request on your part to meet you, and you ended that letter by saying, ‘Do not disappoint me’. In my reply, again from Srinagar, dated 24 July 1944, I intimated to you that I would be glad to receive you at my house in Bombay on my return, which would probably be about the middle of August. This was long before the meeting of the Working Committee or that of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, and long before I reached Lahore, and when you arrived here and told me that you were approaching me in your individual capacity, I at once made it clear to you and informed you, both in our talks and by my letter, that the position you had taken up had no precedent for it, and further that it was not possible to negotiate and reach an agreement unless both the parties were fully represented. .or, it is one-sided business, as it will not be binding upon any organization in any sense whatever, but you would as an individual only recommend it, if any agreement is reached, to the Congress and the country, whereas it would be binding upon me as the President of the Muslim League. I cannot accept this position. I hope you do see the unfairness and the great disadvantage to me, and it is so simple and elementary for anyone to understand. As regards your proposal of yesterday, which you have simplified in your letter of September 24, I have already sent you my reply. With regard to your suggestion to be allowed to address the meeting of the Council, and if they feel like rejecting your ‘offer’ the matter should be put before the open session, let me inform you that only a member or delegate is entitled to participate in the deliberations of the meetings of the Council or in the open session, respectively. Besides, it is a most extraordinary and unprecedented suggestion to make. However, I thank you for your advice. As regards your proposal for arbitration and outside guidance, I have already replied to you, and it is not merely technical but a matter of substance. I fully reciprocate your desire for securing a Congress–League settlement. However, I regret I have failed to convince you and convert you, as I was hopeful of doing.

Document Thirty-Six Gandhi to Jinnah, 26 September 1944
In view of my letter to you of yesterday, left to myself, I would have refrained from dealing with your letter before our meeting today. But I have deferred to Rajaji’s advice to finish the chain of correspondence. I confess I am unable to understand your persistent refusal to appreciate the fact that the .ormula presented to you by me in my letter of the 24th as well as the .ormula presented to you by Rajaji give you virtually what is embodied in the Lahore Resolution, providing at the same time what is absolutely necessary to make the arrangement acceptable to the country. You keep on saying that I should accept certain theses, which you call the basic and fundamental principles of the Lahore Resolution, while I have been contending that the best way for us, who differ in our approach to the problem, is to give body to the demand as it stands in the Resolution and work it out to our mutual satisfaction. It is on this plan that I understand Rajaji’s .ormula is to be conceived, and it is on the same plan that I have tried to work it out in the course of and as a result of our talks. I contend that either gives you the substance of the Lahore Resolution. Unfortunately, you reject both. And I cannot accept the Lahore Resolution as you want me to, especially when you seek to introduce into its interpretation theories and claims which I cannot accept and which I cannot ever hope to induce India to accept. Your constant references to my not being clothed with representative authority are really irrelevant. I have approached you so that, if you and I can agree upon a common course of action, I may use what influence I possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. If you break, it cannot be because I have no representative capacity, or because I have been unwilling to give you satisfaction in regard to the claim embodied in the Lahore Resolution.
Source: Gandhi lxxxiv. 413. Amalendu De, 58–59.

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Document Thirty-Seven Jinnah to Gandhi, 26 September 1944
I have received your letter of September 26, and I note that you have written it with Rajaji’s advice. Of course, it is for you to follow such advice as you may choose to do, but I am only concerned for the moment with you. I note that at the last moment you have resurrected the Gandhi– Rajaji .ormula, although it was shunted all this time and you proceed to say that this .ormula gives me virtually what is embodied in the Lahore Resolution. You further say that on the same plan you have tried to formulate your latest proposals, as mentioned in your letter of September 24 and you maintain that either gives me the substance of the Lahore Resolution. In your previous letter you asserted that your .ormula gives me the ‘essence’ of the Lahore Resolution. I see a very close family resemblance between the two, and the substance of one or the other is practically the same, only it is put in different language, and I have already expressed my opinion, that in my judgment they neither meet the substance nor the essence of the Lahore Resolution. On the contrary, both are calculated completely to torpedo the Pakistan demand of Muslim India. I have never asked you to accept certain theses nor have I introduced any theories in the Lahore Resolution. Theses and theories are matters for scholars to indulge in. I am very sorry I have to repeat, but I am compelled to do so, that I cannot agree with you that my references to your not being clothed with representative authority are really irrelevant. On the contrary, they have an important bearing, as I have already explained to you more than once. You again repeat that if you and I can agree upon a common course of action, you may use what influence you possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. I have already stated from the very beginning that that is not enough, for the reasons I have already given. Your representative capacity comes into play when you are making counter-proposals, and I cannot understand how you can say that it is irrelevant. No responsible organization can entertain any proposal from any individual, however great he may be, unless it is backed up with the authority

of a recognized organization, and comes from its fully accredited representative. However, I need not labour this point any more, as I have already explained it in our previous correspondence. If a break comes, it will be because you have not satisfied me in regard to the essence of the claim embodied in the Lahore Resolution. It is not a question of your being unwilling, but in fact, it is so. If a break comes it will be most unfortunate. If one does not agree with you or differs from you, you are always right and the other party is always wrong, and the next thing is that many are waiting prepared, in your circle, to pillory me when the word goes, but I must face all threats and consequences, and I can only act according to my judgement and conscience.
Source: Gandhi lxxxiv. 477-8. Amalendu De, 60–61.

Document Thirty-Eight Statement of Jinnah, 27 September 1944
Mr. Gandhi from the very commencement of our talks made it clear that he had approached me in his individual capacity and that he represented no one but himself. However, he assured me that he was really open to conviction and conversion to the Muslim League Lahore Resolution of March 1940. Without prejudice to my objection that in order to reach any settlement, negotiations can only be carried on properly when the other side is also fully represented and vested with authority, in deference to Mr. Gandhi’s wishes I agreed to the task of persuading and converting him to the fundamentals of the Lahore Resolution. I have placed before him everything and every aspect of the Muslim point of view in the course of our prolonged talks and correspondence, and we discussed all the pros and cons generally, and I regret to say that I have failed in my task of converting Mr. Gandhi. We have, therefore, decided to release to the Press the correspondence that has passed between us. Nevertheless, we hope that the public will not feel embittered, and we trust that this is not the final end of our effort.

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination Source: Gandhi lxxxiv. 478. Amalendu De, 62–63.

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Document Thirty-Nine Gandhi’s Press Conference on the Talks with Jinnah, 28 September 1944
It is a matter of deep regret that we two could not reach an agreement. But there is no cause for disappointment. The breakdown is only so-called. It is an adjournment sine die. Each one of us must now talk to the public and put our viewpoints before them. If we do so dispassionately and if the public cooperate, we may reach a solution of the seemingly insoluble at an early date. My experience of the previous three weeks confirms me in the view that the presence of a third power hinders the solution. A mind enslaved cannot act as if it was free. I need not impute base motives to the rulers to prove what seems to me to be an axiomatic truth. Nevertheless, I am going to continue to work for the solution as I have been during these three weeks. The questions for consideration are simple. Has the Rajaji .ormula or mine made a reasonable approach to the Lahore Resolution? If they or either of them is such an approach, all parties, and especially the members of the Muslim League, should ask the Quaid-e-Azam to revise his opinion. If Rajaji and I have stultified the Lahore Resolution we should be educated. The chief thing is for the Press and the public to avoid partisanship and bitterness. To a question on his future plans, whether he proposed to concentrate on a Hindu–Muslim settlement or take up political work, seeking imprisonment if necessary, Mahatma Gandhi replied: I shall act as my inner voice tells me. Asked how far the offer he had made had conceded the demand made in the Lahore Resolution of the League, Mahatma Gandhi emphasized that the Rajaji .ormula or the formula that he presented conceded the substance of the League demand. He said: In my opinion, either formula gives as much as can reasonably be expected with due regard to the interests of the whole of India.

In answer to a question whether his offer was to be treated now as withdrawn, he said that so far as he was concerned the offer he had made stood. It was not made in any bargaining spirit. He said: I think it is a just solution of the problem and it is in the spirit of the policy which the Congress has consistently adopted in connection with the communal question, namely, self-determination. A number of questions were put on the representative character of the two leaders who conducted the negotiations and why Mahatma Gandhi prolonged the talks when he was apprised of Mr. Jinnah’s views on the first day of the talks. Mahatma Gandhi answered: I am a man reputed to have inexhaustible patience and I had no reason to despair of either being converted by the Quaid-e-Azam or in my turn converting him. Therefore, so long as there was the slightest possibility, I clung to the hope that we shall pull through to a solution. Haste in such cases is a most dangerous thing. You should, therefore, conclude that yesterday was really the moment when the public should have been taken into confidence. As for myself, I am entirely satisfied that we have not wasted these three weeks. I have no doubt whatsoever that we know now each other better than ever before. When you agreed to meet Mr. Jinnah, did you meet him on the basis that he was the sole representative of the Muslims? I have never admitted that claim, but I have said throughout that the Muslim League is by far the most representative Muslim organization. It would have been folly on my part not to recognize this, but I have always been aware that there is outside the League a large body of Muslims which does not see eye to eye with the League and which does not believe in the two nations theory. Mahatma Gandhi asserted that the fight for freedom had not been suspended when he approached the Quaid-eAzam. He said: My approach to the Quaid-e-Azam was itself a part of the fight for freedom. Asked if there was any possibility of the two leaders meeting

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again in the near future, Mahatma Gandhi said: I hope so. It is for the Press and the public to make it possible and hasten the date. I assure you that we have not parted as enemies, but as friends. If the Rajaji .ormula or his own formula had conceded the substance of the Lahore Resolution, then why not agree to the Resolution itself? Although the Resolution does not say so, if you study the correspondence, it shows that it is based on the two nations theory and it has been known as the Pakistan Resolution. .urther, I had to examine the Resolution in view of the interpretation put upon it by the Quaid-e-Azam in his numerous speeches and statements in elucidation of the Resolution. It is indisputable that the Resolution, while it does not enunciate that theory, is based upon that theory. The Quaid-e-Azam has insisted upon that. Therefore, I urge that apart from the two nations theory, if I could accept the principle of division of India in accordance with the demand of the League, he should accept it. But unfortunately it was just there we split. Asked about Mr. Jinnah’s views regarding a provisional interim government, he said: I am not sure that the Quaid-e-Azam puts great weight on the interim government. I gave all the explanation of my conception of an interim government without any reservation. It is quite clear in my letters. If I did not go any further, it was because I could not and, even if you cross-examine me any further, I would have to say I could not go any further. But if, as you suggest, the Quaid-eAzam attached greater weight to it, then it was open to him to put it into concrete form. I would have then taxed myself and spared no effort to accept the proposition or to make some other suggestions. Mahatma Gandhi was told that those Muslims who did not see eye to eye with the League had no real Muslim backing. He replied: Therefore, I have said that the League is by far the most representative of Muslim opinion, but I cannot despise the others by simply saying that they have no Muslim backing. What does it matter if they have no more Muslim backing if

the opinion represented by a single Muslim, or by a body of Muslims whom you can count on your fingers, is intrinsically sound? The way of approaching a question is not to examine the numerical strength of those behind the opinion, but to examine the soundness of the opinion on merits, or else we will never reach a solution, and if we reach one, it will be a blind solution simply because it is the wish of the largest body. If the largest body goes wrong, it is up to me to say you are wrong and not to submit. The rule of majority does not mean that it should suppress the opinion of even an individual, if it is sound. An individual’s opinion should have greater weight than the opinion of many, if that opinion is sound on merits. That is my view of real democracy. Mahatma Gandhi was asked what he thought of the idea of [the] formation of provinces on linguistic, cultural and communal basis. He replied that since 1920 he was for provinces on a linguistic basis. As for redistribution on a cultural basis, he did not really know what it meant and he was unable to understand how provinces could be reconstituted on communal lines unless there was a suggestion that there should be inter-migration of the various communities to concentrate in particular areas. It seemed to him to be fantastic and impossible. He said: We are not inhabiting a country full of deserts and wastelands. We are a densely populated country and I do not see the slightest chance for such redistribution. In that respect the Lahore Resolution is quite sound — where there is an obvious Muslim majority they should be allowed to constitute a separate State by themselves and that has been fully conceded in the Rajaji .ormula or my formula. There is not much distinction between them. That right is conceded without the slightest reservation. But if it means utterly independent sovereignty so that there is to be nothing in common between the two, I hold it is an impossible proposition. That means war to the knife. It is not a proposition that resolves itself into a voluntary or friendly solution. Therefore, the Rajaji .ormula and my formula have presented certain things to be in common between sovereign States. Therefore, there is no question of one party overbearing the other or the Centre having

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an overbearing Hindu majority. I think our formula should be critically and sympathetically examined and it would be found that the formula concedes everything that could reasonably be conceded if we consider ourselves to be one family. Children of the same family, dissatisfied with one another by reason of change of religion, if they should separate, then the separation should be within ourselves and not separation in the face of the whole world. When two brothers separate, they do not become enemies of one another in the eyes of the world. The world will still recognize them as brothers. A journalist said that some of the Nationalist Muslims felt that the Congress through Mahatma Gandhi meeting Mr. Jinnah had put them in a false position and that they might have to change their attitude towards Indian nationalism. Mahatma Gandhi replied that it was an extraordinary suggestion. Nationalist Muslims were nationalists simply because they could not be otherwise. He said: I am a nationalist, not in order to please anybody, but because I cannot be otherwise. And if I approached the Quaid-e-Azam, I approached him in the common interests of myself and Nationalist Muslims and other Nationalists. Nationalist Muslims, so far as I know, were delighted when I approached the Quaid-e-Azam and were looking forward to a proper solution in the confidence that I would not sell the interests represented by them. Undoubtedly, a Nationalist Muslim represents the nation, but he represents the Muslims also, who are a part of the nation. He would be guilty of disloyalty, if he sacrifices the Muslim interests. But my nationalism has taught me that I would be guilty of disloyalty if I sacrifice the interests of a single Indian. Asked if there was any difference between his present attitude towards the Muslim League demand and the stand he took in 1942, Mahatma Gandhi said: There is very great difference. In 1942, Rajaji had not ‘burst’ on the scene as he did at the Aga Khan Palace with a concrete proposition. It reflects very great credit on his persistence. He never takes up a standpoint without the fullest consideration and having taken it up, he follows it to the bitterest end. He had abundant faith in my loyalty

and he never gave me up as I have never given him up. When he found me in the Aga Khan Palace and presented the .ormula, I did not take even five minutes and I said ‘Yes’ because I saw it in a concrete shape. My mind is narrow. I have not read much literature. I have not seen much of the world. I have concentrated upon certain things in life and beyond that I have no other interest. Therefore, I could not realize the meaning of Rajaji’s stand and I disliked it. But when he came with a concrete formula — I myself a concrete being of flesh and blood — and when he had put something in concrete shape, I felt I could hug it and touch it. Therefore, you see the vast difference between 1942 and today. However, thereby I have not departed from the Congress standpoint in general terms. Congress has accepted self-determination and the Rajaji .ormula has also accepted the principle of self-determination and therefore the .ormula had become common ground. Proceeding, Mahatma Gandhi explained that he accepted the principle of sovereign States, consistent with friendliness. He said: .riendliness suggests that before the whole world we must act as one nation, not united by extraneous circumstances, or united by force of British arms, but united by a greater force, that is, our own determined will.
Source: Gandhi lxxxiv. 419–23. Amalendu De, 65–74.

Document .orty Gandhi on why the talks with Jinnah failed. Interview given to Stuart Gelder, News Chronicle, London, 29 September 1944 at Bombay
Mr. Gandhi told me today why his talks with Mr. Jinnah failed to produce a solution of the Hindu–Muslim differences. ‘I could not accept the two nations basis. This was Mr. Jinnah’s demand. He wants immediate recognition of the North-West .rontier Province, Sind, the whole of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam as sovereign and completely independent Pakistan.’ He wants Mr. Gandhi to agree to this amputation

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from the rest of India without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants by plebiscite. He has rejected the Rajagopalachari .ormula. I asked Mr. Gandhi what he was prepared to recognize as Pakistan and on what basis there could be any hope of agreement in future. He was frank and precise. He replied: ‘I want to make it clear that I believe Mr. Jinnah is sincere, but I think he is suffering from hallucination when he imagines that an unnatural division of India could bring either happiness or prosperity to the people concerned. It was my suggestion that provided there was the safeguard of a plebiscite there could be sovereignty for the predominantly Muslim areas, but it should be accompanied by bonds of alliance between Hindustan and Pakistan. There should be common policy and working arrangement on foreign affairs, defence, communications and similar matters. This is manifestly vital to the welfare of both parts of India.’ This arrangement, Mr. Gandhi said, could not interfere with the internal life of Muslims who would not be subject in any way to Hindu domination. Such a division would not create an artificial split between people who whatever their religious faiths are descended from a common stock and are all Indians. ‘Unfortunately, Mr. Jinnah would have none of it and asked me to agree to the principle of two nations entirely separate.’ I asked Mr. Gandhi if he had adopted the attitude because he thought he could not ‘sell’ such a division to the country or because he thought it wrong in principle. He replied: ‘Because it is fundamentally wrong in principle. If I had thought Mr. Jinnah’s view was right, even though the whole world were against me, I would have accepted it personally and given him my unquestioned allegiance.’ If Mr. Jinnah agreed to your view of division, but insisted there should be no plebiscite or a plebiscite in which only Muslims would vote, would you settle on this basis? Never. How could I agree in a personal or any other capacity to decide the future of millions of people without their having anything to say about their destiny? What was your impression of Mr. Jinnah’s attitude on the

question of an interim national government which you outlined to me in July? Mr. Jinnah has said that he is deeply interested in independence, but it did not seem to me that he set as great store by it as immediate recognition of the Pakistan he wants. Whereas, you see, my view has been all along that we cannot be free among ourselves until we are free from imperial domination. We have parted as friends. These days have not been wasted. I am convinced that Mr. Jinnah is a good man. I hope we shall meet again. I am a man of prayer and I shall pray for understanding. In the meantime, it is the duty of the public to digest the situation and bring the pressure of their opinion upon us.
Source: Gandhi lxxxiv. 424–5. Amalendu De, 75–7.

