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					                Case3:13-cv-04752-JSC Document1 Filed10/11/13 Page1 of 18



 1   Dustin L. Collier (SBN 264766)
 2
     Drew F. Teti (SBN 267641)
     COLLIER TETI, LLP
 3   1 Sansome Street, Ste. 3500
     San Francisco, CA 94104
 4
     www.collierlawsf.com
 5   T: (415) 366-8406
     F: (415) 366-8407
 6   dustin@collier-teti.com
     drew@collier-teti.com
 7
     Attorneys for Plaintiff
 8
     DEDRICK RILEY
 9                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10                             NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
11
                                      SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
12

13   DEDRICK RILEY,                         )     Case No.:
                                            )
14                Plaintiff,                )     COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND
                                            )     DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
15         vs.                              )
                                            )
16   THE CITY OF RICHMOND, a public entity, )     (1) Discrimination Based Upon Race in
                                            )         Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
17   CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS, an individual,     )         Act of 1964, as Amended, § 701 et seq., 42
                                            )         U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;
18   and DOES 1-50, inclusive,              )     (2) Harassment Based Upon Race in Violation
                                            )
19                Defendants.               )         of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
                                            )         1964, as Amended, § 701 et seq., 42
20                                          )         U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;
                                            )     (3) Retaliation in Violation of Title VII of the
21                                          )
                                            )         Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended, §
22                                          )         701 et seq.;
                                            )     (4) Discrimination Based Upon Race in
23                                          )         Violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
                                            )         42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.;
24                                          )
                                            )     (5) Retaliation in Violation of the Civil Rights
25                                          )         Act of 1991, U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.;
                                            )     (6) Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law
26                                          )         in Violation of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 et
                                            )         seq.
27                                          )
28          Comes now Plaintiff DEDRICK RILEY, who complains and alleges as follows:

                                     Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                        COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1                                                        PARTIES
 2              1.       Plaintiff DEDRICK RILEY (hereafter “Plaintiff” or “Mr. Riley”) is, and at all
 3   relevant times described herein was, an adult resident of the State of California. Plaintiff first
 4   began his employment with Defendant CITY OF RICHMOND in or around July 2002 and
 5   remains in the employ of Defendant CITY OF RICHMOND to this day (although, as detailed
 6   more fully below, there have been three discrete periods of time where Plaintiff was separated
 7   from employment with the Defendants and subsequently reinstated).
 8              2.       From November 29, 2004 through January 6, 2010, Plaintiff was an employee of
 9   Defendants CITY OF RICHMOND (“Richmond”), and DOES 1-50, inclusive. 1 At all times
10   relevant herein, Defendants regularly employed five or more employees and have never been a
11   religious association or corporation organized not-for-profit. Defendant Richmond is a public
12   entity and employer within the meaning of California Government Code section 12926(d). At all
13   times herein, Chief of Police CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS (“Magnus” or “Chief Magnus”) was a
14   supervisor and agent of Defendant RICHMOND.
15              3.       Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of the defendants sued herein
16   as DOES 1-50, inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff
17   will amend this Complaint to allege the true and correct names and capacities of these DOE
18   defendant when ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that said
19   defendants, and each of them, are responsible in whole or in part for Plaintiff’s damages as
20   alleged herein.
21                                                        AGENCY
22              4.       Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants, and each
23   of them, were the agents, managers, directors, or employees of the other Defendants, or that said
24   Defendants approved and/or ratified the conduct of the other Defendants, and that each of them
25   was acting within the course and scope of such agency or employment, at all times relevant
26   herein.
27   ///
28

