2_AccessControl.pptx - Department of Computer Science by pengtt


									      Part II: Access Control

Part 2  Access Control         1
                     Access Control
qTwo parts to access control
qAuthentication: Are you who you say you are?
   o Determine whether access is allowed
   o Authenticate human to machine
   o Or authenticate machine to machine
qAuthorization: Are you allowed to do that?
   o Once you have access, what can you do?
   o Enforces limits on actions
qNote: “access control” often used as synonym
 for authorization
 Part 2  Access Control                      2
   Chapter 7: Authentication
                                      Guard: Halt! Who goes there?
                    Arthur: It is I, Arthur, son of Uther Pendragon,
                   from the castle of Camelot. King of the Britons,
                  defeater of the Saxons, sovereign of all England!
                                Monty Python and the Holy Grail

                                Then said they unto him, Say now Shibboleth:
        and he said Sibboleth: for he could not frame to pronounce it right.
               Then they took him, and slew him at the passages of Jordan:
       and there fell at that time of the Ephraimites forty and two thousand.
                                                                Judges 12:6

Part 2  Access Control                                                  3
Are You Who You Say You Are?
qHow to authenticate human a machine?
qCan be based on…
     o Something you know
          § For example, a password
     o Something you have
          § For example, a smartcard
     o Something you are
          § For example, your fingerprint

 Part 2  Access Control                    4
            Something You Know
qLots of things act as passwords!
    o PIN
    o Social security number
    o Mother’s maiden name
    o Date of birth
    o Name of your pet, etc.

Part 2  Access Control             5
       Trouble with Passwords
q“Passwords are one of the biggest practical
 problems facing security engineers today.”
q“Humans are incapable of securely storing
 high-quality cryptographic keys, and they
 have unacceptable speed and accuracy when
 performing cryptographic operations. (They
 are also large, expensive to maintain, difficult
 to manage, and they pollute the environment.
 It is astonishing that these devices continue
 to be manufactured and deployed.)”
Part 2  Access Control                      6
                 Why Passwords?
qWhy is “something you know” more
 popular than “something you have” and
 “something you are”?
qCost: passwords are free
qConvenience: easier for admin to
 reset pwd than to issue a new thumb

Part 2  Access Control                7
                Keys vs Passwords

qCrypto keys               qPasswords
qSpse key is 64 bits       qSpse passwords are 8
                            characters, and 256
qThen 264 keys
                            different characters
qChoose key at             qThen 2568 = 264 pwds
                           qUsers do not select
q…then attacker must        passwords at random
 try about 263 keys        qAttacker has far less
                            than 263 pwds to try
                            (dictionary attack)
 Part 2  Access Control                     8
      Good and Bad Passwords
qBad passwords            qGood Passwords?
     o frank                o jfIej,43j-EmmL+y
     o Fido                 o 0986437653726
     o password               3
     o 4444                 o P0kem0N
     o Pikachu              o FSa7Yago
     o 102560               o 0nceuP0nAt1m8
     o AustinStamp          o PokeGCTall150
Part 2  Access Control                    9
             Password Experiment
   q Three groups of users  each group
     advised to select passwords as follows
       o Group A: At least 6 chars, 1 non-letter
winner o Group B: Password based on passphrase
       o Group C: 8 random characters
   q Results
       o     Group A: About 30% of pwds easy to crack
       o     Group B: About 10% cracked
            §    Passwords easy to remember
       o     Group C: About 10% cracked
            §    Passwords hard to remember
   Part 2  Access Control                              10
          Password Experiment
qUser compliance hard to achieve
qIn each case, 1/3rd did not comply
    o And about 1/3rd of those easy to crack!
qAssigned passwords sometimes best
qIf passwords not assigned, best advice is…
    o Choose passwords based on passphrase
    o Use pwd cracking tool to test for weak pwds
qRequire periodic password changes?
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          Attacks on Passwords
qAttacker could…
    o Target one particular account
    o Target any account on system
    o Target any account on any system
    o Attempt denial of service (DoS) attack
qCommon attack path
    o Outsider  normal user  administrator
    o May only require one weak password!

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                   Password Retry
qSuppose system locks after 3 bad
 passwords. How long should it lock?
    o 5 seconds
    o 5 minutes
    o Until SA restores service
qWhat are +’s and -’s of each?

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                    Password File?
qBad idea to store passwords in a file
qBut we need to verify passwords
qCryptographic solution: hash the pwd
    o Store y = h(password)
    o Can verify entered password by hashing
    o If Trudy obtains “password file,” she
      does not obtain passwords
qBut Trudy can try a forward search
    o Guess x and check whether y = h(x)
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               Dictionary Attack
qTrudy pre-computes h(x) for all x in a
 dictionary of common passwords
qSuppose Trudy gets access to password
 file containing hashed passwords
    o She only needs to compare hashes to her pre-
      computed dictionary
    o After one-time work, actual attack is trivial
qCan we prevent this attack? Or at least
 make attacker’s job more difficult?

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qHash password with salt
qChoose random salt s and compute
          y = h(password, s)
 and store (s,y) in the password file
qNote: The salt s is not secret
qEasy to verify salted password
qBut Trudy must re-compute dictionary
 hashes for each user
    o Lots more work for Trudy!

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              Password Cracking:
                 Do the Math
qPwds are 8 chars, 128 choices per character
    o Then 1288 = 256 possible passwords
qThere is a password file with 210 pwds
qAttacker has dictionary of 220 common pwds
qProbability of 1/4 that a pwd is in dictionary
qWork is measured by number of hashes

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   Password Cracking: Case I
qAttack 1 password without dictionary
    o Must try 256/2 = 255 on average
    o Like exhaustive key search
qDoes salt help in this case?

