FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

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					                 COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
                              Table of Contents
The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), established 27 November 2002, has a
Web site at http://www.ncix.gov. The site provides access to current and back issues of
Counterintelligence News and Developments (CIND) from November 1995 and to the
organization's Annual Report to Congress from the report for 1995.

A private sector Web site with news items of counterintelligence interest is located at
http://www.cicentre.com.

                   FBI                               CIA: Angleton
                   U.S. Espionage Cases              Soviet Spies
                   To the 1970s                      1970s-1980s
                   1990s: A - G                      1990s: H - O
                   1990s: P - Z
                   Stasi Materials                   Military CI
                   2000s: A - J                      2000s: K - Q
                   2000s: R - Z                      2010s

http://intellit.muskingum.edu/ci_folder/citoc.html




                     FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

                                    Table of Contents

The FBI has added pages devoted to its first 100 years of existence to its Web site
(http://www.fbi.gov). The site "covers the 'Bureau of Investigation's' history since its
inception..., and includes a section that details each of the bureau's directors through the
years.... The site also includes a 'Hall of Honor' dedicated to the FBI agents that have been
killed in the line of duty, as well as a detailed history of the bureau's seal." Dan Campbell,
"FBI Celebrates Centennial with Web Site," Government Computer News, 7 Apr. 2008.

                    References                       Interwar Period
                    World War II                     Postwar to 1989
                    1990s                            2000s
                    2010s                            Counterintelligence
                    U.S. Espionage Cases             Domestic Security
                    Intelligence Liaison             Other Topics

          Return to Counterintelligence Table of Contents

          Return to Main Table of Contents

http://intellit.muskingum.edu/fbi_folder/1fbitoc.html




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                            Reference Materials
Included here:

1. Electronic References

2. Print References

1. Electronic References

The FBI has Websites at: http://www.fbi.gov/ and http://foia.fbi.gov. The latter site
provides access to materials released under FOIA on such subject categories as
"Espionage," "Famous Persons," and "Historical Interest."

 Campbell, Dan. "FBI Celebrates Centennial with Web Site." Government Computer News, 7
Apr. 2008. [http://www.gcn.com]

The FBI "has updated its Web site with pages devoted to its first 100 years of existence. The
Web site covers the 'Bureau of Investigation's' history since its inception..., and includes a
section that details each of the bureau's directors through the years.... The site also includes a
'Hall of Honor' dedicated to the FBI agents that have been killed in the line of duty, as well as a
detailed history of the bureau's seal." See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/history.

2. Print References

 Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall. COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's
Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States. Boston: South End Press, 1990.

       From advertisement: "Hundreds of FBI documents reveal that the Black Panthers, the
       American Indian Movement (AIM), and other domestic organizations have been victims
       of FBI repression."

  DuPree, Sherry Sherrod, and Herbert C. DuPree. Exposed!!! Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) Unclassified Reports on Churches and Church Leaders. Washington, DC: Middle Atlantic
Regional Press, 1993.

       In the judgment of Theoharis, JAH 80.4, this book of reprinted documents "is of limited
       value." The DuPrees' "introduction to the forty-three pages of reprinted FBI documents is
       perfunctory, and they offer no rationale for the selection of specific case files and for
       reprinting the specific documents. Their sample is neither comprehensive nor
       representative.... [T]he prospective researcher will more profitably consult Unlocking the
       Files of the FBI," by Haines and Langbart.

 Haines, Gerald K., and David A. Langbart. Unlocking the Files of the FBI: A Guide to Its
Records and Classification System. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1993.

       According to Surveillant 3.2/3, this is the "first comprehensive guide to the records of the
       FBI.... Highly recommended." Theoharis, JAH 80.4, comments that the expertise of
       Haines and Langbart "on the records management practices of federal agencies and their
       specific knowledge of FBI records maintenance and classification procedures make their
       guide an invaluable reference work... The editors, however, do not fully describe the
       disposition of, and make minor errors in their profiles on, some of the FBI's most
       sensitive records."

 Hogue, Henry B. Nomination and Confirmation of the FBI Director: Process and Recent
History. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2005.

 Theoharis, Athan G. The FBI: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide. New York:
Garland, 1994.

Rosswurm, I&NS 11.2, says that "Theoharis knows more about the history of the FBI than
anyone else. This guide reflects this knowledge. It is a must for novice and expert alike."

 Theoharis, Athan G., ed., with Tony G. Poveda, Richard Gid Powers, and Susan Rosenfeld.
The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide - - From J. Edgar Hoover to the X-Files. New
York: Oryx, 2000.
Jonkers, AFIO WIN 15, 16 Apr. 2000, recommends this "excellent," "informed," and "readable"
overview.

 Quirk, John P. FBI Glossary. Guilford, CT: Foreign Intelligence Press, 1988.




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                  World War II
See the "WWII/Pearl Harbor/Tricycle" file for materials relating to Dusko Popov.

Additional materials concerning German intelligence and sabotage operations against the
United States and Great Britain are available at World War
II/Europe/Germany/Operations: A-F and G-Z.

 Breuer, William B. Hitler's Underground War: The Nazi Espionage Invasion of the U.S. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. Nazi Spies in America: Hitler's Undercover War. New York: St.
Martin's, 1990. [pb]

       Surveillant 1.2 notes that Breuer tells the "story of how the FBI, working with Army and
       Navy Intelligence, took on [a] massive Nazi spy apparatus." Kross, IJI&C 5.1, adds that
       the "covert German penetration of the United States is splendidly detailed."

 Farago, Ladislas. The Game of the Foxes: The Untold Story of German Espionage in the
United States and Great Britain During World War II. New York: David McKay, 1971. London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1972.

For Constantinides, this is a book of "uneven quality, controversial claims, and questionable
conclusions.... The author had a penchant for the dramatic and for exaggeration.... The book's
principal fault is that it distorts the reality of German intelligence's effectiveness ... and gets
some of the details wrong as well." Sexton refers to The Game of the Foxes as a "misleading but
popular account of German espionage and double agency in the United States and Great Britain."

 Hart, Scott. Washington at War, 1941-45. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

Wilcox: "Account of FBI activities during World War II."

  Lawless, Jill. "WWII British Spies Frustrated by FBI." Associated Press, 4 Sep. 2007.
[http://www.ap.com]
Newly declassified files released on 4 September 2007 by the British National Archives "chart
the rocky early years of the relationship" between the FBI and the British Security Service (MI5)
"and show how cooperation improved over the course of the war."

 MacDonnell, Francis. Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Hansen, History 26.1, calls Insidious Foes "the first comprehensive treatment" of the Fifth
Column scare in the United States between 1938 and 1942. MacDonnell's work "is notable for its
judicious argument, cohesive organization, and enlarged perspective."

 Rachlis, Eugene. They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight Nazi Saboteurs in America. New York:
Random House, 1961.

Wilcox: "How they were caught, what happened to them."

 Ramsey, R.W.R. "German Espionage in South America, 1939-45." Army Quarterly 118 (Jan.
1988): 55-59. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/ww2/genmisc.htm]

  Ronnie, Art. Counterfeit Hero: Fritz Duquesne, Adventurer and Spy. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1995.

Clark comment: Duquesne is best known from the classic 1945 movie "The House on 92nd
Street," as the central figure in a ring of 33 Nazi spies arrested in New York in 1941.

Cutler, Proceedings 121.11 (Nov. 1995), notes that "Ronnie delved deep into prison records,
government documents, and personal letters to create this unusual biography of a man who was
eventually arrested in what J. Edgar Hoover described as 'the greatest spy roundup in U.S.
history.'" To Chambers, Counterfeit Hero is a "carefully researched and highly readable
demythologizing of Fritz Duquesne." Click for Chambers' full review. Bates, NIPQ 14.3, finds
that Ronnie "has done a fine job of writing" a story "befogged with Fritz's fabrications." The
author "will tell of an episode according to Fritz, then put in a documented fact which makes
Fritz's story impossible."

 Rout, Leslie B., Jr., and John F. Bratzel. Shadow War: German Espionage and United States
Counterespionage in Latin America during World War II. Frederick, MD: University
Publications of America, 1986.

Haglund, I&NS 4.3, finds that the authors have provided excessive detail ("almost numbing") in
this "definitive study" of the "wartime German-American undercover rivalry" in Mexico, Brazil,
Chile, and Argentina. The work "could use a bit more analysis and synthesis."

 Turrou, Leon G., as told to David G. Wittels. Espionage for the Führer: Undercover in
America. [UK]: Allborough Publishing, 1992. Vol. 2 in the Allborough Espionage Series.
Surveillant 2.5: "A new edition of Nazi Spy Conspiracy in America. In the U.S. this was first
published in 1938 by Random House under the title Nazi Spies in America."

 Washburn, Patrick S. "J. Edgar Hoover and the Black Press in World War II." Journalism
History 13, no. 1 (1986): 26-33.

Calder says this article discusses "the FBI's activities concerning the Black press and suspected
illegal activities and alleged ties with the American Communist Party."

  Webb, G. Gregg. "Effective Interagency Collaboration: Intelligence Liaison between the FBI
and State, 1940-44." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol49no3/html_files/FBI_State_3.htm]

"In a community famous for its deep fissures and debilitating rivalries, the working relationship
forged between the Department of State and the Special Intelligence Service of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in Latin America during World War II is both unique and instructive."

  Webb, G. Gregg. "New Insights into J. Edgar Hoover's Role: The FBI and Foreign
Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 1 (2004): 45-58.

Established in 1940, the FBI's Special Intelligence Service (SIS) collected "political, economic,
financial, and industrial intelligence throughout Central and South America" during World War
II. The author argues that historians have attributed to Hoover "a more aggressive interest in
expanding his purview overseas than the record supports."




                     FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

                                Materials from the 1990s

                                     Table of Contents

 General Overviews:

 A-Q
 R-Z

 Reportage by Year:

 1990 -1998

 1999

 Edwin Earl Pitts Spy Case (1996)




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                            General Overviews
                                           1990s
                                              A-Q
 Aldrich, Gary. Unlimited Access: An FBI Agent Inside the Clinton White House. Washington,
DC: Regnery, 1998.

 Barron, John. Operation SOLO: The FBI's Man in the Kremlin. Washington, DC: Regnery,
1996.

        Surveillant 4.3 notes that this is the story of "Morris Childs, who, along with his wife
        Eva, and his brother, Jack, provided the U.S. with secrets for 27 years" from his position
        as editor of the Daily Worker. Childs traveled to Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and
        Cuba and met many of the communist leaders of his day. Although intelligence scholars
        will question the operation's level of importance, Barron's book, reviews of the book, and
        future accounts will "help clarify" SOLO's "role in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold
        War years." For Fontaine, WIR 15.3, Operation SOLO is "a must-read for anyone even
        remotely interested in intelligence."

        On the other side of the evaluation scale, Fischer, IJI&C 10.4, raises the question, "How
        much should be believed of this carelessly written, factually incorrect, and undocumented
        book?... The problem with Barron's account is that much of it is 'inherently implausible'
        (Theodore Draper), some absolutely impossible, and none of it totally confirmable....
        Operation SOLO is replete with non sequiturs and many major and minor errors that
        damage its credibility."
       Other reviewers offer a range of opinion on the book: See, for example, Arnold
       Beichman, "The Incredible Saga of Our Super Spy in Moscow," Washington Times, 9
       Mar. 1996, C1; Theodore Draper, "Our Man in Moscow," New York Review of Books, 9
       May 1996, 4; Harvey Klehr, "Comrade Heroes; Operation SOLO: The FBI's Man in the
       Kremlin," American Spectator, Mar. 1996, 70-72; Richard Gid Powers, "Double Agent,"
       New York Times Book Review, 21 Apr. 1996, 20; and Jeff Stein, "Spy in the Ointment,"
       Washington Post, 23 Apr. 1996, D2.

  Bly, Herman O. Communism, the Cold War, and the FBI Connection: Time to Set the Record
Straight. Lafayette, LA: Huntington House, 1998.

 Breuer, William B. J. Edgar Hoover and His G-Men. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995.

       Surveillant 4.3 says this book focuses "on the law enforcement side of the FBI.... This is
       a sweeping, laudatory tribute to Hoover and his many hand-picked agents." For Wannall,
       WIR 14.3, the author's theme of Hoover's revitalization of the FBI is very congenial. He
       believes that the "bureau, rejuvenated under Hoover's leadership and managerial ability,...
       achieved remarkable successes." Breuer has countered "the barrage of vilification that has
       been heaped" on Hoover "in an objective and factual manner."

 DeLoach, Cartha D. ("Deke"). Hoover's FBI: The Inside Story by Hoover's Trusted Lieutenant.
Washington, DC: Regnery, 1995. 1997. [pb]

       Wannall, Periscope 21.2, says DeLoach makes "a powerful presentation of factual data
       and well-documented conclusions." The author presents "an unbiased portrait" of Hoover
       whose "faults are clearly defined.... On the other hand, DeLoach ... has forcefully
       presented facts which explain and vindicate Hoover's decisions and actions which have
       been interpreted by his detractors in ... derogatory and vilifying terms." In the process, the
       author "put[s] the lie to the ... smear allegations of homosexuality and cross-dressing" of
       Anthony Summers' Official and Confidential. This book "makes excellent reading and
       should dispel many of the wild rumors that thus far have denied Hoover his proper niche
       in American history."

       For Surveillant 4.2, "this precise, highly readable narrative is the most authentic account
       in some time.... [I]t will disappoint [both] rabid FBI haters and uncritical Hoover
       worshippers.... Highly recommended."

 Gentry, Curt. J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets. New York: Norton, 1991. New York:
Truman Talley/Plume, 1992. [pb] New York: Norton, 2001. [pb]

       Clark comment: There is much here, perhaps too much. It is difficult at times to separate
       the sourced from the unsourced from the purely speculative. The following is one of
       many such examples -- this one occurring in the space of less than two pages: "What
       happened ... during the next few days can only be surmised.... would obviously ...
       Typically,... would have.... would surely be ... presumably saw ... Perhaps ... is the likely
       approach ... would have been ... may have ... must have ... would have been...." Parsing
       this huge (760 pages of text) and sprawling work for what is and is not on the mark might
       well require as much research as went into the book itself, although the retelling of earlier
       events (up to 1945) gives the impression of being sounder than some of what follows.

       Surveillant 2.1 calls Gentry's work "[a]n impressive, comprehensive account -- hostile
       but fairer than expected." Nonetheless, the author "presents more of a caricature of
       Hoover than the man deserves." Similarly, Elson, Time, 14 Oct. 1991, notes that Gentry
       "generally is better at describing what the director did than at analyzing what made him
       tick."

       For O'Reilly, Policy Studies Journal 21.3, Gentry's is "by far the best Hoover
       biography ... but we cannot learn much about the director and civil rights from a writer
       who has either never heard of Selma ... or simply cannot keep the movement's seminal
       events straight." Wannall, FILS 11.2, calls the book a "gathering of gossip and
       undocumented allegations." The "principal source ... was William C. Sullivan," who was
       a "biased, vengeful person." Yet Wannall, The Real J. Edgar Hoover (2000), p. 185, also
       refers to Gentry as "one of the less-biased chroniclers of Hoover's life and career."

 Jeffreys, Diarmuid. The Bureau: Inside the Modern FBI. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995. The
Bureau: Inside Today's FBI. London: Macmillan, 1995.

       Harter, Surveillant 4.2, notes that the focus of the book is criminal investigations.
       "Readers searching for ... views on the modern FBI's foreign counterintelligence program
       will be sorely disappointed." The single chapter on the subject "centers on the
       controversial CISPES and Iran-Contra investigations, not your typical counterintelligence
       cases." A second Surveillant 4.2 reviewer concludes that the book is "useful for browsing
       but hard to read all the way through. And in the end [the author] provides nothing new on
       the Bureau."

 Kessler, Ronald. The FBI: Inside the World's Most Powerful Law Enforcement Agency. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. Expanded and updated. The FBI: Inside the World's Most
Powerful Law Enforcement Agency - By the Award-Winning Journalist Whose Investigation
Brought Down FBI Director William S. Sessions. New York: Pocket Books, 1994. [pb]

       Surveillant 3.4/5 sees this as "magazine style material, topical and current." It is a
       "readable blend of dialog, fact, history, opinion, surprising revelation, gossip, and
       accounts of outright malfeasance and scandal.... While much of the book does not deal
       with the intelligence side of the Bureau, the ongoing and highly sensitive MEGAHUT
       operation is uncovered here." Surveillant 4.1 adds that new material is found in the
       Epilogue of the updated paperback. "Kessler surfaces ... the possible hiring, under
       pressure by [FBI director Louis] Freeh, of two ex-drug addict associates."

       For NameBase "Kessler's unprecedented access ... has produced one of the few books to
       concentrate on the years since J. Edgar Hoover's death in 1972. Although there's a
       recruitment-poster quality in Kessler's description of hero agents, this book redeems itself
       by ... describing how things work at the FBI's various departments and major field offices.
       Whatever one thinks about Kessler's 'inside' books..., at least he's thorough."

 North, Mark. Act of Treason: The Role of J. Edgar Hoover in the Assassination of President
Kennedy. New York: Carroll & Graf, 1990.

       Athan G. Theoharis is probably the most widely published, best known, and persistent
       critic of the FBI and Hoover. In his review of this book, Theoharis, WPNWE, 23-29 Dec.
       1991, concludes: "Because of the author's research deficiencies, we are presented with a
       book based on tortuous reasoning and unsupported speculation. To offer this as evidence
       of Hoover's 'role' in the Kennedy assassination requires a leap of faith that only the most
       cynical will make."




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                            General Overviews
                                          1990s
                                             R-Z

  Revel, Oliver Buck, with Dwight Williams. A G-Man's Journal: A Legendary Career Inside
the FBI -- From the Kennedy Assassination to the Oklahoma City Bombing. New York: Pocket
Books, 1998.

 Riebling, Mark. Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA. New York: Knopf,
1994. Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA
Has Endangered National Security. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone, 2002. [pb]




Richard Gid Powers, WPNWE, 7-13 Nov. 1994, calls Wedge a "lively and engaging narrative of
interagency bungling, infighting, [etc.] in every known intelligence case." Unfortunately,
Riebling has turned his material into "a series of '[f]or the loss of a nail the war was lost' stories."
For example, he picks up the old and dismissed tale of Popov's Pearl Harbor questionnaire. "Just
as misguided and illogical is his thesis that the Kennedy assassination could have been prevented
if the CIA had only passed on to the FBI the news that an official at the Soviet embassy in
Mexico City who talked to Oswald shortly before the assassination was a KGB agent attached to
Soviet death squads.... This points to Riebling's ... unfamiliarity with authorities like Gordon
Prange or Gerald Posner, who have laid to rest so much of this tedious conspiracy-theorizing....
The real story in these superficially exciting revelations of official secrets is that there is no story
-- the squabbles between ... Hoover and ... Donovan's many successors do not explain the history
of our time."

Surveillant 3.6 says that some of its "reviewers did not find [the author's] research and fact-
checking sufficiently rigorous.... 'He does not evaluate ... his sources.... He also repeats errors
which have been long since discussed in public print and corrected.... [He has] produced another
book on a subject of which he knows very little, and understands less.... For example, he states
that the U.S. has the only intelligence and security service in the world which divides
counterintelligence into domestic responsibility ... and foreign responsibility.... The author could
not be further from the truth.... [E]rrors of fact ... also lead to errors of interpretation.'"

For McGehee, CIABASE, January 1995 Update Report, this book is "so rife with unsupported
data and conclusions - it loses all credibility." Periscope 20.2 notes that Sam Papich "disagrees
with the author's specific conclusions concerning both the Popov case and the JFK/Oswald case
as well as his concluding views." Nonetheless, Papich believes he was treated fairly and the book
is worth reading. James E. Nolen comments that after 1972 "the liaison role diminished in
importance precisely because a broad exchange at all levels in the field and at Headquarters was
developing." W. Raymond Wannell notes that it is "unfortunate the author did not pursue his
research to the point of eliminating rumor, speculation and biased sources.... Riebling missed the
boat."

Beschloss, NYTBR, 6 Nov. 1994, comments that this "thoroughly researched narrative ... is
constructed as a series of tales, peopled by picaresque figures from Ian Fleming to Oliver North."
According to Riebling, "the Nixon White House quietly encouraged the two agencies to
encroach on each other's territory." The author "succeeds ... in persuading the reader that the
F.B.I.-C.I.A. conflict was a more important piece of the cold war mosaic than heretofore noted
by historians."

According to Robbins, CIRA Newsletter 20.2, "readers of the innumerable exposes of infighting
within the American intelligence community" will find "little in Wedge that is actually new.
First-time author Riebling, however, does profit from his experience as a Random House editor
to bring an exceptionally readable and coherent account ... into one exhaustively sourced work."

According to Robbins, CIRA Newsletter 20.2, "readers of the innumerable exposes of infighting
within the American intelligence community" will find "little in Wedge that is actually new.
First-time author Riebling, however, does profit from his experience as a Random House editor
to bring an exceptionally readable and coherent account ... into one exhaustively sourced work."
NameBase finds Riebling's writing to be "articulate and reflective.... In some sections of this
book, Riebling appears to have relied heavily on the assistance he received from Edward Jay
Epstein.... Fortunately, Riebling explains the Angleton view so competently that it finally makes
sense on its own terms."

Loeb, Washington Post, 21 Oct. 2002, notes that the 2002 paperback edition of this work
includes "an epilogue which Riebling uses to update his thesis and outline a string of missteps he
believes kept the FBI and CIA from preventing al Qaeda's suicide hijackings." If Riebling's
thesis "was provocative at the time, it seems prescient now.... Riebling traces the failure of both
the FBI and the CIA to share the ample clues they possessed of an al Qaeda plot to the Ames
case and its aftermath. The FBI was given authority to police the CIA and wound up ...
eviscerating its clandestine service."

 Summers, Anthony. Official and Confidential: The Secret Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York:
Putnam, 1993.

       Ambrose, WPNWE, 1-7 March 1993: "Drawing on anonymous and hostile sources,... and
       relying heavily on innuendo, rumor, hearsay, and his own speculations,... Summers
       depicts FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as a moral and political monster without a single
       redeeming feature.... Much of the material here is familiar, already covered in detail in
       Richard Gid Powers's 1978 biography.... But the two biographers are often in
       disagreement. Powers dismisses as 'preposterous' the charge that Hoover was responsible
       for the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor; Summers devotes an entire chapter to it. In
       general, in my opinion, in areas of disagreement Powers's work is better researched and
       more reliable than Summers's. Except, perhaps, on the biggest disagreement of all...: the
       sex life of J. Edgar Hoover. Powers found no convincing evidence to prove the widely
       held belief that Hoover was a homosexual; Summers presents an abundance of evidence
       to show that he was.... Summers's most sensational charge is that Hoover was a
       transvestite. His source is Susan Rosenstiel."

       Surveillant 3.1 notes that the "fact that Hoover created a smooth law enforcement
       machine out of a corrupt outfit is left briefly examined in this hostile exposé." The author
       "has included many half-baked innuendos, gossipy twiddle-twattle, and [every] third-
       hand smear he could find." Summers claims that "Dusko Popov ... had been sent to warn
       America that the Japanese were planning to attack the [Pearl Harbor] naval base....
       [G]etting someone to give you a quote about a rumour does not make it true."

       According to Wannall, Periscope 18.3, Hoover's "vilification rested upon..., principally,
       a British author [Summers] whose allegations against a previous American public servant
       (AFIO founder David Atlee Phillips), repeated in a London newspaper, resulted in open-
       court retraction, apology, and acknowledgement of the payment of a substantial sum in
       damages." O'Reilly, Policy Studies Journal 21.3, comments that the stories of cross-
       dressing "may be true, but the 'he said/she said' sources don't prove it." NameBase
       identifies the author thusly: "Anthony Summers, based in Ireland and best known for his
       JFK assassination research...." [Enuf' said.]

 Swearingen, M. Wesley. FBI Secrets: An Agent's Exposé. Boston: South End Press,1995.
Surveillant 4.2 notes that several retired Bureau officials "have stated ... that portions of the book
where they are mentioned contain significant inaccuracies, so readers are warned." Nonetheless,
there are significant accusations in this book, including "many tales of institutionalized
corruption" at the Bureau. According to Namebase, the author "spent 25 years in the FBI....
Most of his career was spent on political cases.... Swearingen is the first agent to offer an
explosive inside look at the FBI's COINTELPRO program."

  Theoharis, Athan G. J. Edgar Hoover, Sex, and Crime: An Historical Antidote. Chicago, IL:
Ivan R. Dee, 1995.

       According to Surveillant 4.2, "Theoharis, a diligent historian and strong critic of the
       Bureau, examines recent claims about Hoover and calls them simplistic and probably
       false.... Recommended." Ellis, I&NS 12.2, finds this to be "a satisfying, sober and elegant
       demolition of sensational revelations about a figure who was tailor-made for conspiracy
       theorists."

 Theoharis, Athan G., ed. A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the People's Right To
Know. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

 Theoharis, Athan G., ed. From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1991.

       Surveillant 2.1 comments that Theoharis, who is one of the FBI's most persistent critics,
       "seeks to demonstrate the extent of FBI involvement in collecting and using derogatory
       information about prominent Americans and political groups. Using recently uncovered
       documents from Hoover's 'Do-Not-File' files, Theoharis charges that Hoover was an
       'indirect blackmailer.'" Rosswurm, I&NS 7.4, sees the book as "a very important
       contribution to our growing knowledge of the FBI and its role in American society" and
       "a magnificent collection of documents."

 Turner, William W. Hoover's FBI: The Men and the Myth. Los Angeles, CA: Sherbourne Press,
1970. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993. [pb]

       Petersen refers to to this book as a "[c]ritical account by a former agent," while
       Surveillant 3.2/3 notes that it was "[p]ublished to coincide with the release of ...
       Coppola's feature film on ... Hoover."

 Watson, Pat. The FBI's Changing Missions in the 1990s. (Working Group on Intelligence
Reform.) Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1992.

       Clark comment: The author was Deputy Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, FBI.
       Surveillant 3.1: "The paper discusses how the FBI has recast its mission in the face of the
       new international environment and changing U.S. national security policy."
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                    1990 - 1998
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Wannall, W. Raymond. "The FBI's Domestic Intelligence Operations: Domestic Security in
Limbo." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 4 (Winter 1990):
443-473.

 Capps, Freddie L., Jr. "Espionage Awareness Programs." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sep.
1991, 17-19.

 Tomlinson, James E. "Foreign Counterintelligence: An FBI Priority." FBI Law Enforcement
Bulletin, Sep. 1991, 10-14.

ProQuest: This article presents a "brief overview of the FBI's foreign counterintelligence
mission."

 Wannall, W. Raymond. "The FBI's Counterintelligence Role." Foreign Intelligence Literary
Scene 11, no. 3 (1992): 1-3.

 Dobbs, Michael, and R. Jeffrey Smith. "The KGB's Keystone Kops: How the FBI Penetrated
Moscow's Washington Spy Ring." WPNWE, 8-14 Mar. 1993, 11-12.

       This article keys off interviews with Yuri Shvets, a former KGB officer who served in
       Washington 1985-1987. "A combination of treachery, bureaucratic incompetence and
       effective FBI penetration of the [Washington 'residency'] enabled U.S. authorities to
       smash long-standing Soviet spy rings and carry out a spectacular expulsion of KGB
       officers in October 1986.... Over the past few years, the KGB has managed to put its
       Washington operation back together, but it lacks the aggressive bite it once had,
       according to sources in Washington and Moscow."

  Allen, Henry. "J. Edgar Hoover's Fall from Fashion: It's Been a Long Slide from National Hero
to Devil in a Black Dress." WPNWE, 29 Mar.-4 Apr. 1993, 10-11.

       Keyed to Anthony Summers' Official and Confidential and television show carried on
       PBS' "Frontline," this article essentially says that the public made Hoover's reputation
       and can destroy it as well. The author seems to relish all the accusations, even without
       accepting any of them.

  Devroy, Ann, and Michael Isikoff. "The Bureau's New Chief: Tough and Fair." WPNWE, 26
Jul.-1 Aug. 1993, 33.
       Reports and comments on the nomination of Louis J. Freeh to replace the fired William S.
       Sessions as FBI Director.

 Isikoff, Michael. "The FBI's Freeh Agent." WPNWE, 15-21 Nov. 1993, 10-11.

       Louis Freeh has been FBI Director since September, and change is in the air.

 Wannall, W. Raymond. "Counterintelligence and Terrorism." Periscope 18, no. 6 (1993): 2.

"In the aborted bombing of U.N. Headquarters, New York City's Federal Building, and the
Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, Hollywood could not have scripted a more perfect scenario to
illustrate the importance to our lives and economy of counterintelligence operations."

 Palmer, Elizabeth A. "Conferees Agree on Bigger Role for FBI in Spy Cases." Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 Sep. 1994, 2706.

House and Senate conferees completed work on the fiscal 1995 intelligence authorization bill on
22 September 1994. The conference committee "decided to clip the wings of the CIA, effectively
placing the FBI in charge of all counterespionage investigations.... In return for the House's
agreement to the FBI provision, Senate conferees dropped their objections to a satellite project
backed by House members."

 Ottaway, David B. "Frustrating the FBI." WPNWE, 24-30 Jul. 1995, 32.

The manhunt for Mir Aimal Kansi, wanted for the shootings outside CIA Headquarters on 25
January 1993, has been slowed by geography and Pakistani politics. At the end of March, the
FBI reclassified Kansi as a suspected international terrorist. This allowed the use of the State
Department's Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program to raise the reward offered for information
leading to the arrest of Kansi to $2 million.

 Cassata, Donna. "Spy Budget Cleared for Clinton; Plan for New Agency Curbed."
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 Dec. 1995, 3894-3895.

On 21 December 1995, the House and the Senate passed the fiscal 1996 intelligence
authorization bill. "The bill reportedly authorizes about $28 billion." The measure allows the FBI
to "obtain a court order to gain access to consumer credit reports and find the names and
addresses of the financial institutions where an individual [under counterintelligence
investigation] had an account."

  Smith, R. Jeffrey, and Thomas W. Lippman. "Join the FBI, See the World." WPNWE, 26 Aug.-
1 Sep. 1996, 32.

       The FBI plans to double its presence overseas over the next four years. The plan is to
       increase from 23 to 46 the number of foreign cities where the FBI maintains a permanent
       office. FBI special agents would increase from 70 to 129 and support personnel from 54
       to 79. Despite several unresolved issues, among them a protocol between the FBI and
       CIA to avoid conflict over foreign operations, the plan generally has the support of
       Congress.

 Weiner, Tim. "Spies Can't Even Trust Other Side to Follow the Rules These Days." New York
Times, 12 Nov. 1996, A1, A4 (N).

       A retired Russian spy, Vladimir Galkin, was arrested by the FBI as he deplaned at
       Kennedy International Airport. The espionage charges against him date back to 1991.
       The Russians are not happy.

 McGee, Jim, and Roberto Suro. "Losing Confidence in the G-Men: The FBI Faces
Congressional Criticism after Management Misfires and Computer Cost Overruns." WPNWE, 24
Mar. 1997, 29.

 Barnes, James A. "Big Chill: The White House and the FBI." National Journal, 12 Apr. 1997,
720.

       ProQuest: "White House officials are now accepting significant responsibility for failing
       to make sure that an FBI warning about Chinese attempts to influence the 1996 election
       reached Pres[ident] Clinton. FBI director Louis Freeh has considered resigning, in part to
       improve the agency's ties with the White House."

 Johnston, David. "Justice Dept. Calls F.B.I. Derelict in Pursuit of C.I.A.'s Most Damaging
Spy." New York Times, 18 Apr. 1997, A13 (N).

       An internal Justice Department inquiry blames the FBI for failing to aggressively pursue
       the counterintelligence case that eight years later led to Aldrich Ames. FBI
       counterintelligence agents believe the criticism is misdirected.

 Gibbs, Nancy. "Under the Microscope: Once the Most Esteemed Federal Agency, the FBI
Comes Under Attack for Sloppy Work." Time, 28 Apr. 1997, 28-35.

       The focus here is two-fold: the recent problems the Bureau has undergone and Director
       Freeh's management style and decisions. The article notes the Director's "icy" relations
       with the White House and the troubles he has had with the Republicans in Congress. A
       side-bar story looks at the difficulties encountered by the FBI laboratory: Elaine
       Shannon, "The Gang that Couldn't Examine Straight," pp. 30-31.

 Thomas, Pierre, and Roberto Sura. "Halfway Around the World, Lure of Reward Triggered
FBI Undercover Effort to Capture CIA Suspect." Washington Post, 19 Jun. 1997, A1, A10-11.
"Going Global to Get Their Man." WPNWE, 23 Jun. 1997, 31.

On 15 June 1997, FBI agents captured Mir Aimal Kansi in a motel on Pakistan's border with
Afghanistan. Kansi is accused of the murderous 1993 attack on motorists outside CIA
headquarters. He was arraigned on murder charges on 18 June 1997 in Fairfax County, Virginia.
 McGee, Jim. "Is the FBI Too Charged Up? The Agency's Growing Power Is Causing Concerns
about Civil Liberties." WPNWE, 11 Aug. 1997, 6-9.

       This is a nonalarmist-yet-cautionary look at changes, especially those associated with
       Director Louis Freeh but preceding him as well, in the authorities for and scope of FBI
       activities. Civil libertarians are concerned that rules adopted in the 1970s in response to
       revelations of FBI investigative abuses under the rationale of national security are being
       weakened in the name of combating terrorism.

       The "changes at the FBI do not only involve amending old rules and widening
       jurisdiction. The agency is also interweaving itself with the rest of the national security
       establishment." Now being created at the FBI is "a unified system of intelligence
       gathering that blends top-of-the-line federal law enforcement, military, civilian
       intelligence and local resources." In addition to the domestic security implications of
       these changes, the FBI's overseas presence has been expanded by acquiring jurisdiction
       over transnational crimes and establishing 23 new FBI offices around the world. In
       essence, "the legal wall that separated the FBI's domestic law enforcement work from the
       military and the intelligence community" has been eroded.




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                            1999
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Weiner, Tim. "F.B.I. Helped Chile Search for Leftists, Files Show." New York Times, 10 Feb.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The FBI tried to track suspected associates of Chilean leftists in the United States in the 1970s
on behalf of the government of Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean dictator, newly declassified
documents show."

 Johnston, David. "F.B.I. Is Proposing a Special Division for Hunting Spies." New York Times,
26 Jun. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "has proposed splitting the [FBI's] national security division into two
divisions, one to fight terrorism and the other to root out spies, both led by assistant directors,"
officials said on 25 June 1999. The Attorney General "has approved the request and forwarded it
to the White House."
  Suro, Roberto. "New FBI Spy Unit Gets Reno's Approval." Washington Post, 26 Jun. 1999, A5.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Officials at the FBI, CIA and Department of Defense have been discussing a possible
reorganization of counterintelligence operations for months. But in the wake of a scathing
congressional report on Chinese espionage, [Attorney General] Reno 'has signed off' on the
proposal and forwarded it to the White House," a senior Justice Department official said on 25
June 1999.

  Associated Press. "More F.B.I. Workers Fired as Inquiries Rise." 8 Aug. 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"The number of F.B.I. employees fired for misconduct rose to 32 from 19 between 1997 and
1998," the bureau's Office of Professional Responsibility reported in its annual report, released
on 6 August 1999. The report "also said 301 employees received discipline ranging from oral
reprimands to dismissal in 1998, compared with 212 the previous year." The report noted "an
increase in the number of ... internal investigations and the speed with which they were
completed."

 Suro, Roberto. "FBI's 'Clean' Team Follows 'Dirty' Work of Intelligence: Units Pool Facts on
Sensitive Foreign Cases but Work Apart." Washington Post, 16 Aug. 1999, A13. "Dirty Work,
but Someone's Got to Do It." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 23 Aug. 1999, 30.

Clark comment: It is interesting and, perhaps, instructive that as the FBI expands its new-found
foreign intelligence role both overseas and in the United States, it is encountering many of the
same difficulties within the Bureau as were previously attributed to "friction" between the FBI
and the CIA. [See Mark Riebling's Wedge (1994).] For a long time, individuals who are less
inclined to run around pointing fingers have understood the inherent differences between the
agendas of those entrusted with enforcing the law and those whose function it is to collect
information.

This article notes that "[a]s the FBI becomes more and more involved in overseas investigations
of terrorist threats, using two distinct teams of agents kept apart by an imaginary wall has
become a key to separating criminal cases that can be prosecuted in open court from intelligence
secrets that must be protected forever.... 'We find ourselves more and more frequently in
situations that require us to protect intelligence assets even as we develop evidence that can be
used in a criminal prosecution,' Larry R. Parkinson, general counsel of the FBI, said in an
interview."

 Weiner, Tim. "Author of Computer Surveillance Plan Tries to Ease Fears." New York Times, 16
Aug. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 30 July 1999, the House Appropriations Committee deleted from the budget proposal $2
million requested by the FBI as start-up money to develop a system -- called Fidnet -- to protect
government computers from hackers. But the main author of the plan, Richard Clarke, National
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism on the National Security
Council, believes that Congress will fund the system once lawmakers understand it.

 O'Harrow, Robert, Jr. "Justice Department Mulls Covert-Action Bill." Washington Post, 20
Aug. 1999, A1. "Who's Tinkering with Your Computer?" Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 30 Aug. 1999, 30.

According to a 4 August 1999 memorandum by the Justice Department, "[l]egislation drafted by
the department, called the Cyberspace Electronic Security Act [CESA], would enable
investigators to get a sealed warrant signed by a judge permitting them to enter private property,
search through computers for passwords and install devices that override encryption programs."

Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), "New White House Computer Surveillance
Plan Would Pose Unprecedented Threat to Privacy," 20 Aug. 1999, says that the proposed
legislation "could result in an unprecedented intrusion into the sanctity of private homes and
businesses."

 Labaton, Stephen. "New Rules Expand Ability of Police to Monitor Talk on Cell Phones." New
York Times, 28 Aug. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 27 August 1999, the federal government "announced new technical standards for cellular
phones that will broadly expand the ability of law enforcement agents to monitor conversations
and locate criminal suspects."

  Stafford, David. "Revealed: The FBI File on Churchill." Times (London), 6 Sep. 1999.
[http://www.the-times.co.uk]

"J. Edgar Hoover inaugurated a file on Winston Churchill, including agent reports and internal
memos, which shows that several death threats were made against him." Includes sidebar story,
"'Affable but drinks excessive amounts.'"

 Rosenfeld, Susan. "Doing Injustice to the FBI: The Negative Myths Perpetrated by Historians."
Chronicle of Higher Education, 8 Oct. 1999, B6-B8.

The former NARA archivist and former FBI official historian argues that "some people often
allow untested negative assumptions about the F.B.I., and its former director J. Edgar Hoover, to
color their responses" to current events. "Even more unfortunate, many scholars are among those
who accept such untested assumptions -- and thus give them the imprimatur of truth." Clark
comment: This article is a quick and informative read; I recommend it.

 Vise, David A., and Lorraine Adams. "FBI to Restructure, Adding Emphasis on Crime
Prevention." Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1999, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[T]he FBI is changing its structure to address internal problems with the handling of
information and put a greater emphasis on preventing terrorism and espionage.... [T]he number
of major operating divisions ... will increase from two -- the Criminal Division and National
Security Division -- to four. A new Counterterrorism Division will focus on terrorist threats and
include the bureau's National Infrastructure Protection Center and its computer crimes unit; an
Investigative Services Division will consolidate analysts who had worked in separate divisions
and will also include the bureau's hostage rescue team and negotiators."

 Vise, David A., and Lorraine Adams. "FBI Deputy Director Retires: Bryant Presided Over
Bureau Reorganization, Major Cases." Washington Post, 1 Dec. 1999, A41. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

On 30 November 1999, Robert M. "Bear" Bryant retired from the number two spot at the FBI
after a 31-year career.




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                               Edwin Earl Pitts

On 18 December 1996, Edwin Earl Pitts, 43, a 13-year veteran of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, was charged at a court hearing in Alexandria, Virginia, with attempted
espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, and lesser counts. Pitts allegedly sold secrets to
the Soviet Union and Russia from 1987 to 1992 in exchange for more than $224,000. Pitts
pleaded guilty to espionage charges on 30 April 1997. On 23 June 1997, he was sentenced to
27 years in prison.

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Reid, Alice. "Espionage Suspect Denies Charges." Washington Post, 31 Dec. 1996, A10.

 Pincus, Walter. "In Espionage Case of Suspect FBI Agent, Questions of Motivation."
Washington Post, 2 Jan. 1997, A6.

 Hall, Charles W., and Walter Pincus. "Spy Suspects Refusing to Go Quietly." Washington Post,
23 Jan. 1997, A9.

Robert C. Kim, Harold Nicholson, Earl Edwin Pitts cases.

 Hall, Charles W. "Spy Suspect Admits Guilt; Second to Do So." Washington Post, 1 Mar. 1997,
A1, A15. "Dear KGB: The Film Is in the Milk Carton." Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 10 Mar. 1997, 35.
       Pitts pleaded guilty to two counts of espionage on 28 February 1997. According to a
       court document, the evidence against Pitts included a computer disk with a February
       1990 letter to the KGB on it. The letter was devastating to any plans to offer an
       entrapment defense. See also, Bill Gertz, "FBI Agent Pleads Guilty to Spying,"
       Washington Times, 1 Mar. 1997, A1, A4; and Neil A. Lewis, "Ex-F.B.I. Supervisor
       Pleads Guilty to Espionage," New York Times, 1 Mar. 1997, A9.

 Masters, Brooke A. "Ex-FBI Agent Gets 27 Years for Passing Secrets to Moscow."
Washington Post, 24 Jun. 1997, A2.

See also, Washington Times, "Ex-FBI Agent Gets 27 Years for Spying for Soviets, Russia," 24
Jun. 1997, A7.

 Risen, James. "Jailed Agent Says He Voiced Suspicion about Spy Suspect." New York Times,
28 May 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Interviewed at the federal prison in Ashland, KY, where he is serving a 27-year sentence for
spying for Moscow, Earl Pitts said that he told FBI investigators in June 1997 "that he knew of
suspicious activity by his fellow agent Robert P. Hanssen that indicated he might also be
spying."

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents

          Return to FBI 1990s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                               Materials from the 2010s
                                    Table of Contents

 General Overviews

 Reportage from 2010

 Reportage from 2011 - 2013

          Return to FBI Table of Contents
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                     General Overviews
                                              2010s

 Graff, Garrett M. The Threat Matrix: The FBI at War in the Age of Global Terror. New York
Little Brown, 2011.

Peake, Studies 55.3 (Sep. 2011), notes that the "principal focus" here is FBI Director Robert
"Mueller and the global counterterrorism mission." The author shows that under Mueller
"progress was continuous and positive, and the Bureau of today bears little resemblance to
Hoover's organization." The Threat Matrix is "a well-told story and a reading pleasure."

 Kessler, Ronald. The Secrets of the FBI. New York: Crown, 2011,

Peake, Stidies 56.1 (Mar. 2012), notes that this work "covers some of the same ground" as his
earlier The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI (2002), "but focuses on elements of the Bureau
not previously revealed publicly. Perhaps the most interesting are tales about the Tactical
Operations Unit, which performs legal, state-of-the-art break-ins.... It is surprising that Kessler
was given access to this never-before-mentioned activity.... There are no source notes.... The
writing is brisk and his tone occasionally gossipy, but Kessler is easy to read. Overall, one gets a
good picture of the scope and magnitude of the varied and difficult jobs performed by the
Bureau."

  Theoharis, Athan G. Abuse of Power: How Cold War Surveillance and Secrecy Policy Shaped
the Response to 9/11. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2011.

Peake, Studies 56.1 (Mar. 2012), notes that this is the latest contribution to the author's "series of
books, all critical of Bureau operations.... The thesis of Theoharis's work is that the [FBI] abused
its powers [after 1936] and continues to do so today." This work "is carefully documented to
support Theoharis's position, and while alternative explanations are possible, he does not provide
them. Nevertheless, this book is deserving of scholarly attention."

 Weiner, Tim. Enemies: A History of the FBI. New York: Random House, 2012.

Drogin, Los Angeles Times, 22 Feb. 2012, says that the author "eviscerates the FBI in a
sweeping narrative that is all the more entertaining because it is so redolent with screw-ups and
scandals.... [T]his is a mordant counter-history.... Presumably the FBI has done some useful
things over the years, but they get short shrift here." However, "Weiner doesn't buy the Hoover
rumors," and even "offers grudging respect for the astute cunning and iron will of a man he calls
'an American Machiavelli.'"
For Temple-Raston, Washington Post, 23 Mar. 2012, "[w]hat makes 'Enemies' so compelling is
that it draws heavily on previously unavailable intelligence files.... Weiner brings together the
files, oral histories and newly discovered notes in Hoover's own fountain-pen handwriting to
reveal the FBI director in the moment, as events were unfolding. The combination provides new
insight into Hoover and what motivated him."

Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012), finds that "there is little new in the book, and there are some
discrepancies and omissions," including "many familiar and important cases," and "many known
successes are overlooked entirely.... Enemies is well written, however, with good documentation
and a definite point of view."

          Return to FBI 2010s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                            2010
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Solomon, John, and Carrie Johnson. "FBI Broke Law for Years in Phone Record Searches."
Washington Post, 19 Jan. 2010, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Bureau officials have confirmed that "[a] Justice Department inspector general's report due out
this month is expected to conclude that the FBI frequently violated the law" between 2002 and
2006 by making terrorism emergency requests for telephone call records in nonemergency
situations or by "simply persuading phone companies to provide records.... FBI officials issued
approvals after the fact to justify their actions."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Faces New Setback in Computer Overhaul." New York Times, 18 Mar.
2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The FBI "has suspended work on parts of its huge computer overhaul," known as Sentinel. "The
overhaul was supposed to be completed this fall, but now will not be done until next year at the
earliest." According to Congressional officials, "[t]he delay could mean at least $30 million in
cost overruns.... Beyond the financial costs are concerns about the F.B.I.'s ability to handle its
law enforcement and national security responsibilities with an information system still regarded
as sub-par in some crucial areas."

 Hsu, Spencer S. "FBI Names Veteran Officer to Oversee Intelligence Divisions." Washington
Post, 21 Apr. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
FBI Director Robert Mueller announced on 21 April 2010 that "Sean Joyce will become the new
executive assistant director of [the FBI] National Security Branch.... Joyce, who was most
recently assistant director of the FBI's International Operations Division,... replaces Arthur M.
Cummings II, who is retiring this month....

"Cummings's deputy, Philip Mudd, a highly regarded CIA counterterrorism official who moved
to the FBI in 2005, has left the bureau in recent weeks, spokesman Paul Bresson confirmed. In
June, Mudd withdrew from consideration to become intelligence chief for the Homeland
Security Department, a decision that came amid Senate pressure over his view of CIA
interrogation policies."

 Savage, Charlie. "White House Seeks to Clarify F.B.I. Powers vis-à-vis E-Mail." New York
Times, 29 Jul. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The Obama administration has asked Congress "to include a provision in the 2011 intelligence
authorization bill modifying the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which forbids
companies that handle electronic communications ... to reveal customer information without a
court warrant. The act makes exceptions for information relevant to national-security
investigations, when speed can be essential." For example, F.B.I. agents can "issue a 'national-
security letter' requiring a company to turn over records listing the phone numbers someone has
called, although a warrant is still required to eavesdrop on the content of calls. The proposal
would add 'electronic communication transactional records' -- like e-mail addresses used in
correspondence and Web pages visited -- to a list of the categories of information that F.B.I.
agents can demand."

 Stein, Jeff. "FBI Sentinel Project Is Over Budget and Behind Schedule, Say IG Auditors."
Washington Post, 20 Oct. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

A report issued on 20 October 2010 by Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine says
the FBI's troubled Sentinel project "'is approximately $100 million over budget and 2 years
behind schedule,' ... and still lacks common features of personal computers and ordinary word
processing, such as search functions, spell-checking and automatic document saves.... The
program could cost another $350 million and take six years to complete, the auditors said."

 Stein, Jeff. "BackChannel Chatter: Top FBI Counterterror Guy Moves On." Washington Post,
21 Dec. 2010. [http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk]

"Donald F. Borelli, who retired last week as head of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in New
York," has "joined a private security consulting company headed by Ali Soufan, another notable
FBI agent who worked against al-Qaeda."

          Return to FBI 2010s Table of Contents
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                      2011 - 2013
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Zamost, Scott, and Kyra Phillips. "CNN Exclusive: FBI Misconduct Reveals Sex, Lies and
Videotape." CNN, 27 Jan. 2011. [http://www.cnn.com]

CNN has obtained "confidential summaries of FBI disciplinary reports, which describe
misconduct by agency supervisors, agents and other employees over the last three years. The
reports, compiled by the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility, are e-mailed quarterly to
FBI employees, but are not released to the public.... [T]he FBI confirms that about 325 to 350
employees a year receive some kind of discipline, ranging from a reprimand to suspension.
About 30 employees each year are fired."

  U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman, and Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member. "'A Ticking Time Bomb':
Counterterrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government's Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack."
3 Feb. 2011. Available at: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Fort_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf.

From "Executive Summary": "Our basic conclusion is as follows: Although neither DoD nor the
FBI had specific information concerning the time, place, or nature of the [5 November 2009]
attack, they collectively had sufficient information to have detected [Army Maj. Nidal Malik]
Hasan's radicalization to violent Islamist extremism but failed both to understand and to act on it.
Our investigation found specific and systemic failures in the government's handling of the Hasan
case and raises additional concerns about what may be broader systemic issues....

"[O]ur investigation finds that the Fort Hood attack is an indicator that the current status of the
FBI's transfonnation to become intelligence-driven is incomplete and that the FBI faces internal
challenges -- which may include cultural barriers -- that can frustrate the on-going institutional
reforms. The FBI needs to accelerate its transformation....

"Since 9/1 1, the FBI has increased its intelligence focus by creating a Directorate of Intelligence
and Field Intelligence Groups in the field offices and hiring thousands of new and better
qualified analysts. However, the FBI must ensure that these analysts are effectively utilized,
including that they achieve significant stature in the FBI....

"In the Hasan case, the JTTF [FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force] model did not live up to the FBI's
strong vision of JTTFs as an effective interagency information-sharing and operational
coordination mechanism. JTTFs have been expanded significantly since 9/11 and are now the
principal domestic federal operational arm for counterterrorism investigations and intelligence
collection.... However, the specific handling of the Hasan case, and systemic disputes between
DoD and the FBI concerning JTTFs which remain unresolved, raise concerns that the JTTF
model requires additional review and improvement in order for JTTFs to function as effectively
as our nation requires."

 Mazzetti, Mark. "Private Spies Aid F.B.I. in Afghan Investigation." New York Times, 28 Feb.
2011. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S officials and private contractors, after the Pentagon ended "its relationship with
a private spy network operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan" and managed by Duane R.
Clarridge, a former top CIA official, the FBI "began tapping the same group to help investigate
the killing of 10 medical aid workers in northern Afghanistan." The network has provided FBI
agents in Kabul "with intelligence reports about militants who may have been involved in the
attack." Clarridge's "network is made up of former C.I.A. and special forces operatives, as well
as dozens of Afghan and Pakistani locals."

  Associated Press. "Senate Votes to Extend Term of FBI Director Mueller." 27 Jul. 2011.
[http://www.ap.org]

On 27 July 2011, the U.S. Senate "extended the term of FBI Director Robert Mueller for up to
two years."

 Savage, Charles. "F.B.I. Focusing on Security Over Ordinary Crime." New York Times, 23 Aug.
2011. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to internal data from March 25, 2009, to March 31, 2011, FBI agents "have been
more likely to be hunting for potential threats to national security than for ordinary criminals in
recent years." The data shows that "agents opened 42,888 assessments of people or groups to see
whether they were terrorists or spies.... Information gathered ... during those assessments had led
to 1,986 preliminary or full investigations. The data also showed that agents initiated 39,437
assessments of people or groups to see whether they were engaged in ordinary crime,... .while
1,329 preliminary or full investigations had been opened based on the information gathered."

  Associated Press. "Counterterror Veteran Is New Deputy FBI Director." 31 Aug. 2011.
[http://www.associatedpress.com]

Sean Joyce has been named the FBI's new deputy director, replacing the retiring Timothy
Murphy. Joyce moves from his position as executive assistant director of the national security
branch.

 Miller, Greg. "FBI Gets a Broader Role in Coordinating Domestic Intelligence Activities."
Washington Post, 19 Jun. 2012. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The FBI has been given an expanded role in coordinating the domestic intelligence-gathering
activities of the CIA and other agencies under a plan enacted this year by Director of National
Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr., officials said. The bureau's highest-ranking field agents now
also serve as the DNI's representatives across the country."
 Rockwell, M. "FBI Counter Intelligence Division Gets New Assistant Director." Government
Security News, 6 Aug. 2012. [http://www.gsnmagazine.com]

On 3 August 2012, FBI Director Robert Mueller named Robert Anderson, Jr., as assistant
director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division at the agency's Washington headquarters."
Anderson had served as the division's deputy assistant director of operations since 2011.

  Bjelopera, Jerome P. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Terrorism Investigations.
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 Apr. 2013. Available
at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf.

"This report sets forth possible considerations for Congress as it executes its oversight role.
These issues include the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations to
support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence
reform initiatives."

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   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                              Table of Contents
Neal H. Petersen, comp. and ed., "Counterintelligence and Internal Security," American
Intelligence, 1775-1990: A Bibliographic Guide (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1992), pp.
152-211, has extensive (over 1,000) listings in the general area of spying in and against the
United States. The listings below focus on (a) particularly useful sources in the area and/or
(b) those published since the late 1980s.

Broader counterintelligence and counterespionage activities are covered under the topic
headings of "Counterintelligence" and "FBI." British espionage cases can be located from
the "UK Spy Cases" Table of Contents. See also the entries under "Soviet Spies." The
Washington Post has a collection of materials on spy cases and other espionage related
matters at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/nation/nationalsecurity/spying/.

 General Materials:

 A-H                                 I-O
 P-Z

 Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood (1998)
Soviet A-Bomb Spies

Venona:
Introduction to Venona        The Venona Materials

Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers

Elizabeth Bentley

Noel Field

Individual Espionage Cases:

Mitchell and Martin (1960) Miller (1985)
Pollard (1985)               Howard (1985)
Walker (1985)                Chin (1985)
Pelton (1986)                Ames (1994)
Nicholson (1996)             Pitts (1996)
Peter Lee (1997)             Squillacote (1997)
Groat (1998)                 Boone (1998)
Wen Ho Lee (1999)            Wispelaere (1999)
Faget (2000)                 Trofimoff (2000)
Hanssen (2001)               Regan (2001)
Montes (2001)                Smith-Leung (2003)
Guantanamo Bay (2003)        Franklin (2004)
Keyser (2004)                Aragoncillo (2005)
Chi Mak (2005)               China Spies (2008)
Myers (2009)                 Russian Spies (2010)
Others (alphabetically, by name):
A                            B
C-F                          G-J
K                            L
M-R                          S-Z

Chinese Espionage (1998-2000)

Cuban Espionage in Florida (from 1998)
 Treason Generally

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         Return to Counterintelligence Table of Contents

         Return to Soviet Spies

         Return to Main Table of Contents




                                   SPY CASES
                                  United States
                                           General
                                             A-H
 Allen, Thomas B. "Year of the Questions -- Spies, Software Moles, and Subversive Agents."
Sea Power 29 (Jun. 1986): 32-33 ff. [Petersen]

 Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale.
New York: Delacorte, 1988. New York: Dell, 1988. [pb]

       Petersen says Merchants of Treason is "an important survey of spy cases since 1968 that
       is critical of U.S. counterintelligence as ineffective." Chambers comments that the book
       "seems to be aimed at the general reader"; it is "well crafted." For Lowenthal, the work
       is "[m]arred by a somewhat breathless and hyperbolic journalistic prose." According to
       Kuntzman, IJI&C 6.2, Allen and Polmar present an "excellent compilation of the spy
       stories that ... made headlines" during the 1980s. The Walker case takes up about half of
       the book. "There is little different, however, between John D. Barron's Breaking the Ring
       and ... Merchants of Treason." Bell, Pollard, Harper, Wu-Tai Chin, and Pelton are also
       covered.

 Barron, John. Operation SOLO: The FBI's Man in the Kremlin. Washington, DC: Regnery,
1996.

       Surveillant 4.3 notes that this is the story of "Morris Childs, who, along with his wife
       Eva, and his brother, Jack, provided the U.S. with secrets for 27 years" from his position
       as editor of the Daily Worker. Childs traveled to Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and
       Cuba and met many of the communist leaders of his day. Although intelligence scholars
       will question the operation's level of importance, Barron's book, reviews of the book, and
       future accounts will "help clarify" SOLO's "role in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold
       War years." For Fontaine, WIR 15.3, Operation SOLO is "a must-read for anyone even
       remotely interested in intelligence."

       On the other side of the evaluation scale, Fischer, IJI&C 10.4, raises the question, "How
       much should be believed of this carelessly written, factually incorrect, and undocumented
       book?... The problem with Barron's account is that much of it is 'inherently implausible'
       (Theodore Draper), some absolutely impossible, and none of it totally confirmable....
       Operation SOLO is replete with non sequiturs and many major and minor errors that
       damage its credibility."

       Other reviewers offer a range of opinion on the book: See, for example, Arnold
       Beichman, "The Incredible Saga of Our Super Spy in Moscow," Washington Times, 9
       Mar. 1996, C1; Theodore Draper, "Our Man in Moscow," New York Review of Books, 9
       May 1996, 4; Harvey Klehr, "Comrade Heroes; Operation SOLO: The FBI's Man in the
       Kremlin," American Spectator, Mar. 1996, 70-72; Richard Gid Powers, "Double Agent,"
       New York Times Book Review, 21 Apr. 1996, 20; and Jeff Stein, "Spy in the Ointment,"
       Washington Post, 23 Apr. 1996, D2.

 Boughton, James M.

1. "The Case against Harry Dexter White: Still Not Proven." History of Political Economy 33, no.
2 (Summer 2001): 221-241.

2. and Roger J. Sandilands. "Politics and the Attack on FDR's Economists: From the Grand
Alliance to the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 73-99.

This is a spirited defense of Lauchlin Currie and Harry Dexter White against charges that they
were Soviet agents.

 Bowman, M. E. "The 'Worst' Spy: Perceptions of Espionage." American Intelligence Journal
18, no. 1/2 (1998): 57-62.

The author finds a "counter-productive pattern" to perceptions surrounding each new espionage
case from the Walkers in 1985 to Nicholson and Pitts in 1996. We "have had a tendency either to
characterize every instance of espionage in superlatives or to pay scant attention at all." Neither
approach produces positive results.

 Carpozi, George, Jr. Red Spies in the U.S. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1973.

       Constantinides finds this book on Soviet espionage in the United States to be a mixed
       bag. The author uncovers "significant or interesting facts, but he carelessly includes
       incorrect or unsubstantiated remarks."
 Charney, David L.[M.D]. "True Psychology of the Insider Spy." Intelligencer 18, no. 1 (Fall-
Winter 2010): 47-54.

The author, a clinical psychiatrist who has consulted within the Intelligence Community and who
was part of the defense teams for Earl Pitts, Robert Hanseen, and Brian Regan, proposes that "[a]
novel way to approach the problem of insider spying would be to build mechanisms that create
safe exits for troubled insiders before they start to spy and safe exits for those already engaged in
spying."

 Craig, Bruce. "A Matter of Espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and Igor Gouzenko --
The Canadian Connection Reassessed." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer
2000): 211-224.

Abstract: "Craig argues that ... the [Russian] defector [Igor Gouzenko] did not possess a shread
of evidence ... that implicated Harry Dexter White in the Soviet [espionage] conspiracy....
Gouzenko's revelations have no relevance or bearing on the espionage case relating to White."

 Craig, R. Bruce. Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter White Case. Lawrence, KS: University
Press of Kansas, 2004.

According to DKR, AFIO WIN 19-04 (7 Jun. 2004), the author "seeks to show that Harry Dexter
White, who spied for the Soviets, was at the same time an honorable man.... Craig's book is
likely to strike at least some readers as intellectually dishonest.... Craig ignores ... mischief
wrought by White.... Some may agree that the publication of Craig's whitewash by what has been
thought of as a reputable university press raises troubling questions about the intellectual
integrity of at least parts of American academia."

Van Hook, Studies 49.1 (2005), says that this work "offers an important contribution to the
often-polemical literature on the problem of Soviet espionage in the United States.... Despite the
less than robust treatment of the VENONA material, a missed opportunity to paint a broader
social picture, and the rather melodramatic representation that the FBI and HUAC unfairly
persecuted White in the final years of his life, the author's otherwise even-handed treatment ... is
well founded and welcome."

 Crawford, David J. Volunteers: The Betrayal of National Defense Secrets by Air Force Traitors.
Washington, DC: GPO, 1988.

 De Toledano, Ralph. Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1967.

       Wilcox: "Special emphasis on the 'Amerasia' case and John Stewart Service, suspected
       Red spy."

 Hagan, Frank E. "Espionage as Political Crime? A Typology of Spies." Journal of Security
Administration 12, no. 1 (1989): 19-36.

Calder: "Provides typologies of ten spies."
 Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr. Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials that
Shaped American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Ehrman, Studies 51.2 (2007), says that this book "is very good, both as an introductory text and
as an example of the promise that comparative study holds for expanding our understanding of
espionage, intelligence, and the political environment in which they are carried out." The authors
"present no new research or material but, rather, provide accounts that readers new to the cases
or with little background in counterintelligence will find to be clear, concise, and useful for later
reference."

 Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr. In Denial: Historians, Communism and Espionage. San
Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2003.

Roberts, I&NS 19.1, finds that this work "highlights the unwillingness of many historians to
grapple with the new evidence" concerning the American Communist Party (CPUSA). The book
is "thorough, concise, and well researched.... every argument made by the supporters of the
CPUSA and revisionist historians is catalogued and answered."

 Haynes, John Earl, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Vassiliev. Spies: The Rise and Fall of the
KGB in America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.

Click for extensive REVIEWS of this major work.

 Herbig, Katherine L.

1. Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007. Technical Report 08-05. Monterey, CA:
Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Mar. 2008.
[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/changes.pdf]

"This report documents changes and trends in American espionage since 1990.... [I]ndividuals
are compared across three groups based on when they began espionage activities.... Findings
include: since 1990 offenders are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign
attachments, connections, and ties. Their espionage is more likely to be motivated by divided
loyalties.... Two thirds of American spies since 1990 have volunteered.... Six of the 11 most
recent cases have involved terrorists, either as recipients of information, by persons working with
accused terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or in protest against treatment of detainees there.
Many recent spies relied on computers, electronic information retrieval and storage, and the
Internet."

2. and Martin F. Wiskoff. Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001.
Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2002. [http://www.ncix.gov]

This work reflects an open-source analysis of 150 cases of espionage committed since 1947. The
authors find that the characteristics of American spies have changed since the end of the Cold
War.
 Huminik, John. Double Agent. New York: New American Library, 1967. London: Hale, 1968.

       Constantinides: The author worked as an FBI double agent against the Soviets. The
       story includes "much on Soviet techniques for developing a prospective agent in the
       private sector and the inducements offered."

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                                    SPY CASES
                                   United States
                                            General

                                               I-O
  INSCOM Journal. Editors. "Convicted of Espionage." 19, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1996).
[http://www.vulcan.belvoir.army.mil]

       This information was provided by the U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs.
       In the period 1986 to 1996, "10 U.S. Army soldiers have been convicted of espionage."
       Names, dates, and sentences are given.

 Joyal, Paul M. Fifteen Years of Espionage. Washington, DC: Nathan Hale Institute, 1991.

Surveillant 2.1: "A compilation of espionage cases and arrests over the last 15 years."

 Kessler, Ronald. Spy vs. Spy: Stalking Soviet Spies in America. New York: Scribner's, 1988.
Spy vs. Spy: The Shocking True Story of the FBI's War Against Soviet Agents in America. New
York: Pocket Books, 1988. [pb]

       According to Evans, IJI&C 3.3, Spy vs. Spy is "easy for laymen to read and entertains."
       However, the subtitle is misleading because the case of the Koechers, who were Czech
       spies, takes up "a large part or all of five of the nineteen chapters." Pollard, who spied for
       Israel, takes up most of Chapter 13. And Chapter 14 belongs to Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a
       PRC spy. The book "reflects ... many institutional prejudices and parochial viewpoints,
       especially regarding the CIA." Cram says this is an "interesting and useful compendium"
       that constitutes a "valuable contribution to counterintelligence literature on the FBI
       experience."
       NameBase comments that "[m]ost of this book recounts the story of Karl F. Koecher and
       his wife Hana, whom Kessler interviewed in 1987. In 1965 they orchestrated a phony
       defection from the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, after which Karl became a
       naturalized U.S. citizen, worked full-time for the CIA beginning in 1973, and continued
       as a contract agent after 1977. He ... spent many of his weekends as a 'swinger' at spouse-
       swapping parties with Hana. By 1982 the FBI's counterintelligence squad was getting
       suspicious. In 1984 Karl Koecher admitted that he had been spying for the East all along,
       and in 1986 he and Hana were traded for Natan Sharansky."

 Knight, Amy. How The Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Soviet Spies.
Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006.

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), finds that the author "adds some new and relatively minor details to
the Gouzenko story. While they do not change the substance of the case, they do describe more
of Gouzenko's personal life after the defection.... Only gradually does the real reason Knight
wrote [this book] become apparent: [she] argues that the primary product of the Gouzenko
defection was the damage done to innocent lives due to the 'unrelenting witch-hunt for spies.'"
When the "innocent lives" mentioned include Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White, there are some
problems.

For Clément, I&NS 21.2 (Apr. 2006), the author's connecting Gouzenko's defection to
"American anti-communist witch-hunts" goes down without choking sounds. The reviewer sees
the work as "a coherent, engaging analysis of Igor Gouzenko's legacy in the Cold War."
Nonetheless, Knight's determination "to denigrate Mackenzie King at every turn" is written off
as but a detail.

Goulden, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), comments that "very little is added to our
knowledge of the Gouzenko matter in [this] inanely titled" book. Rather, it is "an angry riff on
how the Canadians mishandled the case, and how the American Congress and FBI used
Gouzenko to touch off an 'anti-communist witch hunt.'"

 Krall, Yung. A Thousand Tears Falling: The True Story of a Vietnamese Family Torn Apart by
War, Communism, and the CIA. Marietta, GA: Longstreet Press, 1995.

       Surveillant 4.4/5: Yung Krall, the daughter of an NFLSV official, was a spy for the CIA
       and also worked with the FBI for which she helped break up the Humphrey-Huong spy
       ring.

 Lamphere, Robert J., and Tom Shachtman. The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story. New
York: Random House, 1986. New York: Berkley, 1986. [pb] New Ed., with Post-Cold War
Afterword. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. [pb]

       Petersen calls The FBI-KGB War "a particularly revealing first-hand account of
       counterintelligence operations in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s." Miller,
       IJI&C 1.3, agrees, finding it a "masterful presentation of the reality of counterespionage
       activities," and "strongly recommends" it.
       To Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, the book is the
       "best account of th[e] still fragmentary story [of the Venona material].... Lamphere's book
       adds much important information to the stories of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,... Klaus
       Fuchs,... and of the Soviet spy ring which included Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and
       Kim Philby."

       Cram says Lamphere tells the "story about breaking the KGB ciphers during World War
       II and the resulting consequences of that achievement in the struggle against Soviet
       espionage and subversion." This "otherwise excellent history" is marred by the
       "egregious error" of accepting Pincher's tagging of Hollis as a Soviet agent. The author
       discusses Hoover's "vengeful actions" against the early CIA and liaison with it.
       "Although this book has a few errors and the story has perhaps been gilded a bit by
       Lamphere, it nevertheless remains one of the best histories of US counterintelligence."

       According to Surveillant 4.4/5, the 1995 edition includes a 27-page Afterword where
       Lamphere "reviews the KGB-FBI wars using the latest releases from KGB and U.S.
       archives." Commenting in an article published in 2003, Robarge, Studies 47.3/fn.4, says
       that this "remains the best book on the FBI and counterintelligence." For a report on some
       of the difficulties Lamphere experienced in publishing his book, see George Lardner, Jr.,
       "Ex-Agent's Spy Book Tests Secrecy," Washington Post, 27 Oct. 1977, A1.

  Lefebvre, Stéphane. "Cuban Intelligence Activities Directed at the United States, 1959-2007."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 452-469.

The author concludes that "the threat posed by Cuban intelligence agencies is to be taken
seriously." Until there is a regime change in Cuba, "the United States and Cuban exiles will
continue to be the primary targets of Cuba's efficient intelligence agencies." Stéphane Lefebvre,
"Readers' Forum: Cuba Does It Again," International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 760-761, updates his original article by discussing
the case of Walter Kendall Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn.

 Lewy, Guenter. The Cause that Failed: Communism in American Political Life. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990.

 Maldon Institute. America's Espionage Epidemic. Washington, DC: 1986.

       Petersen: "Excellent summary of espionage cases in the mid-1980s."

 Martin, David. "Spy Cases Awaken Interest in Security." ABA Standing Committee Intelligence
Report 7, no. 8 (1985): 1-2, 7. [Petersen]

 Morgan, Ted. Reds: McCarthyism in Twentieth Century America. New York: Random House,
2003.

Powers, NYRB (12 Feb. 2004) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 109-122, comments that the author
"has an appetite for wide reading and a gift for amplitude in narrative.... Morgan's account of the
years we remember by McCarthy's name is rich and fast-paced." However, the parts before and
after, while "perfectly interesting,... lack[] any clear thematic line and veer[] off at the end into
an eighteen-page digression on September 11 and the invasion of Iraq." In addition, "the absence
of the victims of McCarthy witch-hunting starves Reds of its real significance."

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                                    SPY CASES
                                    United States
                                             General

                                               P-Z
  Peake, Hayden B. "Risks of Recruitment." Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 7, no. 6 (1988):
8-10.

 Polmar, Norman, and Thomas B. Allen. "Decade of the Spy." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
115, no. 5 (May 1989): 104-109.

See Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale
(New York: Delacorte, 1988).

  Powers, Thomas. "The Plot Thickens." New York Review of Books, 11 May 2000. Chapter 5 in
Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda, 81-108. Rev. & exp. ed.
New York: New York Review of Books, 2004.

This is an essay on Communism in America, written around reviews of Weinstein and Vassiliev,
The Haunted Wood; Haynes and Klehr, Venona; Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the
Shield; Duff, A Time for Spies; West, The Crown Jewels; and Morgan, A Covert Life.

  Powers, Thomas. "Spy Fever." New York Review of Books, 12 Feb. 2004. Chapter 6 in
Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda, 109-122. Rev. & exp. ed.
New York: New York Review of Books, 2004.

The author uses Ted Morgan's Reds (2003) as the springboard to a discussion of McCarthy and
McCarthyism. He concludes that "[i]t was the bogies McCarthy and his colleagues persecuted --
the thousands of American of vaguely leftist bent -- who paid the price for the convenience the
Moscow spymasters found in tapping [Communist] Party activitists for secret work."
 Sakmyster, Thomas. Red Conspirator: J. Peters and the American Communist Underground.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2011.

Adams, IJI&C 25.1 (Spring 2012), finds that "the meticulous research and evenhanded
narrative" of the author has provided a more accurate assessment of Peters' life work. This is an
"authoritative account." For Chambers, Intelligencer 18.3 (Summer-Fall 2011), "[t]he book's
approach and tone are scholarly. The findings are electrifying, particularly the author's main
conclusion: J. Peters operated his own infiltration networks." Peake, Studies 56.2 (Jun. 2012),
believes that "Red Conspirator fills a gap in the story of communist agents and activity in
America. It is an important contribution to counterintelligence history."

 Sandilands, Roger J. "Guilt by Association? Lauchlin Currie's Alleged Involvement with
Washington Economists in Soviet Espionage." History of Political Economy 32, no. 3 (Autumn
2000): 473-515.

 Sarbin, Theodore R., Ralph M. Carney, and Carson Eoyang, eds. Citizen Espionage: Studies in
Trust and Betrayal. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

According to Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "[t]he authors are behavioral scientists at the Defense
Personnel Security Research Center."

 Sibley, Katherine A.S.

1. Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and the Dawn of the Cold War. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2004.

Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), says that this work is "well documented," "well written," and looks
at domesic counterintelligence in America "from a new perspective." Nonetheless, the author's
thesis that the FBI was more active prior to the end of World War II than previously thought "is
not proved."

For Kirkland, JIH 5.1 (Summer 2005), the author's "scholarship is impressive, drawing upon
multi-archival research in the United States and Russia.... Her work is balanced and perceptive
and is a compelling and authoritative treatment of Soviet spying and the actions the United States
took to counter it." Craig, I&NS 21.1 (Feb. 2006), comments that while "[t]here is little new" in
the author's "generalized thesis,... [w]hat is unique ... is [Sibley's] assessment of espionage in the
manufacturing, military, and industrial sectors.... [T]he book is enlightening and a good read."