     1
         All defendants shall be hereinafter referred to collectively as “Defendants” or “Employer.”
                                                    Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                               COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1                             AIDING AND ABETTING/CONSPIRACY
 2          5.      Defendants, and each of them, aided and abetted, encouraged, and rendered
 3   substantial assistance to the other Defendants in breaching their obligations to Plaintiff, as
 4   alleged herein. In taking action, as alleged herein, to aid and abet and substantially assist the
 5   commission of these wrongful acts and other wrongdoing complained of, each of the Defendants
 6   acted with an awareness of its/ his/her primary wrongdoing and realized that its/his/her conduct
 7   would substantially assist the accomplishment of the wrongful conduct, wrongful goals, and
 8   wrongdoing. Defendants, and each of them, also knowingly and willfully conspired to do the
 9   acts and things herein alleged pursuant to, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy.
10                                              ALTER EGO
11          6.      There is a unity of interest amongst Defendants and each acts as the alter ego of
12   the other.
13                                            JURISDICTION
14          7.      Jurisdiction in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California is
15
     proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, Federal Question Jurisdiction, in that this is an action
16
     arising under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and the
17

18
     Civil Right Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 1981 et seq.).

19          8.      The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
20                                  INTRADISTRICT ASSIGNMENT
21
            9.      Intradistrict assignment in the San Francisco or Oakland Division of the Northern
22
     District of California is proper as the action arises from conduct which primarily occurred in
23

24   Richmond, Contra Costa County, California, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-2(d).

25                                                 VENUE
26          10.     Venue is proper as Plaintiff’s claims arose in the Northern District.
27          11.     Plaintiff is an African American male and is thereby a member of a protected
28   class under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as Amended, §701 et seq., 42 U.S.C.


                                     Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                        COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1   2000(e) et seq.) (“Title VII”“), and is protected from discrimination and harassment, as well as
 2   retaliation, by his employer.
 3          12.     At all times mentioned herein, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
 4   Amended, §701 et seq., 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq. was in full force and effect, and was binding
 5   upon Defendants.
 6          13.     At all times mentioned herein, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §1981 et seq.
 7   was in full force and effect, and was binding upon Defendants.
 8          14.     Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants CITY OF
 9   RICHMOND and/or DOES 1-50 is an employer subject to suit under the Civil Rights Act in that
10   Defendants are a governmental entity with 15 or more employees on each working day in each of
11   20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year and is doing business in the
12   State of California.
13                                   EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
14          15.     On or about May 22, 2013, and within the time provided by law, Plaintiff filed
15   verified charges of discrimination, harassment and retaliation with the Equal Employment
16   Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On or about July 16, 2013, Plaintiff received his “Right to
17   Sue” Notice from the EEOC and now timely files this action.
18                    FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS
19          16.     Plaintiff was initially hired by Defendant CITY OF RICHMOND (“Richmond”)
20   as a police recruit in or around July 2002 and completed the police academy in December of
21   2002, becoming at that time a sworn Police Officer. By May of 2003, Plaintiff completed his
22   training and was assigned a solo beat patrol officer position in May of 2003. In June of 2003,
23   Plaintiff suffered an off-duty motorcycle accident and was released from duty in February 2004,
24   but he was promised reinstatement if he completed the rehabilitation of his injured leg. After
25   extensive rehabilitation, Plaintiff was rehired as a police officer for the Defendants in November
26   of 2004. Plaintiff is an African-American male.
27          17.     During his initial employment, Plaintiff received exceptional performance and
28   training evaluations by his supervisors and training officers. During the initial period of

                                         Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                            COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1   employment (July 2002 to February 2004) and the second period (November 2004 through
 2   September 2006), Plaintiff was never subjected to disciplinary action for any reason.
 3           18.     Throughout the time plaintiff was employed by Defendant Richmond, Plaintiff
 4   was discriminated against with respect to the terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment
 5   because of plaintiff’s race (African-American), color and national origin as alleged more fully
 6   herein below. During the course of his employment, Plaintiff came under the supervision of
 7   Defendant CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS and other managers/supervisors of Defendant Richmond
 8   whom subjected Plaintiff to differential terms and conditions of employment because of his race,
 9   color and national origin. The disparate treatment includes but is not limited to adverse
10   employment actions and harassment not experienced by similarly-situated employees whom
11   were not African-American, as well as excessive scrutiny, criticism, and discipline not otherwise
12   directed at similarly-situated Caucasian employees or employees of other races and national
13   origins than the Plaintiff.
14           19.     From approximately November 29, 2004 through September 13, 2006, the date of
15   Plaintiff’s first termination, Plaintiff was subjected to a continuous pattern of racial
16   discrimination and harassment by his managers and supervisors because he is African-American.
17   Defendant Richmond’s managers, supervisors, and co-workers engaged in demeaning and
18   racially offensive conduct towards African-Americans, including both verbalized and implicit
19   racial slurs and stereotypes, passing over African-American candidates (particularly those who
20   complained of the discrimination and hostile environment) for promotion in favor of less
21   qualified candidates, subjecting African-American employees to biased and inaccurate
22   performance evaluations, subjecting African-American employees to biased and discriminatory
23   hiring and promotional practices and testing, imposing disparate discipline up to and including
24   termination on African-American employees while other employees received lesser discipline (or
25   were not disciplined at all) for similar conduct, initiating meritless and disparate internal affairs
26   investigations into African-American employees, and generally denying African-American
27   employees equal opportunity for advancement, promotion, pay raises, overtime opportunities,
28   shift differentials, and other benefits of employment.

