Education & Social Stratification Lecture 9 The Marxist Class Analysis(1)

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Education & Social Stratification Lecture 9 The Marxist Class Analysis(1) Powered By Docstoc
					         EDM 9206
   The Foundations of EAP




Reason & Rationality
Distinction between Theoretical &
Practical Reasons

 n Theoretical reason/pure reason: It refers
   to human capacities of obtaining reliable
   knowledge/theories of their environment.
   It basically belongs to the epistemological
   domain of human endeavors.
 n Practical reason: It refers to human
   capacities of constructing with other
   human fellows intelligible or even
   acceptable actions and/or interactions. It
   basically belongs to the action (practical)
   domain of human endeavors.
Practical Foundation of Educational
Administration and Policy
 n Both educational administration and policy can
   be construed as human actions and efforts
   deliberately undertaken by human agents to
   intervene particular aspects of the current
   educational environment with the intention to
   bring about improvement to the status quo.
Practical Foundation of Educational
Administration and Policy
 n Accordingly, educational administration and
   policy are human efforts with “in-order-to”
   intents, which point to the future. As a result,
   educational leaders who practice educational
   administration and policy are obliged to give
   reasons to their “in-order-to” intents, in other
   words, to provide “reasons” to the actions”
   which they intend and propose to undertake.
   Therefore, practical reason is one of the
   foundations of study as well practice of
   educational administration and policy.
Practical Foundation of Educational
Administration and Policy
 n Conceptions of action, project and agency
    n Action can be discerned as one’s intentionality
      that has been consolidated into protention and
      anticipation, according to which she will make
      effort to its fulfillment. It can simply be construed
      as a single “in-order-to” intention.
    n Project can be understood as a series of actions,
      which work in a sequence of “in-order-to” intents.
      If all go well, they will probably lead to the
      fulfillment of the anticipated goal.
Practical Foundation of Educational
Administration and Policy
 n Conceptions of action, project and agency
    n Agency is the project organized and undertaken by
      an agent. The concept puts particular emphasis on
      the conception of the agent, who is supposed to
      be a knowledgeable, rational and reasonable actor.
       n Knowledgeability: To be knowledgeable, the agent

         is supposed to have sufficient if not full
         knowledge of the project to be undertaken as well
         the environment (both physical and social) in
         which her project is to be unfolded.
Practical Foundation of Educational
Administration and Policy
 n Conceptions of action, project and agency
    n Agency …
       n Rationality: To be rational, the agent is supposed

         to have identified the objective to be attained, to
         have chosen an effective (or even the most
         efficient) action plan to be undertaken, and finally
         to have concrete idea and/or belief of the chance
         for success.
       n Reasonable: To be reasonable, the agent will not

         only have to be rational but must justify her
         actions and/or project to be socially acceptable. In
         other worlds, she must provide a normative
         justification to the social audience within the
         respective institutional context.
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

  n Weber’s definition and typology of rationality
    and action
     n Rationality as mental processes that
       consciously strive to master reality

      “However much they may vary in content,
      mental processes that consciously strive
      to master reality are common to all types
      of rationality.”     (Karlberg, 1980, p. 1159)
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality




  Actor             To act &
                                            The World
                    to master


                   Degree of
          Consciousness / Reflectiveity &
                Knowledgeability


                   Rationality
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

n Weber’s Typology of rationality:
  n Practical/instrumental rationality
     n Conscious mastery of reality through pragmatic
       and egoistic interest
     n Practical rationality way of life accepts given
       realities and calculates the most expedient
       means of dealing with difficulties they present
   n   Substantive rationality
        n Conscious mastery of reality through ordering
          action into pattern/hierarchy in accordance with
          past, present, or potential “value postulate”.
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

n Weber’s Typology of rationality:
   n   Formal rationality
        n Conscious mastery of reality through means-end

          calculation by reference back to universally
          applies rules, laws or regulations.