Document .orty-One Nehru to Jinnah, 6 October 1946
I have consulted some of my colleagues about the matters discussed by us yesterday and over the possibility of rapprochement between the Muslim League and the Congress. We are all agreed that nothing could be happier and better for the country than that these two organizations should meet again as before as friends having no mental reservations and bent on resolving their differences by mutual consultation and never desiring or allowing the intervention of the British Government through the Viceroy or others of any other foreign power. We would, therefore, welcome the decision of the League to join the Interim Government for it to work as a united team on behalf of India as a whole. The points put forward by you in our conversation were the formula suggested to you by Gandhiji the League not being responsible for the members at present representing the Scheduled Castes and the minorities what should be done in case any vacancy should arise among the members representing the minorities other than the Scheduled Castes the procedure to be adopted over what may be called

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major communal issues and alternating Vice-Presidentship. Regarding (1), we feel that the formula is not happily worded. We do not question the purpose underlying it. We are wiling, as a result of the elections, to accept the Muslim League as the authoritative representative organization of the overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India and that as such and in accordance with democratic principles they have today the unquestionable right to represent the Muslims of India, provided that for identical reasons the League recognizes the Congress as the authoritative organization representing all non-Muslims and such Muslims as have thrown in their lot with the Congress. The Congress cannot agree to any restriction or limitations to be put upon it in choosing such representatives as they think proper from amongst the members of the Congress. We would suggest, therefore, that no formula is necessary and each organization may stand on its merits. Regarding (2), I am to say that the question of the League being responsible does not arise and, as you do not raise any objections to the present constitution of the Government in this respect, there is no question to be solved. Regarding (3), I am to say that if any such vacancy arises, the whole Cabinet will consider what should be done to replace the vacancy and advise the Viceroy accordingly. There can be no question of right in the matter of consultation with the League in regard to the representation of these minorities. Regarding (4), your suggestion about the .ederal Court is not feasible. Matters coming before the Cabinet cannot be made the subject-matter of references to court. We should thrash out all such matters amongst ourselves and bring up agreed proposals before the Cabinet. In the event of failure to reach an agreed decision, we should seek the method of arbitration of our own choice. We hope, however, that we will act with such mutual trust, forbearance and friendliness that there will be no occasion to go to such arbitration. Regarding (5), it is out of the question to have any rotation in the Vice-Presidentship. We have no objection if you desire to have an additional Vice-Chairman for the Co-

ordinating Committee of the Cabinet, who can also preside at such meetings from time to time. I am hoping that if your Committee finally decide upon the League joining the National Cabinet, they will also decide simultaneously to join the Constituent Assembly, or recommend to your Council to this effect. I need hardly mention that when an agreement has been reached by us it can only be varied by mutual agreement and not otherwise.
Source: Pakistan National Archives, Islamabad. Jinnah Papers, .– 98 / 2–3.

Document .orty-Two Interview of Jinnah given to Duncan Hooper of Reuter’s, 25 October 1947
Question. What, in your view, is the best basis for firm and friendly relations between the Dominions of Indian and Pakistan? Answer: .irst and foremost, both Dominions must make allout efforts to restore peace and maintain law and order in their respective states — that is fundamental. I have repeatedly said that, now that the division of India has been brought about by solemn agreement between the two Dominions, we should bury the past and resolve that, despite all that has happened, we shall remain friends. There are many things which we need from each other as neighbours and we can help each other in diverse ways, morally, materially and politically and thereby raise the prestige and status of both dominions. But before we can make any progress, it is absolutely essential that peace must be restored and law and order maintained in both the Dominions. The minorities in both Dominions must be made to feel that their life, property and honour are absolutely safe and secure and they will get without question a fair deal from their respective Governments. It is very unfortunate that vigorous propaganda has been going on from the moment that the division was agreed upon and the two states were created that Pakistan is only a truncated Pakistan, and that it is

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merely a temporary madness on the part of the Muslim League that has brought about this ‘secession’, that Pakistan will have to come into the Union as a penitent, repentant, erring son and that the ‘two nation theory’ is responsible for all that has taken place. It is also very unfortunate that the Muslims in Hindustan are told threateningly that they must abjure the leadership of the League and declare their ‘folly’ in having supported Pakistan and in believing in this ‘fantastic two-nation theory’, also that certain tests and standards of loyalty are demanded from them and unless they satisfy those tests, it is said that they have no place in Hindustan. No Union Between Two States I want to make it quite clear that Pakistan will never surrender and never agree in any shape or form to any constitutional union between the two sovereign states with one common centre. Pakistan has come to stay and will stay. But we are always ready to come to an understanding or enter into agreements with Hindustan as two independent, equal, sovereign states, just as we may have our alliances, friendships and agreements with any other foreign nation. But all this propaganda and agitation, all the threats that are held out even by prominent Congress speakers, against our fully independent sovereign state are not likely to restore goodwill and friendly relations between the two states. We must try to stop any effort or attempt which is intended to bring about a forced union of the two Dominions. The methods advocated for the achievement of this are: 1) Bring about a revolt by Muslims against the Muslim League and the Pakistan Government. 2) .ailing that, making the leaders of Pakistan realize the folly of the two nation theory and change their ways and force them once again to agree to join the Union and thereby create a single India by war. India is a Hindu State If firm and friendly relations are to be established between the two Dominions, this sort of propaganda must stop. As for the two-nation theory, it is not a theory but a fact. The

division of India is based on that fact and, what is more, that fact has been proved beyond doubt by the ugly and deplorable events of the past two months, and by the action of the Dominion of India in pulling out Hindus from Pakistan as their nationals. How then can it be said that there is one nation? I do not wish to dwell upon this further. There are many other events that are taking place which go to show the reality which is that the Dominion of India is a Hindu state. Even a great professor, Dr Gadgil, in his statement of 9 October, says that a ‘Hindu state or more fully a federation of Hindu national states’ is the only proper description of the new Indian Union. And he says that to describe the Indian Union as a Hindu state is to bring out its dominant and most significant characteristic and he further proceeds to say that this does not mean that the territories of the Indian Union have no place for those who do not belong to the Hindu tradition and that others will be discriminated against. Minorities do not cease to be Citizens Minorities belonging to different faiths living in Pakistan or Hindustan do not cease to be citizens of the respective states by virtue of their belonging to a particular faith, religion or race. I have repeatedly made it clear, especially in my opening speech to the Constituent Assembly, that the minorities in Pakistan would be treated as our citizens and will enjoy all the rights and privileges that any other community gets. Pakistan shall pursue that policy and do all it can to create a sense of security and confidence in the non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan. Every citizen is expected to be loyal to the state and to owe true allegiance to it. The arm of the law should be strong enough to deal with any person or section or body of people that is disloyal to the state. We do not, however, prescribe any schoolboy tests of their loyalty. We shall not say to any Hindu citizen of Pakistan, ‘if there was war, would you shoot a Hindu?’ To the Muslim minority and their leaders left in India, I have already conferred advice that they must reorganize themselves under their own chosen leadership as they have a very big part to play in safeguarding the rights and interests of many millions. They have already professed under my

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advice their loyalty to the Government of India and made their position clear on the very first day when they attended the Indian Dominion Constituent Assembly. In spite of this, insidious propaganda is going on that they have been let down by the Muslim League and Pakistan is indifferent to what may happen to them. The Muslim minority in India have played a magnificent part in the achievement and establishment of Pakistan. They were fully active to the consequences that they would have to remain in Hindustan as minorities but not at the cost of their selfrespect and honour. Nobody visualized that a powerful section in India was bent upon the ruthless extermination of Muslims and had prepared a well-organized plan to achieve that end. This gangsterism, I hope, will be put down ruthlessly by the India Government, otherwise they will forfeit the claim to be a civilized Government. I therefore, while deeply and fully sympathising with their sufferings, urge upon Muslims in India to bear their trial with courage and fortitude and not get panicky and play into the hands of our enemies by hasty decisions or actions. They should not in their adversity be led away by mischievous propaganda of interested parties and hold the Muslim League and its leadership responsible for all their tribulations. They must hold on to their posts, and Pakistan, I can assure them, will not be a mere spectator of their sufferings. We are deeply concerned with their welfare and future, and we shall do everything in our power to avert the danger that they are facing. I sincerely hope that, with the co-operation of the Indian Dominion, we shall be able to secure a fair deal for them. Strike at the Roots of Conspiracy Question. Do you consider that Pakistan and India have now passed through the worst of the communal troubles following the transfer of power? Answer: You can hardly call this communal trouble, although I know that it has been very loosely described at that. It is now clear beyond doubt that it was well-planned, wellorganized and well-directed and the object of it all, it seems to me, was to paralyse the new-born Dominion of Pakistan, which obviously was starting from scratch. There is only

one remedy now left — that is for the Indian Dominion to deal ruthlessly with this diabolical conspiracy and extirpate, I say extirpate, the roots of the plot and the powerful men who are behind the organization. It is no use dealing with the symptoms. You must strike at the root. .unction of Muslims Question. What do you consider are now the proper functions of the Muslim League outside Pakistan? Answer. The Muslim League has already achieved its mission — its fundamental object — which was to establish the independent state of Pakistan. The remaining aims and objects of the Muslim League are very general. I quote: ‘to protect and advance the political, religious and other rights and interests of Indian Mussulmans and other communities of India, and to maintain and strengthen brotherly relations between the Mussulmans of India and those of other communities. I wanted to call a meeting of the Working Committee and of the Council of the All-India Muslim League at an early date because it is obvious that we have to reorient the Muslim League organization in the light of the fundamental changes that have taken place. But, unfortunately, owing to the grave situation that was created, we were so fully absorbed that we had no time to attend to this or many other matters which are facing us and which still require our urgent consideration. .air deal for Indian Muslims The main objective of Muslims in India is to play their part in ensuring that they get a fair deal. But, with the establishment of the two Dominions, this is also a matter which can be handled effectively on a Government level. The plan of 3 June was accepted by the two major nations as successor authorities and now in accordance with that plan and under the terms of the Indian Independence Act of 1947, there have emerged two independent sovereign states. In accepting the Plan, even before then, solemn declarations were made both by the Congress and the Muslim League that the minorities of both states would be given a fair deal and that safeguards for them should be

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Documents fresh air that made us stretch ourselves and take deep breaths, like a beam of light that pierced the darkness and removed the scales from our eyes, like a whirlwind that upset... most of all the working of people’s mind. He did not descend from the top; he seemed to emerge from the millions of India... (Jawaharlal Nehru)

secured specially for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights in consultation with them and that position is not seriously questioned even now by any responsible person. Terrific bloodshed The birth of the two Dominions was, I am glad to say, celebrated everywhere as the day of the attainment of freedom and independent, not only for these two major nations but for all the inhabitants of this great sub-continent — yet immediately thereafter there came this terrific bloodshed which was undoubtedly intended to eliminate the Muslim minorities from Hindustan. Lastly, I must emphasize that the Congress and the Indian Dominion Government must put down the leadership of those who planned this ruthless killing and also those elements who are collaborating with them to defy law and order. No Retaliation, no Revenge I have refrained as far as possible from apportioning blame between the Hindus as a community or the Muslims as a community. But I must make it clear that I deplore and condemn without reserve the horrible deeds of killing and destruction that have taken place irrespective of their place of occurrence or origin. I have done my utmost, and I am glad to say, not without considerable success, to impress upon the Muslims that whatever the provocation, there shall be no retaliation, no revenge. On the contrary, it is the duty of every Muslim as a man of honour — and what is more his religion enjoins it upon them — that there should be no retaliation or revenge [and] that it is our bounden duty to protect the minorities and that we mean to give them a fair deal as our citizens.
Source: Afzal, Speeches and statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 437–44. Yusuf, iv. 2361–2638.

Document .orty-Three Mushirul Hasan, ‘The Mahatma and the Qaidi-Azam: A study in contrast’
And then Gandhi came. He was like a powerful current of

Like most of you, I read all about the 50th year of Independence. My regret is that we missed an historic opportunity of reminding ourselves of Gandhi’s moral and political philosophy, his sensitivity to oppression and exploitation, and his contribution to heightening popular consciousness during the liberation struggle. And my disappointment is with the feeble attempts to understand or interpret the Gandhian legacy, more so when a beleaguered nation is supposedly engaged in fighting simultaneously on political, social and economic fronts. True, Gandhi’s moral and political philosophy had severe limitations. It is also true that he lost the magic touch after having led and guided the civil disobedience campaigns. His concern for the plight of Dalits was genuine but their empowerment, which would have caused an upper caste backlash, was not his political agenda. He opposed separate electorates for them. He did not deal with their leaders, notably B. R. Ambedkar, on equal terms. Gandhi’s method of dealing with Muslims was, likewise, based on mistaken beliefs. He treated them as a distinct panIndian entity and approached them as a monolithic religious group and not as differentiated cultural, linguistic and economic entities. He did not turn to the regional Muslim communities or take cognisance of their regional aspirations. He spent years in the company of liberal and secular-minded Muslims without being receptive to their modernist interpretation of Islam. He regarded the traditionalist view as the more authentic voice of India’s Muslims. It is easy to disagree with Gandhi on many such issues and dwell on his inconsistencies and contradictions. Yet his conception of state and society, with its emphasis on morality and non-violence, demands serious attention. Gandhi was a Hindu, but not a Hindu leader. He deployed Hinduised symbols, which appealed to Hindus and Muslims alike in rural areas, to unite and not to divide his growing

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constituency. Indeed, his political engagements developed out of his concern to articulate the interests of the Indian people. That is why Mohamed Ali stated in the early-1920s: ‘It is Gandhi, Gandhi, Gandhi, that has got to be dinned into the people’s ears, because he means Hindu-Muslim unity, non-cooperation, dharma and Swaraj.’ M. A. Jinnah did not endorse such a view then or later. One should understand why this was so, though there is no earthly reason to compare his political trajectory with that of Gandhi or publicise his fulminations against the Mahatma. Why should any book published in the West be the reference point for a Gandhi–Jinnah debate? Is it important to be told that Jinnah spent less than Gandhi on train fares despite travelling first class, since he only had to buy one ticket? Or, that Gandhi believed in the increment of human excrement, whereas the elitist Jinnah did not wish to soil his carefully scrubbed hands by consorting with the masses. At the same time, one is ill-served by those who demonise Jinnah or interpret his role from the lofty heights of Indian nationalism. He should not be belittled for rejecting the Congress creed; others did the same more consistently. He should not be singled out as the ‘villain’, the sole leader responsible for the Partition. The nationalist rhetoric can no longer obscure the role of certain key Congress and Hindu Mahasabha players in signing united India’s deathwarrant. Jinnah’s political trajectory can best be studied in relation to the complex interplay of forces that created spaces for the Pakistan demand to gather momentum, the subtle changes in institutional and bureaucratic structures, the shifts in political alignments and the bitter struggle for gaining access to power, patronage and authority. Still, how did Sarojini Naidu’s ‘Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity’ become Pakistan’s Qaid-i-Azam? Why did Jinnah repudiate his own liberal and secular creed? How and why did he succeed in mobilising so many Muslims in so short a time? The explanations lie elsewhere and not in the pedantic debates centred around the whims and idiosyncrasies of individuals. Jinnah was not a political force when Gandhi launched the Rowlatt Satyagraha and the non-cooperation

movement. He searched in vain for a role in British politics, while Gandhi led the spectacular Dandi March. During the 1937 elections, he was dismayed to discover that Gandhi’s Congress and not his Muslim League was the people’s party. Yet, he was not one to lick his wounds. He bounced back and used his bargaining skills to extract major political concessions from a beleaguered war-time government. That was the time when Gandhi, his bête noir, languished in British jails. The two men had little in common. Jinnah was a constitutionalist who relished debating finer points of law and legal processes. He was often impetuous and sometimes reckless in promoting his favourite projects; hence the use of religion to establish his moral authority on his allies. He was not inclined to define his long-term agenda. He had no blueprint to cope with the demands of a modern nationstate. His overall world-view failed to transcend the confines of the law courts. The Mahatma was a popular and charismatic figure. He was a powerful communicator. He possessed a sharp and intuitive mind, with the ability to marshal his resources towards ends clearly discerned and goals clearly defined. He was an innovator, a synthesiser of diverse political and philosophical traditions. He developed a political theory grounded in the unique experiences and articulated in terms of the indigenous philosophical vocabulary. Such a man was, alas, reduced to being a figurehead in the Congress hierarchy during 1945–7. Humbled and marginalized by his erstwhile colleagues, he was a lonely figure at the time of Independence and Partition. He moved to riot-ravaged areas to provide the healing touch. Here was somebody who practised what he preached. Here was somebody who reminded us through his ideas and actions that a second partition must not be allowed to take place. This is the Mahatma’s legacy for you.
Source: Indian Express, 23 August 1997: <www.financialexpress.com/ie/daily/19970823/23450103.html>

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Appendix Two Document .orty-.our Dr Ambdekar on The Problems of Pakistan (1940), ch. 14 I

Among the many problems to which the partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan must give rise will be the following three problems: (1) The problem of the allocation of the financial assets and liabilities of the present Government of India, (2) The problem of the delimitation of the areas, and (3) The problem of the transfer of population from Pakistan to Hindustan and vice versa. Of these problems the first is consequential, in the sense, that it would be worthwhile to consider it only when the partition of India has been agreed to by the parties concerned. The two other problems stand on a different footing. They are conditions precedent to Pakistan in the sense that there are many people who will not make up their mind on Pakistan unless they are satisfied that some reasonable and just solution of them is possible, I will, therefore, confine myself to the consideration only of the last two problems of Pakistan. On the question of the boundaries of Pakistan we have had so far no clear and authoritative statement from the Muslim League. In fact it is one of the complaints made by the Hindus that while Mr. Jinnah has been carrying on a whirlwind campaign in favour of Pakistan, which has resulted in fouling the political atmosphere in the country, Mr. Jinnah has not thought fit to inform his critics of the details regarding the boundaries of his proposed Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah’s argument has all along been that any discussion regarding the boundaries of Pakistan is premature and that the boundaries of Pakistan will be a matter for discussion when the principle of Pakistan has been admitted. It may be a good rhetorical answer, but it certainly does not help those who wish to apply their mind without taking sides to

II

offer whatever help they can to bring about a peaceful solution of this problem. Mr. Jinnah seems to be under the impression that if a person is committed to the principle of Pakistan he will be bound to accept Mr. Jinnah’s plan of Pakistan. There cannot be a greater mistake than this. A person may accept the principle of Pakistan, which only means the partition of India. But it is difficult to understand how the acceptance of this principle can commit him to Mr. Jinnah’s plan of Pakistan. Indeed if no plan of Pakistan is satisfactory to him he will be quite free to oppose any form of Pakistan although he may be in favour of the principle of Pakistan. The plan of Pakistan and the principle of Pakistan are therefore two quite distinct propositions. There is nothing wrong in this view. By way of illustration it may be said that the principle of self-determination is like an explosive substance. One may agree in principle to its use when the necessity and urgency of the occasion is proved. But no one can consent to the use of the dynamite without first knowing the area that is intended to be blown up. If the dynamite is going to blow up the whole structure or if it is not possible to localize its application to a particular part he may well refuse to apply the dynamite and prefer to use some other means of solving the problem. Specifications of boundary lines seem therefore to be an essential preliminary for working out in concrete shape the principle of Pakistan. Equally essential it is for a bona fide protagonist of Pakistan not to hide from the public the necessary particulars of the scheme of Pakistan. Such contumacy and obstinacy as shown by Mr. Jinnah in refusing to declare the boundaries of his Pakistan is unforgivable in a statesman. Nevertheless those who are interested in solving the question of Pakistan need not wait to resolve the problems of Pakistan until Mr. Jinnah condescends to give full details. Only one has to carry on the argument on the basis of certain assumptions. In this discussion I will assume that what the Muslim League desires is that the boundaries of the Western Pakistan should be the present boundaries of the Provinces of the North-West .rontier, the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, and that the boundaries of Eastern Pakistan should be the boundaries of the present province of Bengal with a few districts of Assam thrown in.