                                      Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                         COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1           20.     Throughout Plaintiff’s employment, his performance was consistently satisfactory
 2   to exemplary. Also throughout Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff regularly and frequently
 3   complained of the racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation he and other African-
 4   American employees of Richmond had been experiencing for decades. This includes but is not
 5   limited to Plaintiff’s filing of a discrimination, harassment, and retaliation lawsuit in October of
 6   2007, a formal complaint filed with the department in or around February or March of 2008.
 7   Following these two protected acts, Plaintiff was suddenly subjected to frequent and regular
 8   Internal Affairs (“IA”) complaints and investigations throughout the remainder of 2008.
 9   Demonstrating that these IA investigations were part of the litigation strategy against Plaintiff in
10   his lawsuit, the Defendants broke from its standard practice of investigating IA matters internally
11   with Plaintiff’s supervisors and instead the matters were assigned to lackeys and catpaws outside
12   the police department.
13           21.     On or about March 7, 2009, Plaintiff and Police Officer Anthony Diaz (“Officer
14   Diaz”), while in the course and performance of their duties as a Police Officers, contacted a
15   person sitting alone in a parked vehicle in a known high drug and prostitution area. Defendant
16   Richmond alleged that Plaintiff used excessive physical force in apprehending this suspect.
17   Plaintiff, meanwhile, denied any such excessive use of force.
18           22.     Subsequently, Magnus charged Plaintiff with filing a false police report,
19   providing false and misleading statements to his supervisor, untruthfulness, and conduct
20   unbecoming of an employee in the service of Richmond. In particular, Magnus alleged that
21   Plaintiff was dishonest about the manner and number of strikes used to subdue the suspect during
22   the March 7, 2009 incident. This conduct was alleged to violate numerous polices, rules, and
23   regulations of the police department. Notably, the Defendants broke from established policy by
24   having the IA investigation commence immediately at 1:00 a.m. on the date of the incident,
25   where normally such emergency investigations only occur with officer-involved shootings and
26   fatalities.
27           23.     On January 6, 2010, Richmond discharged Plaintiff for his alleged misconduct
28   during the March 7, 2009 incident and the reporting thereof. Officer Diaz, meanwhile, was not