2. "Soviet Industrial Espionage against American Military Technology and the US Response,
1930-1945." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 94-123.

The author notes that the Soviet espionage activities against U.S. industrial and military
technology were "highly successful." Although these activities were known to Washington
officials, the United States "mounted only a limited response," because of preoccupation, first,
with the Depression and, then, with World War II.
 Soyster, Harry E. "The Changing Nature of the American Spy." American Intelligence Journal
10, no. 2 (1989): 29-32. [Petersen]

 Stoll, Clifford. The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of Computer Espionage.
New York: Doubleday, 1989. London: Bodley Head, 1990.

       Surveillant 1.1 says this is the "well-told story of the discovery of a clever computer
       system interloper in search of defense secrets for ... the KGB." It received the Best
       American Intelligence Book award for 1989, given by NISC. Petersen sees it as an
       "[i]nteresting but overpublicized account of low-level computer spying."

 Taylor, Stan A., and Daniel Snow. "Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got
Caught." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1997): 101-125.

       This is an interesting, though scarcely definitive, piece of research. The authors used 139
       cases of Americans charged with spying and 40 variables (an appendix with seven of
       those variables is included). They group motivation into four primary categories -- money,
       ideology, ingratiation, and disgruntlement. Their research indicates that the availability of
       electronic surveillance after passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978
       has made the government more successful in catching and prosecuting traitors. In
       addition, they express amazement "at the poor level of tradecraft, even abject stupidity,
       displayed in many cases."

  U.S. Department of Defense. Espionage Cases, 1975-2004: Summaries and Sources. Monterey,
CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2004.
[http://cryptocomb.org/Espionage_Cases_75-04.pdf]

From "Introduction": "Since its first publication in 1985, Recent Espionage Cases has offered the
security educator easy-to-find factual information about cases for use in briefings, newsletters,
and other educational media.... [T]hese case summaries bear little resemblance to the glamorized
fictional accounts of many spy novels; rather, they tell mundane tales of human folly resulting in
tragic personal and national consequences."

 Verbitsky, Anatole, and Dick Adler. Sleeping with Moscow: The Authorized Account of the
KGB's Bungled Infiltration of the FBI by Two of the Soviet Union's Most Unlikely Operatives.
New York: Shapolsky, 1987. [Petersen]

 Whitaker, Reg. "Cold War Alchemy: How America, Britain and Canada Transformed
Espionage into Subversion." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 177-
210.

Abstract: "At the outset of the Cold War, a series of high-level Soviet espionage scandals
unfolded in the English-speaking countries. These cases had a very significant impact in shaping
the dominant counter-espionage model in the West."
 Wise, David. Tiger Trap: America's Secret Spy War with China. Boston, MA: Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2011.

Goulden, Washington Times, 7 Jun. 2011, finds that "[b]ased on extensive interviews with FBI
counterintelligence officers," the author "offers a fascinating primer on how MSS [Chinese
Ministry of State Security] tradecraft differs from that of the old KGB." Wise has produced "a
groundbreaking and highly readable account" of Chinese espionage activities. Peake, Studies
55.3 (Sep. 2011), sees Tiger Trap as "a good account of contemporary Chinese espionage
involving American targets," which also "explains Chinese modus operandi and tradecraft,
reveals connections between operations, and identifies principal players."

For Mattis, IJI&C 25.1 (Spring 2012), this is a "compelling and engaging" book. However, it
"largely fails ... to update the American experience with Chinese intelligence, instead relying on
worn-out analysis of the Chinese." Nonetheless, it "helps fill in the gaps left by the Cox
Committee report and the book by former Department of Energy intelligence chief, Notra
Trulock" [Code Name Kindred Spirit (2002)].

 Wood, Suzanne, and Martin F. Wiskoff. Americans Who Spied Against Their Country Since
World War II. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 1992.

          Return to Spy Cases Table of Contents



                                    SPY CASES
                                   United States
             Weinstein and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood (1998)

 Weinstein, Allen, and Alexander Vassiliev. The Haunted Wood: Soviet
Espionage in America -- the Stalin Era. New York: Random House, 1999.

  Clark comment: This is an exceptional addition to intelligence literature. Although
little of the book's content is truly new in the sense of not being previously known, the
marriage of KGB documents to Venona materials rounds out -- or, perhaps, makes
real -- stories of Soviet spies which previously were less solidly supported. My
biggest complaint about the book is a repetitious presentation of essentially the same
material in discussing the often overlapping cases. I reacted too frequently with a
slightly annoyed, "Yes, I already know that," to material that had been developed
previously in the book. But, then, the authors may well have decided that repeating
core events or relationships were necessary to the narrative -- to prevent the reader
from becoming lost in The Haunted Wood.

  Powers, NYRB (11 May 2000) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 91, says that "anyone
who wants to know what Hiss and his friends were up to can find a rich, convincing,
and vivid report in The Haunted Wood." Gerber, CIRA Newsletter 23.2, believes that
the authors "have made an important contribution" toward helping Americans
understand the Soviet espionage efforts. What they provide is "not the whole story,
but it's a major part of the story."

  Both Macartney, AFIO WIN 1-99 (4 Jan. 1999), and Beichman, WTNWE, 11-17
Jan 1999, comment that few new names of Soviet spies surface in this book. Most of
the names that populate the Russian documents -- Alger Hiss, Laurence Duggan,
Michael Straight, Lauchlin Currie, and Duncan Lee -- have been basically known for
some time. But, as Beichman, notes, this work is important because "we now have a
documented glimpse of the day-to-day operations of the Stalinist spy machine in its
heyday."

  Peake, NWCR 53.3 and Intelligencer 11.2, notes that the authors' method of citing
their documentary evidence "in endnotes by KGB file number, volume number, and
page number ... [has] raised concerns among reviewers, scholars, and people named as
agents, because there is no way to check such citations." Haynes, Journal of Cold
War Studies 1, no. 2 (1999), declares that “The Haunted Wood is a major addition to
scholarly knowledge, featuring information that cannot be found elsewhere.”

  For Geracimos, Publishers Weekly, 18 Jan. 1999, Haunted Wood "lays out the
scope of Soviet operations in human and compelling terms." The authors avoid
ideology, producing "[n]o judgments and few conclusions ... [in] a heavily footnoted
narrative." While noting that "[u]ndoubtedly there is still much to uncover about this
period," Cohen, FA 78.3 (1999), suggests that, nevertheless, "this engaging book will
hold the ground for some time to come."

  Weiner, NYT, 31 Jan. 1999, calls this a "staggering account of sloppiness and
stupidity among the Soviets and their American agents." Even though the files show
that the Soviets had an agent in Congress, "Rep. Samuel Dickstein, who represented a
swath of Manhattan's Lower East Side," he "was generally useless to his Soviet
paymasters.... Most of the Americans working for the Soviets in the United States
eventually were done in by their own clumsiness or betrayed by their colleagues. The
main reason they survived as long as they did was incompetent (or nonexistent)
American counterintelligence before Pearl Harbor."
  To Persico, NYT, 3 Jan. 1999, the "hardest part ... to accept" of the revelations in
Haunted Wood, "at least for those of us who deplored the overzealous Red-hunting of
the late 40's and early 50's, is that the hunt rested on more substance than we cared to
admit.... The work of Weinstein, Vassiliev and their colleagues mining the Soviet lode
begins to approach the significance of an Ultra."

  A letter to the editor from John L. Lee, New York Times, 14 Feb. 1999, takes issue
with Persico's characterization of Duncan Lee (the letter writer's father) as "a spy for
the Soviet Union," based on Persico's reading of Haunted Wood. Lee argues that
"Weinstein and Vassiliev do not meet even minimal standards of scholarly or
journalistic rigor" in their use of sources.

 Similarly, a letter from Michael Straight, New York Times, 24 Jan. 1999, refers to
an "ugly smear" by the reviewer in his characterization of Straight's relationship with
Soviet Intelligence. In a reply, Persico quotes the passage from the book which led
him to his conclusion.

  Other letters expressing opposition to other conclusions drawn by Persico appear in
the New York Times, 24 Jan. 1999, together with Persico's response.

  Malevannyy, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (Moscow), 19-25 Feb. 1999
[from FBIS translation], says that The Haunted Wood "is the latest propaganda act of
the Americans or even of a well thought-out active operation of 'historians in civilian
clothes' from the CIA.... The pages of the book resurrect the spirit of spy-mania that
reigned in America after the Second World War in the period of McCarthyism."

  Old counterintelligence hand James E. Nolan, Jr., IJI&C 12.2, comments that "for
those of us with professional knowledge of espionage activities and a continuing
special interest in them, the book is an extremely valuable contribution to our
knowledge of the period." However, he adds an important caveat: "for the uninitiated,
the task of keeping the material in focus may prove too daunting."

  Nolte, Studies 50.2 (2006), declares that this book "is an almost numbing account of
the details ... that point" to the fact that "Soviet espionage happened, on a large scale,
and did so through the active involvement of American citizens, a disturbing number
of whom held positions of public trust within the Federal government."

  Writing on the Hiss case, Ehrman, Studies, Winter-Spring 2001, faults the authors
for telling "so many stories, several of which are already well known, that the book
sometimes has an unfocused and sensational feel to it and the reader wonders why
they seem compelled to go over old ground."
 See also, Christian Caryl, "A Spy in Congress: The KGB Archives Yield
Tantalizing Nuggests about American Linked to Soviet Espionage," U.S. News &
World Report, 18 Jan. 1999, 36.

         Return to Wei-Weir

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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                          Atomic Bomb Spies
                               Table of Contents
 Generally:

 A-K

 L-Q

 R-Z

 Fuchs

 Rosenbergs

 Theodore Hall and George Koval

 Sudaplatov, Special Tasks (1994)

Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Special
Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness -- A Soviet Spymaster (New York: Little,
Brown, 1994), created a flurry of charge and countercharge surrounding the naming of
Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo Szilard, and Niels Bohr as "voluntary sources"
for Soviet intelligence. A selection of the large body of review literature on Sudoplatov's
book is presented here under its own heading. Should greater access be gained to the files
of the KGB and its predecessor organizations the story of the Atomic Bomb spies of the
1940s could either be rewritten or essentially confirmed.

         Return to U.S. Spy Cases Table of Contents

         Return to Soviet Spies

         Return to UK Spy Cases Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                           Atomic Bomb Spies
                                         Generally
                                             A-K
 Athol, Justin. How Stalin Knows: The Story of the Great Atomic Spy Conspiracy. Norwich,
UK: Jarrold, 1951. [Petersen]

  Bernstein, Jeremy. Oppenheimer: Portrait of an Enigma. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004. 2005.
[pb]

Powers, NYRB 52.14 (22 Sep. 2005), calls this work "an excellent introduction" to
Oppenheimer's story. The author is a "lively writer as well as a physicist."

 Bird, Kai, and Martin J. Sherwin. American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J.
Robert Oppenheimer. New York: Knopf, 2005.

Freedman, FA 84.3 (May-Jun. 2005), calls this work a "stunning blockbuster" based on "a
daunting amount of research." The authors "do full justice to the complexity of Oppenheimer's
story." To Powers, NYRB 52.14 (22 Sep. 2005), this work "is clear in its purpose, deeply felt,
persuasively argued, disciplined in form, and written with a sustained literary power."

  Broad, William J. "New Books Revive Old Talk of Spies." New York Times, 11 May 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

This article focuses on comments from authors of works dealing with the Soviet atomic spying
effort, including Jerrold L. Schecter, Robert Louis Benson, Gregg Herken, Pavel Sudoplatov,
Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Allen Weinstein and
Alexander Vassiliev, and Jeremy J. Stone.

 Broda, Paul. Scientist Spies: A Memoir of My Three Parents and the Atom Bomb. Leicester,
UK: Troubaor, 2011.

The author's mother, Hilde Broda, was married to Austrian physicist Engelbert Broda and British
physicist Alan Nunn May, both of whom were Soviet spies in U.S.-British atomic bomb research.
According to Peake, Studies 55.4 (Dec. 2011) and Intelligencer 19.1 (Winter-Spring 2012), the
author "presents a sympathetic account of life in the 1930s when communism was popular. He
makes clear that his fathers never changed their political views but does not explain how they
rationalized their beliefs while remaining in the West. Scientist Spies fills another niche in the
story of the atomic spies so captivated by communism that they betrayed their country and never
came to regret it."

 Brown, Andrew. "The Viennaese Connection: Engelbert Broda, Alan Nunn May and Atomic
Espionage." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2009): 173-193.

The author explores the linkages between Austrian expatriate scientists May and Broda (who
may have recruited May for espionage) in relation to their work for Soviet intelligence.

 Cassidy, David C. J. Robert Oppenheimer and the American Century. New York: Pi Press,
2004.

Powers, NYRB 52.14 (22 Sep. 2005), calls this work "the best account of Oppenheimer's life in
science.... The book's chief strength is the way it tracks Oppenheimer through the later years of
the quantum revolution.... But Cassidy's grasp of Oppenheimer's character seems once removed,
probably because few who knew him remain to be interviewed."

 Cochran, Thomas B., and Robert S. Norris. Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin.
Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995.

Surveillant 4.2: "Based on KGB archival information," this book reveals the "extent of Soviet
espionage in its search for the secrets of the A-bomb."

 Conant, Jennet. 109 East Palace: Robert Oppenheimer and the Secret City of Los Alamos. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), finds that the author tells the story of the building of the atomic
bomb "in non-technical terms, but her focus is on life in the 'secret city' as it was then.... Conant
provides a new look at how army intelligence and the FBI attempted to prevent breaches" of
security.

 Herken, Gregg. Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert
Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller. New York: Holt, 2002.
Hershberg, I&NS 19.2, says that this work "merits required reading for anyone seriously
interested in nuclear history -- or nuclear espionage." The author's exploration of how Moscow's
spy networks functioned during the Manhattan Project "is especially enlightening.... Herken
firmly rebuts the charge" that Oppenheimer "spied for Moscow, or that his [earlier] communist
activities disqualified him for wartime service for the US government."

 Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic History, 1939-1956.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

       Legvold, FA 74.2, (Mar.-Apr. 1995), says this "account is ... utterly engrossing. To be
       able at last to glimpse the people at work behind the shroud ... makes this a hard book to
       put down. As for spies..., only one seems to have been important: the British atomic
       scientist, Klaus Fuchs. His contribution to the Soviet atomic bomb, however, was large
       and direct. The hydrogen bomb the Soviets developed on their own." Surveillant 4.2 calls
       Holloway's work a "spellbinding ... history of Soviet nuclear policy." See also, David
       Holloway, "Soviet Nuclear History: Sources for Stalin and the Bomb," CWIHPB 4 (Fall
       1994), pp. 1-9.

 Hornblum, Allen M. The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.

Clark comment: My review of this work appears as: "Not So Invisible to History,"
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 383-388.
Click for the "author's version" of this review.

Bykofsky, Philadelphia Daily News, 20 Sep. 2010, refers to this as a "richly researched book."
For Goulden, Washington Times, 4 Oct. 2010, Hornblum's "book injects the needed human
element into an oft-told story," and, thereby, generates some sympathy for Gold, especially in his
later life, on the part of the reviewer. Peake, Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011), finds this "a well-
documented, convincing picture of Harry Gold as an anti-fascist who only wanted to help an
American ally." Chambers, Intelligencer 18.3 (Summer-Fall 2011), notes that the book has "an
excellent epilogue that catches readers up on other actors in the book."

 Hyde, H. Montgomery. The Atom Bomb Spies. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980. New York:
Ballantine, 1981.

       This story is told better and with more reliable sourcing elsewhere.

          Return to A-Bomb Spies Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            Atomic Bomb Spies
                                          Generally

                                             L-Q
 Lamphere, Robert J., and Tom Shachtman. The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story. New
York: Random House, 1986. New York: Berkley, 1986. [pb] New Ed., with Post-Cold War
Afterword. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. [pb]

       Petersen calls The FBI-KGB War "a particularly revealing first-hand account of
       counterintelligence operations in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s." Miller,
       IJI&C 1.3, agrees, finding it a "masterful presentation of the reality of counterespionage
       activities," and "strongly recommends" it.

       To Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, the book is the
       "best account of th[e] still fragmentary story [of the Venona material].... Lamphere's book
       adds much important information to the stories of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,... Klaus
       Fuchs,... and of the Soviet spy ring which included Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and
       Kim Philby."

       Cram says Lamphere tells the "story about breaking the KGB ciphers during World War
       II and the resulting consequences of that achievement in the struggle against Soviet
       espionage and subversion." This "otherwise excellent history" is marred by the
       "egregious error" of accepting Pincher's tagging of Hollis as a Soviet agent. The author
       discusses Hoover's "vengeful actions" against the early CIA and liaison with it.
       "Although this book has a few errors and the story has perhaps been gilded a bit by
       Lamphere, it nevertheless remains one of the best histories of US counterintelligence."

       According to Surveillant 4.4/5, the 1995 edition includes a 27-page Afterword where
       Lamphere "reviews the KGB-FBI wars using the latest releases from KGB and U.S.
       archives." Commenting in an article published in 2003, Robarge, Studies 47.3/fn.4, says
       that this "remains the best book on the FBI and counterintelligence." For a report on some
       of the difficulties Lamphere experienced in publishing his book, see George Lardner, Jr.,
       "Ex-Agent's Spy Book Tests Secrecy," Washington Post, 27 Oct. 1977, A1.

 Lee, Sabine. "The Spy That Never Was." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 4 (Winter
2002): 77-99.

"Though it will not be possible to prove that the late Rudolf Peierls and his wife were not
involved in espionage for the Soviet Union so long as the relevant Soviet files remain closed to
research, the evidence which is accessible to date leaves little doubt about the couple's
allegiances" to Britain and the West.
 McMillan, Priscilla J. The Ruin of J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Birth of the Modern Arms
Race. New York: Viking, 2005.

Powers, NYRB 52.14 (22 Sep. 2005), says that this "short, lucid, and intense book" places the
"final episode in Oppenheimer's life on a dissecting table in order to separate and identify, as if it
were the nervous system of a rat, the filaments of ambition, rancor, and collusion of the three
brooding men who cut Oppenheimer down." The author "writes for the most part with quiet
lucidity, letting each act or utterance speak for itself, but from time to time there shoots up from
her prose something like a tongue of flame."

According to Freedman, FA 84.5 (Sep.-Oct. 2005), the author focuses "on the policy issues at
the heart of the [Oppenheimer] drama and illuminates well the surrounding cast of characters,
with lots of fascinating detail about the interaction between scientific politics and Washington
politics."

Schecter, I&NS 21.4, notes that McMillan "hedg[es] and shy[s] away from" the question of
whether Oppenheimer was ever a member of the Communist Party. The author "appears" to have
"chosen to ignore" Soviet documents that identify Oppenheimer as "an unlisted member of the
CPSU." This "is a powerful book," but at times McMillan's "anger [at the way Oppenheimer was
treated] is so hot it distorts the record."

 Meyerhoff, Hans. "Through the Liberal Looking Glass -- Darkly." Partisan Review 22 (1955):
238-245.

For a flavor of the passions of the times, this article should be read in conjunction with Diana
Trilling's defense of J. Robert Oppenheimer in "The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the
Testimony," Partisan Review 21 (1954): 604-635. See also Diana Trilling, "A Rejoinder to H.
Meyerhoff," Partisan Review 22 (1955): 248-251.

 Moorehead, Alan. The Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo and Nunn May.
London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952.

According to West, I&NS 19.2/277, Moorehead was fed "sanitised versions of MI5's files on
Allan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo..., thus ensuring The Traitors provided a
less than accurate version of the atomic spies."

 Newman, Bernard C. Soviet Atomic Spies. London: Robert Hale, 1952. [Petersen]

 Pilat, Oliver Ramsey. The Atom Spies. New York: Putnam, 1952.

       Pforzheimer terms this an "excellent account of the Soviet atomic espionage rings
       operating in the U.S. during the 1940s and 1950s." Constantinides agrees, noting that
       "the book stands up amazing well.... It is penetrating in its analysis of motives and actions
       of the main figures and captures the mood of time." On the other hand, much more has
       become known about the "atom spies" than Pilat had access to. Pilat is not careful about
       giving the sources for his narrative. He is also inconsistent in his estimate of Julius
       Rosenberg's work as a Soviet agent.

 Polenberg, Richard, ed. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: The Security Clearance
Hearing. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

West, cicentre.com, notes that Polenberg has edited the transcript of the 1954 Personnel Security
Board hearing to about a quarter of its original 1,000 pages and added an Introduction and
Conclusion. According to the reviewer, Polenberg sees Oppenheimer as "a casualty of
McCarthyism." West also remarks that "[t]he hearings were not a manifestation of some
groundless paranoia about Russian spies, but a direct consequence of the absolute confidence
that dozens of NKVD agents had stolen huge quantities of atomic secrets."

 Powers, Thomas. "Phantom Spies at Los Alamos." New York Review of Books, 9 Jun. 1994.
Chapter 4 in Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to Al-Qaeda, 59-79. Rev. &
exp. ed. New York: New York Review of Books, 2004.

The author rejects the charges in Sudoplatov's Special Tasks (1994) that Oppenheimer, Fermi.
Szilard, and Bohr "served as spies for the Soviet Union during the Second World War.... [T]he
charges against Oppenheimer in Sudoplatov's book tend to evaporate on scrutiny." There is a
"complete lack of the establishing and supporting details[] that are the signature of genuine
espionage cases.... [I]n the few cases where details are cited they are irrelevant, misleading, or
blatantly wrong." In addition, "[i]t is impossible to distinguish Sudoplatov's real memories,
however confused by age and years, from the Schectors' own research and general editorial
tidying up."

          Return to A-Bomb Spies Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            Atomic Bomb Spies
                                           Generally

                                               R-Z
 Roberts, Sam. The Brother: The Untold Story of Atomic Spy David Greenglass and How He
Sent His Sister, Ethel Rosenberg, to the Electric Chair. New York: Random House, 2001.

Haynes, I&NS 17.3, calls this book "a well-written melodrama with the ethics of the grade
school playground. Espionage against the United States in the service of Stalin is a mere piffle
compared [to] the monstrous crime of snitching on your sister.... The Brother is written for a
popular audience, scholarly apparatus is minimal, and the sources of much information are
unclear or not given." For Ehrman, Studies 46.4 (2002), this "book is a notable addition to the
literature on the case.... More than anyone else, [Roberts] has told us about the human beings in
the story, and shown that they were not admirable people."

 Roberts, Sam. "Figure in Rosenberg Case Admits to Soviet Spying." New York Times, 12 Sep.
2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 11 September 2008, Morton Sobell in an interview with the New York Times "admitted for
the first time that he had been a Soviet spy. And he implicated his fellow defendant Julius
Rosenberg, in a conspiracy that delivered to the Soviets classified military and industrial
information and what the American government described as the secret to the atomic bomb....
Sobell also concurred in what has become a consensus among historians: that Ethel Rosenberg,
who was executed with her husband, was aware of Julius's espionage, but did not actively
participate.

 Schecter, Jerrold L. and Leona Schecter. Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations
Changed American History. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002.

According to Goulden, AFIO WIN 35-02, 2 Sep. 2002, the authors believe that the activities of
Soviet intelligence agents certainly affected U.S. policy and changed U.S. history. Their effort to
document that viewpoint makes Sacred Secrets "an important contribution to intelligence
literature." In addition, "their analysis of VENONA is the best yet published." Bath. NIPQ 19.4,
sees Sacred Secrets as a "well-researched view of some of the murkier aspects of Cold War
espionage." Although he is "not sure" that he agrees "with all their conclusions," the reviewer
finds that "they make a plausible case."

Holmes, Library Journal, Jul. 2002, finds that Sacred Secrets "is a touch oversold.... While it
adds some details to the historical literature, little new ground is actually broken.... [I]t is less a
path-breaking work than an incremental addition to the Cold War literature." For Haynes, I&NS
17.4, the absence of an explanation of how the authors obtained Soviet intelligence documents
opens the door for doubters to reject them but, for his part, he is willing to "accept[] them as
authentic." Although "[a]n inattention to detail has allowed minor errors to creep into the text...,
students of Soviet espionage ... would be foolish to ignore" this book.

See also, Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, "Special Tasks and Sacred Secrets on Soviet
Atomic Spies," Intelligence and National Security 26.5 (Oct. 2011): 656-675: "In regard to
Soviet atomic espionage Special Tasks and Sacred Secrets are neither reliable nor credible."

 Schweber, Silvan S. In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the Moral
Responsibility of the Scientist. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

According to Schecter, I&NS 16.2, the focus here is on the moral consequences of creating the
atomic bomb, not on "the greatest moral question" of whether to provide classified information
to the Soviet Union. The author "never raises the possibility ... that Oppenheimer had been a
long-time Communist Party member who went into the Communist underground when he started
work on the atomic bomb." Nor does he "deal with the campaign against Oppenheimer
orchestrated by the US Air Force that led to the removal of his security clearance in 1953."

 Trenear-Harvey, Glenmore S. Historical Dictionary of Atomic Espionage. Lanham, MD:
Scarecrow, 2011.

For Peake, Studies 56.1 (Mar. 2012), this is "a useful compendium of espionage personalities
and events associated with nuclear weapons from the 1930s to the present.... For reasons not
explained, this dictionary does not include references, such as were found in earlier contributions
to this series." Overall, this "is a good place to start for those studying atomic espionage."

  Trilling, Diana. "The Oppenheimer Case: A Reading of the Testimony." Partisan Review 21
(1954): 604-635.

The author views the Atomic Energy Commission investigation of J. Robert Oppenheimer in a
negative light. For a flavor of the passions of the times, this article should be read in conjunction
with Hans Meyerhoff, "Through the Liberal Looking Glass -- Darkly," Partisan Review 22
(1955): 238-245; and Diana Trilling, "A Rejoinder to H. Meyerhoff," Partisan Review 21
(1954): 248-251.

 Usdin, Steven T.

1. Engineering Communism: How Two Americans Spied for Stalin and Founded the Soviet
Silicon Valley. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.

According to Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), this is the story of Julius Rosenberg's recruitment
of Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant, "their wartime espionage"; their escape from the net that closed
around the spy ring after Klaus Fuchs confessed that he had spied for the Soviets; "their lives in
the Soviet Union, where they helped create a scientific laboratory complex called Zelenograd;
and what happened to them after the Cold War." The book "is well written and well
documented."

Beard, I&NS 21.2 (Apr. 2006), says that the author "has carefully documented his story in the
secondary literature." The book "succeeds as both a biography of two personally and politically
complex men and as Cold War history."

2. "Famous Espionage Cases: Tracking Julius Rosenberg's Lesser Known Associates." Studies in
Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005).

The author focuses on two of Julius Rosenberg's associates, Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant, to argue
that the responses of the FBI and the U.S. Army "to communist penetration during World War II
were characterized by a ... lack of imagination. The ... Bureau and the army treated communists
as potential subversives, not as spies acting on behalf of the Soviet Union." The ability of Barr
and Sarant to spy "unmolested can only be attributed to stunningly incompetent and
uncoordinated American counterintelligence."
 West, Nigel. [Rupert Allason] Mortal Crimes: The Greatest Theft in History -- Soviet
Penetration of the Manhattan Project. New York: Enigma, 2004.

An AFIO WIN 18-04 (31 May 2004) reviewer finds that the author "painstakingly reconstructs
the warren of espionage networks set up" by Soviet intelligence in the United States in the 1930s.
To Bath, NIPQ 21.3 (Sep. 2005), West's "story is detailed, and it is sometimes difficult to keep
track of the names and numbers of all the players. It is not a casual read, but those who are
willing to undertake it will find it a worthwhile contribution to the study of espionage and the
development of the atom bomb."

Roberts, I&NS 20.2 (Jun. 2005), finds that the author's "main achievement is to synthesize the
all too abundant material about atomic espionage and weave it into a readable and lively
account." However, the reviewer is unhappy about "the scattered and sporadic" footnoting in the
book, and decides that the charges West makes against Ernest Lawence "are not supported by the
available evidence."

          Return to A-Bomb Spies Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            Atomic Bomb Spies
                                        Klaus Fuchs
 Feklisov, Alexandre. Confession d'un Agent Soviétique. Paris: Éditions du Rocher, 1999.
Feklisov, Alexander, and Sergei Kostin. Intro, Ronald Radosh. Tr., Catherine Dop. The Man
Behind the Rosenbergs: Memoirs of the KGB Spymaster Who Also Controlled Klaus Fuchs and
Helped Resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Enigma, 2001.

Feklisov died on 26 October 2007. Martin Weil, "Alexander Feklisov, 93; Key Soviet Spy in
U.S.," Washington Post, 3 Nov. 2007.

Commenting on the French-language edition, Kiracofe, AFIO WIN 24-99 (18 Jun. 1999) and
Intelligencer 10.2, notes that Feklisov served as the case officer for both Julius Rosenberg (1943-
1946) and Klaus Fuchs (1947-1949). The author "reveals significant details concerning his long
career in Soviet intelligence, including a definitive presentation of the Rosenberg case.... There
are also accounts of the successful exfiltration to the Soviet Union of Rosenberg colleagues Joel
Barr and Alfred Sarant." Feklisov "includes much interesting commentary" about the Fuchs case.
According to the reviewer, the author's "comments on his behind-the-scenes contacts, via John
Scali, with the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis are particularly interesting."
Haynes, I&NS 17.3, finds that, with regard to the Rosenbergs, Feklisov "corroborates, fills in
gaps, or fleshes out the story told in Radosh and Milton's The Rosenberg File." Feklisov is,
however, "detailed and candid only in regard to Julius Rosenberg and the impressively large
network of Communist engineers that Rosenberg brought into espionage. He describes other
sources and agents, but in vague terms." For Unsinger, IJI&C16.3, Radosh's introduction is "an
interesting critique of Feklisov's revelations." However, Radosh "gives the impression that the
entire book was about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, but it is about far more than them alone."

See also, Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "Retired KGB Spymaster Lifts Veil on
Rosenbergs," Washington Times, 19 Mar. 1997, A1, A6.

 Goodman, Michael S.

1. "Grandfather of the Hydrogen Bomb? Klaus Fuchs and Anglo-American Intelligence."
Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 34, no. 1 (2003): 1-22.

2. "Klaus Fuchs: The Man Who Opened Pandora's Nuclear Box." BBC History Magazine (Feb.
2007), 38-42.

3. "Overview: Sir Michael Perrin's Interviews with Dr. Klaus Fuchs." In Exploring Intelligence
Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State, eds. R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott,
123-132. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

4. "Santa Klaus? Klaus Fuchs and the Nuclear Weapons Programmes of Britain, the Soviet
Union and America." Prospero: The Journal of British Rocketry and Nuclear History 1, no. 1
(Apr. 2004): 47-70.

5. "Who Is Trying to Keep What Secret from Whom and Why? MI5-FBI Relations and the Klaus
Fuchs Case." Journal of Cold War Studies 7 (Summer 2005): 124-146.

6. and Chapman Pincher. "Research Note: Attlee, Sillitoe and the Security Aspects of the Fuchs
Case." Contemporary British History 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 67-78.

From Royal Historical Society Database: "Discussion of a recently released ... and previously
classified file relating to the security aspects of the case surrounding the atom spy Klaus Fuchs.
The file includes an eight-page memorandum, submitted by the Director-General of MI5, Sir
Percy Sillitoe, to the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee."

 Hornblum, Allen M. The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.

Clark comment: My review of this work appears as: "Not So Invisible to History,"
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 383-388.
Click for the "author's version" of this review.
Bykofsky, Philadelphia Daily News, 20 Sep. 2010, refers to this as a "richly researched book."
For Goulden, Washington Times, 4 Oct. 2010, Hornblum's "book injects the needed human
element into an oft-told story," and, thereby, generates some sympathy for Gold, especially in his
later life, on the part of the reviewer. Peake, Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011), finds this "a well-
documented, convincing picture of Harry Gold as an anti-fascist who only wanted to help an
American ally." Chambers, Intelligencer 18.3 (Summer-Fall 2011), notes that the book has "an
excellent epilogue that catches readers up on other actors in the book."

 Lamphere, Robert J., and Tom Shachtman. The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story. New
York: Random House, 1986. New York: Berkley, 1986. [pb] New Ed., with Post-Cold War
Afterword. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. [pb]

       Petersen calls The FBI-KGB War "a particularly revealing first-hand account of
       counterintelligence operations in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s." Miller,
       IJI&C 1.3, agrees, finding it a "masterful presentation of the reality of counterespionage
       activities," and "strongly recommends" it.

       To Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, the book is the
       "best account of th[e] still fragmentary story [of the Venona material].... Lamphere's book
       adds much important information to the stories of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,... Klaus
       Fuchs,... and of the Soviet spy ring which included Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and
       Kim Philby."

       Cram says Lamphere tells the "story about breaking the KGB ciphers during World War
       II and the resulting consequences of that achievement in the struggle against Soviet
       espionage and subversion." This "otherwise excellent history" is marred by the
       "egregious error" of accepting Pincher's tagging of Hollis as a Soviet agent. The author
       discusses Hoover's "vengeful actions" against the early CIA and liaison with it.
       "Although this book has a few errors and the story has perhaps been gilded a bit by
       Lamphere, it nevertheless remains one of the best histories of US counterintelligence."

       According to Surveillant 4.4/5, the 1995 edition includes a 27-page Afterword where
       Lamphere "reviews the KGB-FBI wars using the latest releases from KGB and U.S.
       archives." Commenting in an article published in 2003, Robarge, Studies 47.3/fn.4, says
       that this "remains the best book on the FBI and counterintelligence."

       For a report on some of the difficulties Lamphere experienced in publishing his book, see
       George Lardner, Jr., "Ex-Agent's Spy Book Tests Secrecy," Washington Post, 27 Oct.
       1977, A1.

 Moorehead, Alan. The Traitors: The Double Life of Fuchs, Pontecorvo and Nunn May.
London: Hamish Hamilton, 1952.

According to West, I&NS 19.2/277, Moorehead was fed "sanitised versions of MI5's files on
Allan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs and Bruno Pontecorvo..., thus ensuring The Traitors provided a
less than accurate version of the atomic spies."
 Moss, Norman. The Man Who Stole the Atom Bomb. London: Grafton, 1987. Klaus Fuchs: The
Man Who Stole the Atom Bomb. New York: St. Martin's, 1987.

Cosslett, I&NS 3.4: "If one merit of a biography is the extent to which it deals with why, as well
as how its subject did the deed, then these two books [Norman Moss and Robert Chadwell
Williams] both rank highly."

 Trahair, Richard C.S. "A Psychohistorical Approach to Espionage: Klaus Fuchs (1911-1988)."
Mentalities 9, no. 2 (1994): 28-49. [Calder]

 Williams, Robert Chadwell. Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1987.

       For Powers, NYRB (9 Jun. 1994) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 63/fn. 5, this is the "best
       account of the Fuchs case." Petersen says this "is a valuable scholarly treatment of Fuchs
       and the Fuchs case." Cosslett, I&NS 3.4: "If one merit of a biography is the extent to
       which it deals with why, as well as how its subject did the deed, then these two books
       [Norman Moss and Robert Chadwell Williams] both rank highly."

          Return to A-Bomb Spies Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            Atomic Bomb Spies
                                        Rosenbergs


Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are regarded as the leaders of the Soviet Union's "Atomic Spy
Ring" during World War II and the early 1950s, although recently released documents
suggest that Ethel may have been less of a leader in the Ring than has been supposed. They
were convicted of espionage during wartime, sentenced to death, and executed on 19 June
1953. Although a river of ink has been used in their defense, it is clear at this date that they
were indeed engaged in espionage against the United States. Allen and Polmar, Merchants
of Treason (1988), treat the Rosenbergs as the last of the big-time ideological spies in the
United States.

The FBI's Electronic Reading Room provides a summary, written in 1953, of the
Rosenberg case at http://vault.fbi.gov/rosenberg-case/rosenberg-case-summary.
 Alavi, Atossa M. "The Government Against Two: Ethel and Julius Rosenberg's Trial." Case
Western Reserve Law Review 53 (2003): 1057-1090.

  Busch, Francis Xavier. Enemies of the State: An Account of the Trials of the Mary Surratt Case,
the Teapot Dome Cases, the Al Capone Case, the Rosenberg Case. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1954.

 Carmichael, Virginia. Framing History: The Rosenberg Story and the Cold War. Vol. 6,
American Culture Series. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

       Accompanying blurb by George Lipsitz, series editor: "[P]rovides one of the most fully
       realized explanations for Cold War anti-communism that I have encountered."

 Cogan, Charles G. "Review Article: In the Shadow of Venona." Intelligence and National
Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 190-195.

In a review of John F. Neville, The Press, the Rosenbergs, and the Cold War (Westport, CT and
London: Praeger, 1995), and John E. Haynes, Red Scare or Red Menace (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee,
1996), Cogan draws the following conclusion about the impact of the release of the Venona
materials on the Rosenberg debate: "it is a useless and sterile exercise, post Venona, to keep
insisting that the accusations against the Rosenbergs were 'political'.... Julius Rosenberg was a
spy and a principal agent of the Soviets, targeted on the United States' atomic secrets."

 De Toledano, Ralph. The Greatest Plot in History. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1963.
New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1977.

       Conservative commentator and author on the Rosenbergs and the Soviet plot to steal
       atomic secrets.

 Dobbs, Michael. "Julius Rosenberg, Spy: But His KGB Handler Says His Role in Stealing
Atom Bomb Secrets Was Minor." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 24 Mar. 1997, 6-7.

       "In interviews with The Washington Post and the Discovery Channel,... [Alexander]
       Feklisov says he held a series of 50 meetings in New York with [Julius] Rosenberg from
       1943 to 1946. He credits Rosenberg with helping to organize an important industrial
       espionage ring for Moscow and handing over top secret information on military
       electronics. At the same time, however, he insists that Ethel Rosenberg never had any
       direct contact with Soviet intelligence, but concedes that she was probably 'aware' of her
       husband's activities." Feklisov (Alexander Fomin) publicly identified himself in 1989 as
       the "Mr. X" who served as a back channel between the White House and the Kremlin
       during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

 Feklisov, Alexandre. Confession d'un Agent Soviétique. Paris: Éditions du Rocher, 1999.
Feklisov, Alexander, and Sergei Kostin. Intro, Ronald Radosh. Tr., Catherine Dop. The Man
Behind the Rosenbergs: Memoirs of the KGB Spymaster Who Also Controlled Klaus Fuchs and
Helped Resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Enigma, 2001.
Feklisov died on 26 October 2007. Martin Weil, "Alexander Feklisov, 93; Key Soviet Spy in
U.S.," Washington Post, 3 Nov. 2007.

Commenting on the French-language edition, Kiracofe, AFIO WIN 24-99 (18 Jun. 1999) and
Intelligencer 10.2, notes that Feklisov served as the case officer for both Julius Rosenberg (1943-
1946) and Klaus Fuchs (1947-1949). The author "reveals significant details concerning his long
career in Soviet intelligence, including a definitive presentation of the Rosenberg case.... There
are also accounts of the successful exfiltration to the Soviet Union of Rosenberg colleagues Joel
Barr and Alfred Sarant." Feklisov "includes much interesting commentary" about the Fuchs case.
According to the reviewer, the author's "comments on his behind-the-scenes contacts, via John
Scali, with the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis are particularly interesting."

Haynes, I&NS 17.3, finds that, with regard to the Rosenbergs, Feklisov "corroborates, fills in
gaps, or fleshes out the story told in Radosh and Milton's The Rosenberg File." Feklisov is,
however, "detailed and candid only in regard to Julius Rosenberg and the impressively large
network of Communist engineers that Rosenberg brought into espionage. He describes other
sources and agents, but in vague terms." For Unsinger, IJI&C16.3, Radosh's introduction is "an
interesting critique of Feklisov's revelations." However, Radosh "gives the impression that the
entire book was about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, but it is about far more than them alone."

See also, Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "Retired KGB Spymaster Lifts Veil on
Rosenbergs," Washington Times, 19 Mar. 1997, A1, A6.

 Fineberg, S. Andhill. The Rosenberg Case: Fact and Fiction. New York: Oceana, 1953.

 Hatch, David A. "VENONA: An Overview." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 1/2 (1996):
71-77.

This is an excellent overview of the Venona project, in terms of the nature of the activity and
what was obtained from it and what was not. The author includes a brief but lucid section on the
relation of the materials to the Rosenberg espionage case. For individuals coming to a discussion
of the Venona decrypts without some background in the project, this is a good place to start.

 Olmsted, Kathryn S. "Blond Queens, Red Spiders and Neurotic Old Maids: Gender and
Espionage in the Early Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 1 (Spring 2004):
78-94.

Elizabeth Bentley, Judith Coplon, Priscilla Hiss, and Ethel Rosenberg "received the most media
coverage of any female Communist spies, and their cases best illustrate the gender constructions
used to interpret them."

 Radosh, Ronald, and Joyce Milton. The Rosenberg File: A Search for Truth. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1983. 2d ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.

       According to Petersen, "[t]he Rosenbergs' guilt ... is now an accepted historical fact in
       view of the research of Radosh and Milton ... and other scholars." Wannell, WIR 15.3,
       regards The Rosenberg File as "the definitive book on the Julius Rosenberg case." Clark
       comment: The second edition makes use of the Venona material and newly available
       Soviet sources to reiterate the work's original argument that the Rosenbergs were
       simultaneously guilty of espionage against the United States and scapegoats in the early
       hysteria of the Cold War.

 Reuben, William A. The Atom Spy Hoax. New York: Action Books, 1955.

       The title tells all that one needs to know about this book.

 Roberts, Sam. The Brother: The Untold Story of Atomic Spy David Greenglass and How He
Sent His Sister, Ethel Rosenberg, to the Electric Chair. New York: Random House, 2001.

Haynes, I&NS 17.3, calls this book "a well-written melodrama with the ethics of the grade
school playground. Espionage against the United States in the service of Stalin is a mere piffle
compared [to] the monstrous crime of snitching on your sister.... The Brother is written for a
popular audience, scholarly apparatus is minimal, and the sources of much information are
unclear or not given." For Ehrman, Studies 46.4 (2002), this "book is a notable addition to the
literature on the case.... More than anyone else, [Roberts] has told us about the human beings in
the story, and shown that they were not admirable people."

 Roberts, Sam. "Figure in Rosenberg Case Admits to Soviet Spying." New York Times, 12 Sep.
2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 11 September 2008, Morton Sobell in an interview with the New York Times "admitted for
the first time that he had been a Soviet spy. And he implicated his fellow defendant Julius
Rosenberg, in a conspiracy that delivered to the Soviets classified military and industrial
information and what the American government described as the secret to the atomic bomb....
Sobell also concurred in what has become a consensus among historians: that Ethel Rosenberg,
who was executed with her husband, was aware of Julius's espionage, but did not actively
participate.

 Schneir, Walter. Final Verdict: What Really Happened in the Rosenberg Case. With Preface
and Afterword by Miriam Schneir. Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2010.

Moynihan, Wall Street Journal, 20 Oct. 2010, notes that the author "does grudgingly admit that
Julius Rosenberg was a Stalinist agent (Ethel remains, in the Schneirs' view, an innocent
bystander). But "Final Verdict" ... makes no serious attempt at reaching historical truth, instead
offering a selective and ultimately unconvincing attempt at personal vindication." For Peake,
Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011), Schneir's "conjectures are only supported by imaginative analysis and
speculation.... Nothing the Schneirs present changes the substance of the case."

 Schneir, Walter, and Miriam Schneir. "Cryptic Answers." Nation, 21 Aug. 1995, 152-153.
       CWIHP 6-7, p. 289: "Former defenders of Rosenbergs say Venona decrypts of KGB
       messages seem genuine and indicate Julius Rosenberg indeed ran Communist spy ring,
       though some key evidence of atomic espionage [is] still lacking."

  Usdin, Steven T. "The Rosenberg Ring's Continued Impact." International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 4 (Winter 2010-2011): 663-679.

"Aside from the obvious consequences of atomic espionage that accelerated the Soviet atom
bomb program by at least two years,... the access to American nonatomic technology, including
the thousands of pages of detailed information about advanced weapons copied by the Rosenberg
ring, helped the USSR tactically and strategically as it was developing the weapons and policies
that made the Cold War possible."

         Return to A-Bomb Spies Table of Contents

         Return to Spy Cases Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                           Atomic Bomb Spies
                Theodore Alvin Hall & George Koval
Included here:

1. Theodore Alvin Hall

2. George Koval

1. Theodore Alvin Hall

 Albright, Joseph, and Marcia Kunstel. Bombshell: The Secret Story of America's Unknown
Atomic Spy Conspiracy. New York: Times Books/Random House, 1997.

       Clark comment: The speculation that Theodore Alvin Hall was the Soviet spy whose
       codename was "Mlad" seems to be at an end. Hall admits to the authors of Bombshell
       having contact with the Soviets, although he carefully (even at this late date) avoids
       admitting to specific acts of espionage. The self-serving justifications offered by Hall for
       his acts of treason (the Soviets were allies and a fear "of an American monopoly of
       atomic weapons if there should be a postwar depression") ring particularly hollow today.
       The question remains, however, why he was allowed to walk away from an FBI
       investigation in the 1950s and 1960s. Perhaps, the best guess may be that the FBI lacked
       the evidence to convict Hall of espionage without revealing the existence of the Venona
       decrypts. See report in New York Times, 16 Sep. 1997, A17 (N). See also, Hall's
       obituary: Bart Barnes, "Atomic Bomb Physicist Theodore Alvin Hall Dies at 74,"
       Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1999, B7.

       Herken, WPNWE, 10 Nov. 1997, says that Bombshell "is both a solid, well-researched
       work and a brilliant piece of reportage." The focus is the spy ring known to its Soviet
       handlers as the "Volunteers," comprised of Theodore Alvin Hall ("Mlad" in the Venona
       traffic), Saville Sax ("Star"), and the husband-and-wife team of Morris and Lona
       ("Helen") Cohen. The book "provides convincing evidence" that Klaus Fuchs' treachery
       "only confirmed information the Russians already had from Hall."

       For Wettering, IJI&C 11.4, this is "an interesting biography of Ted Hall, with some
       fascinating looks at Morris and Lona Cohen." Although the book "contains very little real
       information on Hall's espionage activity," Bombshell is overall "a well-researched and
       very well-written biography of a heretofore little known spy."

 Cohen, Sam. "Ted Hall: A Soldier from Venona." International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 11, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 351-365.

Cohen knew Hall from their days working on the Manhatten Project at Los Alamos, New
Mexico.

 Dobbs, Michael.

1. "Code Name Mlad: The 'Crime of the Century' Is Not Yet Closed." Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 4-10 Mar. 1996, 9-10.

Based on "a review of dozens of recently declassified Soviet and U.S. documents," Dobbs
develops the argument that Theodore Alvin Hall was the Soviet spy known previously only by
the code name Mlad.

2. "Pointing the Finger at Mlad. Newly Declassified Intercepts of Soviet Spy Messages Also
Renew Suspicions about Alger Hiss." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 11-17 Mar.
1996, 34.

A new release of VENONA documents with NSA notes identifying U.S. officials and others as
the Soviet agents mentioned by code name in the Soviet cables names Theodore Alvin Hall as
the Atomic spy known previously only as Mlad ("Youngster").

2. George Koval
 Broad, William J. "A Spy’s Path: Iowa to A-Bomb to Kremlin Honor." New York Times, 12
Nov. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 2 November 2007, the Russian government announced that President Putin had
posthumously awarded George Koval, "a Soviet agent who penetrated the Manhattan Project,"
the title of "Hero of the Russian Federation, the highest honorary title that can be bestowed on a
Russian citizen." Koval "died in his 90s last year in Moscow," but his name "is just coming to
light publicly." Historians say that Koval "was probably one of the most important spies of the
20th century." He was a "mole groomed in the Soviet Union" by the GRU, the military
intelligence agency. "Washington has known about Dr. Koval’s spying since he fled the United
States shortly after the war but kept it secret."

 Isachenkov, Vladimir. "Russia Honors Cold War Spies for Soviets." Associated Press, 12 Nov.
2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 12 November 2007, Russian intelligence honored George Blake, "one of Moscow's most
important Soviet-era spies." Blake was praised by "the Foreign Intelligence Service, a KGB
successor agency, in comments carried by Russian media, and by the service's spokesman." The
accolades for Blake, and the award of Russia's highest medal to George Koval, "another
prominent Soviet spy, came five months after Queen Elizabeth II honored Oleg Gordievsky, a
high-level KGB man who defected to Britain in 1985." An interview with Blake on his 85th
birthday was broadcast by "Russia Today, an English-language cable TV network," on 11
November 2007.

George Koval "was born to Jewish parents who [had] emigrated [to Iowa] from Czarist Russia.
In the early 1930s, the family returned to the Soviet Union.... After he graduated from a Moscow
university, Soviet intelligence sent him back to the U.S. in the 1940s. He was drafted and
assigned to the Manhattan Project.... Other Soviet spies also got into the project, but Koval was
'the only Soviet agent who infiltrated secret U.S. nuclear facilities which produced plutonium,
enriched uranium and polonium for building atomic weapons,' a statement from President Putin's
office said."

 Walsh, Michael. "Iowa-Born, Soviet-Trained." Smithsonian 40, no. 2 (May 2009): 40-47.

This article traces what is known about George Koval's life and his espionage activities for the
Soviet Union. The "GRU spy code-named Delmar" may, "with the exception of ... Klaus Fuchs,...
have done more than anyone to help the Soviet Union achieve ... nuclear parity with the United
States in 1949."

          Return to A-Bomb Spies Table of Contents

          Return to Spy Cases Table of Contents
              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            Atomic Bomb Spies
                                      Pavel Sudoplatov



Sudoplatov, Pavel, and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Jerrold L. and Leona P.
Schecter. Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness--A Soviet
Spymaster. New York: Little, Brown, 1994. [pb] Updated ed. 1995.

For Sudoplatov's obituary see David Stout, "Pavel A. Sudoplatov, 89, Dies; Soviet Spy
Chief at Height of Cold War," New York Times, 28 Sep. 1996, A13; and London Times, 2
Oct. 1996, 19.

  According to Legvold, FA 73.4 (Jul.-Aug. 1994), the "Administration for Special Tasks ... was
responsible for sabotage, kidnapping and assassination ... beyond the country's border."
Sudoplatov directed Trotsky's assassination. He eventually controlled "Department S, the
organization responsible for gathering intelligence on atomic bomb research in the West.... [He
held] intensely sensitive positions.... [I]n the book's most discrediting section, he tars the famous
principals in the Manhattan Project with the unsubstantiated charge of knowingly abetting Soviet
agents in gathering the information Moscow so eagerly sought."

  Bates, NIPQ 10.4, says that the "big question about this book is credibility. There is little
documentary evidence offered. It is largely General Sudoplatov's memory and his word. I still
recommend it, keeping the undocumented nature of the book in mind."

  For Powers, NYRB (9 Jun. 1994) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 59-79, "the charges against
Oppenheimer in Sudoplatov's book tend to evaporate on scrutiny." There is a "complete lack of
the establishing and supporting details[] that are the signature of genuine espionage cases.... [I]n
the few cases where details are cited they are irrelevant, misleading, or blatantly wrong." In
addition, "[i]t is impossible to distinguish Sudoplatov's real memories, however confused by age
and years, from the Schectors' own research and general editorial tidying up."

  Peake, WIR 13.1, notes that "the intensity of ... criticism has exceeded expectations.... The
documentation offered varies from substantial to nil, and the expert reaction has been mixed."
The greatest reaction came in response to the naming of Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, Leo
Szilard, and Niels Bohr as voluntary sources for the NKVD. "Most of the more than fifty articles
and reviews published to date attack the validity of these allegations." Peake reviews the
arguments pro and con. "Whether they played the role he assigns to them, even [Sudoplatov]
may not know for sure. But that he believes the essense of his ... story is very likely indeed....
[O]verall Special Tasks is a valuable contribution that will stimulate further research."
  David Holloway, "Soviet Nuclear History: Sources for Stalin and the Bomb," Cold War
International History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 1-9, argues that "[s]ome of the claims ...
-- especially that ... Oppenheimer,... Fermi,... Szilard, and ... Bohr knowingly passed secret
atomic information to the Soviet Union -- are dubious.... Other aspects of his account -- for
example, about the status of the [Soviet] atomic project during the war -- are quite misleading.
[footnote omitted] The reliability of Sudoplatov's memoirs is, moreover, further clouded by the
impossibility of distinguishing Sudoplatov's recollections from what has been added by his co-
authors."

 Cold War International History Project Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-59, carries two articles
and the translation of what purports to be three KGB documents (pp. 50-51, 57-59) relevant to
Sudoplatov's accusations against the American physicists. Both articles discount Sudoplatov's
version: Vladislav Zubok. "Atomic Espionage and Its Soviet 'Witnesses,'" pp. 50, 52-53; and
Yuri N. Smirnov, "The KGB Mission to Niels Bohr: Its Real 'Success,'" pp. 51, 54-57.

  Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 155-158, carries letters
from the Schecters, Sudoplatov, and Robert Conquest (who wrote a foreword for Special Tasks),
responding to the articles in CWIHPB 4 (Fall 1994).

The Schecters note that there are "physicists who have affirmed the intelligence value of the
answers Bohr gave to the questions prepared by Soviet intelligence in November 1945." They
also quote a number of other Russian sources for the validity of Sudoplatov's presentation.

Sudoplatov (letter to appear in the paperback edition to be published by Little, Brown): "[T]here
were many more sources of atomic secrets besides Fuchs.... I never wrote that Oppenheimer,
Fermi, Szilard and Bohr were agents of Soviet intelligence. They cooperated, but we never
recruited them.... Bohr's answers to Terletsky's carefully prepared questions helped to verify
scientific papers of Oppenheimer, Szilard and Fermi and others which were obtained by our
intelligence and made available for our scientists.... [T]he thrust and important facts of my story
are irrefutable."

Conquest: "Niels Bohr's moral integrity ... is not at issue, though his political attitudes may be....
The question is merely a factual one" of whether he gave useful information. "With all its errors
it seems clear that on the substance of the Bohr incident ... Sudoplatov's ... account has been
confirmed."

  Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6-7 (Winter 1996), p. 278, carries a letter
from Yuri N. Smirnov responding to letters in CWIHP 5 (Spring 1995): "I assert that nothing in
Sudoplatov's version regarding this mission [to Niels Bohr] stands up to a comparison with the
facts..., and it is a total hoax." Also, the Bulletin, p. 279, carries a "character reference" for
Smirnov from Victor Adamsky.

  According to Evans, IJI&C 7.4, Sudoplatov joined the Cheka in 1921 and survived in that
environment until 1953. He then served a full sentence of 15 years in Soviet prisons, and was not
officially "rehabilitated" until 1991. Sudoplatov's position in the NKVD/NKGB/MGB high
command "gave him an authoritative (but not necessarily always reliable) view." With regard to
the "Atomic Spies" chapter, there is a "virtual absence of documentary evidence to substantiate
Sudoplatov's allegations." Whether memory has served Sudoplatov well in his fascinating "oral
history" may or may not be shown by the documents which may or may not become available in
the future.

  Surveillant 4.1 reports that "Time magazine's managing editor, James R. Gaines[,] was ...
quoted in a Washington Post article dated 2 May 1995 expressing some regrets at the way its
nine-page excerpt..., run in the magazine [on 25 Apr. 1994], was handled.... [T]he paperback
edition is the version to purchase, since it contains updated material which uses recently released
documents to bolster Sudoplatov's accusations about atomic espionage."

  William J. Broad, "F.B.I. Disputes Theory of Atomic Bomb Plot," New York Times, 3 May
1995, A8 (N), reports on an FBI statement that it has no evidence to support Sudoplatov's
charges that the architects of the atom bomb spied for Moscow, and in fact has secret evidence to
the contrary. The FBI's conclusion was made public on 1 May 1995 by PFIAB Chairman Les
Aspin. FBI Director Louis J. Freeh wrote Aspin that "the bureau 'is not in possession of any
credible evidence that would suggest that Niels Bohr, Enrico Fermi, Robert Oppenheimer, or Leo
Szilard engaged in any espionage activity on behalf of any foreign power....' To the contrary, Mr
Freeh added, 'the F.B.I. has classified information available that argues against the conclusions
reached by the author of "Special Tasks." The F.B.I., therefore, considers such allegations to be
unfounded.'"

 Jerrold Schecter, a co-author of Sudoplatov's book, "is continuing to amass documents to try to
back up the charges of atomic treason and criticized the F.B.I. [on 2 May 1995]. He said that he
had requested the bureau's files before the book was published ... and was upset that after 50
years only the F.B.I.'s conclusions were being made public."

 See also, Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, "Special Tasks and Sacred Secrets on Soviet
Atomic Spies," Intelligence and National Security 26.5 (Oct. 2011): 656-675: "In regard to
Soviet atomic espionage Special Tasks and Sacred Secrets are neither reliable nor credible."

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          Return to Russia Intelligence Memoirs Table of Contents

          Return to Su-Sun
                                                                             [NSA graphic]




            SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
        Introduction to the Venona Materials

  The term "Venona" began life as "merely an arbitrary codeword stamped on a
relatively small number of documents in order to limit access to a particular
cryptanalytic breakthrough." However, by the time the effort to decipher the texts
generated by this breakthrough ended in 1980, "the codeword 'Venona' meant to a
handful of witting US and Allied intelligence officers the entire program of
cryptanalytic and exploitation activities based on the messages." Michael Warner and
Robert Louis Benson, "Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work Undone,"
Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 1-2.

  On 11 July 1995, DCI John M. Deutch announced the declassification of the Venona
project, and released 49 Venona messages to the public. The Venona project was
begun by the Army Signal Intelligence Service in 1943 with the aim of cracking the
Soviet Diplomatic code. "Ultimately, after a series of cryptographic breakthroughs...,
a number of KGB espionage messages were broken, read, and were discovered to
reveal details of wide spread KGB-inspired espionage efforts, including those of the
Atomic Bomb spies.... Over 2200 translations from the Venona project will be
released in the coming year." On 12 July 1995, the National Cryptologic Museum, Ft.
Meade, MD, unveiled a new exhibit entitled "Soviet Espionage Against the U.S.
Atomic Program," based on the newly declassified Venona documents. NMIA
Newsletter 10, no. 3 (1995), 13.

  A second group of Venona documents was released on 12 October 1995. According
to an NSA press statement, this release, consisting of "over 250 translations of KGB-
GRU communications, focuses on messages between the New York KGB Residency
and Moscow Center during 1942 to 1943.... Highlights of this second release include a
September 1943 message providing KGB Residencies instructions on how to handle
intelligence sources within the Communist party after the disestablishment of the
COMINTERN.... There is a message from the head of Soviet state security L.P. Beria
admonishing the KGB Residencies to improve their security practices and also
included are several messages dealing with Soviet subversive activity in Latin
American countries." From the NSA Homepage at http://www.nsa.gov:8080/.

  Additional Venona documents were released in March 1996. These documents
include notes by NSA identifying the Soviet agents mentioned by code name in the
original cables. See Michael Dobbs, "Pointing the Finger at Mlad," Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, 11-17 Mar. 1994, 34.

  The final release of the Venona materials took place at a conference held 3-4
October 1996 at the National War College on Ft. McNair, Washington, DC. A 450-
page volume of additional documents was distributed at the conference: Robert Louis
Benson and Michael Warner, eds., VENONA: Soviet Espionage and American
Response, 1939-1957 (Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central
Intelligence Agency, 1996). The publication is available through the National
Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161
(Telephone: 703-487-4650) and on the Center for the Study of Intelligence's
Homepage at https://www.cia.gov/csi. See Star Murphy, "VENONA Conference,"
CIRA Newsletter 21, no. 4 (Winter 1996/97): 34-35.

  The National Security Agency maintains a Web site for the Venona translations
(some 2,900) and associated monographs: http://www.nsa.gov. Available at the site
are William P. Crowell [Deputy Director, National Security Agency],
"Remembrances of VENONA"; Robert Louis Benson, "The 1942-43 New York-
Moscow KGB Messages"; and Robert Louis Benson, "The 1944-45 New York and
Washington-Moscow KGB Messages."

  David A. Hatch, "VENONA: An Overview," American Intelligence Journal 17, no.
1/2 (1996), 71-77, supplies an excellent overview of the Venona project, in terms of
the nature of the activity and what was obtained from it and what was not. The author
includes a brief but lucid section on the relation of the materials to the Rosenberg
espionage case. For individuals coming to a discussion of the Venona decrypts
without some background in the project, this is a good place to start.

 A longer, more detailed overview is provided by Robert Louis Benson, The
VENONA Story (Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for
Cryptologic History, [n.d.]). Available at
http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/venona_st
ory.pdf.

  Hayden B. Peake, "The Venona Progeny," Naval War College Review 53, no. 3
(Summer 2000), provides an excellent review of the growing literature drawn from
the Venona materials. An updated version (to include the Romerstein and Breindel
book) appears in Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 74-80.



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           SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
         Reportage on the Venona Materials
                               Table of Contents



 Introduction

 A-C

 D-H

 I-Z



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                                                                           [NSA graphic]




           SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
       Introduction to the Venona Materials

  The term "Venona" began life as "merely an arbitrary codeword stamped on a
relatively small number of documents in order to limit access to a particular
cryptanalytic breakthrough." However, by the time the effort to decipher the texts
generated by this breakthrough ended in 1980, "the codeword 'Venona' meant to a
handful of witting US and Allied intelligence officers the entire program of
cryptanalytic and exploitation activities based on the messages." Michael Warner and
Robert Louis Benson, "Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work Undone,"
Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 1-2.

 On 11 July 1995, DCI John M. Deutch announced the declassification of the Venona
project, and released 49 Venona messages to the public. The Venona project was
begun by the Army Signal Intelligence Service in 1943 with the aim of cracking the
Soviet Diplomatic code. "Ultimately, after a series of cryptographic breakthroughs...,
a number of KGB espionage messages were broken, read, and were discovered to
reveal details of wide spread KGB-inspired espionage efforts, including those of the
Atomic Bomb spies.... Over 2200 translations from the Venona project will be
released in the coming year." On 12 July 1995, the National Cryptologic Museum, Ft.
Meade, MD, unveiled a new exhibit entitled "Soviet Espionage Against the U.S.
Atomic Program," based on the newly declassified Venona documents. NMIA
Newsletter 10, no. 3 (1995), 13.

  A second group of Venona documents was released on 12 October 1995. According
to an NSA press statement, this release, consisting of "over 250 translations of KGB-
GRU communications, focuses on messages between the New York KGB Residency
and Moscow Center during 1942 to 1943.... Highlights of this second release include a
September 1943 message providing KGB Residencies instructions on how to handle
intelligence sources within the Communist party after the disestablishment of the
COMINTERN.... There is a message from the head of Soviet state security L.P. Beria
admonishing the KGB Residencies to improve their security practices and also
included are several messages dealing with Soviet subversive activity in Latin
American countries." From the NSA Homepage at http://www.nsa.gov:8080/.

  Additional Venona documents were released in March 1996. These documents
include notes by NSA identifying the Soviet agents mentioned by code name in the
original cables. See Michael Dobbs, "Pointing the Finger at Mlad," Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, 11-17 Mar. 1994, 34.

  The final release of the Venona materials took place at a conference held 3-4
October 1996 at the National War College on Ft. McNair, Washington, DC. A 450-
page volume of additional documents was distributed at the conference: Robert Louis
Benson and Michael Warner, eds., VENONA: Soviet Espionage and American
Response, 1939-1957 (Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central
Intelligence Agency, 1996). The publication is available through the National
Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161
(Telephone: 703-487-4650) and on the Center for the Study of Intelligence's
Homepage at https://www.cia.gov/csi. See Star Murphy, "VENONA Conference,"
CIRA Newsletter 21, no. 4 (Winter 1996/97): 34-35.

  The National Security Agency maintains a Web site for the Venona translations
(some 2,900) and associated monographs: http://www.nsa.gov. Available at the site
are William P. Crowell [Deputy Director, National Security Agency],
"Remembrances of VENONA"; Robert Louis Benson, "The 1942-43 New York-
Moscow KGB Messages"; and Robert Louis Benson, "The 1944-45 New York and
Washington-Moscow KGB Messages."

  David A. Hatch, "VENONA: An Overview," American Intelligence Journal 17, no.
1/2 (1996), 71-77, supplies an excellent overview of the Venona project, in terms of
the nature of the activity and what was obtained from it and what was not. The author
includes a brief but lucid section on the relation of the materials to the Rosenberg
espionage case. For individuals coming to a discussion of the Venona decrypts
without some background in the project, this is a good place to start.

 A longer, more detailed overview is provided by Robert Louis Benson, The
VENONA Story (Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for
Cryptologic History, [n.d.]). Available at
http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/venona_st
ory.pdf.

  Hayden B. Peake, "The Venona Progeny," Naval War College Review 53, no. 3
(Summer 2000), provides an excellent review of the growing literature drawn from
the Venona materials. An updated version (to include the Romerstein and Breindel
book) appears in Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 74-80.



         Return to NSA Table of Contents




            SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                         Materials on Venona
                                          A-C


 Albright, Joseph, and Marcia Kunstel. Bombshell: The Secret Story of America's Unknown
Atomic Spy Conspiracy. New York: Times Books/ Random House, 1997.
       Clark comment: The speculation that Theodore Alvin Hall was the Soviet spy whose
       codename was "Mlad" seems to be at an end. Hall admits to the authors of Bombshell
       having contact with the Soviets, although he carefully (even at this late date) avoids
       admitting to specific acts of espionage. The self-serving justifications offered by Hall for
       his acts of treason (the Soviets were allies and a fear "of an American monopoly of
       atomic weapons if there should be a postwar depression") ring particularly hollow today.
       The question remains, however, why he was allowed to walk away from an FBI
       investigation in the 1950s and 1960s. Perhaps, the best guess may be that the FBI lacked
       the evidence to convict Hall of espionage without revealing the existence of the Venona
       decrypts. See report in New York Times, 16 Sep. 1997, A17 (N). See also, Hall's
       obituary: Bart Barnes, "Atomic Bomb Physicist Theodore Alvin Hall Dies at 74,"
       Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1999, B7.

       Herken, WPNWE, 10 Nov. 1997, says that Bombshell "is both a solid, well-researched
       work and a brilliant piece of reportage." The focus is the spy ring known to its Soviet
       handlers as the "Volunteers," comprised of Theodore Alvin Hall ("Mlad" in the Venona
       traffic), Saville Sax ("Star"), and the husband-and-wife team of Morris and Lona
       ("Helen") Cohen. The book "provides convincing evidence" that Klaus Fuchs' treachery
       "only confirmed information the Russians already had from Hall."

       For Wettering, IJI&C 11.4, this is "an interesting biography of Ted Hall, with some
       fascinating looks at Morris and Lona Cohen." Although the book "contains very little real
       information on Hall's espionage activity," Bombshell is overall "a well-researched and
       very well-written biography of a heretofore little known spy."

 Andrew, Christopher. "The VENONA Secret." In War, Resistance and Intelligence: Essays in
Honour of M.R.D. Foot, ed. Kenneth G. Robertson. Barnsley, UK: Leo Cooper, 1999.

 Ball, Desmond, and David Horner. Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Spy Network, 1944-
1950. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1998. Concord, MA: Paul & Co., 1998.

According to Peake, NWCR 53.3 and Intelligencer 11.2, this work "is primarily concerned with
ten Australians who spied for Soviet intelligence.... The book also offers a short history of
Australian intelligence, its World War II role (including naval intelligence and naval ULTRA),
and its close links to Britain's Security Service (MI 5).... The book is well written and
impressively documented with primary sources."

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.2, notes that the authors "cover a wide range of information including the
success of the US cryptanalytic attack on VENONA." For Unsinger, IJI&C 14.1, this "is an
excellent review" of the operations of the Comintern, KGB, and GRU in Australia from late in
World War II to the beginning of the Korean War. Breaking the Codes provides "insight into
Australia's reaction to Soviet intelligence operations" and "describes Australia's security
establishment and some of the personalities who shaped its postwar development."

 Beichman, Arnold. "Decrypted Details of Soviet Designs." Washington Times, 24 Aug. 1997,
B4.
 Benson, Robert Louis. [At http://www.nsa.gov]

1. "The 1942-43 New York-Moscow KGB Messages."

Written in association with the Venona document release in 1995.

2. "The 1944-45 New York and Washington-Moscow KGB Messages."

Written in association with the Venona document release in 1996.

  Benson, Robert Louis. The VENONA Story. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security
Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, [n.d.]
[http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/venona_story.pdf]

This is an excellent overview of the VENONA materials.

  Benson, Robert Louis, and Michael Warner, eds. VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the
American Response, 1939-1957. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central
Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996.

Clark comment: There are two parts to this volume: Part I, "The American Response to Soviet
Espionage," has 35 "original documents available to American policymakers during the period
covered"; Part II, "Selected Venona Messages," consists of 99 of the approximately 2,900 KGB,
GRU, and GRU-Naval messages that have been released to the public. The Venona translations
can be accessed via NSA's Homepage at http://www.nsa. gov.

Peake, NWCR 53.3 and Intelligencer 11.2, finds that "[w]hile this book is an excellent
introduction to the [Venona] program, it does not deal in depth with the details of how the
decrypted cables were analyzed or the impact of VENONA on the resulting espionage cases."

For Herken, I&NS 16.3, this is "[t]he starting place for any serious Venona scholar." The
Aegean Park Press edition also "contains ... five of the six monographs on Venona as well as a
valuable index of names and cryptonyms." Cohen, FA 77.2 (Mar.-Apr. 1997), notes that these
documents are "introduced by a balanced and informative historical essay. The result is a
fascinating glimpse of compromised intelligence operations that helped shape the early phase of
the Cold War."

  Breindel, Eric M., and Herbert Romerstein. The Venona Secrets: The Soviet Union's World
War II Espionage Campaign against the United States and How America Fought Back: A Story
of Espionage, Counterespionage, and Betrayal. New York: Basic Books, 1999.

According to Peake, NWCR 53.3, this work adds "corroboration to the work of Haynes and
Klehr with new documentation and analysis, putting particular emphasis on the role of the
Communist Party in Soviet espionage in America."
 Budiansky, Stephen. "A Tribute to Cecil Phillips -- and Arlington Hall's 'Meritocracy.'"
Cryptologia 23, no. 2 (Apr. 1999): 97-107.

From abstract: "Cryptanalyst Cecil Phillips, who made the crucial break into the 'VENONA'
problem near the end of the Second World War, exemplified the diverse talents that rose through
Arlington Hall's unusual meritocracy."

 Cogan, Charles G. "Review Article: In the Shadow of Venona." Intelligence and National
Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 190-195.

In a review of Neville, The Press, the Rosenbergs, and the Cold War (1995), and Haynes, Red
Scare or Red Menace (1996), Cogan draws the following conclusion about the impact of the
release of the Venona materials on the Rosenberg debate: "it is a useless and sterile exercise, post
Venona, to keep insisting that the accusations against the Rosenbergs were 'political'.... Julius
Rosenberg was a spy and a principal agent of the Soviets, targeted on the United States' atomic
secrets."

 Crowell, William P. [Deputy Director, National Security Agency] "Remembrances of
VENONA." http://www.nsa.gov.




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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                           Materials on Venona
                                              D-L
 Dobbs, Michael.

1. "Code Name Mlad: The 'Crime of the Century' Is Not Yet Closed." Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 4-10 Mar. 1996, 9-10.
Based on "a review of dozens of recently declassified Soviet and U.S. documents," Dobbs
develops the argument that Theodore Alvin Hall was the Soviet spy known previously only by
the code name Mlad.

2. "Pointing the Finger at Mlad. Newly Declassified Intercepts of Soviet Spy Messages Also
Renew Suspicions about Alger Hiss." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 11-17 Mar.
1996, 34.

A new release of Venona documents with NSA notes identifying U.S. officials and others as the
Soviet agents mentioned by code name in the Soviet cables names Theodore Alvin Hall as the
Atomic spy known previously only as Mlad ("Youngster").

 Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. "Scourge of McCarthyism was Red Spy." Electronic Telegraph, 8
Apr. 1996. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

The recently released Venona documents identify "Cedric Belfrage, the British writer who
worked for wartime British intelligence, as a Soviet agent in the early 1940s." While Belfrage
worked for British Security Coordination (BSC) in New York from 1941 to 1943, he was also
"agent UCN/9, a source for a KGB officer named Vasilij Zubilin.... Apparently he was not the
only Soviet spy on the staff there. The identification of another agent known as 'Havre' is blacked
out in the declassified documents."

  Fischer, Ben. "'Mr. Guver': Anonymous Soviet Letter to the FBI." Center for the Study of
Intelligence Newsletter 7 (Winter-Spring 1997): 10-11.

The author looks at one of the documents in the Venona collection [Document No. 10 in Benson
and Warner, eds., Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957 (1996)].
The item in question is an anonymous letter, dated 7 August 1943, to "Mr. Guver" (Hoover). It
identifies Soviet "intelligence officers and operations that stretched from Canada to Mexico." It
also includes accusations of war crimes against the KGB rezident in Washington, Vassili M.
Zarubin (a.k.a. Zubilin), and his deputy, Markov (in the United States under the alias of Lt. Col.
Vassili D. Mironov). The author sees the letter, a mix of fact and fantasy, as probably the result
of a personal vendetta either by Markov or another enemy of Zarubin's within the rezidentura.