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III
The question for consideration therefore is: is this a just claim? The claim is said to be founded on the principle of self-determination. To be able to assess the justice of this claim it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the scope and limitations of the principle of self-determination. Unfortunately, there seems to be a complete lack of such an understanding. It is therefore necessary to begin with the question: What is the de facto and de jure connotation of this principle of self-determination? The term self-determination has become current since the last few years. But it describes something which is much older. The idea underlying self-determination has developed along two different lines. During the 19th century self-determination meant the right to establish a form of government in accordance with the wishes of the people. Secondly, self-determination has meant the right to obtain national independence from an alien race irrespective of the form of government. The agitation for Pakistan has reference to self-determination in its second aspect. Confining the discussion to this aspect of Pakistan it seems to me essential that the following points regarding the issue of self-determination should be borne in mind. In the first place, self determination must be by the people. This point is too simple even to need mention. But it has become necessary to emphasize it. Both the Muslim League and the Hindu Maha Sabha seem to be playing fast and loose with the idea of self-determination. An area is claimed by the Muslim League for inclusion in Pakistan because the people of the area are Muslims. An area is also claimed for being included in Pakistan because the ruler of the area is a Muslim though the majority of the people of that area are non-Muslims. The Muslim League is claiming the benefit of self-determination in India. At the same time the League is opposed to self-determination being applied to Palestine. The League claims Kashmir as a Muslim State because the majority of people are Muslims and also Hyderabad because the ruler is Muslim. In like manner the Hindu Maha Sabha claims an area to be included in Hindustan because the people of the area are non-Muslims. It also comes forward

to claim an area to be a part of Hindustan because the ruler is a Hindu though the majority of the people are Muslims. Such strange and conflicting claims are entirely due to the fact that either the parties to Pakistan, namely, the Hindus and the Muslims do not understand what selfdetermination means or are busy in perverting the principle of self-determination to enable them to justify themselves in carrying out the organized territorial loot in which they now seem to be engaged. India will be thrown into a state of utter confusion whenever the question of reorganization of its territories comes up for consideration if people have no exact notions as to what self-determination involves and have not the honesty to stand by the principle and take the consequences whatever they be. It is, therefore, will to emphasize what might be regarded as too simple to require mention, namely, that self-determination is a determination by the people and by nobody else. The second point to note is the degree of imperative character with which the principle of self-determination can be said to be invested. As has been said by Mr. O’Connor: ‘The doctrine of self-determination is not a universal principle at all. The most that can be said about it is that generally speaking, it is a sound working rule, founded upon justice, making for harmony and peace and for the development of people in their own fashion, which, again generally speaking, is the best fashion. But it must yield to circumstances, of which size and geographical situation are some of the most important. Whether the rule should prevail against the circumstances or the circumstances against the rule can be determined only by the application of one's common sense or sense of justice, or, as a Benthamite would prefer to put it, by reference to the greatest good of the greatest number - all these three, if properly understood, are really different methods of expressing the same thing. In solving a particular case very great difficulties may arise. There are facts one way and facts another way. .acts of one kind may make a special appeal to some minds, little or none to others. The problem may be of the kind that is called imponderable, that is to say, no definite conclusion that will be accepted by the generality of the mankind

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may be possible. There are cases in which it is no more possible to say that a nation is right in its claim to interfere with the self-determination of another nation than that it is to say that it is wrong. It is a matter of opinion, upon which honest and impartial minds may differ.’ There are two reasons why this must be so. .irstly, nationality is not such a sacrosanct and absolute principle as to give it the character of a categorical imperative, over-riding every other consideration. Secondly, separation is not quite so essential for the maintenance and preservation of a distinct nationality. There is a third point to be borne in mind in connection with the issue of self-determination. Self-determination for a nationality may take the form of cultural independence or may take the form of territorial independence. Which form it can take must depend upon the territorial layout of the population. If a nationality lives in easily severable and contiguous area, other things being equal, a case can be made out for territorial independence. But where owing to an inextricable intermingling the nationalities are so mixed up that the area they occupy are not easily serverable, then all that they can be entitled to is cultural independence. Territorial separation in a case like this is an impossibility. They are doomed to live together. The only other alternative they have is to migrate.

IV
Having defined the scope and limitations of the idea of self-determination we can now proceed to deal with the question of boundaries of Pakistan. How does the claim of the Muslim League for the present boundary to remain the boundaries of Pakistan stand in the light of these considerations? The answer to this question seems to me quite clear. The geographical layout seems to decide the issue. No special pleading of any kind is required. In the case of the North-West .rontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims are intermixed. In these Provinces a case for territorial separation for the Hindus seems to be impossible. They must remain content with cultural independence and such political safeguards, as may be devised for their safety. The case of the Punjab

and Bengal stands on a different footing. A glance at the map shows that the layout of the population of the Hindus and the Muslims in these two Provinces is totally different from what one finds in the other three Provinces. The non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal are not found living in small islands in the midst of and surrounded by a vast Muslim population spread over the entire surface as is the case with the North-West .rontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal and the Punjab the Hindus occupy two different areas contiguous and severable. In these circumstances, there is no reason for conceding what the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the present boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the boundaries of Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan. Two conclusions necessarily follow from the foregoing discussion. One is that the non-Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal have a case for exclusion from Pakistan by territorial severance of the area they occupy. The other is that the non-Muslims of North-West .rontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind have no case for exclusion and are only entitled to cultural independence and political safeguards. To put the same thing in a different way it may be said that the Muslim League claim for demanding that the boundaries of Sind, North-West .rontier and Baluchistan shall remain as they are cannot be opposed. But that in the case of the Punjab and Bengal such a claim is untenable and that the non-Muslims of these Provinces, if they desire, can claim that the territory they occupy should be excluded by a redrawing of the boundaries of these two Provinces.

V
One should have thought that such a claim by the nonMuslim minorities of the Punjab and Bengal for the redrawing of the boundaries would be regarded by the Muslim League as a just and reasonable claim. The possibility of the redrawing of boundaries was admitted in the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim League passed in March 1940. The Resolution said: ‘The establishment of completely independent States formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted, with such territorial

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readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute independent States as Muslim free national home-lands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.’ That this continued to be the position of the Muslim League is clear from the resolution passed by the Muslim League on the Cripps Proposals as anyone who cares to read it will know. But there are indications that Mr. Jinnah has changed his view. At a public meeting held on 16 November 1942 in Jullunder Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed himself in the following terms:'The latest trick - I call it nothing but a trick - to puzzle and to mislead the ignorant masses purposely, and those playing the game understand it, is, why should the right of self-determination be confined to Muslims only and why not extend it to other communities? Having said that all have the right of self-determination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many bits; likewise the North-West .rontier Province and Sind. Thus there will be hundreds of Pakistans. Sub National Groups ‘Who is the author of this new formula that every community has the right of self-determination all over India ? Either it is colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give them a reply, that the Musalmans claim the right of selfdetermination because they are a national group on a given territory which is their homeland and in the zones where they are in a majority. Have you known any where in history that national groups scattered all over have been given a State? Where are you going to get a State for them? In that case you have got 14 per cent. Muslims in the United Provinces. Why not have a State for them? Muslims in the United Provinces are not a national group; they are scattered. Therefore in constitutional language they are characterized as a sub-national group who cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civilized Government to a minority. I hope I have made the position clear. The Muslims are not a sub-national group; it is their

birthright to claim and exercise the right of selfdetermination.’ Mr. Jinnah has completely missed the point. The point raised by his critics was not with regard to the non-Muslim minorities in general. It had reference to the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal. Does Mr. Jinnah propose to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy a compact and an easily severable territory by his theory of a sub-nation? If that is so, then one is bound to say that a proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any political literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an ingenious concept but it is also a preposterous concept. What does the theory of a sub nation connote? If, I understand its implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must not be severed from the nation to which it belongs even when severance is possible: it means that the relations between a nation and a sub nation are no higher than the relations which subsist between a man and his chattels, or between property and its incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a sub-nation goes with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah’s argument. But does Mr. Jinnah seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal are only chattels so that they must always go wherever the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal choose to drive them? Such an argument will be too absurd to be entertained by any reasonable man. It is also the most illogical argument and certainly it should not be difficult for so mature a lawyer as Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality of it. If a numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation in relation to a numerically larger nation and has no right to territorial separation, why can it not be said that taking India as a whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a sub - nation they have no right to self-determination or territorial separation? Already there exists a certain amount of suspicion with regard to the bona fides of Pakistan. Rightly or wrongly, most people suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief. They think that it has two motives. One immediate, the other ultimate. The immediate motive, it is said, is to join with the neighbouring Muslim countries and form a Muslim

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.ederation. The ultimate motive is for the Muslim .ederation to invade Hindustan and conquer or rather reconquer the Hindu and re-establish Muslim Empire in India. Others think that Pakistan is the culmination of the scheme of hostages which lay behind the demand, put forth by Mr. Jinnah in his fourteen points, for the creation of separate Muslim Provinces. Nobody can fathom the mind of the Muslims and reach the real motives that lie behind their demand for Pakistan. The Hindu opponents of Pakistan if they suspect that the real motives of the Muslims are different from the apparent ones may take note of them and plan accordingly. They cannot oppose Pakistan because the motives behind it are bad. But they are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah, Why does he want to have a communal problem within Pakistan? However vicious may be the motives behind Pakistan it should possess at least one virtue. The ideal of Pakistan should be not have a communal problem inside it. This is the least of virtues one can expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be plagued by a communal problem in the same way as India has been, why have Pakistan at all? It can be welcomed only if it provides an escape from the communal problem. The way to avoid it is to arrange the boundaries in such a way that it will be an ethnic State without a minority and a majority pitched against each other. .ortunately it can be made into an ethnic State if only Mr. Jinnah will allow it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to it. There in lies the chief cause for suspicion and Mr. Jinnah, instead of removing it, is deepening it by such absurd, illogical, and artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations. Rather than resort to such absurd and illogical propositions and defend what is indefensible and oppose what is just, would it not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what Sir Edward Carson did in the matter of the delimitation of the boundaries of Ulster? As all those who know the vicissitudes through which the Irish Home Rule question passed know that it was at the Craig Avon meeting held on 23 September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson formulated his policy that in Ulster there will be a government of Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never a Home Rule Government. As the Imperial Parliament was proposing to withdraw its

government, this policy meant the establishment of a provisional government for Ulster. This policy was embodied in a resolution passed at a joint meeting of delegates representing the Ulster Unionist Council, the Country Grand Orange Lodges and Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on 25th September 1911. The Provisional Government of Ulster was to come into force on the day of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. An important feature of this policy was to invest the Provisional Government with a jurisdiction over all ‘those districts which they (Ulsterites) could control.’ The phrase ‘those districts which they could control’ was no doubt meant to include the whole of the administrative division of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster included nine countries. Of these three were overwhelmingly Catholic. This meant the compulsory retention of the three Catholic counties under Ulster against their wishes. But what did Sir Edward Carson do in the end? It did not take long for Sir Edward Carson to discover that Ulster with three overwhelmingly Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all the courage of a true leader be came out with a declaration that he proposed to cut down his losses and make Ulster safe. In his speech in the House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920 he announced that he was content with six counties only. The speech that he made on that occasion giving his reasons why he was content only with six countries is worth quoting. This is what he said: ‘The truth is that we came to the conclusion after many anxious hours and anxious days of going into the whole matter, almost parish by parish and townland by townland, that we would have no chance of successfully starting a Parliament in Belfast which would be responsible for the government of Donegal, Caven and Monaghan. It would be perfectly idle for us to come here and pretend that we should be in a position to do so, We should like to have the very largest areas possible, naturally. That is a system of land grabbing that prevails in all countries for widening the jurisdiction of the various governments that are set up; but there is no use in our undertaking a government which we know would be a failure if we were saddled with these three countries.’ These are wise, sagacious and most courageous words.

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The situation in which they were uttered has a close parallel with the situation that is likely to be created in the Punjab and Bengal by the application of the principle of Pakistan. The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah if they want a peaceful Pakistan should not forget to take note of them. It is no use asking the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab and Bengal to be satisfied with safeguards. If the Musalmans are not prepared to be content with safeguards against the tyranny of Hindu majority why should the Hindu minorities be asked to be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the Muslim majority? If the Musalmans can say to the Hindus ‘Damn your safeguards, we don’t want to be ruled by you’ ¯ an argument which Carson used against Redmond ¯ the same argument can be returned by the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal against the Muslim offer to be content with safeguards. The point is that this attitude is not calculated to lead to a peaceful solution of the problem of Pakistan. Sabre-rattling or show of force will not do. In the first place, this is a game which two can play. In the second place, arms may be an element of strength. But to have arms is not enough. As Rousseau said: ‘The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms his might into right, and obedience into duty.’ Only ethics can convert might into right and obedience into duty. The League must see that it claim for Pakistan is founded on ethics.

VI
So much for the problem of boundaries. I will now turn to the problem of the minorities which must remain within Pakistan even after boundaries are redrawn. There are two methods of protecting their interests. .irst is to provide safeguards in the constitution for the protection of the political and cultural rights of the minorities. To Indians this is a familiar matter and it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it. Second is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution and would be ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that an exchange of population is possible. But they regard

this as a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is the sign of a panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool and calm temper it will be found that the problem in neither staggering nor baffling. To begin with consider the dimensions of the problem. On what scale is this transfer going to be? In determining the scale one is bound to take into account three considerations. In the first place, if the boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn there will be no question of transfer of population so far as these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place, the Musalmans residing in Hindustan do not propose to migrate to Pakistan nor does the League want their transfer. In the third place, the Hindus in the North-West .rontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan do not want to migrate. If these assumptions are correct, the problem of transfer of population is far from being a staggering problem. Indeed it is so small that there is no need to regard it as a problem at all. Assuming it does become a problem, will it be a baffling problem? Experience shows that it is not a problem which it is impossible to solve. To devise a solution for such a problem it might be well to begin by asking what are the possible difficulties that are likely to arise in the way of a person migrating from one area to another on account of political changes. The following are obvious enough: (1) The machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of population; (2) Prohibition by Government against migration; (3) Levy by Government of heavy taxation on the transfer of goods by the migrating family; (4) The impossibility for a migrating family to carry with it to its new home its immovable property; (5) The difficulty of obviating a resort to unfair practices with a view to depress unduly the value of the property of the migrating family; (6) The fear of having to make good the loss by not being able to realize the full value of the property by sale in the market; (7) The difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges due to the migrating family from the country of departure; (8) The difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment is to be made. If these difficulties are removed the way to the transfer of population becomes clear.

