Democracy by huangyuarong

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									Papers Related to
Public Value -
Democracy Category -
Most Cited All Time and
in the Last 10 Years    Authors Year             Title




                               Jackson,          Public-goods,
                               J.E.;             private interests,
                                        1989
                               King,             and
                               D.C.              representation



most cited articles all time
                               Bellow,           From ethics to
                               G.;               politics -
                                        1978     confronting
                               Kettleso
                               n, J.             scarcity and
                                                 fairness in public-
                               Estlund,          Democratic-
                                                 interest practice
                               D.M.;             theory and the
                               Waldron, 1989     public-interest -
                               J.;               condorcet and
                               Grofman           rousseau revisited
                               , B.; et
                               al.               Direct democracy
                                                 and local public
                               Olken,            goods: evidence
                                          2010
                               B. A.             from a field
                                                 experiment in
                                                 Indonesia


                                                 Direct democracy
                                                 and land use
                               Gerber
                                                 policy:
                               E.R.;
most cited articles in                    2004   Exchanging public
                               Phillips
recent 10 years                                  goods for
                               J.H.
                                                 development
                                                 rights
most cited articles in
recent 10 years




                         Anandi
                                        Democracy,
                         M.;
                                 2007   visibility and public
                         Sharun,
                                        good provision
                         M.
Journal, issue, volume,
page#




American Political Science
Review, 83(4), pp. 1143-1164




Boston University Law Review,
58(3), pp. 337-390



American Political Science
Review, 83(4), pp. 1317-1340




American Political Science
Review, 10(2), pp. 243-267




Urban Studies, 41(2), pp. 463-
479
Journal of Development
Economics, 83(2), pp. 506-529
Abstract
We estimate a model of House members' roll call voting decisions embodying
some hypotheses about representation, including estimates of the influence of
district opinion on broad collective issues relative to personal economic interests,
of the effect of electoral security on constituency responsiveness, and of the
difference in constituency and party voting among Republicans and Democrats.
This model is estimated with votes taken during deliberations on the 1978 Tax
Reform Act, important because it was a significant change from the tax reforms
passed in the late 1960s and 1970s, marked the first appearance of the Kemp-
Roth proposed tax cut, and represented a concerted effort by Republicans to
make tax policy a broad national issue. Findings indicate that constituent
preferences for redistribution are important influences on representatives'
decisions and that Republicans exhibited a greater degree of party voting than the
Democrats while the Democrats better represented their constituent's
preferences.




This article presents an experiment in which 49 Indonesian villages were
randomly assigned to choose development projects through either representative-
based meetings or direct election-based plebiscites. Plebiscites resulted in
dramatically higher satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the
project, greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to contribute.
Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on the actual
projects selected, with some evidence that plebiscites resulted in projects
chosen by women beingpro-development interests, growth opponents that direct
To counter the power of located in poorer areas. The results suggest in
American communities have increasingly turned to the institutions satisfaction
participation in political decision making can substantially increase of direct
and legitimacy. study analyses the effects of one type of direct democracy-
democracy. This
voter requirements for new development-on municipal growth. Analysing data
from a sample of California communities, we consider the impact of voter
requirements on the land use process and outcomes. We find that-in general-
voter requirements fail to stop new development; property owners and
developers can and do adapt to the constraints created by these direct
democracy institutions. We also find, however, that voter requirements change
the land use process in important ways. Specifically, they change the way
developers interact with interest groups in the community and force developers to
compensate current residents for enduring some of the negative aspects of
growth.
We examine the role of visibility in influencing government resource allocation
across a multiplicity of public goods. We show that a "visibility effect" distorts
governmental resource allocation such that it helps explain why governments
neglect provision of essential public goods, despite their considerable benefits.
We show that greater democratization widens the gap in resource allocation
between more visible (such as famine prevention) versus less visible (such as
malnutrition prevention) public goods, up to an intermediate level of democracy.
Beyond this level, this gap decreases. Furthermore, public goods with low
visibility are prone to multiple equilibria in resource allocation, with voter
expectations being shown to be important. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.

								
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