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  Password Cracking: Case II
qAttack 1 password with dictionary
qWith salt
    o Expected work: 1/4 (219) + 3/4 (255) = 254.6
    o In practice, try all pwds in dictionary…
    o …then work is at most 220 and probability of
      success is 1/4
qWhat if no salt is used?
    o One-time work to compute dictionary: 220
    o Expected work still same order as above
    o But with precomputed dictionary hashes, the
      “in practice” attack is free…
Part 2  Access Control                              19
Password Cracking: Case III
qAny of 1024 pwds in file, without dictionary
    o Assume all 210 passwords are distinct
    o Need 255 comparisons before expect to find pwd
qIf no salt is used
    o Each computed hash yields 210 comparisons
    o So expected work (hashes) is 255/210 = 245
qIf salt is used
    o Expected work is 255
    o Each comparison requires a hash computation
Part 2  Access Control                             20
 Password Cracking: Case IV
qAny of 1024 pwds in file, with dictionary
    o Prob. one or more pwd in dict.: 1 – (3/4)1024 = 1
    o So, we ignore case where no pwd is in dictionary
qIf salt is used, expected work less than 222
    o See book, or slide notes for details
    o Approximate work: size of dict. / probability
qWhat if no salt is used?
    o If dictionary hashes not precomputed, work is
      about 219/210 = 29
Part 2  Access Control                                   21
        Other Password Issues
qToo many passwords to remember
    o Results in password reuse
    o Why is this a problem?
qWho suffers from bad password?
    o Login password vs ATM PIN
qFailure to change default passwords
qSocial engineering
qError logs may contain “almost” passwords
qBugs, keystroke logging, spyware, etc.
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qThe bottom line…
qPassword cracking is too easy
    o One weak password may break security
    o Users choose bad passwords
    o Social engineering attacks, etc.
qTrudy has (almost) all of the advantages
qAll of the math favors bad guys
qPasswords are a BIG security problem
    o And will continue to be a big problem
Part 2  Access Control                       23
        Password Cracking Tools
qPopular password cracking tools
    o   Password Crackers
    o   Password Portal
    o   L0phtCrack and LC4 (Windows)
    o   John the Ripper (Unix)
qAdmins should use these tools to test for
 weak passwords since attackers will
qGood articles on password cracking
    o Passwords - Conerstone of Computer Security
    o Passwords revealed by sweet deal
Part 2  Access Control                             24

Part 2  Access Control                25
             Something You Are
    o “You are your key”  Schneier
    o Fingerprint
    o Handwritten signature                  Are
    o Facial recognition              Know         Have
    o Speech recognition
    o Gait (walking) recognition
    o “Digital doggie” (odor recognition)
    o Many more!
Part 2  Access Control                                   26
                 Why Biometrics?
qMore secure replacement for passwords
qCheap and reliable biometrics needed
    o Today, an active area of research
qBiometrics are used in security today
    o Thumbprint mouse
    o Palm print for secure entry
    o Fingerprint to unlock car door, etc.
qBut biometrics not too popular
    o Has not lived up to its promise (yet?)
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                   Ideal Biometric
qUniversal  applies to (almost) everyone
    o In reality, no biometric applies to everyone
qDistinguishing  distinguish with certainty
    o In reality, cannot hope for 100% certainty
qPermanent  physical characteristic being
 measured never changes
    o In reality, OK if it to remains valid for long time
qCollectable  easy to collect required data
    o Depends on whether subjects are cooperative
qAlso, safe, user-friendly, etc., etc.
Part 2  Access Control                               28
                  Biometric Modes
qIdentification  Who goes there?
  o Compare one-to-many
  o Example: The FBI fingerprint database
qAuthentication  Are you who you say you are?
  o Compare one-to-one
  o Example: Thumbprint mouse
qIdentification problem is more difficult
  o More “random” matches since more comparisons
qWe are interested in authentication
 Part 2  Access Control                       29
    Enrollment vs Recognition
qEnrollment phase
    o Subject’s biometric info put into database
    o Must carefully measure the required info
    o OK if slow and repeated measurement needed
    o Must be very precise
    o May be weak point of many biometric
qRecognition phase
    o Biometric detection, when used in practice
    o Must be quick and simple
    o But must be reasonably accurate
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        Cooperative Subjects?
qAuthentication — cooperative subjects
qIdentification — uncooperative subjects
qFor example, facial recognition
    o Used in Las Vegas casinos to detect known
      cheaters (terrorists in airports, etc.)
    o Often do not have ideal enrollment conditions
    o Subject will try to confuse recognition phase
qCooperative subject makes it much easier
    o We are focused on authentication
    o So, subjects are generally cooperative
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                 Biometric Errors
qFraud rate versus insult rate
   o Fraud  Trudy mis-authenticated as Alice
   o Insult  Alice not authenticated as Alice
qFor any biometric, can decrease fraud or
 insult, but other one will increase
qFor example
   o 99% voiceprint match  low fraud, high insult
   o 30% voiceprint match  high fraud, low insult
qEqual error rate: rate where fraud == insult
   o A way to compare different biometrics
Part 2  Access Control                              32
             Fingerprint History
q1823  Professor Johannes Evangelist
 Purkinje discussed 9 fingerprint patterns
q1856  Sir William Hershel used
 fingerprint (in India) on contracts
q1880  Dr. Henry Faulds article in Nature
 about fingerprints for ID
q1883  Mark Twain’s Life on the
 Mississippi (murderer ID’ed by fingerprint)

Part 2  Access Control                      33
             Fingerprint History
q1888  Sir Francis Galton developed
 classification system
    o His system of “minutia” still used today
    o Also verified that fingerprints do not change
qSome countries require fixed number of
 “points” (minutia) to match in criminal cases
    o In Britain, at least 15 points
    o In US, no fixed number of points

Part 2  Access Control                               34
          Fingerprint Comparison
 qExamples of loops, whorls, and arches
 qMinutia extracted from these features

Loop (double)               Whorl   Arch

  Part 2  Access Control                  35
       Fingerprint: Enrollment

qCapture image of fingerprint
qEnhance image
qIdentify points
Part 2  Access Control          36
       Fingerprint: Recognition

qExtracted points are compared with
 information stored in a database
qIs it a statistical match?
qAside: Do identical twins’ fingerprints differ?
 Part 2  Access Control                     37
                    Hand Geometry
qA popular biometric
qMeasures shape of hand
  o Width of hand, fingers
  o Length of fingers, etc.
qHuman hands not unique
qHand geometry sufficient
 for many situations
qOK for authentication
qNot useful for ID problem
 Part 2  Access Control            38
                   Hand Geometry
    o Quick  1 minute for enrollment, 5
      seconds for recognition
    o Hands are symmetric  so what?
    o Cannot use on very young or very old
    o Relatively high equal error rate

Part 2  Access Control                      39
                      Iris Patterns

qIris pattern development is “chaotic”
qLittle or no genetic influence
qDifferent even for identical twins
qPattern is stable through lifetime
Part 2  Access Control                  40
     Iris Recognition: History
q1936  suggested by Frank Burch
q1980s  James Bond films
q1986  first patent appeared
q1994  John Daugman patented best
 current approach
    o Patent owned by Iridian Technologies

Part 2  Access Control                      41
                          Iris Scan
qScanner locates iris
qTake b/w photo
qUse polar coordinates…
q2-D wavelet transform
qGet 256 byte iris code