                                      Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                         COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1   subjected to similar discipline for his involvement in the incident. To the contrary, Officer Diaz
 2   was simultaneously threatened with discipline if he failed to help the Defendants make out a
 3   false case for Plaintiff’s termination and promised more rapid career advancement with
 4   Richmond if he did assist the Defendants in making such a case.
 5          24.     Although the subject of a prior lawsuit and settlement agreement, it is noteworthy
 6   that this is not the first time the Defendants have fabricated a pretextual basis for Plaintiff’s
 7   termination. In 2006, Defendants alleged similar misconduct by Plaintiff arising out of an arrest
 8   incident occurring in March of that year. In September of 2006, Plaintiff was terminated for that
 9   incident. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit in Contra Costa County Case No. C 07-01753,
10   alleging race discrimination and retaliation arising out of the first termination. Additionally,
11   Plaintiff’s Union (“RPOA,” Richmond Police Officers Association) grieved and arbitrated
12   Plaintiff’s termination. On July 2, 2007, Arbitrator Charles A. Askin determined that the City
13   did not have cause to terminate Plaintiff’s employment and ordered his reinstatement with full
14   back-pay. Subsequently, on April 7, 2009, the parties entered into a settlement of Case No. C
15   07-01753, after the Defendants realized their first effort to terminate the Plaintiff had been
16   revealed as meritless and discriminatory. Upon Plaintiff’s reinstatement in July of 2007, he was
17   warned by numerous officers within the police department that he now had a target on his back
18   and he should be careful.
19          25.     Similarly, with Plaintiff’s second termination for the March 7, 2009 incident, the
20   RPOA grieved and arbitrated the termination. On April 30, 2011, Arbitrator Fred D. Butler once
21   again found that the Defendants had moved for Plaintiff’s termination without cause and thus the
22   asserted reasons for the termination are pretextual. The arbitration award once again mandated
23   reinstatement with full back-pay. The award, in particular, requires that the Defendants make
24   rely “whole,” as though the discipline had never occurred. Both arbitration awards also reveal
25   that Plaintiff has been subjected to disciplinary actions for matters that either do not constitute
26   discipline-worthy offenses in the first place or at a minimum have resulted in much lesser
27   discipline for similarly-situated employees whom are neither African-American nor prior race
28   discrimination complainants.

                                      Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                         COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1          26.     Notwithstanding the arbitration award, the Defendants failed to make Plaintiff
 2   “whole,” at that time or any time thereafter. Although Defendants have technically “reinstated”
 3   Plaintiff, he has been placed in an administrative duty with no possibility of working patrol
 4   assignments within the police department. Prior to his second termination, Plaintiff was on
 5   patrol assignments, but the Defendants now refuse outright to permit his to work such
 6   assignments. This is no small matter, as patrol assignments are eligible for shift differentials and
 7   overtime pay in accordance with the RPOA contract and Richmond policies/procedures, while
 8   Plaintiff’s current assignment (in essence a 9-5 desk job) is not eligible. Comparing Plaintiff’s
 9   earnings prior to his second termination with those since his reinstatement in 2011 reveals that
10   the lack of overtime and shift differential opportunities is costing Plaintiff approximately
11   $90,000 per year in compensation he would have otherwise received.
12          27.     Additionally, the desk duty he has been assigned to, ostensibly on a permanent
13   basis, ensures that Plaintiff will never gain the field experience necessary to advance in the
14   police department. In particular, the typical promotional track in the department goes as follows:
15   (1) Police Officer; (2) Detective/Investigator; (3) Sergeant; (4) Lieutenant; (5) Captain; (6)
16   Deputy Chief; and (7) Chief. The qualifications and experience required to become a detective
17   has always expressly included the field experience and involvement in investigations that one
18   can only gain in patrol assignments. Thus, by denying Plaintiff the opportunity to serve in such
19   assignments, Defendants have ensured that Plaintiff will never receive a promotion within the
20   police department.
21          28.     To be sure, Defendants allege that they must exclude Plaintiff from patrol
22   assignments because he is on the “Brady list” with the Contra Costa County District Attorney’s
23   office. The “Brady list” is a list of officer names which the District Attorney’s office is legally
24   required to disclose to criminal defendants whenever the officer(s) thereon are involved in the
25   arrest or prosecution of said defendants. The list includes officers who have been found guilty of
26   untruthfulness, excessive force, or other misconduct. It also includes officers who have been
27   charged with a crime. The purpose of the “Brady list,” as established in Brady v. Maryland
28