 Hatch, David A. "VENONA: An Overview." American Intelligence Journal 17, no. 1/2 (1996):
71-77.

This is an excellent overview of the Venona project, in terms of the nature of the activity and
what was obtained from it and what was not. The author includes a brief but lucid section on the
relation of the materials to the Rosenberg espionage case. For individuals coming to a discussion
of the Venona decrypts without some background in the project, this is a good place to start.

 Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr. Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.
Isserman, NYT, 9 May 1999, points out that in their initial collaborative effort, The American
Communist Movement: Storming Heaven Itself (1992), the authors concluded that: "'Few
American Communists were spies,' ... and 'espionage was not a regular activity of the American
C.P.' Haynes and Klehr have since changed their minds.... There is still room for honest debate
about many aspects of the history of American Communism. But about the involvement of ...
American Communists as accomplices of Soviet espionage during World War II, there are no
longer grounds for serious disagreement....

"This book clearly establishes the main contours of the previously hidden landscape of Soviet
espionage in the United States in the 30's and 40's. One can disagree about details; the authors
speak far too authoritatively about the presumed guilt of several alleged spies.... In general,
however, they are cautious in their judgments of guilt and innocence.... Weinstein and Vassiliev
did a better job in exploring the motives of Stalin's American spies in The Haunted Wood."

Powers, NYRB (11 May 2000) and Intelligence Wars (2004), notes that this work portrays "[t]he
immense intellectual task of reading the Soviet traffic." He describes Venona as "a rich,
convincing, and vivid report." Unsinger, NIPQ 16.3, comments that "[t]he story here is ... a
straight forward look at what we learned [from Venona] about the extent of espionage and those
who played the game.... [The authors] have done a good job in a readable and interesting
manner."

For Peake, NWCR 53.3 and Intelligencer 11.2, "Haynes and Klehr have done a masterful job of
analysis and have presented it in a very readable fashion." The reviewer notes that while the
Venona decrypts may not have convinced everyone of the magnitude of Soviet penetration in the
United States, "[f]or most, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America is the final word."

Herken, I&NS 16.3, calls this "[f]ar and away the best historical and analytical work on Venona
thus far... [T]he authors have written a highly readable and even fascinating history of Soviet
espionage in America.... An invaluable resource for spy buffs are the five appendices, which give
details on known and suspected Soviet agents by name and codename." To Friend, IJI&C 13.3,
the authors have provided "a well-informed and quietly moderate book, devoid of sensationalism
on a sensational subject."

  Hyde, Earl M., Jr. "Bernard Schuster and Joseph Katz: KGB Master Spies in United States."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 35-57.

Hyde uses the Venona materials "to show ... the extent and technique of KGB operations [in the
United States], and the use of the Communist Party" of the USA (CPUSA). He focuses on
"Joseph Katz, who served the KGB for more than ten years as a supurb multifunctional agent and
who managed..., Bernard L. Schuster, the organizational secretary of the Communist Party in
New York."

 Lamphere, Robert J., and Tom Shachtman. The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story. New
York: Random House, 1986. New York: Berkley, 1986. [pb] New Ed., with Post-Cold War
Afterword. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. [pb]
Petersen calls The FBI-KGB War "a particularly revealing first-hand account of
counterintelligence operations in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s." Miller,
IJI&C 1.3, agrees, finding it a "masterful presentation of the reality of counterespionage
activities," and "strongly recommends" it.

To Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, the book is the
"best account of th[e] still fragmentary story [of the Venona material].... Lamphere's book
adds much important information to the stories of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,... Klaus
Fuchs,... and of the Soviet spy ring which included Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and
Kim Philby."

Cram says Lamphere tells the "story about breaking the KGB ciphers during World War
II and the resulting consequences of that achievement in the struggle against Soviet
espionage and subversion." This "otherwise excellent history" is marred by the
"egregious error" of accepting Pincher's tagging of Hollis as a Soviet agent. The author
discusses Hoover's "vengeful actions" against the early CIA and liaison with it.
"Although this book has a few errors and the story has perhaps been gilded a bit by
Lamphere, it nevertheless remains one of the best histories of US counterintelligence."

According to Surveillant 4.4/5, the 1995 edition includes a 27-page Afterword where
Lamphere "reviews the KGB-FBI wars using the latest releases from KGB and U.S.
archives." Commenting in an article published in 2003, Robarge, Studies 47.3/fn.4, says
that this "remains the best book on the FBI and counterintelligence." For a report on some
of the difficulties Lamphere experienced in publishing his book, see George Lardner, Jr.,
"Ex-Agent's Spy Book Tests Secrecy," Washington Post, 27 Oct. 1977, A1.

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      SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                   Materials on Venona
                                      M-Z
 Mark, Eduard. "Venona's Source 19 and the 'Trident' Conference of May 1943: Diplomacy or
Espionage." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 1-31.

The author carefully builds a case that cryptonym 19 in Venona message No. 812 refers to Harry
Hopkins. He does not, however, conclude that this means Hopkins was either a spy or an
unwitting agent of influence. In fact, Mark leans toward a Sudoplatovian explanation that
Hopkins dealt with Soviet officials on instruction of the President, but concludes that this single
message does not answer the question of the nature of Hopkins' contacts with Soviet intelligence.

 Martin, David. "The Code War: How an Army of American Cryptanalysts Solved a
Theoretically Unsolvable Puzzle -- and Uncovered One of the Soviets' Most Sensitive Secrets."
Washington Post, 10 May 1998, W14. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

This is an interesting journalistic account of the Venona project. It gives some feel for the
problems confronting the cryptanalysts who tackled Jade and, with help from some bad security
practices by their Soviet opponents, were able to generate the volume of decrypts contained in
the Venona releases. This is recommended reading for the nonspecialist.

 Murphy, Star. "VENONA Conference." CIRA Newsletter 21, no. 4 (Winter 1996/97): 34-35.

Report on conference held at the National War College, Ft. McNair, Washington, DC., 3-4
October 1996.

  Peake, Hayden B. "OSS and the Venona Decrypts." Intelligence and National Security 12, no.
3 (Jul. 1997): 14-34.

The focus here is the Soviet wartime penetration of OSS Headquarters. Even more specifically,
Peake explores in detail the interaction between Elizabeth Bentley's revelations and the recently
released Venona decrypts in terms of what is revealed about Soviet agents working in OSS'
domestic components.

Although the argumentation is too finely detailed to restate succinctly, the author decides that
Bentley's accusations are, in the main, supported by the information in the Venona materials.
And where they are not supported, they are also not refuted. Peake concludes that "the Soviet
intelligence services did a very thorough job of penetrating the domestic elements of OSS."
However, the Soviets successes "pose a paradox. They were numerous and productive..., but to
date there is no direct evidence of damage that affected the OSS wartime mission in the United
States."

 Peake, Hayden B.

1. "The Venona Progeny." Naval War College Review 53, no. 3 (Summer 2000)
(http://www.nwc.navy.mil) Updated in Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 74-80.

Peake provides an excellent review of the growing literature drawn from the Venona materials.
The updated version includes comments on Romerstein and Breindel, The Venona Secrets (2000).
2. "Soviet Espionage in America: The VENONA Progeny." American Intelligence Journal 20,
nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 75-81.

Includes book reviews of Benson and Warner, eds.; West; Ball and Horner; Haynes and Klehr;
Weinstein and Vassilliev; Albright and Kunstel; and Romerstein and Breindell.

 Romerstein, Herbert, and Eric Breindel. The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and
America's Traitors. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2000.

Peake, Intelligencer 11.2, notes that this work "places particular emphasis on the role of the
Communist Party in Soviet espionage in America from the 1920s to the mid 50s.... Romerstein's
forceful arguments and simple declarative style make for good reading. Undoubtedly the most
controversial aspects of the book will be the portions dealing with three Americans the authors
declare were Soviet agents" -- Harry Hopkins, Harry Dexter White, and Robert Oppenheimer.

For Huck, Intelligencer 11.2, The Venona Secrets is a "detailed, well-organized and well paced
work." It offers "a fascinating window on the underground activities of the above-ground
American Communist Party apparatus." Herken, I&NS 16.3, comments that "Romerstein and
Breindel are knowledgeable guides to the labyrinthine complexities of the spy trade as the
Soviets practiced it."

 Schecter, Jerrold L. and Leona Schecter. Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations
Changed American History. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002.

According to Goulden, AFIO WIN 35-02, 2 Sep. 2002, the authors believe that the activities of
Soviet intelligence agents certainly affected U.S. policy and changed U.S. history. Their effort to
document that viewpoint makes Sacred Secrets "an important contribution to intelligence
literature." In addition, "their analysis of VENONA is the best yet published." Bath. NIPQ 19.4,
sees Sacred Secrets as a "well-researched view of some of the murkier aspects of Cold War
espionage." Although he is "not sure" that he agrees "with all their conclusions," the reviewer
finds that "they make a plausible case."

Holmes, Library Journal, Jul. 2002, finds that Sacred Secrets "is a touch oversold.... While it
adds some details to the historical literature, little new ground is actually broken.... [I]t is less a
path-breaking work than an incremental addition to the Cold War literature." For Haynes, I&NS
17.4, the absence of an explanation of how the authors obtained Soviet intelligence documents
opens the door for doubters to reject them but, for his part, he is willing to "accept[] them as
authentic." Although "[a]n inattention to detail has allowed minor errors to creep into the text...,
students of Soviet espionage ... would be foolish to ignore" this book.

See also, Harvey Klehr and John Earl Haynes, "Special Tasks and Sacred Secrets on Soviet
Atomic Spies," Intelligence and National Security 26.5 (Oct. 2011): 656-675: "In regard to
Soviet atomic espionage Special Tasks and Sacred Secrets are neither reliable nor credible."

 Schneir, Walter, and Miriam Schneir. "Cryptic Answers." Nation, 21 Aug. 1995, 152-153.
CWIHP 6-7, p. 289: "Former defenders of Rosenbergs say Venona decrypts of KGB messages
seem genuine and indicate Julius Rosenberg indeed ran Communist spy ring, though some key
evidence of atomic espionage [is] still lacking."

 Warner, Michael. "Did Truman Know about Venona?" Center for the Study of Intelligence
Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000): 2-4.

Given the existence of information implicating Harry Dexter White, passed by the FBI in
"carefully paraphrased" form to Admiral Souers in October 1950, the author concludes that
"there are two possibilities. Either Truman was not informed about the Venona messages that
implicated White, or he disregarded them. In light of the timing and circumstances of this 17
October FBI report to Adm. Souers, this author votes for the former interpretation."

 Warner, Michael, and Robert Louis Benson. "Venona and Beyond: Thoughts on Work
Undone." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 1-13.

The authors state their goal as follows: "Venona, incomplete as it is, opens large areas for
research. This essay is intended to point scholars toward various records, individuals, and issues
that need closer scrutiny." Clark comment: This goal is admirably achieved, as numerous
potential research matters (some, perhaps, never knowable with certainty) are raised.

  Weinstein, Allen, and Alexander Vassiliev. The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America -
- the Stalin Era. New York: Random House, 1999.

Click for a representative sampling of the numerous comments on and reviews of this major
work.

 West, Nigel. [Rupert Allason] Venona: The Greatest Secret of the Cold War. London:
HarperCollins, 1999.

The dust jacket asserts that this book is "based on the only complete set of [Venona] decrypts
held in Britain outside of Whitehall, supplemented by interviews with most of the principal
players.... [West] identifies for the first time the real names of several important British spies
(including a famous scientist and the son of a peer) whose names have never before made
public."

Peake, NWCR 53.3 and Intelligencer 11.2, notes that while the author's "primary focus is Britain,
he includes the impact of VENONA on Australian security, with its links to the United States
and Britain, and ... describe[s] the links to France, Finland, and Sweden." The reviewer
concludes that of the books available "West gives the most comprehensive coverage of the
VENONA program and provides a good place to become familiar with its scope and depth." For
Herken, I&NS 16.3, West "provides a valuable across-the-Atlantic perspective on Venona."




          Return to Spy Cases Table of Contents
         Return to Venona Table of Contents

         Return to NSA Table of Contents

         Return to Cryptography Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
         Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers
                                  Table of Contents


Alger Hiss' obituary appears in Bart Barnes, "Alger Hiss, Convicted in Celebrated Spy
Case, Dies at 92," Washington Post, 16 Nov. 1996, A1, A16; and Janny Scott, "Alger Hiss,
Divisive Icon of Cold War, Dies at 92," New York Times, 16 Nov. 1996, A1, A31.

American History, Oct. 1999, 15, reports that U.S. District Judge Peter Leisure has "ruled
that the records of the grand jury testimony in the Alger Hiss spy case can be opened to the
public.... The method of access will be determined only after the U.S. Justice Department
decides whether or not to contest the decision."

 A-M

 N-Z

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
         Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers
                                             A-M


  Barros, James. "Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White: The Canadian Connection." Orbis 21, no.
3 (Fall 1977): 593-605.

The author argues that Igor Gouzenko, the Russian defector in Canada, had evidence linking
Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White to Soviet espionage activities. See Bruce Craig, "A Matter
of Espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and Igor Gouzenko -- The Canadian Connection
Reassessed," Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 211-224, for a
counter-argument with regard to evidence concerning White.

  Busch, Francis Xavier. Guilty or Not Guilty?: An Account of the Trials of the Leo Frank Case,
the D. C. Stephenson Case, the Samuel Insull Case, the Alger Hiss Case. Indianapolis, IN:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1952.

 Chambers, Whittaker. Witness. New York: Random House, 1952. London: Deutsch, 1953. [pb]
Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1978.

       Constantinides: "Chambers's account of his work for the communist cause and for the
       Soviets includes interesting details of Soviet clandestine methods of operating and of
       penetration of intelligence targets.... His version of clandestine activities substantially
       stands after three decades and should be read as an evocation of the temper of a particular
       time ... and as a first-hand account of a Soviet apparat." For a contemporaneous and
       positive review, see Sidney Hook, "The Faiths of Whitaker Chambers," New York Times
       Book Review, 25 May 1952, 1.

 Cook, Fred J. The Unfinished Story of Alger Hiss. New York: William Morrow, 1958.

From the "Hiss-was-framed" genre.

 Craig, Bruce. "A Matter of Espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and Igor Gouzenko --
The Canadian Connection Reassessed." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer
2000): 211-224.

Abstract: Craig argues that Igor Gouzenko "did not possess a shread of evidence ... that
implicated Harry Dexter White in the Soviet [espionage] conspiracy.... Gouzenko's revelations
have no relevance or bearing on the espionage case relating to White."

 De Toledano, Ralph, and Victor Lasky. The Seeds of Treason: The True Story of the Hiss-
Chambers Tragedy. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1950. Rev. ed. Chicago: Regnery, 1962.

 Ehrman, John.
1. "The Alger Hiss Case: A Half-Century of Controversy." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 1
(Winter-Spring 2001): 1-13.

This is an excellent, readable review of the Hiss case and of the debate surrounding it.

2. "The Mystery of 'ALES': Once Again, the Alger Hiss Case." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 4
(2007): 29-38. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html]

Over the years, there have been multiple occasions where authors invented scenarios showing
that Hiss was not a spy and then did their best "to prove it through selective use of evidence,
bending the facts, or filling in the blanks with unfounded speculation." Like the Kai Bird and
Svetlana Chervonnaya effort in April 2007, "none of these alternative narratives holds up to
serious examination."

  Gay, James Thomas. "The Alger Hiss Spy Case." American History (Jun. 1998).
[http://www.historynet.com/ah]

The author presents a synopsis of events in the Hiss spy case. He concludes: "[W]hile the
preponderance of evidence" weighs "heavily against Hiss, his unrelenting insistence of
innocence will keep the door of doubt ever so slightly ajar."

 Hiss, Alger. In the Court of Public Opinion. New York: Knopf, 1957.

Clark comment: This is not so much an autobiography as a defense brief to the court of public
opinion. In a review of Hiss' book, Sidney, Hook. "A Fateful Chapter of Our Times," New York
Times Book Review, 12 May 1957, 1, 28, rejects Hiss' protestations of innocence.

 Jacoby, Susan. Alger Hiss and the Battle for History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.

Greenberg, Washington Post, 31 May 2009, comments that despite the author's "stout ability to
resist the biases and thought-formulas of left and right, detachment isn't really what Jacoby is
after. Rather, she seems hell-bent on destroying the fallacy that Hiss's well-established guilt
somehow justified the mania it fed. A worthy cause it is. After all, conservatives, she reminds us,
have exploited such illogic not only in refighting the Red Scare but also in our own day, as
Jacoby contends in a final chapter that ranges zestfully if unsystematically over recent battles
about loyalty and patriotism. So then, in the end we all have reasons why we don't want to let go
of the Cold War."

 Lowenthal, John. "Venona and Alger Hiss." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3
(Autumn 2000): 98-130.

The author, Alger Hiss' lawyer, argues that the Venona team "employed false premises and
flawed comparative logic to reach the desired conclusion that Alger Hiss was the spy Ales, a
conclusion psychologically motivated and politically correct but factually wrong.... [This is] a
warning to view other Venona product with caution and skepticism."
Eduard Mark, "Who Was 'Venona's' 'Ales'? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss Case," Intelligence and
National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 45-72, effectively refutes Lowenthal's reading of
Venona Cable No. 1822 and suggests that Cable No. 195 from Moscow to New York adds
further support to the case against Hiss.

David Lowenthal and Roger Sandilands, "Eduard Mark on Venona's 'Ales': A Note."
Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 509-512, provide a "summary" of a
draft response written by John Lowenthal prior to his death. That response concluded "that Mark
had refuted neither the facts nor the reasoning presented in his [Lowenthal's] article."

 Mark, Eduard. "Who Was 'Venona's' 'Ales'? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss Case." Intelligence and
National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 45-72.

The author effectively refutes John Lowenthal, "Venona and Alger Hiss," Intelligence and
National Security 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 98-130, who argues that the Venona team
"employed false premises and flawed comparative logic to reach the desired conclusion that
Alger Hiss was the spy Ales." Mark concludes that Lowenthal's reading of Venona Cable No.
1822 is incorrect and suggests that Cable No. 195 from Moscow to New York adds further
support to the case against Hiss.

David Lowenthal and Roger Sandilands, "Eduard Mark on Venona's 'Ales': A Note."
Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 509-512, provide a "summary" of a
draft response written by John Lowenthal prior to his death. That response concluded "that Mark
had refuted neither the facts nor the reasoning presented in his [Lowenthal's] article."

         Return to Hiss/Chambers Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
         Alger Hiss and Whittaker Chambers
                                            N-Z


 Olmsted, Kathryn S. "Blond Queens, Red Spiders and Neurotic Old Maids: Gender and
Espionage in the Early Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 1 (Spring 2004):
78-94.
Elizabeth Bentley, Judith Coplon, Priscilla Hiss, and Ethel Rosenberg "received the most media
coverage of any female Communist spies, and their cases best illustrate the gender constructions
used to interpret them."

 Shelton, Christina. Alger Hiss: Why He Chose Treason. New York: Threshold Editions, Simon
& Schuster, 2012.

Clark comment: My review of this work, "Once Again, Alger Hiss," is published in
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 26, no. 1 (2013): 201-207. Until
the number of Eprints allowed has been reached, the review is available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/YxvuzPgsw2F9wWNqYS6k/full. Peake, Studies 56.4 (Dec.
2012), says "[f]or readers new to the topic, Shelton's work provides a good summary." But the
"why" question is not answered here.

Klehr, Wall Street Journal, 20 Apr. 2012, finds that the author "provides a workmanlike account
of Alger Hiss's journey" and "offers several provocative but not always convincing assertions
about why Hiss's guilt remains such a polarizing matter.... Offering scant evidence," Shelton
"asserts that Hiss steered American policy on China and the Soviet Union, even though policy is
rarely susceptible to one person's influence." A Publishers Weekly, 6 Feb. 2012, reviewer takes
note of "Shelton's conservative editorializing ... against liberals who aim ... to turn America into
a latter-day Soviet Union."

For Weiner, Washington Times, 18 Apr. 2012, the author "has tried to make the subject her own,
but most of her additions seem like filler -- digressions from the subject of Hiss.... The book re-
packages others' research but not deftly." Radosh, Weekly Standard, 9 Apr. 2012, comments that
"Shelton suffers from not being a historian.... For anyone who has read any of the earlier books,
it all seems rather redundant. Shelton also commits some amazing errors."

 Smith, John Chabot. Alger Hiss: The True Story. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1976.

From the "Hiss-was-framed" genre. Allen Weinstein, "Was Alger Hiss Framed?" New York
Review of Books, 1 Apr. 1976, 16-18, is a negative contemporaneous review.

 Swan, Patrick A., ed. Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, and the Shism in the American Soul.
Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003.

Whitfield, I&NS 18.3, calls this a "superb anthology" of nearly two dozen previously published
essays. The work "basically endorses the verdict of 20 of the 24 jurors" in the two Hiss trials.
The book's pro-Hiss essays "tend to ignore the documents that incriminated him and instead
impugn the motives of his accuser."

 Tanenhaus, Sam. "Hiss: Guilty as Charged." Commentary 95, no. 4 (Apr. 1993): 32-37.

 Tanenhaus, Sam. Whittaker Chambers: A Biography. New York: Random House, 1997.
       Bernstein, NYT, 18 Feb. 1997, calls the author's account of the Chambers-Hiss case
       "meticulous" and "sober and careful and patient." His conclusion that Hiss did pass secret
       documents to Chambers "is important though not surprising." Tanenhaus tells his story of
       Chambers the person "clearly, authoritatively and with wonderful richness of detail."
       Taylor, Booklist, 1 Feb. 1997, calls this work a "magnificent" and "definitive" biography.
       The author's research is "formidable and exhaustive," and "his narrative unfolds with
       supple effortlessness."

       For Thomas, Washington Post, 31 Jan. 1999, "[t]his thoughtful biography ... is the best
       account of the communist spy trade in America." Oshinsky, WPNWE, 24 Mar. 1997,
       comments that Tanenhaus' "passionate work of scholarship" has given Chambers "a firm
       place in history." Writing in IJI&C 10.3, Jefferson Adams declares that Tanenhaus'
       biography is "[m]eticulously researched and succinctly written"; it "will be an
       indispensible work for many generations to come."

       In the judgment of Falcoff, Commentary, Feb. 1997, "Whittaker Chambers: A Biography
       bids fair ... to become the last word on one of the longest-running controversies of the
       cold war." This is "a monumental work of scholarship which benefits from a vast amount
       of new documentation." To Ehrman, Studies, Winter-Spring 2001, "Tanenhaus is a
       thorough biographer" who presents "a full portrait of Chambers.... Tanenhaus's witing,
       too, is excellent, and he manages to bring a sense of drama and suspense to a well-worn
       story."

 Weinstein, Allen. Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case. New York: Knopf, 1978. Toronto:
Random House, 1978. Rev. ed. New York: Vintage, 1979. [pb] Newly rev. ed. New York:
Random House, 1997.

Clark comment: After spending almost 10 years searching for information to vindicate Hiss,
Weinstein concluded that Hiss was guilty of perjury and espionage. This remains the book to
read on the Hiss case, especially the newly revised edition with its additional material. The
downside of the new edition is that it seems to stretch to justify itself.

Ehrman, Studies, Winter-Spring 2001, comments that "since Perjury appeared, no significant
work has repeated the claim of a frame-up or argued that Hiss was innocent." Pforzheimer calls
Perjury "an important study of a major case of communist espionage in the U.S. in the 1930s and
1940s," while Petersen says it "is a meticulously researched scholarly treatment."

Victor Navasky, "Allen Weinstein's Docudrama," The Nation, 3 Nov. 1997, 11-16, remains
unconvinced, and continues (Navasky, "The Case Not Proved Against Alger Hiss," The Nation,
8 Apr. 1978) to question Weinstein's use of his sources in arriving at his conclusion. Navasky
argues that the revised edition of Perjury reprints interviews that have been challenged by the
interviewees themselves "without indicating that they've been challenged." He also has
reservations about the Venona transcripts, calling them "documents said to be decoded and
annotated cable traffic ... between Moscow and its U.S. agents" (emphasis added.). Nevasky
concludes that "it is at best a hazardous enterprise to attempt definitive readings of the tea leaves
as soon as they are leaked, sold or selectively released by this or that intelligence source."
Allen Weinstein, "'Perjury,' Take Three," New Republic, 29 April 1978, 19-21, fires back at
Navsky's criticisms of Perjury.

 Weiser, Benjamin. "Nixon Lobbied Grand Jury to Indict Hiss in Espionage Case, Transcripts
Reveal." New York Times, 12 Oct. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The Justice Department has released about 4,200 pages of grand jury records from the
investigation of Alger Hiss. The documents include the 51-page transcript of then-Congressman
Richard Nixon's appearance before the grand jury on 13 December 1948.
  White, G. Edward. Alger Hiss's Looking Glass War: The Covert Life of a Soviet Spy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004.

Ehrman, Studies 49.1 (2005), says that the author "provides a convincing analysis of Hiss's
reasons" for committing espionage. The book "does not reveal any new facts or evidence," but it
"still is an important addition to the literature of the case. White's focus on personality --
grounded in thorough research -- provides a useful and insightful way to look at Hiss. The book
not only answers the questions about Hiss's motives for spying and denying his actions but also
strips away the façade of respectability that helped Hiss obscure the facts for so long." Except for
a few spots, the author's prose "is clear and direct, and makes for fascinating reading."

For Mark, I&NS 21.1 (Feb. 2006), this is "arguably the best" book on the life of Alger Hiss. The
author mostly "lets the evidence speak for itself, though not without demonstrations of the
implausibilites of Hiss's ever-evolving defense."

 Zeligs, Meyer. Friendship and Fratricide. New York: Viking, 1967.

Clark comment: The author's psychoanalysis of Chambers to show why he would frame Hiss
was performed without access to Chambers. For a negative contemporaneous review, see Meyer
Schapiro, "Dangerous Acquaintances," New York Review of Books, 23 Feb. 1967, 5-8.

          Return to Hiss/Chambers Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                              Elizabeth Bentley
 Bentley, Elizabeth. Out of Bondage: The Story of Elizabeth Bentley. New York: Devin-Adair,
1951. "Afterword" by Hayden Peake. New York: Ivy Books, 1988.

According to Richelson, A Century of Spies, p. 225, in November 1945 "Elizabeth Terrill
Bentley, who had served as courier for major Soviet espionage rings, began to tell the FBI about
those rings.... Her information led the FBI to seriously investigate charges made in 1939 by
Whittaker Chambers concerning Soviet intelligence penetration of the U.S. government."

Chambers sees "some tradecraft insights" in the book. Constantinides suggests that there may
be a "need for further works on Bentley's life as a Soviet agent." Petersen notes that the 1988
edition is a reprint of the 1951 book, "with analysis by Peake. He demonstrates that Bentley's
testimony holds up well in light of subsequent revelations." See also, Peake, "OSS and the
Venona Decrypts," I&NS 12.3 (Jul. 1997): 14-34.

 Kessler, Lauren. Clever Girl: Elizabeth Bentley, the Spy Who Ushered in the McCarthy Era.
New York: Harper Collins, 2003.

Peake, Studies 48.1, says the author "tells the Bentley story with an easy reading style adding
many well-documented personal details about her life that had escaped public attention." For
Wilson, I&NS 19.4 (Winter 2004), this work was "clearly written with non-academic readers in
mind." The author's "writing style is energetic and vivid, even sensationalistic in places." Kessler
"frequently indulges in sheer speculation about Bentley's thoughts and emotions." In addition,
"Clever Girl is frustratingly documented" and overreliant on Bentley's Out of Bondage. The
reviewer recommends Olmsted's Red Spy Queen as the better book.

 Olmsted, Kathryn S. "Blond Queens, Red Spiders and Neurotic Old Maids: Gender and
Espionage in the Early Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 1 (Spring 2004):
78-94.

Elizabeth Bentley, Judith Coplon, Priscilla Hiss, and Ethel Rosenberg "received the most media
coverage of any female Communist spies, and their cases best illustrate the gender constructions
used to interpret them."

 Olmsted, Kathryn S. Red Spy Queen: A Biography of Elizabeth Bentley. Chapel Hill, NC:
University of North Carolina, 2002.

Bath, NIPQ 19.1/2, says that the author "is generally successful in giving ... a more accurate
picture" of Bentley than earlier depictions. Olmsted recognizes Bentley's "importance in the
post-war U.S. government's battle against the communist infiltration and Soviet intelligence
penetration that had taken place in the 1940s."

For Sibley, I&NS 18.1, the author's portrayal of Bentley is "thorough and balanced.... Olmsted
also makes clear that Bentley cannot be defined merely by her character flaws and mental
weaknesses. Her role in history outweighs these personal defects.... The book is comprehensively
researched and reads like a good detective novel." Similarly, Scully, H-Women, H-Net Reviews,
Apr. 2003, sees this as "a well-researched, coherent, and fast-paced biography." The author "is
evenhanded and careful in her discussion of Bentley's later accusations against especially
prominent individuals."

Peake, Intelligencer 13.2, concludes that the author's "powerful well written characterization ...
adds much that is new about [Bentley's] life. Whether one see[s] her as a heroine or traitor, it is a
valuable contribution to the literature." To Warner, Studies 47.2 (2003), the author's "weaving
of public, legal, and declassified sources has given us a nearly definitive life of Elizabeth
Bentley." However, "Olmsted could have done better at explaining the Bentley case in the
context of the larger American effort against the Soviets."

 Wilson, Veronica A. "Elizabeth Bentley and Cold War Representation: Some Masks Not
Dropped." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 49-69.

From Abstract: "Some commentators, offended by Bentley's failure to fulfil traditional gender
prescriptions, ridiculed her and shed doubts upon her story, which received less serious
consideration than Whittaker Chambers' similar tale. This article explores these criticisms,
Bentley's attempts to counter them with her own public performances of traditional feminity, and,
implicitly, gender's role in American Cold War politics."

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents

          Return to Women - Miscellaneous/Bentley




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                     Noel Field
 Barth, Bernd-Rainer, and Werner Schweizer, eds. Der Fall Noel Field: Schlüsselfigur der
Schauprozesse in Osteuropa [The Case of Noel Field: Key Figure in the Show Trials in Eastern
Europe]. Berlin: BasisDruck Verlag, 2005. Includes DVD, Noel Field -- Der erfundende Spion
[Noel Field -- The Fictitious Spy], a documentary film directed by Werner Schweizer, in German,
French, and English.

Fischer, IJI&C 22.2 (Summer 2009), believes that this "meticulously documented history" will
"stand as the final word on this Cold War mystery."

 De Toledano, Ralph. "The Noel Field Story." American Mercury 80 (Apr. 1955): 5-8.

       Petersen: "Soviet agent in State Department, League of Nations, and relief organizations
       in Europe, 1930-1940s."

 Lewis, Flora. Red Pawn: The Story of Noel Field. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965. The
Man Who Disappeared: The Strange History of Noel Field. London: Arthur Barker, 1965.
       Constantinides: This is a "fine study" that puts "Field and his activities for the Soviets
       and OSS in proper perspective and at the right level of importance" -- that is, "a minor
       figure who played a negligible role."

 Steven, Stewart. Operation Splinter Factor. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974. London: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1974.

Constantinides finds this story of U.S. perfidy against the Soviet Union "quite unreliable," and
calls it "one of the worst books to appear in years in the field of intelligence; no time need be
spent on it." For Fischer, IJI&C 22.2/343-345 (Summer 2009), this is a "specious account." The
book is "replete with factual errors," and its basic thesis "is sheer nonsense."

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                      Bernon F. Mitchell & William H. Martin
Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin were NSA cryptologists who defected to the
Soviet Union in 1960. They surfaced at a Moscow news conference on 6 September 1960.
This was a major embarrassment for NSA. A statement released in Moscow was carried by
the New York Times on 7 September 1960. See Bamford (Penguin, 1983), pp. 177-196, as a
starting point.

Materials presented in chronological order.

  Gieske, Tony. "NSA's Missing Pair Had Parallel Careers." Washington Post, 6 Aug. 1960, A8.
[Barrett]

 Raymond, Jack. "U.S. Fears Two Security Aides Have Gone Behind the Iron Curtain." New
York Times, 6 Aug. 1960, A1. [Barrett]

 Casey, Phil. "Senate Committee Wants Full Report on Two Missing Employees of NSA."
Washington Post, 7 Aug. 1960, A1. [Barrett]

  Pearson, Drew. "Missing NSA Aides Know Codes." Washington Post, 17 Aug. 1960, B25.
[Barrett]

 Pryor, Betty. "McCormick Says Missing NSA Pair Took Valuable Code Secrets to Soviet."
Washington Post, 31 Aug. 1960, A11. [Barrett]
  Raymond, Jack. "Defectors Data Called Valuable." New York Times, 31 Aug. 1960, A15.
[Barrett]

 Caruthers, Osgood. "Two Code Clerks Defect to Soviet Union, Score U.S. 'Spying.'" New York
Times, 7 Sep. 1960, 1, 11. [Bamford2]

 Mitchell, Bernon F., and William H. Martin. "Prepared Statement." New York Times, 7 Sep.
1960, A6.

  Raymond, Jack. "Pentagon Terms Statements False." New York Times, 7 Sep. 1960, A1.
[Barrett]

 Barker, Wayne G., and Rodney E. Coffman. The Anatomy of Two Traitors: The Story of the
Defection of Two Americans to the Soviet Union. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1981.

       Petersen: "Not held in high regard by some experts."

 Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1982. With New Afterword. New York: Penguin, 1983. [pb] UB251U5B35

       Clark comment: This work continues to be reviled by critics; but if Bamford had not
       written it, we would not have had an early, serious, and in-depth look at NSA's activities
       and organization. It is not completely superceded by Bamford's later Body of Secrets
       (2001). Pforzheimer suggests that the book "must be used with caution because of some
       errors of fact." The Afterword in the 1983 paperback edition includes material on the
       British spy, Geoffrey Arthur Prime, and on Government Communications Headquarters
       (GCHQ), the British equivalent of NSA.

       For Lowenthal, the book is "[s]tronger on organizational history than on the actual work
       of signals intelligence." Watson, et al, Encyclopedia, p. xiii, notes that Puzzle Palace "is
       the result of an outstanding research effort, and it provides a detailed and accurate study
       of the agency." Powers, NYRB, 3 Feb. 1983, and Intelligence Wars (2004), 243-255,
       comments that the author "has assembled all that was known, and much that was
       unknown," about NSA, "but the result does not make for light reading." Except for a
       handful of stories, the "book reads like a study of AT&T," with methodical lists of
       organizational detail.

       For some insights on Bamford's monumental research effort, see Paul Constance, "How
       Jim Bamford Probed the NSA," Cryptologia 21, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 71-74.

 Barrett, David M. "Secrecy, Security, and Sex: The NSA, Congress, and the Martin-Mitchell
Defections." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter
2009): 699-729.

It "seems fair and accurate" to say that congressional oversight of NSA from late1952 through
the summer of 1960 "was almost nonexistant.... When Martin's and Mitchell's spectacular
defections and press conference in Moscow unfolded, the 'alarms' set off in the United States
were sufficient to provoke a relatively assertive response from Capitol Hill which did, indeed,
result in changes of NSA policies and procedures. Having said that, no available evidence
suggests that monitoring of the NSA by legislators became even close to comprehensive during
the remainder of the 1960s."

         Return to NSA Table of Contents

         Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




                             SPY CASES - U.S
                           Jonathan J. Pollard
                                    Table of Contents

 Introduction

 1985 - 1997

 1998

 1999

 From 2000

         Return to Israeli-U.S. Relations Table of Contents

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




                             SPY CASES - U.S
                           Jonathan J. Pollard
                                    Introduction

 On 21 November 1985, Naval Investigative Service analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard
was arrested for supplying classified information to Israeli intelligence. He was
convicted of espionage on 4 June 1986, and sentenced to life in prison. His wife, Anne
Louise Henderson Pollard, was also convicted of espionage, and received a five-year
prison sentence.

  In late September 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin appealed to President Clinton
for clemency for Pollard. (Washington Post, 30 Sep. 1995, A9; Paul Bedard, "White
House Clemency for Spy Is Highly Unlikely," Washington Times, 30 Sep. 1995, A2.)

  On 21 November 1995, Pollard was granted Israeli citizenship. The Israeli Interior
Minister "decided to grant Mr. Pollard Israeli citizenship in response to a request from
his lawyers, and after receiving new information about the case." Pollard will soon be
eligible for parole after serving 10 years of his life sentence. "His lawyers have argued
that Israeli citizenship, which guarantees him the right to settle in Israel, would help
him win parole." (New York Times, 22 Nov. 1995, A5.)

 In July 1996, President Clinton again turned down a request for clemency. (Bill
Gertz, "Clinton Rejects Clemency Bid by Israeli Spy Pollard," Washington Times, 27
Jul. 1996, A2.)

  On 9 March 1998, UPI reported that Israeli Cabinet Secretary Danny Naveh is
seeking "new ways" to secure Pollard's release. Naveh expects to visit Pollard in jail
"in a few weeks."

 Pollard became an issue at the Israeli-Palestinian talks in Wye, Maryland, in October
1998 when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu proposed the spy's release as part of the
budding West Bank accord. President Clinton agreed to review the case. (Walter
Pincus, "Convicted Spy Becomes Bargaining Chip," Washington Post, 24 Oct. 1998,
A20.)

 Despite dire predictions from those opposed to such an action, President Bill Clinton
did not include Pollard among those granted pardons and commutations on 20 January
2001

 President George W. Bush also experienced some pressure from his Israeli
counterparts and others to pardon Pollard. (Jonathan Finer, "Bush Trip Revives Israeli
Push for Pardon of Spy," Washington Post, 15 Jan. 2008, A9.) And at the end of
Bush's term, Pollard requested commutation of his sentence. (Ephron, Dan. "Jailed
For 23 Years, An Old Spy Asks For a Fresh Start." Newsweek, 12 Jan. 2009.) That did
not happen.

  In January 2011, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu formally asked President Obama
for Pollard's release.(Joel Greenberg, "Netanyahu Calls for Release of Spy for Israel
Serving Life Sentence in U.S.," Washington Post, 4 Jan. 2011.) Then, again in April
2012, there were reports of renewed calls from Israeli leaders for freeing Pollard.
(Josef Federman, "Israel Steps Up Campaign for Convicted Spy," Associated Press,
11 Apr. 2012.)

 On 14 December 2012, the National Security Archive at George Washington
University published the newly declassified CIA 1987 damage assessment of the
Pollard case:

Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Director of Central Intelligence,
The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment (30 Oct. 1987).
Available at: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/. See Jeffrey T.
Richelson, ed., The Jonathan Pollard Spy Case: The CIA's 1987 Damage Assessment
Declassified (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 407), 14 Dec.
2012.

          Return to Pollard Table of Contents




                              SPY CASES - U.S
                            Jonathan J. Pollard
                             The Pollard Case 1985 - 1997

Materials presented in chronological order.

  Shenon, Philip. "Navy Employee Arrested as Spy." New York Times, 22 Nov. 1985.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

A civilian counterintelligence analyst for the Navy, Jonathan Jay Pollard, "was arrested [on 21
November 1985] on espionage charges, accused of selling classified code information to the
Israeli Government, Federal officials said. The analyst ... was arrested near the Israeli Embassy
here. Federal officials said he was trying to get the Israeli authorities to grant him political
asylum."

  Shenon, Philip. "Shultz Welcomes Apology by Israel." New York Times, 2 Dec. 1985.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"Secretary of State George P. Shultz said [on 1 December 1985] that the United States welcomed
Israel's apology for the purported espionage activities of Jonathan Jay Pollard."

 Blitzer, Wolf. "Pollard: Not a Bumbler, but Israel's Master Spy." Washington Post, 15 Feb.
1987, C1.

  Washington Times. Editors. "Prosecutors Emphasize Damage Caused by Pollard." 19 Feb.1987,
5.

 Kurtz, Howard. "Pollard: Top Israelis Backed Spy Ring." Washington Post, 28 Feb. 1987, A8.

 Shipler, David K. "A Resignation Eases but Doesn't End Strains Over the Pollard Spy
Episode." New York Times, 31 Mar. 1987. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Strains in the Israeli-American relationship appear to have been eased, but not eliminated, by
the announcement [on 30 March 1987] that the Israeli Air Force colonel accused of recruiting an
American naval intelligence analyst as a spy was resigning as commander of a major Israeli air
base.... The Israeli colonel, Aviem Sella, was indicted on charges of espionage by a Federal
grand jury, but is not expected to return to the United States."

 Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale.
New York: Delacorte, 1988. New York: Dell, 1988. [pb]

       Petersen says Merchants of Treason is "an important survey of spy cases since 1968 that
       is critical of U.S. counterintelligence as ineffective." Chambers comments that the book
       "seems to be aimed at the general reader"; it is "well crafted." For Lowenthal, the work
       is "[m]arred by a somewhat breathless and hyperbolic journalistic prose." According to
       Kuntzman, IJI&C 6.2, Allen and Polmar present an "excellent compilation of the spy
       stories that ... made headlines" during the 1980s. The Walker case takes up about half of
       the book. "There is little different, however, between John D. Barron's Breaking the Ring
       and ... Merchants of Treason." Bell, Pollard, Harper, Wu-Tai Chin, and Pelton are also
       covered.

 Friedman, Robert I. "Pollard's Prison Letters: A Portrait of a Fanatic." Washington Post, 19 Jun.
1988, C2.

 Kessler, Ronald. Spy vs. Spy: Stalking Soviet Spies in America. New York: Scribner's, 1988.
Spy vs. Spy: The Shocking True Story of the FBI's War Against Soviet Agents in America. New
York: Pocket Books, 1988.
According to Evans, IJI&C 3.3, Spy vs. Spy is "easy for laymen to read and entertains."
However, the subtitle is misleading because the case of the Koechers, who were Czech spies,
takes up "a large part or all of five of the nineteen chapters." Pollard, who spied for Israel, takes
up most of Chapter 13. And Chapter 14 belongs to Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a PRC spy. The book
"reflects ... many institutional prejudices and parochial viewpoints, especially regarding the
CIA." Cram says this is an "interesting and useful compendium" that constitutes a "valuable
contribution to counterintelligence literature on the FBI experience."

NameBase comments that "[m]ost of this book recounts the story of Karl F. Koecher and his
wife Hana, whom Kessler interviewed in 1987. In 1965 they orchestrated a phony defection from
the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, after which Karl became a naturalized U.S. citizen,
worked full-time for the CIA beginning in 1973, and continued as a contract agent after 1977.
He ... spent many of his weekends as a 'swinger' at spouse-swapping parties with Hana. By 1982
the FBI's counterintelligence squad was getting suspicious. In 1984 Karl Koecher admitted that
he had been spying for the East all along, and in 1986 he and Hana were traded for Natan
Sharansky."

 Tirschwell, Eric. "Victim or Villain? Considering the 'Pollard Affair.'" Congress Monthly 56,
no. 5 (1989): 17-18. [Petersen]

 Henderson, Bernard R. Pollard: The Spy's Story. New York: Alpha Books, 1989.

Henderson is Pollard's father-in-law.

 Blitzer, Wolf. Territory of Lies, the Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard: The American
Who Spied on His Country for Israel and How He Was Betrayed. New York: Harper & Row,
1989.

Chambers characterizes Territory of Lies as "an experienced journalist tak[ing] a less than
flattering look at a credulous twerp." The reviewer in FA 68.4 (1989) calls Blitzer's prose
"occasionally offhand," but adds that the journalist "knows his two countries in detail and is
careful not to venture beyond his evidence."

In a review essay, Richard R. Valcourt, "Misplaced Loyalties: The Pollards and 'Friends,'"
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 3 (1990): 425-431, suggests
that while the author "understands American politics and the structure of the Washington
establishment," he abandons some of his objectivity by championing Anne Pollard's case in
seeking early release. "Blitzer concludes that 'the benefits to Israel did not outweigh the costs."
This is "an estimable book ... [and the] best and most comprehensive account of the affair to
date."As seen by Valcourt, IJI&C

Sinclair, I&NS 6.2, sees the book as "excessively earnest and at times tedious.... Crippled by a
lack of substantive information, Blitzer's book is an unconvincing attempt to vindicate an
unfascinating subject.... Territory of Lies does manage to give an interesting, though unflattering,
view of the Naval Intelligence Service (NIS).... We learn little about the mysterious LAKAM,
though its leadership is examined."
 Pollard, Carol. "A Plea that Was No Bargain for a Crime of Conscience." Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, 4-10 Mar. 1991, 25.

       Carol Pollard is Jonathan Pollard's sister. Here, she has been given a national forum from
       which to argue that Pollard did wrong, but....

 Kurtz, Howard. "Israel's Least Favored Spy." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 13-19
May 1991, 32.

       After a period of relative silence, some major Jewish organizations and Israeli Knesset
       members are lobbying for commutation of Jonathan Pollard's sentence. He is eligible for
       parole in 1997.

 Campbell, Kenneth J. "Profiles in Treason. Jonathan Jay Pollard: A Corrupted Ideologue."
American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (Autumn-Winter 1993): 55-59.

       This is a review of the early life and career of Pollard, with some psychological insights
       as to motivation. Both Pollards are seen as corrupted by Israeli intelligence money.

 Goldenberg, Eliot. The Spy Who Knew Too Much: The Government Plot to Silence Jonathan
Pollard. New York: Shapolsky Publishers, 1993.

       Surveillant 3.4/5: "Here comes the master spin doctors to convince us that Pollard was
       right, the nation was wrong."

 Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign
Policy. New York: Random House, 1991. [pb] The Samson Option: Israel, America and the
Bomb. London: Faber & Faber, 1992. [pb] The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and
American Foreign Policy. With new Afterword. New York: Vintage, 1993.

       According to Surveillant 2.2, the book has, in part, been "vigorously disputed.... [O]ne of
       the key sources, Israeli exile Ari Ben-Menashe, is a very controversial figure." Similar
       questions are raised by Bates, NIPQ 8.4, who finds that the book's "sourcing is vague."
       Bates adds, however, that The Samson Option is "good reading that weaves a plausible
       tale." On the other hand, Beres, IJI&C 10.1/83/fn. 9, finds The Samson Option to be
       "altogether lacking in serious scholarly merit."

       To Beckman, America, 19 Sep. 1992, The Samson Option is "enlightening and
       provocative." Nonetheless, Hersh "lacks evidence" for his claim that the Soviet Union
       was the primary target of Israeli nuclear weapons. Doron, IJI&C 6.1, argues that Hersh
       has been "unable to establish with complete credibility whether or not Israel actually has
       nuclear capability."

       Quandt, WPNWE, 2-8 Dec. 1991, also finds it "difficult to believe that Israel has
       developed a so-called 'counterforce' capability against the Soviets [that is, the capability
       to hit Soviet military targets]. It makes little sense militarily, in contrast to a 'city-busting'
       capability." In a number of instances, Hersh makes a "questionable use of sources," and
       further "weakens his impressive narrative by leaving a trail of minor errors." If nothing
       else, however, Hersh has performed a service by making available more information on a
       difficult topic.

 New York Times. "Israel Grants Citizenship to American Spy." 22 Nov. 1995, A5 (N).

On 21 November 1995, Israeli Interior Minister Ehud Barak granted Israeli citizenship to
Jonathan Pollard.

 Marcus, Amy Dockser. "Israel Embraces Efforts to Free Pollard." Wall Street Journal, 25 Jan.
1996, A18.

 Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Pollard Was an Israeli Spy." Jun. 1998. [http://
www.nacic.gov]

On 11 May 1998, Israel officially acknowledged for the first time "that Jonathan Pollard ... was
indeed an Israeli agent. According to an official Israeli statement, Pollard was 'an Israeli spy,'
who worked for an intelligence agency called the Scientific Liaison Office.... In return for the
acknowledgment, Pollard agreed to drop an Israeli Supreme Court petition that Israel feared
would force the government to explain its intelligence-gathering procedures."

 Gertz, Bill. "Ex-Mossad Spy Says He Directed Pollard." Washington Times, 22 Jun. 1997, A1,
A7.

          Forward to Pollard 1998

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                              SPY CASES - U.S
                            Jonathan J. Pollard
                                The Pollard Case in 1998
     Including Israeli-Palestinian Talks in Wye, Maryland, and Aftermath

Materials presented in chronological order.
 Perl, Peter. "The Spy Who's Been Left In the Cold." Washington Post Magazine, 5 Jul. 1998,
W9 ff. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

This article is more balanced than the Pollard-as-victim claptrap that has appeared much too
frequently in recent years. The author takes the time to state clearly the position of the opposition
to Pollard's release: "Key officials in the Defense and Justice departments and various
intelligence agencies today remain as opposed to Jonathan Pollard's release as they were on
March 4, 1987, when a federal judge sentenced him to life imprisonment for espionage.... These
officials still consider Pollard a dangerous traitor whose release would send a terrible message
that it's okay to spy for a friendly nation or to help an ethnic or religious homeland. And they
portray Pollard as an arrogant, greedy and sometimes delusional young man who sold out his
country for $50,000 in cash, jewelry and lavish trips abroad."

 Associated Press. "After Snag over Israeli Spy Holds Up Signing, Mideast Agreement Goes
Ahead." 23 Oct. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 23 October 1998, "Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian leader Yasir
Arafat ... agreed on a breakthrough land-for-peace West Bank accord, overcoming a last-minute
snag ... centered on Israel's insistence that Jonathan Pollard ... be released. White House
spokesman Joe Lockhart said Clinton agreed ... to review the Pollard case. 'That review will be
done without any commitments. There is no time limit,' he said, or any advance assurance about
the outcome." See also, Walter Pincus, "Convicted Spy Becomes Bargaining Chip," Washington
Post, 24 Oct. 1998, A20; and Mark Thompson, "America's Traitor, Israel's Patriot," Time, 2 Nov.
1998.

 Sieff, Martin. "Pollard Demand Put Clinton in Fix." Washington Times National Weekly
Edition, 2-8 Nov. 1998, 17.

President Clinton stated "that he had reached no conclusion yet on whether he would pardon
Pollard.... However, both diplomats and intelligence officials said Pollard's pardon and release
now appear to be a done deal, and in a matter of weeks at the very most." See also, Rowan
Scarborough, "Pollard Betrayed Crown Jewels of American Spy Data" Washington Times
National Weekly Edition, 2-8 Nov. 1998, 3, with quotes by Joseph diGenova arguing against
Pollard's release.

 Pincus, Walter, and Barton Gellman. "Tenet Said He Might Quit Over Pollard Release."
Washington Post, 11 Nov. 1998, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to sources, "CIA Director George J. Tenet told President Clinton last month that he
would find it difficult to remain as director were convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Jay Pollard
released as part of a Middle East peace agreement." See also, James Risen and Steve Erlanger,
"C.I.A. Chief Vowed to Quit if Clinton Freed Israeli Spy," New York Times, 11 Nov. 1998, A1-
A12 (N).

 Gertz, Bill. "Pollard's Career as a Spy Proved to Be Fruitful for Israelis." Washington Times
National Weekly Edition, 23-29 Nov. 1998, 13.
Gertz reviews the state of play in the Pollard case.

 Pincus, Walter. "White House Canvassing on Release of Pollard." Washington Post, 3 Dec.
1998, A37. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to White House spokesman David Leavy on 2 December 1998, "[t]he White House
has asked senior administration officials to recommend by [11 January 1999] whether convicted
Israeli spy Jonathan Jay Pollard should be granted clemency and to supply any information that
might have a bearing on the case." See also, Bill Gertz, "Clinton to Rule on Pollard in January,"
Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 30 Nov.-6 Dec. 1998, 15.

 Studeman, W.O., Sumner Shapiro, J.L. Butts, and T.A. Brooks. "Release Pollard at the Nation's
Peril." Washington Post, 12 Dec. 1998, A23.

"We, who are painfully familiar with the case, feel obligated to go on record with the facts
regarding Pollard in order to dispel the myths that have arisen from this clever public relations
campaign aimed at transforming Pollard from greedy, arrogant betrayer of the American national
trust into Pollard, committed Israeli patriot.... A presidential grant of clemency or pardon in this
or any other espionage case -- regardless of the foreign government involved and irrespective of
the claimed ideological motivation -- would be totally irresponsible from a national security
standpoint....

"The authors are retired Navy admirals, each of whom served as director of naval intelligence
during the period between 1978 and 1991."

A longer version of this Op-Ed piece is published as "Releasing the Spy Pollard Is Not in the
National Interest," Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 15, no. 1 (Jan. 1999), 1-2. See also
Studeman, Shapiro, Butts, and Brooks, "The Pollard Case: A National Security Community
Perspective," Periscope 21, no. 4 (Dec. 1998), 14.

          Forward to Pollard 1999

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                              SPY CASES - U.S
                            Jonathan J. Pollard
                                The Pollard Case in 1999


Materials presented in chronological order.

 Codevilla, Angelo, Irwin Cotler, Alan Dershowitz, and Kenneth Lasson. "Justice and Jonathan
Pollard." Washington Post, 2 Jan. 1999, A19.

The authors respond to the Studeman, et. al., Op-Ed piece of 12 December 1998. Their
argument is that Pollard is "a victim of a monumental miscarriage of justice.... There is ample
evidence that Pollard is being punished for a crime he didn't commit and is being
disproportionately punished for the one he did.... The president should correct this longstanding
miscarriage of justice."

Clark comment: I cannot help but wonder what sort of mental gymnastics brought the
archconservative Codevilla (for example, see his critique of "the CIA's American Liberal
culture" in Informing Statecraft: Intelligence for a New Century (1992)) to the defense of a man
who sold the secrets of the country to which he morally and legally owed his allegiance to
another country. As the Cheshire cat said....

 Goss, Porter J. "Don't Release Pollard." Washington Times, 5 Jan. 1999, 15.

The HPSCI chair argues: "Pollard is still an unrepentant criminal, fairly adjudicated by the
country he betrayed. It would be a grave mistake to barter our justice system as a sweetener for
Mr. Netanyahu who found the Wye Plantation Agreement a bit too sour."

 Pincus, Walter. "No Decision Near on Altering Pollard's Sentence, White House Says."
Washington Post, 10 Jan. 1999, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

 Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Now Tells of Much Deeper Damage by Pollard." New York Times, 11 Jan.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

U.S. military and intelligence officials say Pollard did more damage to national security than the
public has been told. An article in The New Yorker on 11 January 1999, written by investigative
reporter Seymour Hersh, "cites those officials as saying that Pollard, who was arrested in 1985
and is now serving a life sentence, gave Israel invaluable American intelligence secrets in
exchange for payments of $50,000 and promises of $540,000 more."

 Risen, James. "Keep Pollard Locked Up, Clinton Aides Recommend." New York Times, 12 Jan.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Administration officials say that President Clinton's key national security advisers have
recommended denying clemency to Jonathan Pollard. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says
"there is no compelling foreign policy reason to release Pollard." DCI George Tenet has urged
that Pollard remain in federal prison. Secretary of Defense William Cohen "made the same
recommendation.... Attorney General Janet Reno ... has not yet responded.... But the [FBI] has
urged her to ask the president not to free Pollard." See also, Walter Pincus, "Albright Finds No
Major Foreign Policy Gain in Offering Clemency to Pollard," Washington Post, 12 Jan. 1999,
A2.

  Beinart, Peter. "The Odd Logic of a Spy's Defenders." New York Times, 16 Jan. 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"It is not surprising that [Pollard] should try to rally American Jews to his aid -- criminals often
play the ethnic card when it is all they have left."

 Duffy, Brian, and David Makovsky. "The Spy Who Is Still Stuck in the Cold." U.S. News &
World Report, 18 Jan. 1999, 22.

President Clinton's "top national-security advisers are all still dead set against" the release of
Jonathan Pollard.

 Kuttler, Hillel. "Goverment Puts Official Visits to Pollard on Hold." Jerusalem Post, 19 Jan.
1999. [http://www.jpost.com]

"Visits by Israeli government officials to imprisoned spy Jonathan Pollard have been put on hold
while the campaign proceeds to attain his release, Israeli Embassy officials said at the beginning
of the week. The officials did not say that the decision is an explicit one decided on by either
Pollard or the Israeli government."

 Jonkers, Roy K. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] "Pollard (ad nauseam)." AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes,
20 Jan. 1999. [http://www.his.com/afio]

Text of letter from AFIO President E. Peter Earnest to President Clinton. The AFIO position
paper states, inter alia: "The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) believes that
Jonathan Pollard's prison sentence is justified and should stand. Pollard was correctly brought to
justice and appropriately sentenced for stealing vast quantities of highly classified national
security information and selling them to a foreign power."

  Tsur, Batsheva. "Source: PM Asked Clinton to Postpone Pollard Decision." Jerusalem Post, 20
Jan. 1999. [http://www.jpost.com]

Aviv Bushinsky, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, on 19 January 1999 "denied
that the prime minister had requested" President Clinton to defer a decision on freeing Jonathan
Pollard until after the U.S. impeachment proceedings are completed.

  Tsur, Batsheva. "US Denies Pollard's Attorney His File." Jerusalem Post, 22 Jan. 1999.
[http://www.jpost.com]

"Writing on behalf of Attorney-General Janet Reno, legal counsel Craig Iscoe told Jerusalem
lawyer Larry Dub that the Justice Department does not give out copies of recommendations it
makes to the US president. The reference was to Reno's recent appraisal of the Pollard case
presented to President Bill Clinton for review."

  Washington Post. "[Editorial:] The Facts of the Pollard Case." 25 Jan. 1999, A20.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"We always have thought of Jonathan Pollard, and still do, as a contemptible and duplicitous
mercenary whose misdeeds were reckless and threatening to American security, his motives
uninteresting and immaterial and his word unreliable.... [Nevertheless, the] review of the Pollard
sentence is inhibited by secrecy.... [T]he uncomfortable fact remains that [Pollard] has not been
able to test in court the official assertions that put him away.... The requirement here is not for
relief for a loathsome and guilty spy but for some degree of greater openness for the American
people."

  Hunt, Terence. "Barak Urges U.S. To Release Pollard." Associated Press, 19 Jul. 1999.
[http://www.infobeat.com]

"Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak urged President Clinton to release convicted spy Jonathan
Pollard but did not get a response to his plea, a top White House official said" on 19 July 1999.

 Babington, Charles. "Group Uses First Lady's Candidacy to Seek Spy's Release." Washington
Post, 1 Sep. 1999, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

A pro-Israeli group in New York "is pressing Hillary Rodham Clinton to lobby her husband" on
behalf of convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Jay Pollard.

 Washington Times. "Pollard Presses Court To Seek His Release." 8 Sep. 1999, 14.

According to his attorney, Jonathan Pollard "appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court" on 7
September 1999 "to press for his release."

 Harris, John F. "Barak Emissary Meets Clinton Aide to Lobby for Spy's Pardon, Release."
Washington Post, 20 Dec. 1999, A12. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to U.S. officials, "Moshe Kochnovsky, a senior official in the Israeli Defense Ministry,
met with White House counsel Beth Nolan to make the latest case in a long- standing Israeli
appeal that Pollard be freed from prison and allowed to emigrate."

  New York Times. "Delegation of Democrats Visits Spy in Prison." 30 Dec. 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, who supports clemency for Jonathan Jay Pollard, led a
delegation of [New York] state legislators to a federal prison" in Raleigh, NC, to see Pollard on
29 December 1999. "The visit came a day after another prominent New York Democrat, Alan G.
Hevesi, the city comptroller, visited" Pollard.
          Forward to Pollard from 2000

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                             SPY CASES - U.S
                            Jonathan J. Pollard
                             The Pollard Case from 2000


Materials presented in chronological order.

 Goldenberg, Eliot. The Hunting Horse: The Truth Behind the Jonathan Pollard Spy Case.
Amhearst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000.

According to Schecter, I&NS 17.2, the author "portrays a massive conspiracy against Pollard....
[His] charges of American government complicity remain unproven conjecture designed to
portray Pollard as a victim of state persecution and anti-Semitism."

  CNN. "CIA Spy Hunter Talks to CNN about Notorious Turncoats." 29 May 2000.
[http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/05/29/cia.spy.02/index.html]

In an interview with CNN National Security Correspondent David Ensor, Richard Haver, former
executive director of the CIA's Community Management Staff, "talks about his experiences
with ... John Anthony Walker; Aldrich Ames,... and Jonathan Pollard." (Includes video clips of
interview.)

 Johnston, David. "Pressure Is Again Emerging to Free Jonathan Pollard." New York Times, 13
December 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

President Clinton "is facing a new round of pressure to free Jonathan Jay Pollard....
Administration officials said Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel raised the issue with President
Clinton on [11 December 2000], and the president essentially restated the official position on the
matter, telling Mr. Barak he would review the issue along with other clemency requests."
 Best, Richard A., Jr., and Clyde Mark. Jonathan Pollard: Background and Considerations for
Presidential Clemency. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
31 Jan. 2001.

This is a balanced review of the arguments for and against clemency.

  Erlanger, Steven. "Israeli Found Spy's Data Irresistible." New York Times, 3 Mar. 2006.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

Rafi Eitan, Jonathan Pollard's Israeli intelligence handler, has told the newspaper Yediot
Aharonot that "Pollard provided such good information that he could not face stopping the
operation even though it was aimed at Israel's closest ally, the United States." Eitan said that
Pollard "never exposed American agents in the Soviet Union or elsewhere."

 Olive, Ronald J.

1. Capturing Jonathan Pollard: How One of the Most Notorious Spies in American History Was
Brought to Justice. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Clark comment: The author is a retired special agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS).

Allen, Proceedings 132.12 (Dec. 2006), says that the author's "narrative often has the momentum
of a spy thriller." Olive is convinced that Pollard showed that he was a security risk early in his
career with the Naval Investigative Service (NIS -- now NCIS) and should have been let go years
before he was caught as a spy.

For Brooks, NIPQ 23.1 (Jan. 2007), this "well-written, fast-paced story reads like a novel." The
author "was intimately involved in the investigation and has seen much, if not all, of the
classified information associated with the case." To Goulden, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter
2006-2007) and Washington Times, 24 Dec. 2006, this book "towers over the pack" of the books
on the Pollard case.

Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), finds Capturing Jonathan Pollard to be "a well-documented,
first-hand account of a benchmark espionage case." The author "spends the bulk of the narrative
on how Pollard came under suspicion and how he got caught."

2. "A Spy Left Out in the Cold." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 11 (Nov. 2006): 62-
63.

Here, Olive tells of Pollard's initial meeting with Israeli intelligence officer Aviem Sella, where a
communications plan based on pay phones was worked out.

 Finer, Jonathan. "Bush Trip Revives Israeli Push for Pardon of Spy." Washington Post, 15 Jan.
2008, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"[R]ebuffed by President Bill Clinton during the last period of extended negotiations between
Israelis and Palestinians," supporters of Jonathan Pollard "are [again] ramping up their campaign
for a presidential pardon." Throughout President Bush's visit to Israel last week, Pollard "was on
the unofficial agenda." Israel is certain "to raise the issue again during the ongoing U.S.-brokered
peace talks with the Palestinians, [and] Pollard's supporters and some outside analysts say
circumstances may favor a compromise."

 Ephron, Dan. "Jailed For 23 Years, An Old Spy Asks For a Fresh Start." Newsweek, 12 Jan.
2009. [http://www.newsweek.com]

Jonathan Jay Pollard's lawyers and the Justice Department have told Newsweek that Pollard
"would like President Bush to commute his sentence to time served -- the first time Pollard has
submitted such a request.... Much of the U.S. intelligence community remains against a
commutation."

 Greenberg, Joel. "Netanyahu Calls for Release of Spy for Israel Serving Life Sentence in U.S."
Washington Post, 4 Jan. 2011. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu sent a letter [on 4 January 2011] to President
Obama, formally asking for the release of Jonathan Jay Pollard.... Netanyahu read out the text of
his letter at a session of parliament." Clark comment: If I were an administration advisor, I
would suggest staying well away from this; it has nothing but a downside in terms of domestic
impact.

 Bowman, M. E. "Spike." "The Drumbeats for Clemency for Jonathan Jay Pollard Reverberate
Again." Intelligencer 18, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2011): 7-10.

"Taken in the aggregate, and without analysis," the arguments for Pollard's release "seem logical;
however, if one looks behind the sound bites, the issues are far from simple and explain why
clemency continues to be ill-advised.... Pollard is not a sympathetic character when one is given
the full picture of his activities against this country. He was neither a U.S. nor an Israeli patriot.
He was a self-serving, gluttonous character seeking financial reward and personal gratification."

 Federman, Josef. "Israel Steps Up Campaign for Convicted Spy." Associated Press, 11 Apr.
2012. [http://www.ap.org]

"Israel is ratcheting up calls on Washington to release convicted spy Jonathan Pollard.... Israeli
leaders say that after 27 years the former civilian intelligence analyst for the U.S. Navy should be
freed. But the White House is standing firm, rejecting Israeli appeals based in part on claims that
Pollard suffers from life-threatening ailments."

  Richelson, Jeffrey T., ed. The Jonathan Pollard Spy Case: The CIA's 1987 Damage Assessment
Declassified. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 407. 14 Dec. 2012, at:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/.
According to the newly-declassified CIA 1987 damage assessment of the Pollard case, Pollard's
"Israeli handlers asked primarily for nuclear, military and technical information on the Arab
states, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union – not on the United States."

         Return to Pollard Table of Contents

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




                            SPY CASES - U.S
                         The Walker Spy Ring
Michael Lance Walker, 37, son of the Walker family spy ring's leader, John A. Walker, Jr.,
was released from a halfway house in Boston on 16 February 2000. He had served the
mandatory part, 15 years, of a 25-year prison sentence. Associated Press, "Soviet Spy Ring
Member Released," 16 Feb. 2000.

 Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale.
New York: Delacorte, 1988. New York: Dell, 1988. [pb]

       Petersen says Merchants of Treason is "an important survey of spy cases since 1968 that
       is critical of U.S. counterintelligence as ineffective." Chambers comments that the book
       "seems to be aimed at the general reader"; it is "well crafted." For Lowenthal, the work
       is "[m]arred by a somewhat breathless and hyperbolic journalistic prose." According to
       Kuntzman, IJI&C 6.2, Allen and Polmar present an "excellent compilation of the spy
       stories that ... made headlines" during the 1980s. The Walker case takes up about half of
       the book. "There is little different, however, between John D. Barron's Breaking the Ring
       and ... Merchants of Treason." Bell, Pollard, Harper, Wu-Tai Chin, and Pelton are also
       covered.

 Bamford, James. "The Walker Espionage Case." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 12, no. 5
(May 1986): 110-119.

 Barron, John. Breaking the Ring: The Bizarre Case of the Walker Family Spy Ring. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1987.

       Clark comment: This book was the winner of the 1986 NISC best non-fiction award.

       Vona, IJI&C 1.4, suggests that the Walker spy "ring serves as a testament to the power of
       people in 'low places' who have access to sensitive information in this age of high
       technology.... [This] book mixes too much story with history. Neither the Walker Spy
       Family Case nor espionage in the age of hi-tech is treated critically and analytically....
       [Barron is] very kind to the FBI.... The book is simply too sentimental and too much of it
       has nothing to do with the Walker Case.... [Q]uestions of 'turfing,' rivalry, and sharing of
       glory never arise.... When Barron sticks to the fact[s], he is top-notch."

 Blum, Howard. I Pledge Allegiance... The True Story of the Walkers: An American Spy Family.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.

       According to Chambers, this is "[o]ne of a clutch of books on the case. Nothing to mark
       it as particularly special." Hunter, Spy Hunter (19990, p. 191, finds little redeeming in
       Blum's version of the Walker spy ring: "The book is replete with inaccuracies and
       visions."

  Cashman, Brian A. "Naval Counterintelligence: Investigating the Walker Espionage Crime
Scene." American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 43-45. "Investigating
the Walker Espionage Crime Scene." Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 29-31.

The author seeks "to provide a glimpse ... into the crime scene examination of John A. Walker's
home by a joint FBI/US Naval Investigative Service team of special agents searching for
evidence of espionage."

  CNN. "CIA Spy Hunter Talks to CNN about Notorious Turncoats." 29 May 2000.
[http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/05/29/cia.spy.02/index.html]

In an interview with CNN National Security Correspondent David Ensor, Richard Haver, former
executive director of the CIA's Community Management Staff, "talks about his experiences
with ... John Anthony Walker; Aldrich Ames,... and Jonathan Pollard." (Includes video clips of
interview.)

 Earley, Pete. Family of Spies: Inside the John Walker Spy Ring. New York: Bantam Books,
1988.

       Chambers says that this is "[p]erhaps the best of the bunch" of books on the Walker spy
       ring. Hunter, Spy Hunter (1999), p. 210, agrees with this judgment, calling Earley's "the
       most accurate of the books published on this case." Peake, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009), calls
       Earley's "by far the best treatment of the case."

 Hunter, Robert W., and Lynn Dean Hunter. Spy Hunter: Inside the FBI Investigation of the
Walker Espionage Case. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999.

Clark comment: The first new book on the Walker spy ring in years came from the FBI's lead
investigator on the case. Although there is some hyperbole in calling Walker's "the largest and
most damaging espionage ring of American citizens in the history of our nation," Spy Hunter
does provide an insider's look at an important counterintelligence case. The story told is both
sleazy and cautionary. While it will win no literary prizes, the language is serviceable and moves
the narrative along well enough to make the book a relatively quick read. Of course, only 65 of
the book's total of 218 pages are devoted to the period up to Walker's arrest, with the remainder
covering the aftermath.

A couple of sidenotes: (1) In Ch. 24, pp. 154-159, Hunter savages the Naval Investigative
Service ("I reached the conclusion that it was one screwed-up outfit"). Deserved or just pay-back
time? (2) On p. 169, Hunter tells of a meeting in Vienna with Felix Bloch, "minister-counselor of
the [U.S.] embassy." Hunter attributes Bloch's aloofness and seeming disinterest in the Walker
case to the later suspicions that Bloch was himself engaged in espionage. Sorry, but having
served with Felix Bloch, I would say that aloofness and an extremely reserved manner were
standard issue for the man, whatever the subject.

Sullivan, NWCR (Summer 2000), finds Hunter to be "a talented storyteller" who has produced a
"fascinating narrative." For Kruh, Cryptologia 24.1, "Hunter offers a close-up at how the
investigation was conducted with the accuracy and attention to detail that only he can provide....
[H]e allows the reader not only behind the scenes but into his mind as he plots his course of
action."

 Kneece, Jack. Family Treason: The Walker Spy Case. Briar Cliff Manor, NY: Stein & Day,
1986.

       Kross, IJI&C 1.4: Although "primarily aimed at the lay reader who only wants an
       overview of the case..., [this is a] good place to begin."

 Smith, Esmond D. [CAPT/USN (Ret.)] "ULTRA and the Walkers." U.S Naval Institute
Proceedings 115, no. 5 (May 1989): 110-119.

       According to Sexton, this article compares "the value of U.S. naval ciphers betrayed by
       John Walker to the Soviet Union with the value of ULTRA and MAGIC to the British
       and American navies in World War II."

 Walker, John A., Jr. My Life as a Spy. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008.

Goulden, Washington Times, 14 Dec. 2008, and Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), finds
substantial amounts of nonsense and whining in this "pained attempt" by a traitor "at self-
justification." Walker makes claims in this book, which suggest "that three-plus decades in a
prison cell addled what few brains he ever had." One such is his "claim that he was spirited into
Czechoslovakia during a 1982 crisis to personally brief KGB chairman Yuri Andropov on
whether President Reagan intended a nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R." Clark comment: Goulden
elicited a chuckle from this reader with his line that "Walker's yarn ... might make a good Oliver
Stone movie."

To Peake, Studies 53.4 (Dec. 2009), "[t]here is very little new in this book." Both the story of
Walker's spying and of his family life "are covered in more detail by Pete Earley in Family of
Spies." Herrington, Parameters 36.4 (Winter 2009-2010), comments that "Walker's tone is that
of a sophisticated internationalist, lecturing to the naïve American masses about the evils of their
government, and why he came to believe that it was his duty to become a player in the Cold
War." In addition, "the disjointed recitation of his sexual conquests and the litany of self-
justifications contained in this work make for bad reading."

 Walker, Laura. Daughter of Deceit. Dallas, TX: Word, 1988.

John Walker's daughter.

          Return to MI CI Table of Contents

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                              Ronald W. Pelton
Ronald W. Pelton was an "NSA analyst for 14 years who quit in 1979 after falling deeply in
debt; sold NSA secrets to the Soviet Union in meetings with KGB agents in Vienna, Austria,
from 1980 to 1986; arrested in 1986 after an NSA colleague recognized his voice on a
tapped Soviet Embassy phone; now serving three life terms." Scott Shane, "Some at NSA
Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore
Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995, 6. See also Allen and Polmar,
Merchants of Treason.

 Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale.
New York: Delacorte, 1988. New York: Dell, 1988. [pb]

       Petersen says Merchants of Treason is "an important survey of spy cases since 1968 that
       is critical of U.S. counterintelligence as ineffective." Chambers comments that the book
       "seems to be aimed at the general reader"; it is "well crafted." For Lowenthal, the work
       is "[m]arred by a somewhat breathless and hyperbolic journalistic prose." According to
       Kuntzman, IJI&C 6.2, Allen and Polmar present an "excellent compilation of the spy
       stories that ... made headlines" during the 1980s. The Walker case takes up about half of
       the book. "There is little different, however, between John D. Barron's Breaking the Ring
       and ... Merchants of Treason." Bell, Pollard, Harper, Wu-Tai Chin, and Pelton are also
       covered.

 Gertz, Bill. "Intelligence Operation Red Star of Pelton Trial." Washington Times, 2 Jun. 1986,
A2.
 Schmidt, Susan. "Pelton Convicted of Selling Secrets." Washington Post, 6 Jun. 1986, A1.

 Tyler, Patrick. "Supersecret Work Revealed." Washington Post, 28 May 1986, A1.

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
           The Harold J. Nicholson Spy Case
Harold James Nicholson "was arrested on 16 November 1996 at Dulles International
Airport as he was about to board a flight to Switzerland. On his person were found rolls of
film bearing images of Top Secret documents. Nicholson is the highest ranking Central
Intelligence Agency officer (GS-15) charged with espionage to date. Counterintelligence
officials believe that he began spying for Russian intelligence in June 1994 as he was
completing a tour of duty as deputy station chief in Malaysia....

"Nicholson was charged with passing a wide range of highly classified information to
Moscow, including biographic information on every CIA case officer trained between 1994
and 1996.... According to investigators, for two and a half years he had been hacking into
the agency’s computer system and providing the Russians with every secret he could steal.
It is alleged that Nicholson received approximately $120,000 from the Russians over a two-
year period.

"He came under suspicion in late 1995 when he failed a series of polygraph examinations.
Further investigation revealed a pattern of extravagant spending, and an unusual pattern
of foreign travel followed by large, unexplained bank deposits. Nicholson, who at the time
was in the middle of a divorce and child custody battle, claimed that he did it for his
children and to pay his bills. On 21 November [1996] he was indicted on one count of
conspiracy to commit espionage. On 3 March 1997, Nicholson pleaded guilty under a plea
agreement in which he admitted that he had been a Russian spy. On 6 June [1997] he was
sentenced ... to 23 years and seven months in prison." U.S. Department of Defense, Defense
Security Service, Espionage Cases, 1975-2004: Summaries and Sources (Monterey, CA:
Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2004). A later element in this case was
Nicholson's involvement of his son in trying to get money from the Russians for the work
the elder Nicholson had done.

Materials presented in chronological order.

 Johnston, David. "U.S. Case Sets Out 2-Year Betrayal by C.I.A. Official." New York Times, 19
Nov. 1996, A1, A12 (N).
Harold J. Nicholson probably began spying for the Russians in 1994 while he was stationed in
Malaysia. Nicholson served in Manila, Bangkok, Tokyo, Bucharest, and Kuala Lumpur and as an
instructor of CIA Trainees. In a joint news conference on 18 November 1996, FBI Director
Louis J. Freeh and DCI John M. Deutch described the investigation that led to Nicholson's arrest.
Click for text of the press release from the joint FBI-CIA news conference. See also, Tim
Weiner, "Spy Suspect Seemed Like the Best and the Brightest," New York Times, 19 Nov. 1996,
A12 (N).

  Davies, Hugh. "CIA Spy 'Needed Money for Love.'" Telegraph (London), 20 Nov. 1996.
[http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

U.S. intelligence officials are working on a theory that Harold Nicholson's obsession for a
woman living in Thailand "was so intense that he blindly took foolish risks to keep her happy."

 New York Times. "[Editorial:] Another C.I.A. Betrayal." 20 Nov. 1996, A14 (N).

"Compared with the years they spent fumbling the Aldrich Ames case," the CIA and FBI
"pursued suspicions about Harold Nicholson with alacrity and admirable coordination.... But
progress in these matters is relative. It still took too long ... to detect and investigate Mr.
Nicholson's activities.... The C.I.A. and F.B.I. must improve their response time on espionage
cases, and the agency should not presume that reforms instituted after the Ames fiasco are
adequate."

 Weiner, Tim. "C.I.A.'s Latest Security Breach Puts Many Careers in Jeopardy: Agency's
Operations and Morale Likely to Suffer." New York Times, 20 Nov. 1996, A1, C21 (N).

Initial damage assessments of Harold Nicholson's spying for Moscow suggest that at a minimum
the careers of a number of young officers who were trained at Camp Peary from 1994 to 1996
will be blighted by the likelihood that their names rest someplace in a Russian safe. In addition,
it is believed that the identities of U.S. businessmen in Russia who volunteer information to the
CIA have been exposed. Nicholson taught the Agency's 16-week training course to prospective
CIA operations officers.

 Johnston, David, and Tim Weiner. "On the Trail of a C.I.A. Official, from Asia Travel to Bank
Files: Spies' Trainer Seemed to Ignore Rules He Taught." New York Times, 21 Nov. 1996, A1,
A14 (N).

This article provides some of the details from the 31-page FBI affidavit filed against Harold
Nicholson. The affidavit says "Nicholson left a trail of damning evidence nearly everywhere he
went during the 30 months he is said to have spied.... It was as if he had learned nothing from the
case of Aldrich H. Ames,... unmasked only weeks before Mr. Nicholson is said to have begun his
career as a turncoat.

 Johnston, David. "Single Indictment Against Accused Spy in C.I.A." New York Times, 22 Nov.
1996, A16 (N).
A Federal grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, on 21 November 1996 returned an indictment
against Harold J. Nicholson for conspiracy to commit espionage. The one-count indictment is "a
tactical step designed to streamline the prosecution of the accused spy." The possibility of a
broader espionage indictment at a later date remains.

 Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. "Bored CIA Spies Go Moonlighting." Telegraph (London), 24 Nov.
1996. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

Evans-Pritchard's hypothesis of boredom as an explanation of traitorous behavior (in this
instance, Harold Nicholson's) scarcely seems the most astute analysis.

 Pincus, Walter, and Roberto Suro. "Rooting Out the 'Sour Apples' Inside the CIA: The Latest
Arrest Calls into Question the Effectiveness of Reforms after the Ames Embarrassment."
Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 25 Nov.-1 Dec. 1996, 30.

"Nicholson operated as a Russian spy for at least a year and a half before counterintelligence
investigators formally opened a probe of his activities... The failure of the post-Ames reforms to
deter Nicholson may mean that there are still spies to be caught."

 Thomas, Evan, and Gregory L. Vistica. "The Spy Who Sold Out." Newsweek, 2 Dec. 1996, 35.

This rehashes most of the publicly known aspects of the Nicholson case, mixed together with a
few gratuitous slaps (masquerading as analysis) at the Agency: "Nicholson ... is more accurately
described as a clever careerist, a common breed at Langley since the 1980s"; "case officers spend
many hours waiting around in bars"; "just as Ames was not the first CIA mole [sic] -- only the
first to be caught -- Nicholson's case is almost surely not the last."

 Smith, R. Jeffrey, and Roberto Suro. "Waiting to Close the Trap: For More Than a Year, FBI
Agents Patiently Built Their Case Against a CIA Officer." WPNWE, 2-8 Dec. 1996, 8-9.

This article details the FBI's investigation that led to Nicholson's arrest. Among other matters, it
notes that in early 1996 the investigators sent "national security letters" to Nicholson's financial
institutions, requesting a record of his transactions. These requests "can be made even without a
court-ordered warrant" and prohibit the institutions from telling the person involved that they
have received such a request.

 Washington Post. "[Editorial:] One More Bad Apple at the CIA." Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 2-8 Dec. 1996, 25.

Nicholson's "contempt for the new counterintelligence controls ... is significant. Perhaps it was
necessary to take extra time to build a case against him, but this is far from obvious."

 Hall, Charles W., and Walter Pincus. "Spy Suspects Refusing to Go Quietly." Washington Post,
23 Jan. 1997, A9.

Robert C. Kim, Harold Nicholson, and Earl Edwin Pitts cases.
 Grier, Peter. “Ex-Wife’s View of Life with an Accused CIA Spy.” Christian Science Monitor,
27 Jan. 1997.

The Nicholson case "is one of the strangest and most troubling incidents of alleged espionage
that US intelligence has faced since the end of the cold war. The reason: Nicholson was a hard-
working man on the rise.... A look at Nicholson's life -- including a lengthy, exclusive interview
with his longtime spouse -- reveals a man that some might judge tightly wrapped. He pursued
work instead of vacations, advancement instead of family relations, and after his divorce
struggled with the demands of being an expatriate single father."

 Weiner, Tim. "C.I.A. Official Pleads Guilty to Spying for the Russians." New York Times, 4
Mar. 1997, A11 (N).

Under a plea bargain agreement, Harold J. Nicholson on 3 March 1997 "pleaded guilty to selling
secrets to Moscow." See also, Bill Gertz, "Ex-CIA Official Pleads Guilty," Washington Times, 4
Mar. 1997, A3; and Brooke A. Masters, "CIA Spy Admits Guilt, Says He'll Reveal Damage,"
Washington Post, 4 Mar. 1997, A1, A7.

 Washington Times. "Ex-CIA Officer Gets 23 Years for Selling Secrets to Russia." 5 Jun. 1997,
A8.

Harold J. Nicholson has been sentenced to 23 years and seven months in prison. See also,
Brooke A. Masters, "Convicted Spy Says He Did It for His Family," Washington Post, 6 Jun.
1997, A1, A6; and Tim Weiner, "C.I.A. Traitor, Saying He Wanted Cash for Family, Gets 23
Years," New York Times, 6 Jun. 1997, A19.

  Johnson, Carrie. "Imprisoned Spy, His Son Face Conspiracy Charges." Washington Post, 30
Jan. 2009, A2, [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to federal officials on 29 January 2009, convicted spy "Harold J. Nicholson enlisted
his youngest son [Nathaniel] to travel the world and collect cash from Russian agents as a
'pension' for his past services." Both have pleaded not guilty to charge of "conspiracy, money
laundering and acting as a foreign agent." See also, Eric Lichtblau, "U.S. Says Jailed C.I.A.
Mole [sic] Kept Spying for Russia," New York Times, 30 Jan. 2009.

 CNN. "Former Spy's Son Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy." 28 Aug. 2009. [http://www.cnn.com]

According to a Department of Justice statement on 27 August 2009, Nathaniel Nicholson has
"pleaded guilty in federal court ... to charges of conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign
government and conspiracy to commit money laundering.... He will face more than 20 years in
prison when he is sentenced in January."

 Pincus, Walter. "Imprisoned Former CIA Official Pleads Guilty Again." Washington Post, 8
Nov. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Harold Nicholson pleaded guilty on 8 November 2010 on charges of money laundering and
conspiracy to represent a foreign government "for having his son travel the world to collect cash
from his former Russian spymasters.... Prosecutors have recommended that eight years be added
to Nicholson's current [23-year] sentence."

 Duara, Nigel. "Twice Convicted Ex-CIA Spy Gets 8 More Years." Associated Press, 18 Jan.
2011. [http://www.ap.org]

On 18 January 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Anna J. Brown sentenced Harold Nicholson to
eight more years in prison on "charges of conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government
and conspiracy to commit money laundering."

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents

          Return to CIA 1990s Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                      Peter Lee
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Washington Times. "Physicist Admits Spying for China." 10 Dec. 1997, A9.

See also, William Claiborne, "Taiwan-born Scientist Passed Defense Data," Washington Post,
12 Dec. 1997, A23.

  Counterintelligence News and Developments. "US Nuclear Physicist Sentenced." Jun. 1998.
[http://www.nacic.gov]

On 26 March 1998, Peter Lee, a former nuclear physicist at Los Alamos National Laboratory,
was sentenced to one year in a community corrections facility, three years of probation, 3,000
hours of community service, and a $20,000 fine. He had pleaded guilty to "willfully passing
national defense information to Chinese scientists during a 1985 visit to China" and to
"providing false information in 1997 to his then-employer, TRW, Inc., regarding his contact with
Chinese officials."

 Brooke, James. "An Earlier China Spy Case Points Up Post-Cold War Ambiguities." New York
Times, 13 Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Within two weeks, Peter H. Lee, a Taiwan-born physicist who once worked at the nuclear
weapons laboratory [at Los Alamos], will complete a one-year sentence to a halfway house in
California." Lee "pleaded guilty to passing classified national defense information to Chinese
scientists on a visit to Beijing in 1985. He also pleaded guilty to lying to a government agency
after he described on a security form a May 1997 visit to China as a pleasure trip. In reality, Dr.
Lee, then a researcher for an American military contractor, met extensively with Chinese
scientists."

 Gerth, Jeff, and James Risen. "Reports Show Scientist Gave U.S. Radar Secrets to China." New
York Times, 10 May 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Peter Lee, "[a] scientist working on a classified Pentagon project in 1997[,] provided China with
secrets about advanced radar technology being developed to track submarines, according to court
records and government documents."

  Fenton, Ben. "Nuclear Spy Worked on Secret Trials of British Submarines." Telegraph
(London), 15 May 1999. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

Peter Lee, "an American scientist convicted of spying for China[,] worked closely with British
military and visited Scotland as part of a secret team working on a method of tracking nuclear
missile submarines. The information available to ... Lee as a prominent member of the UK/US
Radar Ocean Imaging Programme (ROIP) is almost certain to have compromised the security of
Britain's Trident nuclear deterrent."

  Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Was It Spying of Not? The FBI Says Secrets Were Leaked
to China, But the Defense Says They Were Declassified Data." Washington Post National
Weekly Edition, 17 May 1999, 29.

Peter H. Lee's story "illustrates how classical Chinese espionage efforts use Chinese scientists
who gather pieces of technical information from U.S. colleagues, rather than relying on
intelligence agents. It is a subtle system that emphasizes collegiality and exchange and explains
why it is time-consuming and difficult for U.S. counterintelligence investigators to catch
American scientists who may have acted illegally."

 Loeb, Vernon. "Justice Accused of Laxity in Spy Case." Washington Post, 27 Oct. 1999, A7.

On 26 October 1999, "Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) ... faulted the Justice Department's 1997
prosecution of physicist Peter H. Lee for passing nuclear secrets to China, saying government
attorneys accepted a lenient plea bargain in an espionage case that could have merited the death
penalty."

  U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Department of Justice Oversight. Committee on the
Judiciary. Report on the Investigation of Peter Lee. Intro., Senator Arlen Specter. Congressional
Record, 20 Dec. 2001. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_rpt/peterlee.html.

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents
     CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                                            1998
                                     Douglas F. Groat

"DOUGLAS F. GROAT, former CIA officer, was arrested on 3 April [1998] and charged
with passing sensitive intelligence information to two foreign governments and attempting
to extort over $500,000 from the CIA in return for not disclosing additional secrets. Groat
had been placed on a three-year paid administrative leave in the spring of 1993 after the
agency felt he posed a security risk, reportedly involving a discipline or job performance
issue.

"Apparently Groat first attempted to extort money from the CIA in May 1996 and was
fired the following October. During a 16-year career at the CIA, Groat participated in
intelligence operations aimed at penetrating the secret codes and communication systems
employed by foreign governments. Groat, a cryptographic expert, was reported to have
revealed classified information to two undisclosed governments regarding the targeting and
compromise of their cryptographic systems in March and April 1997. For Groat, it was
'very much a case of pure revenge,' said a federal official, explaining that the former
intelligence officer had long felt slighted and abused by the CIA because he had never been
given the assignments he thought he deserved.

"Groat is reported to have not received any money from the foreign governments for the
information passed. The former CIA employee pleaded guilty to one count of attempted
extortion 27 July, and was sentenced 27 September to five years confinement followed by
three years probation. According to news reports, the sharp reduction from the original
four-count espionage charge and the limited penalties reflected the government's desire to
avoid a trial in which damaging classified information might have been disclosed." U.S.
Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, Recent Espionage Cases, 1975-1999 at
http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage -- not found 3/10/09.

Materials arranged chronologically.

  Risen, James. "Ex-CIA Agent Charged With Betraying U.S." Los Angeles Times, 4 Apr. 1998.
[http://www.latimes.com]

Douglas F. Groat was indicted on 3 April 1998 on espionage and extortion charges. The CIA
fired Groat in 1996 after a 16-year career. Groat worked for the Agency's Science and
Technology Directorate's "top secret 'black bag' unit that breaks into foreign embassies to steal
code books." The story gives considerable background detail on the Groat case.
See also, Bill Gertz, "Former CIA Officer Charged with Spying," Washington Times, 4 Apr.
1998, A1, A5; Roberto Suro and Peter Slevin, "Fired CIA Operative Accused of Spying,"
Washington Post, 4 Apr. 1998, A1, A9; and Tim Weiner, "C.I.A. Charges Dismissed Spy
Yielded Secrets," New York Times, 4 Apr. 1998, A1, A9.

  Meckler, Laura. "Ex-Wife: CIA 'Punished' Alleged Spy." Associated Press, 4 Apr. 1998.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The former CIA spy now charged with espionage and extortion was sometimes overzealous
about his work and had policy disputes with his superiors that led to his downfall, his ex-wife,"
Madeline Libre, said on 4 April 1998. "Libre agreed that the official reason [Douglas F.] Groat
was fired was involvement in a compromised operation and his refusal of the polygraph test
afterwards. She said he did that because he feared the results would be manipulated and used
against him."

  Jonkers, Roy K. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] "CIA Officer Charged with Treason." AFIO Weekly
Intelligence Notes 13-98 (6 Apr. 1998). [http://www.his.com/~afio/]

 Gertz, Bill. "Accused Spy Sought Immunity." Washington Times, 7 Apr. 1998, A3.

 Pincus, Walter. "CIA Handles Disgruntled Workers with Caution." Washington Post, 7 Apr.
1998, A10.

  Waller, Douglas. "The Strange Case of the Spy in the Winnebago." Time, 13 Apr. 1998.
[http://www.time.com]

"The CIA does not yet know how much damage it has suffered from [Douglas] Groat's alleged
spying. Investigators do not think it is as extensive as the havoc caused by CIA mole Aldrich
Ames.... But the agency's code-breaking capabilities are among its most guarded secrets.... A
nation hostile to the U.S. that learned of the penetration would quickly change its codes."

 Weiner, Tim. "Bail Denied for Ex-C.I.A. Officer Accused as a Spy." New York Times, 17 Apr.
1998, A19 (N).

"All signs at [a 16 April 1998] hearing suggested that Mr. Groat was ready to go to trial.... A trial
could pose huge headaches for the Government, which would have to prove that Mr. Groat
revealed secrets, but would try to do so without revealing what those secrets were."

  Diamond, John. "Ex-CIAer Pleads Guilty to Extortion." Washington Post, 27 Jul. 1998.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 27 July 1998, Douglas Groat pleaded guilty to trying to extort a million dollars from the
Agency, avoiding a trial for espionage.

  Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Former CIA Officer Cuts a Deal." Sep. 1998.
[http://www.nacic.gov]
Former CIA officer Douglas F. Groat's plea bargain "eased prosecutors' concerns that a trial on
all the charges might have forced them to disclose sensitive information in open court."

 Miller, Bill, and Walter Pincus. "Ex-CIA Agent Given 5 Years in Extortion Case." Washington
Post, 26 Sep. 1998, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 25 September 1998, "[f]ormer CIA covert operative Douglas F. Groat was sentenced to five
years in prison ... after admitting attempts to extort money from the agency.... Groat's sentence,
which follows the terms of the plea agreement, calls for the prison time to be spent in a
minimum-security facility. Upon his release, he will be put on three years of supervised
probation. As part of the plea, Groat promised that he would never disclose any classified
information learned during his CIA career or offer secrets to any foreign government."

  Wise, David. "The CIA Burglar Who Went Rogue." Smithsonian (Oct. 2012).
[http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/The-CIA-Burglar-Who-Went-Rogue-
169800816.html]

The author provides background on the Douglas Groat spy case (concluded with a guilty plea of
extortion), on Groat personally, and on Groat's work in "a secret CIA unit that ... specialized in
stealing codes, the most guarded secrets of any nation."

          Return to CIA 1998 Table of Contents

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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                         Wen Ho Lee
                                     Table of Contents

In a case that went through many twists and turns, former Energy Department physicist
Dr. Wen Ho Lee pleaded guilty on 13 September 2000 to mishandling classified
information. No espionage charges were presented. The Washington Post has a guide (with
links) to its coverage ("Key Stories: Stealing U.S. Secrets") of the Chinese spying uproar
at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/losalamos/keystories.htm.

 Reportage:

 March - April 1999
 May - August 1999

 September - December 1999

 From January 2000

 Books

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                        Wen Ho Lee
                                     March-April 1999


Materials presented in chronological order.

  Pincus, Walter. "Suspect in Probe of China Atomic Spying Fails Polygraph." Washington Post,
7 Mar. 1999, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"A Taiwan-born American scientist, who is suspected of turning over to China design
information about a key U.S. nuclear missile warhead 10 years ago, failed a polygraph test last
month, according to administration sources."

 ITN. "Suspected Chinese Spy Fired by US Department." 9 Mar. 1999. [http://www.itn.co.uk]

Wen Ho Lee, a Chinese-American computer scientist who worked at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory in New Mexico, "has been fired by the United States Energy department on suspicion
of stealing nuclear secrets." Reuters, 10 Mar. 1999, quotes a Los Alamos National Laboratory
spokesman as stating that the last time the laboratory "fired a scientist over espionage allegations
was in the mid-1940s when a Russian immigrant named Klaus Fuchs was discovered to be
passing secrets to the Russians." See also, Walter Pincus, "Spy Suspect Fired at Los Alamos
Lab," Washington Post, 9 Mar. 1999, A1.

 Risen, James. "U.S. Fires Nuclear Scientist Suspected of Spying for China." New York Times, 9
Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 5 March 1999, the FBI began questioning Wen Ho Lee "in an attempt to determine whether
he had passed American secrets to the Chinese. The questioning continued through" 7 March
1999, "but Lee failed to fully cooperate," Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said. "FBI officials
acknowledged last week that they did not have enough to arrest Lee then, but hoped their
questioning would lead to a break. While he agreed to talk with investigators and nuclear experts,
his failure to fully cooperate has apparently still left the investigators without enough evidence to
prosecute. But Richardson believed he had sufficient evidence to dismiss Lee."

 Brooke, James. "The Scientist Who Is the Talk of Los Alamos." New York Times, 10 Mar.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 8 March 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson fired Wen Ho Lee from the Los Alamos
National Laboratory for security breaches. "One scientist in Washington who is familiar with
Lee's work said that in the late 1980s, he began working in the area of nuclear weapons design
that looks at the triggering mechanism of thermonuclear bombs -- how the primary bomb triggers
the secondary, thermonuclear, bomb."

 Risen, James. "Los Alamos Scientist Admits Contacts With Chinese, U.S. Says." New York
Times, 16 Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"During three days of interviews with the [FBI] beginning on March 5, Wen Ho Lee ... admitted
that he had failed to report his contacts with Chinese scientists to his supervisors at Los Alamos,
as government regulations required, several officials said. His admissions helped cement the
decision by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson to fire him on March 8, the officials said. Lee's
statements did not provide enough evidence to lead to his arrest, however."

 Eckholm, Erik. "China Says Scientist Told No Secrets About Warheads." New York Times, 23
Mar. 1999.

According to a report issued on 21 March 1999 by the New China News Agency, Wen Ho Lee
"attended two scientific meetings in China in the 1980s." However, "Chinese scientists
vehemently deny that Lee gave away plans for making advanced American warheads."

 Risen, James. "Suspect Scientist Led Key Los Alamos Program." New York Times, 24 Mar.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In 1997, Los Alamos National Laboratory chose Wen Ho Lee, "who was already under
investigation as a suspected spy for China[,] to run a sensitive new nuclear weapons program....
Once in the new position, in charge of updating computer software for nuclear weapons, Lee
hired a post-doctoral researcher who was a citizen of China, intelligence and law-enforcement
officials said."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "FBI's Spying Probe Proves No Easy Task: 'Staleness' of
Case at Weapons Lab Cited." Washington Post, 28 Mar. 1999, A20. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "in recent testimony before House and Senate Appropriations
subcommittees provided the first authoritative on-the-record description ... from the
administration's perspective" of what has been going on with regard to accusations that China
obtained weapons secrets from U.S. nuclear labs.

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "FBI Searches Home of Scientist Suspected of Spying for
China." Washington Post, 11 Apr. 1999, A11. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 10 April 1999, FBI agents searched the home of Wen Ho Lee, "the prime suspect in an
espionage investigation into whether China obtained secret information about U.S. nuclear
warhead design in the mid-1980s."

 Pincus, Walter. "FBI Aided by Los Alamos Scientist's Wife: Before Spying Probe, Sylvia Lee
Supplied Data on Chinese Visitors." Washington Post, 26 Apr. 1999, A4.

The FBI used Sylvia Lee, the wife of then-Los Alamos National Laboratory scientist Wen Ho
Lee, as an informant from 1985 to 1991. Mrs. Lee, "who worked at Los Alamos in an
administrative position and helped arrange tours for visiting Chinese delegations, was used as an
'informational asset' by the FBI.... That meant she volunteered what she considered useful
information about Chinese visitors but was not given assignments by the FBI, intelligence
sources said."

 Risen, James, and Jeff Gerth. "U.S. Says Suspect Put Data on Bombs in Unsecure Files." New
York Times, 28 Apr. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Wen Ho Lee "improperly transferred huge amounts of secret data from a computer system at a
government laboratory, compromising virtually every nuclear weapon in the United States
arsenal, government and lab officials say."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "Los Alamos Security Breach Confirmed." Washington Post,
29 Apr. 1999, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 28 April 1999, "[t]he Clinton administration acknowledged" that Wen Ho Lee "transferred
secret nuclear weapons data from a classified computer network to an unclassified system
vulnerable to outsiders. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson called the data transfer, between 1983
and 1995, 'a serious security breach that is unconscionable.' But he stressed that FBI agents have
yet to determine whether the highly sensitive data ... have been pilfered from the unclassified
computers by foreign countries."
 Risen, James, and Jeff Gerth. "China Spy Suspect Reportedly Tried to Hide Evidence." New
York Times, 30 Apr. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S. officials, Wen Ho Lee "tried to hide evidence that he had transferred nuclear
secrets out of a computer system at a Government nuclear weapons laboratory two days after he
failed an F.B.I. polygraph examination in February.... The scientist ... deleted more than 1,000
files containing millions of lines of classified computer codes related to nuclear weapons from
the computer system at Los Alamos National Laboratory after the lie detector test in February."

          Forward to Wen Ho Lee May-August 1999

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                        Wen Ho Lee

                                     May-August 1999


Materials presented in chronological order.

 Loeb, Vernon. "Spy Suspect Cooperated With FBI in '82: Lee Passed Polygraph in Earlier
Probe of Atomic Espionage at Livermore Lab." Washington Post, 2 May 1999, A2. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

On 29 April 1999, SSCI members "grilled FBI Director Louis J. Freeh" about an incident in
which Wen Ho Lee "cooperated with the FBI 17 years ago when the agency was conducting
another nuclear espionage investigation.... Lee ... passed a polygraph examination in 1982 after
he called a nuclear weapons scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory suspected of
espionage at the time, according to sources familiar with the incident."
 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "Atomic Scientist Denies He Spied, Cites Aid to FBI."
Washington Post, 7 May1999, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Wen Ho Lee ... spoke out for the first time [on 6 May 1999], insisting in a lengthy statement by
his attorney that he has never spied for China and never 'given any classified information to any
unauthorized persons.'"

 Loeb, Vernon, and Roberto Suro. "FBI 'Never Came Close' to Threshold in Lee Case."
Washington Post, 29 May 1999, A4. "The Suspicions Didn't Add Up to Evidence." Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, 7 Jun. 1999, 31.

"FBI agents seeking a warrant for their investigation of espionage suspect Wen Ho Lee were sent
back for additional evidence three times by Justice Department attorneys but 'never came close'
to meeting legal standards for a search or a wiretap, department officials said" on 28 May 1999.

 Johnston, David. "Suspect in Loss of Nuclear Secrets Unlikely to Face Spying Charges." New
York Times, 15 Jun. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 14 June 1999, Government officials said that "it is most unlikely" that Wen Ho Lee "will ever
face criminal charges of espionage.... Investigators pieced together an account of Lee's contacts
with Chinese over the years, producing an outline of circumstantial information. Some of it
seemed to raise questions about Lee. Some of it seemed too speculative to shed significant light
on his activities. And none of it was solid enough to form the basis for an indictment.... One
crucial component is missing. There is no direct evidence that Lee ever passed or tried to pass on
to China any classified national security information."

 Gertz, Bill. "Los Alamos Suspect Might Face Lesser Charge in Espionage Case." Washington
Times, 13 Jul. 1999. Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 19-25 Jul. 1999, 7.

Wen Ho Lee may avoid espionage charges and, instead, be charged "with violations of federal
laws that make it a crime to mishandle national security or atomic energy information contained
in federal computers." Government officials have concluded that "the FBI mishandled the
investigation early on, making a successful espionage prosecution unlikely."

 CBS News. "Spy Suspect: 'I'm Innocent.'" 2 Aug. 1999. [http://www.cbs.com]

In an interview with CBS News on 28 July 1999, carried on CBS' "60 Minutes" on 1 August
1999, Dr. Wen Ho Lee said that "he did only what 'many people' also did in handling classified
data and never committed espionage." Lee admits "that the Energy Department's charge that he
improperly downloaded secret information from a classified computer to a non-classified one
was true. But, he said, that charge is 'misleading' because it was a routine part of his job to do
so."

See also, Robert Pear, "Suspect in Atom Secrets Case Publicly Denies Aiding China," New York
Times, 2 Aug. 1999; and Walter Pincus, "Atomic Lab Scientist Denies Passing Secrets: Lee Says
He Is Being Made a Scapegoat," Washington Post, 2 Aug. 1999, A16.
 Risen, James. "Security of Los Alamos Data Could Delay Trial U.S. Says." New York Times, 7
Aug. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The Energy Department is seeking a delay in the decision on whether to pursue an indictment
against Wen Ho Lee "in connection with the mishandling of nuclear secrets," officials said on 6
August 1999. The officials added that "[m]ore time is needed ... to decide whether to release
highly classified information for use as evidence."

 Loeb, Vernon. "Spy Probe Worries Chinese Americans: Groups Voice Fears of Ethnic
Targeting." Washington Post, 14 Aug. 1999, A5. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Chinese American groups, breaking months of public silence, have expressed concern to federal
officials that espionage suspect Wen Ho Lee may have been targeted on the basis of his
ethnicity."

 Loeb, Vernon. "Ex-Official: Bomb Lab Case Lacks Evidence. Suspect's Ethnicity 'A Major
Factor' in China Spy Probe." Washington Post, 17 Aug. 1999, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

Robert S. Vrooman, the former head of counterintelligence at the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, said on 16 August 1999 that "Federal investigators targeted physicist Wen Ho Lee as
an espionage suspect largely because he is a Chinese American and they still do not have a 'shred
of evidence' that he leaked nuclear secrets to China.... Vrooman made his remarks in an
interview with The Washington Post less than a week after Energy Secretary Bill Richardson
recommended disciplinary action against him and two other former Los Alamos officials for
alleged missteps during the espionage probe."

See also, William J. Broad, "Official Asserts Spy Case Suspect Was a Bias Victim," New York
Times, 18 Aug. 1999.

 Broad, William J. "Official Denies Spy Suspect Was Victim of Bias." New York Times, 19 Aug.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Notra Trulock, the top intelligence officer at the Energy Department, "strongly denied [on 18
August 1999] that racism was involved in his department's years-long investigation of ... Wen
Ho Lee." According to Trulock, "[h]is department sent the names of about a dozen suspects to
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, only three of which were Chinese-Americans and the rest
Caucasians."

 Washington Post. "[Editorial:] The Espionage Scandal." 19 Aug. 1999, A20. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

It is "very difficult to know what to think of Mr. Lee -- especially in light of mounting evidence
that the case against him was thin from the beginning.... This is not to contend that Mr. Lee is
innocent -- something we simply cannot know.... [T]he larger problem of security lapses and
espionage does not go away if Mr. Lee is not a spy, nor does the need for greater vigilance, and
not just at the labs. That's true whether or not we learn any time soon what the exact extent of the
Chinese nuclear espionage was -- or is."

 New York Times. "[Editorial:] The Case of Wen Ho Lee." 20 Aug. 1999. [http://www.
nytimes.com]

"Troubling accusations have been made, and denied, in recent days that Wen Ho Lee ... was
singled out for investigation and punishment because of his Chinese ethnicity.... The truth can
best be established by re-examining all aspects of the handling of the Lee case by the Energy and
Justice Departments.... The review should be headed by a knowledgeable, authoritative figure
like former Senator Sam Nunn or Gen. Colin Powell."

 Spohn, Lawrence. "Espionage Case Against Wen Ho Lee Looking Empty, Some Say."
Albuquerque Tribune, 25 Aug. 1999. [http://www.abqtrib.com/]

"Some former employees at Los Alamos National Laboratory say they believe the momentum in
the investigation of suspected Chinese espionage at the lab may be shifting from government
prosecutors to the chief suspect."




          Forward to Wen Ho Lee September-December 1999

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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                         Wen Ho Lee

                              September - December 1999


Materials presented in chronological order.
 Lumpkin, Beverley. "New Revelations: Investigators Asked Wen Ho Lee for Tape of Nuclear
Secrets." ABC News, 15 Oct. 1999. [http://abcnews.go.com]

According to law enforcement officials, former Department of Energy nuclear scientist Wen Ho
Lee "has not turned over to U.S. investigators copies of key nuclear secrets he allegedly recorded
onto magnetic tape.... Senior Justice Department officials have told ABCNEWS it is highly
unlikely prosecutors would take any action against Lee while a renewed investigation into the
allegations against him is ongoing."

 Hoffman, Ian. "DOE Willing To Risk Secrets for Lee Indictment." Albuquerque Journal, 3
Nov. 1999. [http://www.abqjournal.com]

The Energy Department "has cleared federal prosecutors to use sensitive weapons information
should they decide to seek an indictment against former Los Alamos lab scientist Wen Ho Lee....
[A]fter several weeks of review this summer, DOE security officers concluded that while
bringing Lee to trial has the potential to expose U.S. weapons secrets, the risk was manageable."

  Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Near Decision on Indicting Lee in Los Alamos Case." Washington Post,
5 Nov. 1999, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to senior administration officials, the Justice Department "is in the final stages of
determining what classified information could be presented in court against Wen Ho Lee,
clearing the way for a possible indictment of the former nuclear weapons scientist as early as
next week."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Fired Lab Scientist Can't Account for Some Disks."
Washington Post, 20 Nov. 1999, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Former Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee has told government investigators that he cannot
account for several computer diskettes onto which he downloaded nuclear secrets, according to
Clinton administration officials."

 Loeb, Vernon, and David A. Vise. "Physicist Is Indicted in Nuclear Spy Probe." Washington
Post, 11 Dec. 1999, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Wen Ho Lee was arrested in New Mexico on 10 December 1999 and "charged with 59 counts of
mishandling classified information and violating secrecy provisions of the Atomic Energy Act."
Text of the Wen Ho Lee indictment is available at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/lee_indict.html.

  Lewis, Neil A. "Imprisoned Scientist Sues U.S. Agencies." New York Times, 21 Dec. 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 20 December 1999, Wen Ho Lee filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in Washington, DC,
against the FBI and the Justice and Energy Departments. The suit accuses "the three government
agencies of violating the Privacy Act and selectively leaking 'misleading information.'"
 Pincus, Walter. "Citing Missing Tapes, U.S. Fights Bail for Lee." Washington Post, 25 Dec.
1999, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Government prosecutors told a federal judge on 23 December 1999 that Wen Ho Lee should be
denied bail "because he never provided credible evidence that he destroyed seven missing
computer tapes he made that contain 'classified information sufficient to build a functional
thermonuclear weapon.'"

  Loeb, Vernon. "No Bail in Atomic Data Case." Washington Post, 30 Dec. 1999, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 29 December 1999, Federal Judge James A. Parker ordered that Wen Ho Lee should "remain
in jail without bail pending trial."




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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                       Wen Ho Lee
                                  From January 2000


Materials presented in chronological order.

 Loeb, Vernon. "The Physicist's Biggest Puzzle: Lee's Motives, Possible Damage in Atomic
Secrets Case Remain a Mystery." Washington Post, 2 Jan. 2000, A3. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]
"Why did [Wen Ho Lee] copy enough computer data to design a nuclear warhead when he didn't
need all that information for his work? Why did he transfer top-secret computer codes to
unsecure tapes? What happened to seven of the tapes? And if Lee destroyed them -- as he claims
-- how, when and where did he do it?... U.S. District Judge James A. Parker ... cited the lingering
questions as he ruled, after three days of testimony, that no combination of bail restrictions could
protect the country from the possibility that Lee might somehow pass the missing tapes to a
foreign power."

  Risen, James. "Scientist's Lawyers Seek Better Access to Classified Material." New York Times,
7 Jan. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Lawyers for Wen Ho Lee have asked a federal court in New Mexico to ease restrictions on their
access to classified information."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "FBI Made Wen Ho Lee Think He Failed Polygraph."
Washington Post, 8 Jan. 2000, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"FBI agents misled physicist Wen Ho Lee into believing that he had failed a Department of
Energy polygraph test as they pressed him during a lengthy interrogation last March to confess to
passing nuclear weapons secrets to China."

 Sterngold, James. "Accused Scientist to Go Free on Bail in Los Alamos Case." New York
Times, 25 August 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In a 24 August 2000 decision, Judge James A. Parker of the Federal District Court in
Albuquerque says that the U.S. "government case against the Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee
'no longer has the requisite clarity and persuasive character' needed to keep him in detention
before his trial." The judge's decision requires Dr. Lee to post $1 million in bail and meet other
"tough conditions..., amounting to home detention." The government is expected to appeal the
decision and request a stay.

 Sterngold, James. "Accused Scientist Has Bail Blocked at Last Moment." New York Times, 2
Sep. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The impending release on bail of Wen Ho Lee was stayed on 1 September 2000 by two judges of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

 Sterngold, James. "U.S. to Reduce Case Against Scientist to a Single Charge." New York Times,
11 Sep. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 10 September 2000, the U.S. government agreed "to drop virtually its entire case against
Wen Ho Lee ... in return for Dr. Lee's agreement to plead guilty to a single charge that he
improperly downloaded classified material onto an unsecure computer."

 Sterngold, James. "Nuclear Scientist Set Free After Plea in Secrets Case." New York Times, 14
Sep. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 13 September 2000, Wen Ho Lee pleaded guilty "to a single charge of mishandling nuclear
secrets and left court a free man with an apology from a federal judge, who accused
administration officials of abusing their power and misleading him into thinking that Dr. Lee
posed a threat to national security."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "Guilty Plea, Release Leave Unresolved Questions in Lee
Case." Washington Post, 17 Sep. 2000, A12. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Dr. Lee's plea of guilty "to removing classified information from Los Alamos National
Laboratory" leaves "many of the key questions about his case ... unanswered.... Among the
central issues ... are whether China stole U.S. nuclear secrets, why the government investigation
focused on Lee, why he copied data about nuclear weapons onto portable tapes, and how
important the data may be."

  Broad, William J. "Los Alamos Scientist's Book Creates a New Controversy." New York Times,
5 Aug. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Wen Ho Lee ... may be on a collision course with the government over whether he has violated
security rules in the handling of his forthcoming autobiography."

 Eggen, Dan. "Report Details More FBI Blunders in Wen Ho Lee Probe." Washington Post, 27
Aug. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a classified portion of a Justice Department report, "[t]he FBI's investigation of
Wen Ho Lee was more seriously bungled than officials have previously disclosed, with inept
agents making amateurish mistakes and ignoring orders to consider other suspects.... The 166-
page chapter ... outlines a succession of blunders, misjudgments and faulty assumptions by the
FBI that contributed to the government's shoddy investigation of the former Los Alamos
National Laboratory scientist."

  U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Department of Justice Oversight. Committee on the
Judiciary. Report on the Government's Handling of the Investigation and Prosecution of Dr. Wen
Ho Lee. Intro., Senator Arlen Specter. Congressional Record, 20 Dec. 2001. Available at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_rpt/whl.html.

"The government's investigation of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) nuclear weapons
scientist Dr. Wen Ho Lee was so inept that despite scrutiny spanning nearly two decades, both
the FBI and the Department of Energy missed repeated opportunities to discover and stop his
illegal computer activities."

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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                         Wen Ho Lee
                                             Books

 Lee, Wen Ho, with Helen Zia. My Country Versus Me: The First-Hand Account by the Los
Alamos Scientist Who Was Falsely Accused of Being a Spy. New York: Hyperion, 2001.

Marston, Baltimore Sun, 19 Jan. 2002, calls Lee's book a "lively account," and notes that "Lee
describes himself as a patriotic American scientist, who enjoyed the gentle pursuits of gardening,
fishing and cooking, and devoted his life to helping the U.S. improve defense capabilities."
Bamford, Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2002, finds this a "very personal book on the affair." He
notes that "Lee claims that he downloaded ... [onto an unclassified system complex computerized
codes, some of which were classified,] to use as back-up in case of serious computer problems."

To Panofsky, American Scientist, Jul.-Aug. 2002, Lee provides "self-serving explanations of his
conduct," and "strives greatly (but with only limited success) to justify his mishandling of
classified information.... His account emphasizes the anti-Chinese racial bias of many of the
government investigators." In the end, this book "does not convey a good understanding of all
the circumstances but is interesting nonetheless for its illumination of Lee's personality and
character."

 Stober, Dan, and Ian Hoffman. A Convenient Spy: Wen Ho Lee and the Politics of Nuclear
Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

Epstein, Wall Street Journal, 16 Jan. 2002, says that Stober and Hoffman "brilliantly unravel"
this "curious case." However, the question of why Wen Ho Lee copied what he did onto his
computer is not answered, although the authors "find implausible [his] claim that he wanted to
protect the data from computer failure." To Marston, Baltimore Sun, 19 Jan. 2002, this book,
"like the Lee probe itself, struggles -- and mostly succeeds -- in making immensely complex
scientific concepts understandable to a lay reader. Despite the collapse of the government's case,
however, the authors are unconvinced of Lee's innocence."

For Panofsky, American Scientist, Jul.-Aug. 2002, the authors "offer an excellent sequential
account of [a] complex series of events. They also cover facets of China's nuclear weapons
program, emphasizing in particular that the Chinese have been much more forthcoming than they
are given credit for.... [This] excellent, sober and factual account is well worth reading for the
light it sheds on murky events." Bamford, Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2002, sees A Convenient
Spy as "a well-written cautionary tale that dissects what can happen when race, ambition and
politics mix with espionage, criminal law and foreign policy."
 Trulock, Notra. Code Name Kindred Spirit: Inside the Chinese Nuclear Espionage Scandals.
New York: Encounter Books, 2002

Gertz, Washington Times, 17 Jan. 2003, notes that the author was the Energy Department's
Director of Intelligence from 1994 to 1998. In his book, Trulock charges "that fired Los Alamos
nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee provided sensitive weapons data to China during unreported
meetings with nuclear-weapons scientists. The FBI, however, mishandled the counterespionage
investigation" because Lee "and his wife worked as FBI informants" from 1985 to 1991.

For Peake, Studies 47.3, "[t]he press leaks; the bungled investigations by the FBI, DOE, and the
independent commissions; and the coverups by DOE and the White House are all well
documented" in this book. "It is a messy, unpleasant story of what happens when politics
outweighs security and a whistle blower tries to set things right and loses."

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                          Faget

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Vise, David A. "INS Officer Charged With Spying for Cuba." Washington Post, 18 Feb. 2000,
A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 17 February 2000, the FBI arrested Mariano Faget, a senior official with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in Miami, "and charged him with spying for Cuba.... Through a
combination of technical and physical surveillance, the FBI said, 'Operation False Blue'
uncovered Faget, who was born in Havana, making unauthorized contacts with Cuban
intelligence officers in Miami and other cities." See also, Peter T. Kilborn, "Immigration
Official Charged as Spy for Cuban Government," New York Times, 19 Feb. 2000.

 Driscoll, Amy, and Juan Tamayo. "Alleged Cuban Spy Phoned Contact Instantly." Miami
Herald, 19 Feb. 2000. [http://www.herald.com]

According to the FBI, Mariano Faget "waited just 12 minutes before divulging classified
information about a possible defection of a Cuban intelligence officer to a New York
businessman with ties to the Castro government." Faget "telephoned the Cuban-born
businessman after he was told of the possible defection by FBI and INS officials in what turned
out to be an elaborate trap."

 Santiago, Fabiola. "Aloof Suspect With High Clearance; Was Ideally Positioned To Do Harm."
Miami Herald, 19 Feb. 2000. [http://www.herald.com]

The family of Mariano Faget, the INS official charged with spying for Cuba, "had a sinister past
in Cuba.... [His father,] Mariano Faget Sr.[,] had been one of Fulgencio Batista's best-known
torturers, a 'caza comunistas,' a hunter of suspected communists who ran Batista's Office of Anti-
Communist Repression, known as BRAC."

 Barr, Stephen. "U.S. Orders Cuban Diplomat's Expulsion in Spy Case." Washington Post, 20
Feb. 2000, A25. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to State Department spokesman James Foley, the United States on 19 February 2000
ordered the expulsion of a Cuban diplomat linked to an INS official charged with spying for the
Cuban government. Foley did not identify the diplomat. See also, Irvin Molotsky, "U.S. Expels
Cuban Diplomat Who Is Linked to Spy Case," New York Times, 20 Feb. 2000.

  Tamayo, Juan O. "Cuban Diplomat Expelled Over Spy Link." Miami Herald, 20 Feb. 2000.
[http://www.herald.com]

"The head of the Cuban Interests Section, Fernando Remirez, said in Santiago de Cuba that his
government will not willingly bring home the diplomat targeted for expulsion.... Remirez said
the government would recommend that the official 'remain in United States territory to give
testimony and demonstrate the total falseness of this accusation.'"

 CNN. "Cuban Diplomat Linked to INS Spy Case Identified." 22 Feb. 2000. [http://www.
cnn.com]

"[T]he name of a Cuban government official ordered expelled by the United States has now been
revealed.... Jose Imperatori,... who holds the rank of second secretary at the Cuban diplomatic
mission in Washington -- formally known as the Cuban Interests Section -- has four more days to
leave the United States. But the Cuban government ... is refusing to recall him to Havana."
 New York Times. "Cuba Refuses to Withdraw a Diplomat." 23 Feb. 2000. [http://www.
nytimes.com]

"Cuba will not withdraw the diplomat linked to an espionage investigation, despite an order from
the United States that he leave the country, Cuban officials said." State Department spokesman
James P. Rubin said that if Jose Imperatori did not leave the country "he would lose diplomatic
privileges and immunities and become subject to the laws of the United States."

 Tamayo, Juan O. "N.Y. Contact of Alleged Spy Denies Giving Cuba Secrets." Miami Herald,
24 Feb. 2000. [http://www.herald.com]

In an interview with the Univision television network in Monaco on 23 February 2000, Cuban-
born Pedro Font, "linked to accused Cuban spy Mariano Faget," confirmed that "he has known
Faget since childhood and had met with diplomats attached to the Cuban Interests Section in
Washington" but "denied ... that he passed secrets to Cuba."

  Kidwell, David. "Spy Suspect Defends Calling Cuban Friend." Miami Herald, 25 Feb. 2000.
[http://www.herald.com]

Taking the stand at his bond hearing on 24 February 2000, Mariano Faget "admitted he had
disclosed government secrets -- but only to save a friend, not to spy for Cuba.... His attempts to
minimize his illegal disclosure as an 'error in judgment' didn't convince U.S. Magistrate Barry
Garber, who ordered Faget held without bond while he awaits trial."

 DeYoung, Karen. "Cuban Diplomat Forcibly Expelled: Cited in Spy Case, Envoy Balked at
Departure Order." Washington Post, 27 Feb. 2000, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Expelled Cuban diplomat Jose Imperatori was taken into custody on 26 February 2000 by the
FBI and flown to Montreal on a bureau plane. This was "the first time a foreign diplomat has
tried to defy an expulsion order." See also, Irvin Molotsky, "Cuban Envoy Is Deported After
Defying Expulsion," New York Times, 27 Feb. 2000.

 McCarthy, Shawn. "Cuban Envoy Holes Up in Ottawa." Globe and Mail (Canada), 28 Feb.
2000. [http://www.theglobeandmail.com]

On 27 February 2000, Cuban diplomat Jose Imperatori, "expelled from the United States on spy
charges[,] was holed up in the Cuban Embassy ..., threatening to remain there on a hunger strike
until his name is cleared." See also, Steven Pearlstein, "Cuban Diplomat Remains in Canada:
Havana Orders Alleged Spy to Stay, Requests 30-Day Visa," Washington Post, 29 Feb. 2000, A2.

  Tamayo, Juan O. "Canada Orders Cuban Envoy Back Home." Miami Herald, 29 Feb. 2000.
[http://www.herald.com]

"An angry Canadian government ordered" Cuban diplomat Jose Imperatori "to leave Canada" by
the evening of 28 February 2000, and "end his 'publicity seeking attempt to remain in Ottawa.'"
See also, Steven Pearlstein, "Cuban Deported By U.S. Defies Order to Leave Canada,"
Washington Post, 1 Mar. 2000, A11.

  Lynch, Marika. "Spy Suspect Says He Talked Business." Miami Herald, 1 Mar. 2000.
[http://www.herald.com]

In an interview broadcast on WPLG Channel 10 on 29 February 2000, Mariano Faget said that
he "met with a top Cuban diplomat [Jose Imperatori] to talk about business prospects in a post-
embargo Cuba, but the two never talked about immigration matters."

  Pearlstein, Steven. "Expelled Diplomat Returns to Cuba." Washington Post, 3 Mar. 2000, A24.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Cuban diplomat Jose Imperatori left Canada on 2 March 2000 and "returned home to Havana,
where he received a hero's welcome led by President Fidel Castro."

 Miami Herald. "Faget Pleads Not Guilty to Spying." 7 Mar. 2000. [http://www.herald.com]

On 6 March 2000, Mariano Faget entered a formal plea of not guilty in U.S. District Court to
charges of "communicating national defense information, conversion of government property for
personal use and [making] three false statements."

 Bragg, Rick. "Secrets Trial of High Immigration Official Begins." New York Times, 18 May
2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The trial of Mariano Faget began in Miami on 17 May 2000.

 CNN. "INS Official Guilty of Espionage in Cuba Case." 30 May 2000. [http://www.cnn.com]

On 29 May 2000, a jury convicted Mariano Faget "on four counts of violating the Espionage
Act."

 Los Angeles Times. "Ex-INS Supervisor, Faget, Gets 5 Years in Spy Case." 30 Jun. 2001.

On 29 June 2001, Mariano Faget "was sentenced in Miami to five years in prison for disclosing
official secrets to Cuba."

         Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents

         Return to Other Agencies
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                       Robert Philip Hanssen
                                  Table of Contents

On 18 February 2001, Robert Philip Hanssen, 56, a 27-year veteran of the FBI, was
arrested on espionage charges. Hanssen was a senior special agent who worked as a
counterintelligence supervisor at FBI headquarters. He was arraigned in federal court in
Alexandria, Virginia, on 20 February on charges of passing classified information to Russia
for 15 years.

The lengthy FBI affidavit outlining the evidence against Hanssen is available on the FBI
Website at http://www.fbi.gov/ in PDF format. An HTML version is available from the
Federation of American Scientists at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/hanssen_affidavit.html.
In his "Secrecy News (from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy)" of 21 February
2001, Steven Aftergood calls the affidavit "a fascinating account of the case and itself a
valuable addition to the literature of espionage."

A supplemental affidavit, dated 21 February 2001 but released on 27 February 2001,
includes the text of a farewell message that Hanssen supposedly sent to his Russian
handlers. The text of the affidavit is available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/hanssen_affidavit2.html.

 Reportage:

 20-28 February 2001

 March 2001

 April 2001 and Later

 Books

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents

         Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents

     Return to Russia 2000s Table of Contents
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                        Robert Philip Hanssen
                                  20 - 28 February 2001

Materials presented chronologically.

 Pino-Marina, Christina. "Virginia FBI Agent Arrested on Espionage Charges." Washington
Post, 20 Feb. 2001. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to an FBI spokeswoman, Robert Philip Hanssen, a 27-year FBI veteran, was arrested
on 18 February on at least one espionage charge and will appear in U.S. District Court in
Alexandria on 20 February.

 Johnston, David. "F.B.I. Agent Charged as Spy Who Aided Russia for 15 Years." New York
Times, 21 Feb. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Robert Philip Hanssen, a "senior F.B.I. agent who worked as a counterintelligence supervisor at
the agency's headquarters," was charged on 20 February 2001 "as a spy who passed highly
classified information to Russia for 15 years.... Hanssen, 56, was accused of turning over to
Moscow a huge array of secrets, including the identities of three Russian agents ... recruited to
spy for the United States. Two of the Russians were subsequently tried and executed; the third
was imprisoned and later released. In return, F.B.I. officials said, the Russians paid Mr. Hanssen
a total of $1.4 million."

 Shenon, Philip. "From Dour 'Mortician' of F.B.I. to Suspected Russian Superspy." New York
Times, 21 Feb. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The Russians apparently never knew Hanssen's name. Details of the case released by law
enforcement officials on 20 February 2001 "offer little explanation for the motivations of a man
who, unlike the brazenly greedy Mr. Ames, was never obvious about enjoying the hundreds of
thousands of dollars in cash and diamonds that his Russian handlers supposedly provided."
Hanssen is remembered by FBI colleagues as "dour, colorless, socially awkward 'the mortician,'
as he was called behind his back, both for his personality and his penchant for dark, unstylish
business suits."

 Johnston, David. "F.B.I. Never Gave Lie Test to Agent Charged as Spy." New York Times, 22
Feb. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to law enforcement officials on 21 February 2001, the FBI never polygraphed Robert
Philip Hanssen "to determine whether he might be a security risk during the 15 years when, it is
charged, he spied for the Soviet Union and then Russia." Hanssen "was not under suspicion until
late last year, when American intelligence obtained what officials have said was the entire
Russian case file on his activities as a secret agent."

On 21 February 2001, "William H. Webster, the former F.B.I. and C.I.A. director, said in an
interview that he was assembling a team to assess the bureau's security procedures and methods
for detecting penetrations by foreign agents. Mr. Webster said he would focus on the F.B.I.'s
polygraph policy and other counterespionage methods."

 LaFraniere, Sharon. "Russia Says FBI Agent's Arrest Shouldn't Hurt Relations." Washington
Post, 22 Feb. 2001, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 21 February 2001, Boris Labusov, a spokesman for the Foreign Intelligence Service, "played
down the arrest of Robert Philip Hanssen, saying espionage is a normal part of political life."

 Lewis, Neil A. "The Prosecution Case: Zigs and Zags of Spy Cases Put a Damper on
Predicting." New York Times, 22 Feb. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The espionage case against Robert Philip Hanssen as outlined in a 100-page document from the
F.B.I. looks as strong as can be, with investigators possessing computer disks, bundles of cash, a
fingerprint and other incriminating evidence.

"But lawyers and others familiar with espionage prosecutions know that even the best cases can
take legal twists and turns. The criminal complaint is also the beginning of a process in which Mr.
Hanssen and the government will have to deal with many questions, the most important of which
may be whether he will, in exchange for avoiding a death sentence, agree to tell intelligence
officers what secrets he may have handed over to Moscow.... The espionage act under which Mr.
Hanssen is charged provides for the death penalty in a variety of circumstances, including one in
which the defendant is found guilty of disclosing the identities of agents who die as a result."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Brooke A. Masters. "Spy Suspect Had Deep Data Access, Ex-Associates
Say." Washington Post, 22 Feb. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Three of his former colleagues said on 21 February 2001 that the damage from Robert Hanssen's
"alleged spy career could be particularly severe because he possessed both access to intelligence
information across the government and computer skills that made him among the most
technologically sophisticated officials at the FBI.... Two years after he allegedly began spying
for the KGB in 1985, Hanssen served as deputy director of the FBI Intelligence Division's Soviet
section, giving him full access to information about counterspy activities against the Soviet
Union."

 Risen, James. "The Spymaster: Spy Handler Bedeviled U.S. in Earlier Case." New York Times,
22 Feb. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to an FBI affidavit, KGB colonel Viktor Cherkashin "was instrumental in handling"
both Aldrich H. Ames and Robert Philip Hanssen. "Cherkashin was chief of counterintelligence
in the K.G.B.'s Washington station in 1985 when Mr. Ames and, according to the F.B.I., Mr.
Hanssen also volunteered to spy for Moscow.... To ensure his security, Mr. Hanssen never met
with Mr. Cherkashin or any other K.G.B. officers, and did not tell the K.G.B. his name or where
he worked in the United States government, federal officials said."

 Vise, David A., and Dan Eggen. "FBI Faulted For Rejecting Warnings." Washington Post, 22
Feb. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The FBI failed to heed a series of blunt warnings to adopt security measures that might have
allowed agents to detect the kind of espionage that Robert P. Hanssen allegedly conducted for
much of the past 15 years, government officials said" on 21 February 2001.

 Masters, Brooke A., and Vernon Loeb. "CIA Officer Had Been Focus of Spy Probe."
Washington Post, 23 Feb. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Until FBI investigators targeted Robert P. Hanssen as a possible Russian spy late last year, they
focused on a covert CIA officer who now may be cleared as a result of Hanssen's arrest, sources
close to the case said [on 22 February 2001]. The CIA officer has been on paid leave since
August 1999 while the FBI has investigated whether he was a Russian spy.... Now that Hanssen
has been charged as a Russian spy, authorities are attempting to determine whether to clear the
initial suspect and put him back to work." See also, David Johnston and James Risen, "U.S. Had
Evidence of Espionage, but F.B.I. Failed to Inspect Itself." New York Times, 23 Feb. 2001.

 Eggen, Dan, and David A. Vise. "To Russia, With Longing." Washington Post, 24 Feb. 2001,
A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[A] spy's success still often depends on the psychologically complicated relationship with a
foreign patron. That bond is clearly evident in the case of [Robert Philip] Hanssen,... whose
alleged illicit correspondence is part spy tale and part Valentine." A 109-page affidavit filed "in
U.S. District Court, as well as statements by FBI Director Louis J. Freeh and other U.S. officials,
portray a tangled and, at times, almost intimate relationship between Hanssen and his ..
'handlers.' What began as an alliance solely on Hanssen's terms became, over time, a murkier
compact, a dance between two parties united in suspicion and dependent on trust."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "Bush to Speed Clinton Spy Changes." Washington Post, 24
Feb. 2001, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Senior U.S. officials said on 23 February 2001 that "the Bush administration intends to swiftly
carry out recommendations left by President Clinton for a government-wide reorganization of
counterintelligence [CI] efforts.... Both FBI Director Louis J. Freeh and CIA Director George J.
Tenet have strongly endorsed David Szady," a CI expert "serving as special agent in charge of
the FBI's field office in Portland, Ore.," to be national counterintelligence executive. The
position would oversee CI "spending by all federal agencies and ... identify the most important
technologies, weaponry and other national assets that must be protected from foreign spies."

  Risen, James. "Spy-Hunt Team Followed Trail to F.B.I. Agent." New York Times, 24 Feb. 2001.
[http://www.nytimes.com]
According to officials on 23 February 2001, a joint FBI-CIA "mole hunting" unit "established in
1994 to identify the source of a series of damaging intelligence losses played a crucial role in the
counterespionage probe that led to the arrest" of Robert Philip Hanssen.

 Gordievsky, Oleg. "What Makes the Double Agent Tick." telegraph.co.uk, 25 Feb. 2001.

The former KGB officer suggests that the "most important component" in Hanssen's "survival as
a spy ... was his decision never to meet anyone from the KGB face to face.... Hanssen's caution
ensured that he never attracted any attention from the FBI's molehunters.... [H]is survival in a
position where the usual life-span is measured in months rather than years is a testament to his
toughness."

 Masters, Brooke A., and Walter Pincus. "FBI Left Hanssen an Opening as His Debts
Mounted." Washington Post, 28 Feb. 2001, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to court documents and sources revealed on 27 February 2001, "[t]he FBI gave
alleged spy Robert P. Hanssen an opening by failing to monitor the mail of known KGB officers
and may have ignored evidence that he was running up large debts over the past decade."

 Risen, James, and Philip Shenon. "Accused Spy Suspected Loss of Access to Secrets,
Prosecutors Say." New York Times, 28 Feb. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"A Russian intelligence source warned the United States in the mid-1990's that Moscow had a
spy inside the Federal Bureau of Investigation.... The tip from the Russian official prompted the
F.B.I. to briefly begin a counterintelligence inquiry within its own ranks, officials said. But the
investigation was abandoned after the same Russian source returned, several months later, and
told the Americans that Moscow's agent was in the Central Intelligence Agency, not the F.B.I."

          Return to Hanssen Spy Case Table of Contents

          Return to FBI Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                         Robert Philip Hanssen
                                          March 2001

Materials presented chronologically.
 Loeb, Vernon, and Dan Eggen. "Hanssen Carried Secrets Between FBI, State Dept."
Washington Post, 1 Mar. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Present and former State Department officials said on 28 February 2001 that "[o]ne of accused
spy Robert P. Hanssen's regular duties over the past five years was to carry secret intelligence
documents between the State Department and FBI headquarters."

 Risen, James, with Lowell Bergman. "U.S. Thinks Agent Revealed Tunnel at Soviet Embassy."
New York Times, 4 Mar. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to intelligence and law enforcement officials, the U.S. government "constructed a
secret tunnel under the Soviet Union's embassy in Washington to eavesdrop, but federal
investigators now believe the operation was betrayed" by Robert Philip Hanssen. The existence
of the tunnel operation "has never publicly disclosed.... But in an F.B.I. affidavit in the Hanssen
case, the government stated that Mr. Hanssen 'compromised an entire technical program of
enormous value, expense and importance to the United States government.' Officials said that
was a reference to the tunnel operation and related intelligence activities."

 Risen, James. "F.B.I. Spy Case May Explain Arrest of a K.G.B. Agent." New York Times, 7
Mar. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Former C.I.A. officer Jack Platt" believes that "his onetime adversary turned friend and business
partner, a former major in the K.G.B. named Gennady Vasilenko," was betrayed to the KGB by
Robert Philip Hanssen rather than Aldrich Ames.

  Hoffman, Lisa. "FBI Scandal Leaves CIA Gloating." Sun-Times (Chicago), 11 Mar. 2001.
[http://www.suntimes.com]

"When CIA mole Aldrich Ames was unearthed in 1994, Congress and President Bill Clinton
punished the spy agency by yanking its control over its own counterintelligence operations and
giving it to the FBI.... Now the tables have turned. It's the FBI in the hot seat this time,
embarrassed by its damaging failure to detect its own alleged Russian mole, 15-year FBI
counterintelligence operative Robert Hanssen."

 Eggen, Dan. "Webster Begins Probe of FBI Security Measures." Washington Post, 13 Mar.
2001. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Former FBI and CIA director William H. Webster officially began his probe this week into
security measures at the FBI in the wake of the Robert P. Hanssen spy case, after receiving a
formal outline of his duties from the Justice Department."

 Bamford, James. "My Friend, the Spy." New York Times, 18 Mar. 2001. [http://www.
nytimes.com]

The author, who knew FBI turncoat Robert Hanssen as a friend, writes: "[I]f the criminal charges
prove correct, hidden deep behind [a] pious, anti-Communist facade was a disturbing, bifurcated
psyche" -- "[a] man who could leave Sunday Mass and load a dead drop with top-secret
documents or march in protest at the killing of 'unborn children' while coolly sending American
spies to their deaths."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "Hanssen Case May Be Linked to Defector." Washington
Post, 18 Mar. 2001, A5. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Sergei Tretyakov, previously first secretary in Russia's UN mission, "has become the subject of
international speculation" since Robert Hanssen's arrest. "Tretyakov defected to the United States
in October [2000], around the time that FBI investigators obtained the contents of a KGB case
file that quickly led them to finger Hanssen as a mole.... [However,] Tretyakov is not the only
Russian spy to defect [recently].... In December [2000],... Yevgeny Toropov, another Russian
intelligence officer, defected in Ottawa.... News of Toropov's defection,... confirmed 10 days ago
by Canadian officials, set off another round of guessing about the source of the Hanssen
material."

 Risen, James, and Jane Perlez. "Russian Diplomats Ordered Expelled in a Countermove." New
York Times, 22 Mar. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In a meeting with Russian Ambassador Yuri V. Ushakov on 21 March 2001, U.S. Secretary of
State Colin L. Powell ordered "four or five Russian diplomats" to leave the country. According
to U.S. officials, this move comes "in the wake of the arrest" of FBI agent Robert P. Hanssen "on
charges that he spied for Moscow for more than 15 years." Powell described the Russian
diplomats as "intelligence officers working undercover as diplomats." He also told Ushakov that
"the United States wants another 40 or more diplomats to leave over the next several months in
order to reduce the Russian intelligence presence in the United States. In all, the actions could
affect close to 50 Russian diplomats, officials said."

 Risen, James. "News Analysis: In Espionage Game, Get Caught, Lose Players." New York
Times, 23 Mar. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"President Bush's decision to expel four Russian diplomats immediately, and demand that the
Russians withdraw 46 more by July 1 [2001], is the largest such action since 1986 and far more
aggressive than any similar move taken by the United States since the collapse of the Soviet
Union.... But the actions follow the general rule that both the United States and the Soviet Union,
and now Russia, have always accepted: when one side gets caught running a spy on the other's
turf, some intelligence officers serving under cover as diplomats have to go home."

  Loeb, Vernon. "Spies and Other Ego-Trippers: Psychiatrist Jerrold Post Weighs the Personality
in Politics." Washington Post, 24 Mar. 2001, C1. [http://www.washingtonpost. com]

In 1975 CIA psychiatrist Jerrold M. Post wrote in a now-declassified paper, "The Anatomy of
Treason" that "spies are people 'who have a pattern of split loyalties..., who can sham loyalty on
the surface while actually being disloyal under the surface.... One particular psychological
quality which we find in the major agents in spades ... is narcissism or self-absorption,
egocentricity.' When he heard last month about the arrest of Robert Hanssen, a devout Catholic
and dedicated family man accused of spying within the FBI, Post was puzzled. In all his years as
a psychological profiler, he had rarely come across a spy whose outward life seemed so free of
crisis or conflict."

 Tyler, Patrick E. "Russia Expels 4 Americans and Vows 'Other Measures.'" New York Times,
24 Mar. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 23 March 2001, a Russian Foreign Ministry official said that Russia "was expelling four
United States diplomats for 'activities incompatible with their status,' the diplomatic phrase for
espionage, and added that it would take 'other measures to halt the unlawful activities' of official
American representatives."




          Return to Hanssen Spy Case Table of Contents

          Return to FBI Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                         Robert Philip Hanssen
                                    April 2001and Later


Materials presented chronologically.

 Risen, James, and David Johnston. "F.B.I. Rejected Spy Warning 2 Years Before Agent's
Arrest." New York Times, 22 Apr. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to "current and former" FBI officials, two years before Robert Hanssen's arrest on
charges of spying for Russia, Thomas Kimmel, a senior FBI investigator, "concluded in a still-
classified report that Moscow might have recruited a mole in the bureau's ranks.... In early 1999,
F.B.I. Director Louis Freeh was told by ... Kimmel ... about his findings. In response, the
officials said, senior bureau officials convinced Mr. Freeh that Mr. Kimmel's reasoning was
flawed and investigators focused their hunt for a mole at the Central Intelligence Agency, not the
bureau."
  Risen, James. "Former F.B.I. Agent Indicted in Spy Case." New York Times, 17 May 2001.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 16 May 2001, a federal grand jury in Alexandria, Virginia, returned a 21-count indictment
against Robert P. Hanssen on charges of spying for Moscow for more than 15 years. The
indictment came after negotiations over a possible plea agreement broke down over prosecutors'
refusal to negotiate a deal that would spare Hanssen the death penalty.

 Risen, James. "Jailed Agent Says He Voiced Suspicion about Spy Suspect." New York Times,
28 May 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Interviewed at the federal prison in Ashland, KY, where he is serving a 27-year sentence for
spying for Moscow, Earl Pitts said that he told FBI investigators in June 1997 "that he knew of
suspicious activity by his fellow agent Robert P. Hanssen that indicated he might also be
spying."

 Masters, Brooke A., and Dan Eggen. "'79 Contact by Hanssen Is Detailed: Account Suggests
Spying Predated 1985; Agent Told Wife That Deal Was a Ploy." Washington Post, 16 Jun. 2001,
A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to government officials and others familiar with the case, Bonnie Hanssen, the wife of
accused FBI spy Robert P. Hanssen, became suspicious of his activities in 1979. At that time, he
"told her he had exchanged information for money from Soviet agents, but only in a gambit to
trick them." This suggests that "Hanssen had surreptitious contacts with Moscow at least six
years earlier than prosecutors have publicly alleged. It is also the first public indication that his
wife ever suspected him of espionage before his arrest." See also, James Risen and David
Johnston, "Wife Says Suspect Told a Priest 20 Years Ago of Aiding Soviets," New York Times,
16 Jun. 2001.

  Risen, James. "Ex-Agent Pleads Guilty in Spy Case." New York Times, 7 Jul. 2001.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 6 July 2001, in Federal District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, Robert P. Hanssen pleaded
guilty to charges that he had spied for Moscow since 1985. "In return for his guilty plea, the
government agreed not to seek the death penalty.... Hanssen, who is 57, will be sentenced to life
without parole, and he has agreed to undergo extensive debriefings by officials from the F.B.I.
and other agencies to discuss the extent of his espionage.... As part of the agreement, the
government will let Mr. Hanssen's wife ... receive the survivor's portion of his F.B.I. pension,
and retain ownership of their home in the Washington suburb of Vienna, Va."

 Novak, Robert. "Who Is the Real Hanssen?" Sun-Times (Chicago), 12 Jul. 2001. [http://
www.suntimes.com]

"Three-and-a-half years ago [24 November 1997], I reported that a veteran FBI agent resigned
and retired after refusing a demand by Attorney General Janet Reno to give the Justice
Department the names of top secret sources in China. My primary source was FBI agent Robert
Hanssen."

 Eggen, Dan. "Robert Hanssen, Man of Many Mysteries." Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 16-22 Jul. 2001, 31.

"Spies are often quite clear in their motives.... But Hanssen is still a riddle. The more information
that emerges about his behavior and beliefs, the more contradictory they appear. None of the
usual motives for espionage -- greed, ideology or revenge -- seem sufficient to explain the
multiple deceptions he engaged in at work, at home, and at church."

 Risen, James. "Spy in F.B.I. Is Said to Have Given Secrets to 2 Soviet Agencies." New York
Times, 8 Aug. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Hanssen has told counterintelligence debriefers that at different times he spied for both the GRU
and KGB.

  Pincus, Walter. "Hanssen Gave Away Identity of One of U.S.'s Top Sources." Washington Post,
4 Oct. 2001, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Robert P. Hanssen has reportedly "told government debriefers that in his first round of espionage
for Moscow 22 years ago, he gave away the identity" of Russian army general Dimitri Polyakov
(codenamed "Top Hat"), "one America's best intelligence sources inside the Soviet military."
Although Hanssen said he betrayed Polyakov in 1979, the KGB did not arrest Polyakov until
1986. "Until Hanssen's disclosure, it was believed that Polyakov was one of more than a dozen
U.S. agents first betrayed to the KGB by CIA turncoat Aldrich H. Ames, who was arrested in
1994. See also, Damian Whitworth, "FBI Traitor Reveals Identity of Agent," Times (London), 4
Oct. 2001.

 Thompson, Cheryl W. "Book Says FBI Was Told in '90 Hanssen Might Be Spy." Washington
Post, 16 Dec. 2001, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"In 'The Bureau and the Mole,' Washington Post reporter David A. Vise writes that Hanssen's
brother-in-law, Mark Wauck, an FBI agent in Chicago, discovered in 1990 that Hanssen 'was
hiding thousands of dollars in cash' in his house and 'spending too much money for someone on
an FBI salary.' Wauck reported his suspicions to his supervisors in Chicago, telling them he
thought Hanssen was spying for the Russians. The book contends that the FBI did nothing,
allowing Hanssen to continue spying for 10 more years."

  Vise, David A. "From Russia With Love." Washington Post, 6 Jan. 2002, W18ff.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"FBI agent Robert Hanssen was a frustrated loner isolated from co-workers, family and friends.
Finally he found someone to appreciate his mind and talents: the nice folks from the KGB."
[Article adapted from Vise's The Bureau and the Mole (2002).]
  U.S. Department of Justice. Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs [Webster
Commission]. A Review of FBI Security Programs. Washington, DC: 31 Mar. 2002. Available
at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/websterreport.html.

