581 action_log_2010_1_issued.xls - My Committees by heshishandong

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581 Item Part            Date    Part Title    Secti   Description                               581 Group Comment                               Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to          Date        STATUS Update                                                           Part of
Number                   Added                 on                                                                                                y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                                                                            RSF
                                                                                                                                                                             Difficult                                                                                                                    Work
                                                                                                                                                                             y

2008-001             2           Probability   Equati Equation 12 – Future work is needed to     No work around other than artificially           High      Easy      14       9        126      Lynne Kaley, Phil prior to 2nd   No progress, this item will be covered as part of RSF work.             Yes
                                 of Failure    on 12 correct errors with thick walled vessels.   increase corrosion rate. Add caution note                                                       Henry             ed
                                                                                                 to 581 document for this 2nd edition                                                                              publication
                                                                                                 publication. RSF work


2008-002             2           Probability   18.0    In small bore piping, CUI is typically    User or logic would be needed to tag field       High      Easy      14       9        126      Ken Gottselig        10/28/2008 See ballot 2008-002, 2009-11-12 ballot prepared
                                 of Failure    and     generalized; therefore if thinning was    that CUI is generalized vs localized. Modify
                                               19.0    localized and you took only the max       text to external module in 581. Probabilistic
                                                       damage factor, the total damage factor    approach may change how this is done
                                                       would not reflect both mechanisms.

2008-003             2           Probability    16 /   Change Pipe support penalty F sub PS to a Ready for balloting                              High      Easy      14       9        126      Ken Gottselig         27- Oc t- 08 See ballot 2008-003
                                 of Failure      17    Design Penalty to allow the use for other
                                                       equipment types (e.g. vessel stiffener
                                                       rings, insulation support rings) where a
                                                       "poor" design detail allows water to pool.

2008-004             1           Heat          Table Need to develop the inspection              Not covered as this is bundles. Do not have      high      low       14       6        84       Greg Alvarado -      12/31/2008 2009 Budget Dollars
                                 Exchanger      8.6  effectiveness table for all damage          anything for bundles. Not in 2nd edition                                                        Lead                             2009-04-15 John Britton: In the bundle ballot 581-10-05
                                 Bundle              mechanisms.                                                                                                                                 John Britton, Lisa               (from 2005?) there was some basic Inspection effectiveness'
                                                                                                                                                                                                 Roberts, Al                      given in Table S-9 as Modification factors for Inspection
                                                                                                                                                                                                 Montero, Mark                    Effectiveness. The were:
                                                                                                                                                                                                 Geisenhoff                       Highly Effective (A) - 20% - 100% Eddy Current / IRIS
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  inspection
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Usually Effective (B) - 10% - 20% Eddy Current / IRIS
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  inspection
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Fairly effective (C) - - Visual Inspection
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Ineffective (E) - No Inspection
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  This could be a good starting point for this item. Need to add
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  some meat to this as well as a "D" effectiveness
2008-005             2           Probability   Table Table 10.1 lists the steel product form      Need to review / revisit and recommend          High      low       14       6        84       Lynne Kaley,                     2009 Budget Dollars
                                 of Failure    10.1 (plate or pipe) as required data for HIC/     changes                                                                                        John Britton                     2009-04-15 John Britton: The software currently does not
                                                     SOHIC – H2S and HIC/SOHIC – HF.                                                                                                                                              distinguish between plate and pipe material of construction
                                                     However, this data is not used in either                                                                                                                                     for calculation of susceptibility to HIC-SOHIC (H2S or HF).
                                                     the look-up tables for the severity index or                                                                                                                                 API mentions it as a factor in Table 10.1 but does not use it
                                                     the determination of the damage factor in                                                                                                                                    in calculations. I believe that it should be re-introduced into
                                                     the flowchart in Figure 10.1. Determine if                                                                                                                                   API 581 REV 1 in a similar fashion as it was in Rev 0. With
                                                     the steel product form will have an effect                                                                                                                                   pipe products having a LOW susceptibility unless it is in
                                                     on the calculations and decide if it is                                                                                                                                      "severe service" and no PWHT - in which case it is a MEDIUM
                                                     required data.                                                                                                                                                               susceptibility.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2009-06-20 Lynne Kaley: From the October 1996 version
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  of the BRD in Appendix V, the fabrication type is used as
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  follows:
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  “For equipment and large-diameter piping fabricated from
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  rolled and welded plate steel, the environmental severity
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  determined in Table TM2D.2 and the basic data from Table
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  TM2D.1 on the sulfur content of the plate steel and
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  postweld heat treatment, should be used to determine the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  susceptibility to HIC/SOHIC using Table TM2D.3. Small-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  diameter equipment and piping fabricated from steel pipe and
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  piping components should be considered to have a Low
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Susceptibility to HIC/SOHIC unless it has not been postweld
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  heat treated and is exposed to a high severity environment,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  in which case it should be considered to have a Medium
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Susceptibility. A flow chart of the steps required to
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  determine the susceptibility to HIC/SOHIC is presented in
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Figure TM2D.1.”
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Table TM2D.2 is the Environmental Severity Table (10.3 in
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2nd Edition)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Table TM2D.3 Susceptibility Table (10.4 in 2nd Edition)
2008-006             3           Consequenc 6.8.1. The methodology assigns probabilities to      VCE or flash does need to consider release       High      low       14       6        84       Phil Henry, John                 2009 TM2D.1 Flow Chart (10.1 in 2nd Edition)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  FigureBudget Dollars
                                 e of Failure 4    whether a flash fire or VCE occur without     location. Can make as a function of                                                             Britton, others                  Phil Henry 2009_10_22: Significant research has been
                                                   giving much emphasis on the phenomena.        congestion. Go to a TNO energy method                                                                                            completed on the TNO Multi-Energy method to determine
                                                   It is recommended to consider the             rather than TNT. Tie into facility siting                                                                                        suitability for the API 581 methodology. Due to the
                                                   presence of congestion/confinement in the     studies. We are conservative near the                                                                                            complexity of the method and the fact that in only a
                                                   vicinity since they would be the major        explosion                                                                                                                        handful of petrochemical applications the method would
                                                   source of increasing the flame speed.                                                                                                                                          result in a better solution than the TNT Equivalency method,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  a recommendation will be made not to utilize the method.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  The methodology as currently defined does not lend itself to
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  consistency in implementation and will result in a wide range
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  of consequences depending on the User’s interpretation of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  the inputs. A presentation is available and a ballot to the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2nd edition of 581 has been written.