                                       Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                          COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1   (1963) 373 U.S. 83, is to meet the District Attorney’s duty to disclose any potentially
 2   exculpatory or impeachment evidence to criminal defendants.
 3          29.     However, Plaintiff’s presence on the Brady list is itself the direct result of
 4   Defendants’ discrimination and retaliation. As noted above, all the disciplinary actions taken
 5   against Plaintiff by the Defendants has been overturned and reversed by labor arbitrators, and
 6   thus this does not provide the basis for placing Plaintiff on the Brady list. Instead, Plaintiff is on
 7   the list solely because Magnus directly solicited the District Attorney’s office to criminally
 8   prosecute Plaintiff for assault and battery and other charges arising out of the same March 7,
 9   2009 incident detailed above. Indeed, when Magnus first approached the District Attorney’s
10   office to solicit this prosecution, he was advised that the case lacked probable cause for
11   prosecution. Magnus, however, insisted upon the prosecution as a personal political favor to
12   himself and others within Richmond who desired to drive Plaintiff to resign voluntarily. The
13   District Attorney ultimately capitulated and brought the charges.
14          30.     On or around January 28, 2012, Plaintiff was acquitted of all charges by a Contra
15   Costa County jury. Nevertheless, Magnus requested that the District Attorney place Plaintiff on
16   the Brady list as a result of the prosecution alone, and the District Attorney complied by sending
17   a letter back to Magnus himself advising that Plaintiff was now on the list. Magnus then used
18   this failed and malicious prosecution, and the Brady listing that resulted therefrom, as a further
19   pretext to justify denying equal employment opportunities to Plaintiff as set forth herein.
20          31.     Moreover, even if Plaintiff had legitimately been placed on the Brady list through
21   no fault of the Defendants, the use of his Brady listing to justify denying him patrol assignments
22   would still reveal discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. This is because (1) the Brady
23   listing would be of no practical import in any criminal prosecution in which Plaintiff serves as an
24   arresting officer or witness, as Plaintiff was fully acquitted and reinstated and thus California
25   Evidence Code section 352 should dictate the exclusion of his prosecution from any such
26   criminal proceedings; and (2) other officers whom are listed on the Brady list but whom are
27   neither African-American nor prior race discrimination complainants have been permitted to
28   work patrol assignments and otherwise advance through the ranks of the department.

                                      Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                         COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1          32.     In sum, every effort the Defendants have made to use the March 7, 2009 effort to
 2   terminate Plaintiff’s employment and/or land him in prison has failed miserably and revealed the
 3   vindictive, discriminatory, harassing, and retaliatory nature of their conduct towards the Plaintiff.
 4   Nevertheless, they continue to use these failed efforts to sustain discipline against him or have
 5   him imprisoned as a pretextual justification for denying equal employment opportunity to him to
 6   this day.
 7          33.     Since Magnus was hired as Chief of Police in January of 2006, he has only
 8   recommended the termination of African-American officers, many of which had also complained
 9   of the department’s racial hostilities and/or filed their own lawsuits against the Defendants for
10   race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Similarly, although the police department has
11   increased the size of the police force substantially during Magnus’ tenure, as of January of 2012
12   (the last date for which we possess the data) the number of African-Americans working for the
13   department has remained the same.
14          34.     In response to Plaintiff’s earlier complaints regarding the deprivation of patrol-
15   related overtime opportunities, Richmond stated that Plaintiff should do background checks to
16   gain overtime hours instead. These are still not equal opportunities because there are far more
17   overtime opportunities in patrol than there are for background checks. Additionally, patrol
18   assignments are far more likely to lead to promotional opportunities within the department.
19   Nevertheless, Plaintiff was taking the limited overtime opportunities this assignment provided by
20   completing the background checks. In September 2013, however, Lt. Lori Curran became the
21   new catspaw for Defendant Richmond and initiated a new wave of retaliation against Plaintiff.
22   This included advising Plaintiff’s Sergeant that Plaintiff had filed a lawsuit and he should “watch
23   what he says” around the Plaintiff and intentionally delayed the submission of one of Plaintiff’s
24   background check reports to his Captain. As a result, Plaintiff was reprimanded by his Captain
25   and advised that he could no longer perform background checks either, depriving him of the only
26   remaining overtime opportunity in the Department.
27          35.     Throughout 2012 and 2013, Plaintiff has repeatedly applied for transfers and
28   better assignments within the police department. Each of these applications were denied, some