From "Executive Summary": This commission "was established in response to possibly the worst
intelligence disaster in U.S. history: the treason of Robert Hanssen.... During our review of FBI
security programs, we found significant deficiencies in Bureau policy and practice. Those
deficiencies flow from a pervasive inattention to security.... In the Bureau, security is often
viewed as an impediment to operations, and security responsibilities are seen as an impediment
to career advancement." See also, Walter Pincus, "Hanssen Blamed for Identifying 50 FBI
Informants to Russians," Washington Post, 6 Apr. 2002, A4.

 Masters, Brooke A. "Hanssen Sentenced to Life in Spy Case." Washington Post, 11 May 2002,
A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 10 May 2002, Chief Judge Claude M. Hilton of U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Va.,
sentenced former FBI agent Robert Hanssen to life in prison. See also, James Risen, "Former
F.B.I. Agent Gets Life in Prison for Years as a Spy," New York Times, 11 May 2002.

  U.S. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI's
Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the Espionage Activities of Robert Philip
Hanssen. Washington, DC: Aug. 2003. [Available at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/hanssen.html]

Clark comment: This is the 31-page unclassified executive summary of Justice Department
Inspector General Glenn A. Fine's report. It provides a public version of the main findings in the
lengthier classified reports, two classifications levels of which were prepared.

The summary states: "In 1985 and 1986, the CIA and FBI lost nearly every significant human
asset then operating against the Soviet Union. These losses were unprecedented in scope,
quantity, significance, and timing, yet the FBI undertook no sustained effort to determine their
cause. Senior management was almost entirely unaware of the scope and significance of these
losses, and throughout the 1980s the FBI failed to work cooperatively with the CIA to resolve
the cause of these losses or to thoroughly investigate whether an FBI mole could be responsible
for these setbacks. We now know that Hanssen compromised many of the assets and operations
lost during the mid-1980s."

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 33-03, 22 Aug. 2003, calls the report "a painful picture of our Cold War
FBI counter-espionage posture.... The report of this long-running espionage and treason-from-
within is disturbing reading. It confirms my own suspicion, based on career observations, of the
security (or systemic insecurity) of some HUMINT assets, even if never imagined in this
proportion and magnitude. The report shows the damage from leadership feuds and bureaucratic
turf protection, such as between the Justice Department and the FBI, which possibly colors this
DoJ/OIG report on the FBI to some extent.... This is an interesting report, worth reading in full."
According to Dan Eggen, "Report: Spy Gained From FBI Laxity," Washington Post, 15 Aug.
2003, A4, Fine's report says that "Hanssen ... was a reckless and 'mediocre agent' who succeeded
because of the bureau's poor oversight and lax security.... The inspector general's findings ...
appear to differ sharply from previous characterizations by many Justice Department and FBI
officials, who had sought to portray Hanssen as a savvy and experienced counterintelligence
agent who outwitted pursuers."

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                        Robert Philip Hanssen
                                            Books


  Cherkashin, Victor, with Gregory Feifer. Spy Handler -- Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True
Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen & Aldrich Ames. New York: Basic Books,
2004.

Clark comment: The subtitle of this book is (as often happens with subtitles) misleading at best.
Cherkashin did not literally "recruit" Ames and Hanssen; they dropped themselves into his lap.

Troy, CIRA Newsletter 30.1 (Spring 2005), says that the author "has written an entertaining
book" about "his (relatively brief) involvement with Ames and Hanssen and much more about
his career" that spanned 39 years with the KGB. The book is "enjoyable and easy to read." For
Bath, NIPQ 21.2 (Jun. 2005), this work "is more than the record of a skilled intelligence officer,
it also offers a rare picture of the case officer's day-to-day activities and challenges."

To Usdin, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), the author "provides little new information about Ames,
Hanssen or Pelton." In fact, he "reveals far more about the KGB than about the CIA, FBI or
NSA." Ehrman, Studies 49.3 (2005), comments that the author "not only tells a fascinating story
but also provides numerous insights -- some of them probably unintended -- into the world of the
KGB that make this a rewarding book for specialists and general readers alike." Cherkashin does
not "seem bothered by the character of the post-Stalin system he served or of the service in
which he worked."
Epstein, Wall Street Journal (30 Dec. 2004), usesthe publication of Cherkashin's book to argue
that the arrests of Ames and Hanssen prove that "Angleton was right." Cherkashin's story
"provides a gripping account of [the KGB's] successes in the spy war.... That America's
counterespionage apparatus allowed both [Ames and Hanssen] to operate as long as they did is a
testament to its complacency as much as to the KGB's cleverness."

 Havill, Adrian. The Spy Who Stayed Out in the Cold: The Secret Life of FBI Double Agent
Robert Hanssen. New York: St. Martin's, 2002.

For Marston, Baltimore Sun, 19 Jan. 2002, the author is a "meticulous researcher" who provides
historical and diplomatic context to his telling of Hanssen's story. The reviewer notes that "Havill
rejects as naive Hanssen's contention that the Russians never knew his true identity, and seems
oddly sympathetic to the super-spy." Peake, Intelligencer 13.1, destroys any thought of Havill as
researcher with a listing of errors the reviewer characterizes as "dim-witted," "laughable," and
"absolute nonsense." Peake's advice is "Don't waste time on this one."

  Schiller, Lawrence. Into the Mirror: The Life of Master Spy Robert P. Hanssen -- Based Upon
an Investigation by Norman Mailer and Lawrence Schiller. New York: HarperCollins, 2002.
[Peake, Studies 48.3/92/fn2]

 Shannon, Elaine, and Ann Blackman. The Spy Next Door: The Extraordinary Secret Life of
Robert Philip Hanssen, the Most Damaging FBI Agent in U.S. History. New York: Little, Brown,
2002.

Marston, Baltimore Sun, 19 Jan. 2002, finds this "a highly readable account that strips away
Good Bob's straight-arrow facade, to reveal a Bad Bob who betrayed his country on an
unprecedented scale." For Weinstein, Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2002, the authors provide "a
detailed and meticulous chronological tracing of Hanssen's life and times, from cradle to
capture." Peake, Intelligencer 13.1, says this is "easy reading and informative." To Bath, NIPQ
18.4, the authors, in their rush to get this book quickly onto the market, "mak[e] suppositions
little supported by evidence," which do not look very good in the light of later materials.

 Vise, David A. The Bureau and the Mole: The Unmasking of Robert Philip Hanssen, The Most
Dangerous Double Agent in FBI History. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2002.

According to Marston, Baltimore Sun, 19 Jan. 2002, the author "traces the superficially parallel
careers of Hanssen and former FBI Director Louis Freeh." But the two "had no direct
interaction,... so Vise's structure occasionally seems forced." Nevertheless, the book "is a
carefully researched and compelling account, with a startling bombshell: in 1990, Hanssen's
brother-in-law and fellow FBI agent Mark Wauck reported to his FBI superiors in Chicago that
Hanssen was spending far beyond his bureau salary, had thousands in cash hidden in his home
and that Wauck suspected Hanssen was spying for the Russians. Incredibly, the FBI did
nothing."

Bath, NIPQ 18.4, also finds the "attempted parallel" between "the hunted" (Hanssen) and "the
hunter" (Freeh) to be "a bit strained." To Weinstein, Washington Post, 20 Jan. 2002, this is an
"intelligent and well-researched" work. However, its usefulness is diminished by the absence of
an index. There are also touches of a novel in Vise's work, as when he reaches into the minds of
both Hanssen and Freeh. For Peake, Intelligencer 13.1, some readers may find Vise's 72 pages
on former FBI Director Louis Freeh distracting. Otherwise, this work is "easy reading and
informative."

  Wise, David. Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America. New
York: Random House, 2002.

To Peake, Studies 48.3 (2004), Wise's is the "best book about the Robert Hanssen espionage
case." It is also "a disturbing tale of personal treachery and bureaucratic ineptitude." Once the
FBI decided that there was a CIA suspect, "they never considered an alternative until given hard
evidence of the mole's true identity." For Goulden, Washington Times, 8 Dec. 2002, and
Intelligencer 13.2, "Wise adds an important new element to the case, the inside story of how our
intelligence agencies finally tracked [Hanssen] down and brought him to justice.... [He also]
offers fresh information on Hanssen's crimes."

Sherrill, Washington Post, 3 Nov. 2002, opines that "Wise smartly guesses that the FBI 'may
have failed to detect Hanssen sooner because it was in love with its own image' of bureaucratic
purity and shrewdness -- a hangover from the myth-ridden Hoover era.... A traitor in their ranks?
Impossible." Campbell, Journal of Intelligence History 3.1, comments that "David Wise has
written another excellent book on espionage.... [T]his book shows careful research and balanced
analysis and it can be recommended to academics and intelligence officers."

          Return to Hanssen Spy Case Table of Contents

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                             Ana Belen Montes

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Miller, Bill, and Walter Pincus. "Defense Analyst Accused of Spying for Cuba." Washington
Post, 22 Sep. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Ana Belen Montes, the DIA's senior analyst for Cuba, was arrested at her office at Bolling Air
Force Base on 21 September 2001. She is "accused of providing classified information about
military exercises and other sensitive operations to the Cuban government."

 Moreno, Sylvia. "An Improbable Spy? Friends Old and New Stunned by Arrest of Reserved,
Frugal Defense Analyst." Washington Post, 4 Oct. 2001, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"In Washington's world of top-level intelligence briefings, Ana Belen Montes was the go-to
person on Cuba. She told people how the communist nation worked. But all the while, federal
authorities say, the 44-year-old Defense Intelligence Agency analyst was telling Cuba just how
the United States operated, from the identity of undercover agents sent to infiltrate the island to
details on military exercises."

 Golden, Tim. "Pentagon's Top Cuba Expert Pleads Guilty to Espionage." New York Times, 20
Mar. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 19 March 2002, Ana B. Montes pleaded guilty in Federal District Court in Washington, DC,
to a single count of conspiracy to commit espionage. Montes admitted "that she spied for the
Cuban government for 16 years" and acknowledged "that she had revealed the identities of four
American undercover intelligence officers and provided the Cuban authorities with reams of
other secret and top-secret military and intelligence information.... Under her plea bargain, Ms.
Montes will be sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment and 5 years' probation." See also, Neely
Tucker, "Defense Analyst Pleads Guilty to Spying for Cuba," Washington Post, 20 Mar. 2002,
A1.

  Tucker, Neely. "Spy for Cuba Sentenced to 25 Years." Washington Post, 17 Oct. 2002, B1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 16 October 2002, Ana Belen Montes was sentenced to 25 years in prison for spying for Cuba.
U.S. District Judge Ricardo M. Urbina "was unmoved" by a five-minute speech from the
"unapologetic ["I obeyed my conscience rather than the law," Montes said in court] spy who
used shortwave radios and encrypted transmissions to relay sensitive U.S. secrets to the Cuban
government."

 Carmichael, Scott W. True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes,
Cuba's Master Spy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007.

From publisher: The author "served as the lead case agent for the DIA on the Ana Montes
espionage investigation." Montes is "the only member of the intelligence community ever
convicted of espionage on behalf of the Cuban government."

Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), comments that "many of the details one would like to know -- just
when and how she was recruited, precisely what was it that made DIA security and the FBI think
she was an agent -- have been omitted, probably for security reasons.... There is more to be said
about the Montes case, but True Believer is a worthwhile start." For Gambone, I&NS 26.2&3
(Apr.-Jun. 2011), Carmichael offers "a fascinating story," but one handicapped by his inability
"to present evidence in support of his many assertions."

To Chesser, American Spectator, 3 Jul. 2007, this work "shows that catching spies within our
own intelligence structure is a painstaking process." The author, "as much as he is able..., walks
readers through each step of evidence gathering and case development, while illustrating the
challenges in convincing his higher-ups that Montes was a problem." Goldman, IJI&C 21.2
(Summer 2008), declares this to be "a bad book for many reasons." The author manages to tell us
more about himself than he does about Montes, replacing the presentation of facts with "what if
scenarios" for which "he provides no evidence or information."

Harter, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer-Fall 2007), finds "three glaring deficiencies" in this work:
"the author fails to fully portray the role of the FBI...; define the damage done by Montes'
espionage; and provide a meaningful explanation of her recruitment" by the Cubans. Although
the book "is a good overview," it "remains an incomplete treatment." For Prout, DIJ 16.2 (2007),
"aside from a glimpse at the bureaucratic organization of DIA, this book provides very little
'inside information'" on the Montes case. The author's "commentary on the modus operandi of
well trained professional espionage agents could have come from spy novels and Grade B
movies."

  Popkin, Jim. "Ana Montes Did Much Harm Spying for Cuba. Chances Are, You Haven't Heard
of Her." Washington Post, 18 Apr. 2013. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Former DIA analyst Ana Montes lives today "in a two-bunk cell in the highest-security women's
prison in the nation," the Federal Medical Center Carswell in Fort Worth. She "spied [for Cuba]
for 17 years, patiently, methodically," but years after she was caught spying, "Montes remains
defiant."

 Schoenberg, Tom. "Ex-State Department Lawyer Allegedly Recruited Cuban Spy." Bloomberg,
26 Apr. 2013. [http://www.bloomberg.com]

According to the Justice Department, "a nine-year-old indictment unsealed" on 25 April 2013 in
federal court in Washington,DC, charges former U.S. State Department lawyer Marta Rita
Velazquez "with one count of conspiracy to commit espionage." The indictment states that
Velazquez "introduced Ana Belen Montes to the Cuban Intelligence Service in 1984 and later
helped Montes get a position as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst." According to a Justice
Department statement, Velazquez "fled the U.S. 11 years ago and is living in Stockholm."

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                   Guantanamo Bay Suspects
As this multifaceted investigation played out, serious doubts exist about the nature of the
espionage allegations initially made against one or more of the individuals concerned.

Materials arranged chronologically.

  CNN. "Sources: Muslim Chaplain's Arrest Prompts U.S. Probe." 22 Sep. 2003.
[http://www.cnn.com]

Bush administration sources have said that "[a] military and intelligence investigation into
possible security breaches at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is under way
following the arrest of a U.S. Army Islamic chaplain." Capt. James Yee "has not been charged,
[but] is being held in the brig in Charleston, South Carolina, on suspicion of espionage and
treason."

  Vogel, Steve, and John Mintz. "Translator Accused of Spying: U.S. Airman Worked With
Guantanamo Detainees." Washington Post, 24 Sep. 2003, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to officials on 23 September 2003, Senior Airman Ahmad I. Halabi, "[a] U.S. Air
Force translator who worked with al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at the Guantanamo Bay
prison[,] has been charged with spying for Syria." Military authorities allege that Halabi
"attempted to deliver sensitive information to Syria, including more than 180 notes from
prisoners, a map of the installation, the movement of military aircraft to and from the base,
intelligence documents and the names and cellblock numbers of captives at the prison in Cuba."
See also, Rowan Scarborough and Steve Miller, "Airman Accused of Terror Spying,"
Washington Times, 24 Sep. 2003 and Eric Schmitt, "Airman Is Charged as Spy for Syria at
Guantanamo Camp," New York Times, 24 Sep. 2003.

 Starr, Barbara, and Terry Frieden. "Officials: Guantanamo Translator Arrested." CNN, 30 Sep.
2003. [http://www.cnn.com]

According to U.S. officials, Ahmed Mehalba, a civilian translator for the Titan Corporation who
worked at the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was arrested on 29 September 2003
"after immigration officials at Boston's Logan Airport found what are alleged to be classified
materials in his possession..... Mehalba is the third person arrested in what appears to be a
widening investigation of possible espionage at the base where suspected al Qaeda and Taliban
terrorists are held." See also, Neil A. Lewis, "Guantanamo Inquiry Widens as Civilian Translator
Is Held," New York Times, 1 Oct. 2003.

 CNN. "Officer Accused of Mishandling Intelligence Data; Colonel Assigned to Guantanamo
Faces Two Charges." 29 Nov. 2003. [http://www.cnn.com]
According to U.S. Central Command on 29 November 2003, Col. Jack Farr, "[a]n Army
intelligence officer assigned to a task force guarding al Qaeda and Taliban detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been charged with improperly handling classified material and lying
to investigators probing the alleged security breach."

 Lewis, Neil A., and Thom Shanker. "Missteps Seen in Muslim Chaplain's Spy Case." New York
Times, 4 Jan. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"First held on suspicion of being part of an espionage ring, Captain [James J.] Yee, 35, was in
the end charged with the far less serious crime of mishandling classified information. He was
also eventually charged with adultery and keeping pornography on his government computer,
both violations of military law."

  Lewis, Neil A. "Charges Dropped against Chaplain." New York Times, 20 Mar. 2004.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

A statement released from U.S. Southern Command in Miami on 19 March 2004 says that the
military is "dropping all charges, including one of mishandling classified information, against
Capt. James J. Yee, the former Muslim chaplain at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba."

 Lane, Charles. "Air Force Spy Trial to Proceed Despite Modified Evidence." Washington Post,
12 Sep. 2004, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

With a military espionage trial against Senior Airman Ahmad al Halabi, a former Air Force
translator at the U.S. military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, ready to begin on 14 September
2004, the Air Force acknowledged last week "that only one of the more than 200 documents it
had accused ... Halabi of plotting to smuggle into Syria was classified.

"The concession is the latest government retrenchment in a series of cases that last year led
investigators to suspect a possible spy ring at the prison..., and resulted in the arrests of two U.S.
servicemen and a contract translator, all of them Muslim. Earlier this year, the government
dropped all charges against Capt. James Yee, a Muslim Army chaplain.... A third man, Ahmed
Fathy Mehalba, a former civilian translator at Guantanamo Bay, faces trial in a Boston federal
court."

 Golden, Tim. "How Dubious Evidence Spurred Relentless Guantánamo Spy Hunt." New York
Times, 19 Dec. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"[C]onfidential government documents, court files and interviews show that the investigations"
into suspicious behavior by a Muslim chaplain and others at the Guantánamo prison "drew
significantly on questionable evidence and disparate bits of information that ... linked Captain
[James J.] Yee tenuously to people suspected of being Muslim militants in the United States and
abroad."

  Finer, Jonathan. "Interpreter Pleads Guilty to Taking Data." Washington Post, 11 Jan. 2005, A6.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 10 January 2005, Ahmed F. Mehalba, a former civilian interpreter at the U.S. military prison
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, pleaded guilty to "lying to government agents and removing
classified documents....

"Mehalba ... was one of four people accused of security breaches at the Guantanamo Bay
detention facility.... Ahmad I. Halabi, an Air Force senior airman who had served as an
interpreter..., pleaded guilty to four lesser crimes. Army Capt. James Yee, a Muslim chaplain,...
was found guilty only of minor administrative charges of adultery and storing pornography on a
government computer. And in September, the Army dropped charges against Reserve Col. Jackie
Duane Farr, an intelligence officer who was accused of trying to remove classified documents."

         Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                             Donald W. Keyser
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Lichtblau, Eric, and David E. Sanger. "State Dept. Official Arrested in Inquiry on Taiwan
Contact." New York Times, 16 Sep. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to law enforcement and intelligence officials, Donald W. Keyser, a former "ranking
official on East Asian affairs" at the State Department, was arrested on 15 September 2004. He is
"charged with concealing a trip to Taiwan, and is suspected of improperly passing documents to
Taiwanese intelligence agents.... F.B.I. agents in the bureau's Washington field office are
investigating the case as possible espionage." See also, Jerry Markon, "Powell Aide Gave
Papers to Taiwan, FBI Says," Washington Post, 16 Sep. 2004, A1.

 Morello, Carol. "Arrest Shocks Former State Department Colleagues: Highly Regarded Expert
on Asia Is Accused of Passing Documents and Taking Secret Trip to Taiwan." Washington Post,
17 Sep. 2004, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to an affidavit filed on 15 September 2004 in U.S. District Court in Alexandria,
Donald W. Keyser "was released on $500,000 bond on a charge of lying about [a] trip to Taiwan
on an official government document." The affidavit "said that Keyser made the unsanctioned trip
after official visits to China and Japan and that he met" a Taiwanese agent, "a 33-year-old
woman, in Taipei."

 Waterman, Shaun. "U.S. Diplomat Pleads to Secrecy Charges." United Press International, 12
Dec. 2005. [http://www.upi.com]
Donald Keyser pleaded guilty on 12 December 2005 "to mishandling classified documents and
lying about his relationship with a Taiwanese intelligence officer." He is scheduled for
sentencing in February 2006. According to a plea agreement, Keyser had a personal relationship
between 2002 and 2004 with "Isabelle Cheng, an employee of [Taiwan's] espionage agency, the
National Intelligence Bureau."

  Lefebvre, Stéphane. "The Case of Donald Keyser and Taiwan's National Security Bureau."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 512-526.

This article furnishes a quick walkthrough of the Keyser case. Lefebvre's conclusion is that
"Keyser seems to have been a target of opportunity who presented himself vulnerably due to his
infatuation with Cheng. Or did Isabelle Cheng purposefully target him after spotting his fondness
for her?"

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents



             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                          Chi Mak and Family
Materials presented chronologically.

  U.S. Department of Justice. "Press Release: Three Charged with Acting as Foreign Agents for
the People's Republic of China" 15 Nov. 2005.
[http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel05/china111505.htm -- not found 7/20/08]

On 15 November 2005, a federal grand jury in Los Angeles indicted Chi Mak; his wife, Rebecca
Laiwah Chiu; and his brother, Tai Wang Mak, "on charges of acting as agents of a foreign
government without prior notification" to the U.S. Attorney General. "According to the affidavit
in support of the criminal complaint, Chi Mak was an engineer for ... Power Paragon. Allegedly,
Chi Mak transferred data relating to a sensitive government project to his home, where his wife
assisted him in copying the information onto CDs. Chi Mak delivered the CDs to his brother,
who encrypted the information and ... allegedly planned to travel to the PRC to deliver the
information."

  U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Los Angeles Division. "Press
Release: Charges Brought Against Mother and Son for Acting as Agents of a Foreign
Government." 7 Jun. 2006. [http://losangeles.fbi.gov/pressrel/2006/la060706.htm -- not found
3/8/09]

On 7 June 2006, Fuk Heung Li and her son, Billy Yui Mak, "were indicted ... by a grand jury on
charges of lying to the government and acting as agents" of the PRC. The two are respectively
the wife and son of Tai Mak, charged in November 2005 "with failing to register as an agent of a
foreign government."

  U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Los Angeles Division. "Press
Release: Five Family Members Face New Charges of Conspiring to Export U.S. Defense
Articles to China and Lying to Federal Investigators." 25 Oct. 2006.
[http://losangeles.fbi.gov/pressrel/2006/la102506.htm -- not found 3/8/09]

On 25 October 2006, a federal grand jury added a superseding indictment against five family
members previously charged with acting as agents of the PRC. The indictment "adds counts of
conspiracy to export [U.S.] defense articles to China, attempted and actual export of [U.S.]
defense articles to China, possession of property in aid of a foreign government and making false
statements" to federal investigators. "Court documents ... allege that unidentified co-conspirators
from the PRC provided Chi Mak with tasking lists that requested specific defense information,
including sensitive areas of U.S. Naval research concerning nuclear-powered submarines."

  Marquez, Jeremiah. "Engineer on Trial Over Military Secrets." Associated Press, 28 Mar. 2007.
[http://www.washingonpost.com]

Chi Mak, a Chinese-American engineer at defense contractor Power Paragon, went on trial on 28
March 2007 "on charges that he stole information on U.S. military technology for two decades to
send to China."

 CNN. "Engineer Guilty of Trying to Leak U.S. Military Secrets." Associated Press, 10 May
2007. [http://www.cnn.com]

On 10 May 2007, jurors in Santa Ana, California, convicted Chi Mak "of conspiring to export
U.S. defense technology to China, including data on an electronic propulsion system that could
make submarines virtually undetectable." He was also "found guilty of being an unregistered
foreign agent, attempting to violate export control laws and making false statements to the FBI....
Mak faces up to 35 years in prison when he is sentenced September 10."

  Associated Press. "Engineer's Kin Admits to Aiding in Espionage." 4 Jun. 2007.
[http://www.ap.org]

"Authorities say three relatives" of Chinese-born engineer Chi Mak, "convicted of attempting to
export U.S. defense technology to China[,] have pleaded guilty to their roles in the conspiracy.
Chi Mak's brother Tai Mak, Tai Mak's wife, Fuk Li, and the couple's son, Yui 'Billy' Mak were
set to stand trial in Santa Ana [on 5 June 2007]. Chi Mak's wife, Rebecca Laiwah Chiu, is still
scheduled to face similar charges."

  Flaccus, Gillian. "Engineer Gets 24 1/2 Years in Prison." Associated Press, 24 Mar. 2008.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Chinese-born engineer Chi Mak "was sentenced [on 24 March 2008] to 24 1/2 years in federal
prison" for conspiring to export U.S. defense technology to China.
"Mak's wife, Rebecca Laiwah Chiu, pleaded guilty last year ... to one count of acting as a foreign
agent without registering with the U.S. government. She is serving three years in federal prison
and will be deported upon release. His brother, Tai Mak, pleaded guilty last year to conspiring to
violate export control laws in exchange for a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison. Tai Mak's
wife, Fuk Li, pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the violation of export control laws and
received three years of probation. Yui 'Billy' Mak, the son of Tai Mak and Fuk Li, pleaded guilty
to aiding and abetting the violation of export control laws and was sentenced to time already
served. The three will also be deported."

  Associated Press. "10-year Term for Trying to Bring Military Secrets to China." 21 Apr. 2008.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Tai Mak, the younger brother of Chi Mak, "was sentenced to 10 years in federal prison [on 21
April 2008] in his family's conspiracy to export military technology to China."

 Lefebvre, Stéphane. "The PRC's Compromise of U.S. Government Information and
Technologies." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter
2009): 652-666.

The author looks at three cases: The Mak family; Bergersen, and Roth/Sherman. He also
explores the difficulties of trying to catch Chinese spies.

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
 Walter Kendall Myers & Gwendolyn Myers
Materials arranged chronologically.

  Sullivan, Andy. "Ex-U.S. State Official, Wife Face Cuba Spy Charges." Reuters, 5 Jun. 2009.
[http://www.reuters.com]

The Justice Department said on 5 June 2009 that Walter Kendall Myers, a former U.S. State
Department official, and his wife Gwendolyn Myers "have been arrested for spying for the
Cuban government for nearly 30 years." The two have "pleaded not guilty."

  Sheridan, Mary Beth, and Del Quentin Wilber. "A Slow Burn Becomes a Raging Fire: Disdain
for U.S. Policies May Have Led to Alleged Spying for Cuba." Washington Post, 7 Jun. 2009.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The State Department and intelligence community are investigating how much damage the
alleged spying" of Walter Kendall Myers and Gwendolyn Myers "may have done. Myers had
worked as a European political expert for more than 20 years at the State Department, and had
been associated with its Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1988 until his retirement in
2007."

  Courson, Paul. "Cuban Spy Suspects Select Attorneys." CNN, 17 Jun. 2009.
[http://www.cnn.com]

On 17 June 2009, U.S. District Judge Reginald Walton "questioned a decision" by Walter
Kendall Myers and Gwendolyn Myers "to use the same lawyers to fight" charges of "conspiracy
to act as illegal agents of the Cuban government, wire fraud and providing classified information
to Havana.... The couple said they want the same defense team... The judge accepted that they
understood their decision."

 Gentile, Carmen. "Cuban Spies' Shortwave Radios Go Undetected." Washington Times, 18 Jun.
2009. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]

Walter Kendall Myers, a retired State Department officer, and his wife, Gwendolyn, "who are
accused of spying for Cuba appear to have avoided capture for 30 years because their
communications with the Caribbean island were too low-tech to be detected by sophisticated U.S.
monitors." According to a Justice Department affidavit, "they told an FBI agent posing as a
Cuban intelligence officer that they received orders from Cuba's intelligence services over
shortwave radio."

 Wilber, Del Quentin. "Former U.S. official, Wife Admit to 30 Years of Spying for Cuba."
Washington Post, 21 Nov. 2009. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Former State Department official Walter K. Myers and his wife, Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers,
"admitted in federal court [on 20 November 2009] that they spied for Cuba over the past three
decades." Myers "pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit espionage and wire fraud," and "faces a
mandatory sentence of life in prison." His wife "pleaded guilty to conspiring to gather and
transmit national defense information," and faces a sentence of 6 to 7 1/2 years. "Under the plea
deal, the couple agreed to forfeit $1.7 million, the total of Myers's salary over the years, in cash
and property to the U.S. government."

 Cratty, Carol. "Former State Department Official Sentenced to Life for Spying for Cuba." CNN,
16 Jul. 2010. [http://www.cnn.com]

On 16 July 2010, former State Department official Walter Kendall Myers was sentenced to life
in prison for spying for Cuba. His wife and partner in spying, Gwendolyn Steingraber Myers,
"received a sentence of six years and nine months, but will get credit for more than a year
already served.... Myers' life sentence does not include the possibility of parole."

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents
         Return to State Department




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                       Richard William Miller
A contemporaneous account of the Miller case can be found in William Overend's articles
in the Los Angeles Times of 24 October 1985, 7 November 1985, and 15 July 1986.

 Howe, Russell Warren. Sleeping with the FBI: Sex, Booze, Russians and the Saga of an
American Counterspy Who Couldn't. Washington, DC.: National Press Books, 1993.

       Surveillant 2.6 believes this book "gives far more credibility" to Miller's "'investigation'
       of the KGB than probably ever existed (until he was caught)." Harter, FILS 12.6,
       comments that the book has "no footnotes, endnotes, nor bibliography.... The KGB seems
       omnipresent, while the FBI is represented as bungling in comparison.... [I]nformed ...
       opinion on this operation ... is not evident." There are also other errors.

 Verbitsky, Anatole, and Dick Adler. Sleeping with Moscow: The Authorized Account of the
KGB's Bungled Infiltration of the FBI by Two of the Soviet Union's Most Unlikely Operatives.
New York: Shapolsky, 1987.




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         Return to Russia - Soviet Spies

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                          Edward Lee Howard
Edward Lee Howard, 50, died in Moscow on 12 July 2002. Pincus, Washington Post, 21 Jul.
2002, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost. com]

 Eringer, Robert. RUSE: Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2008.

According to Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), this work
concerns the author's activities with the FBI to lure Edward Lee Howard back to the United
States, where he could be arrested for espionage. In terms of documentation, it "falls squarely in
the 'trust me' category" and "struggles to attain mediocrity."

 Howard, Edward Lee. Safe House: The Compelling Memoirs of the Only CIA Spy to Seek
Asylum in Russia. Bethesda, MD: National Press Books, 1995.

Surveillant 14.1 notes that Howard does not say whether he gave the Soviets secrets after he fled
the United States. He "describes a purported clandestine return to the U.S. in 1986,... [and]
describes meeting a Soviet mole ... working for the U.S. government who remains hidden today
and implies that there are others.... Those who believe Howard's account of this trip can
generally be recognized by the number of deeds they carry announcing ownership in various
bridges." The bottomline: "His story, such as it is, is old hat. He reveals nothing new in the way
of fact although he does embellish the known events to rationalize his persecution complex. It all
adds up to boredom squared."

According to Valcourt, IJI&C 9.1, Howard's book is "an attempt to secure a favorable place for
himself in the pantheon of intelligence operatives. Painting himself as a victim of surly
bureaucrats..., Howard offers little of substance to sustain his innocence." Safe House mixes
"bravado, fable, and whimpering" and will become a "mostly forgotten work" by someone who
was not nearly as significant as originally thought. Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008), refers to
Howard's book as "a forgettable and largely fantasy memoir."

Chambers: "Howard does himself few favors with this book. From his drug use in the Peace
Corps to his defection and to the time he nearly gets repatriated by an enthusiastic Soviet guard,
he makes one dumb decision after another.... When he isn't being silly, Howard is being
disingenuous. He admits that he did give information to the KGB, but claims that it can't have
done any harm as such information is ephemeral.... The style is clear, but flat....

"Howard expresses a considerable dislike for David Wise's book about him, claiming to have
been misquoted a number of times. However, Wise ... did take the time to find out more about
the CIA's treatment of Howard after the firing than Howard tells us about and he shows a level of
detachment from the case that allows useful lessons to be drawn. It is recommended over this
offering." For Chambers' full review, CLICK here.

 Newsweek [Evan Thomas, et al.]. "Deadly Mole." 7 Mar. 1994, 24-29.
Includes sidebar: "The Decade of the Spy," pp. 26-27; and associated stories: Michael Elliott,
"Why Russia Continues to Torment America," pp. 28-29; Dorinda Elliott, with Yevgenia Albats,
"Back at KGB Headquarters," p. 29; David Wise, "The Spy Who Didn't Get Away," p. 30 [on
Edward Lee Howard]; Jonathan Alter, "Not-So-Smart Intelligence," p. 31.

  Peake, Hayden B. "Risks of Recruitment." Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 6, no. 6 (1988):
8-10.

 Pincus, Walter. "CIA Defector Edward Lee Howard Said to Have Died in Moscow."
Washington Post, 21 Jul. 2002, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Edward Lee Howard, the former CIA case officer who escaped to Moscow in September 1985
after coming under suspicion as a spy for the Soviet Union, died there [12 July 2002,] according
to a family friend."

 Wise, David.

1. "The Spy Who Got Away." New York Times Magazine, 2 Nov. 1986, 30.

2. The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard, The CIA Agent Who
Betrayed His Country's Secrets and Escaped to Moscow. New York: Random House, 1988. New
York: Avon, 1988. [pb]

Chambers recommends this work over Howard's Safe House. Maas, NYT (12 Jun. 1988),
suggests that whatever the author "lacks stylistically, he is a reporter of impeccable credentials....
Certainly his version of the events pertaining to ... Edward Lee Howard ... is as good as we can
expect to get."

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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                             Larry Wu-tai Chin
After working for the U.S. military in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Larry Wu-tai Chin
was employed by the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) as a Chinese-
language translator at its overseas installation in Okinawa. Chin later resigned and
immigrated to the United States. After obtaining his U.S. citizenship, Chin was rehired by
FBIS as a staff employee. He worked with Chinese-language materials in that organization
until his retirement in 1981. Arrested in 1985, Chin was tried and convicted of espionage on
behalf of the People's Republic of China, conspiracy, and tax fraud. He committed suicide
in February 1986.

Materials presented chronologically.

  Pichirallo, Joe. "Ex-CIA Analyst Gave Secrets to China for 30 Years: FBI Details Its Case
against Chin." Washington Post, 24 Nov. 1985, A1, A24.

 Shenon, Philip. "Former C.I.A. Analyst Is Arrested and Accused of Spying for China." New
York Times, 24 Nov. 1985, A1, A31.

 Perl, Peter. "Chin's 'Good Fortune' Debated." Washington Post, 25 Nov. 1985, A16.

 Engelberg, Stephen. "30 Years of Spying for China Is Charged." New York Times, 27 Nov.
1985, B8.

 Pichirallo, Joe. "Retiree Kept Close CIA Ties." Washington Post, 27 Nov. 1985, A1, A10.

 Marcus, Ruth. "Accused Spy Used Hong Kong Banks." Washington Post, 28 Nov. 1985, A26.

 Toner, Robin. "Bail Denied Ex-CIA Worker in China Spy Case." New York Times, 28 Nov.
1985, B8.

 Wines, Michael. "Bigger Role Laid to Suspected Spy." Los Angeles Times, 28 Nov. 1985, 1, 10.

 Marcus, Ruth, and Joe Pichirallo. "Chin Believed Planted in U.S. as Spy." Washington Post, 6
Dec. 1985, A1, A22.

 Shenon, Philip. "U.S. Says Spy Suspect Had Access to Highly Classified Data." New York
Times, 3 Jan. 1986, A12.

 Murphy, Caryle. "Top CIA Official Gives Chin Jurors a Lesson in Intelligence Gathering."
Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1986, A32.

John Stein testifies at Larry Chin's trial.

  Murphy, Caryle. "Accused Spy Says He Meant to Promote U.S. China Ties." Washington Post,
7 Feb. 1986, A11.

 Engelberg, Stephen. "Ex-CIA Aide Convicted in Spy Case." New York Times, 8 Feb. 1986, 8.

 Murphy, Caryle. "Jury Convicts Chin of Spying for Chinese." Washington Post, 8 Feb. 1986,
A11.
 Murphy, Caryle. "Chin: Nothing to Regret." Washington Post, 11 Feb. 1986, A5.

 Engelberg, Stephen. "Spy for China Found Suffocated in Prison, Apparently a Suicide." New
York Times, 22 Feb. 1986, 1, 7.

 Murphy, Caryle. "Spy Larry Chin Dies in Apparent Suicide." Washington Post, 22 Feb. 1986,
A1, A6.

 Murphy, Caryle. "Chin's Death Ruled a Suicide." Washington Post, 23 Feb. 1986, A10.

 Murphy, Caryle. "Chin's Last Letter to Wife Ordinary Note, Son Says." Washington Post, 25
Feb. 1986, B5.

 Wines, Michael. "Spy Reportedly Unmasked by China Defector." Los Angeles Times, 5 Sep.
1986, 1, 12.

 Allen, Thomas B., and Norman Polmar. Merchants of Treason: America's Secrets for Sale.
New York: Delacorte, 1988. New York: Dell, 1988. [pb]

       Petersen says Merchants of Treason is "an important survey of spy cases since 1968 that
       is critical of U.S. counterintelligence as ineffective." Chambers comments that the book
       "seems to be aimed at the general reader"; it is "well crafted." For Lowenthal, the work
       is "[m]arred by a somewhat breathless and hyperbolic journalistic prose." According to
       Kuntzman, IJI&C 6.2, Allen and Polmar present an "excellent compilation of the spy
       stories that ... made headlines" during the 1980s. The Walker case takes up about half of
       the book. "There is little different, however, between John D. Barron's Breaking the Ring
       and ... Merchants of Treason." Bell, Pollard, Harper, Wu-Tai Chin, and Pelton are also
       covered.

 Barron, John. "Tracking China's Master Spy." Reader's Digest, Dec. 1989, 97-99.

       This title is a bit much, even for Reader's Digest; John Barron should have known better.
       Larry Chin may have been the only PRC spy ever found in the CIA, but a "master spy"
       he was not.

 Safire, William. "I Remember Larry." New York Times, 2 Jan. 1997, A19.

       In the midst of President Clinton's Asian money flap, Safire recalls the role of Larry Wu-
       tai Chin, the former CIA employee who was arrested in 1985 and convicted of espionage
       on behalf of the PRC. Safire suggests that China is certainly interested in learning U.S.
       trade secrets and in influencing U.S. trade policy.

 Chin, Cathy. Death of My Husband: Larry Wu-Tai Chin. Taipei, Taiwan: Tunghwang, 1998.
[Hoffman, "Selected Bibliography," p. 287]

 Stein, Jacob A. Legal Spectator and More. Washington, DC: Magazine Group, 2003.
Stein was Larry Wu-Tai Chin's defense attorney.

 Hoffman, Tod. The Spy Within: Larry Chin and China's Penetration of the CIA. Hanover, NH:
Steerforth, 2008.

Clark comment: When you peel away from this book the extravagant rhetoric and the over use
of "he must have..." guesses at what an individual felt in a given situation, you have a decent
feature article for the Sunday magazines of the New York Times or Washington Post. Admittedly,
the straightforward recitation of what is known about the Chin spy case might not seem
sufficiently exciting to warrant attention more than 20 years after the exposure of the "only
known example of a Chinese penetration operation," (p. 143) so some bulking up of the story
may have been necessary. From the thrust of his narrative, it seems clear that Hoffman received
the bulk of his "inside" information from FBI-associated sources; probably as a consequence,
there are some small errors of understanding when he touches on CIA-related matters. This is not
a bad read; you simply must wade through too much extraneous stuff to get to the meat of the
author's tale.

Goulden, Washington Times, 14 Dec. 2008, says that the author's expertise in Chinese
counterintelligence "is obvious." This book is "a textbook read on how tenacious FBI agents put
together bits and pieces of evidence to make an unbeatable court case." To Peake, Studies 52.4
(Dec. 2008), this "is a well-told story about a spy who beat the security system and couldn't resist
telling the FBI how he did it." Brazil, Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), sees this as "a
good read and an invaluable look at a major espionage case," although details that are
"imagined" leave the reader wondering what is going on. See also Brazil's review in INS 25.3
(Jun. 2010).

For McGovern, McGill Daily, 3 Nov. 2008, the author "excels in painting an insightful picture
of Chinese culture and history, the roots of which shaped their spies and their methods of
gathering intelligence.... Hoffman is a skilled writer and definitely succeeds in producing a page-
turner." Kappler, Gazette (Montreal), 13 Sep. 2008, finds that this "book tells us as much as
we'll ever know about Larry Chin, probably. Yet it also illustrates the limitations of the genre --
which Hoffman admits in a preface: In real life, 'spies are ghosts' and 'the mystery is never
absolutely resolved.' We're left wanting to know more about what drove Chin."

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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            The Ames Spy Case
                                    Table of Contents

CIA intelligence officer Aldrich Hazen Ames and his wife, Rosario Ames, were arrested 21
February 1994. Ames was charged with providing classified information to the Soviet KGB
and its successor service, the Russian Ministry of Security for the Russian Federation
(SVR), over a nine-year period.

"From 1983 to 1985, Ames had been assigned to the counterintelligence unit in the agency's
Soviet/East European Division, where he was responsible for directing the analysis of
Soviet intelligence operations. In this capacity he would have known about any penetration
of the Soviet military or the KGB.... According to court documents, Ames' information
allowed the Russians to close down at least 100 intelligence operations and led to the
execution of the agents in Russia that he betrayed....

"Ames reportedly received up to $2.5 million from the Russians over this period of time....
A search of Ames' office uncovered 144 classified intelligence reports not related to his
current assignment in CIA's Counternarcotics Center. He provided the Soviets, and later
the Russians, with the identities of ten US clandestine agents (at least nine of whom were
executed), the identities of many US agents run against the Russians, methods of double
agent operations and communications, details on US counterintelligence operations,
identities of CIA and other intelligence personnel, technical collection activities, analytic
techniques, and intelligence reports, arms control papers, and the cable traffic of several
federal departments.

"On 28 April 1994, Aldrich Ames and his wife pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit
espionage and to evading taxes. Ames was immediately sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole. Under a plea agreement, Maria Rosario Ames was sentenced to five years
and three months in prison for conspiring to commit espionage and evading taxes on $2.5
million obtained by her husband for his illegal activities." U.S. Department of Defense,
Defense Security Service, Espionage Cases, 1975-2004: Summaries and Sources (Monterey,
CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2004).

Text of the "Abstract" of the CIA Inspector General's Report of Investigation, dated 21
October 1994, is available at: http://www.loyola.edu/departments/academics/political-
science/strategic-intelligence/intel/hitzrept.html. This site also has other materials dealing
with the Ames spy case.

The place to begin in trying to understand the Ames case is Arthur S. Hulnick, "The Ames
Case: HOW Could It Happen?" International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 133-154.

 Reportage on Ames Case (To 1999)

 Developments from 2000

 Books on Ames Case:
 A-F

 G-Z

 Fallout from the Ames Case:

 1994

 1995-1996

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                             Edwin Earl Pitts

On 18 December 1996, Edwin Earl Pitts, 43, a 13-year veteran of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, was charged at a court hearing in Alexandria, Virginia, with attempted
espionage, conspiracy to commit espionage, and lesser counts. Pitts allegedly sold secrets to
the Soviet Union and Russia from 1987 to 1992 in exchange for more than $224,000. Pitts
pleaded guilty to espionage charges on 30 April 1997. On 23 June 1997, he was sentenced to
27 years in prison.

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Reid, Alice. "Espionage Suspect Denies Charges." Washington Post, 31 Dec. 1996, A10.

 Pincus, Walter. "In Espionage Case of Suspect FBI Agent, Questions of Motivation."
Washington Post, 2 Jan. 1997, A6.

 Hall, Charles W., and Walter Pincus. "Spy Suspects Refusing to Go Quietly." Washington Post,
23 Jan. 1997, A9.

Robert C. Kim, Harold Nicholson, Earl Edwin Pitts cases.
 Hall, Charles W. "Spy Suspect Admits Guilt; Second to Do So." Washington Post, 1 Mar. 1997,
A1, A15. "Dear KGB: The Film Is in the Milk Carton." Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 10 Mar. 1997, 35.

       Pitts pleaded guilty to two counts of espionage on 28 February 1997. According to a
       court document, the evidence against Pitts included a computer disk with a February
       1990 letter to the KGB on it. The letter was devastating to any plans to offer an
       entrapment defense. See also, Bill Gertz, "FBI Agent Pleads Guilty to Spying,"
       Washington Times, 1 Mar. 1997, A1, A4; and Neil A. Lewis, "Ex-F.B.I. Supervisor
       Pleads Guilty to Espionage," New York Times, 1 Mar. 1997, A9.

 Masters, Brooke A. "Ex-FBI Agent Gets 27 Years for Passing Secrets to Moscow."
Washington Post, 24 Jun. 1997, A2.

See also, Washington Times, "Ex-FBI Agent Gets 27 Years for Spying for Soviets, Russia," 24
Jun. 1997, A7.

 Risen, James. "Jailed Agent Says He Voiced Suspicion about Spy Suspect." New York Times,
28 May 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Interviewed at the federal prison in Ashland, KY, where he is serving a 27-year sentence for
spying for Moscow, Earl Pitts said that he told FBI investigators in June 1997 "that he knew of
suspicious activity by his fellow agent Robert P. Hanssen that indicated he might also be
spying."

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            Squillacote, Strand, and Clark

The conviction of Squillacote, Strand, and Clark on espionage charges was aided by the
existence in CIA hands of "the complete original files from East Germany's foreign spy
operations." Walter Pincus, "Cold War Footnote: CIA Obtained East Germany's Foreign
Spy Files," Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1998, A2. Click for reporting on the Stasi files.

Materials presented chronologically.
 Weiner, Tim. "3 Onetime Campus Radicals Held in Spy Case." New York Times, 7 Oct. 1997,
A1, A16 (N).

"Three onetime student radicals at the University of Wisconsin were charged [on 6 Oct. 1997]
with spying for communist intelligence services since the 1970s." See also, Brooke A. Masters
and Peter Finn, "Three Former Leftists Held in Va. on Espionage Charges," Washington Post, 7
Oct. 1997, A1, A14; and Brooke A. Masters, "Friends Knew Alleged Spies as Neighborhood
Activists," Washington Post, 8 Oct. 1997, B1, B7.

 Gertz, Bill. "Ideology Spurred Spy Suspects to Carry on After Cold War." Washington Times, 8
Oct. 1997, A3.

 Pincus, Walter. "FBI Finds Leads in Files of Former East German Spy Service." Washington
Post, 11 Oct. 1997, A22.

 Weiner, Tim. "Spies Just Wouldn't Come in from Cold War, Files Show." New York Times, 15
Oct. 1997, A1, A11 (N).

This report reinforces the portrait of the three campus-radicals-turned-spies as ideologically
motivated. Stand was recruited in his teens by his father, an East German intelligence officer
who emigrated to New York, and he in turn recruited his wife, Squillacote. The leads to the three
came from East German intelligence that made their way into American hands after the Cold
War ended.

 New York Times. "Bail Ruled Out for 3 Accused Spies." 23 Oct. 1997, A14.

  Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Red Diaper Babies." Dec. 1997.
[http://www.nacic.gov]

"Theresa Marie Squillacote, 39, was a senior staff attorney in the office of the Deputy
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform until January 1997.... Prior to her Pentagon
assignment, Squillacote worked for the House Armed Services Committee....

"Kurt Alan Stand, 42, was a regional representative of the International Union of Food,
Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers Association.... He
recruited Squillacote about the time he married her in 1980.

"James Michael Clark, 49, a private investigator from Falls Church, Virginia, once worked for a
defense contractor at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in Boulder, Colorado, and had access to
classified information on chemical warfare."

 Masters, Brooke A. "Couple, Friend Indicted in Spy Case." Washington Post, 18 Feb. 1998, A4.

  Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Wiretaps Upheld in Spy Case." Sep. 1998.
[http://www.nacic.gov]
U.S. District Judge Claude Hilton "has refused to suppress evidence collected during a six-day
search" of the D.C. home of alleged spies Theresa Maria Squillacote and Kurt Stand. He also
"said that extensive wiretaps of their conversations were legally authorized. Defense attorneys
had argued that FBI agents ... had violated the terms of the search warrant, which restricted the
search to certain hours." The judge "said that FBI agents present after those hours were necessary
to secure the house. He also rejected a bid for a 'taint hearing' after defense attorneys argued that
agents used wiretaps to gather information that is protected by psychotherapist and marital
privileges."

  Masters, Brooke A. "Prosecutor in Spy Case Describes A Life of Self-Serving Treachery,
Defense Attorney Calls Charges Overblown as Trial Begins." Washington Post, 8 Oct. 1998.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Theresa Maria Squillacote and Kurt Alan Stand "conspired to spy for East Germany, the Soviet
Union, Russia and South Africa over the course of more than 20 years," Assistant U.S. Attorney
Randy I. Bellows stated at the opening of the couple's federal court trial on 7 October 1998.
Squillacote's attorney, Lawrence S. Robbins, "has said that the FBI illegally enticed his client
into breaking the law."

  Washington Post. "Ex-Associate Testifies Against Spy Suspects." 16 Oct. 1998, B9.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

A couple "charged with conspiring to spy for East Germany told a friend that they had received
training in using miniature cameras and deciphering Morse code sent by radio from Cuba, the
friend testified [on 15 October 1998]. But James Michael Clark also testified in U.S. District
Court that Theresa Maria Squillacote and Kurt Alan Stand did not tell him that they had
photographed specific documents. Clark, 50, has already pleaded guilty in the case."

  Masters, Brooke A. "Spy Denies Working With Couple: Witness Says He Passed Documents
Without Defendants' Help." Washington Post, 17 Oct. 1998, B8.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Admitted spy James Michael Clark testified [on 16 October 1998] that he had passed two dozen
classified documents to East Germany on his own but that he never conspired with a District
couple on trial for espionage.... Clark told the 15-member jury panel that [Kurt Alan] Stand
introduced him to an East German, who in turn put him in touch with Lothar Ziemer, who
became his longtime spymaster. He said Stand and [Theresa Maria] Squillacote had told him that
they had received much of the same training in spycraft and met many of the same East
Germans."

  Hopper, Dale. "Lawyer, Husband Convicted of Spying." Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 Oct. 1998.
[http://www.phillynews.com]

Theresa Squillacote and Kurt Stand were convicted on 23 October 1998 of spying for the Soviet
bloc. They could get life in prison.
 Masters, Brooke A. "Husband and Wife Sentenced for Espionage." Washington Post, 23 Jan.
1999, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 22 January 1999, Theresa Maria Squillacote and Kurt Alan Stand were sentenced "to 21 and
17 years in prison, respectively, for spying for East Germany." A report in Counterintelligence
News and Developments, "Red Diaper Babies Sentenced," Mar. 1999, notes that these sentences
were "the minimum required under federal sentencing guidelines."

  Robbins, Lawrence S. "[Letters:] Heed the Evidence." Washington Post, 12 Feb. 1999, A34.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"As lead counsel for Theresa Squillacote,... I write to correct the serious misimpression created
by ... The Post's account of the sentencing.... In fact, the government never even charged Terry
with 'obtain[ing] secrets for East Germany,' nor was there the slightest evidence that she ever did
so. Rather, the evidence showed that, through an elaborate sting operation, the government
managed to induce Terry to provide four classified documents to an undercover FBI agent
(posing, not as an East German, but as a South African)."

  Associated Press. "Convicted Spies Lose Court Appeal." 16 Apr. 2001.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 16 April 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court, without comment, turned away the appeal of the
"convicted husband-and-wife team of Marxist spies," Theresa M. Squillacote and Kurt A. Stand.

 Aftergood, Steven. "Supreme Court Rebuffs FISA Challenge." Secrecy News (from the FAS
Project on Government Secrecy), 23 Apr. 2001. [http://www.fas.org]

With regard to the U.S. Supreme Court's dismissal of the Squillacote-Stand appeal, Aftergood
notes that "the FBI requested and received 20 separate FISA authorizations for surveillance"
during the Squillacote-Stand investigation. Their attorneys "were never permitted to see the
underlying documentation that the government used to justify the surveillance." The government
said that "all required procedures were followed at all times,... that access to the FISA
applications by the defendants' attorneys was correctly denied on national security grounds[,] ...
that the investigation and prosecution of Squillacote and Stand survived multiple layers of
judicial review and that their conviction was upheld on appeal."




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     CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                                        Stasi Files
                                          1998 - 2000s

Materials presented chronologically.

 Theurmer, Angus MacLean. "My Stasi File: Tattered Cloak, Not Much Dagger." Christian
Science Monitor, 13 Jul. 1998, 11.

See T. Rees Shapiro, "Angus Thuermer dies at 92; former journalist, CIA official,"
Washington Post, 9 May 2010, C8.

The author was CIA chief of base in West Berlin from 1975 to 1978. He wrote to the West
German office in charge of old East German intelligence documents, and received his Stasi file --
18 pages of tailing reports. He was still waiting for his FBI file.

 Pincus, Walter. "Cold War Footnote: CIA Obtained East Germany's Foreign Spy Files."
Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1998, A2. "CIA to Germany: What Spy Files?" Washington Post
National Weekly Edition, 30 Nov. 1998, 17.

"[T]he complete original files from East Germany's foreign spy operations, including the true
identities of its thousands of agents,... are in the possession" of the CIA "and are stored at the
agency's Langley headquarters.... Sources ... said the files were obtained after the fall of East
Germany's communist government. They had been removed from Stasi offices in Berlin well
before the Berlin Wall fell by members of the East German clandestine service....

"[R]ecords from the files were used in the espionage trial in Virginia of Theresa Marie
Squillacote and Kurt Alan Stand.... In an affidavit, FBI special agent Katharine G. Alleman said
she had 'inspected copies of certain HVA file records and I have been provided information
concerning other HVA file records,' without noting where or from whom she obtained the
records.... As one former intelligence official aware of the operation ['Operation Rosewood'] said
recently, 'When the complete history of the closing days of the Cold War is written, this will be
one of CIA's greatest triumphs.'"

 U.S. Department of State. "Daily Press Briefing." 23 Nov. 1998.

Asked to confirm the report that the U.S. Government had the Stasi files, State Department
Spokesman James Rubin acknowledged that "[f]ormer East German opposition leaders did
present a petition to the US Embassy in Berlin on November 9," 1998. He, then, noted: "The
German Democratic Republic State Security Service was an intelligence and police agency. We
do not comment on intelligence matters."
  Associated Press. "Germany Demands US Return Spy Files." 9 Dec. 1998.
[http://www.ap.org]

In a television interview, German intelligence chief Ernst Uhrlau demanded "that the United
States return former communist East German spy files the CIA allegedly grabbed at the end of
the Cold War."

  Boyes, Roger. "CIA to Return Stasi Papers." Times (London), 19 Jan. 1999. [http://www. the-
times.co.uk]

The CIA "has agreed to hand over thousands of files on agents who spied for communist East
Germany." See also, Washington Post, "U.S. to Release E. German Intelligence Files," 19 Jan.
1999, A14.

 Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Won't Hand Over E. German Spy Files: CIA Obtained Data Sometime
After '89." Washington Post, 20 Jan. 1999, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[I]nformed government sources" say that the "United States has no plans to hand over to the
German government" the files from East Germany's foreign spy operations, "which the CIA
obtained in a clandestine operation sometime after 1989." These statements were in response to
earlier reports that an agreement had been reached for the return of the files. See also, Roger
Boyes, "U.S. Denies Deal to Hand Over Stasi Spy Files," Times (London). 21 Jan. 1999.

 Associated Press.

1. "Germany Expects Stasi Files Back." 21 Jan. 1999. [http://www.ap.org]

Johannes Legner, the spokesman for the German government agency that oversees the Stasi files
in Berlin, said that the agency "expects the United States will eventually hand over secret files
that were spirited away to Washington shortly after the Berlin Wall fell."

2. "Germany, U.S. to Discuss Spy Files." 27 Jan. 1999. [http://www.ap.org]

During a 8-9 February 1999 visit to Washington, Bodo Hombach, German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder's chief of staff, will meet with DCI George Tenet and probably national security
adviser Sandy Berger to "press efforts to recover former East German spy files believed taken by
the CIA."

 Cole, Deborah. "U.S.-Held Files Seen Uncovering E. German Spies." Reuters, 4 Feb. 1999.

"Files thought to be in the hands of the CIA could blow the cover of former agents in communist
East Germany's international espionage network, according to [State Ombudsman for the
Documents of the Former East German State Security Service (Stasi) Joachim Gauck].... The
remark comes before a German government delegation ... travels to Washington [on 8 February
1999] to ask for the return of Cold War files on East German spying that ended up in the United
States after the fall of the Berlin Wall."
 Drozdiak, William. "The Cold War in Cold Storage: Washington Won't Part With East German
Spy Files; Bonn Wants Them Back." Washington Post, 3 Mar. 1999, A17. [http://
www.washingtonpost.com]

When German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder visited the United States last month, he "was
fervently hoping he would return home with ... the top-secret archives of East Germany's foreign
spy operations that the CIA spirited away after the fall of the Berlin Wall." However, President
Clinton would not even discuss the issue. The Chancellor's "senior aides said privately" that he
"was outraged by the ... refusal to surrender files that Germany considers its property. They
warned that the impasse soon could seriously damage cooperation on intelligence and other
matters between the countries."

  Goetz, John, and Matthew Campbell. "Germany Seeks CIA Spy Dossier." Sunday Times
(London), 21 Mar. 1999.

The CIA "is ready to return files from the former East German Stasi spy agency which include
the names of 3,000 agents who spied on West Germany for the communists." Ernst Uhrlau, the
coordinator of German secret services, said he had "assurances from George Tenet ... that the
files will be handed over.... He said the CIA and the German secret services had agreed to make
'intensive joint use' of the files." Associated Press, 22 March 1999, quotes German television
ZDF as stating that the United States has agreed to turn over the Stasi files. The report adds that a
"government spokesman confirmed the report, but said the two sides agreed not to discuss
details."

 The Independent (UK). "How the CIA Stole East German Files." 20 Sep. 1999. [http://
www.independent.co.uk]

"The unmasking of British spies and 'agents of influence' was made possible by a remarkable
CIA coup -- the stealing of the secret archive of agent files of the East German spy service. In the
thousands of files the Americans discovered the names of dozens of spies in the West who had
worked for the East German secret service... The American coup is seen to be on a par with
MI6's brilliant operation to spirit Colonel Vasili Mitrokhin and his archive out of Russia in
1992."

 Pincus, Walter. "Berlin to Get CIA Copies of 320,000 Stasi Files." Washington Post, 27 Oct.
1999, A27. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

U.S. and German officials stated on 26 October 1999 that the CIA will turn over to Germany
"copies of a significant part, but not all," of the Stasi files obtained after the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989. According to U.S. officials, "[f]iles relating to foreigners who worked for the Stasi
in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere will not be turned over."

 New York Times. "U.S. Gives Cold-War Spy Files to Germany." 6 Apr. 2000. [http://www.
nytimes.com]
According to a German government spokesman on 5 April 2000, the CIA "has handed over the
first of a large cache of East German files listing intelligence agents and their code names."

Tony Czuczka, "Former Spy Files Returned to Germany," Associated Press, 5 Apr. 2000,
reports that German government spokesman Uwe-Karsten Heye said that "the first CD-ROM
arrived at Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's office [on 31 March 2000]. It was still sealed and had
not yet been analyzed, he said. Some 1,000 further discs are to follow over the next 1 1/2 years."

  Aris, Ben. "Fresh Stasi Files Could Name German MPs." The Guardian, 8 Jul. 2003.
[http://www.guardian.co.uk]

"The CIA has handed over to the German authorities highly sensitive files that name tens of
thousands of former East German secret service agents.... The so-called Rosewood files contain
more than 200,000 names, including up to 50,000 active Stasi agents who have so far escaped
detection."

 Glees, Anthony. The Stasi Files: East Germany's Secret Operations against Britain. London:
Free Press, 2003.

Maddrell, I&NS 19.3 (Autumn 2004), comments that "[p]oor judgement and relatively weak
material make this an unsatisfactory book." The author "makes excessive use of speculation,
presumption and unconvincing reasoning.... [H]e does not identify a single British informant
with access" to classified information. In addition, "Glees' willingness to make claims about the
[British] Security Service's operations, even though he had no access to its records, goes much
too far."

In a response, Glees, I&NS 19.3 (Autumn 2004), argues that the reviewer "completely ignored
the witness testimony" in the book. "The material ... may not be complete but that does not make
it 'weak.' ... [By] ignoring the witness testimony, Meddrell fails to understand that in fact I rely as
much on witness testimony as on the evidence in the files."

Peake, Studies 47.4 (2003), notes that the author "considers only HVA (East German foreign
intelligence) operations involving British subjects.... This is not an easy book to read and
understand. It is awkwardly organized and its analysis is steadfastly mediocre. There is doubt
that the conclusions are supported by the evidence and [there is] no way to check" since Glees'
"research is based on Stasi files that are no longer available to public examination."

          Return to CIA 1998, 1999, and 2000s

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. - Squillacote

          Return to Germany - Post-Cold War - Files
          NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
               David Sheldon Boone Spy Case

Arrested in October 1998, former National Security Agency (NSA) analyst and retired U.S.
Army sergeant David Boone pleaded guilty in December 1998 to conspiracy to commit
espionage for the former Soviet KGB. In February 1999, he was sentenced to 24 years and
four months in prison.

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Risen, James. "Spy Agencies' Ex-Analyst Charged With Selling Secrets to Soviets." New York
Times, 14 Oct. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]

A former NSA analyst was charged on 13 October 1998 with spying for the former Soviet Union.
"David Sheldon Boone, a 46-year-old former enlisted man who worked for both Army
intelligence and the NSA during his 21-year Army career, was arrested by FBI agents on [10
October 1998] .... The government charged that from 1988 until 1991, Boone passed top secret
documents to a KGB officer ... revealing, among other things, what the United States knew about
the capabilities of Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. In return, he was paid more than $60,000 by
the KGB, the government said." See also, Sylvia Moreno and Vernon Loeb, "Ex-Army
Cryptologist Accused of Spying: FBI Says He Sold Secrets to Soviets," Washington Post, 14 Oct.
1998, B1.

 Diamond, John. "Ex-Pentagon Analyst Indicted on Spy Charges." Associated Press, 6 Nov.
1998. [http://www.ap.com]

On 5 November 1998, a grand jury in Alexandria, VA, indicted former NSA analyst David
Sheldon Boone on charges of spying for the KGB.

 Associated Press. "Trial Set for Ex-NSA Analyst." 9 Nov. 1998. [http://www.ap.org]

David Sheldon Boone has waived his right to a speedy trial on espionage charges. Trial has been
set for 23 February 1999; a closed pretrial hearing on classified information is scheduled for 11
January 1999.

  Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Former Crypto Analyst Arrested." Dec. 1998.
[http://www.nacic.gov]

"Boone allegedly began spying for the Soviet Union in 1988 after he walked into the Soviet
Embassy in Washington, D.C. and volunteered his services. In his initial meeting, Boone
provided Soviet Embassy employees with a classified document he had written based on
decrypted NSA intercept information. The Soviets paid Boone $300 for this document."

 Masters, Brooke A. "Ex-Analyst for NSA Pleads to Espionage." Washington Post, 19 Dec.
1998, A4.

David Sheldon Boone pleaded guilty on 18 December 1998 to "selling top-secret documents to
the KGB, including a comprehensive list of U.S. reconnaissance programs and a description of
nuclear targets in Russia." Boone "faces between 24 and 30 years in prison under federal
sentencing guidelines." Sentencing has been set for 26 February 1999.

 Davis, Patricia. "Ex-NSA Worker Gets 24 Years for Spying." Washington Post, 27 Feb. 1999,
B2.

On 26 February 1999, David Sheldon Boone, 46, a former NSA code analyst who began spying
for the Soviet Union in 1988, was sentenced in U.S. District Court in Alexandria to 24 years and
four months in prison.

 Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Boone Pleads Guilty to Spying and Is
Sentenced." Mar. 1999. [http://www.nacic.gov]

"In his guilty plea, Boone acknowledged that between 1988 and 1991 he delivered 'highly
classified documents' to agents of the KGB.... Among information Boone handed to the KGB
were documents detailing US targeting of tactical nuclear weapons in case of nuclear attack by
the Soviets and details of the US military's use of signals intelligence."




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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                     Jean-Philippe Wispelaere
Materials arranged chronologically.

  Johnston, David. "U.S. Arrests Australian in Spy Case." New York Times, 18 May 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]
Jean-Philippe Wispelaere, a former Australian military intelligence analyst who worked in
Canberra for the Australian Defense Intelligence Organization, was charged on 17 May 1999,
"with trying to sell more than 700 highly classified American defense documents to an
undercover FBI agent who posed as an overseas spy.... Wispelaere was arrested on [15 May
1999] as he arrived at Dulles International Airport on a flight from London for a meeting with
the undercover agent." See also, Roberto Suro, "Australian Arrested on Spy Charge,"
Washington Post, 18 May 1999, A9; and Bill Gertz, "FBI Sting Snags Australian Spy
Attempting to Sell U.S. Secets," Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 24-30 May 1999,
20.

 Washington Post. "Australian Faces More Spy Charges." 16 Jul. 1999, B2. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

Jean-Philippe Wispelaere was indicted on 15 July 1999 by a federal grand jury in Alexandria "on
a charge of espionage and a second count of attempted espionage for allegedly selling U.S.
secrets to a foreign country."

 Masters, Brooke A. "Espionage Suspect Found Incompetent: Australian Accused of Selling
U.S. Documents, Photos." Washington Post, 20 Nov. 1999, B2. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

Jean-Philippe Wispelaere, the former Australian intelligence analyst charged with selling U.S.
secrets, "is not mentally competent to stand trial at this point, federal mental health officials have
found.... Wispelaere was supposed to go on trial earlier this month ... on espionage and attempted
espionage charges, but in September his behavior became increasingly erratic and bizarre, his
lawyer said. [He was] sent to a federal corrections facility in Butner, N.C., for observation, and
officials there concluded that he was incompetent to assist in his defense.... The doctors at Butner
have asked for 120 more days to evaluate and treat Wispelaere."

  Masters, Brooke A. "Australian Pleads Guilty in Spy Case." Washington Post, 9 Mar. 2001, A4.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 8 March 2001, former Australian Defense Intelligence Organization official Jean-Philippe
Wispelaere "pleaded guilty in federal court in Alexandria to a charge of attempted espionage and
now faces at least 15 years in prison for trying to sell stolen classified U.S. documents.... The
case has dragged on for nearly two years because Wispelaere suffered such a serious bout of
schizophrenia that he was declared temporarily unable to stand trial."

 Highfield, John. "Australian Spy Sentenced to Jail in the US." Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, 9 Mar. 2001. [http://www.abc.net.au]

A U.S. District Court in Virginia on 9 March 2001 'imposed a 15 year sentence" on Jean-
Philippe Wispelaere. "Under a plea bargain, his lawyers have promised he'll cooperate fully in
debriefings, as they're putting it, with Australian and US intelligence and law enforcement
agencies."
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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                      Trofimoff
Materials arranged chronologically.

  Chachere, Vickie. "Top Military Man Alleged to Be Spy." Associated Press, 14 Jun. 2000.
[http://www.infobeat.com]

On 14 June 2000, George Trofimoff, a retired Army Reserve colonel, was charged with spying
for the Soviet Union and Russia for 25 years. Trofimoff allegedly sold classified material to the
Russians while serving as the civilian chief of the U.S. Army Element of the Nuremburg Joint
Interrogation Center in Germany from 1969 to 1994. He retired from his Army civilian job in
1995. The FBI and prosecutors said that Trofimoff was paid $250,000 over the course of his spy
career, and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, the Soviet award presented for "bravery
and self-sacrifice in the defense of the socialist homeland."

According to the indictment, "Trofimoff was recruited into the KGB by a boyhood friend, Igor
Vladimirovich Susemihl, a Russian Orthodox priest who served as the Archbishop of Vienna and
Austria and temporary Archbishop of Baden and Bavaria. Trofimoff allegedly took documents
from his work and photographed them, passing the film on to Susemihl and other KGB officers
during meetings in Austria. The indictment also notes eight meetings between Trofimoff and
KGB officers, naming the KGB agents in three instances."

 Marquis, Christopher. "Ex-Army Employee Charged With Spying for Russia for at Least 25
Years." New York Times, 15 Jun. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Donna Bucella, U.S. attorney for the Middle District of Florida, "declined to estimate the
damage wrought" by George Trofimoff's suspected spying. Nevertheless, "several factors
suggested a major security breach, including the sensitivity of the Nuremberg center, a NATO
facility staffed by Germans, British, French and Americans;... Trofimoff's clearance to view
virtually any documents, and his longevity in the job."

  Long, Phil. "Spy Suspect Bragged of Deeds, Prosecutor Says." Miami Herald, 21 Jun. 2000.
[http://www.herald.com]
On 30 June 2000, Assistant U.S. Attorney Walter Furr asked a federal magistrate in Tampa to
keep George Trofimoff in jail while awaiting trial. "Furr detailed how the U.S. government got
on the accused spy's trail, and the trap that federal agents laid for him that led to his arrest. The
heart of the government's case is "a six-hour interview in Melbourne [Florida] in February 1999,
during which the prosecutor said Trofimoff spoke freely about spying for the Soviets for 25
years, beginning in Germany in 1969.... Western intelligence agencies got on Trofimoff's trail,
Furr said, following the 1992 defection to Britain of former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin."

 Marquis, Christopher. "Retired Army Employee, 74, Is Found Guilty of Spying." New York
Times, 27 Jun. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 26 June 2001, a jury at a federal court in Florida convicted George Trofimoff of spying for
the Soviet Union and Russia over at least 25 years.

 Long, Phil. "Former Intelligence Officer Gets Life Sentence in Tampa." Miami Herald, 27 Sep.
2001. [http://www.miami.com]

On 27 September 2001, George Trofimoff was sentenced to life in prison.

 Byers, Andy J. The Imperfect Spy: The Inside Story of a Convicted Spy. St. Petersbueg, FL:
Vandamere, 2005.

Keiser, Proceedings 132.3 (Mar. 2006), says the author "has written a remarkable history of
[George] Trofimoff's background and life as a spy.... The Imperfect Spy is a good read." For
Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), the author "tells
an awful story well." The story of why Trofimoff did what he did, "how he worked for his foster
brother, a KGB agent; and the damage he inflicted makes exciting reading. The Imperfect Spy is
a distressing story, but a worthy contribution to counterintelligence literature."

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                  Brian P. Regan

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Masters, Brooke A., and Vernon Loeb. "Air Force Retiree Charged as Spy: Secret Documents
Passed, U.S. Says." Washington Post, 25 Aug. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Brian P. Regan, a retired Air Force master sergeant who works for NRO contractor TRW Inc.,
was arrested on 23 August 2001 and charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. Officials
"said they have evidence of spying involving one country, which they declined to name, but
government sources identified it as Libya." See also, Walter Pincus, "Satellite Agency Has
Tradition of Secrecy; Joint Defense-CIA Enterprise Uses Many Contract Employees Such as
Alleged Spy," Washington Post, 25 Aug. 2001, A10; and James Risen, "Employee of U.S.
Contractor Accused of Conspiracy to Spy," New York Times, 25 Aug. 2001.

 Masters, Brooke A. "Spy Suspect Had Missile Site Coordinates." Washington Post, 24 Oct.
2001, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 23 October 2001, Brian P. Regan was indicted by a federal grand jury in Alexandria, VA, on
a single count of attempted espionage.

 Masters, Brooke A., and Dan Eggen. "Indictment Says Suspect Tried to Sell Defense Secrets."
Washington Post, 15 Feb. 2002, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 14 February 2002, "[a] federal grand jury in Alexandria charged espionage suspect Brian P.
Regan ... with trying to spy for Iraq, Libya and China, alleging the retired Air Force master
sergeant drafted a letter to Saddam Hussein offering to sell top secret defense information for
$13 million."

  Markon, Jerry. "Jury Opens Deliberations in Federal Espionage Case; Regan Could Face Death
if Convicted of Spying Charges." Washington Post, 11 Feb. 2003, B2. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

On 10 February 2003, "[j]urors began deliberating the fate of Brian P. Regan..., after prosecutors
portrayed him as a coldblooded spy aiming to help Saddam Hussein while his attorney called
him a childlike incompetent who never intended to hurt anyone."

 Markon, Jerry. "Convicted Spy Accepts Life Sentence: Sudden Sentencing Deal Will Prevent
Prosecution of Ex-Air Force Analyst's Wife." Washington Post, 21 Mar. 2003, B1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"In a surprise deal with prosecutors" on 20 March 2003, "convicted spy Brian P. Regan accepted
a sentence of life in prison for trying to sell secrets to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in exchange
for an agreement not to prosecute his wife, who authorities say may have obstructed justice to
help her husband."