   n   Theoretical rationality
        n Conscious mastery of reality through

          construction of precise abstract concepts rather
          than action
        n Philosophers, priest and then scientist
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

  n Weber’s typology of action:
     n   Traditional action
     n   Affectual action
     n   Value-rational action
     n   Purposive-rational / Means-end rational action
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

  n Weber’s typology of action:
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

 n Weber’s theory of rationalization of the Occident
  “Among the classical figures of sociology, Max
   Weber is the only one who broke with both the
   premises of the philosophy of history and the basic
   assumptions of evolutionism and who nonetheless
   wanted to conceive of the modernization of old-
   European society as the result of a universal-
   historical process of rationalization. ...Weber shares
   this concept (i.e. rationalization) with Marx, on the
   one hand, and with Horkheimer and Adorno, on the
   other.
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

 n Weber’s theory of rationalization of the Occident
  “According to Marx, the rationalization of society
   takes place directly in the development of productive
   forces, that is, in the expansion of empirical
   knowledge, the improvement of production of
   techniques, and the increasingly effective
   mobilization, qualification, and organization of
   socially useful of labor power. One the other hand,
   relations of production, the institutions that express
   the distribution of social power and regulate a
   differential access to the means of production, are
   revolutionized only under the pressure of
   rationalization of productive forces.
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

 n Weber’s theory of rationalization of the Occident
  “Max Weber views the institutional framework of the
   capitalist economy and the modern state in a
   different way ─ not as relations of production that
   fetter the potential for rationalization, but as
   subsystems of purposive rational action in which
   Occidental rationalism develops at a societal level.
   Of course, he is afraid that bureaucratization will lead
   to a reification of social relationships, which will
   stifle motivational incentives to a rational conduct of
   life.
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

 n Weber’s theory of rationalization of the Occident
  “Horkheimer and Adorno, and latter Marcuse, interpret
   Marx in this Weberian perspective. Under the sign of
   an instrumental rationality that has become
   autonomous, the rationality of mastering nature
   merges with the irrationality of class domination.
   Fettered forces of production stabilized alienated
   relations of production. The Dialectic of Enlightenment
   removes the ambivalence that Weber still entertained
   in relation to rationalization process and it abruptly
   reverses Marx’s positive assessment. Science and
   technology ─ for Marx an unambiguously
   emancipatory potential ─ themselves become the
   medium of social repression.” (Habermas, 1984/1981,
   p. 143-144)
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

n Weber’s theory of rationalization of the
  Occident
  n   Domains of rationalization
       n   Capitalism as worldly asceticism and methodical
           enterprise of production
       n   Legal formalism
       n   Bureaucraticism
       n   Ascetical and ethical vocationalism and
           professionalism
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

n   Weber’s thesis of the construction of the human
    “Iron Cage”
      n   Ray and Reed’s thesis of the “Iron Cage” of
          bureaucratic rationalization
      n   Stephen Kalberg’s thesis of the eclipse of substantive
          rationality
      n   Horkheimer and Adorno’s thesis of Dialectic of
          Enlightenment
  Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

n Stephen Kalberg’s thesis of the eclipse of substantive
 rationality (Kalberg, 1980)
   “Practical, theoretical, and formal rationalization process strongly
    dominate substantive rationalization processes in modern Western
    societies. The Judeo-Christian world view, which provided the
    point of reference for major groupings of substantive and ethical
    rationalities as well as for the theoretical rationalization of their
    values, has been largely replaced by the scientific world view.
    …(V)alues could no longer defined as the legitimate subject matter
    of the 20th century’s major theoretical rationalization process.”
    (1173-4)
   “The banishment of these values led Weber to ask a specific
    question: ‘What type of person will -or could-survive in the modern
    cosmos?’” (p. 1175)
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

