Individual Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation by pptfiles


									Individual Stability in Hedonic Coalition Formation

Szilvia Pápai

We study the existence of Nash stable and individually stable coalition structures
in hedonic coalition formation games, where a coalition structure is a partition
of the players, and players strictly rank the coalitions that they belong to. The
hedonic coalition formation game in which all coalitions are feasible is viewed as
a general model, and more specific models, such as the marriage and roommate
models, are defined by the set of admissible coalitions, which are assumed to
include all singletons. In this paper we give characterizations, in terms of
restrictions on admissible coalitions, of the hedonic coalition formation models
which are Nash stable and individually stable, respectively, in the sense that at
least one such coalition structure exists for all preference profiles in the given
model. In particular, the result for Nash stability is that coalitions of size two
are inadmissible, while for individual stability single-lapping odd cycles,
together with certain specified disjoint subsets of the coalitions in the odd
cycle, are inadmissible.

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