Part 2  Access Control               42
     Measuring Iris Similarity
qBased on Hamming distance
qDefine d(x,y) to be
    o # of non match bits / # of bits compared
    o d(0010,0101) = 3/4 and d(101111,101001) = 1/3
qCompute d(x,y) on 2048-bit iris code
    o Perfect match is d(x,y) = 0
    o For same iris, expected distance is 0.08
    o At random, expect distance of 0.50
    o Accept iris scan as match if distance < 0.32
Part 2  Access Control                               43
            Iris Scan Error Rate
distance      Fraud rate

 0.29 1 in 1.31010
 0.30 1 in 1.5109
 0.31 1 in 1.8108
 0.32 1 in 2.6107
 0.33 1 in 4.0106
 0.34 1 in 6.9105
 0.35 1 in 1.3105
== equal error rate
 Part 2  Access Control
                           distance   44
             Attack on Iris Scan
qGood photo of eye can be scanned
    o Attacker could use photo of eye
qAfghan woman was authenticated by
 iris scan of old photo
    o Story is here
qTo prevent attack, scanner could use
 light to be sure it is a “live” iris

Part 2  Access Control                 45
 Equal Error Rate Comparison
qEqual error rate (EER): fraud == insult rate
qFingerprint biometric has EER of about 5%
qHand geometry has EER of about 10-3
qIn theory, iris scan has EER of about 10-6
   o But in practice, may be hard to achieve
   o Enrollment phase must be extremely accurate
qMost biometrics much worse than fingerprint!
qBiometrics useful for authentication…
   o …but identification biometrics almost useless today
  Part 2  Access Control                           46
Biometrics: The Bottom Line
qBiometrics are hard to forge
qBut attacker could
    o Steal Alice’s thumb
    o Photocopy Bob’s fingerprint, eye, etc.
    o Subvert software, database, “trusted path” …
qAnd how to revoke a “broken” biometric?
qBiometrics are not foolproof
qBiometric use is limited today
qThat should change in the (near?) future
Part 2  Access Control                              47
            Something You Have
qSomething in your possession
qExamples include following…
    o Car key
    o Laptop computer (or MAC address)
    o Password generator (next)
    o ATM card, smartcard, etc.

Part 2  Access Control                  48
                   Password Generator
                                     1. “I’m Alice”
             3. PIN, R
                                         2. R
            4. h(K,R)
generator                               5. h(K,R)
   K                         Alice                      Bob, K
       q Alice receives random “challenge” R from Bob
       q Alice enters PIN and R in password generator
       q Password generator hashes symmetric key K with R
       q Alice sends “response” h(K,R) back to Bob
       q Bob verifies response
       q Note: Alice has pwd generator and knows PIN
       Part 2  Access Control                            49
      2-factor Authentication
q Requires any 2 out of 3 of
    o Something you know
    o Something you have
    o Something you are
q Examples
    o ATM: Card and PIN
    o Credit card: Card and signature
    o Password generator: Device and PIN
    o Smartcard with password/PIN
Part 2  Access Control                    50
                     Single Sign-on
qA hassle to enter password(s) repeatedly
   o Alice wants to authenticate only once
   o “Credentials” stay with Alice wherever she goes
   o Subsequent authentications transparent to Alice
qKerberos --- example single sign-on protocol
qSingle sign-on for the Internet?
   o Microsoft: Passport
   o Everybody else: Liberty Alliance
   o Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)

Part 2  Access Control                           51
                          Web Cookies
qCookie is provided by a Website and stored
 on user’s machine
qCookie indexes a database at Website
qCookies maintain state across sessions
    o Web uses a stateless protocol: HTTP
    o Cookies also maintain state within a session
qSorta like a single sign-on for a website
    o But, a very, very weak form of authentication
qCookies also create privacy concerns
Part 2  Access Control                               52

Part 2  Access Control              53
       Chapter 8: Authorization
            It is easier to exclude harmful passions than to rule them,
                                          and to deny them admittance
                    than to control them after they have been admitted.
                                                              Seneca

                You can always trust the information given to you
                                            by people who are crazy;
they have an access to truth not available through regular channels.
                                                 Sheila Ballantyne

  Part 2  Access Control                                        54
                 Authentication vs
qAuthentication  Are you who you say you are?
  o Restrictions on who (or what) can access system

qAuthorization  Are you allowed to do that?
  o Restrictions on actions of authenticated users

qAuthorization is a form of access control
qBut first, we look at system certification…

 Part 2  Access Control                             55
           System Certification
qGovernment attempt to certify
 “security level” of products
qOf historical interest
    o Sorta like a history of authorization
qStill required today if you want to
 sell your product to the government
    o Tempting to argue it’s a failure since
      government is so insecure, but…
Part 2  Access Control                        56
                          Orange Book
qTrusted Computing System Evaluation
 Criteria (TCSEC), 1983
    o   Universally known as the “orange book”
    o   Name is due to color of it’s cover
    o   About 115 pages
    o   Developed by DoD (NSA)
    o   Part of the “rainbow series”
qOrange book generated a pseudo-religious
 fervor among some people
    o Less and less intensity as time goes by
Part 2  Access Control                          57
           Orange Book Outline
    o Provide way to assess security products
    o Provide guidance on how to build more
      secure products
qFour divisions labeled D thru A
    o D is lowest, A is highest
qDivisions split into numbered classes

Part 2  Access Control                     58
                 D and C Divisions
qD --- minimal protection
    o Losers that can’t get into higher division
qC --- discretionary protection, i.e.,
 don’t force security on users, have
 means to detect breaches (audit)
    o C1 --- discretionary security protection
    o C2 --- controlled access protection
    o C2 slightly stronger than C1 (both vague)
Part 2  Access Control                        59
                          B Division
qB --- mandatory protection
qB is a huge step up from C
    o In C, can break security, but get caught
    o In B, “mandatory” means can’t break it
qB1 --- labeled security protection
    o All data labeled, which restricts what
      can be done with it
    o This access control cannot be violated
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                 B and A Divisions
qB2 --- structured protection
    o Adds covert channel protection onto B1
qB3 --- security domains
    o On top of B2 protection, adds that code
      must be tamperproof and “small”
qA --- verified protection
    o Like B3, but proved using formal methods
    o Such methods still impractical (usually)
Part 2  Access Control                        61
      Orange Book: Last Word
qAlso a 2nd part, discusses rationale
qNot very practical or sensible, IMHO
qBut some people insist we’d be better
 off if we’d followed it
qOthers think it was a dead end
    o And resulted in lots of wasted effort
    o Aside: people who made the orange book,
      now set security education standards
Part 2  Access Control                    62
                 Common Criteria
qSuccessor to the orange book (ca. 1998)
    o Due to inflation, more than 1000 pages
qAn international government standard
    o And it reads like it…
    o Won’t ever stir same passions as orange book
qCC is relevant in practice, but only if you
 want to sell to the government
qEvaluation Assurance Levels (EALs)
    o 1 thru 7, from lowest to highest security

Part 2  Access Control                              63
qNote: product with high EAL may not
 be more secure than one with lower
    o Why?
qAlso, because product has EAL doesn’t
 mean it’s better than the competition
    o Why?