“Would this type of person be little more than a pale reflection of the
formal rationality characterizing his merely adaptive action in the
legal, economic, and scientific spheres as well bureaucratic form of
domination, and of the practical rational orientations require to
handle life’s daily task and difficulties? The type of person capable
of systematically rationalizing action ‘from within’ — in relation to a
unified value constellation — and thereby lending his or her entire
existence an unambiguous ‘direction’ and meaning as viewed by
Weber as a historical subject bound to historically and
sociologically unique traditions, cultural values, and social-
economic structures. Casting his glance down through the ages
from the perspective of the dawning of the 20th century, he saw the
fading away of the distinct configuration of sociological factors that
carried the historical subject which, to him, embodied Western
civilization’s highest ideals: the autonomous and free individual
whose actions were given continuity by their reference to ultimate
values.” (P. 1175-6)
Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

 n Thesis of eclipse of substantive rationality in
   EAP in HKSAR: The Case of the Quality
   School Education discourse in HKSAR
    n   Quality education of instrumental rationality
    n   Quality education of practical rationality
    n   Quality education of formal rationality
    n   Quality education of theoretical rationality
    n   Quality education of substantive rationality
Conception of Practical Reason:

n John Rawls distinction between rational and
  reasonable persons within the conception of
  modern man.
   n   “Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when,
       among equals say, they are ready to propose
       principles and standards as fair terms of
       cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given
       the assurance that others will likewise do so. ….The
       reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a
       system of fair cooperation and that its fair terms be
       reasonable for all to accept is part of its idea of
       reciprocity.” (1993, 49-50)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n John Rawls distinction …
  n   “The rational is, however, a distinct idea from the reasonable
      and applied to a single, unified agent (either an individual or
      corporate person) with the powers of judgment and
      deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly its own.
      The ration applies to how these ends and interests are adopted
      and affirmed, as well as to how they are given priority. It also
      applies to the choice of means, in which case it is guided by
      such familiar principles as: to adopt the most effective means
      to ends, or to select the most probable alternative, other things
      equal.” (1993, p. 50) More specifically, “what rational agents
      lack is the particular form of moral sensibility that underlies the
      desire to engage in fair cooperation. …Rational agents
      approach being psychopathic when their interests are solely in
      benefits to themselves.” (1993, p. 51) As in everyday speech,
      we may characterize rational agents that “their proposal was
      perfectly rational given their strong bargaining position, but it
      was nevertheless highly unreasonable.” (1993, 48)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n In light of Rawls’ distinction, practical reason can
  then be construed as reasons that reasoning
  agents attributed to their actions. It goes beyond
  the principle of rationality and means-end
  calculation. It conforms to the principle of
  reciprocity and fairness, which members of a
  given community mutually accepted.
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Accordingly, practical reason can be defined as
  human capacity to attribute their actions to
   n   The principle of rationality,
   n   The principle of reciprocity, and/or even
   n   The principle of fairness
Conception of Practical Reason:

n New-institutionalism and distinction between logic
  of consequence and logic of appropriateness:
  James G, March has formulated two logics to
  account for human action within institutional
  contexts. They are
   n   Logic of consequence: The logic is basically in
       congruence with the principle of rationality mentioned in
       preceding section. It refers to the reasons attributed to a
       given action are mainly preference-based. The action in
       point is evaluated primarily according to the preferences
       (desire or goal) of the actors. Furthermore, the action is
       also evaluated in light of its effectiveness in attaining the
       identified goal. In short, it is a logic based on means-end
       rational calculation. (March, 1994, Pp. 2-3)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n New-institutionalism …
  n   Logic of appropriateness: The logic is to a certain extent
      in correspondence with the principle of reciprocity
      explicated in preceding section. However, March is more
      explicit in identifying the institutional context within
      which the mutual reciprocity among members is
      constituted. That is, the reason attributed to an action
      are mainly rule-following based with reference to the
      norms and regulations of a given institutional context. In
      short, the appropriateness in point is defined by rules
      stipulated in the given institution.
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Kant and Hegel’s debate on the foundation of
  practical reason
   n   Both Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Hegel have attributed
       one essential attributes to modern agent, i.e. freedom.
       As a result, both would not have satisfied with March’s
       rule-following based logic of appropriateness. Both have
       in fact strive to seek a more fundamental (a priori) base
       for practical reason
Conception of Practical Reason:

 n   Immanuel Kant’s formulation of the fundamental base of
     practical reason in Critique on Practical Reason should be
     read in accompany with his book Critique on Pure Reason.
      n   Kant has adopted his inquiry approach in Critique on Pure
          Reason, in which he is attempting to find the foundation for
          theoretical reason. Kant attempts to found law of practice in
          human action as he has found in law of nature in scientific
          reason.
      n   Accordingly, he attempts to establish universally applied
          moral imperatives for practical reason. As Paul Ricoeur
          underlines that
           “Kant sets out on the path of the most dangerous of all
          ideas, …that the practical order is amenable to a system of
          knowledge, to a type of scientificity, comparable to the
          knowledge and science required in the theoretical
          order….that there is a science of praxis” (Ricoeur, 1991, p.
          199)
Conception of Practical Reason:

 n   Immanuel Kant’s formulation …
      n   In refuting Kant’s idea of science of practice, Paul Ricoeur
          contents that “Few ideas today are as healthy and as
          liberating as the idea that there is a practical reason but
          not a science of practice. The domain of action is from an
          ontological perspective that of changing things and from
          an epistemological perspective that of verisimilitude, in the
          sense of what is plausible and probable.” (Ricoeur, 1991,
          p. 199)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Kant and Hegel’s debate on the foundation of
  practical reason
   n   Friedrich Hegel on the other hand, reside the
       fundamental base of practical reason on (Sittlichkeit)
       “concrete ethical life”
        n   Hegel resides the idea of concrete ethical life in the
            concept of the State. It is “a political institution in which
            the individual find meaning and satisfaction. The core of
            this institution is the constitution of a Sate of Law in
            which the will of each individual recognizes itself in the
            will of all.” (Ricoeur, p. 203) Accordingly, it is the State
            and its embodiment of will of all, which provides the
            fundament base for practical reason of modern agents.
Conception of Practical Reason:

  n   Friedrich Hegel on the other hand, reside the
      fundamental base of practical reason on (Sittlichkeit)
      “concrete ethical life”
       n   However, Paul Ricoeur underlines that “Without saying
           with Marx that Hegel simply projected an ideal State that
           conceals its deviation from the real State, I shall say that
           Hegel describes the State in its inchoate state and with
           its inherent tendencies, already there but not yet
           developed, without giving the reasons for its difficult
           establishment. Now not only does this State scarcely
           progress, but it regresses in actual fact. In our own day
           we see the very idea of an institutional mediation of
           freedom regress in people’s thoughts and desires.”
           (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 203)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Paul Ricoeur’s conception of practical reason as
  critique: Having criticized both Kant and Hegel’s
  theses on the foundation of practical reason, Paul
  Ricoeur reformulates the foundation of practical
  reason as follows
   n   Practical reason as dialectic of freedonm and institutions:
       Paul Ricoeur founds the foundation of practical reason on
       Max Weber’s concept of legitimate order, which generates
       and accumulates from concrete human interactions and
       institutions. Accordingly, Ricoeur suggests
        n   “This epistemological individualism seems to me better able
            to resolve dialectically the problem of freedom and the
            institutions, to the extent that institutions appear as
            objectifications, even reifications, of intersubjective relations
            that never presuppose…a supplement of mind.” (Ricoeur,
            1991, p. 204)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Paul Ricoeur’s conception of practical reason as
  critique:
   n   Practical reason as dialectic of freedom & institutions: …
        n   As a result, “the fate of practical reason is henceforth played
            out on the level of the process of objectification and
            reification in the course of which institutional mediations
            become alien to the desire for satisfaction of individuals.
            Practical reason, I shall say, is the set of measures taken by
            individuals and institutions to preserve and restore the
            reciprocal dialectic of freedom and institutions, outside of
            which there is no meaningful action.” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 205)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Paul Ricoeur’s conception of practical reason …
   n   Reallocating practical reason to a “intermediary status”:
        n   Having allocated the foundation of practical reason on
            concrete intersubjective relations (or the life world) among
            ordinary members of the community, the State is no
            longer construed as the objective Mind, which supersedes
            the practical minds of its citizens. In stead, the state with
            its legitimized practical reason “remains …inseparable
            from the network of the interactions among individuals
            and shares the probabilistic character of all anticipations
            concerning the course of human affairs.” (Ricoeur, 1991,
            p. 205)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Paul Ricoeur’s conception of practical reason …
   n   Reallocating practical reason to a “intermediary status”:
       …..
        n   As a result, “practical reason …must not elevate its claims
            beyond the median zone that extends between the science
            of immutable and necessary things and arbitrary opinions,
            both of collectivities and individuals. The
            acknowledgement of this intermediary status of practical
            reason is the guarantee of its sobriety and of its openness
            of discussion and criticism.” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 206)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Paul Ricoeur’s conception of practical reason …
   n   Practical reason as critique: Accepting its dialectical
       nature and intermediary status, practical reason can then
       recover its critical function.
        n   “The critical function of practical reason is to unmask the
            hidden mechanism of distortion through which the
            legitimate objectification of the communal bound
            becomes an intolerable alienation.” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 206)
        n   By legitimate objectification, it refers to “the set of
            principles, rules, and symbolic mediations that found the
            identity of a human community.” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 206)
Conception of Practical Reason:

n Paul Ricoeur’s conception of practical reason …
   n   Practical reason as critique: ….
        n   By alienation, it refers to “the systematic distortions that
            prevent the individual from harmonizing the autonomy of
            her will with the demands coming from these symbolic
            mediations. It is here…that what has been what has bben
            termed ‘ideology critique’ is to be incorporated into
            practical reason as its critical moment.” (Ricoeur, 19191,
            p. 206)
Conception of Practical Reason:

 n   Conception of ideology critique:
      n   According to Paul Ricoeur’s conception (see also Ricoeur,
          1991, Pp. 246-269), ideology “as second-order systems of
          representation” of social actions with institutions, it has
          embodied both positive and negative functions in the
          constitution of practical reason.
            § The positive function of ideology refers to the function of
              integrating various social relations into the communal bonds
              of institutions. It provides “cognitive validity” and
              “normative dignity” to practical reason supporting the
              regular and resilient patterns of interactions in institutional
              contexts.
            § The negative function of ideology refers to the function of
              mystifying and rationalizing social relations, which have
              been reified and alienated from the spontaneous and
              harmonious social bonds of the lifeworld of the community.
              It refers to the ‘false consciousness’ forging around the
              apparatuses of the real state, as the Marxists have aptly
              underlined.
Conception of Practical Reason:

 n   Conception of ideology critique:
      n   “Ideology critique is then to attack the roots of these
          systematic distortions, at the level of the hidden relations
          between work, power, and language.” (Ricoeur, 1991, Pp.
          206-7) “Ideology critique is …one of the instruments of
          though by which practical reason can be transformed
          from knowledge to critique. One must then speak not so
          much of the critique of practical reason but of practical
          reason as critique..” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 207)
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

n Conceptions of rationality
   n   “When we use the expression ‘rational’, we suppose that
       there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge.
       Rationality has less to do with the possession of knowledge
       than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and
       use knowledge. In linguistic utterances knowledge is
       expressed explicitly; in goal-directed actions an ability, an
       implicit knowledge is expressed. … The close relation
       between knowledge and rationality suggests that the
       rationality of an expression depends on the reliability of the
       knowledge embodied in it. ” ( Habermas, 1984, P.8)
   n   “Rationality is understood to be a disposition of speaking
       and acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behavior
       for which there are good reasons or ground.” (p.22)
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

n Habermas’ classification of rationality
   n   Cognitive-instrumental rationality:
        n   “A goal-directed action can be rational only if the actors
            satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his intention to
            intervene successfully in the world.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 11)
            Accordingly, there are two conditions for the success of an
            teleological (goal-directed) action
               § Cognitive condition: True propositions of the conditions
                 necessary for the realization of the intervention.
               § Instrumental condition: The effectiveness of carrying out the
                 interventions, i.e. teleological actions.
        n   Definition of cognitive-instrumental rationality: “The concept
            of cognitive-instrumental rationality …carries with it
            connotations of successful self-maintenance made possible
            by informed disposition over, and intelligent adaptation to,
            conditions of a contingent environment.” (p.10)
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