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The first three difficulties can be easily removed by the two States of Pakistan and Hindustan agreeing to a treaty embodying an article in some such terms as follows: ‘The Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan agree to appoint a Commission consisting of equal number of representatives and presided over by a person who is approved by both and who is not a national of either.’ ‘The expenses of the Commission and of its Committees both on account of its maintenance and its operation shall be borne by the two Governments in equal proportion.’ ‘The Government of Pakistan and the Government of Hindustan hereby agree to grant to all their nationals within their territories who belong to ethnic minorities the right to express their desire to emigrate.’ ‘The Governments of the States above mentioned undertake to facilitate in every way the exercise of this right and to interpose no obstacles, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration. All laws and regulations whatsoever which conflict with freedom of emigration shall be considered as null and void.’ The fourth and the fifth difficulties which relate to transfer of property can be effectually met by including in the treaty articles the following terms: ‘Those who, in pursuance of these articles, determine to take advantage of the right to migrate shall have the right to carry with them or to have transported their movable property of any kind without any duty being imposed upon them on this account. ‘So far as immovable property is concerned it shall be liquidated by the Commission in accordance with the following provisions: (1) The Commission shall appoint a Committee of Experts to estimate the value of the immovable property of the emigrant. The emigrant interested shall have a representative chosen by him on the Committee. (2) The Commission shall take necessary measures with a view to the sale of immovable property of the emigrant.’ As for the rest of the difficulties relating to reimbursement for loss, for payment of pensionary and charges for

specifying the currency in which payments are to be made the following articles in the treaty should be sufficient to meet them: (1) The difference in the estimated value and the sale price of the immovable property of the emigrant shall be paid in to the Commission by the Government of the country of departure as soon as the former has notified it of the resulting deficiency. One fourth of this payment may be made in the money of the country of departure and three-fourths in gold or short term gold bonds. (2) The Commission shall advance to the emigrants the value of their immovable property determined as above. (3) All civil or military pensions acquired by an emigrant at the date of the signature of the present treaty shall be capitalized at the charge of the debtor Government, which must pay the amount to the Commission for the account of its owners. (4) The funds necessary to facilitate emigration shall be advanced by the States interested in the Commission. Are not these provisions sufficient to overcome the difficulties regarding transfer of population? There are of course other difficulties. But even those are not insuperable. They involve questions of policy. The first question is: is the transfer of population to be compulsory or is it to be voluntary? The second is: is this right to State-aided transfer to be open to all or is it to be restricted to any particular class of persons? The third is: how long is Government going to remain liable to be bound by these provisions, particularly the provision for making good the loss on the sale of immovable property? Should the provisions be made subject to a time limit or should the liability be continued indefinitely? With regard to the first point, both are possible and there are instances of both having been put into effect. The transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria was on a voluntary basis while that between Greece and Turkey was on a compulsory basis. Compulsory transfer strikes

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one as being prima facie wrong. It would not be fair to compel a man to change his ancestral habitat if he does not wish to, unless the peace and tranquility of the State is likely to be put in jeopardy by his continuing to live where he is or such transfer becomes necessary in his own interest. What is required is that those who want to transfer should be able to do so without impediment and without loss. I am therefore of opinion that transfer should not be forced but should be left open for those who declare their intention to transfer. As to the second point, it is obvious that only members of a minority can be allowed to take advantage of the scheme of State aided transfer. But even this restriction may not be sufficient to exclude all those who ought not to get the benefit of this scheme. It must be confined to certain well-defined minorities who on account of ethnic or religious differences are sure to be subjected to discrimination or victimization. The third point is important and is likely to give rise to serious difference of opinion. On a fair view of the matter it can be said that it is quite unreasonable to compel a Government to keep open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost. There is nothing unfair in telling a person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration contained in the foregoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period and that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate but it will have to be at his own cost and without the aid of the State. There is no inequity in thus limiting the right to State-aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no control. But migration may not be the result of political change. It may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes, aid to the emigrant cannot be an obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of time. When it takes place within a defined period from the happening of a political change it may be presumed to be political. When

it occurs after the period it may be presumed to be for private reasons. There is nothing unjust in this. The same rule of presumption governs the cases of civil servants who, when a political change takes place, are allowed to retire on proportionate pensions if they retire within a given period but not if they retire after it has lapsed. If the policy in these matters is as I suggest it should be, it may be given effect to by the inclusion of the following articles in the treaty: ‘The right to voluntary emigration may be exercised under this treaty by any person belonging to an ethnic minority who is over 18 years of age. ‘A declaration made before the Commission shall be sufficient evidence of intention to exercise the right. ‘The choice of the husband shall carry with it that of the wife, the option of parents or guardians that of their children or wards aged less than 18 years. ‘The right to the benefit provided by this treaty shall lapse if the option to migrate is not exercised within a period of 5 years from the date of signing the treaty. ‘The duties of the Commission shall be terminated within six months after the expiration of the period of five years from the date when the Commission starts to function.’ What about the cost? The question of cost will be important only if the transfer is to be compulsory. A scheme of voluntary transfer cannot place a very heavy financial burden on the State. Men love property more than liberty. Many will prefer to endure tyranny at the hands of their political masters than change the habitat in which they are rooted. As Adam Smith said, of all the things man is the most difficult cargo to transport. Cost therefore need not frighten anybody. What about its workability? The scheme is not new. It has been tried and found workable. It was put into effect after the last European War, to bring about a transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it has worked, has been tried and found workable. The scheme I have outlined is a copy of the same scheme. It had the effect of bringing

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about a transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it was worked with signal success. What succeeded elsewhere may well be expected to succeed in India. The issue of Pakistan is far from simple. But it is not so difficult as it is made out to be provided the principle and the ethics of it are agreed upon. If it is difficult it is only because it is heart-rending and nobody wishes to think of its problems and their solutions as the very idea of it is so painful. But once sentiment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan, the problems arising out of it are neither staggering nor baffling.
Source: <www.ambedkar.org>. Ambedkar, Pakistan, 369–84.

one must, if one can, be ready with a solution long before the hour of decision arrives. It is wise to build a bridge if one knows that one will be forced to cross the river. The principal problem of Pakistan is: who can decide whether there shall or shall not be Pakistan? I have thought over the subject for the last three years, and I have come to some conclusions as to the proper answer to this question. These conclusions I would like to share with others interested in the solution of the problem so that they may be further explored. To give clarity to my conclusions, I have thought that it would serve the purpose better if I were to put them, in the form of an Act of Parliament. The following is the draft of the Act which embodies my conclusions: Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same as follows 1 (1) If within six months from the date appointed in this behalf a majority of the Muslim members of the Legislatures of the Provinces of the North-West .rontier, the Punjab, Sind and Bengal pass a resolution that the predominantly Muslim areas be separated from British India, His Majesty shall cause a poll to be taken on that question of the Muslim and the non-Muslim electors of these Provinces and of Baluchistan in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 1 (2) The question shall be submitted to the electors in these Provinces in the following form: (i) Are you in favour of separation from British India? (ii) Are you against separation? (3) The poll of Muslim and non-Muslim electors shall be taken separately. 2 (1) If on a result of the poll, a majority of Muslim electors are found to be in favour of separation and a majority of non-Muslim electors against separation, His Majesty shall by proclamation appoint a Boundary Commission for the purpose of preparing a list of such districts and areas in these Provinces in which a majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Such districts and areas shall be called Scheduled Districts.

Document .orty-.ive Additions to Dr Ambedkar’s Analysis (late 1944). Chapter 15: Who Can Decide? and Epilogue
There are two sides to the question of Pakistan, the Hindu side and the Muslim side. This cannot be avoided. Unfortunately however the attitude of both is far from rational. Both are deeply embedded in sentiment. The layers of this sentiment are so thick that reason at present finds it extremely difficult to penetrate. Whether these opposing sentiments will wither away or they will thicken, time and circumstances alone can tell. How long Indians will have to wait for the melting of the snow no one can prophesy. But one thing is certain that ‘until this snow melts freedom will have to be put in cold storage. I am sure there must be many millions of thinking Indians who are dead opposed to this indefinite postponement of Indian freedom till an ideal and a permanent solution of Pakistan is found. I am one of them. I am one of those who hold that if Pakistan is a problem and not a pose there is no escape and a solution must be found for it. I am one of those who believe that what is inevitable must be faced. There is no use burying one’s head in the sand and refusing to take notice of what is happening round about because the sound of it hurts one’s sentiments. I am also one of those who believe that

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2 (2) The Scheduled Districts shall be collectively designated as Pakistan and the rest of British India as Hindustan. The Scheduled Districts lying in the North-west shall be called the State of Western Pakistan and those lying in the North-east shall be called Eastern Pakistan. 3 (1) After the findings of the Boundary Commission have become final either by agreement or the award of an Arbitrator, His Majesty shall cause another poll to be taken of the electors of the Scheduled Districts. 3 (2) The following shall be the form of the questions submitted to the electors: (i) Are you in favour of separation forthwith? (ii) Are you against separation forthwith? 4 (1) If the majority is in favour of separation forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make arrangements for the framing of two separate constitutions, one for Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. 4 (2) The New States of Pakistan and Hindustan shall commence to function as separate States on the day appointed by His Majesty by proclamation issued in that behalf. 4 (3) If the majority are against separation forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make arrangements for the framing of a single constitution for British India as a whole. 5 No motion for the separation of Pakistan if the poll under the last preceding section has been against separation forthwith and no motion for incorporation of Pakistan into Hindustan if the poll under the last preceding section has been in favour of separation forthwith shall be entertained until ten years have elapsed from the date appointed by His Majesty for putting into effect the new constitution for British India or the two separate constitutions for Pakistan and Hindustan. 6 (1) In the event of two separate constitutions coming into existence under Section .our it shall be lawful for His Majesty to establish as soon as may be after the appointed day, a Council of India with a view to the eventual establishment of a constitution for the whole of British India, and to bringing about harmonious action between

the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan, and to the promotion of mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters affecting the whole of British India, and to providing for the administration of services which the two parliaments mutually agree should be administered uniformly throughout the whole of British India, or which by virtue of this Act are to be so administered. 6 (2) Subject as hereinafter provided, the Council of India shall consist of a President nominated in accordance with instructions from His Majesty and forty other persons, of whom twenty shall be members representing Pakistan and twenty shall be members representing Hindustan. 6 (3) The members of the Council of India shall be elected in each case by the members of the Lower Houses of the Parliament of Pakistan or Hindustan. 6 (4) The election of members of the Council of India shall be the first business of the Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan. 6 (5) A member of the Council shall, on ceasing to be a member of that House of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan by which he was elected a member of the Council, cease to be a member of the Council: Provided that, on the dissolution of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan, the persons who are members of the Council shall continue to hold office as members of the Council until a new election has taken place and shall then retire unless re-elected. 6 (6) The President of the Council shall preside at each meeting of the Council at which he is present and shall be entitled to vote in case of an equality of votes, but not otherwise. 6 (7) The first meeting of the Council shall be held at such time and place as may be appointed by the President. 6 (8) The Council may act notwithstanding a deficiency in their number, and the quorum of the Council shall be fifteen. 6 (9) Subject as aforesaid, the Council may regulate their own procedure, including the delegation of powers to committees.

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6 (10) The constitution of the Council of India may from time to time be varied by identical Acts passed by the Legislature of Pakistan and the Legislature of Hindustan, and the Acts may provide for all or any of the members of the Council of India being elected by parliamentary electors, and determine the constituencies by which the several elective members are to be returned and the number of the members to be returned by the several constituencies and the method of election. 7 (1) The Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan may, by identical Acts, delegate to the Council of India any of the powers of the Legislatures and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan, and such Acts may determine the manner in which the powers so delegated are to be exercisable by the Council. 7 (2) The powers of making laws with respect to railways and waterways shall, as from the day appointed for the operation of the new constitution, become the powers of the Council of India and not of Pakistan or Hindustan: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan making laws authorising the construction, extension, or improvement of railways and waterways where the works to be constructed are situate wholly in Pakistan or Hindustan as the case may be. 7 (3) The Council may consider any questions which may appear in any way to bear on the welfare of both Pakistan and Hindustan, and may, by resolution, make suggestions in relation thereto as they may think proper, but suggestions so made shall have no legislative effect. 7 (4) It shall be lawful for the Council of India to make recommendations to the Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan as to the advisability of passing identical Acts delegating to the Council of India the administration of any all-India subject, with a view to avoiding the necessity of administering them separately in Pakistan or Hindustan. 7 (5) It shall be lawful for either Legislature at any time by Act to deprive the delegation to the Council of India of any powers which are in pursuance of such identical Acts as aforesaid for the time being delegated to the Council

and thereupon the powers in question shall cease to be exercisable by the Council of India and shall become exercisable in parts of British India within their respective jurisdictions by the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan and the Council shall take such steps as may be necessary to carry out the transfer, including adjustments of any funds in their hands or at their disposal. 8 (1) If at the end of ten years after coming into operation of a constitution for British India as prescribed by Section 4 (3) a petition is presented to His Majesty by a majority of the Muslim members representing the Scheduled Districts in the Provincial and Central Legislatures demanding a poll to be taken with regard to the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan, His Majesty shall cause a poll to be taken. 8 (2) The following shall be the form of the questions submitted to the electors: (i) Are you in favour of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan? (ii) Are you against the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan? 9 If the result of the poll is in favour of separation it shall be lawful for His Majesty to declare by an Order-in-Council that from a day appointed in that behalf Pakistan shall cease to be a part of British India, and dissolve the Council of India. 10 (1) Where two constitutions have come into existence under circumstances mentioned in Section 4 it shall be lawful for His Majesty to declare by an Order-in-Council that Pakistan shall cease to be a separate State and shall form part of Hindustan. Provided that no such order shall be made until ten years have elapsed from the commencement of the separate constitution for Pakistan. Provided also that no such declaration shall be made unless the Popular Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan have passed Constituent Acts as are provided for in Section 10 (2). 10 (2) The popular Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan may, by identical Acts agreed to by an absolute majority of members at the third reading (hereinafter referred to as Constituent Acts), establish, in lieu of the Council of India, a Legislature for United India, and may determine the

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number of members thereof and the manner in which the members are to be appointed or elected and the constituencies for which the several elective members are to be returned, and the number of members to be returned by the several constituencies, and the method of appointment or election, and the relations of the two Houses if provided for to one another. 11 (1) On the date of the union of Pakistan and Hindustan the Council of India shall cease to exist and there shall be transferred to the Legislature and Government of India all powers then exercisable by the Council of India. 11 (2) There shall also be transferred to the Legislature and Government of British India all the powers and duties of the Legislatures and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan, including all powers as to taxation, and those Legislatures and Government shall cease to exist. 12 (1) A poll under this Act shall be taken by ballot in the same manner so far as possible as a poll of electors for the election of a member to serve in a Legislature and His Majesty may make rules adopting the election laws for the purpose of the taking of the poll. 12 (2) An elector shall not vote more than once at the poll, although registered in more than one place. 12 (3) Elector means every adult male and female residing in the Provinces of North-West .rontier, the Punjab, Sind, and Bengal and in Baluchistan. 13 This Act may be called the Indian Constitution (Preliminary Provisions) Act, 194(?). I do not think that any detailed explanation is necessary for the reader to follow and grasp the conclusions I have endeavoured to embody in this skeleton Act. Perhaps it might be advantageous if I bring out some of the salient features of the proposals to which the projected statute of Parliament is intended to give effect by comparing them with the Cripps proposals. In my opinion it is no use for Indians to ask and the British Parliament to agree to proceed forthwith to pass an Act conferring Dominion Status or Independence without first disposing of the issue of Pakistan. The Pakistan issue must

be treated as a preliminary issue and must be disposed of one way or the other. This is why I have called the proposed Act ‘The Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act’. The issue of Pakistan being one of self-determination must be decided by the wishes of the people. It is for this that I propose to take a poll of the Muslims and non-Muslims in the predominantly Muslim Provinces. If the Majority of the Muslims are in favour of separation and a majority of nonMuslims are against separation, steps must be taken to delimit the areas wherever it is possible by redrawing provincial boundaries on ethnic and cultural lines by separating the Muslim majority districts from the districts in which the majority consists of non-Muslims. A Boundary Commission is necessary for this purpose. So a Boundary Commission is provided for in the Act. It would be better if the Boundary Commission could be international in its composition. The scheme of separate referenda of Muslims and nonMuslims is based on two principles which I regard as fundamental. The first is that a minority can demand safeguards for its protection against the tyranny of the majority. It can demand them as a condition precedent. But a minority has no right to put a veto on the right of the majority to decide on questions of ultimate destiny. This is the reason why I have confined the referendum on the establishment of Pakistan to Muslims only. The second is that a communal majority cannot claim a communal minority to submit itself to its dictates. Only a political majority may be permitted to rule a political minority. This principle has been modified in India where a communal minority is placed under a communal majority subject to certain safeguards. But this is as regards the ordinary question of social, economic and political importance. It has never been conceded and can never be conceded that a communal majority has a right to dictate to a communal minority on an issue which is of a constitutional character. That is the reason why I have provided a separate referendum of non-Muslims only, to decide whether they prefer to go in Pakistan or come into Hindustan. After the Boundary Commission has done its work of delimiting the areas, various possibilities can arise. The

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Musalmans may stop with the delimitation of the boundaries of Pakistan. They may be satisfied that after all the principle of Pakistan has been accepted — which is what delimitation means. Assuming that the Musalmans are not satisfied with mere delimitation but want to move in the direction of establishing Pakistan there are two courses open to them. They may want to establish Pakistan forthwith or they may agree to live under a common Central Government for a period of say ten years and put the Hindus on their trial. Hindus will have an opportunity to show that the minorities can trust them. The Muslims will learn from experience how far their fears of Hindu Raj are justified. There is another possibility also. The Musalmans of Pakistan having decided to separate forthwith may after a period become so disgusted with Pakistan that they might desire to come back and be incorporated in Hindustan and be one people subject to one single constitution. These are some of the possibilities I see. These possibilities should in my judgement be kept open for time and circumstances to have their effect. It seems to me to be wrong to say to the Musalmans if you want to remain as part of India then you can never go out or if you want to go then you can never come back. I have in my scheme kept the door open and have provided for both the possibilities in the Act (1) for union after a separation of ten years, (2) for separation for ten years and union there after. I personally prefer the second alternative although I have no strong views either way. It would be much better that the Musalmans should have the experience of Pakistan. A union after an experience of Pakistan is bound to be stable and lasting. In case Pakistan comes into existence forthwith, it seems to me necessary that the separation should not altogether be a severance, sharp and complete. It is necessary to maintain live contact between Pakistan and Hindustan so as to prevent any estrangement growing up and preventing the chances of reunion. A Council of India is accordingly provided for in the Act. It cannot be mistaken for a federation. It is not even a confederation. Its purpose is to do nothing more than to serve as a coupling to link Pakistan to Hindustan until they are united under a single constitution.

Such is my scheme. It is based on a community-wise plebiscite. The scheme is flexible. It takes account of the fact that the Hindu sentiment is against it. It also recognizes the fact that the Muslim demand for Pakistan may only be a passing mood. The scheme is not a divorce. It is only a judicial separation. It gives to the Hindus a term. They can use it to show that they can be trusted with authority to rule justly. It gives the Musalmans a term to try out Pakistan. It might be desirable to compare my proposals with those of Sir Stafford Cripps. The proposals were given out as a serial story in parts. The draft Declaration issued on 29 March 1943 contained only the following: ‘His Majesty’s Government therefore make the following terms: (a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India in manner described hereafter an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India. (b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation of Indian States in the constitution-making body. (c) His Majesty’s Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so framed subject only to: (c i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides. With such nonacceding provinces should they so desire. His Majesty’s Government will be prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down.’ Particulars of accession and secession were given in his broadcast. They were in the following terms: ‘That constitution-making body will have as its object the framing of a single constitution for the whole of India — that is, of British India, together with such of the Indian States as may decide to join in.