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581 Item Part            Date    Part Title     Secti   Description                                581 Group Comment                               Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to        Date        STATUS Update                                                            Part of
Number                   Added                  on                                                                                                 y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                                                                           RSF
                                                                                                                                                                               Difficult                                                                                                                   Work
                                                                                                                                                                               y

2008-007             3           Consequenc 6.8.1. Qualitative studies by Lees (1986) have         Event tree probability tables the prob of        High      low       14       6        84       Phil Henry, Les                2009 Budget Dollars
                                 e of Failure  2   shown that ignition probability increases       ignition goes up as lighter molecular weight.                                                   Loushin, Greg                  2009-04-20 Allison Hardy: Event tree probability tables
                                                   as the size of the release increases. The       Make this a function of flash point (lower                                                      Holton (outside                the prob of ignition goes up as lighter molecular weight.
                                                   values for the probability of ignition          flash point) instead of density. Level 2                                                        consultant- need               Make this a function of flash point (lower flash point) instead
                                                   employed in the Level 2 event trees are a       only.                                                                                           funding), Steve                of density. Level 2 only.
                                                   significant improvement over Level 1 and                                                                                                        Bolinger                       2009-10-22 Phil Henry: The replacement curve for the
                                                   are consistent with current research.                                                                                                                                          probability of Ignition as a function of flash point
                                                   For example, the Energy Institute in the                                                                                                                                       temperature has been developed and ballot has been
                                                   United Kingdom has performed extensive                                                                                                                                         written.
                                                   research on ignition probabilities and has
                                                   published a number of reports on this
                                                   topic. One report, Ignition Probability
                                                   Review, Model Development and Look-up
                                                   Correlations, relates ignition probability to
                                                   the mass release rate. The following
                                                   figure shows how curves from their
                                                   research are similar to the work of Cox,
2008-008             3           Consequenc 5.8.2. Needandverifycited in Section 6.8.1.2. for
                                                   Lee, to Ang level 1 overpressure limit          Limit on person is 5 psi explosion               High      low       14       6        84                                      2009-03-12. Information has been found (see PPT file from
                                 e of Failure 3.b  personnel.                                      overpressure, this is very high, same as                                                                                       DNV). Limit on overpressure in API is 5 psig for both
                                                                                                   equipment. Lynne to check old training                                                                                         equipment and personnel.
                                                                                                   material (blast overpressure). Using 3psi in                                                                                   2009-04-15 Lynne Kaley
                                                                                                   Level 2, 5 psi in Level 1 for both personnel                                                                                   Equipment Damage Criteria:
                                                                                                   and equipment. Lynne to call Bernie Weber.                                                                                     • Explosion overpressure: 5 psig
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Thermal Radiation: 12,000 BTU/hr-ft 2 for fireball, jet fire
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  and pool fire
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Flash Fire: 25% of area within the LFL of the cloud when
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  ignited
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Personnel Serious Injury Criteria:
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Explosion overpressure: 5 psig
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Thermal Radiation: 4,000 BTU/hr-ft 2 for fireball, jet fire
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  and pool fire
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  • Flash Fire: LFL limits of the cloud when ignited
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2009-04-22 Phil Henry: Add to Status the following: The
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2nd edition, Part 3 paragraph 5.8.2.3 needs to be modified
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  since it incorrectly shows that the Level 1 consequence area
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  tables were based on 3 psig overpressure
2008-009             2           Probability    18.0    A measure wall loss based on a thinning      It was agreed upon in past meetings not to     High      low       14       6        84       Phil Henry                     No progress.                                                   Yes
                                 of Failure     and     inspection should only be applied to the ar/ change until RSF approval is implemented.
                                                19.0    t calculation for thinning and not external. This is a warning in the text. RSF Work
                                                        Lyondell has recommended a methodology
                                                        to do this.


2008-010             2           Probability    15.6.3 Wording in 15.6.3 notes that the             Need to review / revisit and recommend          High      low       14       6        84                                      2009 Budget Dollars
                                 of Failure            susceptibility changes with respect to the changes. Same as item 2008-005. Combine                                                                                         2009-10-15 Lynne Kaley
                                                       product form for HIC/SOHIC – HF.             with this item 2008-005                                                                                                       From the October 1996 version of the BRD in Appendix V,
                                                       However, this logic is not built into either                                                                                                                               the fabrication type is used as follows:
                                                       the look-up tables for the severity index                                                                                                                                  “If HF is present in any concentration, then the equipment/
                                                       nor the flowchart to determine damage                                                                                                                                      piping is potentially susceptible to HIC/SOHIC-HF. Basic
                                                       factor. Determine whether product form                                                                                                                                     data from Table TM2I.1 should be used to obtain the
                                                       will affect the calculations and determine                                                                                                                                 susceptibility rating from Table TM2I.2 for carbon steel.
                                                       if it is required data.                                                                                                                                                    Piping fabricated from wrought components of conventional
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  steels (i.e., A 53, A 106, API 5L [not including 5LX], A 234, A
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  105, etc.) should be considered to have a low susceptibility
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  to HIC/SOHIC-HF. For equipment, and large diameter piping
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  fabricated from rolled and welded plate steel, the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  susceptibility should be determined using Table TM2I.2. A
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  flow chart of the steps required to determine the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  susceptibility is presented in Figure TM2I.1.”
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Table TM2D.2 is the Environmental Severity Table (15.3 in
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2nd Edition)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Figure TM21.1 Flow Chart (15.1 in 2nd Edition)
2008-011             3           Consequenc             Handle liquid volume fractions             results in order of magnitude differences in     high      low       14       6        84       Phil Henry                     No progress
                                 e of Failure           appropriately for release                  consequence areas. This is being worked as
                                                                                                   of Feb 2008.