Part 2  Access Control             64
                          EAL 1 thru 7
qEAL1 --- functionally tested
qEAL2 --- structurally tested
qEAL3 --- methodically tested, checked
qEAL4 --- designed, tested, reviewed
qEAL5 --- semiformally designed, tested
qEAL6 --- verified, designed, tested
qEAL7 --- formally … (blah blah blah)
Part 2  Access Control                  65
                 Common Criteria
qEAL4 is most commonly sought
    o Minimum needed to sell to government
qEAL7 requires formal proofs
    o Author could only find 2 such products…
qWho performs evaluations?
    o Government accredited labs, of course
    o For a hefty fee (like, at least 6 figures)

Part 2  Access Control                        66
                 Authentication vs
qAuthentication  Are you who you say you are?
  o Restrictions on who (or what) can access system
qAuthorization  Are you allowed to do that?
  o Restrictions on actions of authenticated users
qAuthorization is a form of access control
qClassic authorization enforced by
  o Access Control Lists (ACLs)
  o Capabilities (C-lists)

 Part 2  Access Control                             67
    Lampson’s Access Control Matrix
    qSubjects (users) index the rows
    qObjects (resources) index the columns
                               Accounting Accounting Insurance    Payroll
                  OS            program      data      data        data

      Bob rx                   rx        r         ---           ---

    Alice rx                   rx        r         rw            rw

     Sam rwx                   rwx       r         rw            rw
  program     rx               rx        rw        rw            rw
     Part 2  Access Control                                                68
 Are You Allowed to Do That?
qAccess control matrix has all relevant info
qCould be 1000’s of users, 1000’s of resources
qThen matrix with 1,000,000’s of entries
qHow to manage such a large matrix?
qNeed to check this matrix before access to
 any resource is allowed
qHow to make this efficient?

 Part 2  Access Control                   69
      Access Control Lists (ACLs)
     qACL: store access control matrix by column
     qExample: ACL for insurance data is in blue
                               Accounting Accounting Insurance    Payroll
                  OS            program      data      data        data

      Bob rx                   rx        r         ---           ---

     Alice rx                  rx        r         rw            rw

     Sam rwx                   rwx       r         rw            rw
  program     rx               rx        rw        rw            rw
     Part 2  Access Control                                                70
             Capabilities (or C-Lists)
     qStore access control matrix by row
     qExample: Capability for Alice is in red
                               Accounting Accounting Insurance    Payroll
                  OS            program      data      data        data

      Bob rx                   rx        r         ---           ---

    Alice rx                   rx        r         rw            rw

     Sam rwx                   rwx       r         rw            rw
  program     rx               rx        rw        rw            rw
     Part 2  Access Control                                                71
            ACLs vs Capabilities
                   r                       r
Alice             ---     file1   Alice    w            file1
                   r                      rw

                   w                      ---
Bob                r      file2   Bob      r            file2
                  ---                      r

                  rw                       r
Fred               r      file3   Fred    ---           file3
                   r                       r

Access Control List                        Capability

q Note that arrows point in opposite directions…
q With ACLs, still need to associate users to files
Part 2  Access Control                                     72
                 Confused Deputy
qTwo resources              qAccess control matrix
    o Compiler and BILL
      file (billing info)          Compiler    BILL
qCompiler can write      Alice x              ---
 file BILL
qAlice can invoke     Compiler rx             rw
 compiler with a
 debug filename
qAlice not allowed to
 write to BILL

Part 2  Access Control                             73
  ACL’s and Confused Deputy

              debug                      BILL
                       IL L
           file name B

Alice                                           BILL

qCompiler is deputy acting on behalf of Alice
qCompiler is confused
    o Alice is not allowed to write BILL
qCompiler has confused its rights with Alice’s
Part 2  Access Control                                74
                 Confused Deputy
qCompiler acting for Alice is confused
qThere has been a separation of authority
 from the purpose for which it is used
qWith ACLs, difficult to avoid this problem
qWith Capabilities, easier to prevent problem
    o Must maintain association between authority and
      intended purpose
    o Capabilities make it easy to delegate authority

Part 2  Access Control                             75
            ACLs vs Capabilities
    o Good when users manage their own files
    o Protection is data-oriented
    o Easy to change rights to a resource
    o   Easy to delegate---avoid the confused deputy
    o   Easy to add/delete users
    o   More difficult to implement
    o   The “Zen of information security”
qCapabilities loved by academics
    o Capability Myths Demolished
Part 2  Access Control                                76
    Multilevel Security (MLS)

Part 2  Access Control         77
Classifications and Clearances
qClassifications apply to objects
qClearances apply to subjects
qUS Department of Defense (DoD)
 uses 4 levels:

Part 2  Access Control             78
Clearances and Classification
qTo obtain a SECRET clearance
 requires a routine background check
qA TOP SECRET clearance requires
 extensive background check
qPractical classification problems
    o Proper classification not always clear
    o Level of granularity to apply
    o Aggregation  flipside of granularity
Part 2  Access Control                        79
         Subjects and Objects
qLet O be an object, S a subject
     o O has a classification
     o S has a clearance
     o Security level denoted L(O) and L(S)
qFor DoD levels, we have

Part 2  Access Control                       80
    Multilevel Security (MLS)
qMLS needed when subjects/objects at
 different levels use/on same system
qMLS is a form of Access Control
qMilitary and government interest in MLS
 for many decades
    o Lots of research into MLS
    o Strengths and weaknesses of MLS well
      understood (almost entirely theoretical)
    o Many possible uses of MLS outside military

Part 2  Access Control                            81
                MLS Applications
qClassified government/military systems
qBusiness example: info restricted to
    o Senior management only, all management,
      everyone in company, or general public
qNetwork firewall
qConfidential medical info, databases, etc.
qUsually, MLS not a viable technical system
    o More of a legal device than technical system