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‘But we realize this very simple fact. If you want to persuade a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go in there is no way out, they are to be forever locked in together. ‘It is much wiser to tell them they can go in and if they find they can’t come to a common decision, then there is nothing to prevent those who wish, from leaving again by another door. They are much more likely all to go in if they have knowledge that they can by their free will go out again if they cannot agree. ‘Well, that is what we say to the provinces of India. Come together to frame a common constitution — if you find after all your discussion and all the give and take of a constitution-making assembly that you cannot overcome your differences and that some provinces are still not satisfied with the constitution, then such provinces can go out and remain out if they wish and just the same degree of self-government and freedom will be available for them as for the Union itself, that is to say complete self-government.’ To complete the picture further details were added at the Press Conference. Explaining the plan for accession or secession of provinces Sir Stafford Cripps said: ‘If at the end of the Constituent Assembly proceedings, any province or provinces did not wish to accept the new constitution and join the Union, it was free to keep out — provided the Provincial Assembly of that province, by a substantial vote say not less than 60 per cent, decided against accession. If it was less than 60 per cent, the minority could claim a plebiscite of the whole province for ascertaining the will of the people. In the case of the plebiscite, a bare majority would be enough. Sir Stafford explained that for completing accession there would have to be a positive vote from the Provincial Assembly concerned. The non-acceding province could, if they wanted, combine into a separate union through a separate Constituent Assembly, but in order to make such a Union practicable they should be geographically contiguous.’ The main difference between my plan and that of Sir Stafford Cripps is quite obvious. .or deciding the issue of

accession or secession which is only another way of saying, will there be or will there not be Pakistan, Sir Stafford Cripps took the Province as a deciding unit. I have taken community as the deciding unit. I have no doubt that Sir Stafford adopted a wrong basis. The Province can be a proper unit if the points of dispute were inter-provincial. .or instance, if the points of dispute related to questions such as distribution of taxation, of water, etc., one could understand the Province as a whole or a particular majority in that Province having the right to decide. But the dispute regarding Pakistan is an inter-communal problem which has involved two communities in the same Province. .urther the issue in the dispute is not on what terms the two communities will agree to associate in a common political life. The dispute goes deeper and raises the question whether the communities are prepared at all to associate in a common political life. It is a communal difference in its essence and can only be decided by a community-wise plebiscite.

IV
I do not claim any originality for the solution I have proposed. The ideas which underlie it are drawn from three sources, from the Irish Unity Conference at which Horace Plunket presided, from the Home Rule Amending Bill of Mr. Asquith and from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It will be seen that my solution of the Pakistan problem is the result of pooled wisdom. Will it be accepted? There are four ways of resolving the conflict which is raging round the question of Pakistan. .irst is that the British Government should act as the deciding authority. Second is that the Hindus and the Muslims should agree. Third is to submit the issue to an International Board of Arbitration and the fourth is to fight it out by a Civil War. Although India today is a political mad-house there are I hope enough sane people in the country who would not allow matters to reach the stage of Civil War. There is no prospect of an agreement between political leaders in the near future. The A.I.C.C. of the Indian National Congress at a meeting in Allahabad held in April 1942 on the motion of Mr. Jagat Narayan Lal resolved not to entertain the proposal for Pakistan. Two other ways are left to have the

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problem solved. One is by the people concerned; the other is by international arbitration. This is the way I have suggested. I prefer the former. .or various reasons this seems to me the only right course. The leaders having failed to resolve the dispute it is time it was taken to the people for decision. Indeed, it is inconceivable how an issue like that of partition of territory and transference of peoples’ allegiance from one government to another can be decided by political leaders. Such things are no doubt done by conquerors to whom victory in war is sufficient authority to do what they like with the conquered people. But we are not working under such a lawless condition. In normal times when constitutional procedure is not in abeyance the views of political leaders cannot have the effect which the fiats of dictators have. That would be contrary to the rule of democracy. The highest value that can be put upon the views of leaders is to regard them as worthy to be placed on the agenda. They cannot replace or obviate the necessity of having the matter decided by the people. This is the position which was taken by Sir Stafford Cripps. The stand taken by the Muslim League was, let there be Pakistan because the Muslim League has decided to have it. That position has been negatived by the Cripps proposals and quite rightly. The Muslim League is recognized by the Cripps proposals only to the extent of having a right to propose that Pakistan as a proposition be considered. It has not been given the right to decide. Again it does not seem to have been realized that the decision of an All-India body like the Congress which does not carry with it the active consent of the majority of the people, immediately affected by the issue of Pakistan, cannot carry the matter to solution. What good can it do if Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Rajagopalachariar agreeing or the AllIndia Congress Committee resolving to concede Pakistan, if it was opposed by the Hindus of the Punjab, or Bengal? Really speaking it is not the business of the people of Bombay or Madras to say, ‘let there be Pakistan’. It must be left to be decided by the people who are living in those areas and who will have to bear the consequences of so violent, so revolutionary and so fundamental a change in the political and economic system with which their lives

and fortunes have been closely bound up for so many years. A referendum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the safest and the most constitutional method of solving the problem of Pakistan. But I fear that solving the question of Pakistan by a referendum of the people howsoever attractive may not find much favour with those who count. Even the Muslim League may not be very enthusiastic about it. This is not because the proposal is unsound. Quite the contrary. The fact is that there is another solution which has its own attractions. It calls upon the British Government to establish Pakistan by the exercise of its sovereign authority. The reason why this solution may be preferred to that which rests on the consent of the people is that it is simple and involves no such elaborate procedure as that of a referendum to the people and has none of the uncertainties involved in a referendum. But there is another ground why it is preferred, namely, that there is a precedent for it. The precedent is the Irish precedent and the argument is that if the British Government by virtue of its sovereign authority divided Ireland and created Ulster why cannot the British Government divide India and create Pakistan? The British Parliament is the most sovereign legislative body in the world. De L’Homme, a .rench writer on the English Constitution, observed that there is nothing the British Parliament cannot do except make man a woman and woman a man. And although the sovereignty of the British Parliament over the affairs of the Dominions is limited by the Statute of Westminster it is still unlimited so far as India is concerned. There is nothing in law to prevent the British Parliament from proceeding to divide India as it did in the case of Ireland. It can do it, but will it do it? The question is not one of power but of will. Those who urge the British Government to follow the precedent in Ireland should ask what led the British Government to partition Ireland. Was it the conscience of the British Government which led them to sanction the course they took or was it forced upon them by circumstances to which they had to yield? A student of the history of Irish Home Rule will have to admit that the partition of Ireland was not sanctioned by conscience but by the force of circumstances. It is not

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often clearly realized that no party to the Irish dispute wanted partition of Ireland. Not even Carson, the Leader of Ulster. Carson was opposed to Home Rule but he was not in favour of partition. His primary position was to oppose Home Rule and maintain the integrity of Ireland. It was only as a second line of defence against the imposition of Home Rule that he insisted on partition. This will be quite clear from his speeches both inside and outside the House of Commons. Asquith’s Government on the other side was equally opposed to partition. This may be seen from the proceedings in the House of Commons over the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1912. Twice amendments were moved for the exclusion of Ulster from the provisions of the Bill, once in the Committee stage by Mr. Agar-Roberts and again on the third reading by Carson himself. Both the times the Government opposed and the amendments were lost. Permanent partition of Ireland was effected in 1920 by Mr. Lloyd George in his Government of Ireland Act. Many people think that this was the first time that partition of Ireland was thought of and that it was due to the dictation of the Conservative–Unionists in the Coalition Government of which Mr. Lloyd George was the nominal head. It may be true that Mr. Lloyd George succumbed to the influence of the predominant party in his coalition. But it is not true that partition was thought of in 1920 for the first time. Nor is it true that the Liberal Party had not undergone a change and shown its readiness to favour partition as a possible solution. As a matter of fact partition as a solution came in 1914 six years before Mr. Lloyd George’s Act when the Asquith Government, a purely Liberal Government, was in office. The real cause which led to the partition of Ireland can be understood only by examining the factors which made the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith change its mind. I feel certain that the factor which brought about this change in the viewpoint of the Liberal Government was the Military crisis which took place in March 1914 and which is generally referred to as the ‘Curragh Incident’. A few facts will be sufficient to explain what the ‘Curragh Incident’ was and how decisive it was in bringing about a change in the policy of the Asquith Government. To begin at a convenient point the Irish Home Rule Bill had

gone through all its stages by the end of 1913. Mr. Asquith who had been challenged that he was proceeding without a mandate from the electorate had however given an undertaking that the Act would not be given effect to until another general election had been held. In the ordinary course there would have been a general election in 1915 if the War had not supervened. But the Ulstermen were not prepared to take their chance in a general election and started taking active steps to oppose Home Rule. They were not always very scrupulous in choosing their means and their methods and under the seductive pose that they were fighting against the Government which was preventing them from remaining loyal subjects of the King they resorted to means which nobody would hesitate to call shameless and nefarious. There was one Maginot Line on which the Ulstermen always depended for defeating Home Rule. That was the House of Lords. But by the Parliament Act of 1911 the House of Lords had become a Wailing Wall neither strong nor high. It had ceased to be a line of defence to rely upon. Knowing that the Bill might pass notwithstanding its rejection by the House of Lords, feeling that in the next election Asquith might win, the Ulstermen had become desperate and were searching for another line of defence. They found it in the Army. The plan was twofold. It included the project of getting the House of Lords to hold up the Annual Army Act so as to ensure that there would be no Army in existence to be used against Ulster. The second project was to spread their propaganda — that Home Rule will be Home Rule — in the Army with a view to preparing the Army to disobey the Government in case Government decided to use the Army for forcing Home Rule on Ireland. The first became unnecessary as they succeeded easily in bringing about the second. This became clear in March 1914 when there occurred the Curragh Incident. The Government had reasons to suspect that certain Army depots in Ireland were likely to be raided by the Unionist Volunteers. On March 20th, orders were sent to Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of the .orces in Ireland, to take steps to safeguard these depots. His reply was a telegram to the effect that officers were not prepared to obey and were resigning their commissions and it was feared

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that men would refuse to move. General Sir Hubert Gough had refused to serve against the Ulster Unionists and his example had been followed by others. The Government realized that the Army had become political, nay, partisan. It took fright and decided in favour of partition acting on the well-known maxim that wisdom is the better part of valour. What made Asquith change his position was not conscience but the fright of the Army rebelling. The fright was so great that no one thereafter felt bold enough to challenge the Army and enforce Home Rule without partition. Can His Majesty’s Government be depended upon to repeat in India what it did in Ireland? I am unable to answer the question. But two things I will say. The first thing is that His Majesty’s Government knows full well what have been the consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish .ree State has become the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The enmity knows no limits. The wound caused by partition will never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact. The Partition of Ireland cannot but be said to be morally indefensible inasmuch as it was the result not of the consent of the people but of superior force. It was as bad as the murder of Duncan by Macbeth. The blood stains left on His Majesty’s Government are as deep as those on Lady Macbeth and of which Lady Macbeth said that ‘All the perfumes of Arabia’ had failed to remove the stink. That His Majesty’s Government does not like to be responsible for the execution of another deed of partition is quite clear from its policy with the Jew–Arab problem in Palestine. It appointed the Peel Commission to investigate. The Commission recommended partition of Palestine. The Government accepted it in principle as the most hopeful line of solving the deadlock. Suddenly the Government realized the gravity of forcing such a solution on the Arabs and appointed another Royal Commission called the Woodhead Commission which condemned partition and opened an easy way to a Government which was anxious to extricate itself from a terrible position. The partition of Ireland is not a precedent worthy to be followed. It is an ugly incident which requires to be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very much if His Majesty’s Government will partition India on its own authority at the behest of the Muslim League.

And why should His Majesty’s Government oblige the Muslim League? In the case of Ulster there was the tie of blood which made a powerful section of the British politicians take the side of Ulster. It was this tie of blood which made Lord Curzon say ‘You are compelling Ulster to divorce her present husband, to whom she is not unfaithful and you are compelling her to marry someone else who she cordially dislikes, with whom she does not want to live’. There is no such kinship between His Majesty’s Government and the Muslim League and it would be a vain hope for the League to expect His Majesty’s Government to take her side. The other thing I would like to say is that it would not be in the interests of the Muslim League to achieve its object by invoking the authority of His Majesty’s Government to bring about the partition of India. In my judgement more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be adopted in bringing about Pakistan if the object is that after partition Pakistan and Hindustan should continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other. What is the procedure which is best suited for the realization of this end? Everyone will agree that the procedure must be such that it must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to the other. The method must be of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another solution better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people. I have made my suggestion as to which is the best course. Others also will come forth with theirs. I cannot say that mine is the best. But whatever the suggestion be unless good sense as well as a sense of responsibility is brought to bear upon the solution of this question it will remain a festering sore. Epilogue Here I propose to stop. .or I feel that I have said all that I can say about the subject. To use legal language I have drawn the pleadings. This I may claim to have done at sufficient length. In doing so, I have adopted that prolix style so dear to the Victorian lawyers, under which the two sides plied one another with plea and replication,

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rejoinder and rebutter, surrejoinder and surrebutter and so on. I have done this deliberately with the object that a full statement of the case for and against Pakistan may be made. The foregoing pages contain the pleadings. The facts contained therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have also given my findings. It is now for Hindus and Muslims to give theirs. To help them in their task it might be well to set out the issues. On the pleadings the following issues seem to be necessary issues: (1) Is Hindu–Muslim unity necessary for India’s political advancement? If necessary, is it still possible of realization notwithstanding the new ideology of the Hindus and the Muslims being two different nations? (2) If Hindu–Muslim unity is possible, should it be reached by appeasement or by settlement? (3) If it is to be achieved by appeasement, what are the new concessions that can be offered to the Muslims to obtain their willing co-operation, without prejudice to other interests? (4) If it is to be achieved by a settlement, what are the terms of that settlement? If there are only two alternatives, (i) Division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, or (ii) .ifty-fifty share in Legislature, Executive and the Services, which alternative is preferable? (5) Whether India, if she remained one integral whole, can rely upon both Hindus and Musalmans to defend her independence, assuming it is won from the British? (6) Having regard to the prevailing antagonism between Hindus and Musalmans and having regard to the new ideology demarcating them as two distinct nations and postulating an opposition in their ultimate destinies, whether a single constitution for these two nations can be built in the hope that they will show an intention to work it and not to stop it? (7) On the assumption that the two-nation theory has come to stay, will not India as one single unit become an incoherent body without organic unity, incapable of developing into a strong united nation bound by a common

faith in a common destiny and therefore likely to remain a feebler and sickly country, easy to be kept in perpetual subjection either of the British or-of any other foreign power? (8) If India cannot be one united country, is it not better that Indians should help India in the peaceful dissolution of this incoherent whole into its natural parts, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan? (9) Whether it is not better to provide for the growth of two independent and separate nations, a Muslim nation inhabiting Pakistan and a Hindu nation inhabiting Hindustan, than pursue the vain attempt to keep India as one undivided country in the false hope that Hindus and Muslims will some day be one and occupy it as the members of one nation and sons of one motherland? Nothing can come in the way of an Indian getting to grips with these issues and reaching his own conclusions with the help of the material contained in the foregoing pages except three things: (1) A false sentiment of historical patriotism, (2) a false conception of the exclusive ownership of territory and (3) absence of willingness to think for oneself. Of these obstacles, the last is the most difficult to get over. Unfortunately thought in India is rare and free thought is rarer still. This is particularly true of Hindus. That is why a large part of the argument of this book has been addressed to them. The reasons for this are obvious. The Hindus are in a majority. Being in a majority, their viewpoint must count! There is not much possibility of peaceful solution if no attempt is made to meet their objections rational or sentimental. But there are special reasons which have led me to address so large a part of the argument to them and which may not be quite so obvious to others. I feel that those Hindus who are guiding the destinies of their fellows have lost what Carlyle calls ‘the Seeing Eye’ and are walking in the glamour of certain vain illusions, the consequences of which must, I fear, be terrible for the Hindus. The Hindus are in the grip of the Congress and the Congress is in the grip of Mr. Gandhi. It cannot be said that Mr. Gandhi has given the Congress the right lead. Mr. Gandhi first sought to avoid facing the issue by taking refuge in two things. He started by saying that

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to partition India is a moral wrong and a sin to which he will never be a party. This is a strange argument. India is not the only country faced with the issue of partition or shifting of frontiers based on natural and historical factors to those based on the national factors. Poland has been partitioned three times and no one can be sure that there will be no more partition of Poland. There are very few countries in Europe which have not undergone partition during the last 150 years. This shows that the partition of a country is neither moral nor immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place in it. As a second refuge Mr. Gandhi started by protesting that the Muslim League did not represent the Muslims and that Pakistan was only a fancy of Mr. Jinnah. It is difficult to understand how Mr. Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah’s influence over the Muslim masses has been growing day by day and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for battle. Never before was Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses. He distrusted them. To exclude them from political power he was always for a high franchise. Mr. Jinnah was never known to be a very devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the Holy Koran as and when he was sworn in as an M.L.A., he does not appear to have bothered much about its contents or its special tenets. It is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of curiosity or religious fervour. Mr. Jinnah was never found in the midst of Muslim mass congregations, religious or political. Today one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a man of the masses. He is no longer above them. He is among them. Now they have raised him above themselves and call him their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only become a believer in Islam, but is prepared to die for Islam. Today, he knows more of Islam than mere Kalama. Today, he goes to the mosque to hear Khutba and takes delight in joining the Id congregational prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr. Jinnah by name. Today they know him by his presence. No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or ends without Allah-ho-Akbar and Long Live Qaide-Azam. In this Mr. Jinnah has merely followed King Henry IV of .rance—the unhappy father-in-law of the English