                                     Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                        COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1   without explanation and some explicitly citing the “Brady list” issue described above. Plaintiff
 2   filed an IA complaint in March 2012 regarding this matter, but was advised explicitly by the
 3   Defendants’ human resources department that they will not investigate the case because Plaintiff
 4   has filed a lawsuit.
 5                                      FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
 6             DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
 7                                       (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.)
 8                           (Against Defendant RICHMOND and/or Does 1-50)
 9           36.     By this reference, Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every paragraph set forth
10   above as though fully set forth at this place.
11           37.     Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that he was discriminated
12   against in the terms and conditions of his employment, as outlined above, on the basis of his race
13   as set forth herein, in violation of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
14           38.     Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants and/or
15   Does 1-50 willfully and/or with reckless indifference, violated the Title VII of the Civil Rights
16   Act and discriminated against Plaintiff as outlined above, on the basis of his race. Such
17   discrimination has resulted in damage and injury to Plaintiff as alleged herein.
18           39.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or Does’1-50 unlawful
19   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered special damages including but not limited to past and future loss
20   of income, benefits, and other damages to be proven at time of trial.
21           40.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s and/or Does 1-50 unlawful
22   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered general damages including but not limited to emotional pain,
23   suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary
24   losses to be proven at the time of trial.
25           41.     The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors,
26   supervisors and/or managing agents of Defendants and/or Does 1-50 who were acting at all times
27   relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendants and/or
28



                                         Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                            COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1   Does 1-50 are, therefore, liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine
 2   of Strict Liability.
 3           42.     As a result of the conduct of Defendants and/or Does 1-50, Plaintiff was forced to
 4   retain an attorney in order to protect his rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable
 5   attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial
 6   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq.
 7           WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.
 8                                    SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
 9                            HARASSMENT IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
10                                      (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.)
11                            (Against Defendant RICHMOND and DOES 1-50)
12           43.     By this reference, Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every paragraph set forth
13   above as though fully set forth at this place.
14           44.     Plaintiff was subjected to unwanted and harassing conduct in the form of slurs,
15   insults, jokes, or other verbal comments or intimidation of a racial nature on account of
16   Plaintiff’s race.
17           45.     The harassing conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
18   of Plaintiff’s employment and to create a racially abusive or hostile work environment. Much of
19   the harassing conduct was committed by Plaintiff’s immediate supervisors. Additionally, some
20   of the harassing conduct was committed by Plaintiff’s non-immediate supervisors or coworkers,
21   Defendants knew or should have known of the harassing conduct, and Defendants failed to take
22   prompt, effective remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment.
23           46.     Plaintiff perceived the working environment to be hostile or abuse.
24           47.     A reasonable African-American in the plaintiff’s circumstances would consider
25   the working environment to be abusive or hostile.
26           48.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or Does’1-50 unlawful
27   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered special damages including but not limited to past and future loss
28   of income, benefits, and other damages to be proven at time of trial.

                                         Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                            COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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 1           49.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s and/or Does 1-50 unlawful
 2   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered general damages including but not limited to emotional pain,
 3   suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary
 4   losses to be proven at the time of trial.
 5           50.     The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors,
 6   supervisors and/or managing agents of Defendants and/or Does 1-50 who were acting at all times
 7   relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendants and/or
 8   Does 1-50 are, therefore, liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine
 9   of Strict Liability.
10           51.     As a result of the conduct of Defendants and/or Does 1-50, Plaintiff was forced to
11   retain an attorney in order to protect his rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable
12   attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial
13   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq.
14           WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.
15                                      THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
16                            RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
17                                       (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.)
18                            (Against Defendant RICHMOND and Does 1-50)
19           52.     By this reference, Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every paragraph set forth
20   above as though fully set forth at this place.
21           53.     Pursuant to the United States Code Section 2000e et seq., Plaintiff had a legal
22   right to be free from discrimination and harassment, because Defendants RICHMOND and/or
23   Does 1-50 employed more than fifteen employees and knew of Plaintiff’s race.
24           54.     As a result of complaining about discrimination and harassment on the basis of
25   race and filing two prior lawsuits regarding such complaints, Defendants and/or Does 1-50
26   retaliated against Plaintiff.
27           55.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or Does1-50 unlawful
28   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered special damages including but not limited to past and future loss
     of income, benefits, and other damages to be proven at time of trial.
                                         Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                            COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
                                                  Page 13 of 18
                Case3:13-cv-04752-JSC Document1 Filed10/11/13 Page14 of 18