Part 2  Access Control                              82
          MLS Security Models
qMLS models explain what needs to be done
qModels do not tell you how to implement
qModels are descriptive, not prescriptive
    o That is, high level description, not an algorithm
qThere are many MLS models
qWe’ll discuss simplest MLS model
    o Other models are more realistic
    o Other models also more complex, more difficult
      to enforce, harder to verify, etc.
Part 2  Access Control                               83
qBLP security model designed to express
 essential requirements for MLS
qBLP deals with confidentiality
    o To prevent unauthorized reading
qRecall that O is an object, S a subject
    o Object O has a classification
    o Subject S has a clearance
    o Security level denoted L(O) and L(S)

Part 2  Access Control                      84
qBLP consists of
    Simple Security Condition: S can read O
     if and only if L(O)  L(S)
    *-Property (Star Property): S can write O
     if and only if L(S)  L(O)
qNo read up, no write down

Part 2  Access Control                    85
  McLean’s Criticisms of BLP
qMcLean: BLP is “so trivial that it is hard to
 imagine a realistic security model for which it
 does not hold”
qMcLean’s “system Z” allowed administrator to
 reclassify object, then “write down”
qIs this fair?
qViolates spirit of BLP, but not expressly
 forbidden in statement of BLP
qRaises fundamental questions about the
 nature of (and limits of) modeling
Part 2  Access Control                      86
             B and LP’s Response
qBLP enhanced with tranquility property
    o Strong tranquility: security labels never change
    o Weak tranquility: security label can only change
      if it does not violate “established security policy”
qStrong tranquility impractical in real world
    o   Often want to enforce “least privilege”
    o   Give users lowest privilege for current work
    o   Then upgrade as needed (and allowed by policy)
    o   This is known as the high water mark principle
qWeak tranquility allows for least privilege
 (high water mark), but the property is vague
Part 2  Access Control                               87
          BLP: The Bottom Line
qBLP is simple, probably too simple
qBLP is one of the few security models that
 can be used to prove things about systems
qBLP has inspired other security models
    o Most other models try to be more realistic
    o Other security models are more complex
    o Models difficult to analyze, apply in practice

Part 2  Access Control                                88
                          Biba’s Model
qBLP for confidentiality, Biba for integrity
    o Biba is to prevent unauthorized writing
qBiba is (in a sense) the dual of BLP
qIntegrity model
  o Spse you trust the integrity of O but not O
  o If object O includes O and O then you cannot
    trust the integrity of O
qIntegrity level of O is minimum of the
 integrity of any object in O
qLow water mark principle for integrity
Part 2  Access Control                         89
qLet I(O) denote the integrity of object O
 and I(S) denote the integrity of subject S
qBiba can be stated as
    Write Access Rule: S can write O if and only if
      I(O)  I(S)
      (if S writes O, the integrity of O  that of S)
    Biba’s Model: S can read O if and only if
        I(S)  I(O)
      (if S reads O, the integrity of S  that of O)
qOften, replace Biba’s Model with
    Low Water Mark Policy: If S reads O, then
       I(S) = min(I(S), I(O))
Part 2  Access Control                                 90
                              BLP vs Biba
high             BLP                     Biba           high

l          L(O)               L(O)    I(O)                    l
e                                                             e
v                                                             v
e          L(O)                       I(O)      I(O)          e
l                                                             l

low        Confidentiality              Integrity           low

    Part 2  Access Control                            91

Part 2  Access Control             92
qMultilevel Security (MLS) enforces access
 control up and down
qSimple hierarchy of security labels is
 generally not flexible enough
qCompartments enforces restrictions across
qSuppose TOP SECRET divided into TOP
qBoth are TOP SECRET but information flow
 restricted across the TOP SECRET level
Part 2  Access Control                   93
qWhy compartments?
    o Why not create a new classification level?
qMay not want either of
qCompartments designed to enforce the need
 to know principle
    o Regardless of clearance, you only have access to
      info that you need to know to do your job

Part 2  Access Control                            94
qArrows indicate “” relationship
                          TOP SECRET {CAT, DOG}

   TOP SECRET {CAT}                         TOP SECRET {DOG}

                               TOP SECRET

                            SECRET {CAT, DOG}

   SECRET {CAT}                                   SECRET {DOG}

qNot all classifications are comparable, e.g.,
Part 2  Access Control                                          95
        MLS vs Compartments
qMLS can be used without compartments
    o And vice-versa
qBut, MLS almost always uses compartments
    o MLS mandated for protecting medical records of
      British Medical Association (BMA)
    o AIDS was TOP SECRET, prescriptions SECRET
    o What is the classification of an AIDS drug?
    o Everything tends toward TOP SECRET
    o Defeats the purpose of the system!
qCompartments-only approach used instead
Part 2  Access Control                          96
                    Covert Channel

Part 2  Access Control              97
                    Covert Channel
qMLS designed to restrict legitimate
 channels of communication
qMay be other ways for information to flow
qFor example, resources shared at
 different levels could be used to “signal”
qCovert channel: a communication path not
 intended as such by system’s designers

Part 2  Access Control                       98
       Covert Channel Example
qAlice has TOP SECRET clearance, Bob has
qSuppose the file space shared by all users
qAlice creates file FileXYzW to signal “1” to
 Bob, and removes file to signal “0”
qOnce per minute Bob lists the files
    o If file FileXYzW does not exist, Alice sent 0
    o If file FileXYzW exists, Alice sent 1
qAlice can leak TOP SECRET info to Bob!
Part 2  Access Control                               99
          Covert Channel Example

Alice:     Create file       Delete file   Create file                Delete file

Bob:       Check file        Check file    Check file    Check file   Check file

Data:              1               0             1             1           0


   Part 2  Access Control                                                     100
                    Covert Channel
q Other possible covert channels?
    o Print queue
    o ACK messages
    o Network traffic, etc.
q When does covert channel exist?
    1. Sender and receiver have a shared resource
    2. Sender able to vary some property of resource
       that receiver can observe
    3. “Communication” between sender and receiver
       can be synchronized
Part 2  Access Control                             101
                    Covert Channel
qSo, covert channels are everywhere
q“Easy” to eliminate covert channels:
    o Eliminate all shared resources…
    o …and all communication
qVirtually impossible to eliminate covert
 channels in any useful system
    o DoD guidelines: reduce covert channel capacity
      to no more than 1 bit/second
    o Implication? DoD has given up on eliminating
      covert channels!
Part 2  Access Control                              102
                    Covert Channel
qConsider 100MB TOP SECRET file
    o Plaintext stored in TOP SECRET location
    o Ciphertext (encrypted with AES using 256-bit
      key) stored in UNCLASSIFIED location
qSuppose we reduce covert channel capacity
 to 1 bit per second
qIt would take more than 25 years to leak
 entire document thru a covert channel
qBut it would take less than 5 minutes to
 leak 256-bit AES key thru covert channel!
Part 2  Access Control                          103
  Real-World Covert Channel

 qHide data in TCP header “reserved” field
 qOr use covert_TCP, tool to hide data in
       o Sequence number
       o ACK number