2008-012             3           Consequenc Table Review/revise the outage days in Table           Add editorial note to table 5.17. Phil to       Medium     Easy      8        9        72       Ken Gottselig      11/15/2009 Note was added to table 5.17 in the 2nd edition. Need
                                 e of Failure 5.17 5.17. Many seem quite low. Should be            add to 2nd edition. Second item to review                                                                                      revision to table.
                                                   conservative.                                   the table                                                                                                                      2009-04-15 John Britton: No progress
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2009-11-10: Ballot completed (Ken Gottselig)



2008-013             2           Probability    Annex Annex B, paragraph B13 does not show         True, needs to have references added            Medium     Easy      8        9        72       Edystein Egholm     1/22/2010 2009-04-15 John Britton: For a reference for CO2
                                 of Failure     B.B13 any bibliographic references. Also, no                                                                                                                                      corrosion. the module used data data taken directly from
                                                      mention of organic acid which are                                                                                                                                           NORSOK - M-506. According to Eydstein the module in API is
                                                      fundamental in CO2 corrosion.                                                                                                                                               just a simplified version of M-506. Adding some text in 581
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  mentioning the carbonic acid could be inserted fairly easily.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  Sent to E. Egholm to write ballot 01/22/2010


2008-014             3           Consequenc A.3.6. The consequence areas for ammonia are           Review and revise.                              Medium     Easy      8        9        72       Phil Henry                     No progress
                                 e of Failure 7    based upon aqueous or anhydrous
                                                   ammonia - not clear - needs to be clearly
                                                   stated.




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581 Item Part            Date    Part Title     Secti   Description                                    581 Group Comment                             Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to        Date   STATUS Update                                                            Part of
Number                   Added                  on                                                                                                   y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                                                                      RSF
                                                                                                                                                                                 Difficult                                                                                                              Work
                                                                                                                                                                                 y

2008-015             1           Heat           8.6.5   Bundle life extension should be added to     valid comment. Need to do it the way as         Medium     low       8        6        48       Phil Henry, Ken           No progress
                                 Exchanger              the remaining bundle life, not to the past proposed                                                                                          Gottselig
                                 Bundle                 bundle life. This could be tied into the ERL
                                                        approach of 8.6.4.3.3.
2008-016             1           Heat           8.5.2   Need to adjust the risk matrix x and y    review risk matrix for all equipment types      Medium        Low       8        6        48       Allison Hardy,            Boyd McKay to revise the existing 2008-016 item. Phil Henry
                                 Exchanger              values to make more consistant with other (iso risk format). This is a reporting issue if                                                    Boyd McKay                to revise 2010_01
                                 Bundle                 module of API RBI.                        we agree with Iso risk format. 2008_11: We                                                         (2008_11), Phil
                                                                                                  should add this as an alternate method                                                             Henry (2010_01)
                                                                                                  rather than delete the existing method.

2008-017             3           Consequenc 5.8.1       A variety of models have been developed        Modeler is a dense gas, lighter gases will    Medium     low       8        6        48       Phil Henry,               Chuck P - 2012 probably - E2G to pay
                                 e of Failure           to represent the physics of the                move up. We have overly conservative                                                          Chuck P. 2010
                                                        atmosphere, and there are a number of          results for light gases such as H2 and
                                                        commercially available models, including       methane.
                                                        SLAB, that evaluate the source term
                                                        conditions and determine if the release is
                                                        dense or passive. Based on these passive
                                                        versus dense calculations, these models
                                                        then use the appropriate equation to
                                                        model the release to predict consequence
                                                        areas. Currently, the API RBI software
                                                        only uses dense calculations. A passive or
                                                        neutrally buoyant modeler should be
                                                        added.
2008-018             2           Probability    14.2    References are made in 14.2 to Alloy 400       Find the lost references and logic/flowchart. Medium     Low       8        6        48       Lynne Kaley               2009 Budget Dollars
                                 of Failure             susceptibility but neither BRD nor the         This is included in 571 but not in 581                                                                                  2009-10-15 Lynne Kaley: From the October 1996 version
                                                        software has any methodology for                                                                                                                                       of the BRD in Appendix V, there is a mention of Alloy 400 as
                                                        calculating susceptibility, reference                                                                                                                                  an acceptable material for HF service at higher HF
                                                        provided in 14.8, needs to be included                                                                                                                                 concentrations and temperature. At the end of the
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Description of Damage section, there is a final comment:
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               “Alloy 400 may also crack in HF service if oxygen or other
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               oxidizers are allowed into the system. A 1200°F stress relief
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               for one hour per inch of thickness will reduce the potential
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               for cracking in Alloy 400 by reducing residual stresses.” And
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               reference “Corrosion Resistance of Nickel-Containing Alloy in
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Hydrofluoric Acid, Hydrogen Fluoride and Fluorine, Corrosion
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Engineering Bulletin CEB-5, The International Nickel Co., Inc.,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               1968” is given.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               There is no other guidance or logic in the methodology giving
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               a cracking susceptibility. In addition, the V3.3.3 software
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               disables HSC-HF as a potential mechanism for Alloy 400.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               The comment in the action table refers to information in 571
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               but not in 581 but I think that is a typo. There is no
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               cracking susceptibility for Alloy 400 in 571.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               Resolution: If we want to add technical logic to API 581, a
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               task group will have to be assigned to identify the logic for
2008-019             3           Consequenc      7.8    For ASTs, see 7.8, Shouldn't we be             ASTs only model tank floor. Committee to    Medium       low       8        6        48       Steve Wickerson,          that mechanism.
                                 e of Failure           modeling flammable and explosives, toxic       decide on how to handle shell leaks. Yes we                                                   Steve Bolinger,
                                                        for a shell leak?                              should be modeling. See focus group action                                                    Jon Britton
                                                                                                       list




2008-020             3           Consequenc      5.5    In 5.5, all liquid releases should be          10000 lb or 3 minutes is not applicable to    Medium     low       8        6        48       Phil Henry                No progress
                                 e of Failure           modeled as a continuous release                liquids, could do for both level 1 and 2.
                                                        regardless of the quantity or the duration     Need more info from GH. Phil to find out
                                                        of release. In such cases, a puddle or         more
                                                        pool will be formed, and, depending on the
                                                        make-up and temperature of the liquid
                                                        release, evaporation over an extended
                                                        period of time will occur. Selection of pool
                                                        size and depth will depend on the quantity
                                                        of liquid released.