 Markon, Jerry. "Coded Messages Add to Mystery of a Failed Spy." Washington Post, 28 Apr.
2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[P]rosecutors have said in court documents that they suspect [Brian P.] Regan removed 'far
more' than the 800 pages of classified documents he admits stealing and that he may have buried
documents at various secret locations. And everyone from the FBI's cryptanalysis group to other
intelligence agencies are only now breaking the code in the letters found in Regan's cell and on
some of the documents Regan was carrying in a fan-shaped folder when he was arrested in
August 2001."

 Markon, Jerry. "Convicted Spy Led FBI to Papers Buried in Parks." Washington Post, 31 Jul.
2003, B1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to law enforcement officials on 30 July 2003, "[c]onvicted spy Brian P. Regan buried
more than 20,000 pages of documents classified as top secret or higher," intending "to sell them
to Iraq, Iran and other countries in 'one of the largest espionage schemes in history'.... The trove
of documents, CD-ROMs and videotapes, found in 19 locations by FBI agents after months of
digging at state parks in Virginia and Maryland, contained detailed information about U.S.
satellites, early warning systems and weapons of mass destruction, officials said."

  Bhattacharjee, Yudhijit. "Tale of a Would-Be Spy, Buried Treasure, and Uncrackable Code."
Intelligencer 18, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2011): 17-22.

First appeared in Wired, Feb. 2010, http://www.wired.com.

          Return to NRO 2001

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
     The James J. Smith-Katrina Leung Case

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Eggen, Dan, and Kimberly Edds. "Ex-FBI Agent, Longtime 'Asset' Arrested in Spy Case."
Washington Post, 10 Apr. 2003, A22. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

See also, Greg Krikorian, David Rosenzweig, and K. Connie Kang, "Ex-FBI Agent Is Arrested
in China Espionage Case," Los Angeles Times, 10 Apr. 2003; Eric Lichtblau and Barbara
Whitaker, "Ex-F.B.I. Agent Is Accused of Passing Secrets to Lover," New York Times, 10 Apr.
2003; and Jerry Seper, "Ex-Agent for F.B.I. Arrested in Theft," Washington Times, 10 Apr. 2003.
  Eggen, Dan, and Susan Schmidt. "Ex-FBI Agent Resigns Post at Nuclear Weapons Lab:
Officials Examine Link to Spy Case." Washington Post, 11 Apr. 2003, A3.
[http://www.washingtonpost. com]

William Cleveland Jr., head of security at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, resigned
his post on 10 April 2003. The lab has "stripped him of his security clearances and launched an
investigation of his nine-year tenure" in a position he has held since retiring from the FBI in
1993.

Cleveland "is referred to anonymously in FBI affidavits unsealed [on 9 April 2003] in the
espionage-related case that has resulted in the arrests of another former agent, James J. 'J.J.'
Smith, and Los Angeles socialite Katrina M. Leung.... He has not been charged in connection
with the case.... The court papers reveal that Cleveland admitted having a sexual relationship
with Leung from 1988 until he retired in 1993, and that the intermittent affair resumed in 1997
and 1999. He maintained the relationship even after discovering that Leung had unauthorized
contact in 1991 with the Chinese intelligence service, court documents say."

  Murphy, Dean E., and Calvin Sims. "After Espionage Arrests, F.B.I. Looks Back and Wonders,
'How?'" New York Times, 11 Apr. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 9 April 2003, Katrina Leung, a Los Angeles businesswoman, was arrested "on charges of
obtaining a classified national security document for the Chinese government." The FBI said that
Leung "had a 20-year affair with James J. Smith, a former F.B.I. agent who had recruited her as
an informer, and that she had passed on information culled from Mr. Smith. Officials said she
sometimes surreptitously photocopied classified documents he had left unattended at her house.
Mr. Smith, 59, who worked for the F.B.I. for 30 years before retiring in 2000, was also arrested
and charged with negligence." See also, Eric Lichtblau, "F.B.I. Never Gave Agent in Spy Case a
Polygraph," New York Times, 11 Apr. 2003.

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Was Told Years Ago of Possible Double Agent." New York Times, 12
Apr. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to current and former officials, senior FBI officials were told as early as 1991 that
Katrina Leung "appeared to be spying for the Chinese, but they continued using her as an
informer nonetheless."

  Schmidt, Susan, and Dan Eggen. "FBI Assesses Potential Spy Damage: Congress Told FBI
Probes Dating From at Least 1991 Under Review." Washington Post, 12 Apr. 2003, A10.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Top FBI officials have told members of Congress that every Chinese counterintelligence case
investigated by the FBI since at least 1991 may have been compromised by a suspected agent of
the Chinese government arrested in Los Angeles this week. The unfolding spy case, involving
alleged Chinese double agent Katrina M. Leung and her FBI contact, former senior China
counterintelligence agent James J. Smith, will require major damage assessment of Chinese
espionage and technology transfer investigations, according to congressional leaders who have
been briefed on the probe."

 Risen, James, and Eric Lichtblau. "Spy Suspect May Have Told Chinese of Bugs, U.S. Says."
New York Times, 15 Apr. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 14 April 2003, government officials said that "[c]ounterintelligence officials fear that an
F.B.I. informer in Los Angeles tipped off the Chinese government to a covert [U.S.] effort to
plant listening devices aboard China's version of Air Force One... The National Security
Agency,... working with the [FBI] and other intelligence organizations, led an operation to plant
bugs in a Boeing 767 used by the president of China while it was in the United States for
refitting, officials said. The listening devices were quickly discovered, and the Chinese
government disclosed the incident early last year."

 Edds, Kimberly, and Dan Eggen. "Alleged Chinese Spy Is Denied Bail." Washington Post, 16
Apr. 2003, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

 Krikorian, Greg. "What Did FBI Know When in Spying Case." Los Angeles Times, 19 Apr.
2003. [http://www.latimes.com]

  Sanchez, Rene. "Agent in Spy Saga Was 'One of Us.'" Washington Post, 20 Apr. 2003, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

 Risen, James, and Eric Lichtblau. "Intelligence on China Was Forwarded to Presidents." New
York Times, 29 Apr. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Intelligence leads" provided by Katrina Leung "may have gone to every president from Ronald
Reagan to George W. Bush," U.S. officials have said. "Much of Ms. Leung's information related
to the political and diplomatic maneuverings of the Chinese leadership in Beijing, as well as the
inner workings of China's intelligence service."

 Rosenzweig, David. "Financial Accusations a Subplot in Spy Case." Los Angeles Times, 4 May
2003. [http://www.latimes.com]

"In declaring Katrina Leung a flight risk and ordering her held without bail, a U.S. magistrate
expressed concern, not only about her close ties to high-ranking officials in China, but also about
the possibility that she might have large sums of money hidden in overseas accounts."

  Eggen, Dan. "Handling of Secrets in Spy Cases Debated." Washington Post, 7 May 2003, A2.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The prosecution of Katrina Leung and James J. Smith "has sparked a strenuous debate among
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence officials over how to protect classified information while
pursuing the charges in the case, according to people familiar with the deliberations."
  Schmidt, Susan. "Ex-FBI Agent Indicted in Spy Probe." Washington Post, 8 May 2003, A6.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Informant Is Charged with Copying Secret Papers." New York Times, 9
May 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

 Ragavan, Chitra, and Carol Hook. "China Doll." U.S. News & World Report, 10 Nov. 2003,
38ff.

"U.S. News has conducted an extensive review of the [Katrina Leung] case..., examining
hundreds of pages of court records and interviewing more than a dozen current and former
counterintelligence experts. The review reveals a systemic failure of security procedures and a
stunningly free-and-easy pattern of access by Leung to some of the nation's most highly secret
intelligence operations."

  Krikorian, Greg. "Handler of Alleged Spy Cuts Plea Deal." Los Angeles Times, 12 May 2004.
[http://www.latimes.com]

See also, Susan Schmidt and Kimberly Edds, "Ex-Handler of Alleged FBI Spy Cuts Deal,"
Washington Post, 13 May 2004, A3.

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Agent Pleads Guilty in Deal in Chinese Spy Case." New York Times, 13
May 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 12 May 2004, James J Smith, former senior FBI agent accused of having an affair with
suspected Chinese double agent Katrina Leung, pled guilty to a charge of falsely concealing that
affair from the Bureau. As part of the plea agreement, Federal prosecutors dropped two counts of
gross negligence in handling of national security documents. Smith will probably avoid prison
time.

 Associated Press. "Charges Dropped in FBI 'Spy Case': Judge Throws Out Case against
Chinese-American Woman." 6 Jan. 2005. [http://www.cnn.com]

On 6 January 2005, U.S. District Judge Florence Marie Cooper "dismissed all charges" against
Katrina Leung "accused of using a sexual affair with an FBI agent to gain unauthorized access to
classified documents."

 Lefebvre, Stéphane. "Sex Again: The Smith-Leung Case." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 296-304.

"Smith was not properly held to account, which indicates a failure in leadership and
administrative/personnel management at the Bureau.... Smith's lack of respect for well-
established operational and ethical standards could have been caught sooner had the FBI's
operational and personnel policies been fully and consistently enforced."

 CNN. "Accused Double Agent Pleads to Tax Charge." 16 Dec. 2005. [http://www.cnn.com]
On 16 December 2005, Katrina Leung, a prominent Chinese-American businesswoman "accused
of being a Chinese double agent[,] pleaded guilty" to "a tax violation and lying to authorities
about her longtime affair" with FBI counterintelligence agent James J. Smith. Leung was
sentenced to "three years of probation and was ordered to complete 100 hours of community
service. She also must pay a $10,000 fine and participate in FBI debriefings for 18 months."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                          Lawrence A. Franklin
Materials arranged chronologically.

  Graham, Bradley, and Thomas E. Ricks. "FBI Probe Targets Pentagon Official: Analyst
Allegedly Gave Data to Israel." Washington Post, 28 Aug. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Government officials said on 27 August 2004 that the FBI "is investigating a mid-level Pentagon
official who specializes in Iranian affairs for allegedly passing classified information to Israel....
The name of the person under investigation was not officially released, but two sources
identified him as Larry Franklin. He was described as a desk officer in the Pentagon's Near East
and South Asia Bureau.... Franklin worked at the Defense Intelligence Agency before moving to
the Pentagon's policy branch three years ago." See also, James Risen, "Pentagon Official
Suspected of Giving U.S. Secrets to Israel," New York Times, 28 Aug. 2004.

 Ricks, Thomas E., and Robin Wright. "Analyst Who Is Target of Probe Went to Israel."
Washington Post, 29 Aug. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Officials say that Lawrence A. Franklin, "a career analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency
who specializes in Iran," is at the center of an FBI "investigation into whether classified
information was passed to the Israeli government.... Officials and colleagues said [on 28 August
2004] that Franklin had traveled to Israel, including during duty in the Air Force Reserve."
According to a former co-worker at the DIA, Franklin "may have been based at the U.S.
Embassy in Tel Aviv on those tours,... but was never permanently assigned there."

 Wright, Robin, and Dan Eggen. "Leak Inquiry Includes Iran Experts in Administration."
Washington Post, 4 Sep. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"FBI counterintelligence investigators have ... questioned current and former U.S. officials about
whether a small group of Iran specialists at the Pentagon and in Vice President Cheney's office
may have been involved in passing classified information to an Iraqi politician or a U.S.
lobbying group allied with Israel." Pentagon officials insist that "FBI questions about key
policymakers did not mean they were the subjects of the intelligence leak investigation. Senior
Pentagon officials have said they were told by the FBI that the investigation is focused on just
one suspect..., Lawrence A. Franklin, an Iran specialist in [Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas J.] Feith's office."

 Johnston, David, and Eric Lichtblau. "Pentagon Analyst Charged With Disclosing Military
Secrets." New York Times, 5 May 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 4 May 2005, Pentagon analyst Lawrence A. Franklin was arrested on charges of "illegally
disclosing highly classified information about possible attacks on American forces in Iraq to two
employees" of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPIC). Franklin made "a brief
appearance ... in federal court in Alexandria, Va., and was released on $100,000 bond. A
preliminary hearing ... is scheduled for [27 May 2005]. If convicted, Mr. Franklin could be
sentenced to a maximum of 10 years in prison."

 Markon, Jerry. "Defense Worker Charged Again in Secrecy Case." Washington Post, 25 May
2005, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Lawrence Franklin, the Defense Department analyst charged previously by federal prosecutors in
Alexandria, Virginia, with disclosing classified information, was charged on 24 May 2005 with
"possessing classified documents," according to papers filed in U.S. District Court in West
Virginia.

  Markon, Jerry. "FBI Tapped Talks About Possible Secrets: Case Against Ex-AIPAC Officials
Could Focus on Several Contacts With Defense Analyst." Washington Post, 3 Jun. 2005, A7.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In July 2004, Defense Department analyst Lawrence Franklin met at the Pentagon City mall with
an American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) official, Keith Weissman. Sources
familiar with the meeting said that Franklin "warned that Iranian agents were planning attacks
against American soldiers and Israeli agents in Iraq." Weissman "left the mall and went to the
office of colleague Steve Rosen. The two men then relayed the information to the Israeli
Embassy in Washington and a reporter for The Washington Post. What the AIPAC officials did
not know, the sources said, was that the FBI was listening in -- to both the meeting and their
subsequent phone calls -- and that ... Franklin[] was cooperating in an investigation of whether
classified U.S. information was being passed on to the government of Israel."

  Eggen, Dan, and Jamie Stockwell. "U.S. Indicts 2 in Case of Divulged Secrets: Both Worked
for Pro-Israel Lobby." Washington Post, 5 Aug. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 4 August 2005, Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman, former employees of the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) "were indicted ... on charges that they illegally
received and passed on classified information to foreign officials and reporters over a period of
five years.... Although no foreign government is named in the indictment, U.S. government
sources have identified Israel as the country at the center of the probe."

 Johnston, David. "Israel Lobbyists Facing Charges in Secrets Case." New York Times, 5 Aug.
2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The 4 August 2005 indictment against Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman, former employees
of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), says that "the two men had disclosed
classified information about a number of subjects, including American policy in Iran, terrorism
in central Asia, Al Qaeda and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers apartment in Saudi
Arabia."

The indictment also contains additional charges against Lawrence Franklin. It accuses him "of
using his position as a desk officer to gather information to hand over to Mr. Rosen or Mr.
Weissman, or to an unidentified foreign official, who government officials and lawyers involved
in the case have said was Naor Gilon, an Israeli Embassy political officer. The indictment refers
to two other foreign government officials, but does not identify them. Both are Israelis, a
government official said."

  Lichtblau, Eric. "Pentagon Analyst Admits Sharing Secret Data." New York Times, 6 Oct. 2005.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 5 October 2005, former senior Defense Department analyst Lawrence A. Franklin "pleaded
guilty in federal court" in Alexandria, Virginia, "to three criminal counts for improperly retaining
and disclosing classified information.... The offenses carry a maximum of 25 years in prison, but
as part of a plea agreement, prosecutors are expected to recommend leniency" in return for
Franklin's "cooperation in a continuing investigation in the January trial of ... Steven J. Rosen
and Keith Weissman," former lobbyists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

 Johnston, David. "Former Military Analyst Gets Prison Term for Passing Information." New
York Times, 21 Jan. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 20 January 2006, a federal judge sentenced Lawrence A. Franklin "to 12 years and seven
months in prison ... after the analyst admitted passing classified military information about Iran
and Iraq to two pro-Israel lobbyists and an Israeli diplomat." The lobbyists, Steven J. Rosen and
Keith Weissman, "are scheduled for trial in April."

  Markon, Jerry. "Pentagon Analyst Given 12 1/2 Years In Secrets Case." Washington Post, 21
Jan. 2006, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

The sentencing in U.S. District Court in Alexandria on 20 January 2006 of Lawrence A. Franklin
"closed one chapter of a long-running investigation into an alleged conspiracy to obtain and
illegally pass classified information to foreign officials and reporters. But with the case still
shrouded in secrecy, [the sentencing] hearing cast no new light on the information Franklin
provided, whether its transmission harmed the United States and whether anyone will be charged
other than the two lobbyists, who ... are awaiting trial."

 Lefebvre, Stéphane. "Spying on Friends? The Franklin Case, AIPAC, and Israel." International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 600-621.

Does not see any lasting effect on U.S.-Israeli relations coming out of this case.

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                           Leandro Aragoncillo
Materials arranged chronologically.

 U.S. Attorney's Office, District of New Jersey. "News Release: Leandro Aragoncillo and
Michael Ray Aquino." 12 Sep. 2005. [http://www.cicentre.com]

Leandro Aragoncillo, an FBI intelligence analyst at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, was arrested
on 10 September 2005 and charged with acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign official and
passing classified information to that official and others in the Philippines. Also arrested was
Michael Ray Aquino, a former official with the Philippines National Police. He is charged with
with acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign official and passing classified information to
that official and others in the Philippines.

 Smothers, Ronald. "Two Men Are Charged With Passing Secrets to Philippines." New York
Times, 13 Sep. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

FBI analyst Leandro Aragoncillo and Michael Ray Aquino, former deputy director of the
Philippines National Police, have been arrested and are "accused of passing classified agency
information to government officials in Manila.... According to affidavits by F.B.I. agents, Mr.
Aragoncillo passed copies of classified F.B.I. documents about the Philippines to Mr. Aquino
between February and August [2005] by way of cellphone text messages and e-mail messages
through Hotmail and Yahoo accounts."

  Lichtblau, Eric, and Ronald Smothers. "New Spy Case Revives Concerns Over Security at
F.B.I." New York Times, 7 Oct. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The widening investigation into an F.B.I. analyst suspected of passing intelligence to the
Philippines is raising new concerns about the bureau's vulnerabilities in protecting its secrets
from internal espionage.... Leandro Aragoncillo ... is accused of improperly combing the [FBI's]
computer system to print or download 101 classified documents on the Philippines, including 37
marked 'secret,' and passing the information to Manila."

  Bridis, Ted. "FBI Missed Internal Signs of Espionage." Associated Press, 17 Jan. 2006.
[http://www.ap.org]

"By the government's own account, FBI analyst Leandro Aragoncillo was spying in plain sight.
He rummaged through FBI computers for intelligence reports unrelated to his work and then e-
mailed the classified documents to opposition leaders in the Philippines.... Aragoncillo's lawyers
and prosecutors are trying to wrap up a plea deal that would secure a guilty plea and his
cooperation.... He is not charged with espionage.... Instead, he's charged in court papers with
conspiring to reveal government secrets, acting as a foreign agent and improperly using FBI
computers."

 Smothers, Ronald. "Former Marine Admits Passing Secret Documents." New York Times, 5
May 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 4 May 2006, Leandro Aragoncillo "pleaded guilty in federal court to passing top-secret
information and documents to political opponents of the current Philippine government."
Aragoncillo worked in the White House in the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations and,
from 2004, as an FBI intelligence analyst.

 CNN. "FBI Analyst Sentenced for Spying." 18 Jul. 2007. [http://www.cnn.com]

According to federal prosecutors, Leandro Aragoncillo was sentenced on 18 July 2007 to "10
years in prison for espionage" and fined $40,000. Aragoncillo "admitted supplying classified
documents to Philippine nationals in an effort to overthrow that country's government."

On 17 July 2007, "Michael Ray Aquino, a co-conspirator, was sentenced ... to six years in
prison." Aquino, a former Philippine national police officer, "pleaded guilty in July 2006 to
taking classified documents, obtained from Aragoncillo, and passing them on to Philippine
officials plotting to overthrow [Philippine President Gloria Macapagal] Arroyo."

  Associated Press. "Court Vacates Sentence of Filipino in Spy Case." 6 Feb. 2009.
[http://www.newsday.com]

On 6 February 2009, a federal appeals court vacated the sentence of former Philippine National
Police officer Michael Ray Aquino, who is "serving a six-year, four-month sentence after
pleading guilty to unauthorized possession of classified documents." The court "concluded that
the sentence was based on a mistaken interpretation of federal guidelines." Aquino's lawyer said
that the new sentencing range will be 36 to 46 months.

          Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents
              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                            China Spies in 2008
Materials presented chronologically.

  Frieden, Terry. "Feds: U.S. Defense Analyst Leaked Secrets to China." CNN, 11 Feb. 2008.
[http://www.cnn.com]

Gregg William Bergersen, a weapons systems policy analyst at the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency, "has been arrested and charged with espionage." He is "accused of passing
American military secrets to the Chinese government." In addition, "two Chinese immigrants --
Tai Shen Kuo, 58, and Yu Xin Kang, 33 ... -- were charged with conspiracy to disclose national
defense information to a foreign government."

In a separate case, "Dongfan 'Greg' Chung, 72, a Chinese native who is a naturalized U.S. citizen
[and] had been an employee of Rockwell International [and Boeing] for more than 30 years" was
arrested in Orange County, California, and charged with "economic espionage and acting as an
agent of China."

  Gertz, Bill. "4 Arrests in China Spy Cases." Washington Times, 12 Feb. 2008.
[http://www.washingtontimes.com]

According to senior U.S. officials, arrests in "two separate spy cases highlight the national
security threat posed by Beijing's aggressive intelligence gathering of secrets and technology....
The arrests were carried out in Virginia, Louisiana and Southern California, and the secrets
compromised include military communications technology, arms sales and corporate trade
secrets related to the space shuttle, according to court papers." See also, Neil A. Lewis, "Justice
Dept. Announces Arrests in 2 Chinese Espionage Cases." New York Times, 12 Feb. 2008.

  Mikkelsen, Randall. "U.S. Defense Analyst Guilty in China Spy Case." Reuters, 1 Apr. 2008.
[http://abcnews.go.com]

The Justice Department said on 31 March 2008 that "Gregg William Bergersen pleaded guilty at
federal district court in Alexandria, Virginia, to conspiracy to disclose national defense
information to unauthorized persons." According to court documents, "[m]uch of the information
pertained to U.S. military sales to China's arch rival, Taiwan, and communications security
issues.... Bergersen admitted in court papers that he gave national defense information" to Tai
Shen Kuo, also arrested in February 2008.
"Charges of spying are still pending against Kuo, a U.S. citizen born in Taiwan, and [Yu Xin]
Kang, a Chinese citizen accused of acting as an intermediary between Kuo and a Chinese official.
Both have pleaded not guilty."

 Lewis, Neil A. "Spy Cases Raise Concern on China's Intentions." New York Times, 10 Jul.
2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Navy veteran Gregg W. Bergersen, Taiwan-born New Orleans entrepreneur Tai Shen Kuo, and
Chinese intelligence officer Yu Xin Kang "are awaiting sentencing in a federal court for their
involvement in ... the illegal transfer of information to China.... According to court papers and
interviews, Mr. Kuo and his Chinese handlers ran what intelligence professionals call a 'false
flag' operation on Mr. Bergersen ... making him believe that the information he was providing
was going to Taiwan, an American ally, not Beijing." Nonetheless, FBI surveillance tapes
"showed that Mr. Bergersen understood he was engaged in a serious crime."

 Barakat, Matthew. "Former Pentagon Analyst Gets Almost 5 years in Prison for Passing
Taiwan Secrets to Chinese." Associated Press, 11 Jul. 2008. [http://www.ap.org]

On 11 July 2008, Gregg W. Bergersen was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 57 months "in
prison for giving secret information about U.S.-Taiwan military relations" to a New Orleans
furniture salesman who was also a Chinese spy.

  Associated Press. "Chinese National Sentenced for Aiding Spy." 1 Aug. 2008.
[http://www.ap.org]

On 1 August 2008, Chinese national Yu Xin Kang, who had been living in New Orleans with
furniture salesman and Chinese spy Tai Shen Kuo, was sentenced in U.S. District Court to 18
months in prison. "Kang at times served as an intermediary for Kuo in helping him get secret
information about U.S.-Taiwanese military relations to the Communist government in Beijing."

  Jackman, Tom. "Man Sentenced in Spy Case." Washington Post, 9 Aug. 2008, B3.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Tai Shen Kuo "was sentenced [on 8 August 2008] to more than 15 years in prison by a federal
judge in Alexandria."

 Lefebvre, Stéphane. "The PRC's Compromise of U.S. Government Information and
Technologies." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter
2009): 652-666.

The author looks at three cases: The Mak family; Bergersen, and Roth/Sherman. He also
explores the difficulties of trying to catch Chinese spies.

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents
                                    SPY CASES
                                   United States
                                   Russian Spies (2010)

See the FBI compilation, "Operation Ghost Stories: Inside the Russian Spy Case," 31 Oct.
2011 at: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/october/russian_103111/russian_103111.
Materials released by the FBI include "dozens of still images, surveillance video clips, and
documents related to the investigation."

Materials presented in chronological order.

 Shane, Scott, and Charlie Savage. "In Ordinary Lives, U.S. Sees the Work of Russian Agents."
New York Times, 28 Jun. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 28 June 2010, "federal prosecutors accused 11 people of being part of a Russian espionage
ring, living under false names and deep cover in a patient scheme to penetrate what one coded
message called American 'policy making circles.' An F.B.I. investigation that began at least
seven years ago culminated with the arrest on [27 June 2010] of 10 people in Yonkers, Boston
and northern Virginia.... The criminal complaints are packed with vivid details gathered in years
of covert surveillance -- including monitoring phones and e-mail, placing secret microphones in
the alleged Russian agents' homes, and numerous surreptitious searches."

See also, Jerry Markon, "FBI Arrests 10 Accused of Working as Russian Spies," Washington
Post, 29 Jun. 2010, A1.

 Barry, Ellen. "'Illegals' Spy Ring Famed in Lore of Russian Spying." New York Times, 29 Jun.
2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The "arrest of 11 people seems to offer a glimpse into a recent form of the [Russians' 'illegals']
program.... [I]f prosecutors are correct, two things seem clear: First, that Russia's network of
illegals has survived, and perhaps even grown, since the Soviet Union's collapse. And second,
that the agents' assignment -- collecting information about politics and getting to know policy
makers -- can now be achieved through more straightforward means."

 Montgomery, David. "Arrests of Alleged Spies Draws Attention to Long Obscure Field of
Steganography." Washington Post, 29 Jun. 2010, C1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[A]s the Justice Department's case unfolds against 11 alleged Russian clandestine operatives,
we all are learning a fancy new word: steganography. It's the practice of hiding information in
otherwise unremarkable objects or media.... According to the FBI's complaint against nine of the
defendants, investigators recovered more than 100 text files that had been embedded in
steganographic images and exchanged" between the alleged conspirators "and their alleged
controllers in the Moscow headquarters of a Russian intelligence agency."

 Shane, Scott, and Benjamin Weiser. "Spying Suspects Seemed Short on Secrets." New York
Times, 29 Jun. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The suspected Russian spy ring rolled up by the F.B.I. this week had everything it needed for
world-class espionage: excellent training, cutting-edge gadgetry, deep knowledge of American
culture and meticulously constructed cover stories. The only things missing in more than a
decade of operation were actual secrets to send home to Moscow.... As cold war veterans
puzzled over the rationale for Russia's extraordinary effort to place agents in American society,
both Russian and American officials signaled that the arrests would not affect the warming of
relations between the countries."

On 29 June 2010, "the police in Cyprus arrested the man known as Christopher R. Metsos,...and
American officials disclosed that they had moved to make arrests over the weekend because one
of the people suspected of being Russian agents ... was planning to fly out of the United States
on [27 June 2010], possibly for good."

Evan Perez and Alkman Granitsas, "U.S. Seeks to Keep Spy Suspects in Jail; Cypriot Police
Hunt for Man Who Fled," Wall Street Journal, 1 Jul. 2010, report that "Metsos, the alleged
moneyman in the spy ring, was arrested this week" in Cyprus, but "[a] judge granted him bail,
with the agreement that he surrender his passport and report regularly to a police station. 'Within
24 hours of being bailed, Metsos simply disappeared,' prosecutors said."

 Miller, Greg, and Philip P. Pan. "Alleged Spy Ring Seen as 'Throwback to the Cold War.'"
Washington Post, 30 Jun. 2010, A7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The roll-up of an alleged network of Russian spies has provided new evidence that the era of
Cold War espionage never completely ended, exposing what U.S. intelligence experts described
as Moscow's ongoing commitment to aggressive espionage operations, as well its fondness for
spycraft techniques that haven't advanced since the KGB was dissolved."

 Weiser, Benjamin, and Michael Wilson. "Suspect Placed Love for Russia Before His Son,
Prosecutors Say." New York Times, 1 Jul. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In Federal District Court in Manhattan on 1 July 2010, the only one of four defendants allowed
bail was Vicky Peláez, who "the government concedes lived under her own name.... Peláez is a
veteran columnist for El Diario La Prensa, a newspaper in New York. Her husband, known as
Juan José Lázaro Sr., postponed his request for bail." The second couple, known as Richard and
Cynthia Murphy of Montclair, NJ, were denied bail. Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis "said he
was not confident that they would not flee." Similar detention hearings in Boston and Alexandria,
VA, were "postponed as lawyers asked for more time to prepare their arguments for bail."
CNN, "Alleged Russian Spy Confesses, Officials Say," 1 Jul. 2010, reports that the suspect
known as Juan Lazaro "has admitted that he worked for Russia's intelligence service," according
to court documents. Prosecutors say "[h]e allegedly told federal agents that he was not born in
Uruguay, that 'Juan Lazaro' is not his real name, that his house in Yonkers, New York, had been
'paid for by the "Service"' and, although he loved his son, he would not violate his loyalty to the
'Service' even for his son."

  Cratty, Carol. "3 Suspects in Russian Spy Ring Case Ordered Held." CNN, 2 Jul. 2010.
[http://www.cnn.com]

According to a court document released at U.S. District Court in Alexandria, VA, on 2 July 2010,
"the man known as Michael Zottoli is really a Russian named Mikhail Kutzik" and "the woman
known as Patricia Mills is a Russian citizen named Natalia Pereverzeva. Prosecutors said that
Zottoli and Mills ... made the admissions" soon after their arrest. Another suspect named Mikhail
Semenko "appeared at a separate hearing.... Magistrate Judge Theresa Buchanan ordered that the
three continue to be held in jail and cited the government's contention that they are dangers to the
community and a flight risk."

 Pincus, Walter. "FBI Spent Nearly Decade Pursuing Spy Suspects in Bid to Gain
Counterintelligence." Washington Post, 3 Jul. 2010, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

According to court documents, "by mid-2006 investigators had already searched the homes of
four of the couples" suspected of being agents of Russia's foreign intelligence service, "planted
microphones in at least three of their residences, regularly reviewed their encrypted computer
messages, and videotaped meetings where money and equipment were exchanged.... [T]he FBI
has revealed enough information about the suspects to indicate that it may have gained valuable
counterintelligence about Moscow's spy operations."

  Narizhnaya, Khristina. "Russian Spy Claims Swap in Works for Spies in US." Associated Press,
7 Jul. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Russia and the United States are working out a spy swap involving Russians recently arrested in
the United States and people convicted of spying in Russia," Dmitry Sutyagin, the brother of
imprisoned nuclear researcher Igor Sutyagin said on 7 July 2010. Igor Sutyagin "is serving a 14-
year prison sentence on charges of spying for the United States." See also, Andrew E. Kramer,
Scott Shane, and Benjamin Weiser, "Steps Point to Possible Swap of Spy Suspects With
Russia," New York Times, 7 Jul. 2010.

 Baker, Peter, and Benjamin Weiser. "Russian Spy Suspects Plead Guilty as Part of a Swap."
New York Times, 8 Jul. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The United States and Russia agreed on 8 July 2010 "to trade 10 Russian agents arrested last
month for four men imprisoned in Russia for alleged contacts with Western intelligence
agencies.... The 10 long-term sleeper agents pleaded guilty to conspiracy before a federal judge
in Manhattan after revealing their true identities. All 10 were sentenced to time served and ...
were to be taken by bus [on 8 July 2010] to a New York-area airport and flown out of the
country....

"Within hours of the New York court hearing, the Kremlin announced that President Dmitri A.
Medvedev had signed pardons for the four men Russia considered spies after each of them
signed statements admitting guilt. The Kremlin identified them as Igor V. Sutyagin, an arms
control researcher held for 11 years; Sergei Skripal, a colonel in Russia's military intelligence
service sentenced in 2006 to 13 years for spying for Britain; Aleksandr Zaporozhsky, a former
agent with Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service who has served seven years of an 18-year
sentence; and Gennadi Vasilenko, a former K.G.B. major who was arrested in 1998 for contacts
with a C.I.A. officer."

 Sheridan, Mary Beth, and Jerry Markon. "U.S., Russian Planes Swap 14 Spies in Vienna."
Washington Post, 9 Jul. 2010. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

News services report that "[t]wo airplanes ... landed at Vienna's international airport early [on 9
July 2010].... After a brief time on the ground, the planes reportedly took off again ... apparently
to deliver those on board to their respective destinations. The 10 accused spies who were
expelled from the U.S. are headed to Russia,... while the four who had been jailed in Russia are
being sent to the West." See also, Nicholas Kulish, Peter Baker, and Ellen Barry, "Prisoner
Swap in Vienna Ends U.S.-Russia Espionage Case," New York Times, 9 July 2010.

 Abbakumova, Natasha, and Andrew Higgins. "U.S. Weighed Spy Swap Well Before 'Sleeper'
Agents Were Arrested." Washington Post, 9 Jul. 2010. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

The four Russians released in the spy swap with Russia flew from Vienna to an RAF base in
Oxfordshire, England, where two of them left the aircraft. A U.S. official identified the two as
Sergei Skripal and Igor Sutyagin. Alexander Zaporozhsky and Gennady Vasilenko continued on
to the United States. "A White House official said [on 9 July 2010] that the Obama
administration began considering a possible spy swap as early as June 11, the date that President
Obama was informed of the case.... The official ... said the United States provided the Russian
government with the names of the four people it wanted released in exchange for the 10 agents."

See also, Scott Shane and Ellen Barry, "Intrigue and Ambiguity in Cases of 4 Russians Sent to
West in Spy Swap," New York Times, 9 Jul. 2010; and Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus,
"Four Spies Russia Freed Have Little in Common with Swap Counterparts," Washington Post, 9
Jul. 2010.

  Vicini, James. "U.S. Deports Another Person in Russian Spy Probe." Reuters, 13 Jul. 2010.
[http://www.reuters.com]

U.S. government officials said on 13 July 2010 that a 23-year-old Russian, identified as Alexey
Karetnikov, had been detained and deported. "U.S. officials declined to comment on whether
Karetnikov was part of the [earlier] spy swap."
 Schwirtz, Michael. "Agents Deported by U.S. Are Honored in Moscow." New York Times, 18
Oct. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 18 October 2010, Russian President Dmitri A. Medvedev awarded government honors to at
least some of the "Russian sleeper agents[] arrested in the United States this summer and
deported to Russia as part of a prisoner exchange." Medvedev's spokeswoman "would not say
which awards were given out or whether all 10 of those arrested this summer were among the
recipients."

 Lefebvre, Stéphane, and Holly Porteous. "The Russian 10 ... 11: An Inconsequential
Adventure?" International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 3 (Fall 2011):
447-466.

This article provides a good survey of the case of the ten Russian illegals rounded up in June
2010 and traded back to Russia for four individuals being held in that country in July. One
conclusion: "[G]iven the expense and long-term commitment of developing and placing these
kinds of assets, one of the 'take aways' of this incident for Russia may be to revisit or reinstill
operational training, operational security, and discipline. Little excuse is acceptable for
operatives to have been so lax about basic operational security and so ignorant of the
technologies they were using."

 Lucas, Edward. Deception: The Untold Story of East-West Espionage Today. New York:
Walker, 2012.

Goulden, Washington Times, 15 Aug. 2012, notes that the author "argues that Russia's dispatch
of the sleeper agents 'is not a laughing matter.'" In Deception, Lucas "contends that 'the most
serious' of the sleeper spies ... was Andrei Bezrukov, who lived in Cambridge, Mass., under the
name of 'Donald Heathfield,' along with his wife, Yelena." To Peake, Studies 56.4 (Dec. 2012),
"Deception is a well-wrttien journalistic account" that provides a "disquieting tale of post-Soviet-
era espionage, security, corruption, and their historical antecedents." The book "is generally well
documented from open sources, but not in all instances."

For West, IJI&C 25.4 (Winter 2012-2013), the author shows "a jaundiced viewpoint of the
Western intelligence community's competence." Also, the book has "[n]umerous ... examples of
minor inexactitudes." Nonetheless, the book's strength is its "stark assessment of how much of
the Russian economy has been seized by faceless men who wield the ability to intimidate overly
inquisitive journalists and orchestrate accidents for incautious rivals."

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents

          Return to Russia 2010 Table of Contents
   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                        Other Cases - By Name
                                                 A
Included here:

1. "Abu Hakim" (and other aliases)

2. Hassan Abu-Jihaad

3. Amerasia Case

4. Michael Allen

5. Robert S. Allen

6. Carlos Alvarez

Materials in each listing presented chronologically..

1. "Abu Hakim" and Other Aliases

 White, Josh. "Translator Who Faked Identity Pleads Guilty To Having Secret Data."
Washington Post, 15 Feb. 2007, A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"An Arabic translator who used an assumed identity to get work as a contractor for the U.S.
Army in Iraq pleaded guilty" on 14 February 2007 in federal court in New York to "charges of
possessing classified national defense documents.... Authorities said ... that they do not even
know the translator's real name." They referred "to him in court documents under several of his
aliases, including 'Abu Hakim' and 'Abdulhakeem Nour.'" He was an employee with secret and
top-secret clearances with the "Titan Corp., which supplied translators to the U.S. military to aid
in fighting the war in Iraq."

2. Hassan Abu-Jihaad

  Frieden, Terry. "Sailor in Spy Case Gets Maximum 10-year Sentence." CNN, 3 Apr. 2009.
[http://www.cnn.com]

On 3 April 2009, former U.S. Navy sailor Hassan Abu-Jihaad was sentenced in U.S. District
Court in Connecticut to 10 years in prison for providing "al Qaeda supporters secret information
about planned ship movements."
3. Amerasia

In 1945, six people, including three government employees, involved in producing or
supplying information to the magazine Amerasia were arrested and accused of espionage
on behalf of the Chinese Communists. Two of the accused eventually plea bargained
convictions for unauthorized possession of government documents and were fined; the
others, including John Stewart Service, were cleared. See Petersen, p. 182, for materials on
this case from the 1950s-1970s.

 George, Willis. Surreptitious Entry. New York: Appleton-Century, 1946.

Clark comment: Disgruntled second-story man for OSS and ONI tells all. For Constantinides,
this is "a good handbook on clandestine techniques of entry ... and on surveillance.... George
headed the OSS team that made entry into Amerasia's offices."

 De Toledano, Ralph. Spies, Dupes, and Diplomats. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1967.

       Wilcox: "Special emphasis on the 'Amerasia' case and John Stewart Service, suspected
       Red spy."

 Klehr, Harvey, and Ronald Radosh. The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism. Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.

       Unsinger, IJI&C 10.2, notes that Klehr and Radosh "supply "an expanded view of the
       familiar case, made possible by greater access to the documents of the period." Wannell,
       WIR 15.4, finds the book to be a "very readable and understandable" presentation of a
       complicated case. The book both explains the Amerasia case itself and portrays its
       aftermath, including "two highly politicized congressional hearings."

       For Schmitt, APSR 91.3, this is "the most definitive account to date of both the case itself
       and its place in the domestic political turmoil over anticommunism which followed." The
       book's focus really is not espionage, but the authors "provide a good if somewhat untidy
       overview of the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of the case."

4. Michael Allen

Michael Allen, "a retired naval senior chief radioman, was arrested for selling classified
information in 1986. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to eight years in prison, a fine
of $10,000, and forfeiture of his retirement pay." Watson, et al, eds., United States
Intelligence, p. 16.

5. Robert S. Allen

  Nicholson, Samuel. "A Most Unlikely Agent: Robert S. Allen." Intelligencer 18, no. 1 (Fall-
Winter 2010): 35-41. [Initially released on 11 September 2010 on
http://www.washingtondecoded.com/site/2010/09/a-most-unlikely-agent.html]
According to Alexander Vassiliev's notebooks (see Haynes/Klehr/Vassiliev, Spies [2009])
Allen, who wrote the "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column with Drew Pearson from 1932 to
1942, was in 1933 "a fully recruited and undoubtedly witting Soviet agent," with the cover name
of "George Parker." This was an ethical breach, not a criminal act, as he was not passing
classified information. The relationship may have existed only in January and February 1933.

6. Carlos Alvarez

  Weaver, Jay. "FIU Couple Plead Guilty in Cuba Spy Case." Miami Herald, 19 Dec. 2006.
[http://www.miami.com]

"[F]ormer Florida International University [FIU] professor Carlos Alvarez pleaded guilty [on 19
December 2006] to conspiring to be an unregistered agent who informed on the Cuban exile
community" for the Cuban government. "His wife, Elsa, an FIU counselor on leave, also pleaded
guilty in Miami federal court to being aware of his illegal activity, harboring him and failing to
disclose it to authorities.... Carlos Alvarez faces up to five years in prison and his wife, Elsa, up
to three years at their sentencing." Assistant U.S. Attorney Matthew Axelrod "said Carlos
Alvarez's involvement with the Cuba intelligence service began in 1977."

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                        Other Cases - By Name
                                               C-F
Included here:

1. Jeffrey M. Carney

2. John Franklin Carter

3. James M. Clark (see Theresa Marie Squillacote)

4. Clyde Lee Conrad

5. Judith Coplon

6. Jack E. Dunlap
7. James Wilbur Fondren, Jr.

8. Kenneth Wayne Ford, Jr.

9. Jane Foster

Materials in each listing presented chronologically.

1. Jeffrey M. Carney

Sgt. Jeffrey M. Carney was an Air Force linguist at an NSA listening post in Berlin from
1982 to 1984. He defected to East Berlin in 1985 and passed on secrets; in 1991, he was
sentenced to 38 years in prison. [Scott Shane, "Some at NSA Betrayed Country," from
Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore Sun, reprint of six-part
series, 3-15 December 1995, 6.] After his defection, Carney changed his name to Jens
Karney. [Benjamin B. Fischer, "The GDR's Exceptional Spies," International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 1 (Spring 2009), 265/fn. 5.] Carney served 11
years of his sentence before being released. [Fischer, 265/fn. 6.]

2. John Franklin Carter

  Coyle, Gene A. "John Franklin Carter: Journalist, FDR's Secret Investigator, Soviet Agent?"
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 148-172.

The author looks at the indirect accusation by Pavel Sudoplatov that Carter had been a GRU
agent during the war. In the end, Coyle can only reach the conclusion that "a fair assessment is
that the allegation is plausible."

3. James M. Clark (see Theresa Marie Squillacote)

4. Clyde Lee Conrad

Retired Army Sergeant Clyde Lee Conrad was arrested in 1988 by Federal Republic of
Germany authorities and tried for espionage on behalf of the Hungarian and Czechoslovak
intelligence services between 1976 and 1988. He was convicted by the Koblenz State
Appellate Court on June 6, 1990, and sentenced to life in prison.

Four others were later convicted on espionage charges in Florida for involvement with
Conrad's spy ring: Roderick James Ramsay, sentenced in August 1992 to 36 years in
prison; Jeffrey Rondeau and Jeffrey Gregory, sentenced in June 1994 to 18 years each; and
Kelly Therese Warren, sentenced on 12 February 1999 to 25 years in prison. Associated
Press, "Former Soldier Gets 25 Years for Her Role in Espionage Plot," Washington Post, 13
Feb. 1999. Reuters, "Woman Gets 25-Year Term for Spying in Germany," New York Times,
14 Feb. 1999. Counterintelligence News and Developments, "Former Army Clerk
Sentenced," Mar. 1999.
  Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Spy Dies in Prison." Mar. 1998.
[http://www.nacic.gov]

"Clyde Lee Conrad ... died on January 8, 1998, in a German prison where he was serving a life
sentence. The 50-year-old Conrad was convicted of masterminding an espionage ring that sold
highly sensitive information to Hungarian and Czechoslovak intelligence agents from 1975 to
1985."



5. Judith Coplon

Judith Coplon (Judith Socolov) died on 26 February 2011. See Sam Roberts, "Judith
Coplon, Haunted by Espionage Case, Dies at 89," New York Times, 1 Mar. 2011 (corrected
3 Mar. 2011).

  Mitchell, Marcia, and Thomas Mitchell. The Spy Who Seduced America. Montpelier, VT:
Invisible Cities Press, 2002.

Bath, NIPQ 19.1/2, notes that the authors conclude that, based on the Venona transcripts, Judith
Coplon was indeed a spy. However, "the government's unceasing efforts to convict on the basis
of inept investigation and tainted evidence" also made her a victim. For Jonkers, Intelligencer
13.2, this story is still relevant because it teaches "how NOT to prosecute an accused spy."
(Emphasis in original) The reviewer's bottomline: "Good reading, deep secrets, still relevant -- a
triple hit."

To Peake, Studies 47.2 (2003), the Mitchells "have done a superb job of researching this famous
case. And although their decision not to include endnotes is impossible to comprehend,
[footnote omitted] they did indicate in the text the major sources used." And they "leave no room
for doubt as to Coplon's guilt.... Judy Coplon's notorious story is a major part of
counterintelligence history and the Mitchells have brought it to life in vivid terms. It is a great
read." Similarly, Leab, I&NS 20.2 (Jun. 2005), finds that the authors have "used intelligently a
wide range of sources.... The book is a good read."

6. Jack E. Dunlap

Sgt. Jack E. Dunlap was a NSA courier who allegedly sold secrets to the Soviet Union for
three years; he killed himself while under investigation in 1962. Scott Shane, "Some at NSA
Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore
Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995, 6.

7. James Wilbur Fondren, Jr.

 CNN. "Defense Official Charged in Spy Conspiracy." 13 May 2009. [http://www.cnn.com]
According to a criminal complaint unsealed in the Eastern District of Virginia on 13 May 2009,
Pentagon official James Wilbur Fondren, Jr. "has been charged with conspiracy to communicate
classified information to a person he believed represented China's government." Fondren worked
as the "deputy director for the Washington liaison office for U.S. Pacific Command."

 Markon, Jerry. "Defense Department Official Convicted in Espionage Case." Washington Post,
25 Sep. 2009. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 25 September 2009, a federal jury in Alexandria, Virginia, convicted James W. Fondren Jr.
"of providing classified information to a Chinese government agent and lying to the FBI about
it." He "faces as much as 20 years in prison when he is sentenced" on 22 January 2010.

 Markon, Jerry. "Defense Official Gets Three Years for Espionage." Washington Post, 22 Jan.
2010. [http://voices.washingtonpost.com]

On 22 January 2010, former Defense Department official James W. Fondren, Jr., "was sentenced
to three years in prison."

8. Kenneth Wayne Ford, Jr.

 Shane, Scott. "Ex-Federal Employee Indicted on Documents Charge." New York Times, 24
May 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Former NSA employee Kenneth Wayne Ford Jr. has been "indicted in Maryland for possession
of classified documents. The federal indictment said ... Ford ... left the agency in late 2003 and
was arrested on Jan. 12, 2004, for illegally possessing secret information 'relating to the national
defense.'" Associated Press, 24 May 2005, adds that the 23 May 2005 indictment included
"charges of unlawfully possessing classified national defense information and making a false
statement" in a submission to Lockheed Martin for a security clearance.

 Castaneda, Ruben. "Md. Man on Trial Over NSA Documents." Washington Post, 30 Nov. 2005,
B5. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Kenneth W. Ford, Jr., who worked as a computer expert at NSA, is on trial in U.S. District Court
in Greenbelt, Maryland, "on charges that he took national security documents without
authorization. Ford is also accused of failing to inform a prospective private-sector employer,
who required him to have a security clearance, that he was charged with taking the secret
documents illegally."

  U.S. Attorney's Office. District of Maryland. "Former Maryland NSA Employee Convicted of
Wrongfully Possessing Classified Information." 16 Dec. 2005.
[http://usaomd.blogspot.com/2005_12_11_usaomd_archive.html -- no longer active link
11/28/12]
On 15 December 2005, "a federal jury convicted Kenneth Wayne Ford, Jr., ... on charges of
unlawfully possessing classified information related to the national defense, and making a false
statement to a U.S. government agency."

9. Jane Foster

 Conant, Jennet. A Covert Affair: Julia Child and Paul Child in the OSS. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2011.

According to Peake, Studies 55.3 (Sep. 2011), "we learn in considerable detail" what Paul Child,
Jane Foster, Elizabeth MacDonald, and Julia McWilliams did in the OSS during World War II.
Of course, "there is no actual covert affair" here, but "[s]ervice in the OSS was a formative
experience for all involved in the story."

Cimino, AIJ 29.2 (2011), stresses that this book's title is "tremendously misleading," as "[t]he
major character is actually Jane Foster." The story reads like fiction novel, "only the story is real.
The characters with all of their talents and flaws are captivating." Similarly, Goulden,
Washington Times, 15 Apr. 2011, accuses the publisher of pulling a "blatantly egregious ... bait-
and-switch sting on an unwary reader.... Foster's story alone did not warrant a book; roping in the
famed Julia Child seems a ploy, but one that falls flat." See also review by Chapman, IJI&C
25.3 (Fall 2012).

 Foster, Jane. An Unamerican Lady. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1980.

       Constantinides notes that Foster, who worked in Morale Operations with OSS during
       World War II, was indicted with her husband in 1957 as Soviet agents. In discussing her
       OSS experiences, Foster "relates much about personal, social, and administrative matters
       but precious little about her operations." With regard to the charges brought against her,
       she denies being a Soviet agent but admits that she lied about her Communist Party
       membership and marital status.

       The indictment against Foster came on the basis of information from FBI double agent
       Boris Morros. See Morros, My Ten Years as a Counterspy (1959). See also, Conant, A
       Covert Affair (2011).

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                        Other Cases - By Name
                                               K
Included here:

1. Ben-Ami Kadish

2. William P. Kampiles

3. Tyler G. Kent

4. Robert C. Kim

5. Daniel M. King

6. Karl F. Koecher

Materials in each listing presented chronologically.

1. Ben-Ami Kadish

Click for reportage on this case.

2. William P. Kampiles

William Kampiles worked as a watch officer at the CIA Operations Center March-
November 1977. When he resigned from the CIA, he took with him a copy of the technical
manual for the KH-11 reconnaissance satellite which he sold to Soviet intelligence for
$3,000. Caught, tried, and convicted of espionage, Kampiles was sentenced to 40 years in
prison.

  O'Toole, Thomas, and Charles Babcock. "CIA 'Big Bird' Satellite Manual Was Allegedly Sold
to the Soviets." Washington Post, 23 Aug. 1978, A1, A16.

 Aviation Week & Space Technology. Editors. "Former CIA Officer Arrested in Secret Satellite
Manual Sale: The Case of William P. Kampiles." 28 Aug. 1978, 22-23. [Petersen]

 Hurt, Henry. "CIA in Crisis: The Kampiles Case." Reader's Digest, Jun. 1979, 65-72.

  Tully, Andrew. Inside the FBI: From the Files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Independent Sources. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.

       According to Constantinides, the counterintelligence and counterespionage aspects of
       this book are all in one chapter and include three cases: William Kampiles' sale of the
       KH-11 manual to the Soviets, the Troung and Humphrey arrests and convictions for
       passing documents to the North Vietnamese, and the FBI's double-agent operation
       against the Soviets using U.S. Navy officer Lindberg. Tully adds little to our
       understanding of the three cases.

3. Tyler G. Kent

 Snow, John Howard. The Case of Tyler Kent. New York: Domestic & Foreign Affairs &
Citizens Press, 1946.

       Constantinides calls this book "a rambling, incoherent, and disconnected political tract
       that adds nothing relevant to our knowledge."

 Kimball, Warren F. "Roosevelt and the Pre-War Commitments to Churchill: The Tyler Kent
Affair." Diplomatic History 5 (Fall 1981): 291-311. [Petersen]

 Lownie, Andrew. "Tyler Kent: The Spy in the Code Room." Back Channels 1, no. 3 (Spring
1992): 16-17.

       U.S. code clerk arrested in London in 1940 for spying; question remains, "Who for?"

  Bearse, Ray, and Anthony Read. Conspirator: The Untold Story of Tyler Kent. Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1991. [pb] Read, Anthony, and Ray Bearse. The Conspirator: The Untold Story
of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Tyler Kent, Spy. London: Macmillan, 1992.

       Surveillant 1.5, 2.6: "Well-written, scholarly biography of American code clerk, Tyler G.
       Kent,... allegedly subverted by the Soviets ... and later convicted of stealing some 2,000
       classified messages from the U.S. Embassy in London during the late 1930's and early
       1940's.... Highly recommended."

4. Robert C. Kim

Robert C. Kim, a civilian Navy intelligence analyst, was accused of passing military secrets
to South Korea. Kim worked at the Office of Naval Intelligence in suburban Maryland. He
was accused of supplying classified information to an employee of the office of the South
Korean military attaché. (New York Times, 1 Apr. 1997, A10) On 7 May 1997, under a plea
agreement, Kim entered a plea of guilty to one count of espionage. (CNN, 7 May 1997)

 Hall, Charles W., and Dana Priest. "Navy Worker Is Accused of Passing Secrets." Washington
Post, 26 Sep. 1996, A1, 14-15.

See also, Bill Gertz, "Seoul to Recall Attache Linked to Spy Suspect," Washington Times, 26
Sep. 1996, A1, 13; Robert S. Greenberger, "U.S. Navy Worker Is Charged as Spy for South
Korea," Wall Street Journal, 26 Sep. 1996, A9; David Johnston, "U.S. Charges Navy Civilian
with Spying," New York Times, 26 Sep. 1996, A10 (N).

 Pae, Peter, and Lena H. Sun. "Charges of Passing Secrets Puzzle Friends of Suspect."
Washington Post, 27 Sep. 1996, A18.
 Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Even Among Allies, Sharing Has Limits." Washington Post, 27 Sep. 1996,
A18.

 Hall, Charles W., and Walter Pincus. "Spy Suspects Refusing to Go Quietly." Washington Post,
23 Jan. 1997, A9.

Robert C. Kim, Harold Nicholson, Earl Edwin Pitts cases.

 Masters, Brooke A. "Alleged Spy for South Korea to Plead Guilty on Lesser Charges, Sources
Say." Washington Post, 6 May 1997, A10.

 Masters, Brooke A. "Prosecutors Say Former Navy Employee Gave Information to S. Korea."
Washington Post, 12 Jul. 1997.

On 11 July 1997, former Office of Naval Intelligence computer specialist Robert C. Kim was
sentenced in U.S. District Court in Alexandria, VA, "to nine years in prison for spying after
prosecutors said Kim passed classified documents to his native South Korea." Kim had "pleaded
guilty to conspiring to gather national defense information, which has a maximum sentence of 10
years."



5. Daniel M. King

 Stout, David. "Naval Petty Officer Is Accused of Giving Russia Information." New York Times,
30 Nov. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to military officials, Petty Officer First Class Daniel M. King, a Navy code expert,
was arrested on 5 November 1999 and charged with "passing intelligence about submarines to
the Russians while he worked in a Navy unit of the National Security Agency at Fort Meade,
Md."

 Timberg, Craig. "Court Rules Spy Hearing Must Begin Again Publicly." Washington Post, 9
Dec. 2000, B2. [http://washingtonpost.com]

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals ruled on 7 December 2000 that the court
hearing of Petty Officer 1st Class Daniel King must start over because "more of the hearing must
be conducted in public."

  Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Navy Drops Espionage Charges." Mar. 2001.
[http://www.nacic.gov]

"On March 9, 2001, the US Navy dropped all espionage charges against Navy Petty Officer First
Class Daniel King. The officer overseeing the Navy's prosecution of the sailor stated in a letter
that because of King's mental state during questioning, and the lack of corroborating evidence,
he doubted the validity of King's confession."
  Loeb, Vernon. "Charges Filed in Failed Spy Probe." Washington Post, 18 Apr. 2001, A19.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The court-appointed military defense attorneys "for Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Daniel M. King
filed military charges this week against three Navy attorneys and a Navy spokeswoman for their
actions in a failed espionage prosecution brought against King in the fall of 1999."

6. Karl F. Koecher

"KARL F. KOECHER, a former CIA employee, and his wife, were arrested 27 November
[1984].... In 1962 Koecher was trained as a foreign agent by Czech intelligence. He and his
wife staged a phony defection to the US in 1965.... Both became naturalized citizens in 1971
and Koecher obtained a translator job with the CIA two years later where he translated
Top Secret materials until 1975. Koecher ... was arrested after being observed making
frequent contact with KGB operatives. According to Federal prosecutors, Mrs. Koecher
operated as a paid courier for Czech intelligence until 1983. An FBI agent testified that
from February 1973 to August 1983, Karl Koecher passed on to Czech agents highly
classified materials including names of CIA personnel.... [T]he case never came to trial. On
11 February 1985, Koecher was exchanged in Berlin for Soviet dissident Anatoly
Shcharansky." U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, Recent Espionage
Cases, 1975-1999.

 Kessler, Ronald. Spy vs. Spy: Stalking Soviet Spies in America. New York: Scribner's, 1988.
Spy vs. Spy: The Shocking True Story of the FBI's War Against Soviet Agents in America. New
York: Pocket Books, 1988. [pb]

       According to Evans, IJI&C 3.3, Spy vs. Spy is "easy for laymen to read and entertains."
       However, the subtitle is misleading because the case of the Koechers, who were Czech
       spies, takes up "a large part or all of five of the nineteen chapters." Pollard, who spied for
       Israel, takes up most of Chapter 13. And Chapter 14 belongs to Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a
       PRC spy. The book "reflects ... many institutional prejudices and parochial viewpoints,
       especially regarding the CIA." Cram says this is an "interesting and useful compendium"
       that constitutes a "valuable contribution to counterintelligence literature on the FBI
       experience."

       NameBase comments that "[m]ost of this book recounts the story of Karl F. Koecher and
       his wife Hana, whom Kessler interviewed in 1987. In 1965 they orchestrated a phony
       defection from the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, after which Karl became a
       naturalized U.S. citizen, worked full-time for the CIA beginning in 1973, and continued
       as a contract agent after 1977. He ... spent many of his weekends as a 'swinger' at spouse-
       swapping parties with Hana. By 1982 the FBI's counterintelligence squad was getting
       suspicious. In 1984 Karl Koecher admitted that he had been spying for the East all along,
       and in 1986 he and Hana were traded for Natan Sharansky."

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents
   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                       Other Cases - By Name
                                             M-R
Included here:

1. Pedro Leonardo Mascheroni and Marjorie Roxby Mascheroni

2. Ronald N. Montaperto

3. Edwin G. Moore, II

4. Stewart D. Nozette

5. James S. Petersen, Jr.

6. Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber

7. Nada Prouty

Materials in each listing presented chronologically.

1. Pedro Leonardo Mascheroni and Marjorie Roxby Mascheroni

 Broad, William J. "Couple Accused of Passing Nuclear Arms Secrets." New York Times, 17
Sep. 2010. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 17 September 2010, physicist Pedro Leonardo Mascheroni and his wife, Marjorie Roxby
Mascheroni, both of whom once worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, were arrested
and "charged with a criminal conspiracy to help Venezuela build an atom bomb.... The arrests ...
and a 22-count indictment came after a sting operation" by the FBI. "The government did not
accuse the Venezuelan government, or anyone working for it, of seeking weapons secrets."

The indictment for the Mascheronis in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico is
available at: https://www.fas.org/irp/news/2010/09/masch-indict.pdf. See also, Associated Press,
"Not-Guilty Pleas by Couple Accused of Passing Secrets to Venezuela," 20 Sep. 2010.
2. Ronald N. Montaperto

 Gertz, Bill. "Ex-DIA Analyst Admits Passing Secrets to China." Washington Times, 23 Jun.
2006. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]

Former DIA analyst Ronald N. Montaperto "has pleaded guilty to illegally holding classified
documents and admitted in a plea agreement to passing 'top secret' information to Chinese
intelligence officials.... The guilty plea was part of an agreement reached [on 21 June 2006] in
U.S. District Court in Alexandria.... A Pentagon official said Montaperto's value to China
included both the secrets he shared and his role facilitating Chinese deception of U.S.
intelligence by providing feedback on how those efforts were working."

3. Edwin G. Moore, II
"EDWIN G. MOORE II, a retired CIA employee, was arrested by the FBI in 1976 and
charged with espionage after attempting to sell classified documents to Soviet officials.... A
search of his residence yielded ten boxes of classified CIA documents. Moore retired from
the CIA in 1973, and although financial gain was a strong motivational factor leading to
espionage, it is known that he was disgruntled with his former employer due to lack of
promotion. Moore ... was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison. He was granted
parole in 1979." U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, Recent Espionage
Cases, 1975-1999.

4. Stewart D. Nozette

 Wilber, Del Quentin. "Maryland Scientist Is Charged with Spying for Israel." Washington Post,
19 Oct. 2009. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to federal prosecutors, Stewart D. Nozette was charged on 19 October 2009 "with
trying to sell top-secret information to Israel for $11,000.... Authorities said the charges stemmed
[from] an undercover sting operation in which an FBI agent posed as an Israeli spy.... Nozette
worked for the Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory from 1990
through 1999" and "was president of the Alliance for Competitive Technology, a nonprofit group
he founded in 1990. He has held security clearances as high as top secret and had regular access
to classified information as recently as 2006." Prosecutors and FBI officials said that Nozette
gave the FBI agent "classified information about the country's satellites, early-warning systems
and its ability to retaliate against a large-scale attack."

Associated Press,"US Scientist Indicted for Trying to Provide Israel with Classified
Information," 22 Oct. 2009, reports the grand jury indictment of Nozette. Steven Aftergood,
"Scientist Stewart Nozette Pleads Guilty to Attempted Espionage," Secrecy News, 8 Sep. 2011,
reports that Nozette "pleaded guilty [on 7 September 2011] to attempted espionage for providing
classified information to an undercover FBI agent posing as an Israeli intelligence officer."
5. Joseph Sidney Petersen, Jr.

Petersen was an "NSA code-breaker charged in 1954 with providing secret documents to
the Netherlands; served four years in prison." Scott Shane, "Some at NSA Betrayed
Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore Sun, reprint
of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995, 6.

  Wiebes, Cees. "Operation 'Piet': The Joseph Sidney Petersen Jr. Spy Case, a Dutch 'Mole'
Inside the National Security Agency." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 4 (Aug. 2008):
488-535.

Arrested in 1954, Petersen had been working for the Dutch for over 10 years.

6. Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber

 Anderson, Jack, and Fred Blumenthal. "Trapped at the Washington Monument." Parade, 6 Jan.
1957, 6-8.

According to Pforzheimer, Studies 6.2 (Spring 1962), this article tells the story of two
naturalized Americans, Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber, "who became Soviet intelligence agents in
Vienna." Ponger was sentenced to 15 years in prison, while Verber received 10 years.

7. Nada Prouty

 Shenon, Philip. "C.I.A. Officer Admits Guilt Over Hezbollah Files." New York Times, 14 Nov.
2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 13 November 2007, Nada Nadim Prouty, "[a] Lebanese-born C.I.A. officer" who previously
worked for the FBI, "pleaded guilty ... to charges that she illegally sought classified information"
from FBI computers about the radical Islamic group Hezbollah. Prouty "also confessed that she
had fraudulently obtained American citizenship." She "faces up to 16 years in prison." The plea
agreement "appeared to expose grave flaws in the methods used" by the CIA and FBI "to
conduct background checks."

See also, Michael Isikoff, et al. "Dangerous Liaisons: Nada Prouty Worked for the FBI and CIA.
Now There's Worry She's Not Who They Thought She Was," Newsweek, 26 Nov. 2007, 35; and
Joby Warrick and Dan Eggen. "Ex-FBI Employee's Case Raises New Security Concerns: Sham
Marriage Led to U.S. Citizenship," Washington Post, 14 Nov. 2007, A3.

  Pelley, Scott. "The Case Against Nada Prouty." CBS: 60 Minutes, 28 Mar. 2010.
[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/26/60minutes/main6335794.shtml]

The "60 Minutes" segment is certainly part of Prouty's public effort to generate support for her
effort to regain her U.S. citizenship. The program includes favorable comments on her work
from Bob Grenier, retired former CIA station chief in Islamabad, Pakistan, and head of the CIA's
Counter-Terrorism Center. Grenier is also quoted as saying that a full investigation "completely
exonerated" Prouty of being a Hezbollah spy. Although her citizenship was revoked, the judge
who sentenced her blocked her deportation. She lives today in Virginia as a "deportable alien."

Jeff Stein, "Spy Talk: The Haunting of Nada Prouty, a Counterterrorism Heroine,"
http://blog.washingtonpost.com, 30 Mar. 2010, calls the "60 Minutes" piece "sympathetic" to
Prouty.

Prouty has a Website at http://nadaprouty.com/, which features her book -- Nada Prouty,
Uncompromised: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of an Arab American Patriot in the CIA
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

A Justice Department statement released to the Detroit Free Press on 19 March 2010
[http://www.freep.com], "makes no apologies for the prosecution of Nada Prouty....
Unfortunately, it appears that Prouty today seeks to cast herself as a victim of the U.S.
government and the subject of an overzealous prosecution.... The only victim in this case was the
U.S. government which was repeatedly defrauded by Prouty and risked compromise because of
her illegal acts.... She has no one to blame but herself for her predicament."

See also, The Daily Star (Lebanon), "Ex-CIA 'Spy for Hizbullah' Fights to Stay in US," 23 Jun.
2010. [http://www.dailystar.com.lb]

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                       Other Cases - By Name
                                               B
Included here:

1. David H. Barnett

2. Virginia Jean Baynes

3. Felix Bloch

4. Herbert Boeckenhaupt

5. Christopher Boyce and Andrew Lee
6. Joseph Garfield Brown

Materials in each listing presented chronologically.

1. David H. Barnett

David H. Barnett worked for the CIA until 1970, with duty in the Far East and the United
States. Strapped for money, he approached Soviet intelligence in 1976 and began selling the
names of CIA agents and other information. Arrested in 1980, he was convicted and
sentenced to 18 years in prison. Watson, et al, eds., United States Intelligence, p. 36.

2. Virginia Jean Baynes

In 1991, "an internal CIA inquiry determined that [Virginia Jean] Baynes,... assigned ... to
the embassy in Manila, had passed two or three classified documents to [Joseph Garfield]
Brown. Baynes had met Brown when she enrolled in a karate class which he taught at an
embassy annex. According to Baynes, as the friendship between her and Brown grew in the
late summer of 1990, he asked her to obtain CIA information on assassinations planned by
an insurgent group that were to be carried out in the Philippines. Baynes who held a Top
Secret clearance complied with his request by removing secret documents from the
embassy.... Baynes pleaded guilty to espionage in federal court on 22 May 1992, and served
a 41-month prison term." U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, Recent
Espionage Cases, 1975-1999 at http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage/ [no longer active
1/31/08].

3. Felix Bloch

Felix Bloch, a Foreign Service officer, was accused in 1989 of spying for Russia; he was
never charged. Dershowitz' description below is apt.

 Mackenzie, Hillary, and John Holland. "A Case of Espionage: The FBI Investigates an
American Diplomat." Maclean's, 7 Aug. 1989, 27.

       This contemporaneous article notes that Bloch had been relieved of his senior position at
       the State Department and placed on administrative leave. Investigators apparently
       videotaped him in Paris handing over a briefcase to a KGB agent.

 Dershowitz, Alan. "A Curious Case Gets Curiouser." Washington Times, 27 Dec. 1989, F3.

 Wise, David. "The Felix Bloch Affair." New York Times Magazine, 13 May 1990, 28-31 ff.

  Leppard, David, Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Paul Nuki, Gareth Walsh, and Clive Freeman. "Briton's
Treachery Exposed by Keeper of KGB's Secrets: Defector Smuggled Out Copies of the 'Crown
Jewels' of Soviet Espionage." Sunday Times (London), 12 Sept. 1999. [http://www.the-
times.co.uk]
Vasili Mitrokhin was head archivist of the KGB's First Chief Directorate until he retired in 1985.
He regularly removed key files from storage, copied down their contents on pieces of paper,
smuggled them past the security guards, took them to his home, and typed up verbatim
transcripts of his handwritten notes.

In 1992, "he travelled to Latvia, taking thousands of pages of his documents with him. He
walked into the American embassy in Riga and asked if he could defect.... Incredibly, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers at the embassy were not interested.... The documents he had
were clearly not originals and could easily have been fakes....

"Undeterred, Mitrokhin went to the British embassy," where a Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
officer "spotted his potential. After a series of in-depth interviews and consultations with
headquarters, Mitrokhin was formally accepted as an MI6 agent.... Within weeks of his defection,
MI6 carried out a delicate operation to remove the files [hidden in Mitrokhin's house and
garden].... The classified files went back to the 1930s....

"[S]enior intelligence officers say that the files have generated hundreds of new leads and could
lead to a spate of new espionage prosecutions.... Some of Mitrokhin's information helped to
convict Robert Lipka, a former clerk at the National Security Agency. He had spied for the
Russians in the late 1960s but had evaded FBI surveillance until Mitrokhin came in. He is now
serving an 18-year sentence.

"Another case that has been reopened is that of Felix Bloch, the highest-ranking State
Department official ever investigated for espionage. He was fired in 1989 and stripped of his
pension, but the FBI never had enough evidence to charge him."

  Macintyre, Ben. "Files Led FBI to Agent at Work in US." Times (London), 13 Sep. 1999.
[http://www.the-times.co.uk]

According to former KGB officer Vasili Mitrokhin and Cambridge historian Christopher
Andrew, Robert Lipka, a former clerk at the National Security Agency, was captured "through
information contained in the 'Mitrokhin files.'" Lipka is "currently serving an 18-year sentence
for espionage."

The files "are also believed to contain information ... on the enduring mystery of Felix Bloch....
The State Department alleged he had engaged in 'illegal activities involving agents of a foreign
intelligence service', but he was never charged and instead lost his job for lying to the FBI about
the incident."

  Blythe, Anne. "As Spy Meeting Looms, Suspect Still on Agenda: Ex-Diplomat Lives Quietly
in Triangle." News & Observer (Raleigh, NC), 23 Mar. 2009. [http://www.newsobserver.com]

"Felix Bloch, the suspected spy never charged with espionage, [now] lives in relative anonymity,
driving a Chapel Hill bus."
4. Herbert Boeckenhaupt

Herbert Boeckenhaupt, an Air Force communications specialist and crypto-repairman
stationed at March AFB, California, was arrested in October 1966 for selling classified
information to the Soviet GRU. He was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
Watson, et al, eds., United States Intelligence, p. 47.

5. Christopher Boyce and Andrew Lee

 Lindsey, Robert. The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979. New York: Pocket Books, 1979. [pb] London: Jonathan
Cape, 1980.

       Clark comment: Lindsey tells the story of how Christopher John Boyce and Andrew
       Daulton Lee sold out TRW, the CIA, and their country. Constantinides finds this book
       surprisingly good, given the brief length of time the author had to work on it. Nonetheless,
       "there are errors and some aspects that cause criticism.... There is a tendency toward
       broad, flat statements.... The plethora of direct quotes and descriptive detail lacks any
       source notes whatsoever." Lindsey tells the story of Boyce's escape and recapture in The
       Flight of the Falcon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).

6. Joseph Garfield Brown

"JOSEPH GARFIELD BROWN, former US airman [1966-1968] and martial arts
instructor, was arrested by FBI agents on 27 December 1992, and charged with spying for
the Philippine government. Brown allegedly provided an official there with illegally
obtained secret CIA documents.... [On 28 December 1992,] he was indicted on three counts
of espionage in federal court in Alexandria, Virginia. Brown ... [was] accused of obtaining
classified documents in 1990 and 1991 in Manila from CIA secretary, VIRGINIA JEAN
BAYNES, and passing them to a Philippine government official.... Brown pleaded guilty in
April 1993 to a charge of conspiring to commit espionage.... He was sentenced to nearly six
years in prison." U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Service, Recent Espionage
Cases, 1975-1999 at http://www.dss.mil/training/espionage/ [no longer active 1/31/08].

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                       Other Cases - By Name
                                              G-J
Included here:

1. George and Marisol Gari

2. Noshir Gowadia

3. James W. Hall, III

4. Maurice Halperin

5. Victor N. Hamilton

6. Kitty Harris

7. Joseph G. Helmich, Jr.

8. Gerardo Hernandez

9. Robert Lee Johnson

Materials in each listing presented chronologically.

1. George and Marisol Gari

 Seper, Jerry. "Couple Charged as Spies." Washington Times, 1 Sep. 2001. [http://www.
washtimes.com]

George and Marisol Gari were arrested on 31 August 2001 and charged with "conspiracy to act
as agents of a foreign government without proper identification or notice to the attorney general."
U.S. authorities say that they were members of "the largest Cuban spy ring ever detected,... 'La
Red Avispa,' or the Wasp Network, five members of whom were convicted in June of conspiring
to spy on the United States for Fidel Castro's regime."

Reuters, 23 Sep. 2001, reports that Marisol Gari has "pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy
to act as an unregistered agent for Cuba.... George Gari pleaded guilty ... to one count of acting
as an unregistered agent for Cuba." According to the Associated Press, 7 Jan. 2002, George Gari
was sentenced to a federal prison term of seven years, and Marisol Gari to 3 1/2 years.