Part 2  Access Control                  104
  Real-World Covert Channel
qHide data in TCP sequence numbers
qTool: covert_TCP
qSequence number X contains covert info
                                        ACK (or RST)
    SYN                                 Source: B
    Spoofed source: C                   Destination: C
    Destination: B                      ACK: X
    SEQ: X                B. Innocent

A. Covert_TCP                             C. Covert_TCP
    sender                                   receiver
Part 2  Access Control                             105
               Inference Control

Part 2  Access Control            106
  Inference Control Example
qSuppose we query a database
    o Question: What is average salary of female CS
      professors at SJSU?
    o Answer: $95,000
    o Question: How many female CS professors at
    o Answer: 1
qSpecific information has leaked from
 responses to general questions!
Part 2  Access Control                            107
         Inference Control and
qFor example, medical records are
 private but valuable for research
qHow to make info available for
 research and protect privacy?
qHow to allow access to such data
 without leaking specific information?

Part 2  Access Control              108
      Naïve Inference Control
qRemove names from medical records?
qStill may be easy to get specific info
 from such “anonymous” data
qRemoving names is not enough
    o As seen in previous example
qWhat more can be done?

Part 2  Access Control               109
Less-naïve Inference Control
qQuery set size control
    o Don’t return an answer if set size is too small
qN-respondent, k% dominance rule
    o Do not release statistic if k% or more
      contributed by N or fewer
    o Example: Avg salary in Bill Gates’ neighborhood
    o This approach used by US Census Bureau
    o Add small amount of random noise to data
qMany other methods  none satisfactory
Part 2  Access Control                                 110
                Inference Control
qRobust inference control may be impossible
qIs weak inference control better than nothing?
  o Yes: Reduces amount of information that leaks
qIs weak covert channel protection better than
  o Yes: Reduces amount of information that leaks
qIs weak crypto better than no crypto?
  o Probably not: Encryption indicates important data
  o May be easier to filter encrypted data

 Part 2  Access Control                            111

Part 2  Access Control             112
                          Turing Test
qProposed by Alan Turing in 1950
qHuman asks questions to another human
 and a computer, without seeing either
qIf questioner cannot distinguish human
 from computer, computer passes the test
qThe gold standard in artificial intelligence
qNo computer can pass this today
    o But some claim to be close to passing

Part 2  Access Control                       113
    o Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell
      Computers and Humans Apart
qAutomated  test is generated and scored
 by a computer program
qPublic  program and data are public
qTuring test to tell…  humans can pass the
 test, but machines cannot pass
    o Also known as HIP == Human Interactive Proof
qLike an inverse Turing test (well, sort of…)
Part 2  Access Control                            114
             CAPTCHA Paradox?
q“…CAPTCHA is a program that can generate
 and grade tests that it itself cannot pass…”
    o “…much like some professors…”
qParadox  computer creates and scores
 test that it cannot pass!
qCAPTCHA used so that only humans can get
 access (i.e., no bots/computers)
qCAPTCHA is for access control

Part 2  Access Control                    115
                 CAPTCHA Uses?
qOriginal motivation: automated bots stuffed
 ballot box in vote for best CS grad school
    o SJSU vs Stanford?
qFree email services  spammers like to use
 bots to sign up for 1000’s of email accounts
    o CAPTCHA employed so only humans get accounts
qSites that do not want to be automatically
 indexed by search engines
    o CAPTCHA would force human intervention

Part 2  Access Control                        116
CAPTCHA: Rules of the Game
qEasy for most humans to pass
qDifficult or impossible for machines to pass
    o Even with access to CAPTCHA software
qFrom Trudy’s perspective, the only unknown
 is a random number
    o Analogous to Kerckhoffs’ Principle
qDesirable to have different CAPTCHAs in
 case some person cannot pass one type
    o Blind person could not pass visual test, etc.
Part 2  Access Control                               117
          Do CAPTCHAs Exist?
qTest: Find 2 words in the following

qEasy for most humans
qA (difficult?) OCR problem for computer
    o OCR == Optical Character Recognition
Part 2  Access Control                      118
qCurrent types of CAPTCHAs
    o Visual  like previous example
    o Audio  distorted words or music
qNo text-based CAPTCHAs
    o Maybe this is impossible…

Part 2  Access Control                  119
              CAPTCHA’s and AI
qOCR is a challenging AI problem
    o Hard part is the segmentation problem
    o Humans good at solving this problem
qDistorted sound makes good CAPTCHA
    o Humans also good at solving this
qHackers who break CAPTCHA have solved a
 hard AI problem
    o So, putting hacker’s effort to good use!
qOther ways to defeat CAPTCHAs???
Part 2  Access Control                          120

Part 2  Access Control               121

    Internet                Firewall   network

qFirewall decides what to let in to internal
 network and/or what to let out
qAccess control for the network
Part 2  Access Control                           122
          Firewall as Secretary
qA firewall is like a secretary
qTo meet with an executive
    o First contact the secretary
    o Secretary decides if meeting is important
    o So, secretary filters out many requests
qYou want to meet chair of CS department?
    o Secretary does some filtering
qYou want to meet the POTUS?
    o Secretary does lots of filtering
Part 2  Access Control                           123
           Firewall Terminology
qNo standard firewall terminology
qTypes of firewalls
    o Packet filter  works at network layer
    o Stateful packet filter  transport layer
    o Application proxy  application layer
qOther terms often used
    o E.g., “deep packet inspection”

Part 2  Access Control                       124
                          Packet Filter
qOperates at network layer
qCan filters based on…
    o Source IP address                   transport
    o Destination IP address
    o Source Port
    o Destination Port                       link
    o Flag bits (SYN, ACK, etc.)
    o Egress or ingress

Part 2  Access Control                               125
                          Packet Filter
qAdvantages?                              application
    o Speed
    o No concept of state
    o Cannot see TCP connections             link
    o Blind to application data