2008-021             1           Heat           Table Scale build up. Can this be differentiated       needs to be worked. Proposed filtering item     low      easy      2        9        18
                                 Exchanger       8.1  from fouling and be treated separatedly?         only.
                                 Bundle               Treat scaling as a key attribute




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581 Item Part            Date    Part Title    Secti   Description                                  581 Group Comment                             Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to   Date   STATUS Update                          Part of
Number                   Added                 on                                                                                                 y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                               RSF
                                                                                                                                                                              Difficult                                                                       Work
                                                                                                                                                                              y

2008-022             2           Probability    B.6    According to the H2O / HF module the         Need to review Table B.34. Jon Dobis to       Medium Medium        8        2        16       Jon Dobis
                                 of Failure            corrosion rate for carbon steel is the same check
                                                       for HF in water conc. >= 80% and for
                                                       anhydrous hydrofluoric acid. This doesn’t
                                                       appear to be right according to NACE
                                                       paper 04645. This situation doesn’t seem
                                                       to comply with practical situations verified
                                                       in HF units. In my opinion it’s difficult to
                                                       trust this module to give a good corrosion
                                                       rate prediction but I'm not an expert in
                                                       this corrosion mechanism.
2008-023             2           Probability    8.2, API RP 571 states that cracking is most        Task group to look at NACE and 571            Medium Medium        8        2        16
                                 of Failure    Figure prevalent in MEA and DEA systems, not         documents and recommend changes
                                                 8.1  MEA and DIPA. It then states that DIPA
                                                      performs better than MEA and DEA, but
                                                      not as well as MDEA. Paragraph 8.2 and
                                                      Figure 8.1 needs to match API 571.


2008-024             3           Consequenc 5.8.5      As discussed in 5.8.5, the values for the    Comment valid. – need better numbers with Medium Medium            8        2        16       Phil Henry           No progress
                                 e of Failure          consequence area reduction factors           supporting references. Require a 3rd party
                                                       employed in Table 5.10 seem arbitrary and    to develop. Phil to ask Greg Holton to give
                                                       need supporting references to evaluations    estimate of cost to develop
                                                       and tests of mitigation measures in
                                                       process unit environments.




2008-025             3           Consequenc 5.8.5     Adjustment of consequence areas to            Comment is valid, for Level 2. Additional     Medium Medium        8        2        16       Phil Henry           No progress
                                 e of Failure         account for energy efficiency is              work including references is needed.
                                                      appropriate and important. For example,       Require a 3rd party to develop. Phil to ask
                                                      Lees in Loss Prevention in the Process        Greg Holton to give estimate of cost to
                                                      Industries has found that the energy          develop
                                                      efficiency in most explosions has been
                                                      small, with approximately 2% of the
                                                      combustion energy being converted into a
                                                      blast wave. Unlike the Level 1
                                                      methodology, however, Lees makes no
                                                      distinction between instantaneous and
                                                      continuous sources. Clearly, employment
                                                      of some form of adjustment like Equation
                                                      17 is necessary and appropriate, but no
                                                      distinction between instantaneous and
                                                      continuous sources should be made, and
                                                      references to actual historical releases
                                                      should be provided to support the
2008-026             2           Probability   16.6.3 parameter values in the equation. date
                                                      In the approved external ballot, the                                                        Medium Medium        8        2        16
                                 of Failure     and was modified
                                               17.6.3 based on the coating condition at the time
                                                      of inspection.
                                                      "A" effectiveness Date=Inspection Date +
                                                      5 years "B" effectiveness Date=Inspection
                                                      Date + 2 years . This is not in the final
                                                      2nd edition publication.
                                                      Here is what is in approved last ballot

                                                       Table N-6 – External Corrosion
                                                       Adjustments for Coatings Quality
                                                       New Coating Quality
                                                       None Medium High
                                                       Date = Date Installed Date = Coating
                                                       Date + 5 Date = Coating Date + 15
                                                       Existing Coating Quality at Inspection
                                                       Date
                                                       None Medium High
                                                       Date = Inspection Date Date = Inspection
                                                       Date + 5 years, for an “A” level
                                                       inspection*.
                                                       Date = Inspection Date + 2 years for a “B”
                                                       level inspection*.
                                                       *(Only if the coating was found intact
                                                       upon inspection) Not used.




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581 Item Part            Date    Part Title     Secti   Description                                      581 Group Comment                                Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to         Date        STATUS Update                                                            Part of
Number                   Added                  on                                                                                                        y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                                                                            RSF
                                                                                                                                                                                      Difficult                                                                                                                    Work
                                                                                                                                                                                      y

2008-027             3           Consequenc      5.5    In 5.5, vapor releases that extend beyond        Probably technically correct, we will not     Medium Medium           8        2        16
                                 e of Failure           one minute should be modeled using               change level 1. Investigate this for level 2.
                                                        continuous models. Treating vapor
                                                        releases in the manner described above
                                                        has several advantages. First, many
                                                        vapor releases are characterized by a very
                                                        large initial release (such as when a
                                                        pressure relief valve opens) followed by a
                                                        longer, lower rate, more steady-state
                                                        release. Modeling the initial release as a
                                                        puff and the follow-on release as a plume
                                                        produces defendable results. Second,
                                                        lumping an entire three-minute release into
                                                        one puff may produce misleading results.
                                                        In such a case, too much emphasis may
                                                        be placed on a particular accident
                                                        sequence because it produces a very
                                                        undesirable and unacceptable
                                                        consequence outcome (like a vapor cloud
                                                        explosion) when such an outcome is
                                                        actually not possible if its release
2008-028             1           Heat            3.1    Include the definition and work book for
                                                        conditions are properly modeled.                 Open action item. There is little technical  Medium Medium            8        2        16
                                 Exchanger              Qualitative Risk Analysis from the original      basis for current work book. This is for all
                                 Bundle                 edition of the base resource document            modules. Scott to look at providing a simple
                                                        (Appendix A) to offer the option for a           quantitive procedure to group to review
                                                        simplified method to quickly prioritize units,
                                                        major portions of units or systems for
                                                        further risk analysis.