King Charles I. Henry IV was a Huguenot by faith. But he did not hesitate to attend mass in a Catholic Church in Paris. He believed that to change his Huguenot faith and go to mass was an easy price to pay for the powerful support of Paris. As Paris became worth a mass to Henry IV, so have Dongri and Null Bazaar become worth a mass to Mr. Jinnah and for similar reason. It is strategy; it is mobilization. But even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition, he is sinking with his ideology which by his very sinking is spreading into all the different strata of Muslim society and is becoming part and parcel of its mental make-up. This is as clear as anything could be. The only basis for Mr. Gandhi’s extraordinary view is the existence of what are called Nationalist Musalmans. It is difficult to see any real difference between the communal Muslims who form the Muslim League and the Nationalist Muslims. It is extremely doubtful whether the Nationalist Musalmans have any real community of sentiment, aim and policy with the Congress which marks them off from the Muslim League. Indeed many Congressmen are alleged to hold the view that there is no different between the two and that the Nationalist Muslim inside the Congress are only an outpost of the communal Muslims. This view does not seem to be quite devoid of truth when one recalls that the late Dr. Ansari, the leader of the Nationalist Musalmans, refused to oppose the Communal Award although it gave the Muslims separate electorates in teeth of the resolution passed by the Congress and the Nationalist Musalmans. Nay, so great has been the increase in the influence of the League among the Musalmans that many Musalmans who were opposed to the League have been compelled to seek for a place in the League or make peace with it. Anyone who takes account of the turns and twists of the late Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and Mr. .aziul Huq, the late Premier of Bengal, must admit the truth of this fact. Both Sir Sikandar and Mr. .azlul Huq were opposed to the formation of branches of the Muslim League in their Provinces when Mr. Jinnah tried to revive it in 1937. Notwithstanding their opposition, when the branches of the League were formed in the Punjab and in Bengal within one year both were compelled to join them. It is a case of those coming to scoff remaining to

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pray. No more cogent proof seems to be necessary to prove the victory of the League. Notwithstanding this Mr. Gandhi instead of negotiating with Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League with a view to a settlement, took a different turn. He got the Congress to pass the famous Quit India Resolution on the 8th August 1942. This Quit India Resolution was primarily a challenge to the British Government. But it was also an attempt to do away with the intervention of the British Government in the discussion of the Minority question and thereby securing for the Congress a free hand to settle it on its own terms and according to its own lights. It was in effect, if not in intention, an attempt to win independence by bypassing the Muslims and the other minorities. The Quit India Campaign turned out to be a complete failure. It was a mad venture and took the most diabolical form. It was a scorched-earth campaign in which the victims of looting, arson and murder were Indians and the perpetrators were Congressmen. Beaten, he started a fast for twentyone days in March 1943 while he was in gaol with the object of getting out of it. He failed. Thereafter he fell ill. As he was reported to be sinking the British Government released him for fear that he might die on their hand and bring them ignominy. On coming out of gaol, he found that he and the Congress had not only missed the bus but had also lost the road. To retrieve the position and win for the Congress the respect of the British Government as a premier party in the country which it had lost by reason of the failure of the campaign that followed up the Quit India Resolution, and the violence which accompanied it, he started negotiating with the Viceroy. Thwarted in that attempt, Mr. Gandhi turned to Mr. Jinnah. On the 17th July 1944 Mr. Gandhi wrote to Mr. Jinnah expressing his desire to meet him and discuss with him the communal question. Mr. Jinnah agreed to receive Mr. Gandhi in his house in Bombay. They met on the 9th September 1944. It was good that at long last wisdom dawned on Mr. Gandhi and he agreed to see the light which was staring him in the face and which he had so far refused to see. The basis of their talks was the offer made by Mr.

Rajagopalachariar to Mr. Jinnah in April 1944 which, according to the somewhat incredible story told by Mr. Rajagopalachariar, was discussed by him with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 when he (Mr. Gandhi) was fasting in gaol and to which Mr. Gandhi had given his full approval. The following is the text of Mr. Rajagopalachariar’s formula popularly spoken of as the C. R. .ormula: (1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for .ree India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period. (2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State. (3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held. (4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes. (5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis. (6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India. The talks which began on the 9th September were carried on over a period of 18 days till 27th September when it was announced that the talks had failed. The failure of the

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talks produced different reactions in the minds of different people. Some were glad, others were sorry. But as both had been, just previous to the talks, worsted by their opponents in their struggle for supremacy, Gandhi by the British and Jinnah by the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and had lost a good deal of their credit the majority of people expected that they would put forth some constructive effort to bring about a solution. The failure may have been due to the defects of personalities. But it must however be said that failure was inevitable having regard to certain fundamental faults in the C. R. .ormula. In the first place, it tied up the communal question with the political question in an indissoluble knot. No political settlement, no communal settlement, is the strategy on which the formula proceeds. The formula did not offer a solution. It invited Mr. Jinnah to enter into a deal. It was a bargain: ‘If you help us in getting independence, we shall be glad to consider your proposal for Pakistan.’ I don’t know from where Mr. Rajagopalachariar got the idea that this was the best means of getting independence. It is possible that he borrowed it from the old Hindu kings of India who built up alliance for protecting their independence against foreign enemies by giving their daughters to neighbouring princes. Mr. Rajagopalachariar forgot that such alliances brought neither a good husband nor a permanent ally. To make communal settlement depend upon help rendered in winning freedom is a very unwise way of proceeding in a matter of this kind. It is a way of one party drawing another party into its net by offering communal privileges as a bait. The C. R. .ormula made communal settlement an article for sale. The second fault in the C. R. .ormula relates to the machinery for giving effect to any agreement that may be arrived at. The agency suggested in the C. R. .ormula is the Provisional Government. In suggesting this Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously overlooked two difficulties. The first thing he overlooked is that once the Provisional Government was established, the promises of the contracting parties, to use legal phraseology, did not remain concurrent promises. The case became one of the executed promise against an executory promise. By consenting to the establishment of a Provisional Government, the League

would have executed its promise to help the Congress to win independence. But the promise of the Congress to bring about Pakistan would remain executory. Mr. Jinnah who insists, and quite rightly, that the promises should be concurrent could never be expected to agree to place himself in such a position. The second difficulty which Mr. Rajagopalachariar has overlooked is what would happen if the Provisional Government failed to give effect to the Congress part of the agreement. Who is to enforce it? The Provisional Government is to be a sovereign government, not subject to superior authority. If it was unwilling to give effect to the agreement, the only sanction open to the Muslims would be rebellion. To make the Provisional Government the agency for forging a new Constitution, for bringing about Pakistan, nobody will accept. It is a snare and not a solution. The only way of bringing about the constitutional changes will be through an Act of Parliament embodying provisions agreed upon by the important elements in the national life of British India. There is no other way. There is a third fault in the C. R. .ormula. It relates to the provision for a treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan to safeguard what are called matters of common interests such as Defence, .oreign Affairs, Customs, etc. Here again Mr. Rajagopalachariar does not seem to be aware of obvious difficulties. How are matters of common interest to be safeguarded? I see only two ways. One is to have a Central Government vested with Executive and Legislative authority in respect of these matters. This means Pakistan and Hindustan will not be sovereign States. Will Mr. Jinnah agree to this? Obviously he does not. The other way is to make Pakistan and Hindustan sovereign States and to bind them by a treaty relating to matters of common interests. But what is there to ensure that the terms of the treaty will be observed? As a sovereign State Pakistan can always repudiate it even if it was a Dominion. Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously drew his inspiration in drafting this clause from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. But he forgot the fact that the treaty lasted so long as Ireland was not a Dominion and that as soon as it became a Dominion it repudiated the treaty and the British Parliament stood silent and grinned,

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for it knew that it could do nothing. One does not mind very much that the talks failed. What one feels sorry for is that the talks failed giving us a clear idea of some of the questions about which Mr. Jinnah has been observing discreet silence in his public utterances, though he has been quite outspoken about them in his private talks. These questions are: (1) Is Pakistan to be conceded because of the Resolution of the Muslim League? (2) Are the Muslims, as distinguished from the Muslim League, to have no say in the matter? (3) What will be the boundaries of Pakistan? Whether the boundaries will be the present administrative boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal or whether the boundaries of Pakistan will be ethnological boundaries? (4) What do the words ‘subject to such territorial adjustments as may be necessary’, which occur in the Lahore Resolution mean? What were the territorial adjustments the League had in mind? (5) What does the word ‘finally’ which occurs in the last part of the Lahore Resolution mean? Did the League contemplate a transition period in which Pakistan will not be an independent and sovereign State? (6) If Mr. Jinnah’s proposal that the boundaries of Eastern and Western Pakistan are to be the present administrative boundaries, will he allow the Scheduled Castes, or, if I may say so, the non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal to determine by a plebiscite whether they wish to be included in Mr. Jinnah’s Pakistan and whether Mr. Jinnah would be prepared to abide by the results of the plebiscite of the non-Muslim elements in the Punjab and Bengal? (7) Does Mr. Jinnah want a corridor running through U. P. and Bihar to connect up Eastern Pakistan to Western Pakistan? It would have been a great gain if straight questions had been put to Mr. Jinnah and unequivocal answers obtained. But instead of coming to grips with Mr. Jinnah on these questions, Mr. Gandhi spent his whole time proving that the C. R. .ormula is substantially the same as the League’s Lahore Resolution — which was ingenious if not nonsensical and thereby lost the best opportunity he had of having these questions clarified. After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have retired to their pavilions as players in a cricket match do after their game is over, as though there is nothing further to be

done. There is no indication whether they will meet again and if so when. What next? is not a question which seems to worry them. Yet it is difficult to see how India can make any political advance without a solution of the question which one may refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions about which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which solution will have to be found. How? It must be by agreement or by arbitration. If it is to be by agreement, it must be the result of negotiations — of give and take and not of surrender by one side to the other. That is not agreement. It is dictation. Good sense may in the end prevail and parties may come to an agreement. But agreement may turn out to be a very dilatory way. It may take long before good sense prevails. How long one cannot say. The political freedom of India is a most urgent necessity. It cannot be postponed and yet without a solution of the communal problem it cannot be hastened. To make it dependent on agreement is to postpone its solution indefinitely. Another expeditious method must be found. It seems to me that arbitration by an International Board is the best way out. The disputed points in the minorities problem including that of Pakistan should be remitted to such a Board. The Board should be constituted of persons drawn from countries outside the British Empire. Each statutory minority in India — Muslims, Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Indian Christians — should be asked to select its nominee to this Board of Arbitration. These minorities as also the Hindus should appear before the Board in support of their demands and should agree to abide by the decision given by the Board. The British should give the following undertakings: (1) That they will have nothing to do with the communal settlement. It will be left to agreement or to a Board of Arbitration. (2) They will implement the decision of the Board of Arbitration on the communal question by embodying it in the Government of India Act. (3) That the award of the International Board of Arbitration would be regarded by them as a sufficient discharge of their obligations to the minorities in India and would agree to give India Dominion Status.

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The procedure has many advantages. It eliminates the fear of British interference in the communal settlement which has been offered by the Congress as an excuse for its not being able to settle the communal problem. It is alleged that, as there is always the possibility of the minorities getting from the British something more than what the Congress thinks it proper to give, the minorities do not wish to come to terms with the Congress. The proposal has a second advantage. It removes the objection of the Congress that by making the constitution subject to the consent of the minorities, the British Government has placed a veto in the hands, of the minorities over the constitutional progress of India. It is complained that the minorities can unreasonably withhold their consent or they can be prevailed upon by the British Government to withhold their consent as the minorities are suspected by the Congress to be mere tools in the hands of the British Government. International arbitration removes completely every ground of complaint on this account. There should be no objection on the part of the minorities. If their demands are fair and just no minority need have any fear from a Board of International Arbitration. There is nothing unfair in the requirement of a submission to arbitration. It follows the well-known rule of law, namely, that no man should be allowed to be a judge in his own case. There is no reason to make any exception in the case of a minority. Like an individual it cannot claim to sit in judgement over its own case. What about the British Government? I cannot see any reason why the British Government should object to any part of this scheme. The Communal Award has brought great odium on the British. It has been a thankless task and the British should be glad to be relieved of it. On the question of the discharge of their responsibilities for making adequate provision for the safety and security of certain communities in respect of which they have regarded themselves as trustees before they relinquish their sovereignty what more can such communities ask than the implantation in the constitution of safeguards in terms of the award of an International Board of Arbitration? There is only one contingency which may appear to create some difficulty for the British Government in the matter of enforcing

the award of the Board of Arbitration. Such a contingency can arise if any one of the parties to the dispute is not prepared to submit its case to arbitration. In that case the question will be: will the British Government be justified in enforcing the award against such a party? I see no difficulty in saying that the British Government can with perfect justice proceed to enforce the award against such a party. After all what is the status of a party which refuses to submit its case to arbitration? The answer is that such a party is an aggressor. How is an aggressor dealt with? By subjecting him to sanctions. Implementing the award of the Board of Arbitration in a constitution against a party which refuses to go to arbitration is simply another name for the process of applying sanctions against an aggressor. The British Government need not feel embarrassed in following this process if the contingency should arise. .or it is a well-recognized process of dealing with such cases and has the imprimatur of the League of Nations which evolved this formula when Mussolini refused to submit to arbitration his dispute with Abyssinia. What I have proposed may not be the answer to the question: What next? I don’t know what else can be. All I know is that there will be no freedom for India without an answer. It must be decisive, it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the parties concerned.
Source: ibid. Ambedkar, Pakistan, 385–416.

Document .orty-Six Accusations of Partiality against Mountbatten and the Radcliffe Boundary Award, 1947
As the last Viceroy of India, charged with presiding over Partition, Earl Mountbatten of Burma has been accused of partiality towards India and in particular of influencing the boundary commission to alter the frontier in India’s favour. Apart from general remarks to this effect, the claim of partiality was attested in detail by the late Christopher Beaumont, who was private secretary to Sir Cyril (later Lord) Radcliffe, the chairman of the Indo-Pakistan Boundary Commission. The commission’s deliberations were supposed

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to be secret, impartial and impervious to political persuasion. But Radcliffe was persuaded at a lunch with Mountbatten to alter the line in the Punjab, transferring the sub-districts of .erozepur and Zira from Pakistan to India.3 Radcliffe
3 Obituary of His Honour Christopher Beaumont, The Times, 31 May 2002. Zaidi (ed.), Jinnah Papers, v. 431–4. Some of this has been questioned by others such as Campbell-Johnson: V. Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War (London and New York, 2000), 38. Other accusations of partiality: P. Zeigler, Mountbatten. The Official Biography (London, 1985), 417–22. Most recently, Lucy Chester writes: ‘The two most controversial elements of this line involved Gurdaspur and .erozepore. Pakistani critics interpreted Radcliffe’s decision to grant most of Gurdaspur District to India as an attempt to provide India with a land link to Kashmir. As one element of the beginnings of the Kashmir conflict, this allegation remains controversial. It is worth noting that no all-weather road linked Kashmir and India in 1947; when the first Indo-Pakistani war began in late 1947, India airlifted troops and supplies into Kashmir rather than take an overland route. The other controversy was over .erozepore’s allocation to India; this decision came as a surprise in the wake of early August leaks indicating that Radcliffe would allocate a section of .erozepore to Pakistan.’ <www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_01-03/ chester_partition/chester_partition.html> Beaumont considered that Mountbatten was ‘“doubtless” told by Nehru and Menon that to give .erozepore to Pakistan would result in a war between the two newly independent countries’; moreover, Mountbatten was ‘in turn under pressure from Nehru and almost certainly from the Maharaja of Bikaner whose State would have been adversely affected if the canal headworks at .erozepore had gone to Pakistan and who is said to have told Mountbatten that unless .ereozepore was allotted to India he would have to accede to Pakistan.’ Zaidi (ed.), Jinnah Papers, v. 433–4. ‘On news reaching the Maharaja that the Boundary Commission was likely to award .erozepur Tehsil to Western Punjab, the Maharaja again telegraphed the Viceroy stressing the importance of retaining the Headworks at .erozepore in India as the economic life of the State depended entirely upon it urging that his Prime Minister and Chief Engineer Irrigation, might be afforded an opportunity to place [the] facts before the Viceroy. It must be said to the credit of Lord Mountbatten especially, and to others concerned as well, that the efforts of Bikaner were finally crowned with success and a just cause upheld. .erozepore remained in India.’ <www.realbikaner.com/ history/rulers/sadulsingh.html> Evan Jenkins confirmed to Mountbatten on 7 April 1948 that when he saw the printed map (required as advance warning for

denied the distinction between provisional and final awards: ‘there could be no awards until I had decided to make a report to the Viceroy, and only the document which contained that report could be called an award. All the earlier drafts — and there were quite a few — were drafts and no more.’4 Mountbatten claimed that ‘on numerous occasions’ he had refused to pass on representations to Radcliffe and that he ‘made a point of not looking at the maps containing the Award until the day on which they were shown to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan’. He could not comment on whether any adjustments were made to the boundary line in the Punjab between 8 August and 13 August; but his assumption was that the original line was ‘only tentative’ and that it was ‘amended subsequently to “balance” the Bengal Boundary line.’5 However, it is a matter of record that whereas the British sources contain Sir George Abell’s memorandum to Stuart Abbott of 8 August 1947, they do not contain the note from H. C. Beaumont describing the map of the proposed boundary by which Radcliffe proposed to demarcate his award. The expectation, according to Abell, was that ‘there will not be any great changes from this boundary’, but on 10 August or 11 August, Sir Evan Jenkins was informed by secraphone message from the Viceroy’s house to ‘Eliminate Salient’, by which was meant the .erozepore salient from the proposed Pakistan marked clearly on Beaumont’s map dated 8 August.6 There is thus clear evidence at least to
military dispositions) on 8 August 1947, the whole of the .erozepore and Zira Tahsils were included in Pakistan. On 10 or 11 August he received a message to ‘eliminate salient’ (that is, to transfer these districts to India): Zaidi (ed.), Jinnah Papers, v. 426–7. Radcliffe claimed that this was the ‘result of his own unfettered judgement’ and not the result of Mountbatten’s influence: ibid. v. 430. Ibid., v. 429–30. Ibid., v. 423–4. The concept of balance or compensation between the separate Bengal and Punjab awards was one reason why Mountbatten had taken up Jinnah’s suggestion that Radcliffe should chair the separate commissions: J. Chatterji, ‘The fashioning of a frontier: the Radcliffe Line and Bengal’s border landscape, 1947–52’, Modern Asian Studies, 33 (1999), 192 n 19. The Transfer of Power, 1942–47, xii. 579. NDC V-1, volume II part II, ‘enclosure to no 198’. One of the two maps is reproduced in Lamb, Incomplete Partition, 52.