2. Noshir Gowadia

 Regan, Tom. "More Charges against B2 Bomber Designer Accused of Spying: Indicted
Engineer Pleads 'Not Guilty' to Selling Secrets to China, Israel, and Others." Christian Science
Monitor, 13 Nov. 2006. [http://www.csmonitor.com]
Noshir Gowadia, indicted in November 2005 for selling secrets about the B2 stealth bomber to
China, "has been charged with additional counts of spying in an indictment returned by a grand
jury last week." ABC News has reported that Gowadia "was also accused of trying to sell more
US classified military information to individuals in Israel, Germany, and Switzerland." Gowadia
was "one of the lead engineers" on the B2 bomber project.

  Gertz, Bill. "Engineer Indicted on Spying." Washington Times, 12 Dec. 2007.
[http://www.washingtontimes.com]

According to a federal indictment, former U.S. defense contractor Noshir S. Gowadia "spent
more than two years working with China's military to design and test a radar-evading component
for a new Chinese cruise missile as part of an espionage conspiracy." The indictment states that
Gowadia "worked closely with a Chinese government agent and missile technicians to illegally
supply the stealth-missile technology during six visits to China between 2003 and 2005."

 Daranciang, Nelson. "Accused Spy in Pretrial Hearings." Star-Bulletin (Honolulu), 10 Jan.
2009. [http://www.starbulletin.com]

On 9 January 2009, a federal court in Honolulu heard pretrial motions in the criminal trial of
Noshir Gowadia on charges "of selling secrets about the B-2 bomber to China, trying to sell
military secrets to other countries, money laundering and making false statements. His trial is
scheduled for April."

 McAvoy, Audrey. "Opening Statements Begin in Hawaii Spy Trial." Associated Press, 13 Apr.
2010. [http://www.ap.org]

On 13 April 2010, assistant U.S. Attorney Ken Sorenson told a jury that Noshir Gowadia
betrayed the United States "by selling military secrets to China." Gowadia's "defense countered
that the information he passed on was 'obvious' and 'well-known.'" Gowadia worked at Northrop
Corp. 1968-1986, and "helped design the propulsion system for the B-2 stealth bomber."
Gowadia's "trial is expected to last into July."

  CNN. "Engineer Gets 32 Years in Jail for Selling Defense Designs to China." 25 Jan 2011.
[http://www.cnn.com]

Convicted by a federal jury in August 2010, Noshir Gowadia was sentenced on 24 January 2011
to "32 years in prison for selling secret defense designs to China."

3. James W. Hall, III

James W. Hall, III, was an Army warrant officer and intelligence analyst in Germany who
sold eavesdropping and code secrets to East Germany and the Soviet Union from 1983 to
1988; he is serving 40-year sentence for those activities. Scott Shane, "Some at NSA
Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore
Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995, 6.
4. Maurice Halperin

 Kirschner, Don S. Cold War Exile: The Unclosed Case of Maurice Halperin. Columbia, MO:
University of Missouri Press, 1995.

Clark comment: Accused by Elizabeth Bentley of passing OSS secrets to the Soviets during
World War II, Maurice Halperin fled to Mexico, Moscow, Cuba, and eventually Vancouver. Was
he a spy for the Soviet Union or a scapegoat during the peak of the McCarthy era?

Surveillant 4.4/5 calls this book "a sympathetic historical analysis of a dyed-in-the-wool leftist."
Peake, "OSS and the Venona Decrypts," I&NS 12.3 (Jul. 1997), 25-26, links Halperin to two
cypytonyms in the Venona traffic -- "Hare" and, later, "Stowaway" -- but acknowledges that
"there is no way to positively identify him as 'Hare' working solely from the messages released."
See Haynes, Klehr, and Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (2009), pp.
312-314, for a clear connection of Halperin to the cypytonym "Hare."



5. Victor N. Hamilton

Victor N. Hamilton was an "Arabic linguist at NSA who defected to Moscow in 1963." He
"has resided in [a] Russian hospital for 30 years, diagnosed with schizophrenia." Scott
Shane, "Some at NSA Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom Bowman, "No Such
Agency," Baltimore Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995, 6.

6. Kitty Harris
 Damaskin, Igor, and Geoffrey Elliott. Kitty Harris: The Spy with Seventeen Names. London: St.
Ermin's, 2001.

Unsinger, IJI&C 17.1, finds that the authors "use Kitty Harris's life to explain a great deal about
the USSR's International Department and its personnel." The Soviet files used by the authors
"describe Harris not as a case officer, but simply a cutout for [Earl] Browder [from 1923 to
1929], doing his courier work." During World Warr II, "she began doing work in support of
Soviet espionage efforts in the atomic energy sphere, in her usual capacity as courier and cutout."
The book "is somewhat of a disappointment," in that it has "just a few quotes from papers in the
KGB's Harris files."

7. Joseph G. Helmich, Jr.

Joseph G. Helmich, Jr., was a "former Army warrant officer who sold details of U.S. code
machines to the Soviet Union from 1963 to 1966; arrested and sentenced to life in prison in
1981." Scott Shane, "Some at NSA Betrayed Country," from Scott Shane and Tom
Bowman, "No Such Agency," Baltimore Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995,
6.

 Deavours, Cipher A. "Helmich and the KL-7." Cryptologia 6, no. 3 (1982): 283-284.
8. Gerardo Hernandez

 Pressley, Sue Anne. "Five Cuban Agents Guilty of Spying on U.S." Washington Post, 9 Jun.
2001, A12. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 8 June 2001, a federal jury in Miami "convicted five Cuban agents of espionage against the
United States.... The leader of the group, Gerardo Hernandez, was found guilty of contributing to
the death of four fliers from the Brothers to the Rescue exile group who were shot down in 1996
in international airspace by Cuban MiGs. Prosecutors alleged that Hernandez steered fellow
spies away from the targeted flights and delivered a message to Havana that led to the
shootdown."

9. Robert Lee Johnson

 Barron, John. "The Sergeant Who Opened the Door." Reader's Digest 104 (Jan. 1974): 187-
194 ff.

       Petersen: "Robert Lee Johnson sold NATO secrets to Russia."

 Campbell, Kenneth J. "Robert L. Johnson: The Army Johnnie Walker." American Intelligence
Journal 11, no. 2 (1990): 5-10. [Petersen]

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                       Other Cases - By Name
                                               L
Included here:

1. Kurt G. Lessenthien

2. Robert S. Lipka

3. Clayton Lonetree

Materials in each listing presented chronologically.
1. Kurt G. Lessenthien

 Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Navy Spy Sentenced." Nov 1996. [http://
www.nacic.gov]

"After he admitted to trying to sell military secrets to Russia, Petty Officer Kurt G. Lessenthien -
a nuclear submarine crewmen and instructor at the Navy's Nuclear Power School in Orlando,
Florida - was sentenced to 27 years in prison on 28 October 1996."

2. Robert S. Lipka

 Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Ex-NSA Employee Sentenced for Cold War
Espionage." Dec. 1997. [http://www.nacic.gov]

"Robert S. Lipka, 51, was sentenced to 18 years in prison and fined $10,000 on September 24,
1997 for selling top-secret documents to the Soviet Union three decades ago. He was charged
with photographing the papers while working as a US Army clerk at the National Security
Agency from 1965 through 1967. During this period he photographed documents with a camera
provided by the Soviet agents and dropped off the film in a park for payments of up to $1,000 a
drop[,] according to US Government affidavits."

  Leppard, David, Jon Ungoed-Thomas, Paul Nuki, Gareth Walsh, and Clive Freeman. "Briton's
Treachery Exposed by Keeper of KGB's Secrets: Defector Smuggled Out Copies of the 'Crown
Jewels' of Soviet Espionage." Sunday Times (London), 12 Sept. 1999. [http://www. the-
times.co.uk]

Vasili Mitrokhin was head archivist of the KGB's First Chief Directorate until he retired in 1985.
He regularly removed key files from storage, copied down their contents on pieces of paper,
smuggled them past the security guards, took them to his home, and typed up verbatim
transcripts of his handwritten notes.

In 1992, "he travelled to Latvia, taking thousands of pages of his documents with him. He
walked into the American embassy in Riga and asked if he could defect.... Incredibly, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers at the embassy were not interested.... The documents he had
were clearly not originals and could easily have been fakes....

"Undeterred, Mitrokhin went to the British embassy," where a Secret Intelligence Service (MI6)
officer "spotted his potential. After a series of in-depth interviews and consultations with
headquarters, Mitrokhin was formally accepted as an MI6 agent.... Within weeks of his defection,
MI6 carried out a delicate operation to remove the files [hidden in Mitrokhin's house and
garden].... The classified files went back to the 1930s....

"[S]enior intelligence officers say that the files have generated hundreds of new leads and could
lead to a spate of new espionage prosecutions.... Some of Mitrokhin's information helped to
convict Robert Lipka, a former clerk at the National Security Agency. He had spied for the
Russians in the late 1960s but had evaded FBI surveillance until Mitrokhin came in. He is now
serving an 18-year sentence.

"Another case that has been reopened is that of Felix Bloch, the highest-ranking State
Department official ever investigated for espionage. He was fired in 1989 and stripped of his
pension, but the FBI never had enough evidence to charge him."

  Macintyre, Ben. "Files Led FBI to Agent at Work in US." Times (London), 13 Sep. 1999.
[http://www.the-times.co.uk]

According to former KGB officer Vasili Mitrokhin and Cambridge historian Christopher
Andrew, Robert Lipka, a former clerk at the National Security Agency, was captured "through
information contained in the 'Mitrokhin files.'" Lipka is "currently serving an 18-year sentence
for espionage."

The files "are also believed to contain information ... on the enduring mystery of Felix Bloch....
The State Department alleged he had engaged in 'illegal activities involving agents of a foreign
intelligence service', but he was never charged and instead lost his job for lying to the FBI about
the incident."

3. Clayton Lonetree

 Headley, Lake, and William Hoffmann. The Court Martial of Clayton Lonetree. New York:
Henry Holt, 1989. [Chambers]

 Kessler, Ronald. Moscow Station: How the KGB Penetrated the American Embassy. New
York: Scribner's, 1989. New York: Pocket Books, 1990. [pb]

       Surveillant 1.1 notes that Moscow Station is simultaneously the "only [full] treatment of
       the CIA Station in Moscow, Lonetree and the Embassy bugging" and controversial.
       Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, comments that
       Kessler's picture of "the embassy's pathetic failure to protect its own security" is
       "thoroughly documented."

       According to Evans, IJI&C 3.4, Kessler asserts that the embassy code room was
       compromised, and charges the CIA and NSA "with covering up the compromise, the
       Naval Investigative Service (NIS) with mismanaging related cases..., and the Office of
       Special Investigation (OSI) under the Government Accounting Office with
       misrepresenting the quality of the NIS performance." The reviewer adds: "If a KGB
       penetration could not be proven, there could hardly be a cover-up." There is a detailed
       analysis of the chronology and evidence. Evans concludes that "the existence ... of a ...
       conspiracy [by NIS] seems outside not only the realm of possibility, but of credibility."

       NameBase calls Moscow Station "the story of the KGB's efforts to penetrate the U.S.
       embassy in Moscow, mainly by planting eavesdropping devices and by assigning
       attractive Soviet women to bait U.S. personnel.... About half of the book reconstructs the
       investigation of Clayton J. Lonetree,... a young marine guard, [who] confessed in 1987
       after passing secrets to his Soviet girlfriend, who was employed at the embassy, and her
       KGB control officer, Alexei G. Yefimov."

 Sharman, Jackson R., III. "Embassy Spy's Conviction Upheld: Court Denies Lonetree Appeal."
National Security Law Report 15, no. 1 (Jan. 1993): 3-4.

United States v. Lonetree, No. 65,642 (NMCM 88 2414) (United States Ct. Mil. App. Sept. 28,
1992).

 Barker, Rodney. Dancing with the Devil: Sex, Espionage, and the U.S. Marines -- The Clayton
Lonetree Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

Surveillant 4.3: "Barker's attempt to paint Lonetree as a victim of racial prejudice..., as merely a
scapegoat for the errors of his superiors, and, alas, as a misguided victim of love, do not change
the facts." The Periscope 21.5 reviewer suggests that Barker "at least" sets the record "straighter
than it was before," but also notes that "much of the material [in the book] is not attributable."

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




   ESPIONAGE CASES - UNITED STATES
                        Other Cases - By Name
                                               S-Z
Included here:

1. Amarylis Silverio Santos and Joseph Santos

2. Sharon W. Scrange

3. Glynn D. Shriver

4. Glenn Souther

5. I.F Stone

6. Michael Straight
7. Marta Rita Velazquez

8. Otto Verber (See Kurt Ponger)

9. Kelly Therese Warren (See Clyde Lee Conrad)

10. Ariel J. Weinmann

11. William Weisband

Materials in each listing presented chronologically.

1. Amarylis Silverio Santos and Joseph Santos

 Pressley, Sue Anne. "10 Arrested on Charges of Spying for Cuba: Military Facilities Targeted,
FBI Alleges." Washington Post, 15 Sep. 1998, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Ten people allegedly operating as a Cuban spy ring "have been arrested and accused of
collecting information on U.S. military installations and anti-Castro groups in Florida, federal
officials announced [on 15 September 1998]. The arrests, carried out [on 12 September 1998],
ended the most extensive espionage effort involving Cuban agents ever uncovered here, U.S.
Attorney Thomas E. Scott said."

Clark comment: The number of arrests in this case eventually reached 14. In March 2000,
Amarylis Silverio Santos and her husband, Joseph Santos, along with several others of the group,
pleaded guilty to "charges of acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government." John Elvin,
"Jail Time for Cuban Spies," Insight on the News, 6 Mar. 2000.



2. Sharon W. Scrange

Sharon W. Scrange was a CIA operations support employee in Ghana. She was convicted
of espionage on 27 September 1985 and sentenced to five years in prison. She was paroled
after serving 18 months. See Allen and Polmar, Merchants of Treason (1988).

3. Glenn D. Shriver

 Barakat, Matthew. "US Man Pleads Guilty to Spying Attempts for China." Associated Press,
22 Oct. 2010. [http://www.ap.org]

Glenn D. Shriver pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court on 22 October 2010 "to accepting $70,000
from Chinese spies as he attempted to secure jobs with the CIA and U.S. Foreign Service that
would have allowed him to expose U.S. government secrets.... Under a plea agreement,
prosecutors and defense attorneys agreed to recommend a four-year prison term that a judge is
required to impose at sentencing" set for 21 January 2011.

  Barakat, Matthew. "Mich. Man Gets 4 Years for Attempted Spy Effort." Associated Press, 21
Jan. 2011. [http://www.ap.org]

On 21 January 2011, Glenn D. Shriver was sentenced to four years in prison for taking $70,000
from Chinese spies. "According to court documents, Shriver was approached by Chinese officers
while living in Shanghai in 2004. He answered an English-language ad seeking someone with an
East Asian studies background to write a paper on U.S.-Chinese relations. After Shriver
answered the ad, Chinese intelligence officers began to recruit Shriver and encourage him to
seek out U.S. government jobs that would give him access to classified documents."

4. Glenn Souther

 Kessler, Ronald. The Spy in the Russian Club: How Glenn Souther Stole America's Nuclear
War Plans and Escaped to Moscow. New York: Scribner's, 1990. New York: Pocket Books,
1992. [pb]

       Surveillant 1.1: "U.S. sailor Glenn Souther defected to the USSR and ... sold U.S. plans
       on targets, on satellite surveillance photos, NSA intercepts of Soviet communications,
       and H-bomb delivery routes." See Department of Defense Security Institute, Recent
       Espionage Cases: Summaries and Sources, August 1992 (Richmond, VA: Department of
       Defense Security Institute, 1992), p. 23, for brief information on Souther -- defected 1986,
       turned up in Moscow, suicide 1989.



5. I.F. Stone

 Holland, Max. "I.F. Stone: Encounters with Soviet Intelligence." Journal of Cold War Studies
11, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 144-205.

Alexander "Vassiliev's handwritten notes from documents in KGB archives" show that from
April 1936 until at least the fall of 1938 Stone had "a meaningful relationship" with Soviet
intelligence. "What was the nature of the link over time? Did it have a bearing on Stone's
journalism? This essay attempts to answer the first question by retracing the history of the
allegations leveled about Stone.... The article assesses the provenance and credibility of the
allegations both as discrete claims and when taken together as a whole. The balance of the essay
addresses the second question by juxtaposing the allegations with Stone's writings to discern the
significance and meaning of the ostensible associations."

6. Michael Straight

"Michael Straight, the patrician former magazine publisher who described in a political
memoir his lingering involvement with Soviet spies whom he first met when they were all
students at Cambridge University," died on 4 January 2004. Christopher Lehmann-Haupt,
"Michael Straight, Who Wrote of Connection to Spy Ring, Dies at 87," New York Times, 5
Jan. 2004.

 Straight, Michael. After Long Silence. New York: Norton, 1983.

       Rocca and Dziak: "Apologia by the former editor of The New Republic who was
       recruited and handled for the Soviets by Anthony Blunt at Cambridge in the mid-1930s."

 Hook, Sidney. "The Incredible Story of Michael Straight." Encounter, Dec. 1983, 68-73.
[Rocca & Dziak]

 Perry, Roland. Last of the Cold War Spies: The Life of Michael Straight, the Only American in
Britain's Cambridge Spy Ring. New York: Da Capo, 2005.

According to Anderson, Washington Post, 8 Aug. 2005, the author "asserts in this damning
biography" that Michael Straight "was a dedicated communist and a covert agent of the KGB"
from "his undergraduate days at Cambridge in the 1930s.... Straight may still have friends who
accept his claim that his spying ended when he entered the Army, but Perry argues persuasively
that this polished son of American capitalism was indeed the last of the Cold War spies."
Similarly, Bailey, cicentre.com, calls this "an immensely readable and well-researched
biography."

On the other hand, Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), has some doubts about Perry's version of
events. The author "presents only speculation about Straight's continuing espionage." He also
"gets too many documented facts wrong." The reviewer's conclusion: "Whatever Straight's
reality, Perry's has been distorted by poor research and analysis, which has led to assertions not
proved."

For Schecter, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), the author "argues hard, but not convincingly, that
Straight remained under Soviet control until the 1990s." His evidence for this "is more
circumstantial th[a]n documented.... Perry's prodigious research lacks a series of smoking guns
to prove some of his conclusions."

7. Marta Rita Velazquez

 Schoenberg, Tom. "Ex-State Department Lawyer Allegedly Recruited Cuban Spy." Bloomberg,
26 Apr. 2013. [http://www.bloomberg.com]

According to the Justice Department, "a nine-year-old indictment unsealed" on 25 April 2013 in
federal court in Washington,DC, charges former U.S. State Department lawyer Marta Rita
Velazquez "with one count of conspiracy to commit espionage." The indictment states that
Velazquez "introduced Ana Belen Montes to the Cuban Intelligence Service in 1984 and later
helped Montes get a position as a Defense Intelligence Agency analyst." According to a Justice
Department statement, Velazquez "fled the U.S. 11 years ago and is living in Stockholm."
8. Otto Verber (see Kurt Ponger)

9. Kelly Therese Warren (See Clyde Lee Conrad)

10. Ariel J. Weinmann

 Associated Press. "Sailor Pleads Guilty to Espionage: Faces Life Sentence for Trying to Sell
Classified Data in Austria in 2005." 4 Dec. 2006. [http://www.msnbc.msn.com]

On 4 December 2006, Petty Officer 3rd Class Ariel J. Weinmann "pleaded guilty ... to espionage,
desertion and other charges." He was "accused of stealing a Navy laptop and peddling its
classified contents to an undisclosed foreign government." He "faces a sentence of life in prison
without parole, a dishonorable discharge from the Navy and forfeiture of all pay."

11. William Weisband

In the post-World War II period, the Army Security Agency (ASA) "had broken messages
used by the Soviet armed forces, police and industry, and was building a remarkably
complete picture of the Soviet national security posture.... Then, during 1948, in rapid
succession, every one of these cipher systems went dark....

"Soviet intelligence had had an agent inside AFSA [Armed Forces Security Agency] who
had revealed the extent of U.S. penetration of Soviet cipher systems. This was William
Weisband, who had been recruited by the KGB in 1934. During and after World War II,
Weisband was involved in the U.S. COMINT efforts, working (as a native speaker of
Russian) in the Russian section in ASA and, later, AFSA. Although in 1950 the FBI
uncovered information alleging espionage activities by Weisband..., he was never charged
with espionage -- Weisband lost his job with AFSA and served a year in prison for
contempt of a grand jury.2" [2. Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner, VENONA:
Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957 ([Washington, DC:] NSA/CIA
Publication, 1996).] David A. Hatch, with Robert Louis Benson, The Korean War: The
SIGINT Background (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000).

John Earl Haynes, a historian at the Library of Congress, "was one of the first people
outside the agency [NSA] to stumble across Weisband's name two years ago when sorting
through post-World War II documents the agency declassified in 1996. 'He was a major
figure, but has never had any kind of public profile because they never tried him,' Haynes
said. 'He refused to show up in court [for a grand jury hearing]. The evidence was
thoroughly convincing to those who saw it, but it could not have been brought to trial
without revealing too many secrets.'"

Weisband "spent a year in prison for failing to appear before the grand jury and then
returned home to Fairfax. He worked odd jobs in different offices until his death in 1967.
NSA officials said [on 28 June 2000] recent documents pulled from Soviet archives
reconfirm his extensive involvement." Laura Sullivan, "Spy's Role Linked to U.S. Failure
on Korea: NSA Report Shows Why 1950 Invasion Came as Surprise," Baltimore Sun, 29
Jun. 2000.




         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                        China
                                      1998 - 2000
                                  Table of Contents

This is not an easy story to follow. Beyond its technology transfer and nuclear espionage
sides, it also contains elements of the dispute surrounding the manner in which the
Democratic Party raised campaign funds for the 1996 Presidential election. The strongest
Clinton haters have cast a broad range of the President's dealings with China in such light
as to represent actions injurious to U.S. national security. No effort has been made to
capture all of reporting on the various sides of this story; rather, selected reportage is
presented to create a context for those stories that are specifically intelligence related.

 Technology Transfer (1998-1999)

 Wen Ho Lee Spy Case (1999-2000)

 Fallout from the Lee Case (1999-2000):

 15 March 1999

 April 1999

 May 1999

 Cox Committee Report

 June 1999
 July 1999

 August 1999

 September - December 1999

 From January 2000

         Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents

         Return to China Table of Contents

         Return to General Postwar - 1990s Table of Contents

         Return to Other Agencies/DOE



                           POST-COLD WAR
                    PRC Technology Transfer
                                        1998 - 1999

Materials are arranged in reverse chronological order.

 Gerth, Jeff. "McDonnell Douglas and Chinese Indicted for Deal." New York Times, 20 Oct.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 19 October 1999, a Federal grand jury indicted the McDonnell Douglas Corporation and the
state-owned China National Aero Technology Import and Export Corporation (Catic) "on
charges of conspiring to hide important details of a 1994 sale of American machining equipment,
some of which was diverted to a Chinese military site."

 Gertz, Bill. "China Recruits Spies for Science." Washington Times, 11 Oct. 1999. [http://
www.washtimes.com]

According to the quarterly report of the National Counterintelligence Center (NCIC), "China is
recruiting scientists around the world in its efforts to acquire weapons technology from other
countries."
 Counterintelligence News and Developments. "Industrial Espionage Key to PRC Technological
Development." Mar. 1999. [http://www.nacic.gov]

Reports on two articles in specialized PRC publications that suggesting "that China is ethically
justified in using 'informal' means to level the global 'technology imbalance'": "The International
Economic Intelligence War," in the 19 November 1998 issue of Zhongguo Maoyi Bao, and "On
the North-South Technology Imbalance," in the May 1998 technology policy journal Keji Jinbu
yu Duice.

 Gerth, Jeff, and Eric Schmitt. "Political Battle: What to Reveal on China Arms." New York
Times, 10 Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In Boston on 9 March 1999, "a federal grand jury indicted Yao Yi, a Chinese scientist, and
Collin Shu, a Canadian, on charges of conspiracy to violate export control laws by attempting to
ship fiberoptic gyroscopes to China.... The Customs Service contends that the shipments, had
they succeeded, could have helped China improve the accuracy of their missiles."

 Sanger, David E. "Clinton Aides Admit Lapses on Espionage by Chinese." New York Times, 7
Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said on 6 March
1999 "that the investigation into China's acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapons technology showed
enormous lapses in security at the Energy Department's laboratories in the 1980s."

 Gertz, Bill. "House Panel Urges Action on Chinese Thefts." Washington Times, 5 Feb. 1999.

The recommendations of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns, chaired by Christopher Cox (R-CA), have been declassified by
the White House. The full report remains secret, but "reveals how Chinese intelligence agents
stole data on the neutron bomb ... from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California
circa 1986."

 Gertz, Bill. "Technology Transfers Threaten U.S.: Panel." Washington Times National Weekly
Edition, 4-10 Jan. 1999, 18.

A report by the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns, chaired by Christopher Cox (R-CA), has "made 38 recommendations to both the
administration and Congress that would tighten controls over sensitive technology transfer."

 Gerth, Jeff, and Eric Schmitt. "House Panel Says Chinese Obtained U.S. Arms Secrets." New
York Times, 31 Dec. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]

A House select committee has "has found that over the last 20 years China obtained, sometimes
through theft, some of the most sensitive of American military technology, including nuclear
weapons design." The panel's inquiry began in May 1998, prompted by the transfer by U.S.
companies of satellite and missile-related technology to China.
"[W]itnesses and intelligence officials who worked with the committee said it agreed with
assessments by the Pentagon and the State Department that information shared with Chinese
scientists by two American companies, the Hughes Electronics Corporation and Loral Space and
Communications, had improved Beijing's ability to launch satellites and ballistic missiles."

  Mintz, John. "Panel Faults Space Aid to China." Washington Post, 31 Dec. 1998, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The House select committee's report "is the most comprehensive review so far" of evidence that
aerospace companies Hughes and Loral "shared sensitive U.S. technologies as they pursued
commercial relations in China.... In a rare show of bipartisanship on what for months has been a
divisive issue, the special panel ... voted 9-0 yesterday to endorse the secret ... study and send it
to congressional leaders and the Clinton administration. The panel is expected to release a
shorter, unclassified version of its findings within a few months, after it is reviewed by
government agencies."

  Mintz, John. "U.S. Probes Company's Covert Operations." Washington Post, 30 Dec. 1998, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Federal agents raided the Alexandria office of Vector Microwave Research Corporation on 20
November 1997. "Vector was a leading entrepreneur in a classified or 'black' specialty with high
stakes and few rules: covertly acquiring foreign missiles, radar, artillery and other weapons for
U.S. intelligence agencies." Although no charges have been filed, "investigators are trying to
determine at whose behest the firm bid for a batch of North Korean missiles" and whether the
company "provided China sensitive technical specifications on the U.S. Stinger antiaircraft
missile."

 Gerth, Jeff. "C.I.A. Ignored Report of Payments to Chinese for Satellite Contracts." New York
Times, 24 Dec. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"CIA officers in China told headquarters in March 1996 that a consultant for American
aerospace companies had made payments to Chinese officials in hopes of getting lucrative
contracts, U.S. intelligence officials say.... [F]or reasons that remain unclear, the cable
languished in CIA files for more than two years.... It was unearthed this year only after
congressional committees began examining whether the Clinton administration had
compromised national security in its zeal to promote high technology exports to China.... The
consultant is Bansang Lee, a Chinese-American who worked for Hughes Space &
Communications and for Loral Space & Communications."

  Loeb, Vernon, and John Mintz. "CIA Faces Criminal Probe in China Case: Information Given
to Satellite Firm." Washington Post, 5 Dec. 1998, A1. "Did the CIA Spill the Beans to China on
Space Technology?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 14 Dec. 1998, 29.

"The Justice Department has initiated a criminal probe of the CIA to determine whether the
agency obstructed justice when it provided information to Hughes Electronics Corp. about the
scope of an ongoing congressional investigation into the transfer of sensitive U.S. space
technology to China."

 Timperlake, Edward, and William C. Triplett, II. Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton
Compromised U.S. Security for Chinese Cash. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1998.

Seamon, Proceedings 125.2 (Feb. 1999), comments that "for credulous Clinton haters and true
conspiracy buffs, this tendentious polemic provides a satisfying feast." The authors were
"determined to demonstrate that Chinese money, illegally funneled to Democratic campaigns,
was behind a far worse scandal than sexual hanky-panky in the Oval Office."

 Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Gains Intelligence in China Launches." Washington Post, 13 Jun. 1998,
A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"When Chinese officials, trying to explain in 1996 why one of their satellite-bearing rockets had
blown up, gave an American review panel a report detailing what had gone wrong, it was the
first time they had revealed to outsiders the inner workings of their Long March missiles. The
Chinese report, said John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists, contained 'material a
spy could only dream of.'"

 Pincus, Walter, and Roberto Suro. "CIA Director Is Quiet on Technology Transfer."
Washington Post, 5 Jun. 1998, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 4 June 1998, "CIA Director George J. Tenet refused ... to discuss with the Senate Intelligence
Committee a secret report about an unauthorized U.S. transfer of information [by aerospace
company Loral] to Chinese missile officials, citing a last-minute request by Attorney General
Janet Reno to reserve comment on the case." Reno later withdrew the objection, clearing the way
for the CIA to release the report to the Senate committee.

 Suro, Roberto, and John F. Harris. "President Overrode China Launch Concerns." Washington
Post, 23 May 1998, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Documents released by the White House on 22 May 1998 show that "President Clinton gave the
go-ahead in February" to Loral's satellite launch in China "despite staff concerns that granting
such approval might be seen as letting the company 'off the hook' in a Justice Department
investigation of whether it previously provided unauthorized assistance to China's ballistic
missile program." The documents also show "that the State Department and other agencies had
determined that the launch ... was in 'the national interest' and recommended approval."

 Suro, Roberto. "Justice Dept. Investigates Satellite Exports." Washington Post, 17 May 1998,
A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The Justice Department's campaign finance task force has begun to examine whether a Clinton
administration decision to export commercial satellites to China was influenced by contributions
to the Democratic Party during the 1996 campaign."
 Eilperin, Juliet. "GOP Says U.S. Gave China Nuclear Edge." Washington Post, 6 May 1998,
A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Congressional Republicans will hold hearings to investigate President Clinton's decisions
permitting aerospace companies Loral and Hughes to export satellites to be launched by Chinese
rockets. The issue is whether the actions "allowed the Chinese to acquire technology to improve
the accuracy of their nuclear missiles."

         Return to Spy Cases/China Table of Contents

         Return to CIA/1998 Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                       Wen Ho Lee

                                   Table of Contents

In a case that went through many twists and turns, former Energy Department physicist
Dr. Wen Ho Lee pleaded guilty on 13 September 2000 to mishandling classified
information. No espionage charges were presented. The Washington Post has a guide (with
links) to its coverage ("Key Stories: Stealing U.S. Secrets") of the Chinese spying uproar
at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/losalamos/keystories.htm.

 Reportage:

 March - April 1999

 May - August 1999

 September - December 1999

 From January 2000

 Books

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         Return to Spy Cases Table of Contents
          Return to Other Agencies/DOE




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                          China
                          Fallout from the China Spy Case
                                     To 15 March 1999


Materials presented chronologically.

 Risen, James, and Jeff Gerth. "China Stole Nuclear Secrets From Los Alamos, U.S. Officials
Say." New York Times, 6 Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

China's technological breakthrough in the 1980s in producing small nuclear warheads "was
accelerated by the theft of U.S. nuclear secrets from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New
Mexico." In June 1996, "the FBI formally opened a criminal investigation into the theft.... The
bureau maintained tight control over the case. The CIA counterintelligence office, for one, was
not kept informed of its status, according to [Paul] Redmond, ['the agency's chief spy hunter,']
who has since retired."

 Sanger, David E. "Clinton Aides Admit Lapses on Espionage by Chinese." New York Times, 7
Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

National Security Adviser Sandy Berger and Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said on 6 March
1999 "that the investigation into China's acquisition of U.S. nuclear weapons technology showed
enormous lapses in security at the Energy Department's laboratories in the 1980s."

 Suro, Roberto. "GOP Calls for Hill Probe of Chinese Nuclear Spying." Washington Post, 8 Mar.
1999, A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 7 March 1999, "Republican congressional leaders ... called for investigative hearings and
threatened sanctions against the Clinton administration if it was found to have looked the other
way while Chinese spies raided U.S. nuclear warfare technology."
  CNN. "CIA Measures Damage Following Leaked Nuclear Secrets." 9 Mar. 1999.
[http://www.cnn.com]

According to U.S. officials on 8 March 1999, "[a] CIA-led task force is assessing how much
damage may have been done to U.S. national security after a Chinese scientist at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico allegedly shared nuclear secrets.... The information leaks at
the Los Alamos nuclear research laboratory allegedly happened during the 1980s."

 Gates, Robert M. "The ABC's of Spying." New York Times, 14 Mar. 1999. [http://www.
nytimes.com]

This Op-Ed by the former DCI argues that "[t]he current furor in Washington over Chinese
espionage at Los Alamos offers fresh evidence that finger-pointing and sound bites are a lousy
way to protect and advance American security interests.... [B]oth the Clinton Administration and
its critics neglect [a reality]: despite the bonhomie of countless summit meetings and press
statements, the post-cold-war world is a very tough neighborhood in which nations still cynically
and ruthlessly pursue their own interests."

 Harris, John F., and Vernon Loeb. "Spy Case Tests U.S. Openness With China; Engagement
Policy Failing, Critics Say." Washington Post, 14 Mar. 1999, A1. "Is the U.S. Too Engaging
with China?" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 22 Mar. 1999, 15-16.

"At its heart, the Los Alamos case remains a mystery. The prime suspect, Chinese American
scientist Wen Ho Lee, was fired ... by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson after failing an FBI
polygraph test.... But government sources acknowledge that he may never be charged, noting that
FBI agents secretly investigated him while he performed his duties from June 1996 almost up
until the point when he was polygraphed last month. They never had enough evidence to obtain a
wiretap to monitor his calls or a warrant to search his home."

 Sanger, David E. "'No Question,' U.S. Says, Leak Helped China." New York Times, 15 Mar.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

National Security Adviser Sandy Berger "acknowledged [on 14 March 1999] that 'there's no
question' that China benefited from obtaining the design of America's most miniaturized nuclear
warhead from the Los Alamos National Laboratory."

 Loeb, Vernon. "CIA Probe Gets Outside Review: Retired Admiral to Examine Report on China
Spy Case Damage." Washington Post, 16 Mar. 1999, A16. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 15 Mar. 1999, DCI George J. Tenet announced that "an outside review ... of the CIA's
internal assessment of national security damage resulting from China's possible theft of nuclear
weapons secrets from Los Alamos National Laboratory" will be led by retired Adm. David E.
Jeremiah. The announcement "came in direct response to a recommendation of a House select
committee [chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.)] probing technology transfers to China."
See also, Bill Gertz and Nancy E. Roman, "CIA Chief Orders Study of Damage Done by
Chinese Spies," Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 22-28 Mar. 1999, 18.
 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Richardson Announces Seven New Initiatives
To Strengthen DOE's Counterintelligence Efforts." 17 Mar. 1999. [http://www.doe.gov]

On 17 March 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson "formally unveiled" before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence "seven new initiatives to strengthen the Department's ability to
prevent the loss of sensitive information."

 Barry, John, and Gregory L. Vistica. "The Penetration Is Total." Newsweek, 19 Mar. 1999.

U.S. officials believe that China may have acquired considerable information over the last 20
years about U.S. nuclear weapons. "The government's damage-assessment team is now trying to
figure out who could have given the secrets to Beijing. They do not believe it was a foreign
visitor to the labs, or leaks through U.S. allies.... 'This was done by American citizens,' says one
source close to the investigation.... [T]he close-knit nuclear community [is] wondering if a
colleague could have done the unthinkable."

 Stout, David. "Clinton Asks Panel to Analyze Security Threats at Nuclear Labs." New York
Times, 19 Mar. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 17 March 1999, President Clinton announced that the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB) will "analyze security threats at the Energy Department's nuclear
laboratories, after suspicions surfaced that China stole nuclear-weapons designs from the United
States.... The president asked the board's chairman, Warren Rudman, a former Republican
senator from New Hampshire, to report back within 60 days." See also, Jeanne Cummings and
David Rogers, "White House Plans to Launch a Review of Security Threats at U.S. Nuclear
Labs," Wall Street Journal, 19 Mar. 1999, A3.

 Loeb, Vernon. "Chinese Spy Methods Limit Bid to Find Truth, Officials Say." Washington
Post, 21 Mar. 1999, A24. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[S]enior U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials say they may never solve the mystery
of how China learned about miniaturized warheads precisely because the Chinese employ a
diffuse and maddeningly patient espionage strategy far different from the Cold War paradigm of
moles, agents and payoffs. China's spying, they say, more typically involves cajoling morsels of
information out of visiting foreign experts and tasking thousands of Chinese abroad to bring
secrets home one at a time like ants carrying grains of sand."

 Seper, Jerry, and Bill Gertz. "FBI Probes New Leads." Washington Times National Weekly
Edition, 22-28 Mar. 1999, 1, 23.

"An FBI investigation of Chinese nuclear espionage has widened to include additional targets
and a review of new information, law enforcement forces said" on 17 March 1999.

 Thurman, James N. "Spying On America: It's A Growth Industry." Christian Science Monitor,
23 Mar. 1999, 1.
"While Washington focuses on the alleged Chinese theft of US weapons technology, experts say
intelligence-gathering in the post-cold-war era is now far more sophisticated and involves a
multitude of nations and motives -- economic, strategic, and political."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "FBI's Spying Probe Proves No Easy Task: 'Staleness' of
Case at Weapons Lab Cited." Washington Post, 28 Mar. 1999, A20. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "in recent testimony before House and Senate Appropriations
subcommittees provided the first authoritative on-the-record description ... from the
administration's perspective" of what has been going on with regard to accusations that China
obtained weapons secrets from U.S. nuclear labs.

 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Secretary Richardson Orders Additional
Measures to Strengthen Security at Department of Energy Sites: Security Report for 1997 and
1998 Sent to Congress." 30 Mar 1999. [http://www.doe.gov]

On 30 March 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson sent to Congress the Department's
"Annual Report on Safeguards and Security at its nuclear weapons facilities." He also "outlined a
series of measures being taken to strengthen departmental security."

         Forward to China - April 1999

         Return to Spy Cases/U.S. Table of Contents

         Return to China Table of Contents

         Return to Spy Cases/China Table of Contents




             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                          China
                          Fallout from the China Spy Case

                                          April 1999


Materials presented chronologically.

  Drogin, Bob. "Secrets, Science Are Volatile Mixture at Los Alamos Lab." Los Angeles Times,
1 Apr. 1999. [http://www.latimes.com]

"[F]or all the high-tech hardware used to protect 7 million classified documents from spies, Los
Alamos increasingly is under attack by critics in Congress and elsewhere who fear security is left
behind when some scientists meet their peers overseas, especially in China."

 Risen, James. "White House Said to Ignore Evidence of China's Spying." New York Times, 13
Apr. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Notra Trulock, a senior intelligence official at the Energy Department, told the Senate Armed
Services Committee on 12 April 1999 "that his superiors and other Clinton administration
officials repeatedly downplayed or dismissed evidence that China had stolen nuclear weapons
secrets from a government weapons laboratory."

 Hosenball, Mark, and Daniel Klaidman. "Unleasing 'Golden Tiger' on Beijing." Newsweek, 19
Apr. 1999, 42.

A U.S. task force, codenamed "Golden Tiger," will investigate unsolved cases of Chinese
technology smuggling and acquisition of military and technological secrets.

 Gertz, Bill. "Energy Official Blocked Spy Report." Washington Times National Weekly Edition,
19-25 Apr. 1999, 1, 22.

Notra Trulock, the Energy Department top intelligence official, and Elizabeth A. Moler, who
was acting Energy Secretary in 1998, disagreed over whether the latter blocked the former's
notification of HPSCI about the nuclear spying case at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Spy, Counterspy and a Splitting Atomic Headache: Energy
Sleuth's Testimony Seems to Undercut GOP." Washington Post, 21 Apr. 1999, A23.

Testimony last week by Notra Trulock, the Energy Department's intelligence chief, "seems to
undercut many of the Republican charges ... [o]n the issue of foot-dragging" by the Clinton
administration in responding to charges of security breaches at the U.S. nuclear laboratories.

In addition, "[a] CIA review of Trulock's concerns, headed by retired Adm. David Jeremiah...,
reportedly confirms the initial CIA analysis that, although classified U.S. data were obtained and
probably aided Chinese nuclear programs, the overall impact 'is a lot more uncertain than some
people -- including Trulock -- admit,' according to a source familiar with the study."

 Risen, James, and Jeff Gerth. "China Stole Data on Atom Warhead, U.S. Report Finds." New
York Times, 21 Apr. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to government officials, a comprehensive damage assessment by the intelligence
community, coordinated by the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs
and independently reviewed by an outside panel headed by retired Adm. David Jeremiah, "has
concluded that China stole design information related to the United States' most advanced
nuclear warhead from a government nuclear weapons laboratory." See also, Jeff Gerth, "Report
Warns of Big Gains to Chinese From Spying," New York Times, 22 Apr. 1999.

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Chinese Stole Data on Reentry Vehicles: U.S. Intelligence
Assesses Losses." Washington Post, 22 Apr. 1999, A4.

An intelligence assessment delivered by DCI Tenet to the President and Congress on 21 April
1999 "found that Chinese spying has obtained secret information over the past 20 years not only
on U.S. nuclear weapons designs but also on U.S. reentry vehicles, the containers that carry
explosive devices through space.... [T]he finding that China has stolen classified information on
reentry vehicles for multiple-warhead missiles marked a new dimension in the Chinese
espionage debate." See also, Ben Macintyre, "Nuclear Theft 'Badly Harmed US,'" Times
(London), 22 Apr. 1999.

 Risen, James, and Jeff Gerth. "U.S. Says Suspect Put Data on Bombs in Unsecure Files." New
York Times, 28 Apr. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Wen Ho Lee, the former Los Alamos scientist suspected of spying for China, "improperly
transferred huge amounts of secret data from a computer system at a government laboratory,
compromising virtually every nuclear weapon in the United States arsenal, government and lab
officials say." See also, Vernon Loeb and Walter Pincus, "Los Alamos Security Breach
Confirmed," Washington Post, 29 Apr. 1999, A1.

  Schmitt, Eric. "Lab's Laxity in Spy Case Outrages Lawmakers." New York Times, 29 Apr. 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"Senior lawmakers expressed outrage and frustration on [28 April 1999] over the government's
failure to monitor a scientist suspected of spying for China, who officials now say may have
given away secrets to virtually every nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal."

  Loeb, Vernon. "50 Years of Nuclear Know-How Compromised: Los Alamos 'Legacy Codes'
May Be More Valuable Than Blueprints, Experts Say." Washington Post, 30 Apr. 1999, A16.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Secret computer programs transferred by Wen Ho Lee "from a classified computer network to a
vulnerable desktop machine are mathematical models, known aptly as 'legacy codes,' embodying
50 years of American nuclear know-how. Their discovery last month during a search of Wen Ho
Lee's office computer ... has sent shock waves through the weapons laboratory and the
Department of Energy."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Senators Irate at Handling of Nuclear Spy Probe."
Washington Post, 30 Apr. 1999, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"After grilling FBI Director Louis J. Freeh for nearly three hours in a closed-door hearing,
members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from both parties appeared equally
outraged at what they depicted as lax handling of past and present investigations into suspected
leaks of classified data."

          Forward to Fallout - May 1999

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                          China
                          Fallout from the China Spy Case

                                          May 1999


Materials presented chronologically.

Click for materials on the Cox Committee Report, the unclassified version of which was
released on 25 May 1999.

 Gerth, Jeff, and James Risen. "1998 Report Told of Lab Breaches and China Threat." New York
Times, 2 May 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
A secret report, prepared by U.S. counterintelligence officials "throughout the Government" and
"distributed to the highest levels of the Government" warned that "China posed an 'acute
intelligence threat' to the Government's nuclear weapons laboratories and that computer systems
at the labs were being constantly penetrated by outsiders.... The 25-page counterintelligence
report contains many examples of lax security and serious intelligence breaches at the labs that
have not been previously disclosed, involving more than a dozen foreign countries."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "GOP Senators: U.S. Bungled Probes of Atomic Spying."
Washington Post, 6 May 1999, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Senate Republicans unveiled new evidence [on 5 May 1999] that investigations of the chief
suspect in possible Chinese espionage at nuclear weapons laboratories have been marked by
repeated bungles over the past 15 years, including at one point the loss of his security file."

 Johnston, David. "Justice Department to Investigate Handling of Spy Case." New York Times, 7
May 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Attorney General Janet Reno said [on 6 May 1999] that the Justice Department would examine
whether federal authorities had mishandled the investigation of a nuclear scientist suspected of
spying for China."

 Hosenball, Mark, and Daniel Klaidman. "The Slow Boat to China Crew: Did the Feds Take
Too Long to Investigate the Lee Case? " Newsweek, 10 May 1999. [http://www.newsweek.com]

"Government officials tell Newsweek that both the Energy Department and the FBI failed to act
aggressively on suspicions that [Wen Ho] Lee may have been leaking secrets despite warning
signs that spanned nearly 20 years."

 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Richardson Unveils Security Reform Package."
11 May 1999. [http://www.energy.gov]

On 11 May 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson "unveiled the largest, most sweeping reform
of security programs in the department's history. The announcement includes the creation of a
new high-level Office of Security and Emergency Operations and improved oversight, increased
nuclear materials inventory accountability, additional cyber-security improvements, a zero-
tolerance security policy, new counterintelligence measures, accelerated safeguard and security
improvement goals, more physical upgrades, cyber-threat training, and an extension of the
executive order on automatic declassification."

See also, James Risen, "Energy Secretary Announces Program to Strengthen Lab Security," New
York Times, 12 May 1999.

 Johnston, David. "Reno's Handling of Reports of Chinese Spy Are Criticized." New York Times,
20 May 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Senators at a closed-door hearing of the Intelligence Committee [on 19 May 1999] lashed out at
Attorney General Janet Reno for what they said was her failure to aggressively manage the case
of a suspected spy for China at the Los Alamos nuclear weapons."

 New York Times. "Cohen Puts Off Trip to China." 26 May 1999.

"Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen has postponed his trip next month to China, citing
tension between Washington and Beijing, the Pentagon announced" on 25 May 1999.

 Johnston, David. "If Lawmakers Call for Blood, They May End Up With Reno's." New York
Times, 27 May 1999.

The Cox committee's "conclusion that China systematically stole nuclear secrets has roused
angry lawmakers in both parties to look for a high-profile official to blame, and increasingly they
are taking aim at Attorney General Janet Reno, for failing to respond aggressively to the threat.
Ms. Reno is not alone in the cross hairs; other officials, like Samuel R. Berger, the national
security adviser, have also come under attack. But it is Ms. Reno who appears to be most
vulnerable."

 Johnston, David. "Pushed to a Wall by Lawmakers, Reno Defends Herself." New York Times,
28 May 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Attorney General Janet Reno said on [27 May 1999] that she was never fully informed of a
dispute between the Justice Department and the FBI over a proposal to wiretap a scientist
suspected of spying for China. Reno ... said that FBI Director Louis J. Freeh or her own
intelligence staff should have advised her of their disagreement."

 Pincus, Walter. "Lab Reforms Stall in House." Washington Post, 28 May 1999, A3.

"Legislation to tighten security at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories ran into a snag in the
House [on 27 May 1999] after a separate measure breezed through the Senate by a voice vote."

 Roman, Nancy E., and Dave Boyer. "Senate Approves Tighter Security at Nuclear Labs."
Washington Times, 28 May 1999. Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 31 May- 6 Jun.
1999, 3.

"The Senate responded to Chinese spying [on 27 May 1999] by easily passing legislation to
tighten security at U.S. nuclear laboratories.... [T]he Senate adopted a set of proposals by
Majority Leader Trent Lott ... that would expand congressional oversight of technology exports
and increase Pentagon monitoring of satellite launches in China."

 Seper, Jerry. "Reno Blames FBI For Not Initiating China Wiretap." Washington Times, 28 May
1999.

"Attorney General Janet Reno, sharply criticized in Congress for declining to aggressively
investigate suspected Chinese espionage, said [on 27 May 1999] the FBI should have come to
her two years ago if it had concerns about a Justice Department refusal to seek a wiretap in the
spy probe."

 Freedberg, Sydney J., Jr. "Misdirected Energy: Good Science Springs from Openness; Good
Security from a Closed Loop. The Energy Department Struggles to Reconcile the Two in the
Wake of Chinese Spying." National Journal (29 May 1999), 1463-1466.

  Associated Press. "Energy Chief to Dismiss Officials in Spy Case." 31 May 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said [on 30 May 1999 on the NBC News program 'Meet the
Press'] that he would dismiss some department officials for failing to act on signs that China was
stealing secrets from an American nuclear weapons lab."

 Gribben, August. "Chinese Spies Take Advantage of Open U.S. Society." Washington Times,
31 May 1999.

"[T]he People's Republic of China has perfected the technique of using against the United States
its most envied and cherished virtues -- its liberty and openness.... [B]y 'being very, very patient
in taking bits and pieces to make the larger whole,' Chinese intelligence has scored
impressively....

"Consider that each year, U.S. government agencies, universities and businesses routinely invite
Chinese bureaucrats, business representatives, scientists, educators and students to attend
conferences, trade shows, workshops, expositions and the like.... Chinese participation in such
events seems harmless. To the PRC, they seem like targets of opportunity.... The Cox report and
defense analysts make clear that the Chinese have relentlessly exploited every opening to tease
from the United States the information China wants or needs."

          Forward to China June 1999

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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                         China
                         Fallout from the China Spy Case

                                         May 1999
                   Cox Committee Report on Chinese Spying
   U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. Security and
   Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China --
                Unclassified version released 25 May 1999



Text of the unclassified version of the report of the House select committee headed by Rep.
Christopher Cox (R-CA) is available at: http://www.house.gov/coxreport/. See also
Kenneth E. deGraffenreid, ed, The Cox Report: The Unanimous and Bipartisan Report of
the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military Commercial Concerns
with the People's Republic of China (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999).

From the "Preface": "This three-volume report is an unclassified, redacted version of the
Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns with the Peoples Republic of China issued on January 3, 1999."

As noted by John Macartney, "[e]xcept for an item in the appendix that criticizes the CIA
for warning industry that Congress was going to be questioning them..., there is not much
criticism of the Intelligence Community." [AFIO WIN 21-99 (28 May 1999)] Click to access
the item referred to by Macartney.

Richard Carpenter has assisted by compiling many of the listed items.

Materials presented chronologically.

 Gertz, Bill. "Technology Transfers Threaten U.S.: Panel." Washington Times National Weekly
Edition, 4-10 Jan. 1999, 18.

A report by the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns, chaired by Christopher Cox (R-CA), has "made 38 recommendations to both the
administration and Congress that would tighten controls over sensitive technology transfer."

 Gertz, Bill. "House Panel Urges Action on Chinese Thefts." Washington Times, 5 Feb. 1999.

The recommendations of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns, chaired by Christopher Cox (R-CA), have been declassified by
the White House. The full report remains secret, but "reveals how Chinese intelligence agents
stole data on the neutron bomb ... from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California
circa 1986."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Chinese Espionage Is Termed 'Pervasive': Report Hits Labs
For Loss of Secrets." Washington Post, 16 May 1999, A18.

According to congressional and administration sources, the report of the House select committee
headed by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), which will be released this week, "describes China as
an emerging military threat and strategic nuclear rival that has gained design secrets of America's
five most modern nuclear warheads through 'pervasive' spying at the nation's nuclear
laboratories." See also, Jeff Gerth, "China Stole Data, Report Concludes," New York Times, 21
May 1999.

 Fenton, Ben. "US Officials Face Sack over China Spy Report." Telegraph (London), 25 May
1999. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

"Some of those who have seen advance copies of the [Cox Committee's] report have called for
the head of Janet Reno, the Attorney-General, over her failure to follow up FBI reports that
China was obtaining 'the crown jewels' of American nuclear secrets. Others have suggested that
Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser, should be fired for failing to bring the matter to the
attention of President Clinton soon enough. Mr Clinton is accused of dissembling over what he
knew and when."

  Weiner, Tim. "Nuclear Thriller With Ending as Yet Unwritten." New York Times, 25 May 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

The Cox report's "conclusions are blunt...: China has stolen data on every significant American
nuclear warhead, the stolen secrets helped China design and test modern nuclear weapons, and
Chinese espionage at the biggest government weapons labs is long-standing and continuing."
However, "[n]ot everyone agrees with the conclusion that the Chinese stole nuclear weapons
data." See also, Juliet Eilperin, "Panel Unites to Expose Chinese Espionage," Washington Post,
25 May 1999, A4, which discusses Cox's leadership in producing a bipartisan document.

  U.S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Secretary Richardson Points to Dramatic
Progress in Strengthening Counterintelligence and Security." 25 May 1999.
[http://www.energy.gov]

Energy Secretary Richardson reacts to Cox Committee report: "I want to caution against
oversensationalizing the conclusions of the report. Not every allegation is a proven fact."

 Eckholm, Eric. "China Labels Spying Claims 'Groundless.'" New York Times, 26 May 1999.

"Accusations that Chinese spies stole nuclear weapon designs and missile technology from the
United States are 'totally groundless,' China's Foreign Ministry said" on 25 May 1999.
 Gerth, Jeff, and James Risen. "Spying Charges Against Beijing Are Spelled Out by House
Panel." New York Times, 26 May 1999.

The long-awaited report by the the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China "that describes a pattern of
systematic and successful Chinese espionage to learn American nuclear secrets was released on
[25 May 1999], and President Clinton said he agreed that national security should be improved."

See also, John M. Broder, "President's Sober Response Assures Public of Security Measures,"
New York Times, 26 May 1999; Vernon Loeb, "Spy Report Sparks GOP Attack," Washington
Post, 26 May 1999, A1; Walter Pincus, "China May Add 100 Missiles Over 15 Years,"
Washington Post, 26 May 1999, A22, and "Missiles May Be Added Despite Stated Policy,"
Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 31 May 1999, 15-16; Nancy E. Roman, "China Spy
Report Stuns Capitol Hill," Washington Times, 26 May 1999; and Bill Sammon, "Clinton
Distances Himself From Scandal," Washington Times, 26 May 1999.

 New York Times. "[Editorial:] America's Stolen Secrets." 26 May 1999.

"Better coordination is needed among the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies in
detecting, investigating and prosecuting nuclear espionage. The Energy Department must clearly
demonstrate that it can manage the labs. Otherwise it may make sense to transfer them to
Pentagon control. Whichever department is in charge, more rigorous security screening is needed
for those engaged in the most sensitive weapons work."

 Risen, James. "Fund-Raising Figure Had Spy Case Role." New York Times, 26 May 1999.

According to the House select committee report, "Johnny Chung, a Chinese-American at the
heart of the campaign finance controversy, was given $300,000 by two Chinese military officials
in an apparent effort to establish one of them, [a Lieutenant Colonel in the Chinese Army and]
the daughter of a Chinese general, in the United States so she could acquire American
technology."

 Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Nuclear Pickpocket." 26 May 1999, A28.

"Finding a balance between openness and caution will never be easy," but it does not "make
sense for the United States to open its strategic pockets and allow China to help itself."

 Washington Times. "[Editorial:] The Cox Report." 26 May 1999. Washington Times National
Weekly Edition, 31 May-6 Jun. 1999, 36.

The conclusions of the Cox report "demonstrate that the Chinese nuclear espionage and legal and
illegal willful technology transfers will drastically compromise U.S. national security for decades
to come."

 Weiner, Tim. "How Right Is Report? Caveats by Experts." New York Times, 26 May 1999.
"Almost everyone in the Government agrees that Chinese spies stole nuclear secrets from
American weapons laboratories. All concur that security at the labs was lax. But the Cox report's
conclusions -- classified and unclassified -- do not all dovetail with those of the American
intelligence community.... The Cox committee emphasizes espionage as the main source of
China's ill-gotten nuclear knowledge. But assessing which part of China's nuclear know-how
came from espionage is like trying to unscramble an egg, intelligence officials say: it also came
from scientific conferences and publications, declassified documents, unauthorized leaks and
Chinese expertise."

 Pincus, Walter. "Prescriptions for Keeping Secrets: Report on Chinese Espionage Inspires a
Variety of Hill Proposals." Washington Post, 27 May 1999, A3.

"One day after a House select committee delivered its Chinese espionage report in Congress,
legislators in both houses began discussing what to do about it. Proposals ranged from requiring
nuclear lab employees who visit sensitive foreign countries to be accompanied by an anti-spying
expert to setting up a bipartisan commission to review counterintelligence across the federal
government."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "Planted Document Sows Seeds of Doubt: Spy Experts
Wonder What China Hoped to Reap." Washington Post, 28 May 1999, A3. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

The House select committee has concluded "that Chinese spies had stolen secrets on seven of the
United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons, giving them nuclear design information
'on a par with our own.' But the committee's ... report on Chinese espionage revealed that this
central conclusion rested largely upon a document deliberately fed to the CIA by a 'walk-in'
Chinese agent, a spy secretly acting on the orders of China's intelligence agency. That discovery
suggests that China deliberately supplied the United States with evidence of its own espionage
against the U.S. nuclear weapons complex."

On 31 May 1999, the Washington Post, p. A22, carries a letter, "China's Nuclear Data Theft,"
from Representatives Christopher Cox (R-CA) and Norm Dicks (D-WA), respectively, chairman
and ranking member of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military-
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. The letter reads in part: "While there
is mystery in the motives of the PRC in providing this document to the United States..., there is
no question about the authenticity of the U.S. nuclear weapons design data it contains.... The
debate over whether the PRC stole design information for the W-88 is over: it did."

 Maggs, John. "Secrets Shanghaied: Warhead Design, Missile and Satellite Technology,
Machine Tools -- You Name It, the Cox Committee Says China Stole It." National Journal, 29
May 1999, 1454-1461.

The Cox Committee report "builds a largely circumstantial but overwhelming case for the claim
that China has gained crucial design information for all of the U.S. nuclear arsenal ... -- yet, the
report sticks close to its mandate in avoiding sweeping judgments on the significance of these
losses."
 Pincus, Walter. "China Spy Gains Overvalued, Two Former Lab Directors Say." Washington
Post, 30 May 1999, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Two former heads of national nuclear labiratories, Harold M. Agnew and Johnny S. Foster, "say
information allegedly stolen by China through espionage was not as valuable as portrayed" by
the House select committee's report.

  Pincus, Walter. "Hill Report on Chinese Spying Faulted: Five Experts Cite Errors,
'Unwarranted' Conclusions by Cox Panel." Washington Post, 15 Dec. 1999, A16. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

The report of the House select committee chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA) "contained
significant factual errors, 'inflammatory' language and 'unwarranted' conclusions, according to a
point-by-point rebuttal to be issued [on 15 December 1999] by five experts at Stanford
University." The analysis was coordinated by Michael M. May, co-director of Stanford's Center
for International Security and Cooperation and a former director of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.

"The panel's expert on Chinese governance and policy was Alastair Iain Johnston, a Harvard
professor who is a visiting scholar at Stanford. The nuclear weapons section of its report was by
Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, former director of the Stanford High Energy Physics Laboratory; the
Chinese arms control section was by Marco Di Capua, a Lawrence Livermore physicist who
served at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 1993 to 1997; and the section on China's acquisition
of U.S. missile technology was by Lewis R. Franklin, a career intelligence expert on Sino-Soviet
missile and space research who is a visiting scholar at Stanford."

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                          China
                           Fallout from the China Spy Case

                                       1-16 June 1999

Materials presented in chronological order.

  Federation of American Scientists. Secrecy & Government Bulletin 79 (Jun. 1999).
[http://www.fas.org/sgp/bulletin/index.html]

This issue of the FAS organ, written by Steven Aftergood, contains two items ("The Cox
Committee and the Tsien Case" and "Chinese Espionage and the New York Times") which point
out "errors" in the Cox report and in New York Times reporting surrounding Chinese nuclear
espionage in the United States.

 Eckholm, Eric. "China Detects Racism in U.S. Report on Spying." New York Times, 1 Jun.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 31 May 1999, the information minister of China's State Council, Zhao Qizheng, called the
Cox report "a tissue of half-truths, conjectures and lies." At a news conference, the minister
"used an Internet hookup" to show that "detailed information" on U.S. "nuclear weapons was
readily available from public sites.... [A] Web page of the Federation of American Scientists
(http://www.fas.org) was shown on a screen as an operator scrolled through it, displaying
technical descriptions of American warheads and missiles. But neither Internet sites like that nor
books that Zhao [also] cited offer the secret design details at the center of the most serious
espionage charges." See also, Michael Laris, "Chinese Surfer Downloads U.S. Nuclear Data."
Washington Post, 1 Jun. 1999, A10.

A brief item in Federation of American Scientists, Secrecy & Government Bulletin 79 (Jun.
1999) notes the use by Chinese officials of the FAS Website, but comments that the site "does
not provide detailed weapon designs that would enable readers to construct a nuclear weapon."

 Tauscher, Ellen O. "Stop the Spies." Washington Post, 1 Jun. 1999, A15.

Representative Tauscher (D-CA) argues that the revelations about PRC spying at U.S. nuclear
labs indicates a "systemic failure of our counterintelligence operation. It has lacked centralization
and did not adequately address emerging threats in the post-Cold War paradigm. Our intelligence
agencies also have failed to embrace new technologies. Just as our national labs lead the world in
state-of-the-art technology, so too must our counterintelligence agencies lead the world in
surveillance and verification measures."

 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Releases
Report on Energy Department's Foreign Visits and Assignments Program: Board Calls
Continued International Exchange Essential." 8 Jun 1999. [http://www.energy.gov]

On 8 June 1999, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (SEAB) "released a report which
concludes that broad scientific benefits of international collaborations" at DOE's "national
laboratories make it essential to the scientific and technological strength of the United States. In
addition, the report says that foreign national visitors and assignees can safely have managed
access to DOE's laboratories and other facilities without jeopardizing national security."

 Eilperin, Juliet, and Vernon Loeb. "Weapons Lab Reforms Backed." Washington Post, 10 Jun.
1999, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 9 June 1999, the U.S. House of Representatives "unanimously adopted several measures" that
would "tighten security and counterintelligence at U.S. weapons labs, bolster export controls and
call on the administration to consider transferring the nation's nuclear weapons programs outside
the Energy Department."

 Gerth, Jeff. "U.S. Adds 6 Chinese Sites to List that Alerts Computer Sellers." New York Times,
10 Jun. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"In an effort to prevent sensitive technology from being used by the Chinese military, the
Commerce Department has told exporters that shipments to six missile and nuclear sites in China
will require Federal approval."

 Risen, James. "Energy Secretary Delays Disciplining Staff Over Spy Case." New York Times,
10 Jun. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Dissatisfied with a DOE review that he "believed did not hold enough senior officials at Energy
Department headquarters accountable for the blunders in the Los Alamos spy case," Secretary
Bill Richardson "has ordered a new investigation" by the department's inspector general.
Richardson will "delay any reprimands" until he sees the results of the new investigation.

 Pincus, Walter. "Security Not a Priority For Bush Energy Chief: Breaches Have Led to Nuclear
Lab Changes." Washington Post, 14 Jun. 1999, A14.

"When retired Adm. James D. Watkins took over the Energy Department in early 1989, then-
President George Bush told him that security and safeguards at the department's nuclear weapons
laboratories were 'a complete mess.'... Watkins instituted a study of security and beefed up some
personnel rules and physical barriers. But the former chief of naval operations ... made his first
priority restructuring responsibility within the department, particularly environmental, safety and
health standards."

  Special Investigative Panel. President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Science at Its
Best, Security at Its Worst: A Report on Security Problems at ther U.S. Department of Energy.
[Released 15] June 1999. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/pfiab/index.html.

Members of the PFIAB panel were Warren Rudman, chair and former U.S. Senator; Ann Z.
Caracristi, former NSA deputy director; Sidney D. Drell, physicist, consultant, and chair of a
University of California panel that helps manage the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratories; and Stephen Friedman, former chairman of Goldman, Sachs & Co.
 Pincus, Walter. "Panel Urges Some Autonomy for Nuclear Weapons Program." Washington
Post, 15 Jun. 1999, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The PFIAB report recommends "making the Energy Department's nuclear weapons functions
semi-autonomous inside the department or splitting them off into an independent agency
reporting directly to the White House."

  Risen, James. "Report Scolds Bureaucracy for U.S. Nuclear Lab Lapses." New York Times, 15
Jun. 1999.

The PFIAB report "argues that the Energy Department has mishandled the nation's nuclear
secrets for 20 years." The report, briefed to President Clinton on 14 June 1999, says that "Clinton
administration initiatives to tighten security at nuclear weapons laboratories are not being carried
out fully because of bureaucratic arrogance and foot-dragging."

  U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Statement by Secretary of Energy Richardson on
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Report." 15 Jun. 1999. [http://www.energy.
gov]

"I agree with the Report's conclusion that serious change is needed in the department's
organizational structure.... [But] I have strong reservations about the Board's recommendation to
establish a semi-independent or independent agency for nuclear weapons matters."

  New York Times. "[Editorial:] New Management for the Nuclear Labs." 16 Jun. 1999.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

The Rudman panel has produced a "powerful, balanced report." Of the options identified for
improving security at the U.S. nuclear labs "a fully independent agency accountable to the
highest political authorities seems best."

 Pincus, Walter. "Energy's Nuclear Arms Oversight Hit: Panel Suggests Possibly Taking
Complex Out of Department Hands." Washington Post, 16 Jun. 1999, A18. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

PFIAB's report "cited ... several examples of 'substantial problems in management' that the panel
said have undermined security at the Energy Department and its nuclear weapons laboratories."

 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Richardson Selects Security 'Czar.'" 16 Jun.
1999. [http://www.energy.gov]

On 16 June 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson "named General Eugene E. Habiger as the
Director of a new high-level Office of Security and Emergency Operations. Habiger, who has
been commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, retired from the United States Air
Force in 1998." See also, Jeff Gerth, "Retired General to Oversee Security for Nuclear Weapons
Labs," New York Times, 17 Jun. 1999.
         Forward to China 17 June-July 1999

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                        China
                         Fallout from the China Spy Case
                                  17 June - July 1999

Materials presented in chronological order.

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Support Builds for Separate Nuclear Authority."
Washington Post, 17 Jun. 1999, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Although the House select committee that he chaired "did not include specific recommendations
for reform," Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA) said on 16 June 1999 that "he supports a proposal to
transfer control over nuclear weapons production and research from the Department of Energy to
an independent agency much like the old Atomic Energy Commission."

 Pincus, Walter. "Nuclear Security Blanket: Compromise May Be Near on New Agency to
Oversee Atomic Arms." Washington Post, 20 Jun. 1999, A3. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"[T]he Department of Energy and its congressional critics are moving toward a compromise:
creating a new agency within the department to oversee the production of America's nuclear
weapons."

 Loeb, Vernon. "Polygraphs Start for 5,000 at Energy: Opposition Mounts to Widespread Lie
Detection to Catch Spies at Weapons Labs." Washington Post, 21 Jun. 1999, A2. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson has ordered the polygraphing of some "5,000 nuclear weapons
scientists and other sensitive employees" at the DOE, "extending wholesale use of 'lie detector'
tests for the first time outside" the CIA and NSA.

 Gerth, Jeff. "In Wake of Espionage, Debate on New Nuclear Arms Agency." New York Times,
23 Jun. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 22 June 1999, the U.S. Senate and the Clinton Administration "moved closer ... to a drastic
legislative restructuring of the Energy Department," by the creation of an "Agency for Nuclear
Stewardship." However, Energy Secretary Richardson is continuing to resist a separate office to
oversee nuclear weapons programs. See also, Audrey Hudson, "Hill Eyes Change to Guard
Nuke Secrets," Washington Times, 23 June 1999. Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 28
Jun.-4 Jul. 1999, 15.

 Freedberg, Sydney J., Jr. "Energy Labs Debate Boils Over." National Journal (26 Jun. 1999),
1896-1897.

Discusses reaction to PFIAB report at the Energy Department, at the Labs, and in Congress. The
focus is Energy Secretary Richardson's resistance to a semiautonomous agency responsible for
national security work at the Energy Department.

 Risen, James, and Jeff Gerth. "U.S. Is Said to Have Known of China Spy Link in 1995." New
York Times, 27 Jun. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to current and former officials, "[t]he White House was told about China's apparent
theft of American nuclear weapons technology in July 1995... Until now, the Administration has
left the impression that the White House first learned about the matter in April 1996, when
Samuel R. Berger, then President Clinton's deputy national security adviser, was briefed on the
case by Energy Department officials."

  Friedman, Norman. "World Naval Developments: Chinese Spied for Decades." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 125, no. 7 (Jul. 1999): 107.

"The question ... is whether the potential of [the vast Chinese] market blinded many U.S.
companies and the U.S. administration itself to the liklihood that a stronger China would be a
major strategic threat.... Will the fruits of espionage encourage the Chinese to imagine that they
can take chances, such as attacking Taiwan, without fear of U.S. intervention, because their
growing arsenal will deter us?"

 Gerth, Jeff. "President's Top Security Adviser Questioned by Senate Committee." New York
Times, 1 Jul. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 30 June 1999, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger answered questions before the SSCI
"about how the White House has handled the allegations of nuclear espionage by China. One
official who attended the meeting ... said that Berger repeated previous accounts of how he first
learned about the issue in April 1996 and first informed Clinton in July 1997, after receiving a
more detailed briefing." See also, Walter Pincus, "Berger Defends Handling of Espionage
Allegations Before Hill Panel," Washington Post, 1 Jul. 1999, A18.

 Pincus, Walter. "Richardson Accepts Nuclear Agency Plan: DOE Unit Would Be
Semiautonomous." Washington Post, 8 Jul. 1999, A16. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 7 July 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson agreed "to create a semiautonomous agency to
run" the complex of "laboratories and plants that research, assemble and maintain America's
nuclear weapons." Establishment of an Agency for Nuclear Stewardship (ANS) "would be the
most significant change produced" after "more than a year of controversy over allegations of
Chinese espionage and lax security at the weapons labs. The new agency also would represent
the first major reorganization of the nuclear weapons complex in more than two decades," since
the DOE was formed in 1976-1977. See also, Matthew L. Wald, "Secretary Agrees to Idea of
Agency on Nuclear Weapons," New York Times, 8 Jul. 1999.

 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Richardson Toughens Requirements for
Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments: Policy Directive Strengthens Controls over
Foreign Nationals at DOE Facilities." 14 Jul. 1999. [http://www.energy.gov]

"The Visits and Assignments Policy Office will act as a central accounting center to track and
analyze the details of foreign visits and assignments to DOE facilities to ensure that these are
conducted in a secure manner."

  U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Statement of Secretary of Energy Bill
Richardson on the Senate Bill to Reorganize the Department of Energy." 21 Jul. 1999.
[http://www.energy. gov]

The Senate has "made significant improvements to the reorganization proposal by adopting
amendments to ensure the Secretary of Energy retains direction, control and authority over the
agency's policies, including counterintelligence and security policies, to preserve scientific
interaction between the Energy Departments' defense labs and the rest of the Department, and to
protect field operations. These amendments are important."

  Pincus, Walter. "Senate Votes for New DOE Nuclear Weapons Agency: Proposal's Prospects
in House Are Less Certain." Washington Post, 22 Jul. 1999, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.
com]

"In its first legislative response to allegations of Chinese spying, the Senate voted
overwhelmingly [on 21 July 1999] to give responsibility for nuclear weapons research and
production to a new agency inside the Department of Energy." See also, Eric Schmitt, "Spying
Furor Brings Vote in Senate for New Unit," New York Times, 22 Jul. 1999.

 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Energy Secretary Richardson Orders
Department-wide 'Security Stand-Down': Latest Action To Immerse Employees In Intense
Security Education, Training." 29 Jul. 1999. [http://www.energy.gov]
  Aftergood, Steven. "Wrongheaded 'Protection.'" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 4
(Jul.-Aug. 1999). [http://www.bullatomsci.org]

"[E]fforts to reduce the scope of government secrecy and promote declassification of Cold War
records may be an unfortunate casualty of the Chinese nuclear espionage scandal.... In particular,
the reported theft of nuclear secrets has cast a government-wide chill on declassification and may
spell the end of the Energy Department's Openness Initiative." See also, Steven Aftergood,
"Security: How Not to Combat Chinese Espionage," Los Angeles Times, 4 Jul. 1999.

          Forward to China August 1999

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                          China
                          Fallout from the China Spy Case

                                        August 1999


Materials presented in chronological order.

 Wettering, Fred. "Chinese Espionage and the Department of Energy." Intelligencer 10, no. 2
(Aug. 1999): 1-4.