2008-029             2           Probability    Genera Need to revisit the inspection                    Revisit                                           High      High      14       1        14
                                 of Failure       l    effectiveness table




2008-030             2           Probability    Genera As a general comment from a LNG gas               581 committee to look at upstream concerns        high      High      14       1        14       John O'Brien (SCI   11/12/2008 2008_11: should this group handle upstream RBI. SCI chair
                                 of Failure       l    producer, the determination of corrosion          and address. Are there other upstream                                                            chair)                          to discuss with CRE and Upstream group.
                                                       rate in Annex B is almost exclusively             concerns? Additional damage mechanisms.                                                                                          2009-04-15 Lynne Kaley: This is not my action but we
                                                       dedicated to refining industry, with very         Look for sub group of upstream companies                                                                                         have been working with several upstream companies and
                                                       few item dealing with upstream. Only              to work on this issue.                                                                                                           applying the API 581 methodology. There is a task group
                                                       chapter which could be considered as                                                                                                                                               within the API RBI User Group that is developing a list of
                                                       relevant is chapter B13 CO2 Corrosion. No                                                                                                                                          comments and recommended modifications for use in
                                                       mention of corrosion rate when we have                                                                                                                                             upstream applications. The group is also keeping Roland
                                                       CO2 and H2S together. We are working                                                                                                                                               Goodman and the API Upstream standards committees
                                                       on Gas Plant wrapper.                                                                                                                                                              updated as development continues. The recommendations
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          will be documented and presented to both the API RBI User
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Group and API 581 committee when their work is complete.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          2009-04-10 John O'Brien - See Email in minutes April 2009

2008-033             3           Consequenc 6.8.1. Qualitative studies by Lees (1986) have               Further work is needed on event tree              High      High      14       1        14       Phil Henry                      2009-04-22 Phil Henry : E2G is currently performing
                                 e of Failure  3   shown that ignition probability increases             probabilities, E2G will take this as an action                                                                                   rigorous comparisons between the Level 1 and Level 2
                                                   as the size of the release increases. The             item for future revisions. A 3rd party may                                                                                       consequence modelers, spurred on by recent efforts of
                                                   values for the probability of ignition                be required to develop after some further                                                                                        Allison Hardy. In general, the Level 2 modeler will result in
                                                   employed in the Level 2 event trees are a             research                                                                                                                         higher consequence areas. The main difference appears to
                                                   significant improvement over Level 1 and                                                                                                                                               be the calculation of the event tree probability of ignition
                                                   are consistent with current research.                                                                                                                                                  which increase significantly as a result of release rate. A
                                                   For example, the Energy Institute in the                                                                                                                                               summary of these results is planned to be presented at the
                                                   United Kingdom has performed extensive                                                                                                                                                 User’s Group meeting in June.
                                                   research on ignition probabilities and has
                                                   published a number of reports on this
                                                   topic. One report, Ignition Probability
                                                   Review, Model Development and Look-up
                                                   Correlations, relates ignition probability to
                                                   the mass release rate. The following
                                                   figure shows how curves from their
                                                   research are similar to the work of Cox,
                                                   Lee, and Ang cited in Section 6.8.1.2.
2008-034             3           Consequenc 6.8.1. Qualitative studies by Lees (1986) have               Further work is needed on event tree              High      High      14       1        14       Phil Henry                      2009-04-22 Phil Henry: E2G is currently performing
                                 e of Failure  2   shown that ignition probability increases             probabilities, E2G will take this as an action                                                                                   rigorous comparisons between the Level 1 and Level 2
                                                   as the size of the release increases. The             item for future revisions. A 3rd party may                                                                                       consequence modelers, spurred on by recent efforts of
                                                   values for the probability of ignition                be required to develop after some further                                                                                        Allison Hardy. In general, the Level 2 modeler will result in
                                                   employed in the Level 2 event trees are a             research                                                                                                                         higher consequence areas. The main difference appears to
                                                   significant improvement over Level 1 and                                                                                                                                               be the calculation of the event tree probability of ignition
                                                   are consistent with current research.                                                                                                                                                  which increase significantly as a result of release rate. A
                                                   For example, the Energy Institute in the                                                                                                                                               summary of these results is planned to be presented at the
                                                   United Kingdom has performed extensive                                                                                                                                                 User’s Group meeting in June.
                                                   research on ignition probabilities and has
                                                   published a number of reports on this
                                                   topic. One report, Ignition Probability
                                                   Review, Model Development and Look-up
                                                   Correlations, relates ignition probability to
                                                   the mass release rate. The following
                                                   figure shows how curves from their
                                                   research are similar to the work of Cox,
2008-035             2           Probability  5.0  How do we address SCC mechanisms on
                                                   Lee, and Ang cited in Section 6.8.1.2.                SCC on cladding has not been considered.          High      High      14       1        14
                                 of Failure   and cladding where this could result in                    Need to develop methodology to address
                                              6.0  exposing the base material to the
                                                   environment before the corrosion
                                                   mechanism would indicate.




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581 Item Part            Date    Part Title    Secti   Description                                 581 Group Comment                                 Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to       Date       STATUS Update                                                           Part of
Number                   Added                 on                                                                                                    y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                                                                        RSF
                                                                                                                                                                                 Difficult                                                                                                                Work
                                                                                                                                                                                 y

2008-036             2           Probability           Implement the RSF for thinning and          currently being worked. Late 2009 for              High      High      14       1        14                                    2009-04-20 Ken Gottselig: Prototype is scheduled for end                Yes
                                 of Failure            cracking                                    evaluation of this method                                                                                                      of year 2009, Limit states equations for general and local
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  thinning are developed. Difficult part will be to account for
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  inspection effectiveness.


2008-037             2           Probability           Revise sour water module to reflect JIP     Items B.2 and B.7 will be absorbed into this       High      High      14       1        14       M. Cayard (FHR)    11/7/2008 See attached proposed rewrite in email to Ken 11-7-08
                                 of Failure            public domain documents                     item

2008-038             2           Probability   Table Add Fiberglass Liners (Tanks) to Table 6.1 Require modification to table 6.1, 6.2 and            Low       low       2        6        12
                                 of Failure     6.1, & 6.2                                      6.5
                                                6.2


2008-039             1           Heat          8.7.2   This section is unclear on how to use the valid comment, needs to be cleaned up.                low      low       2        6        12       Phil Henry                   No progress
                                 Exchanger             data to make the “inspect versus replace”
                                 Bundle                decision. What if both are less that the
                                                       ECOF?? Both greater??