nConceptions of rationality
  n   Communicative rationality:
       n   “An assertion can be called rational if the speakers satisfies
           the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal
           of reaching an understanding about something in the world
           with at least one other participant in communication.”
           (Habermas, 1984, p. 11)
       n   Definition of communicative rationality: “Concept of
           communicative rationality carries with it connotation based
           ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained,
           unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative
           speech, in which different participants overcome their
           merely subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of
           rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both
           the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of
           their lifeworld.” (p. 10)
Habermas’ Conceptions of Communicative Rationality




Actor         Mutual understanding         Another Actor
                 and consensus



            Reasonable, well-grounded, &
            unconstrained argumentations



                Communicative
                  Rationality
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

nRationality and the world
  n Realist's objective world: The realist worldview
    “starts from the ontological presupposition of the
    world as the sum total of what is the case and
    clarifies the conditions of the rational behavior on
    this basis. ...On this model rational actions
    basically have the character of goal-directed,
    feedback-controlled interventions in world of
    existing states of affairs.” (1984, p. 11-12)
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

nRationality and the world
  n Phenomenologist's lifeworld: “The phenomenologist
    does not ...simply begin with the ontological
    presupposition of an objective world; he makes this a
    problem by inquiring into the conditions under which
    the unity of an objective world is constituted for the
    members of a community. The world gains objectivity
    only through counting as one and the same world for a
    community of speaking and acting subjects. ...Through
    communicative practice they assure themselves at the
    same time of their common life-relations, of an
    subjectively shared lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded
    by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the
    members as knowledge.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 12-13)
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

n Habermas’ theory of argumentation: Validity-claims
 of communicative rationality:
  n   “I believe that the concept of communicative
      rationality ...can be adequately explicated only in
      terms of a theory of argumentation.” (1984, p. 18)
  n   “We use the term argumentation for that type of
      speech in which participants thematize contested
      validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize
      them through arguments. An argument contains
      reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic
      way with the validity claim of a problematic
      expression.” (1984, p. 18)
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

n Habermas’ theory of argumentation: Validity-claims
 of communicative rationality:
  n   Types of argumentation: Habermas has differentiated
      argumentation into the following types
       n   Theoretical discourse: It refers to the form of
           argumentations in which controversies over validity
           claims of “truth of propositions and/or efficacy of
           teleological actions” are thematized and if positive
           settled.
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

n Habermas’ theory of argumentation:
   n Types of argumentation:
     n   Practical discourse: It refers to form of argumentations
         undertaken in existing normative contexts or moral-
         practical spheres. Accordingly, controversies over
         validity claims are appealed to the “rightness” of
         expressions within particular normative contexts and
         moral-practical rules.
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

n Habermas’ theory of argumentation:
   n Types of argumentation:
     n   Evaluative criticism: There are situations in which the
         validity of an expressions is neither appealed to the truth
         or efficacy in objective world nor to the rightness in
         normative contexts but to specific set of value standards
         shared among members of particular culture and
         language communities. Habermas has specified
         aesthetic criticism as the prototypical case of this form
         of argumentation. In this form of argumentation the
         adequacy of the set standard of values to be used will be
         asserted, criticized, debated and if possible accepted.
Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality

n Habermas’ theory of argumentation:
   n Types of argumentation:
     n   Therapeutic critique: In the case of private and/or self-
         presenting expressions, their validity claims will be
         based on the truthfulness and sincerity of the speakers.
         The prototypical case of therapeutic critique, which
         Habermas specifies, is critique employed by
         psychotherapists to distinguish their clients’ self-
         deceptive and/or illusive utterances from truthful and/or
         sincere expressions.
     n   Explicative discourse: It refers to “ a form of
         argumentation in which the comprehensibility, well-
         formedness or rule-correctness of symbolic expressions
         is no longer naively supposed or contested but is
         thematized as a controversial claim.” (1984, p.22)
John Forester’s Application of Habermas’
Theory of Communication to Policy Planning