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demonstrate Beaumont’s contention that the map had been changed and that the Viceroy was cognizant of the change (though it should be noted that this does not necessary prove that Mountbatten himself initiated the change: Radcliffe was operating from his residence).7

Document .orty-Seven ‘M. R. T.’s’ Nationalism in Conflict (Bombay, 1943) .oreword by Qaid-i-Azam Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 24 December 1942
India of modern conception with its so-called present geographical unity is entirely the creation of the British who hold it as one administrative system by a system of bureaucratic government whose ultimate sanction is the sword and not the will or sanction o the people behind the government so established. This position is very much exploited by the Hindu Congress and another Hindu organization, the Hindu Mahasabha. India is a vast subcontinent. It is neither a country nor a nation. It is composed of nationalities and races, but the two major nations are the Muslims and the Hindus. Talk of Indian unity as one central constitutional government of this vast sub-continent is simply a myth. The difference in India between the two major nations, the Hindus and the Muslims, are a thousand times greater when compared with the continent of Europe. In fact the diversity of its races, religions, cultures and languages has no parallel in any other part of the world; but fortunately the Muslim homelands are in the North Western and Eastern zones of the sub-continent where they are in a solid majority with a population of nearly 70 millions and they desire that these parts should be separated from the rest of India and constituted into independent sovereign states [sic].8 The Muslims stand unequivocally for their own freedom and
7 8 Lamb, Incomplete Partition, 53. Thus, apparently, Jinnah accepted a separation of West and East Pakistan in December 1942.

independence and also that of the Hindus and the Hindu India in the sub-continent of India, whereas the Hindu machinations and all proposals and schemes suggested by them are intended and calculated to bring a hundred million Muslims under the subjugation and hegemony of the Hindu Raj over the whole sub-continent of India which means that Muslims shall be merely transferring their bondage of slavery from the British Raj to the Hindu Raj. In sheer ignorance or with a view to misguide the foreign opinion deliberately in their own favour, it is urged in these days that India’s case has a parallel in China, Soviet Russia or even in the United States of America and that its problems can be successfully tackled in the light of experience gained by the peoples of these countries. A cursory examination of such a plea by any intelligent man will convince him that it is completely misleading to compare India’s problems with these countries. The present books are a collection of articles which had appeared in different newspapers and had thrown a great deal of light on the Pakistan demand of Muslim India, and hence I agreed to their being collected and published in the form of two books as they explain the Muslim position regarding many of the current political issues which have been agitating the Muslim mind. The author, Mr. M. R. T., has given his consent that these books should be issued on behalf of the Home Study Circle. He has marshalled facts and figures which are very valuable and he has done a great service already by periodically publishing them in various newspapers. In the first book, entitled Pakistan and Muslim India,9 he has placed in a very impartial way the exposition of many factors which clearly demonstrate that the only solution of India’s constitutional problem is by means of partition of India and by accepting the fundamental principles of [the] Pakistan scheme laid down in the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League passed in March 1940.
9 This has not been identified with certainty. However, it is probably: India’s Problem of Her .uture Constitution. All-India Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution popularly known as ‘Pakistan’, being a collection of essays by various authors [the preface signed: M. A. Jinnah] (Bombay, 1940).

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The second book, entitled Nationalism in Conflict10 in India, contains the collection of writings of the same author. This will show that India is not a national state, that India is not a country but a sub-continent composed of nationalities, the two major nations being the Hindus and the Muslims whose culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, name and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, laws and jurisprudence, social and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, outlook on life and of life are fundamentally different, nay in many respects antagonistic. Of course, the views expressed in these books are those of the author and not the official views of the Muslim League or myself. I have undertaken to write this foreword in order to commend these two books to all readers who want to understand the problem of India’s future constitution and its solution and I feel confident that anyone who reads them dispassionately and with an open mind will find by the sheer facts and figures and historical and political arguments advanced that partition of India is in the interests of both the major nations, Hindus and Muslims. M. R. T.: Chapter I. Two Nations In India The Congress–League problem admits of a very easy solution once it is conceded that Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations. The Congress, however, claims that it alone has the right to speak on behalf of all classes and communities of this vast sub-continent as it represents the Indian nation. This position of the Congress is challenged by the Muslim League which is the only authoritative representative organization of 90 millions of Muslims. Of late, prominent Hindu leaders have been carrying on whirlwind propaganda to prove that Muslims are an integral part of the Indian nation and are identical with the Hindus racially, culturally and economically. The Muslim demand for Pakistan is considered as a negation of nationalism and their right to apply the principle of self-determination to predominantly Muslim areas is condemned in the strongest terms.
10 That is, the book from which this foreword is extracted.

Mr Munshi11 says that the Pakistan movement is intended to destroy the Indian nation. Mr Satyamurti12 denies that Hindus and Muslims have any racial or cultural differences. They might, he says, worship different gods, but their outlook and culture are the same fundamentally. Even a staunch Hindu like Sir S[arvepalli] Radhakrishnan,13 who asserts in his essay on ‘the spirit of Hinduism’ that Hinduism is not an idea but power, that Hindu culture has maintained its tradition unbroken to the present day, reminds the Muslims that India has been a nation from early times. To repeat his actual words: ‘if a nation is a body of men and women, with their roots in the past and shaped by long historic processes, India is a nation from early times.’ I will prove herewith that these views of Hindu leaders are absolutely wrong and are effectively contradicted by other prominent Hindu leaders who recognize that Hindus and Muslims are separate nations. L. Hardyal [= Har Dayal (1884–1939)] wrote as early as 1925 in the Pratap of Lahore14 that if the British left Indi, the Hindu nation would be threatened by Afghanistan and that if the Hindu wanted to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers. I reproduce his actual statement: ‘I declare that the future of the Hindu race, of Hindustan and the Punjab rests on these four pillars: (1) Hindu Sangathan; (2) Hindu Raj; (3) Shud[dh]i of Muslims; (4) and conquest and Shud[dh]i of Aghanistan and the frontiers. So long as the Hindu nation does not accomplish these four things, the safety of our children and great-grandchildren will ever be in danger, and the safety of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions are homogeneous. But the Mussalmans and Christians are far
11 12 13 14 Kanaiyalal Maneklal Munshi, Akhand Hindustan (Bombay, 1942). Presumably the same author as S. Satyamurti, The Indo–Burma Immigration Agreement. A Nation in Revolt (Delhi, 1941). Sir S. Radhakrishnan, The Hindu View of Life (1927; repr. 1941). This was an Urdu language newspaper. .or Har Dayal: Thursby, Hindu–Muslim Relations in British India, 178, quoting Emily C. Brown, Har Dayal (Tucson, 1975), 233–4. This article has been called the ‘political testament’ of the exiled Hindu revolutionary Har Dayal, so it cannot be taken in any way as representative of Hindu opinion.

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removed from the confines of Hinduism, for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arabic and European institutions. Thus, just as one removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions…’15 This statement clearly proves that a community which entertains such feelings of hatred and revenge against a neighbouring Muslim state, and relies on violence for the establishment of Hindu Raja and the conversion of Muslims, cannot live on terms of amity with the latter. Such exclusive sentiments can only be nurtured by a nation by a nation bent on aggression against another. If the Hindu race has one history and homogeneous institutions and Muslims have an alien religion and alien institutions, then evidently both represent separate nations. Conclusive evidence on this point is further furnished by the writings of Mr Savarkar, President, All-India Hindu MahaSabha, who at present commands, equally with the greatest Congress leaders, immense influence among the Hindus. In a speech at the Hindu Maha Sabha session held at Ahmedabad in 1937, he said:16 ‘Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organizations.’ ‘But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When the time is ripe you can solve them; but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to diagnose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on
15 16 Also quoted by Thursby, loc. cit. Thursby concludes ‘a mental partition of the united nation thus already existed’. Ambedkar, Pakistan, 129, also quotes this statement. These quotations from Savarkar were also analyzed by Dr Ambedkar and there seems to be a reliance on his arguments from this part of the chapter onwards. Ambedkar, Pakistan, 142.

the contrary these are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India.’ Defining the aims of the Hindu Mahasabha as representative of the Hindu nation, Mr Savarkar says: ‘It has come to my notice that a very large section of the English educated Hindus hold back from joining the Hindu Maha Sabha under the erroneous idea that it is an exclusively Religious organization — something like a Christian Mission… It is not a Hindu Dharma Mahasabha, but a Hindu National Mahasabha… As a national Hindu body it will of course propagate and defend the National Hindu Church comprising each and all religions of Hindusthani origin against any nonHindu attack or encroachment. But the sphere of its activity is far more comprehensive than that of an exclusively religious body. The Hindu Mahasabha identifies itself with the National life of Hindustan in all its entirety, in all its social, economical, cultural and above all political aspects and is pledged to protect and promote all that contributes to the freedom, strength and glory of the Hindu nation.’17 Mr Savarkar places the foundation of the Hindu nation on two conditions: firstly the retention of the name Hindustan as the proper name for India. This name is preferred by him, as it signifies the land of the Hindu. His second condition is that Sanskrit should be retained as a sacred language. Hindi as a national language and Nagri as the script of Hindudom. Clarifying the Hindu position further on the question of Hindi or Hindustani, he writes: ‘This Sanskrit Nistha Hindi has nothing to do with that hybrid, the so-called Hindustani which is being hatched up by the Wardha scheme. It is nothing short of a linguistic monstrosity and must be ruthlessly suppressed. Not only that but it is our bounden duty to oust as ruthlessly all unnecessary alien words whether Arabic or English, from every Hindu tongue — whether provincial or dialectical.’18 Mr Savarkar insists on these two conditions as he thinks that Hindus are a nation by themselves. In support of his theory of a separate Hindu nation, he argues in the following words: ‘Only those Nations have
17 18 Also quoted by Ambedkar, Pakistan, 133. Also quoted by Ambedkar, Pakistan, 138.

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persisted in maintaining their National unity and identity during the last three to four centuries in Europe which had developed racial, linguistic cultural and such other organic affinities in addition to their Territorial unity or even at times in spite of it and consequently willed to be homogeneous national units — such as England, .rance, Germany, Italy, Portugal, etc. ‘Judged by any and all of these tests which go severally and collectively to form such a homogeneous and organic Nation, in India we Hindus are marked out as an abiding Nation by ourselves. Not only do we own a common .atherland, a Territorial unity, but what is scarcely found anywhere else in the world, we have a common Holy Land which is identified with our common .atherland. This Bharat Bhumi, this Hindustan, India, is both our .atherland19 and Holy Land. Our patriotism is therefore doubly sure. ‘Then, we have common affinities, cultural, religious, historical, linguistic, and racial which through the process of countless centuries of association and assimilation moulded us into a homogeneous and organic nation and above all induced a will to lead a corporate and common national life.’ Mr Savarkar concludes his statement with clear words which admit of no ambiguity in meaning. He says: ‘We Hindus, in spite of a thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu people — say the English or Japanese or even the Indian Muslims. That is the reason why today we the Hindus from Kashm[ir] to Madras and Sindh to Assam will have to be a Nation by ourselves.’20 In face of the above lucid and frank exposition of the Hindu case as a separate nation, there is not the least doubt to think that Muslims form a separate nation by themselves. Indeed, in this respect both Mr Jinnah and Mr Savarkar are in full agreement. Both insist that there are two nations in India but they differ in regard to the
19 20 ‘Motherland’ was changed to ‘.atherland’ to accord with Muslim sensibilities. Ambedkar, Pakistan, 140, quotes the original. Also quoted by Ambedkar, Pakistan, 141.

conditions on which the two nations should live. Dr Ambedkar thus criticizes the attitude of Mr Savarkar in regard to the Muslim demand for Pakistan: ‘Mr. Savarkar admits that the Muslims are a separate nation. He concedes that they have a right to cultural autonomy. He allows them to have a national flag. Yet he opposes the demand of the Muslim nation for a separate national home. If he claims a national home for the Hindu nation, how can he refuse the claim of the Muslim nation for a national home?’ Continuing his argument, Dr Ambedkar says:21 ‘History records two ways as being open to a major nation to deal with a minor nation when they are citizens of the same country and are subject to the same constitution. One way is to destroy the nationality of the minor nation and to assimilate and absorb it into the major nation, so as to make one nation out of two. This is done by denying to the minor nation any right to language, religion or culture and by seeking to enforce upon it the language, religion and culture of the major nation. The other way is to divide the country and to allow the minor nation a separate, autonomous and sovereign existence, independent of the major nation. Both these ways were tried in Austria and Turkey, the second after the failure of the first.’ Dr Ambedkar advises the second course and warns against the dangers resulting from the scheme of the Hindu Maha Sabha, as this will establish a swaraj in which there will be two nations under the mantle of one single constitution in which the major nation will be allowed to hold the minor nation in subordination to itself. He cites the instances of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Turkey which denied the right of self-determination to important nationalities within their state limits and hence fell an easy prey to foreign intrigues and internal disintegration. Congress leaders, in their desire to preserve what they call India’s integrity, unity and indivisibility, emphasize the necessity of Hindu–Muslim unity, but they forget that ‘political unity is worth nothing if it is not the expression of real union’. Muslims have no desire to give up their individuality and merge into a common Indian nation.
21 Ibid. 143–4.

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Similarly the Hindus have no real desire for unity or fusion, as they are not prepared to lose contact with their past traditions and customs and to tolerate what they call alien institutions. Where the will to unite is lacking, political union under a single government cannot create it. As Dr Ambedkar states: ‘I do not think that a permanent union can be made to depend upon the satisfaction of mere material interests.’ According to him, ‘pacts may produce unity. But that unity can never ripen into union.’ M. Renan,22 the famous .rench writer, supports the same idea when he says: ‘Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between men. But nevertheless can interests suffice to make a nation? I do not believe it. Community of interests make commercial treaties. There is a sentimental side to nationality; it is at once body and soul; a Zollverein is not a fatherland.’ James Bryce23 expresses his views in these words. ‘The permanence of an institution depends not merely on the material interests that support it, but on its conformity to the deep-rooted sentiment of the men for whom it has been made.’ The strongest bond that alone can furnish a permanent guarantee for the union of two peoples is Religion and this bond is lacking in India. Professor Marvin,24 emphasising the part that Religion has played in preserving the unity of the Roman Empire, thus records his impressions: ‘The unity of the Roman Empire was mainly political and military. It lasted for between four and five hundred years. The unity which supervened in the Catholic Church was religious and moral and endured for a thousand years.’
22 Also quoted by Ambedkar. Ernest Renan (1823–92) delivered a public lecture at the Sorbonne on 11 March 1882 entitled ‘Qu’estce qu’une nation?’ The lecture was published in 1882 and there have been two modern editions in 1992 and 1996. Also quoted by Ambedkar. James Bryce (1832–1922) wrote, among other works, The Holy Roman Empire (3rd edn. 1871); Russia and Turkey (1876); Handbook of home rule: being articles on the Irish question by W. E. Gladstone...[et al.]; with preface by Earl Spencer, ed. James Bryce (1887); The American Commonwealth (1888) and Briton and Boer: both sides of the South African question (1900). Also quoted by Ambedkar. .rancis Sydney Marvin (1863–1943) published The Unity of Western Civilization (Oxford 1915).

Bryce25 describes the unifying effect of Christianity as common religion in these words: ‘It is on religion that the inmost and deepest life of a nation rests... The first lesson of Christianity was love, a love that was to join in one body those whom suspicion and prejudice and pride of race had hitherto kept apart. There was thus formed by the new religion a community of the faithful, a Holy Empire, designed to gather all men into its bosom.’ Source: ‘M. R. T.’s’ Nationalism in Conflict in India (Bombay, 1942; 2nd edn. 1943).

Appendix Three Evidence of the Census .igures for the Muslim Case for Self-Determination
Table One: Distribution of the Muslim population, Census of 1921, analysed by Hasan Percentage of Muslim Population within province 6.71 19.74 54.00 14.28 55.33 10.85 4.05 28.96 91.62

Province Madras Bombay Bengal United Provinces Punjab Bihar and Orissa Central Provinces and Berar Assam North-West .rontier Province

Population 2,840,488 3,820,153 25,210,802 6,481,032 11,444,321 3,690,182 563,574 2,202,460 2,062,786

23

Source: Hasan (1979), 10. 25 Also quoted by Ambedkar.

24

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Table 2 Ambedkar’s Proposed Redistribution of the Population between Pakistan and India, 1945 Muslim Population in Pakistan 1. Punjab 13,332,460 Muslim Population in India 1. Total 66,442,766 Muslim Population in British India (Excluding Burma and Aden).

Table 3: Population of India by communities, 1941 Census, as analysed by Ambedkar Communities 1. Hindus 2. Muslims 3. Scheduled Castes 4. Tribal 5. Sikhs 6. Christians British India Indian States and Agencies 150,890,146 55,227,180 79,398,503 39,920,807 16,713,256 4,165,097 12,659,593 8.892,373 8.728,233 1,526,350 Total 206,117,326 92.058.096 48,813,180 25,441,489 5,691,447

2. N.W...P. 3. Sind 4. Baluchistan

2,227,303 2,830,800 405,309 2. Muslim 47,897,301 Population grouped in Pakistan and Eastern Bengal State.

(i) Indian Christians

1,655,982

1,413,808 26,486 7,708 870,914 64,590 12,922 3,153 38,474

3,069,790 140,422 83,459 1.449.286 232,003 114,890 22,480 409,877 383,643,745

(ii) Anglo-Indians 113,936 (iii) Others 7. Jains 8. Buddhists 75,751 578,372 167,413 101,968 19.327 371,403

5. Eastern Bengal Muslim States

27,497,624 3. Balance of 18,545,465 Muslims in British Hindustan 27,497,624 1,603,805 47,897,301

9. Parsees 10. Jews 11. Others Total

(i) Eastern Bengal (ii) Sylhet Total

294,171,961 89,471,784

Source: Ambedkar (1945), ch. 6, ‘Pakistan and communal peace’.