2008-040             3           Consequenc 6.7.2      It is recommended that example                Create Level 2 example                            low      low       2        6        12       Phil Henry                   No progress
                                 e of Failure          calculations be provided that calculates
                                                       the flash fraction of a representative fluid.


2008-041             1           Heat            8     Need to review the Additional               No do not need to align to fixed equipment,         low      low       2        6        12                                    No progress
                                 Exchanger             Uncertainties used based on the level of    but we do need to review.
                                 Bundle                inspection, do these need to align with
                                                       fixed equipment??
2008-042             2           Probability           Minimum probablity of failure threshold     Minor to add to 581. Make this user                 low      low       2        6        12
                                 of Failure            (residual risk).                            defined. This is for unispectable risk.


2008-043             2           Probability           Intermittent service for CUI.               Life fractions / timeline needed to calcuate        low      low       2        6        12
                                 of Failure                                                        result

2008-044             2           Probability   Table It is not clear why tank shell wall GFFs are Open action item.    Consider RSF for Tank         Medium     High      8        1         8                                                                                                            Yes
                                 of Failure     4.1  different than a pressure vessel wall. Add walls and floor
                                                     a note to explaining why the Tank course
                                                     GFFs are different than the vessel/ finfan
                                                     values OR decide whether or not to
                                                     change to pressure vessel Gff.

2008-045             2           Probability   Genera Review all of cracking mechanisms to         Need group to address                             Medium     High      8        1         8
                                 of Failure      l    determine how to give credit for internal
                                                      linings.

2008-046             2           Probability    5.6, Need to include Furnace/ Heater as an         Creep module is on list of new / revised    Medium           High      8        1         8
                                 of Failure    Table equipment type                                modules, will need to add furnace equipment
                                                5.2                                                type.




2008-047             3           Consequenc 5.4.2      Allow for higher response time and change   There is a cutoff time for mitigation. It does Medium        High      8        1         8                                    No progress
                                 e of Failure          consequence accordingly. This effects       seem arbitrary to use 3 minutes as the
                                                       the available mass for the release. Using   cutoff. Need 3rd party involvment to
                                                       a cutoff mass to determine the release      complete this. Both level 1 and level 2
                                                       type is not accurate.


2008-048             2           Probability           Ability to add a tank roof as a component   Lynne to forward priority. Concern about          Medium     high      8        1         8                                    Joel Andreani and Phil Henry (both E2G) are working this.
                                 of Failure            and also internal floating roofs            personnel exposure to thinning roofs.
                                                                                                   Environmental effect of holed through roof.
                                                                                                   Consider tank group at API


2008-049             2           Probability           HTHA module                                 Phil to check on HTHA module, 941 mods for Medium            High      8        1         8                                    No progress
                                 of Failure                                                        cladding and weld overlay. Revise effort and
                                                                                                   difficulty when more data is obtained


2008-050             2           Probability   Table Add life extension method for ferrules        For ferrules, life extension factor of 0.5 max.     low     Medium     2        2         4       Phil Henry                   No progress
                                 of Failure     8.6  insertion                                     Peer review of life extension table. May
                                                                                                   consider adding other items to table

2008-051             1           Heat          Table Can mitigation actions such as scale          needs to be worked - (corrosion or bundle           low     Medium     2        2         4
                                 Exchanger      8.1  inhibitor also be included??                  fouling?). Effort depends on solution
                                 Bundle


2008-052             2           Probability   Table Cement lining of sea water CS network to      Add cement lining to this section. Flowchart/ Low           Medium     2        2         4
                                 of Failure     6.1  be added to Table 6.1.                        logic and table modifications. Sub-group to
                                                                                                   determine how to add it.




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581 Item Part            Date      Part Title        Secti   Description                                   581 Group Comment                              Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to   Date   STATUS Update                          Part of
Number                   Added                       on                                                                                                   y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                               RSF
                                                                                                                                                                                      Difficult                                                                       Work
                                                                                                                                                                                      y

2008-053             3             Consequenc 5.4.3          In 5.4.3, revise the calculation procedure    Action item: We don't reduce the inventory      Low      Medium     2        2         4                            No progress
                                   e of Failure              to account for inventory reduction if the     based on success. We reduce the
                                                             operator is successful in mitigating the      consequence area or amount of release.
                                                             release. If the operator is unsuccessful,     Good idea but low priority, could only do on
                                                             assess the impact of the release using the    Level 2 method. Can be done when item
                                                             inventory group mass.                         5.4.2 is done.
2008-054             3             Consequenc 5.4.2          In 5.4.2, for large leaks, recommend that a   Action Item: Open, based on mitigation or       Low      Medium     2        2         4                            No progress
                                   e of Failure              safety function be added to the event         isolation, we adjust amount released. (Level
                                                             tree which accounts for operator              2). Low priority but it is right way to go.
                                                             intervention. The likelihood of success or
                                                             failure should be determined from data on
                                                             industrial accidents or plant operating
                                                             history. The potential impacts of the
                                                             release would then be calculated for both
                                                             the inventory group mass and the reduced
                                                             inventory.

2008-055             4             Consequenc 5.4.3          In 5.4.2, for large leaks, recommend that a Action Item: Open, based on mitigation or         Low      Medium     2        2         4                            No progress
                                   e of Failure              safety function be added to the event       isolation, we adjust amount released. (Level
                                                             tree which accounts for operator            2). Low priority but it is right way to go.
                                                             intervention. The likelihood of success or
                                                             failure should be determined from data on
                                                             industrial accidents or plant operating
                                                             history. The potential impacts of the
                                                             release would then be calculated for both
                                                             the inventory group mass and the reduced
                                                             inventory.


2008-056             2             Probability        7.3    The screening criteria only focus on       task group needed to address this issue.            low      High      2        1         2
                                   of Failure                carbon and low-alloy steel. However, API
                                                             RP 571 specifically states that 300 Series
                                                             SS is susceptible to caustic cracking. The
                                                             screening should include 300 Series SS.