n Reinstating communicative rationality in
  educational administration and policy
   n   John Forester's thesis of systemic distortion of
       communication
   n   Forester's formulation of practical
       communicative action in policy and planning
        n   The content of practical communicative action
             § Factual claim of truth
             § Rhetorical claim of comprehensibility
        n   The context of practical communicative action
             § Political claim of legitimacy
             § Expressive claim of sincerity
Forester’s Communicative Distortion
Debate between
John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas

n In 1993 John Rawls published his book Political
  Liberalism. And 1995 Jurgen Habermas published
  a “Remark on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism”
  in Journal of Philosophy Vol. 92 (3), Pp. 109-131.
  On the same issue of the journal John Rawls
  wrote a “Reply to Habermas.” (Pp. 132-180)
Debate between
John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas

n Locating this debate within the discussion on the
  foundation of practical reason, we can see that
  there are two distinct foundations of practical
  reason, namely
   n   Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality and
       ethics, , which emphasizes the procedural
       rationality and ethics necessary for the reciprocal
       and consensual foundation of practical reason.
   n   John Rawls’s theory of justice, which emphasizes
       the substantive foundation in constituting practical
       reason, namely justice
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 價值、理想與道德
  n 價值:「大體上說來,一切具價值之事物,
    都是人所欲得的,人所尋求的、喜悅的、愛
    護的、讚美的、或崇敬的。簡言之,即都是
    人所欲或所好的。一切具負價值或反價值之
    事物,則都是人所不欲得的,人所不尋求的
    、厭棄的、憎恨的、貶斥的、鄙視的。簡言
    之,即都是人所不欲或所惡的」。(唐君毅
    ,2005a,頁707)
  n 理想:則是個人認定並力求實現的一種具 價
    值的境界。
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 價值、理想與道德
  n 道德價值是價值的一種,一種個人在 自己行
    為生活中,所欲或所好者。「孟子說: 『可
    欲之謂善』」,就可理解為道德價值(特別
    是善德價值)的定義。(唐君毅, 2005a,
    頁708)
  n 道德理想就是「欲其實現於我之行為生活。
    然此理想乃我自心所建立,乃我 自己對自己
    之所命。」(唐君毅,2005 b., 頁443)
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 道德意識
  就是指當「一道德理想…昭臨於吾人之現實自
  我之前,並有普遍性言,固 …當稱為一客觀之理
  想。然此客觀理想,乃我心之所建立,乃我自己
  對我之所命。我之如是建立理想以自命,宛若求
  此理想之自上至下而貫徹於現實自我之中。故吾
  人復可自覺此理想為內在吾人之整個道德自我者
  。」(唐君毅,2005b, 頁443)簡言之,就是
  把一道德理想客觀化,並「建立理想以自命。」
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 道德自覺
  就是指把道德意識及理想,自覺地貫轍到「自
  己支配、改造、主宰自己之志行中。」例如,「
  道德上善之價值,…皆表現於自己對自己之支配
  ,改造或主宰上。自覺道德上之善,表現於 自覺
  的以自己支配、改造、主宰自己之志行 中。(
  2005b, 頁440)
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 道德自我
 n   道德自我是一超越個別工具性的自我,並能統攝諸
     活動的最高層次的道德自覺 。「最初之自覺的善不
     善之觀念,乃所以判斷吾人之活動之方式者。而吾
     人初所覺之活動之方式,即達一目的之手段之方式
     。故吾人初所謂善不善之觀念,乃所以 判斷吾人達
     一目的之手段。此手段亦即包含目的於其中之整個
     活動之一部,而非吾人整個活動之全體或本身。而
     吾人之能對吾人一活動之全體或本身,作不善之道
     德判斷,必待吾人之超越一活動而統攝諸活動之自
     我之呈現。」(2005b., 頁451)
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 道德自我
 n   因此,道德自我就是一「涵蓋通觀將來之自我與他
     人之判斷之自我,即為一至高無上之權衡一切善下
     善,而作道德判斷之一獨立不倚之自我。此自我之
     初呈現,即呈為一超越當下之自我之活動,而涵蓋
     通觀此時之自我活動,與他時之自我及他人自我之
     活動之關係之自我。」( 2005b, 頁452)
 n   道德自我不單只是「判斷善不善之 知的自我,同時
     為一善善惡不善之行的自我…。此自我既能善善惡
     不善,則為一絕對善,而具備善於其自身之自我。
     此即為一道德自我」。( 2005b, 頁453)
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 道德理性:
 n   「吾人上所言:能判斷吾人之活動之善不善而善
     善惡不善之自我,即吾人 道德理性自我,亦吾
     人之良知。吾人之活動之善者即合理者,不善
     者即不合理者。蓋所謂合理之活動,即自覺為
     能普遍建立之活動,而所謂自覺為能普遍建立
     之活動,即自覺能為不同時之吾之自我與他人
     之自我所同肯定之活動。」( 2005b, 頁453)
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 道德理性:
 n   「吾人真自覺求吾之活動為合理而出自理性自
     我,亦必求所成就之活動,亦合理而出自一理
     性自我。故吾人求吾人之活動之成為 普遍建立
     者,即一方求其能為不同時之自我、他人之自
     我所肯定承認;一方求吾人之活動能為不同時
     之理性自我,他人之理性自我所可普遍建立於
     其自身──即普遍建立於一切人類之理性自我
     自身者。由是,而吾人運用 道德理性以判斷吾
     人之活動之是否合理,吾人所當考究者,即吾
     人活動是否可為我之理性自我及他人之理性自
     我所同肯定承認,並普遍建立於一切人類之理
     性自我之上一點。」(2005b, 頁454)
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 道德理性:
 n   「故吾人之考慮吾人之活動之善不善,可自此
     活動是否能促進成就其他之活動上考慮,可自
     此活動是否能在普遍的人類之理性自我上建立
     考慮。亦可自此活動是否能真得我之 良知之印
     證,是否能慊足於我之良知上考慮。三者之義
     ,原是一貫。自哲學上言之,第一即功利主義
     之觀點,第二即理性主義之觀點,第三即直覺
     主義、良知主義之觀點。然吾人則會通之為一
     ,而分三層次說。」(2005b, 頁455)
唐君毅對道德理性的理解