 1           56.       As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s and/or Does 1-50 unlawful
 2   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered general damages including but not limited to emotional pain,
 3   suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary
 4   losses to be proven at the time of trial.
 5           57.       The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors,
 6   supervisors and/or managing agents of Defendants and/or Does 1-50 who were acting at all times
 7   relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendants and/or
 8   Does 1-50 are, therefore, liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine
 9   of Strict Liability.
10           58.       As a result of the conduct of Defendants and/or Does 1-50, Plaintiff was forced to
11   retain an attorney in order to protect his rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable
12   attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial
13   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq.
14           WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.
15                                     FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
16                                 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE
17                                            (42 U.S.C.A. §1981)
18    (Against Defendant RICHMOND, Defendant CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS and Does 1-50)
19           59.       By this reference, Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every paragraph set forth
20   above as though fully set forth at this place.
21           60.       Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that he was discriminated
22   against in the terms and conditions of his employment, as outlined above, on the basis of his race
23   as set forth herein, in violation of the 42 U.S.C.A. §1981, in that Plaintiff was denied the equal
24   benefit of all laws and proceedings for the protections of persons and property as is enjoyed by
25   white citizens.
26           61.       Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants and/or
27   Does 1-50 willfully and/or with reckless indifference, violated and discriminated against Plaintiff
28   as outlined above, on the basis of his race. Such intentional discrimination has resulted in

                                         Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                            COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
                                                  Page 14 of 18
                Case3:13-cv-04752-JSC Document1 Filed10/11/13 Page15 of 18



 1   damage and injury to Plaintiff as alleged herein.
 2           62.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or Does’1-50 unlawful
 3   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered special damages including but not limited to past and future loss
 4   of income, benefits, and other damages to be proven at time of trial.
 5           63.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or Does 1-50 unlawful
 6   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered general damages including but not limited to emotional pain,
 7   suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary
 8   losses to be proven at the time of trial.
 9           64.     The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors,
10   supervisors and/or managing agents of Defendants and/or Does 1-50 who were acting at all times
11   relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendants and/or
12   Does 1-50 are, therefore, liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine
13   of Strict Liability.
14           65.     As a result of the conduct of Defendants and/or Does 1-50, Plaintiff was forced to
15   retain an attorney in order to protect his rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable
16   attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial
17   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988(b)(c) et seq.
18           WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.
19                                      FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
20                                  RETALIATION BASED ON RACE
21                                           (42 U.S.C.A. §1981)
22    (Against Defendant RICHMOND, Defendant CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS and Does 1-50)
23           66.     By this reference, Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every paragraph set forth
24   above as though fully set forth at this place.
25           67.     Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that he was retaliated
26   against in the terms and conditions of his employment, as outlined above, on the basis of his race
27   and having complained of race-based harassment and discrimination as set forth herein, in
28   violation of the 42 U.S.C.A. §1981 in that Plaintiff was denied the equal benefit of all laws and
     proceedings for the protections of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.
                                         Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                            COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
                                                  Page 15 of 18
                Case3:13-cv-04752-JSC Document1 Filed10/11/13 Page16 of 18