2008-057             2             Probability               Boiler module                                 Antonio to present at next User Group            low      High      2        1         2
                                   of Failure                                                              meeting



2008-059             2             Probability       Equati Equation 11 does not go to Table 5.11 till     It was agreed upon in past meetings not to      None      None      0        0         0                                                                   Yes
                                   of Failure        on 11, remaining wall is less than Tmin + CA.         change until RSF approval is implemented.
                                                     Table This can be significant "damage" with no        RSF approach to be presented at next 581
                                                      5.11 indication in software of a problem (no         meeting. Issue should go away with RSF.
                                                            damage factor). Table 5.11 is still based      See RSF item for priority and ranking Part
                                                            on a % of total wall loss instead of a % of    of RSF work
                                                            "acceptable" wall loss. Incorporate
                                                            damage state probabilities for Trd and CR
                                                            prior to going to an equation like equation
                                                            11. Rework equation 11 and table 5.11 so
                                                            that a significant DF is observed when
                                                            approaching Tmin.

2008-060             2             Probability        7.6,   All SCC equations (ie Section 7.6 Equation     RSF to handle cracking in addition to metal    None      None      0        0         0                                                                   Yes
                                   of Failure         8.6    15, Section 8.6 Equation 16, etc) -           loss. Make sure limit state equation for
                                                             Future work needs to be done on the           cracking is added. Part of RSF work
                                                             equation. Inspection intervals are too
                                                             conservative without inspection history
                                                             and not conservative enough once an
                                                             effective inspection history has been
                                                             established.
2008-061             2             Probability               Carbonate Cracking - revision using           NACE paper presented by ExxonMobil. Paper       High     Medium     14       2        28
                                   of Failure                alternative parameters                        # 07564.

2008-062             3    Oct-08   Consequenc                ASTs should be able to model the same         would need procedure to address failure of       low     Medium     2        2         4
                                   e of Failure              fluids as other fixed equipment               tank roof. 620 also covers refrigerated
                                                                                                           tanks.
2008-063                                                     Add tanks designed to API 620                                                                  low      high      2        1         2


2008-064                                                     Add finfan header box                         MAWP basis versus tmin                         Medium     low       8        6        48       Phil Henry           No progress


2008-066                                         2           calculate the probability of personal injury regulatory requirements effect on risk          Medium Medium        8        2        16
                                                                                                          targets.

2008-067                                                     Example Manual - To aid in jurisdictional     Develop case studies to demonstrate benefit     high      high      14       1        14
                                                             approval, examples should be provided to      (difference) vs traditional methods
                                                             demonstrate the calculations. The
                                                             examples are provided to illustrate the
                                                             calculations used in the assessment
                                                             procedures in API 581.
2008-068                                                     Improve inspection planning procedure.                                                        high      high      14       1        14       Dave Osage
                                                             Dave Osage to supply proposed procedure




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581 Item Part            Date         Part Title   Secti   Description                                  581 Group Comment                                Priorit   Effort   Calc'd Technic Technical     Assigned to     Date   STATUS Update                                             Part of
Number                   Added                     on                                                                                                    y                  Priority al        Ranking                                                                                    RSF
                                                                                                                                                                                     Difficult                                                                                            Work
                                                                                                                                                                                     y

2008-069                                                   Add 0.5Cr-0.5Mo generic material (e.g. SA-                                                    Medium Medium        8        2        16       Phil Henry             No progress
                                                           387, SA 204 grade A) to table 20.3 in the
                                                           HTHA section of Part 2.



2009-001                                                   need to provide a definition/table           The drivers for external corrosion. This can      high      Easy      14       9        126      K Gottselig
                                                           explaining the available external            be the weather at a location (e.g. Marine),
                                                           environments possible for external damage    the potential for cooling tower drift, the use
                                                           module. These could be defined based on      of sprinkler systems, or other contributors.
                                                           annual rain fall or something like that.     Choices Include:
                                                           ·       Marine                               Severe – sweating environments, operating
                                                           ·       Temperate                            temperature near dew point, cycling through
                                                           ·       Arid/Dry                             dew point regularly, cooling water tower
                                                           ·       Severe                               drift areas
                                                                                                        Marine – coastal locations, high annual
                                                                                                        rainfall and warmer climates
                                                                                                        Temperate – drier mid-continent locations
                                                                                                        Dry – Arid climates
2009-002             2   3/3/2009                   21     Brittle Fracture Module                                                                       Medium Medium        8        2        16       Ken Gottselig          No progress
                                                           review and revise the brittle fracture                                                                                                        Lynne Kaley
                                                           module. Comparison with Failure data
                                                           shows some failures occuring with low
                                                           damage factors (low as 19). Module also
                                                           should be able to handle assessment for
                                                           brittle fracture at pressures other than
                                                           MAWP, both higher and lower.
2009-003             2   3/12/2009                         Ethanol Stress Corrosion Cracking            Recommend that this group await technical        Medium     High      8        1         8
                                                           Develop technical basis for a risk based     basis document from pipeline group or API
                                                           approach to assessing ethanol SCC            Corrosion and Materials.


2009-004                 4/1/4/2009                        New Module for ESCC.                                                                           High     Medium     14       2        28       Ken Gottselig          presented at 2009 Spring Meeting




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             Part     Part Title    Voter        Secti Description                                                              581 Group Comment                             Priority   Effort   Technical   Assigned Date
                                                  on                                                                                                                                               Ranking    to

                  2   Probability   Jon          Table Allow User input for corrosion on-line monitoring adjustment             Note to the Table to be added as part of     Completed   None        0
                      of Failure    Patterson    5.13 factor                                                                    2008 January ballot. DONE

                  2   Probability   Jon Britton - Table Need to add references for the generic probabilities of failure         References added to 2008 January ballot      Completed   None        0
                      of Failure    Det Norske     4.1 listed in Table 4.1. The generic probabilities are the basis for
                                    Veritas             the likelihood calculation and need to be clearly defined. If a
                                    (USA), Tom          specific reference cannot be shown, then the logic behind the
                                    Wylie - Shell       values as presented by Mike Conley's June 24, 2003
                                    Global              presentation should be clearly stated.
                                    Solutions
                  2   Probability   Tom Wylie - Table Table 19.1 does not match the external technical module and               addressed in Jan 2008 ballot. Done           Completed   None        0
                      of Failure    Shell Global 19.1 software. Revise to match the external module.
                                    Solutions