 道德價值    道德理想      道德意識    道德自覺


            道德活動

         涵蓋通觀、獨立不倚於個
         別道德活動之 道德自我

個人                         道德理性自我

        能判斷道德活動「有所成就」、「普
         遍成立」及「良知印正」之自覺性


            道德理性
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 唐君毅道德理性的重要性
   n 對照於 Weber的主宰外在現實的 purposive-instrumental
     rationality及Habermas的實現存在於社群間的 mutual
     understanding及intersubjectivity ;唐君毅的道德理性
     則是不是一種「往外用的力量」而是一種「往內用
     」及內注的力量。
唐君毅對道德理性的理解

n 唐君毅道德理性的重要性
 n   「什麽是真正的道德生活?自覺的自己支配自己,是爲道德生活。
     但是你要求自己支配自己, 你必須有如下的認識:
     你首先當認識:支配自己是比支配世界更偉大的工作。西方的諺語 “
     拿破侖能支配世界,然而不能支配自己 ”,因爲他不能控制他困在島
     上時的鬱悶。
     你能支配世界、戰勝世界,只是表示你的意志力,能破除外界一切阻
     礙。而支配自己、戰勝自己,則表示你能主宰 “用以破除外界一切阻
     礙之意志力”之本身。
     所以支配自己,是比支配世界更偉大的工作。
     我們常人的習慣,總是想把力量往外用,總想對外界有所支配。這同
     自覺的道德生活,是極端相反的。我們若不求自覺的道德生活則已;
     如欲求自覺的道德生活,我們首先要把我們全部的生活習慣,翻轉過
     來,把力量往內用。所以我們首先要把支配自己的價值,看成比支配
     世界高,去作如上之思維。」(唐君毅, 2005c, 頁11)
 Topic 4
Rationality




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