Papers Related to Public Value - Democracy Category - Most Cited All Time and in the Last 10 Years Authors Year Title Jackson, Public-goods, J.E.; private interests, 1989 King, and D.C. representation most cited articles all time Bellow, From ethics to G.; politics - 1978 confronting Kettleso n, J. scarcity and fairness in public- Estlund, Democratic- interest practice D.M.; theory and the Waldron, 1989 public-interest - J.; condorcet and Grofman rousseau revisited , B.; et al. Direct democracy and local public Olken, goods: evidence 2010 B. A. from a field experiment in Indonesia Direct democracy and land use Gerber policy: E.R.; most cited articles in 2004 Exchanging public Phillips recent 10 years goods for J.H. development rights most cited articles in recent 10 years Anandi Democracy, M.; 2007 visibility and public Sharun, good provision M. Journal, issue, volume, page# American Political Science Review, 83(4), pp. 1143-1164 Boston University Law Review, 58(3), pp. 337-390 American Political Science Review, 83(4), pp. 1317-1340 American Political Science Review, 10(2), pp. 243-267 Urban Studies, 41(2), pp. 463- 479 Journal of Development Economics, 83(2), pp. 506-529 Abstract We estimate a model of House members' roll call voting decisions embodying some hypotheses about representation, including estimates of the influence of district opinion on broad collective issues relative to personal economic interests, of the effect of electoral security on constituency responsiveness, and of the difference in constituency and party voting among Republicans and Democrats. This model is estimated with votes taken during deliberations on the 1978 Tax Reform Act, important because it was a significant change from the tax reforms passed in the late 1960s and 1970s, marked the first appearance of the Kemp- Roth proposed tax cut, and represented a concerted effort by Republicans to make tax policy a broad national issue. Findings indicate that constituent preferences for redistribution are important influences on representatives' decisions and that Republicans exhibited a greater degree of party voting than the Democrats while the Democrats better represented their constituent's preferences. This article presents an experiment in which 49 Indonesian villages were randomly assigned to choose development projects through either representative- based meetings or direct election-based plebiscites. Plebiscites resulted in dramatically higher satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the project, greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to contribute. Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on the actual projects selected, with some evidence that plebiscites resulted in projects chosen by women beingpro-development interests, growth opponents that direct To counter the power of located in poorer areas. The results suggest in American communities have increasingly turned to the institutions satisfaction participation in political decision making can substantially increase of direct and legitimacy. study analyses the effects of one type of direct democracy- democracy. This voter requirements for new development-on municipal growth. Analysing data from a sample of California communities, we consider the impact of voter requirements on the land use process and outcomes. We find that-in general- voter requirements fail to stop new development; property owners and developers can and do adapt to the constraints created by these direct democracy institutions. We also find, however, that voter requirements change the land use process in important ways. Specifically, they change the way developers interact with interest groups in the community and force developers to compensate current residents for enduring some of the negative aspects of growth. We examine the role of visibility in influencing government resource allocation across a multiplicity of public goods. We show that a "visibility effect" distorts governmental resource allocation such that it helps explain why governments neglect provision of essential public goods, despite their considerable benefits. We show that greater democratization widens the gap in resource allocation between more visible (such as famine prevention) versus less visible (such as malnutrition prevention) public goods, up to an intermediate level of democracy. Beyond this level, this gap decreases. Furthermore, public goods with low visibility are prone to multiple equilibria in resource allocation, with voter expectations being shown to be important. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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