                  2   Probability  Ken            5.6, The non-intrusive inspection example for "B" effectiveness has           clean up table to clear up this issue. Can     None      None        0
                      of Failure   Gottselig -   Table more requirements than the "A" effectiveness example. Should             be handled in existing Jan 2008 ballot
                                   Lyondell       5.7 not "A" be more stringent than "B".
                                   Chemical
                                   Company
                  2   Probability Ken             18.0    If thinning is localized (>50 mils wall loss difference) to a large   Training issue.                              Completed   None        0
                      of Failure   Gottselig -    and     area, but general in nature, and CUI was widespread, then the
                                   Lyondell       19.0    total damage factor would not reflect both mechanisms.
                                   Chemical
                  2   Probability Company
                                   Ken            18.0    External modules do not reflect the ballot approved earlier this      In current ballot January 2008. Done         Completed   None        0
                      of Failure   Gottselig -    and     year.
                                   Lyondell       19.0
                                   Chemical
                  3   Consequenc Company
                                   Nasser        Tables   Add references for consequence area curves in Level 1 (DNV to         DNV cannot find the references.(level 1).    Completed   None        0
                      e of Failure Balhareth -    5.8     check)
                                   Saudi          and
                                   Aramco         5.9
                  3   Consequenc                 Table    Do we want to add the capability of allowing User input the Cost Software item only. Write-up is done. KG     Completed        none        0
                      e of Failure                7.6     parameters appearing in Table 7.6?                               to extract from this list and email to Lynne



                  3   Consequenc Greg Holton     Table For ease of use, units for calculated values of Cp should be the Not recommended to work on this item.                  None      None        0
                      e of Failure - Holton       5.2 same for all fluids, see Table 5.2. Table represents as
                                   Engineering         programmed in V3.3, will make changes to document and
                                                       software if UG recommends.

                  3   Consequenc Greg Holton     All  To complement the English unit equations in the text, an                  Completed delete issue                       Completed   None        0
                      e of Failure - Holton    Sectio appendix with metric unit equations with defined parameter
                                   Engineering   ns   values should also be provided.

                  3   Consequenc Greg Holton     5.8.3 As discussed in 5.8.3, the 10,000 ft2 consequence area              Valid point. Not changing level 1. Level 2        Completed   None        0
                      e of Failure - Holton            limitation in Level 1 assessments will underestimate the effects is OK. Level 1 is non-conservative.
                                   Engineering         of thermal radiation for a pool fire of this size. By placing a cap Recommend: No action
                                                       on the effect area, the consequences of certain accident
                                                       sequences could be under predicted.

2008-             2   Probability   Kelly        Tables   Tables 17.3M and 17.3, The compromise values for severe               The current module can predict corrosion       high      easy       126       Allison             11/17/2008
058                   of Failure    VanLoon -     17.3    service appear to be low by at least a factor of two. Observed        rates of up to 80 mpy on "severe", 40 mpy                                     Hardy
                                    Conoco        and     CUI corrosion rates in coastal locations is a significant problem     on marine. Agreed to accept as is and
                                    Phillips     17.3M    on the order of 40+ mpy. It doesn't appear that the module            look for future improvements in CUI
                                                          instructions would get to 40 with out someone sharing the             module
                                                          information that I have brought to the table. Also, the worst
                                                          temperature range has been observed to be between 180 and
                                                          250°F rather than 160 and 240°F.




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2008-              2   Probability   Ricardo        B.7     Under deposit corrosion resulting from ammonium bisulfide salt      Review module and revise as appropriate.         High      High   14    M. Cayard             11/7/2008
031                    of Failure    Costa -                (NH4HS) sublimation and consequent accumulation is not              A new module may be required.                                           (FHR)
                                     Instituto              considered; This is a very important corrosion issue.               We do not believe that a module is
                                     Soldadura e                                                                                appropriate for under deposit corrosion for
                                     Qualidade                                                                                  either ammonium bisulfide salt or ammonium
                                     (ISQ)                                                                                      chloride (NH4Cl) salt. The formation of
                                                                                                                                these deposits should be avoided. This
                                                                                                                                item is closed

2008-              2   Probability   Ricardo        B.2     Under deposit corrosion caused by ammonium chloride (NH4Cl)         Review module and revise as appropriate.         High      High   14    M. Cayard             11/7/2008
032                    of Failure    Costa -                salts is not treated in this module. This is a very important       A new module may be required                                            (FHR)
                                     Instituto              corrosion issue and should be reviewed.                             We do not believe that a module is
                                     Soldadura e                                                                                appropriate for under deposit corrosion for
                                     Qualidade                                                                                  either ammonium bisulfide salt or ammonium
                                     (ISQ)                                                                                      chloride (NH4Cl) salt. The formation of
                                                                                                                                these deposits should be avoided. This
                                                                                                                                item is closed




2008-              2   Probability   Kelly         Tables   Tables 17.3M and 17.3, The compromise values for severe             The current module can predict corrosion         high      easy   126   Allison             11/17/2008
058                    of Failure    VanLoon -      17.3    service appear to be low by at least a factor of two. Observed      rates of up to 80 mpy on "severe", 40 mpy                               Hardy
                                     Conoco         and     CUI corrosion rates in coastal locations is a significant problem   on marine. Agreed to accept as is and
                                     Phillips      17.3M    on the order of 40+ mpy. It doesn't appear that the module          look for future improvements in CUI
                                                            instructions would get to 40 with out someone sharing the           module
                                                            information that I have brought to the table. Also, the worst
                                                            temperature range has been observed to be between 180 and
                                                            250°F rather than 160 and 240°F.




2008-              ?                                        All items have been accounted for. Close this item                  review TWG actions - Hearl Mead's list        Aug 2005
065                                                                                                                                                                           last
                                                                                                                                                                              meeting of
                                                                                                                                                                              TWG.
                                                                                                                                                                              Lynne to
                                                                                                                                                                              forward to
                                                                                                                                                                              Ken.




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