NOTE. The figures for the Scheduled Castes both for British India and Indian States do not give the correct totals. The figures for Ajmer-Merwara in British India and for Gwalior State are not included in the totals. The Census Reports for 1940 fail to give these figures. Source: Ambedkar (1945).

Table 4: Communal distribution of population by minorities in the Provinces of British India, 1941, as analysed by Ambedkar. Total Provinces Population Population 583,693 89,899 33,768 10,204,733 501,631 60,306,525 36,340,151 20,849,840 16,813,584 3,442,479 438,930 33,005,434 4,716,314 1,920,368 783,697 33.7 87.5 54.7 12.9 9.2 4.7 676,291 5,102 7,878,970 4,840,379 1,855,148 3,051,413 6.6 1.0 13.0 13.3 8.9 18.1 37,750 2,633 110,923 24,693 338,812 48,260 .4 .5 .2 .07 1.6 .3 8,005 23.7 Nil 779 2.3 744 3,464 11,918 16,281 13,213 8,011 14,996 % Population % 15.4 Nil Population % 3,895 .8 Population % 867 .15 2.2 .03 2.3 .03 .04 .04 .09 1. AjmereMerwara 2. Andaman Nicobar 3. Assam 4. British 5. Bengal 6. Bihar 7. Bombay 8. Central Provinces & Berar 9. Coorg 10. Delhi 168,726 917,939 14,780 304,971 8.8 25,740 33.2 121,693 15.3 13.3 3,309 10,494 2.0 1.1
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Muslims

Scheduled Castes

Indian Christians

Sikhs

Nil 16,157

1.8

291 292

49,341,810 3,038,067 8,728,544 28,418,819 5,267

3,896,452 2,788,797 146,301 16,217,242 251 4,229,221 3,054,635 55,020,617 8,416,308

7.9 91.8 1.7 57 4.8

8,068,492 Nil 1,238,171 1,248,635 918

16.4 14.2 4.4 17.4 72.2 191,634 4.5 15.3 11,717,158 21.3

2,001,082 5,426 26,584 486,038 216 13,232 131,327 295,502.935 79,344,863 26.9 40,919,744 13.9 28,823,802 4,168,470 14.4 3,919,619 13.6 7,516,349 547,844 7.3 420,760 5.6 13,208,718 3.604,866 40,903,147 14,114,470 448,528 335,169 6,231,062 2,185,246 3.4 93 15-2 15.5 2,359,836 691.577 8,018,803 3,698,355 17.9 19.2 19.6 26.2

4.06 .2 .3 1.7 4.1 .3 .2 3,245,453 1.0 12,651 .04 12,042 .2 42,135 6,125 120,549 10,778 .3 .2 .3 .08

418 57,989 232 3,757,401 Nil 31,011 232,445

.001 1.9 .003 13.2

.7 .4 4,155,147 1.0 3,204 .01 10,009 .1 12,766 2,230 226,096 6,349 .1 .05 .5 .05
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11. Madras 12. N.-W...P. 13. Orissa 14. Punjab 15. Panth Piploda 16. Sind 17. United Provinces Total * Bihar Chota Nagpur * C.P. Berar Agra Oudh Source: Ambedkar (1945).

Table 5: Communal distribution of population by minorities in Indian States, Census of 1941, analysed by Ambedkar States and Agencies 1. Assam 2. Baluchistan 356,204 3. Baroda 4. Bengal 5. Central India 6. Chattisgarh 7. Cochin 8. Deccan (and Kolhapur) 9. Gujarat 10. Gwalior 4,006,159 240,903 6.0 1,458,702 58,000 3.9 55,204 2,785,428 182,036 6.5 306,898 1,422,875 109,188 7.7 141,154 9.9 11.0 4,050,000 28,773 0.7 483,132 11.9 11,820 399,394 17,236 7,506,427 439,850 5.9 1,027,009 13.7 7,582 2,144,829 372,113 17.3 269,729 12.6 564 .03 .1 .3 2,855,010 223,610 7.8 230,794 8.1 9182 .3 346,251 97.2 65 .02 40 .01 126 566 28 2731 507 28.1 9 .6 22 .001 725,655 31,662 4.4 265 .04 25913 3.6 381 Total Muslims Population Population % Scheduled Castes Population % Indian Christians Population % Sikhs Population % .05 .04 .02 .001 .04 .01

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3-8

4,215 1,352

.3 .03

182 2,342

.01 .06
293 294

2,097,475 3,073,540

12.8 76.4

2,928,048 17.9 113,464 2.8

215,989 3,079

1.3 .08

5,330 65,903

.03 1.6

11. Hyde16,338,534 rabad 12. Kashmir 4,021.616 and .eudatories 13. Madras 498,754 14. Mysore 7,329,140 15. N.-W...P. 46,267 16. Orissa 3,023,731 17. Punjab 5,503,554 18. Punjab Hill 1,090,644 19. Rajputana 13,670,208 20. Sikkim 121,520 21.Travancore 6.070,018 22. U.P. 928,470 23. Western 4,904,156 India Total 91,810,571 Source: Ambedkar (1945)

30,263 485,230 22,068 14,355 2,251,459 46,678 1,297,841 83 434,150 273,625 600,440

6.0 66 47.7 0.47 40.9 4.3 9.5 0.07 7.2 29.5 12.2

83,734 1,405,067 Nil 352,088 349,962 238,774 76 395,952 152,927 358,038

16.8 19.2 11.6 6.4 21.9 06 6.5 16-5 7.3 15,733,133 16.59 8,892,373 9.7

20,806 98,580 571 2,249 6,952 188 4,349 34 1,958,491 1,281 3,105

4.2 1.3 1.2 .07 .1 .02 .03 .03 32.3 .1 .06 2,794,959 3.1

5 269 4,472 151 1,342,685 17,739 81,896 1 31 731 239

004 9.1 .005 24.4 1-6 .6

.08 .005 1,526,350 1.7
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Table 6: Communal distribution of population in the Punjab by districts, Census of 1941, analysed by Ambedkar Muslims Districts 128,240 135,103 119,250 136,713 124,006 7,092 121,622 170,855 154,431 13.7 5,971 68,469 8.4 1,632 73,504 5.1 11,031 .5 .2 .8 12.7 14.1 14.0 13.7 14.6 18.4 13.5 14.6 1,235 1,026 1,457 1,223 4,892 508 590 6,060 .1 .1 .2 .1 .6 1.3 .07 .5 60,731 1,466 637 19,887 153,543 1,032 4,809 198,194 6.0 .2 .07 2.0 18.1 2.7 .5 16.9 524,602 645,371 441,287 529,588 288,652 22,374 725,909 413,837 298,744 26.5 156,579 341,175 41.7 106,246 479,486 33.7 216,229 Total Population 1,006,709 956,399 851,458 994,575 847,745 38,576 899,377 1,170,323 Population % Population % Population % 52.1 57.5 51.8 53.2 34.0 58.-0 80.7 35.4 13.9 12.9 15.2
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Scheduled Castes Population %

Indian Christians Population %

Sikhs

Hindus

1. Hissar 285,208 28.3 2. Rohtak 166,569 17.4 3. Gurgaon 285,992 33.6 4. Karnal 304,346 30.6 5. Ambala 268,999 31.7 6. Simla 7,022 18.2 7. Kangra 43,249 4.8 8. Hoshi380,759 32.5 yarpur 9. Jullundar 1.127,190 509,804 45.2 10. Ludhi- 818,615 302,482 36.9 ana. 11. .ero- 1.423,076 641,448 45.1 zpore.

295 296

12. Lahore 1,695,375 1,027,772 60.6 32,735 13. Amri- 1,413,876 657,695 46.5 22,750 tsar 14. Gurda- 1,153,511 589,923 51.1 45,839 spur. 15. Sialkot 1,190,497 739,218 62.1 65,354 16. Gujra- 912,235 642,706 70.5 7,485 nwalla 17. Shak- 852,508 542,344 63.6 22,438 hupura 18. Gujarat 1,104,52 945,609 85.6 4,621 19. Shah- 998,921 835,918 83.7 9,693 apur 20. Jhea- 629,658 563,033 89.4 771 lam.

1.9 1.6 4.0 5.5 .8 2.6 .4 1.0 .1

67,686 25,330 40,262 73,846 60,380 59,985 4,391 12,690 730

4.0 310,648 18.3 252,004 1.8 510,845 36.1 194,727 4.4 221,251 19.2 244,935 6.2 139,409 11.7 165,965 6.6 99,139 10.9 100,630 7.0 160,706 18.9 66,744 .4 70.233 1.3 48.046 .1 24,680 6.3 80,022 4.8 92,479 3.9 40,117

14.9 13.8 21.2 13.9 11.0 7.8 7.2 9.2 6.4
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Muslims Population 21. Rawalpindi 22. Attock 23. Mianwali 506,321 436,260 24. Montgomery 25. Lyallpore 1,396,305 877,518 26. Jhang. 27. Multan 28. Muzaffargarh 29. DeraGazi Khan 30.Transfro- 40,246 ntier Tract Total . 28.418,820 16,217,242 57.1 1,592,320 5.6 40,084 99.6 Nil Nil 486,038 1.7 581,350 512,678 88.1 1,059 .2 46 .01 712,849 616,074 86.4 2,691 .4 218 .03 1,484,333 1,157,911 78.0 24.530 1.7 13,270 .9 821,631 678,736 82.6 1,943 .2 744 .1 12,238 61,628 5.882 1.072 2 62.8 68,222 4.9 51,694 3.7 1,329,103 918,564 69.1 43,456 3.2 24,101 1.9 86.2 1,008 .2 324 .06 6,865 1.3 675,875 611,128 90.4 1,015 .1 504 .09 20,102 30 42,194 61,806 785,231 628,193 80.0 4.233 .5 4,212 .5 64,127 8.2 78,245 % Population % Population % Population % Population % 10.0 6.2 12.2

Scheduled Indian Sikhs Hindus Castes Christians

175.064 13.2 167,510 12.6 262,737 18.8 135,637 9.7 1.-5 127,946 15.6 4.1 .8 .2 225,342 15.2 87,952 66,348 160 12.3 114 .4 3,757,401 13.2 6,301,737 22.2

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination

297

Source: Ambedkar (1945).

298

Table 7: Communal distribution of population in Bengal by districts, Census of 1941, analysed by Ambedkar Muslims Districts 1. Burdwan 2. Birbhum 3. Banknra 5. Hooghly 6. Howrah 7. 24Parganas 8. Calcutta 9. Nadia 10. Murshidabad 11. Khulna Total Population % Population 1,890,732 336,665 1,048,317 287,310 1,289,640 55,564 1,377,729 207,077 1490,304 296,325 17.8 27.4 4.3 7.7 15.0 19.9 3,536,386 1,148,180 32.5 2,108,891 497,535 1,640,530 927,747 1,943,218 959,172 23.6 1,759,846 1,078,007 61.3 56.6 49.4 12. Rajashahi 1,571,750 1,173.285 74.6 Scheduled Castes Hindus Population % 430,300 280,254. 355,290 339,066 245,810 184,318 743,397 55,228 143,682 167,184 470,550 75,650 22.8 26.7 97.5 10.6 17.8 12.4 21.0 2.6 8.2 10.2 24.2 4.8 Population % 963,520 406,182 723,269 853.734 Indian Christians Population % 51.0 3,280 38.8 344 56.1 1,216 2.342,897 73.4 3,834 61.9 543 1,000,548 67.1 994 1.566,599 44.3 20,823 1,476,284 70.0 16,431 514,268 517,803 507,143 253,580 29.2 10,749 31.6 394 26.1 3,538 16.1 1,166 .2 .03 .1 .1 .04 .06 .6 .8 .6 .02 .2 .07

4. Midnapore 3,190,647 246,559

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13. Dinajpur 14. Jalpaiguri 1,089,513 251,460 15. Darjeeling 376,369 16. Rangpur 17. Bogra 18. Pabna 19. Malda . 20. Dacca 21. Myrnensiagh 6,023,758 4,664.548 77.4 22. .aridpur 23. Bakargunj 3,549,010 2,567,027 72.3 24. Tippera 25. Naokhali 26. Chittagong 2,153,296 1,605,183 74.5 27. Chittagong 247,053 Hill Tracts. 28. Jessore Total Source: Ambedkar (1945) 60,306,525 33,005,434 54.7 1,828,216 1,100,713 60.2 314,856 7,270 2.9 283 .1 17.2 57,024 2.6 2,217,402 1,803,937 81.3 81,817 3.7 3,860,139 2,975,901 77.1 227,643 5.9 427,667 12.1 480,962 652,318 330.494 401,050 4,598 406,223 2,888,803 1,871,336 64.4 527,496 18.3 478,742 340,676 5.7 955,962 4,222,143 2,841,261 67.3 409,905 9.7 950,227 1,232,618 699,945 56.7 75,535 6.1 390,143 31.6 466 22.5 15,846 15.9 2,322 16.6 9,549 13.6 9,357 16.9 428 14.9 535 18.6 395 1.9 60 22.2 1057 17,630,054 29.3 110,923 1705,072 1,313,968 77.1 114,738 6.7 269,017 15.8 285 1,260.463 1,057,902 83.9 61,303 4.9 126,229 10.0 286 2,877,847 2,055,186 71.4 495,462 17.2 307,387 10.7 389 .01 .02 .02 .04 .4 .04 .3 .2 .01 .02 .02 .02 .06 .2
299

1,926,833 967,246 23.4 2.4 28,922 7.7 149,574 39.7 2,599 .7 325,504 29.9 226,143 20.8 2,589 .2 9,125

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination

50.2

399,410

20.7

375,212

19.5 1,448

.07

7,378,.970 12.2

300

Table 8: Communal distribution of population in Assam by districts, Census of 1941, analysed by Ambedkar Muslims Districts Total Population % Population Scheduled Castes Population % Indian Christians Population % Sikhs Population % Hindus Population %

Surma Valley 1. Kachahar 641,181 232,950 36.3 51,961 8.1 3,744 2. Sylhet 3,116,602 1,892,11760.7 364,510 11.7 2,590 3. Khasi and 118,665 1,555 1.3 63 .05 120 Jantia Hills 4. Naga Hills 189,641 531 5. Lushai Hills 152,786 101 Assam Valley 6. Goalpara 1,014,285 468,924 7. Kamrup 8. Darang 1,264,200 361,522 736,791 120,995 9. Nowgong 710,800 250,113 46.2 23,434 391 59,092 16.4 19.475 35.2 59,214 2.3 4.7 2.6 8.3 269 1,038 6,367 4,049 .2 .06 45 22 .02 .01 9 Nil

.6 —.08 —.1 ————.03 —.08 —.8 .6 ——-

——————————-

173,855 27.1 785,004 25.2 12,676 10.7 4,153 2,425 2.2 1.6

282,789 27.9 637,457 50.4 328,283 44.6 229,137 32.2
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10. Sibsagar 1.074.741 51.769 11. Lakmipur 894,842 44.579 12. Garo Hills 233,569 10,398 13. Sadiya 60,118 .rontier Tract 14. Balipara 6,512 .rontier Tract Total Source: Ambedkar (1945) 10.204,733 3,442,479 33.7 676,291 6.6 37,750 .4 3,464 61 .9 74 1.1 23 .4 ——2.514 864 1.4 3,991 6.6 486 .8 ——14.605 4.5 789 .3 1 ——13,518 5.8 24.3 38.6 5.0 43,527 4.9 .3,786 .4 ——457,509 51.1

4.8

50,184

4.7

15,268

1.4 —-

—-

593,007 55.2

Gandhi, Ambedkar and Jinnah on Self-Determination

.03 3,536,932 34.6

301 302

Table 9: N-W... Province proportion of Muslim population by districts, Census of 1941, analysed by Ambedkar Districts Total Population Total Muslim Population 796,230 Mardan Peshawar Kohat Bannu D.I. Khan. 506,539 851,833 289,404 295,930 298,131 756,004 483,575 769,589 266,224 257,648 255,757 P. C. of Muslim Population to Total Hazara 94.9 965 90.4 92.0 871 85.8 Total Non- Muslim Population 40,226 22,964 82,244 23,180 38,282 42,374 P. C. of Non-Muslim to Total 5.1 4.5 9.6 8.0 12.9 14.2

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Source: Ambedkar (1945)

304

South Asian History Academic Papers ISSN 1475-178X

Enquiries should be sent to: Professor Richard Bonney Director Centre for the History of Religious and Political Pluralism Institute for the Study of Indo-Pakistan Relations (INPAREL) University of Leicester Leicester LE1 7RH United Kingdom

The Institute for the Study of Indo-Pakistan Relations (INPAREL) was established in 2001 in the Centre for the Study of the History of Religious and Political Pluralism, University of Leicester. Its objective is to study the relations of India and Pakistan in South Asia. The two countries have been hostile to each other since their birth in 1947 when British rule ended. It is hoped that the 21st century will bring about peace in South Asia. INPAREL’s contribution will be to seek peaceful coexistence between these hostile powers. This will be facilitated through the production of knowledge from an academic, ‘pressure-free’, platform located at the University of Leicester. Such knowledge will be widely disseminated through lectures, conferences, books and academic papers. The South Asian History Academic Papers series (SAHAPS) is an INPAREL initiative. Papers may be written from a multidisciplinary point of view and are encouraged to discuss and analyze issues from both the Indian and Pakistan viewpoints. All papers should be analytical rather than narrative and well-documented. Once published, the copyright will rest with the author and INPAREL. Pakistan, Indian and non-South Asian academics are encouraged to write for the South Asian Academic Paper series. Proposals for papers should be sent first to the Director of INPAREL. Once approved, the papers should be formatted in house style and sent in an agreed WORD format via a file attached to an e-mail. The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Director, or those of the Institute.


				
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