Part 2  Access Control                             126
                              Packet Filter
   qConfigured via Access Control Lists (ACLs)
        o Different meaning than at start of Chapter 8
              Source           Dest    Source         Dest               Flag
 Action         IP              IP      Port          Port   Protocol    Bits

Allow       Inside        Outside     Any       80           HTTP       Any

Allow       Outside       Inside      80        > 1023       HTTP       ACK

Deny        All           All         All       All          All        All

   qQ: Intention?
   qA: Restrict traffic to Web browsing
    Part 2  Access Control                                              127
                     TCP ACK Scan
qAttacker scans for open ports thru firewall
    o Port scanning is first step in many attacks
qAttacker sends packet with ACK bit set,
 without prior 3-way handshake
    o Violates TCP/IP protocol
    o ACK packet pass thru packet filter firewall
    o Appears to be part of an ongoing connection
    o RST sent by recipient of such packet

Part 2  Access Control                             128
                        TCP ACK Scan
          ACK dest port 1207

          ACK dest port 1208

          ACK dest port 1209

Trudy                                     RST        Internal

   qAttacker knows port 1209 open thru firewall
   qA stateful packet filter can prevent this
        o Since scans not part of established connections
   Part 2  Access Control                             129
         Stateful Packet Filter
qAdds state to packet filter    application
qOperates at transport layer    transport
qRemembers TCP connections,      network
   flag bits, etc.
qCan even remember UDP
 packets (e.g., DNS requests)    physical

Part 2  Access Control               130
         Stateful Packet Filter
qAdvantages?                              application
    o Can do everything a packet filter
      can do plus...                      transport
    o Keep track of ongoing connections
      (so prevents TCP ACK scan)
qDisadvantages?                              link
    o Cannot see application data
    o Slower than packet filtering

Part 2  Access Control                         131
                Application Proxy
q A proxy is something that
  acts on your behalf
q Application proxy looks at        transport

  incoming application data          network
q Verifies that data is safe           link
  before letting it in

Part 2  Access Control                   132
                Application Proxy
q Advantages?
    o Complete view of connections
      and applications data            transport
    o Filter bad data at application
      layer (viruses, Word macros)      network

q Disadvantages?                          link
    o Speed

Part 2  Access Control                      133
                Application Proxy
qCreates a new packet before sending it
 thru to internal network
qAttacker must talk to proxy and convince
 it to forward message
qProxy has complete view of connection
qPrevents some scans stateful packet filter
 cannot  next slides

Part 2  Access Control                     134
qTool to scan for open ports thru firewall
qAttacker knows IP address of firewall and
 IP address of one system inside firewall
    o Set TTL to 1 more than number of hops to
      firewall, and set destination port to N
qIf firewall allows data on port N thru
 firewall, get time exceeded error message
    o Otherwise, no response

Part 2  Access Control                          135
        Firewalk and Proxy Firewall
Trudy         Router          Router             Router

          Dest port 12343, TTL=4
          Dest port 12344, TTL=4
          Dest port 12345, TTL=4
          Time exceeded

   q This will not work thru an application proxy (why?)
   q The proxy creates a new packet, destroys old TTL

    Part 2  Access Control                               136
       Deep Packet Inspection
qMany buzzwords used for firewalls
    o One example: deep packet inspection
qWhat could this mean?
qLook into packets, but don’t really
 “process” the packets
    o Like an application proxy, but faster

Part 2  Access Control                       137
Firewalls and Defense in Depth
  qTypical network security architecture

                                                  FTP server
           Web server

                                                  DNS server

                                                               Intranet with
                            Packet         Application           additional
Internet                    Filter           Proxy                defense

  Part 2  Access Control                                             138
Intrusion Detection Systems

Part 2  Access Control   139
            Intrusion Prevention
qWant to keep bad guys out
qIntrusion prevention is a traditional
 focus of computer security
    o Authentication is to prevent intrusions
    o Firewalls a form of intrusion prevention
    o Virus defenses aimed at intrusion
    o Like locking the door on your car

Part 2  Access Control                      140
             Intrusion Detection
qIn spite of intrusion prevention, bad guys
 will sometime get in
qIntrusion detection systems (IDS)
    o Detect attacks in progress (or soon after)
    o Look for unusual or suspicious activity
qIDS evolved from log file analysis
qIDS is currently a hot research topic
qHow to respond when intrusion detected?
    o We don’t deal with this topic here…
Part 2  Access Control                            141
Intrusion Detection Systems
qWho is likely intruder?
    o May be outsider who got thru firewall
    o May be evil insider
qWhat do intruders do?
    o Launch well-known attacks
    o Launch variations on well-known attacks
    o Launch new/little-known attacks
    o “Borrow” system resources
    o Use compromised system to attack others. etc.

Part 2  Access Control                           142
qIntrusion detection approaches
    o Signature-based IDS
    o Anomaly-based IDS
qIntrusion detection architectures
    o Host-based IDS
    o Network-based IDS
qAny IDS can be classified as above
    o In spite of marketing claims to the contrary!

Part 2  Access Control                               143
                 Host-Based IDS
qMonitor activities on hosts for
    o Known attacks
    o Suspicious behavior
qDesigned to detect attacks such as
    o Buffer overflow
    o Escalation of privilege, …
qLittle or no view of network activities

Part 2  Access Control               144
            Network-Based IDS
qMonitor activity on the network for…
    o Known attacks
    o Suspicious network activity
qDesigned to detect attacks such as
    o Denial of service
    o Network probes
    o Malformed packets, etc.
qSome overlap with firewall
qLittle or no view of host-base attacks
qCan have both host and network IDS

Part 2  Access Control                   145
Signature Detection Example
qFailed login attempts may indicate
 password cracking attack
qIDS could use the rule “N failed login
 attempts in M seconds” as signature
qIf N or more failed login attempts in M
 seconds, IDS warns of attack
qNote that such a warning is specific
    o Admin knows what attack is suspected
    o Easy to verify attack (or false alarm)

Part 2  Access Control                        146
            Signature Detection
qSuppose IDS warns whenever N or more
 failed logins in M seconds
    o Set N and M so false alarms not common
    o Can do this based on “normal” behavior
qBut, if Trudy knows the signature, she can
 try N  1 logins every M seconds…
qThen signature detection slows down Trudy,
 but might not stop her

Part 2  Access Control                        147
            Signature Detection
qMany techniques used to make signature
 detection more robust
qGoal is to detect “almost” signatures
qFor example, if “about” N login attempts in
 “about” M seconds
    o Warn of possible password cracking attempt
    o What are reasonable values for “about”?
    o Can use statistical analysis, heuristics, etc.
    o Must not increase false alarm rate too much