 1           68.     Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants and/or
 2   Does 1-50 willfully and/or with reckless indifference, violated and retaliated against Plaintiff as
 3   outlined above, on the basis of his race. Such intentional retaliation has resulted in damage and
 4   injury to Plaintiff as alleged herein.
 5           69.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or Does’1-50 unlawful
 6   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered special damages including but not limited to past and future loss
 7   of income, benefits, and other damages to be proven at time of trial.
 8           70.     As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ and/or Does 1-50 unlawful
 9   conduct, Plaintiff has suffered general damages including but not limited to emotional pain,
10   suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life and other nonpecuniary
11   losses to be proven at the time of trial.
12           71.     The unlawful conduct alleged above was engaged in by the officers, directors,
13   supervisors and/or managing agents of Defendants and/or Does 1-50 who were acting at all times
14   relevant to this Complaint within the scope and course of their employment. Defendants and/or
15   Does 1-50 are, therefore, liable for the conduct of said agents and employees under the Doctrine
16   of Strict Liability.
17           72.     As a result of the conduct of Defendants and/or Does 1-50, Plaintiff was forced to
18   retain an attorney in order to protect his rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks the reasonable
19   attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this litigation in an amount according to proof at trial
20   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988(b)(c) et seq.
21           WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as set forth below.
22                                      SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
23                      DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF LAW
24                                            (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983)
25    (Against Defendant RICHMOND, Defendant CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS and Does 1-50)
26           73.     By this reference, Plaintiff hereby incorporates each and every paragraph set forth
27   above as though fully set forth at this place.
28           74.     At all relevant times herein, Defendants acted under color of law as a police

                                         Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                            COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
                                                  Page 16 of 18
                 Case3:13-cv-04752-JSC Document1 Filed10/11/13 Page17 of 18



 1   department, police chief, and/or other police or government official.
 2          75.     With regard to the criminal prosecution of the Plaintiff, Defendants improperly
 3   exerted pressure on the prosecutor, knowingly provided misinformation to the prosecutor,
 4   concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad faith conduct that was
 5   actively instrumental in causing the initiation of the criminal proceedings. This malicious
 6   prosecution sought to deprive Plaintiff of his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
 7   Amendment to the United States Constitution (insofar as it was motivated by Defendants’ racial
 8   animus). The malicious prosecution also sought to deprive Plaintiff of his First Amendment
 9   right to speak out about the Defendants’ unlawful employment practices and his right to petition
10   the courts for redress in response to those unlawful practices.
11          76.     Defendant CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS had final policymaking authority from
12   Defendant Richmond with regard to recommending cases for prosecution to the Contra Costa
13   County District Attorney’s office. Defendant CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS either acted ultra
14   vires and in excess of that authority when he solicited the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff or,
15   alternatively, he was acting as a final policymaker for Defendant Richmond. In any event,
16   Defendant Richmond knew of and specifically approved of Defendant CHRISTOPHER
17   MAGNUS’ conduct in this regard.
18          77.     Defendant Richmond’s training policies were not adequate to train its employees
19   and Chief of Police on how to handle the usual and recurring situations with which they must
20   deal, including but not limited to the decision about whether or not to recommend criminal
21   prosecution of a subordinate in retaliation for making civil rights complaints and initiating civil
22   rights litigation. Defendant Richmond was deliberately indifferent to the obvious consequences
23   of its failure to adequately train its employees and Chief of Police in this regard. This failure to
24   train was closely related to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights, such as to be a moving force that
25   caused the ultimate injury.
26                                        PRAYER FOR RELIEF
27          WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as follows:
28          1.      For compensatory damages against all Defendants in an amount according to
     proof but in no event less
                                      Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                         COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
                                               Page 17 of 18
                 Case3:13-cv-04752-JSC Document1 Filed10/11/13 Page18 of 18



 1

 2   than 5 million dollars;
 3          2.      For declaratory relief against all Defendants;
 4          3.      For injunctive relief against all Defendants;
 5          4.      For punitive damages against Defendant CHRISTOPHER MAGNUS;
 6          4.      For statutory attorneys’ fees and costs of suit against all Defendants;
 7          5.      For such other and further relief as is just and proper against all Defendants.
 8                                   DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
 9          Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial for each and every claim for which he has a right
10   thereto.
11

12   Date: October 11, 2013                        Respectfully Submitted,

13

14                                                 ________/s/_______________________
                                                   Dustin L. Collier
15                                                 Drew F. Teti
                                                   Attorneys for Plaintiff
16
                                                   DEDRICK RILEY
17

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                                     Riley v. City of Richmond et al.
                        COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
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