Part 2  Access Control                                148
            Signature Detection
qAdvantages of signature detection
    o   Simple
    o   Detect known attacks
    o   Know which attack at time of detection
    o   Efficient (if reasonable number of signatures)
qDisadvantages of signature detection
    o   Signature files must be kept up to date
    o   Number of signatures may become large
    o   Can only detect known attacks
    o   Variation on known attack may not be detected
Part 2  Access Control                              149
              Anomaly Detection
qAnomaly detection systems look for unusual
 or abnormal behavior
qThere are (at least) two challenges
    o What is normal for this system?
    o How “far” from normal is abnormal?
qNo avoiding statistics here!
    o mean defines normal
    o variance gives distance from normal to abnormal

Part 2  Access Control                           150
     How to Measure Normal?
qHow to measure normal?
    o Must measure during “representative”
    o Must not measure during an attack…
    o …or else attack will seem normal!
    o Normal is statistical mean
    o Must also compute variance to have any
      reasonable idea of abnormal

Part 2  Access Control                      151
  How to Measure Abnormal?
qAbnormal is relative to some “normal”
    o Abnormal indicates possible attack
qStatistical discrimination techniques include
    o   Bayesian statistics
    o   Linear discriminant analysis (LDA)
    o   Quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA)
    o   Neural nets, hidden Markov models (HMMs), etc.
qFancy modeling techniques also used
    o Artificial intelligence
    o Artificial immune system principles
    o Many, many, many others

Part 2  Access Control                            152
         Anomaly Detection (1)
qSpse we monitor use of three commands:
   open, read, close
qUnder normal use we observe Alice:
   open, read, close, open, open, read, close, …
qOf the six possible ordered pairs, we see
 four pairs are normal for Alice,
   (open,read), (read,close), (close,open), (open,open)
qCan we use this to identify unusual activity?

Part 2  Access Control                               153
          Anomaly Detection (1)
qWe monitor use of the three commands
  open, read, close
qIf the ratio of abnormal to normal pairs is
 “too high”, warn of possible attack
qCould improve this approach by
   o Also use expected frequency of each pair
   o Use more than two consecutive commands
   o Include more commands/behavior in the model
   o More sophisticated statistical discrimination
 Part 2  Access Control                             154
          Anomaly Detection (2)
q Over time, Alice has               q Recently, “Alice”
  accessed file Fn at                  has accessed Fn at
  rate Hn                              rate An

   H0      H1     H2       H3             A0   A1    A2    A3
   .10    .40    .40       .10           .10   .40   .30   .20

q Is this normal use for Alice?
q We compute S = (H0A0)2+(H1A1)2+…+(H3A3)2 = .02
   o We consider S < 0.1 to be normal, so this is normal
q How to account for use that varies over time?
 Part 2  Access Control                                         155
         Anomaly Detection (2)
qTo allow “normal” to adapt to new use, we
 update averages: Hn = 0.2An + 0.8Hn
qIn this example, Hn are updated…
 H2=.2.3+.8.4=.38 and H3=.2.2+.8.1=.12
qAnd we now have

                          H0   H1   H2   H3
                          .10 .40 .38 .12

Part 2  Access Control                       156
           Anomaly Detection (2)
qThe updated long                qSuppose new
 term average is                  observed rates…
     H0     H1     H2      H3      A0    A1    A2    A3
     .10    .40    .38     .12     .10   .30   .30   .30

qIs this normal use?
qCompute S = (H0A0)2+…+(H3A3)2 = .0488
  o Since S = .0488 < 0.1 we consider this normal
qAnd we again update the long term averages:
 Hn = 0.2An + 0.8Hn
 Part 2  Access Control                                   157
           Anomaly Detection (2)
qThe starting                    qAfter 2 iterations,
 averages were:                   averages are:

     H0     H1     H2      H3       H0    H1    H2    H3
     .10    .40    .40     .10      .10   .38   .364 .156

qStatistics slowly evolve to match behavior
qThis reduces false alarms for SA
qBut also opens an avenue for attack…
  o Suppose Trudy always wants to access F3
  o Can she convince IDS this is normal for Alice?
 Part 2  Access Control                               158
         Anomaly Detection (2)
qTo make this approach more robust, must
 incorporate the variance
qCan also combine N stats Si as, say,
   T = (S1 + S2 + S3 + … + SN) / N
   to obtain a more complete view of “normal”
qSimilar (but more sophisticated) approach
 is used in an IDS known as NIDES
qNIDES combines anomaly & signature IDS

Part 2  Access Control                     159
     Anomaly Detection Issues
qSystems constantly evolve and so must IDS
  o Static system would place huge burden on admin
  o But evolving IDS makes it possible for attacker to
    (slowly) convince IDS that an attack is normal
  o Attacker may win simply by “going slow”
qWhat does “abnormal” really mean?
  o Indicates there may be an attack
  o Might not be any specific info about “attack”
  o How to respond to such vague information?
  o In contrast, signature detection is very specific
 Part 2  Access Control                            160
              Anomaly Detection
    o Chance of detecting unknown attacks
    o Cannot use anomaly detection alone…
    o …must be used with signature detection
    o Reliability is unclear
    o May be subject to attack
    o Anomaly detection indicates “something unusual”,
      but lacks specific info on possible attack

Part 2  Access Control                            161
        Anomaly Detection: The
            Bottom Line
qAnomaly-based IDS is active research topic
qMany security experts have high hopes for its
 ultimate success
qOften cited as key future security technology
qHackers are not convinced!
   o Title of a talk at Defcon: “Why Anomaly-based
     IDS is an Attacker’s Best Friend”
qAnomaly detection is difficult and tricky
qAs hard as AI?
 Part 2  Access Control                             162
     Access Control Summary
qAuthentication and authorization
    o Authentication  who goes there?
         § Passwords  something you know
         § Biometrics  something you are (you
           are your key)
         § Something you have

Part 2  Access Control                          163
     Access Control Summary
qAuthorization  are you allowed to do that?
    o Access control matrix/ACLs/Capabilities
    o MLS/Multilateral security
    o BLP/Biba
    o Covert channel
    o Inference control
    o Firewalls
    o IDS
Part 2  Access Control                         164
           Coming Attractions…
qSecurity protocols
    o   Generic authentication protocols
    o   SSH
    o   SSL
    o   IPSec
    o   Kerberos
    o   WEP
    o   GSM
qWe’ll see lots of crypto applications in the
 protocol chapters
Part 2  Access Control                     165

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