The author spent July 1995-July 1996 with DOE's Counterintelligence Office, on detail from the
CIA Operations Directorate. He details numerous problems that hampered security efforts at the
Department but believes that "the belated ... reforms enacted in 1998 have gone a long way
towards addressing the problems described."
  Pincus, Walter. "China Spy Probe Bungled, Panel Finds." Washington Post, 6 Aug. 1999, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

A bipartisan report by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, issued on 5 August 1999,
says that "the FBI and the Energy Department bungled the investigation of a nuclear scientist
suspected of giving China secret information about the design of the W-88 warhead.... The ...
report ... says the investigators failed to look into other suspects, fought among themselves over a
search warrant to a computer, and made other 'compound missteps.'" See also, Jeff Gerth,
"China Espionage Inquiry Was Plagued by Many Mistakes, Senate Report Says," New York
Times, 6 Aug. 1999.

 Schmitt, Eric. "Congressional Pact Alters Energy Department to Protect Nuclear Secrets." New
York Times, 6 Aug. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"House and Senate negotiators reached agreement on [5 August 1999] on a significant
revamping of the Department of Energy, establishing a new agency within the department to
oversee nuclear weapons programs in response to accusations of Chinese espionage."

 Pincus, Walter. "Richardson May Urge Veto of Nuclear Agency." Washington Post, 7 Aug.
1999, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to DOE director of public affairs Brooke Anderson, Secretary Bill Richardson has "a
lot of problems" with a congressional plan to create a National Nuclear Security Administration
as "a separately administered agency" inside the Energy Department.

 U. S. Department of Energy. "Press Release -- Richardson Announces Results of Inquiries
Related to Espionage Investigation." 12 Aug. 1999. [http://www.energy.gov]

On 12 August 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson "announced the results of [three] inquiries
into specific aspects of the espionage investigation" at the DOE's Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) by the independent Office of the Inspector General. The Secretary said, the
report makes clear that DOE's "political and career management failed to give necessary
attention to counterintelligence and security. That combined with the lack of accountability,
unclear communication with other agencies and dysfunctional reporting relationships was fertile
ground for the problems that occurred during the investigation. There was a total breakdown in
the system."

 Risen, James. "Nuclear Lab Should Punish 3 Colleagues, Official Says." New York Times, 13
Aug. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Energy Secretary Bill Richardson has recommended disciplinary action against" Siegfried
Hecker, director of Los Alamos from 1986 to 1997, Terry Craig, until recently a
counterintelligence team leader at the lab, and Robert Vrooman, former chief of
counterintelligence, "for failing to handle properly the espionage investigation" into allegations
that China may have stolen nuclear secrets from the lab, officials stated on 12 August 1999. See
also, Vernon Loeb, "Richardson Recommends Discipline for 3 in Los Alamos Case,"
Washington Post, 13 Aug. 1999, A9.

 Risen, James. "Official Who Led Inquiry Into China's Reputed Theft of Nuclear Secrets Quits."
New York Times, 24 Aug. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Notra Trulock, the DOE official who led the initial inquiry into China's suspected theft of U.S.
nuclear secrets, resigned on 23 August 1999, "saying he was protesting roadblocks to his pursuit
of the case by Clinton Administration policy makers and other Government officials." See also,
Vernon Loeb and Walter Pincus, "Espionage Whistleblower Resigns: Energy's Trulock Cites
Lack of Support as Debate About His Tactics Grows," Washington Post, 24 Aug. 1999, A1.

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "Allegations of Bias Hurt Case Against Spy Suspect."
Washington Post, 26 Aug. 1999, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Inquiries "by Congress and the Clinton administration have revealed flaws in the reasoning that
led Notra Trulock ... and the FBI to ignore other potential suspects and focus on [Wen Ho] Lee."
Others involved in the investigation "have said ... that they believe Trulock lacked any hard
evidence against Lee and singled him out as a suspect because of his ethnicity."

 Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Mr. Trulock's Resignation." 27 Aug. 1999, A28. [http://
www.washingtonpost.com]

"[A]t least some of Mr. Trulock's concerns have considerable merit.... Chinese espionage does
appear to have netted design information about American warheads. Far less clear, however, is
how much design information really was compromised.... There is reason to wonder as well
whether Mr. Trulock's confidence that the leak came from Los Alamos was reasonable or
whether it led him to narrow his search for the spy and focus too quickly on former Los Alamos
scientist Wen Ho Lee.... All of this makes it hard to take Mr. Trulock's as the last word in this
affair.... At the same time, his contribution in insisting that lab security and Chinese nuclear
spying were a problem requiring immediate attention cannot be dismissed."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Los Alamos Actions May Take Months: Lab Must Follow
University's Procedures." Washington Post, 31 Aug. 1999, A4. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

Although Energy Secretary Bill Richardson has recommended that Los Alamos National
Laboratory discipline three employees involved in the Wen Ho Lee spy case, "[i]t may be weeks
or even months" before the lab's director takes action against the employees, officials said on 30
August 1999. "[B]ecause the lab is managed by the University of California,... personnel actions
must follow the university's procedures, which include a fact-finding process, rights of appeal
and possible arbitration."

          Forward to China September 1999
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              SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                           China
                          Fallout from the China Spy Case
                             September - December 1999

Materials presented in chronological order.

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "Veto Urged For Energy Revamp: State Attorneys General,
Democrats Oppose Plan." Washington Post, 9 Sep. 1999, A19. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"Leading congressional Democrats and 46 state attorneys general are urging President Clinton to
veto a Republican plan to reorganize the Department of Energy. The reorganization ... would
create a semiautonomous agency to oversee the DOE's enormous complex of laboratories and
plants that research, assemble and maintain America's nuclear arsenal."

 Loeb, Vernon. "3 Los Alamos Officials Penalized Over Probe." Washington Post, 11 Sep. 1999,
A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Although not named in the 10 September 1999 announcement, Sig Hecker, Los Alamos National
Laboratory's former director, Robert S. Vrooman, the Laboratory's former counterintelligence
chief, and Terry Craig, a counterintelligence team leader, have "received relatively mild
administrative sanctions ... for failing to properly handle an investigation into suspected Chinese
espionage at the nuclear weapons facility."

 Kamen, Al. "The Lie Detector that Didn't." Washington Post, 17 Sep. 1999, A23. [http://
www.washingtonpost.com]
On 14 September 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson took a polygraph test to set an
example for department scientists unhappy about the prospect of being polygraphed themselves
"on espionage matters."

 Risen, James. "Security at Los Alamos Has Improved, Review Finds." New York Times, 21 Sep.
1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The Energy Department said 20 September 1999 "that a new review had found that security at
Los Alamos National Laboratory had improved in recent months, but that security procedures at
the nation's two other weapons laboratories [Lawrence Livermore and Sandia] still lagged."

 Loeb, Vernon. "Nuclear Overhaul Passes: Senate Approves a New Agency." Washington Post,
23 Sep. 1999, A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 22 September 1999, "the Senate overwhelmingly passed legislation ... creating an agency to
manage the nation's nuclear weapons plants in the most far-reaching reorganization of the
Department of Energy since its creation 22 years ago."

 Risen, James, and David Johnston. "U.S. Will Broaden Investigation of China Nuclear Secrets
Case." New York Times, 23 Sep. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Government officials said on 22 September 1999 that "Attorney General Janet Reno and [FBI]
Director Louis J. Freeh ... have ordered Federal agents to broaden their investigation into
evidence of Chinese nuclear espionage, moving far beyond the Government's earlier scrutiny of a
scientist fired from Los Alamos National Laboratory."

 Schmitt, Eric. "In Shift, Secretary Supports Bill that Overhauls Energy Dept." New York Times,
28 Sep. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Energy Secretary Bill Richardson says he will recommend that President Clinton sign a $289
billion Pentagon budget bill that overhauls the Energy Department, creating an agency within the
department to oversee nuclear weapons programs."

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "DOE Loses $35 Million for Cyber Security." Washington
Post, 29 Sep. 1999, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 28 September 1999, the U.S. Senate "passed an energy appropriations bill that omits $35
million requested by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson for increased computer security....
Richardson ... issued a statement charging that Congress was withholding 'important tools
needed to implement security reform' that Congress itself had demanded.... A member of the
conference committee ... said the $35 million was eliminated because lawmakers 'want to see
management reform' before they approve a huge funding increase."

 Pincus, Walter. "Experts Cite U.S. Intelligence Gains From China Programs." Washington Post,
11 Oct. 1999, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"While a furor has arisen over Chinese spying on the United States, the federal government has
been silent about the other side of the coin -- what U.S. intelligence agencies have learned during
visits by Chinese scientists to U.S. weapons laboratories and trips by U.S. scientists to China's
nuclear research facilities. 'We got more out of those Chinese visits than they got,' said Richard
Kerr, a former deputy director of the CIA who served this year on an intelligence community
panel that reviewed allegations of Chinese espionage at America's nuclear labs."

  Pincus, Walter. "Richardson Cuts Lab Lie Tests Sharply: Plan Focuses on People in Sensitive
Jobs." Washington Post, 16 Oct. 1999, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Energy Secretary Bill Richardson ... has sharply reduced the number of federal employees who
will be required to take polygraph examinations about their handling of nuclear secrets. Instead
of imposing the 'lie detector' tests on more than 5,000 scientists and other employees at the
nation's three nuclear weapons laboratories, the Department of Energy will limit the testing to
several hundred people per lab, or a total of about 1,000 employees, DOE officials said."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Walter Pincus. "FBI Widens Chinese Espionage Probe." Washington Post,
19 Nov. 1999, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The FBI has found new evidence suggesting that China may have stolen information about the
most advanced U.S. nuclear warhead from one of the weapon's assemblers, widening an
investigation once focused almost exclusively on Los Alamos National Laboratory and one of its
staff scientists, Wen Ho Lee."

 Gilley, Bruce. "China's Spy Guide: A Chinese Espionage Manual Details the Means by Which
Beijing Gathers Technology and Weapons Secrets from the United States." Far Eastern
Economic Review, 23 Dec. 1999, 14. [http://www.feer.com]

A 361-page book, published in China in 1991 and written by "two of China's top military
intelligence specialists," is "believed to be the first comprehensive manual on China's overseas
military espionage to have been seen outside the country." The book, entitled Sources and
Methods of Obtaining National Defence Science and Technology Intelligence, "outlines
strategies for gathering both open and secret military technologies from abroad, and provides
information on how to gather such intelligence in the United States."




          Forward to China January 2000

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             SPY CASES - UNITED STATES
                                          China
                          Fallout from the China Spy Case
                                   From January 2000

Materials presented in chronological order.

 Loeb, Vernon. "Back Channels: The Intelligence Community -- The Select Agenda."
Washington Post, 4 Jan. 2000, A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

HPSCI has "hired Paul Redmond, the CIA's former head of counterintelligence, to help draft a
report, due out by mid-February, on security and counterintelligence failures at the DoE's nuclear
weapons laboratories."

  Pincus, Walter. "Richardson Offers Nuclear Security Plan." Washington Post, 9 Jan. 2000, A15.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 7 January 2000, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson "sent Congress his plan for a new,
semiautonomous agency to run his department's nuclear weapons programs. The plan ... calls for
the director of the new National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), who will also serve
as an undersecretary of energy, to be appointed and confirmed by March 1. ... Richardson's plan
gives NNSA its own general counsel but says that some other Energy Department employees
will serve concurrently in positions inside and outside NNSA."

 Gertz, Bill. "China Boosts Spy Presence in U.S., CIA, FBI Report." Washington Times, 9 Mar.
2000. [http://www.washtimes.com]

According to a joint CIA and FBI report sent to Congress in January but released on 8 March
2000, "China's spy services are stepping up military spying against the United States while using
Chinese students as intelligence agents and 'political influence' programs to manipulate U.S.
policy."

 Marquis, Christopher. "Report Faults F.B.I. Over Its Handling of Nuclear Secrets Case." New
York Times, 19 May 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]
A Justice Department review, reported to Attorney General Janet Reno earlier this week, says
that the FBI "gravely mishandled its inquiry into Wen Ho Lee ... by failing to dedicate sufficient
resources to the task and focusing too narrowly on a single suspect." See also, David A. Vise and
Vernon Loeb, "Justice Study Faults FBI In Spy Case," Washington Post, 19 May 2000, A1.

 Pincus, Walter, and Vernon Loeb. "China Spy Probe Shifts to Missiles." Washington Post, 19
Oct. 2000, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to senior U.S. officials, "[a] new review of Chinese military documents provided by a
defector in 1995 has led U.S. intelligence agencies to conclude that Chinese espionage has
gathered more American missile technology than nuclear weapons secrets."

 Kan, Shirley A. China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets. Washington,
DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 Feb. 2006.

This report reviews the many factors that went into the huge dispute over Chinese spying.

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                            LATIN AMERICA
                                           Cuba
                          Spy Rings in Florida (from 1998)

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Pressley, Sue Anne. "10 Arrested on Charges of Spying for Cuba: Military Facilities Targeted,
FBI Alleges." Washington Post, 15 Sep. 1998, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Ten people allegedly operating as a Cuban spy ring "have been arrested and accused of
collecting information on U.S. military installations and anti-Castro groups in Florida, federal
officials announced [on 15 September 1998]. The arrests, carried out [on 12 September 1998],
ended the most extensive espionage effort involving Cuban agents ever uncovered here, U.S.
Attorney Thomas E. Scott said."

Clark comment: The number of arrests in this case eventually reached 14. In March 2000,
Amarylis Silverio Santos and her husband, Joseph Santos, along with several others of the group,
pleaded guilty to "charges of acting as unregistered agents of a foreign government." John Elvin,
"Jail Time for Cuban Spies," Insight on the News, 6 Mar. 2000.

 Weiner, Tim. "3 Cuban Diplomats Ordered Out of U.S. for Spying." New York Times, 24 Dec.
1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 23 December 1998, three Cuban diplomats at the United Nations were ordered to leave the
United States. "The three men were linked to espionage after an investigation by the FBI that led
to the arrest and indictment of 10 suspected Cuban agents in Miami three months ago. The three
men in New York have diplomatic passports, which give them immunity from prosecution as
spies."

  Arostegui, Martin C. "Spy Ring for Cuba Uncovered." Miami Herald, 19 Jan. 1999.
[http://www.herald.com]

Spanish prosecutors "have charged five members of Spanish military intelligence and a
businessman of spying for the Cuban government. The ring's activity involved secret meetings in
Miami between the Spanish spies and their Cuban handlers, plus money laundering, industrial
espionage and disseminating disinformation favorable to Cuba."

 Associated Press. "FBI Explains Side in Downing of 2 Planes." Washington Post, 29 Dec. 2000,
A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Encrypted communications between the Cuban government and five accused Cuban spies were
intercepted in early 1996 but were not decoded in time to enable the authorities to alert the exile
group Brothers to the Rescue that Cuba was planning to shoot down its airplanes, the FBI said in
a court filing. The messages, which were sent over shortwave radio and intercepted by the FBI,
have been declassified for the trial of the five Cubans. They are charged with being members of a
spy ring that targeted South Florida military installations and infiltrated anti-Castro exile
groups."

 Pressley, Sue Anne. "Five Cuban Agents Guilty of Spying on U.S." Washington Post, 9 Jun.
2001, A12. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 8 June 2001, a federal jury in Miami "convicted five Cuban agents of espionage against the
United States.... The leader of the group, Gerardo Hernandez, was found guilty of contributing to
the death of four fliers from the Brothers to the Rescue exile group who were shot down in 1996
in international airspace by Cuban MiGs. Prosecutors alleged that Hernandez steered fellow
spies away from the targeted flights and delivered a message to Havana that led to the
shootdown."
 Seper, Jerry. "Couple Charged as Spies." Washington Times, 1 Sep. 2001. [http://www.
washtimes.com]

George and Marisol Gari were arrested on 31 August 2001 and charged with "conspiracy to act
as agents of a foreign government without proper identification or notice to the attorney general."
U.S. authorities say that they were members of "the largest Cuban spy ring ever detected,... 'La
Red Avispa,' or the Wasp Network, five members of whom were convicted in June of conspiring
to spy on the United States for Fidel Castro's regime."

Reuters, 23 Sep. 2001, reports that Marisol Gari has "pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy
to act as an unregistered agent for Cuba.... George Gari pleaded guilty ... to one count of acting
as an unregistered agent for Cuba." According to the Associated Press, 7 Jan. 2002, George Gari
was sentenced to a federal prison term of seven years, and Marisol Gari to 3 1/2 years.

 Roig-Franzia, Manuel. "Cubans Jailed in U.S. as Spies Are Hailed at Home as Heroes."
Washington Post, 3 Jun. 2006, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Although its immediate focus is the five Cubans serving long prison terms for espionage-related
convictions in 2001, this article reviews some of the incidents of Cuban spying in the United
States. It also quotes Cuban leaders for the view that the espionage activities are designed to
protect Cuba from terrorist acts.

  Lefebvre, Stéphane. "Cuban Intelligence Activities Directed at the United States, 1959-2007"
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 460.

On 4 June 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of
the five Cuban agents and the sentences of Gonzalez and Hernandez. The Court vacated and
remanded the sentences of Campa, Medina, and Guerrero back to the District Court.

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                                    SPY CASES
                                   United States
                                    Treason Generally
 Archer, Jules. Treason in America: Disloyalty Versus Dissent. New York: Hawthorne Books,
1971. [Petersen]

 Boveri, Margaret. Tr., Jonathan Steinberg. Treason in the Twentieth Century. London:
MacDonald, 1961. New York: Putnam's, 1963.

       Pforzheimer calls Boveri's work a "brilliant, subtle, provocative analysis of treason
       during World War II." It "brims with incisive comments and over thirty sharply-drawn
       character sketches of 'traitors.'" Those covered include Quisling, Laval, and Petain.

 Bulloch, John. Akin to Treason. London: Arthur Barker, 1966.

       Constantinides: The goal here was "to analyze the motives of Britons who committed
       acts 'akin to treason' from the Boar War" to the 1960s. "This series of essays lacks source
       notes and suffers from the author's tendency to combine fact, opinion, and speculation."

 Carlton, Eric. Treason: Meanings and Motives. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1998.

  Davis, David B., comp. and ed. The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion
from the Revolution to the Present. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971.

 DuCann, Charles Garfield Lott. Famous Treason Trials. New York: Walker, 1964.

 Lewy, Guenter. The Cause that Failed: Communism in American Political Life. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990.

  Loeb, Vernon. "Spies and Other Ego-Trippers: Psychiatrist Jerrold Post Weighs the Personality
in Politics." Washington Post, 24 Mar. 2001, C1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In 1975 CIA psychiatrist Jerrold M. Post wrote in a now-declassified paper, "The Anatomy of
Treason," that "spies are people 'who have a pattern of split loyalties..., who can sham loyalty on
the surface while actually being disloyal under the surface.... One particular psychological
quality which we find in the major agents in spades ... is narcissism or self-absorption,
egocentricity.' When he heard last month about the arrest of Robert Hanssen, a devout Catholic
and dedicated family man accused of spying within the FBI, Post was puzzled. In all his years as
a psychological profiler, he had rarely come across a spy whose outward life seemed so free of
crisis or conflict."

  Marbes, Wilhelm. "Psychology of Treason." Studies in Intelligence 30, no. 2 (Summer 1986):
1-11. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal,
1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 70-82. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

       A CIA psychiatrist discusses the mental makeup of defectors. He makes a number of
       interesting assertions, one of which is that "the percentage of [major] mental disorders ...
       among defectors is less than one would expect to find in an ordinary population of the
       same size." Stated simply, defectors are no crazier than the rest of us. The Agency's
       psychiatrists were not able to establish a single profile that would describe all defectors,
       but "there are clusters of characteristics which fit most defectors."

       Richards J. Heuer, Jr., calls this article "a first class piece. Recent research suggests that
       what is written here about Soviet defectors applies equally well to many of the American
       traitors ostensibly motivated by money or revenge."

 Murphy, Seán. Letting the Side Down: British Traitors of the Second World War. Stroud:
Sutton, 2004.

From publisher: "[A]bout two hundred British citizens were under investigation for assisting the
Axis powers. Using the case studies of the individuals concerned, Sean Murphy uncovers the
reasons for their treacherous activities, describes how they collaborated with the enemy, and
come the end of the war he explores their respective fates."

 Pincher, Chapman. Traitors: The Labyrinths of Treason. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1987.
London: New English Library, 1989. [pb]

 Sarbin, Theodore R., Ralph M. Carney, and Carson Eoyang, eds. Citizen Espionage: Studies in
Trust and Betrayal. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

According to Richards J. Heuer, Jr., "[t]he authors are behavioral scientists at the Defense
Personnel Security Research Center."

  Thompson, Terry. "Security and Motivational Factors in Espionage." Intelligencer 11, no. 1
(Jul. 2000): 1-9. American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 47-56.

The author addresses the "why" question in CI -- why would an individual risk everything in a
crime that carries maximum penalties and an intense stigma? In the 1930s, 1940s, and the Cold
War period, ideology was often the dominant motivation for commiting treason. Today, "recent
trends indicate that pursuit of money is the most common motivation in espionage." Other
motivations include anger/revenge, ego, and ethnicity.

 West, Nigel [Rupert Allason], ed. The Faber Book of Treachery. London: Faber & Faber, 1995

       Surveillant 4.3: This is an anthology of the writings of individuals "convicted or charged
       with treachery.... Some so-called traitors include German patriots who fled the Nazis, or
       Soviet intelligence personnel who defected to the West." The writings are presented
       under the headings of "The British," "The Soviets," "The Soviet Bloc," "The Americans,"
       "The French," "The Israelis," and "The Germans."

 West, Rebecca.
Much of what West does in her works on treason stands up well, especially from a
philosophical point of view, even after so many years.

1. The Meaning of Treason. New York: Viking, 1946. London: The Reprint Society, 1952.

2. The New Meaning of Treason. New York: Viking, 1964. [pb] Rev. ed., 1967.

Constantinides finds this work "marked by the penetrating analysis and writing ability for which
the author is famous." She provides "discerning judgments on the traitors and their motives."
Taylor and Snow, I&NS 12.2/116/fn.1, note that West's "epilogue in both volumes is a good
introduction to the concept of ideological treason."

 Wheale, Adrian. Renegades: Hitler's Englishmen. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994.

       Thurlow, I&NS 11.1: "Broadly speaking, the renegades were mainly involved with Nazi
       propaganda,... and with the attempted formation of ... the 'British Free Corps,' to fight
       against the Soviet Army on the eastern front." This book "gives the most illuminating
       account" of the latter effort thus far published. The author's work is also "useful" in
       discussing the motives behind treasonous behavior: "Wheale shows the complexity of the
       motives of those involved..., and provides a much more plausible assessment[] than
       Rebecca West's classic contemporary unsympathetic account of the weeds and misfits
       who dabbled in treason."

         Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents

         Return to UK Spy Cases Table of Contents

         Return to Main Table of Contents



                                       RUSSIA
                                   Soviet Spies
                                   Table of Contents

 General

 Comintern

 Rudolf Abel
 By Name

 The Venona Materials

  Nigel West & Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels (1998) and TRIPLEX: Secrets from
the Cambridge Spies (2009)

 1996 Russia-UK Spy Incident

 "Mitrokhin Files" Revelations (September 1999)

     Return to Russia Table of Contents




                                RUSSIA
                               Soviet Spies
                                    General
Included here:

1. Hammer

2. Kapitza

3. Loginov

4. Mally

5. Nora Murray

6. Ruth Werner

7. Richard Sorge:

a. A - R

b. S - Z
8. Rote Kapelle and Rote Drei:

a. A - Q

b. R - Z

9. Atomic Bomb Spies

10. The Cambridge Five (plus Modin and Orlov)

11. Blake and Lonsdale

12. Richard William Miller

13. Also see "Spy Cases U.S." Table of Contents for additional Soviet spies

1. Hammer

 Blumay, Carl, and Henry Edwards. The Dark Side of Power: The Real Armand Hammer. New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

      According to Surveillant 3.1, this work shows that Hammer was "listed in KGB files as
      an agent vliyana, an agent of influence for the Soviet government." Anthony Cave
      Brown, WPNWE, 12-18 Jun. 1995, says that this book's material on Armand Hammer is
      particularly instructive, because it shows Hammer present at both the beginning of the
      Comintern and the end of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, to the end, Hammer "remained
      a political riddle." See also, Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, The Secret World of American
      Communism (1995).

 Epstein, Edward Jay.

1. Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer. New York: Random House, 1996.

      According to Goulden, IJI&C 9.4, the author "performs the ultimate unmasking of a man
      who deceived, even betrayed, his country, his family, and the hired toadies who posed as
      his friends.... The account is of a man who bribed and cheated his way to great wealth --
      and who started with Soviet gold.... Epstein tells in gripping detail how the Soviets used
      the willing Hammer as a financial errand boy.... Dossier, a rousing read, is one of the best
      intelligence books of the decade."

2. "The Riddle of Armand Hammer." New York Times Magazine, 23 Nov. 1981, 68-73, 112, 114,
116, 118, 129, 122.
2. Peter Kapitza

 Shoenberg, David. "Kapitza, Fact and Fiction." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 4 (Oct.
1988): 49-61.

Although Kapitza has been referred to in connection with both the development of the Soviet
atom bomb and the Cambridge spy ring, the author argues that he really was not part of either
activity.

3. Yuriy Loginov

 Carr, Barbara. Spy in the Sun: The Story of Yuriy Loginov. Cape Town, South Africa: Howard
Timmins, 1969.

       Constantinides: Loginov was a Soviet illegal arrested in South Africa in 1967. The
       report is based on official records, and sometimes reads like it. "The many faults and
       shortcomings overshadow one of the lengthier and more complete expositions of Soviet
       illegal modus operandi, which stands up if particular details do not."

4. Mally

  Duff, William E. A Time for Spies: Theodore Stephanovich Mally and the Era of the Great
Illegals. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999.

According to Powers, NYRB (11 May 2000) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 99-100, Mally was "a
Hungarian captured by the tsarist armies during World War I and freed by the Bolsheviks, who
recruited him to the Communist cause and a career in the running of spies.... He performed his
most important job during the two years (1935-1937) he spent handling the Cambridge Five in
London.... Much of Mally's life is still unknown, but the character of the man emerges clearly in
Duff's wonderful book."

Goedeken, Library Journal (15 Oct. 1999), finds that the author is "at times overly detailed in
his presentation"; nevertheless, he "provides the reader with a sophisticated analysis of ... Mally
and his work as an undercover agent for Stalin." Barron, IJI&C 14.3, notes that although this
"well-documented treatise" focuses on Mally, it "is really an exposition of overall operations of
Soviet Illegals during the 1930s."



5. Nora Murray

 Murray, John. A Spy Called Swallow: The True Story of Nora, the Russian Agent. London:
W.H. Allen, 1978.

Nora is Nora Korzhenko who became Murray's wife after being "recruited by the Soviet
secret police to seduce Murray" who worked at the British Embassy in Moscow. She
"became the first Soviet war bride to come to Britain." [Obituary] "John Murray,"
Telegraph (London), 18 Oct. 2000.

Rocca and Dziak: This is the "story of the daughter of a prestigious security service official,
purged from her liaison position with the Soviet Foreign Office in 1938, who became an
informant in 1941 and targeted on an official of the British Embassy, Moscow." See also, Nora
Murray, I Spied for Stalin (London: Odhams, 1950).

 Murray, Nora. I Spied for Stalin. London: Odhams, 1950. New York: Wilfrid, Funk, 1951.

"Mrs Murray ... became something of a celebrity following the publication of her book, and was
much in demand for interviews." [Obituary] "John Murray," Telegraph (London), 18 Oct. 2000.
See also, John Murray, A Spy Called Swallow: The True Story of Nora, the Russian Agent
(London: W.H.Allen, 1978).

6. Ruth Werner

  Fischer, Benjamin B. "Farewell to Sonia, the Spy Who Haunted Britain." International Journal
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 61-76.

Fischer notes that, strictly speaking, Ruth Werner "was not ... a spy. As a GRU ... agent and
illegal who served as liaison between the Moscow Center and the real spies, she was rather a
spy-handler." As SONIA of the Venona transcripts, she handled both Klaus Fuchs and Melita
Norwood, work that "put[s] her in the superstar category" in espionage history.

 Werner, Ruth. Sonjas Rapport. Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1977. Sonya's Report: The
Fascinating Autobiography of One of Russia's Most Remarkable Secret Agents. London: Chatto
& Windrus, 1991.

Surveillant 2.1 identifies Sonya's Report as the autobiography of a "Soviet agent and
associate/lover of Richard Sorge." It is the "professional memoir of a Communist intelligence
agent.... Her greatest coup: the passing of British A-bomb secrets from Klaus Fuchs to Stalin."

Ruth Werner (born Ursula Ruth Kuczynski in Berlin in 1907) died in Berlin on 7 July 2000 at the
age of 93. Her obituary, "Ruth Werner," Times (London), 10 Jul. 2000, 27, termed her "[o]ne of
the most effective agents for the Soviet Union in the early, tension-filled years of the Cold War."
Werner's skills as a Soviet agent are illustrated by the continuation of her work dispatching Klaus
Fuchs' take to Moscow for two years after her cover had been blown to British security. After
fleeing the United Kingdom in 1949, she became "a key member" of the bureaucracy of the East
German Communist Party, "in which she served for several decades."

See David Binder, "Ruth Werner, Colorful and Daring Soviet Spy, Dies at 93," New York Times,
23 Jul. 2000, 27; "Cold War Spy Ruth Werner," Washington Post, 9 Jul. 2000, C6; "Ruth
Werner, Soviet Spy, Died on July 7th, Aged 93," The Economist, 13 Jul. 2000, 26; and Michael
Hartland, "Sonia, The Spy Who Haunted Britain," Sunday Times, 15 Jul. 2000, 1, 3.
      Return to Soviet Spies Table of Contents



                  INTELLIGENCE LIAISON
              U.S. Domestic Liaison Activities
 Baker, Stewart. "Should Spies Be Cops?" Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994-1995): 36-52.

ProQuest: The BNL affair "centered on charges that the Justice Department and the CIA
covered up the Bush administration's channeling of prewar military assistance to Iraq. Whether
the CIA should expand its traditional beat to become cops is discussed."

  Baumann, Andrea Barbara. "Silver Bullet or Time Suck? Revisiting the Role of Interagency
Coordination in Complex Operations." PRISM 3, no. 3 (Jun. 2012): 33-46.
[http://www.ndu.edu/press]

"The drawdown of American military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a reduction in
the immediate demand for operational civilian-military coordination within the U.S.
Government.... The resulting challenge is to design a flexible institutional framework that allows
agencies to cooperate effectively if and where needed, while at the same time allowing them to
prioritize scarce resources in accordance with distinctly different core mandates and working
methods." (Italics in original)

  Hulnick, Arthur S. "Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The 'Spies Are Not Cops' Problem."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 269-286.

The author looks at some of the problems inherent in the relationship between intelligence and
law-enforcement agencies, and specifically between the CIA and FBI. He notes a growing
degree of cooperation between the two in counterintelligence and other areas since the Ames
case, but clearly sees that differences remain and are likely to continue to do so. He believes
there is a need for a "permanent body to adjudicate issues of tasking, warrants, and the like."

 Kitfield, James. "Covert Counterattack." National Journal, 16 Sep. 2000, 2858-2865.

"[S]enior officials of the CIA, FBI, Defense Department, and National Security Council have
worked quietly for more than a year to draft a plan [called "Counter-Intelligence 21" or CI-21] to
broaden cross-agency cooperation to encompass virtually the government's entire national
security apparatus."

 Perlez, Jane. "F.B.I. Chief Cites C.I.A. Help in African Bombing Inquiry." New York Times, 15
Sep. 1998, A5 (N).
In a visit to an FBI-financed international training center in Budapest, Hungary, on 14 September
1998, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh said that "much of the progress made in the investigation of
the bombings of two American embassies in East Africa had been a result of close cooperation
between two usually rival agencies" -- the FBI and the CIA.

 Riebling, Mark. Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA. New York: Knopf,
1994. Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA
Has Endangered National Security. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone, 2002. [pb]




Richard Gid Powers, WPNWE, 7-13 Nov. 1994, calls Wedge a "lively and engaging narrative of
interagency bungling, infighting, [etc.] in every known intelligence case." Unfortunately,
Riebling has turned his material into "a series of '[f]or the loss of a nail the war was lost' stories."
For example, he picks up the old and dismissed tale of Popov's Pearl Harbor questionnaire. "Just
as misguided and illogical is his thesis that the Kennedy assassination could have been prevented
if the CIA had only passed on to the FBI the news that an official at the Soviet embassy in
Mexico City who talked to Oswald shortly before the assassination was a KGB agent attached to
Soviet death squads.... This points to Riebling's ... unfamiliarity with authorities like Gordon
Prange or Gerald Posner, who have laid to rest so much of this tedious conspiracy-theorizing....
The real story in these superficially exciting revelations of official secrets is that there is no story
-- the squabbles between ... Hoover and ... Donovan's many successors do not explain the history
of our time."

Surveillant 3.6 says that some of its "reviewers did not find [the author's] research and fact-
checking sufficiently rigorous.... 'He does not evaluate ... his sources.... He also repeats errors
which have been long since discussed in public print and corrected.... [He has] produced another
book on a subject of which he knows very little, and understands less.... For example, he states
that the U.S. has the only intelligence and security service in the world which divides
counterintelligence into domestic responsibility ... and foreign responsibility.... The author could
not be further from the truth.... [E]rrors of fact ... also lead to errors of interpretation.'"

For McGehee, CIABASE, January 1995 Update Report, this book is "so rife with unsupported
data and conclusions - it loses all credibility." Periscope 20.2 notes that Sam Papich "disagrees
with the author's specific conclusions concerning both the Popov case and the JFK/Oswald case
as well as his concluding views." Nonetheless, Papich believes he was treated fairly and the book
is worth reading. James E. Nolen comments that after 1972 "the liaison role diminished in
importance precisely because a broad exchange at all levels in the field and at Headquarters was
developing." W. Raymond Wannell notes that it is "unfortunate the author did not pursue his
research to the point of eliminating rumor, speculation and biased sources.... Riebling missed the
boat."

Beschloss, NYTBR, 6 Nov. 1994, comments that this "thoroughly researched narrative ... is
constructed as a series of tales, peopled by picaresque figures from Ian Fleming to Oliver North."
According to Riebling, "the Nixon White House quietly encouraged the two agencies to
encroach on each other's territory." The author "succeeds ... in persuading the reader that the
F.B.I.-C.I.A. conflict was a more important piece of the cold war mosaic than heretofore noted
by historians."

According to Robbins, CIRA Newsletter 20.2, "readers of the innumerable exposes of infighting
within the American intelligence community" will find "little in Wedge that is actually new.
First-time author Riebling, however, does profit from his experience as a Random House editor
to bring an exceptionally readable and coherent account ... into one exhaustively sourced work."
NameBase finds Riebling's writing to be "articulate and reflective.... In some sections of this
book, Riebling appears to have relied heavily on the assistance he received from Edward Jay
Epstein.... Fortunately, Riebling explains the Angleton view so competently that it finally makes
sense on its own terms."

Loeb, Washington Post, 21 Oct. 2002, notes that the 2002 paperback edition of this work
includes "an epilogue which Riebling uses to update his thesis and outline a string of missteps he
believes kept the FBI and CIA from preventing al Qaeda's suicide hijackings." If Riebling's
thesis "was provocative at the time, it seems prescient now.... Riebling traces the failure of both
the FBI and the CIA to share the ample clues they possessed of an al Qaeda plot to the Ames
case and its aftermath. The FBI was given authority to police the CIA and wound up ...
eviscerating its clandestine service."

  Scalingi, Paula L. "Intelligence Community Cooperation: The Arms Control Model."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992): 401-
410.

  Turner, Michael A. "CIA-FBI Non-Cooperation: Cultural Trait or Bureaucratic Inertia?"
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 259-273.

"The CIA's culture ... alone does not account for the lack of interagency cooperation between the
CIA and the FBI.... Additional causes are vested in the vagueness of the governing legislation
and the bureaucratic inertia created by the historic separation of the two agencies." The
bipartisan Presidential Commission "has the opportunity to affect the structural relationship
between the CIA and the FBI in a positive way by addressing the legal ambiguities and
promoting training in interagency cooperation." However, such changes will last "only if
accompanied by steps to significantly affect the attitudes of key officials in each of the
agencies."

 Zapp, Greg. "Former Attorney General [William P. Barr] Comments on Intelligence and Law
Enforcement." Periscope 18, no. 6 (1993): 1.
This is a report on remarks by Barr, the last Attorney General in the Bush Administration and a
CIA employee 1973-1977, at an AFIO luncheon 7 June 1993 at Fort Myers Officers' Club. Barr
stated: "US involvement [in a coup attempt against Noriega], had Noriega been killed, would not
have been legally considered assassination."

In other remarks, Barr noted that "[s]ome of the difficulties that arise in the Intelligence
Community's cooperation with the Department of Justice result from different mission
requirements: the Intelligence Community needs to protect sources and methods while Law
Enforcement needs to identify sources in order to prosecute.... In Mr. Barr's analysis, if
Intelligence is to support Law Enforcement, American intelligence agencies will have to
organize to improve dissemination."

          Return to Liaison Table of Contents

          Return to FBI Table of Contents

          Return to CIA Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                          The Interwar Period
 Ackerman, Kenneth D. Young J. Edgar: Hoover, the Red Scare, and the Assault on Civil
Liberties. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2007.

Goulden, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer-Fall 2007), says that this book about Hoover's role in the
so-called Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 is "[a] good read, despite an often annoying political slant."
According to Publishers Weekly (via Amazon.com), although "many at the time believed J.
Edgar Hoover played only a small role in the [Palmer] raids, in fact they were organized by
Hoover, then only a 24-year-old Department of Justice agent who Ackerman describes as
possessing an uncanny ability to please his superiors, a preternatural ability to attend to detail
and a dangerously distorted moral compass."

 Batvinis, Raymond J. The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence. Lawrence, KS: University of
Kansas Press, 2007.

From publisher: The author is a former FBI special agent . He covers "the crucial period before
Pearl Harbor when the Bureau's powers secretly expanded to face the developing international
emergency." Batvinis "examines the FBI's emerging new roles during the two decades leading up
to America's entry into World War II to show how it cooperated and competed with other federal
agencies." Peake, Studies 51.3 (2007), concludes that "[f]or those interested in how the FBI
crafted its niche in the American national security program," this book "is the place to start."

  Belknap, Michael. "Uncooperative Federalism: The Failure of the Bureau of Investigation's
Intergovernmental Attack on Radicalism." Publius 12 (1982): 25-47.

 Candeloro, Dominic. "Louis F. Post and the Red Scare of 1920." Prologue 11 (1979): 40-55.

  Charles, Douglas M. "'Before the Colonel Arrived': Hoover, Donovan, Roosevelt, and the
Origins of American Central Intelligence, 1940-41." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2
(Jun. 2005): 225-237.

Two FBI representatives arrived in the United Kingdom in late 1940 (that is, before Col. William
Donovan arrived in early 1941). During their visit, "they surveyed British intelligence, met high-
ranking intelligence officials, and reported back" to FBI Director Hoover. "The FBI director
subsequently submitted a report to [President] Roosevelt ... that outlined the organization and
methods of both the Security Service (MI5) and Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)."

 Charles, Douglas M.

1. "Informing FDR: FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Foreign Policy
Debate, 1939-45." Diplomatic History 24 (Spring 2000): 211-232.

2. J. Edgar Hoover and the Anti-Interventionists: FBI Political Surveillance and the Rise of the
Domestic Security State, 1939-1945. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2007.

3 and John P. Rossi. "FBI Political Surveillance and the Charles Lindbergh Investigation, 1939-
1944." The Historian 59 (1997): 831-847.

 Fox, John F., Jr. "Early Days of the Intelligence Community: Bureaucratic Wrangling over
Counterintelligence, 1917–18." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005), 9-17.

"As the United States prepared to send troops to fight in France in 1917,... foreign agents had
been acting largely with impunity on domestic soil for three years. Treasury Secretary William
Gibbs McAdoo made what might appear to be a reasonable proposal: centralize all intelligence
responsibility, especially counterintelligence, in a Bureau of Intelligence to be run by the
Department of State or the Treasury Department.... [H]is proposal exacerbated a bureaucratic
battle underway between the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice over how
counterintelligence ... should be handled on the homefront. When the dust settled following the
armistice of 1918, Justice's Bureau of Investigation -- the predecessor to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) -- came out on top as the agency in charge of domestic counterintelligence, a
responsibility that has not been changed since that time."

  Hannant, Larry. "Inter-War Security Screening in Britain, the United States and Canada."
Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 4 (Oct. 1991): 711-735.
The internal security forces of Canada (RCMP), Britain (MI5), and the United States (FBI) all
declined in numbers of personnel from the early 1920s into the 1930s. Nevertheless, these
services worked "to broaden the range of their security operations." One of the "important new
enterprises they launched in this time" was "systematic security screening of civil servants and
even industrial workers."

 MacDonnell, Francis. Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Hansen, History 26.1, calls Insidious Foes "the first comprehensive treatment" of the Fifth
Column scare in the United States between 1938 and 1942. MacDonnell's work "is notable for its
judicious argument, cohesive organization, and enlarged perspective."

 McCormick, Charles H. Seeing Reds: Federal Surveillance of Radicals in the Pittsburgh Mill
District, 1917-1921. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997.

For Wannall, IJI&C 12.1, the author "demonstrates an anti-government attitude ... [and]
displays an inborn dislike of some government officials, including J. Edgar Hoover, on whose
plate he ladled accusations, holding him responsible for the actions of the personnel of an agency
he did not head or control."

 Williams, David.

1. "The Bureau of Investigation and Its Critics, 1919-1921: The Origins of Federal Political
Surveillance." Journal of American History 68 (1981): 560-579. [Petersen]

2. "Failed Reform: FBI Political Surveillance, 1924-1936." First Principles 7, no. 1 (1981): 1-4.
[Petersen]

          Return to U.S. Interwar Table of Contents

          Return to FBI Table of Contents
                   FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                          Post-World War II Materials

                                  Pre-1990s

                              Table of Contents

General Overviews:

A-K

L-P

Q-Z

Richard William Miller Spy Case (1985)

        Return to FBI Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                          General Overviews
                               Pre-1990s
                                     A-K
Ayer, Frederick W., Jr.
Petersen: "In charge of FBI-attached personnel in SHAEF."

1. "The Intelligence Services." Vital Speeches of the Day (1 Feb. 1958): 247-251.

2. Yankee G-Man. Chicago: Regnery, 1957.

 Bell, Griffin. Taking Care of the Law. New York: Morrow, 1982.

       Bell was Attorney General in Jimmy Carter's administration. He discusses both
       intelligence and internal security matters.

 Berens, John. "The FBI and Civil Liberties from Franklin Roosevelt to Jimmy Carter: An
Overview." Michigan Academician 13 (1980): 131-144.

 Blackstock, Nelson. COINTELPRO: The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom. New York:
Vintage, 1975.

       Wilcox: "Member of Socialist Workers Party attacks FBI and COINTELPRO."

 Clark, J. Ransom.

1. "Federal Bureau of Investigation." In Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History, Volume Six:
Postwar Consensus to Social Unrest, 1946 to 1975, ed. Thomas S. Langston, 166-170.
Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010.

2. "Federal Bureau of Investigation." In Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History, Volume Seven:
The Clash of Conservatism and Liberalism, 1976 to Present, ed. Richard M. Valelly, 153-156.
Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010.

3. "J. Edgar Hoover." In Encyclopedia of U.S. Political History, Volume Six: Postwar Consensus
to Social Unrest, 1946 to 1975, ed. Thomas S. Langston, 199-201. Washington DC: CQ Press,
2010.

 Churchill, Ward, and Jim Vander Wall. COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's
Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States. Boston: South End Press, 1990.

       From advertisement: "Hundreds of FBI documents reveal that the Black Panthers, the
       American Indian Movement (AIM), and other domestic organizations have been victims
       of FBI repression."

 Cochran, Louis. FBI Man: A Personal History. New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1966.

       Wilcox: "Personal account of the adventures of an FBI agent, including spy cases."

 Collins, Frederick L. The FBI in Peace and War. New York: Putnam's, 1943. New York: Ace
Books, 1962. [pb]
 Columbia Journalism Review. Editors. "CIA, FBI, and the Media: Excerpts from the Senate
Report on Intelligence Activities." 15 (Jul. 1976): 37- 42. [Petersen]

 Cook, Fred J.

1. The FBI Nobody Knows. New York: MacMillan, 1964.

       Chambers suggests that this book is a "disinformation exercise."

2. "J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI." Lithopnion 6, no. 2 (1971): 8-15, 58-63. [Petersen]

 Demaris, Ovid. The Director: An Oral Biography of J. Edgar Hoover. New York: Harper's
Magazine Press, 1975.

       Wilcox: "Critical biography."

 De Toledano, Ralph. J. Edgar Hoover: The Man in His Time. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington
House, 1973.

       A positive presentation of Hoover's career.

 Donner, Frank.

1. "Hoover's Legacy." The Nation, 1 Jun. 1974, 678-700. [Petersen]

2. "How J. Edgar Hoover Created His Intelligence Powers." Civil Liberties Review 3 (Feb.-Mar.
1977): 34-51. [Petersen]

3. "Investigating the FBI and the CIA." Current 172 (Apr. 1975): 31-37. [Petersen]

 Elliff, John T. The Reform of FBI Intelligence Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1979.

       Constantinides: "Reform of FBI intelligence operations is analyzed from the legal point
       of view: how to eliminate legal abuses and violations of civil liberties in conducting such
       operations, not how to increase the operations' effectiveness.... The study is thoughtful
       and basically sound..., but there is debate on some of Elliff's recommendations as lacking
       realism, being too restrictive, or not being valid.... For the historian of CI, Elliff discusses
       (in a general way) the little-known case of a U.S. scholar engaged in espionage for the
       East Germans."

 Exeter Books. Editors. The FBI. New York: Brompton Books, 1989.

 Felt, W. Mark. The FBI Pyramid from the Inside. New York: Putnam's, 1979.
       Felt retired as the FBI's number two executive; he was later revealed to have been
       Woodward and Bernstein's "Deep Throat."

 Fitch, Stephen D. "The FBI Library Awareness Program: An Analysis." Intelligence and
National Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 101-111.

       "In 1987 a national controversy erupted ... over the revelations of an FBI operation called
       the 'Library Awareness Program', which involved an effort by the FBI to recruit librarians
       to report on library patrons.... The FBI's initiation of this program can be understood as
       one response to an era in which several new problems have emerged concerning the
       protection of scientific information."

 Flaherty, John J.

1. Inside the FBI. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943.

2. Our FBI: An Inside Story. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1951.

               These are pro-FBI accounts, very similar to much of the writing on the Bureau of
               the period. The second is an update of the first.

 Huminik, John. Double Agent. New York: New American Library, 1967. London: Hale, 1968.

Constantinides: The author worked as an FBI double agent against the Soviets. The story
includes "much on Soviet techniques for developing a prospective agent in the private sector and
the inducements offered."

  Keller, William W. The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: The Rise and Fall of a Domestic
Intelligence State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.

       Feinman, Presidential Studies Quarterly 21.1, sees the author demonstrating that from
       the late 1940s to the late 1960s "liberals were willing to delegate extensive powers to
       Hoover to fight domestic Communism and to infiltrate and undermine the Ku Klux
       Klan." The alliance between the liberals and Hoover began to falter only "when it became
       obvious that Hoover was unwilling to promote civil rights."

 Kelley, Clarence M. Kelley: The Story of an FBI Director. Kansas City, MO: Andrews,
McMeel, 1987.

 Kessler, Ronald. Spy vs. Spy: Stalking Soviet Spies in America. New York: Scribner's, 1988.
Spy vs. Spy: The Shocking True Story of the FBI's War Against Soviet Agents in America. New
York: Pocket Books, 1988. [pb]

       According to Evans, IJI&C 3.3, Spy vs. Spy is "easy for laymen to read and entertains."
       However, the subtitle is misleading because the case of the Koechers, who were Czech
       spies, takes up "a large part or all of five of the nineteen chapters." Pollard, who spied for
      Israel, takes up most of Chapter 13. And Chapter 14 belongs to Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a
      PRC spy. The book "reflects ... many institutional prejudices and parochial viewpoints,
      especially regarding the CIA." Cram says this is an "interesting and useful compendium"
      that constitutes a "valuable contribution to counterintelligence literature on the FBI
      experience."

      NameBase comments that "[m]ost of this book recounts the story of Karl F. Koecher and
      his wife Hana, whom Kessler interviewed in 1987. In 1965 they orchestrated a phony
      defection from the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service, after which Karl became a
      naturalized U.S. citizen, worked full-time for the CIA beginning in 1973, and continued
      as a contract agent after 1977. He ... spent many of his weekends as a 'swinger' at spouse-
      swapping parties with Hana. By 1982 the FBI's counterintelligence squad was getting
      suspicious. In 1984 Karl Koecher admitted that he had been spying for the East all along,
      and in 1986 he and Hana were traded for Natan Sharansky."

         Return to FBI Postwar Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
              General Overviews - Pre-1990s
                                            L-P
 Lamphere, Robert J., and Tom Shachtman. The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story. New
York: Random House, 1986. New York: Berkley, 1986. [pb] New Ed., with Post-Cold War
Afterword. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995. [pb]

      Petersen calls The FBI-KGB War "a particularly revealing first-hand account of
      counterintelligence operations in the United States during the 1940s and 1950s." Miller,
      IJI&C 1.3, agrees, finding it a "masterful presentation of the reality of counterespionage
      activities," and "strongly recommends" it.

      To Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, the book is the
      "best account of th[e] still fragmentary story [of the Venona material].... Lamphere's book
      adds much important information to the stories of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg,... Klaus
      Fuchs,... and of the Soviet spy ring which included Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, and
      Kim Philby."

      Cram says Lamphere tells the "story about breaking the KGB ciphers during World War
      II and the resulting consequences of that achievement in the struggle against Soviet
       espionage and subversion." This "otherwise excellent history" is marred by the
       "egregious error" of accepting Pincher's tagging of Hollis as a Soviet agent. The author
       discusses Hoover's "vengeful actions" against the early CIA and liaison with it.
       "Although this book has a few errors and the story has perhaps been gilded a bit by
       Lamphere, it nevertheless remains one of the best histories of US counterintelligence."

       According to Surveillant 4.4/5, the 1995 edition includes a 27-page Afterword where
       Lamphere "reviews the KGB-FBI wars using the latest releases from KGB and U.S.
       archives." Commenting in an article published in 2003, Robarge, Studies 47.3/fn.4, says
       that this "remains the best book on the FBI and counterintelligence." For a report on some
       of the difficulties Lamphere experienced in publishing his book, see George Lardner, Jr.,
       "Ex-Agent's Spy Book Tests Secrecy," Washington Post, 27 Oct. 1977, A1.

 Lowenthal, Max. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. New York: Sloane, 1950. London:
Turnstile, 1950.

       Hannant, I&NS 6.4/732/fn. 8, refers to Lowenthal's as a "pioneering study of the FBI,...
       [which] contains more than any other about the Bureau's security screening efforts."

 Lynum, Curtis O. The FBI and I: One Family's Life in the FBI During the Hoover Years.
Pittsburgh, PA: Dorrance, 1988.

       According to Surveillant 1.3, Lynum had a "26 year FBI career." Here, he discusses
       "criminal cases..., domestic intelligence reporting requirements, Hoover's formation in
       1941 of a Secret Intelligence Service within FBI to run covert operations and deep-cover
       operations (primarily in Mexico and South America), Norwegian spy ships, and German
       counterespionage."

 McCague, James. FBI: Democracy's Guardian. New Canaan, CT: Garrard, 1974. [Petersen]

 Messick, Hank. John Edgar Hoover. New York: Davis McKay, 1972. [Petersen]

 Morros, Boris. My Ten Years as a Counterspy. New York: Viking, 1959.

According to Pforzheimer, Studies 6.2 (Spring 1962), Morros was first an agent for Soviet
intelligence and then worked for 10 years as a double agent for the FBI.

 Munves, James. The FBI and the CIA: Secret Agents and American Democracy. New York:
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975.

From publisher: "Presents cases involving the FBI and CIA from the Depression years to the
Watergate burglary and discusses the role of these two agencies in government and in the lives of
ordinary citizens."

 Nash, Jay Robert. Citizen Hoover: A Critical Study of the Life and Times of J. Edgar Hoover
and His FBI. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1972. [Petersen]
 Ollestad, Norman. Inside the FBI. New York: Lyle Stuart, 1967.

       Petersen: "Critical."

 O'Reilly, Kenneth.

1. "Adlai E. Stevenson, McCarthyism, and the FBI." Illinois Historical Journal 81 (Spring
1988): 45-60. [Jeffreys-Jones]

2. "The FBI and the Origins of McCarthyism." Historian 45 (1983): 372-393. [Jeffreys-Jones]

3. "Herbert Hoover and the FBI." Annals of Iowa 47 (1983): 46-63. [Jeffreys-Jones]

4. Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace. Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 1983.

5. "Racial Matters": The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972. New York: Free Press,
1989. [Jeffreys-Jones]

6. "The Roosevelt Administration and Black America: Federal Surveillance Policy and Civil
Rights during the New Deal and World War II Years." Phylon 48 (1987): 12-45. [Jeffreys-
Jones]

 Overstreet, Henry, and Bonaro Overstreet. The FBI in Our Open Society. New York: Norton,
1969.

       According to Pforzheimer, this book covers from the early days of the FBI to the late
       1960s. One section "focuses on early criticisms of the Bureau.... On balance, the book
       favorably portrays the FBI." However, the "more intense criticism of the Bureau and its
       leadership" came after publication of this book.

 Perkus, Cathy, ed. Cointelpro: The FBI's Secret War on Political Freedom. New York: Monad,
1975.

 Powers, Richard Gid.

1. G-Men: Hoover's FBI in America's Popular Culture. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1983.

2. Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York: Free Press, 1987.

Petersen calls Secrecy and Power "a well-researched ... biography that is critical of Hoover." It
has a "good bibliography." O'Reilly, Policy Studies Journal 21.3, says this is the "first serious
post-FOIA study but also the first revisionist one." Hoover's is a "'profoundly ambiguous'
historic legacy." For Bresler, I&NS 4.1, "Powers' definitive work is a valuable insight into a
career that may never again be duplicated even in its broadest outline."
         Return to FBI Postwar Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                           General Overviews
                                     Pre-1990s
                                             Q-Z
 Reynolds, Quentin. The FBI. New York: Random House, [1963 (Petersen); 1954 (Wilcox)].

       Wilcox: "Critical account ... by [p]ro-Soviet American novelist."

  Ross, Caroline, and Ken Lawrence. The Politics of Repression in the United States, 1939-1976:
J. Edgar Hoover's Detention Plan. Jackson, MS: American Friends Service Committee, Program
on Government Surveillance, 1978. [Petersen]

See also, Tim Weiner, "Hoover Planned Mass Jailing in 1950," New York Times, 23 Dec. 2007.

 Schott, Joseph L. No Left Turns: The FBI in Peace and War. New York: Praeger, 1975.

       Wilcox: "Exposé of FBI abuses, COINTELPRO, surveillance of dissidents."

 Sullivan, William C., and Bill Brown. The Bureau: My Thirty Years in Hoover's FBI. New
York: Norton, 1979. New York: Pinnacle, 1982.

       Constantinides notes that Sullivan was number three in the FBI hierarchy prior to his
       split with Hoover in 1971. Sullivan tends to blame the bureau's shortcomings in
       counterintelligence and counterespionage work "on Hoover and the structure within the
       FBI, which many will consider valid as far as it goes but an incomplete explanation."

 Theoharis, Athan G.

1. "A Creative and Aggressive FBI: The Victor Kravchenko Case." Intelligence and National
Security 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 321-331.
Victor Kravchenko defected from the Soviet Union in April 1944. His "case confirms that FBI
officials had willingly employed intrusive investigative techniques..., and further had initiated
aggressive non-criminal intelligence investigations."

2. "The FBI's Stretching of Presidential Directives, 1936-1953." Political Science Quarterly 91
(Winter 1977): 649-673.

3. "Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)." In Government Agencies, ed. Donald R. Whitnah,
214-219. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1983. [Petersen]

4. ed. Beyond the Hiss Case: The FBI, Congress, and the Cold War. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1978.

This is an earlier work by this long-time FBI/Hoover critic.

5. and John Stuart Cox. The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988. New York: Bantam, 1990. [pb]

       Surveillant 1.2 notes that Theoharis and Cox draw on "previously unknown and sensitive
       Bureau files as well as interviews." O'Reilly, Policy Studies Journal 21.3, comments that
       the authors are "absolutely relentless in criticizing Hoover." Theoharis is "unique in that
       he relished work in the files." Schrecker, JAH 76.1, sees the book as providing "a
       detailed description of the FBI's unauthorized activities and of the elaborate ruses Hoover
       and his aides devised to conceal them." The authors have found no evidence that Hoover
       was gay, but their "occasionally heavy-handed psychologizing cannot always be
       sustained."

 Tully, Andrew.

1. The FBI's Most Famous Cases. New York: Morrow, 1965.

2. Inside the FBI: From the Files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Independent
Sources. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.

According to Constantinides, the counterintelligence and counterespionage aspects of this book
are all in one chapter and include three cases: William Kampiles' sale of the KH-11 manual to
the Soviets, the Troung and Humphrey arrests and convictions for passing documents to the
North Vietnamese, and the FBI's double-agent operation against the Soviets using U.S. Navy
officer Lindberg. Tully adds little to our understanding of the three cases.

 Ungar, Sanford J.

1. FBI: An Uncensored Look Behind the Walls. Boston: Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1976

According to Pforzheimer, this book "was published before much of the testimony ... in 1975-
76 before various congressional committees which went into great detail on many of the
Bureau's operations in the internal security area." Wilcox says it is a "[c]ritical account,
especially with respect to political surveillance of leftists."

2. "The FBI File." The Atlantic 235 (Apr. 1975): 37-52. [Petersen]

  U.S. Congress. Senate. Memorial Tributes to J. Edgar Hoover in the Congress of the United
States and Various Articles and Editorials Relating to His Life and Work. Sen. Doc. No. 93-68.
93d Cong., 2d sess. Washington, DC: GPO, 1974. [Petersen]

 Verbitsky, Anatole, and Dick Adler. Sleeping with Moscow: The Authorized Account of the
KGB's Bungled Infiltration of the FBI by Two of the Soviet Union's Most Unlikely Operatives.
New York: Shapolsky, 1987. [Petersen]

  Wannall, W. Raymond. "The FBI: Perennial Target of the Left." Nightwatch 3, no. 8 (1988): 1-
4. (Special Report) [Petersen]

 Watters, Pat, and Stephen Gillers, eds. Investigating the FBI. Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1973.

       Wilcox: "Critical acount of FBI domestic political surveillance, COINTELPRO."

 Webster, William H. "The FBI and the War Against Terrorism and Espionage." ABA Standing
Committee Intelligence Report 7, no. 12 (1985): 1, 7. [Petersen]

FBI Director at time of article.

  Weiner, Tim. "Hoover Planned Mass Jailing in 1950." New York Times, 23 Dec. 2007.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

According to a collection of cold-war documents declassified on 21 December 2007, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover "had a plan to suspend habeas corpus and imprison some 12,000
Americans he suspected of disloyalty. Hoover sent his plan to the White House on July 7, 1950,
12 days after the Korean War began." The names of the individuals to be arrested "were part of
an index that Hoover had been compiling for years. 'The index now contains approximately
twelve thousand individuals, of which approximately ninety-seven per cent are citizens of the
United States,' he wrote."

 Whitehead, Don. The FBI Story: A Report to the People. New York: Random House, 1956.
The FBI Story. London: Mueller, 1957.

       Petersen calls this a "standard favorable treatment of the Bureau," while Wilcox notes
       that Whitehead emphasizes counterespionage activity. For Pforzheimer (1985), the book
       is a somewhat dated but nevertheless "relatively comprehensive and solid treatment of
       FBI history through the mid-1950's."
  Wicker, Tom. "What Have They Done Since They Shot Dillinger?" New York Times Magazine
(28 Dec. 1969): 4-7, 14-15, 18-19, 28-29.

 Wright, Richard O., ed. Whose FBI? LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1974.

Wilcox: "Critical account"; "collection of articles."

          Return to FBI Postwar Table of Contents

          Return to FBI Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                        Richard William Miller
A contemporaneous account of the Miller case can be found in William Overend's articles
in the Los Angeles Times of 24 October 1985, 7 November 1985, and 15 July 1986.

 Howe, Russell Warren. Sleeping with the FBI: Sex, Booze, Russians and the Saga of an
American Counterspy Who Couldn't. Washington, DC.: National Press Books, 1993.

       Surveillant 2.6 believes this book "gives far more credibility" to Miller's "'investigation'
       of the KGB than probably ever existed (until he was caught)." Harter, FILS 12.6,
       comments that the book has "no footnotes, endnotes, nor bibliography.... The KGB seems
       omnipresent, while the FBI is represented as bungling in comparison.... [I]nformed ...
       opinion on this operation ... is not evident." There are also other errors.

 Verbitsky, Anatole, and Dick Adler. Sleeping with Moscow: The Authorized Account of the
KGB's Bungled Infiltration of the FBI by Two of the Soviet Union's Most Unlikely Operatives.
New York: Shapolsky, 1987.




          Return to FBI Postwar Table of Contents

          Return to Russia - Soviet Spies

          Return to Spy Cases - U.S. Table of Contents
               FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                           Materials from the 2000s
                              Table of Contents

General Overviews:

A-J

K-S

T-Z

Reportage from 2000-2001:

General

Files on John Lennon

Robert Philip Hanssen Spy Case

Attack on U.S and War on Terrorism

Reportage from 2002:

General: January - May

General: June - December
Attack on U.S. and War on Terrorism

Joint House-Senate Investigation of 9/11 Attack (2002-2003)

Independent Commission

Reportage from 2003-2004:

General

The James J. Smith-Katrina Leung Spy Case

Independent Commission

Reportage from 2005:

General

Leandro Aragoncillo Spy Case

Reportage from 2006

Reportage from 2007

Reportage from 2008

Reportage from 2009

       Return to FBI Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                       General Overviews
                                   2000s
                                               A-J
 Campbell, Dan. "FBI Celebrates Centennial with Web Site." Government Computer News, 7
Apr. 2008. [http://www.gcn.com]

The FBI "has updated its Web site with pages devoted to its first 100 years of existence. The
Web site covers the 'Bureau of Investigation's' history since its inception..., and includes a
section that details each of the bureau's directors through the years.... The site also includes a
'Hall of Honor' dedicated to the FBI agents that have been killed in the line of duty, as well as a
detailed history of the bureau's seal." See http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/history.

 DeLong, Candice. Special Agent: My Life on the Front Line as a Woman in the FBI. New
York: Hyperion, 2001.

 Dew, Rosemary, and Pat Pape. No Backup -- My Life as a Female FBI Agent Battling,
Kidnappers, Terrorists, and the Destructive Culture that Handcuffs the Bureau. New York:
Carroll & Graf, 2004.

AFIO WIN 01-04 (12 Jan. 2004) suggests that this is an "angry, burn-the-bridges, insider look at
[Dew's] experiences as female and agent in the pre-1990 Bureau.... She suggests the Bureau is a
dysfunctional family which fosters the environment where someone like Robert Hanssen can
work and thrive."

According to Peake, Studies 49.1 (2005), this book "describes several constants" in the author's
"relatively brief but promising career. The positive ones include rapid promotion, awards, and
commendations. The major negative aspect ... was the pervasive and persistent sexual
harassment.... In part two of the book, Dew ... reviews the Hoover legacy with its emphasis on
law enforcement." She "examines the effect of the Bureau's reluctance to cooperate with other
intelligence agencies, the impact of several discomforting recent espionage and terrorist cases ...
and the failures associated with 9/11. Since she was not involved, she merely gives views based
on her experience." Dew also "makes a series of specific recommendations aimed at long-range
FBI improvement."

  Earley, Pete. Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America after the End
of the Cold War. New York: Putnam's, 2008.

Tretyakov died 13 June 2010 at his home in Florida. See T. Rees Shapiro, "Sergei
Tretyakov Dies; Former Russian Spy Defected to U.S. in 2000," Washington Post, 10 Jul.
2010, B4.

Wise, Washington Post, 27 Jan. 2008, notes that Comrade J is SVR Col. Sergei Tretyakov, who
was the deputy rezident (station chief) in New York when he defected in 2000. The reviewer
does not care much for some of Tretyakov's accusations against Western politicians, but finds
that "[t]he real value of [his] saga lies less in his scattershot claims and innuendoes than in his
sharp eye and gossipy insider's view of the KGB/SVR's training, methods, foibles and tricks."
For Goulden, Washington Times, 20 Jan. 2008, this is "an unsettling book." However, "[s]py
buffs will love Tretyakov's gossipy accounts of National Enquirer-style sexual and alcohol
misbehavior in KGB and SVR offices." Ransom, NIPQ 24.2 (Apr. 2008), comments that the
author "covers a great deal of ground, sometimes roaming without any specific destination."

Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), wishes there were more
details on Tretyakov's work for the FBI in the three years before his defection. This book is in
essence an unsourced defector memoir, and that raises "the question of accuracy." Nevertheless,
"Earley has provided another well told espionage case study." While lamenting its lack of an
index, West, IJI&C 21.4 (Winter 2008-2009), still finds the book to be "important, not so much
because it contains sensational disclosures -- which it does not -- but more for what it reveals
about the daily grind of life in the New York rezidentura."

 Eringer, Robert. RUSE: Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2008.

According to Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), this work
concerns the author's activities with the FBI to lure Edward Lee Howard back to the United
States, where he could be arrested for espionage. In terms of documentation, it "falls squarely in
the 'trust me' category" and "struggles to attain mediocrity."

 Freeh, Louis J., with Howard Means. My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill
Clinton, and Fighting the War on Terror. New York: St Martin’s, 2005.

Walsh, Washington Post, 16 Oct. 2005, calls Freeh's book "a scorching account of his
relationship with Bill Clinton and of leading the bureau at a time when, as Freeh writes, the
president's 'scandals . . . never ended.'... Freeh devotes a scant two chapters to the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks and their aftermath, explaining that enough newsprint and news hours already have been
dedicated to what went wrong without his rehashing the details. This will be too little for many."

For Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), although the
author "dealt with aspects of some important events during his seven-year tenure -- 1 September
1993-25 June 2001 -- ... few details are provided here.... In the area of domestic
counterintelligence,... he says nothing in the title and little in the book. Less than a page for the
CIA's Aldrich Ames ... and Harold Nicholson ([p.] 236), just a few more for the FBI's Earl Pitts
and Robert Hanssen.... This book is FBI lite. GOOGLE will be more informative."

 Gertz, Bill. Enemies: How America's Foes Steal Our Vital Secrets -- and How We Let It
Happen. New York: Crown, 2006.

It seems odd to Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), that the author "treats cases in which [enemy] agents
were caught or confessed -- presumed successes -- yet he argues that 'FBI is out of control' ([p.]
199) and American CI isn't doing anything right, largely because it takes too long to catch the
culprits, a problem he blames on the lack of high-level attention. Like others before him, Gertz
argues that more resources, better leadership, and proactive programs are needed."
Brooks, NIPQ 23.1 (Jan. 2007), notes that this book "deals with the rather consistent failures of
U.S. counterintelligence." The author "points out the failures of the FBI to detect, their ineptitude
in investigating, and their flawed prosecutions as evidence that the nation requires an MI-5 type
professional counterintelligence service." West, IJI&C 20.4 (Winter 2007), finds that this work
"is not so much a work of disclosure, but more a series of case histories." The author's "account
of wholesale ineptitude and worse at the FBI's Hoover Building is written in racy journalese, and
reads as if it had been downloaded off his newspaper's website."

For Goulden, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007) and Washington Times, 12 Nov. 2006,
"even someone who is reflexively friend[ly] towards intelligence and law enforcement agencies
must feel appalled at Mr. Gertz's account of sweeping incompetence by the men and women who
are paid good salaries to protect important secrets.... Not a pleasant read, to be sure, but a
valuable one."

 Hersh, Burton. Bobby and J. Edgar: The Historic Face-Off Between the Kennedys and J.
Edgar Hoover That Transformed America. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2007.

Goulden, Washington Times, 23 Sep. 2007, finds that this book "does a serious disservice to
history (and the truth)." The author has produced "a nose-holder of a book"; it is "laden with
outlandish assertions.... Repeating nut stuff serves only to keep nonsense in circulation." For
Harter, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer-Fall 2007), this is "a well-written hodgepdge, blending fact,
rumor and innuendo." It has "nothing new." Hersh "includes some mighty tell tales ... which
stretch belief, and challenge common sense." Although it is "at times an interesting account," the
author too often "allowed speculation to become fact; rumor and innuendo to masquerade as
reality."

To Theoharis, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), this is a "well-written, massive, and extensively research
study" that "does not advance our understanding" and "devolve[s] into gossipy, at times
conspiratorial, assertions.... Hersh's affinity for the sensational at times leads to his distortion of a
more complex reality."

 Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. The FBI: A History. New Haven,CT, and London: Yale University
Press, 2007.

Clark comment: Jeffreys-Jones's interpretation of FBI history is not uninteresting; however, it
often seems that he is trying too hard to shoehorn his two main themes (racism and civil
liberties) into his narrative.

Although he finds rather strange ("historical sleight of hand") the author's locating the FBI's
beginning in 1871 rather than 1908, Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1
(Spring 2008), judges this work to be "a balanced review of the FBI's organization and functions
from ... 1908 to the present." Hickman, I&NS 24.4 (Aug. 2009), comments that if this book
"fails to persuade in some of its novel vantage points and observations, it still should provoke
spirited debate."
 Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. "The FBI's Continuing Challenge: Centralized Intelligence vs. Civil
Liberties." Chronicle of Higher Education 51, no. 20 (21 Jan. 2005).

The joint Congressional inquiry into the 9/11 attacks "recommended the creation of a cabinet-
level director of national intelligence. At a stroke, the time-honored functional split between the
FBI and CIA would be eradicated. Implicitly, civil liberties would be subordinated to the more
urgent need to fight terrorism.... The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, of
December 2004, created the post of director of national intelligence, or DNI, but the law
reflected political compromises and is vague in vital areas.... Intelligence turf wars and
controversy are likely to continue."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                             General Overviews
                                            2000s
                                              K-S
 Kessler, Ronald. The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI. New York: St. Martin's, 2002.
With Epilogue. New York: St. Martin's, 2003. [pb]

According to Stein, Washington Post Book World, 5 May 2002, Kessler finds that then-FBI
director Louis J. Freeh "almost destroyed the bureau through colossal mismanagement, borne of
sheer donkey-like stubbornness and arrogance." The author portrays an FBI that seems to have
failed to master today's world of computer-assisted intelligence gathering. Kessler concludes that
with the "appointment of Robert Mueller as the FBI's eleventh director, the bureau appears to be
in good hands."

Clark comment: As a journalistic versus a scholarly account, this work has its faults. Finding
people who say that Hoover used his secret files to "blackmail" even presidents does not mean
that it happened that way. Too many quotes from even named sources essentially saying the
same thing do not help to advance understanding. Given that it is stronger on 1972-2002 (30
years, 345 pages) than on 1908-1972 (64 years, 189 pages), it is difficult to accept this work as
truly a "history" of the FBI. That said, however, the author has produced a work that cuts closer
to the bone in describing the Bureau than the usual dichotomous "hate-Hoover" and "defend-
Hoover" presentations. Although Kessler spends more words on the FBI's failings than on its
successes, he clearly has developed a substantial respect for the organization and the people who
populate it. His concluding argument for more leeway and more resources for the FBI is not truly
supported by his narrative, but it seems to be heartfelt. Overall, I found this book very useful and,
despite its length, easy to read.

 Lance, Peter.

1. 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI -- The Untold Story. New York:
HarperCollins, 2004.

According to Peake, Studies 48.3 (2004), the author "finds widespread fault and is pessimistic
about improvements, even from the congressional commissions."

2. Triple Cross: How Bin Laden's Master Spy Penetrated the CIA, the Green Berets, and the FBI
-- and Why Patrick Fitzgerald Failed to Stop Him. New York: Regan, 2006.

Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), notes that this work continues the author's story of Ali Mohammed
(begun in 1000 Years for Revenge). He also provides other, new "dots"; the problem is that "it is
by no means clear how they connect."

 Lehman, John. "Five Years Later: Are We Any Safer?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132,
no. 9 (Sep. 2006): 18-22.

The former Secretary of the Navy and 9/11 commission member does not really answer the
question raised in the title. Other than that, however, this article is a powerful indictment of how
Congress and the White House mishandled the intelligence reform effort. His most pointed
criticisms are directed at the FBI ("Our attempt to reform the FBI has failed.") and the failure to
create a strong DNI.

 Posner, Richard A. Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps. Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 2007.

Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), finds that the author "is
convinced that creating a new MI5-like organization with only a security and counterintelligence
mission is necessary to achieve effective domestic counterterrorism efforts." However, Posner
does not consider "the level of personal and organizational disruption that creating another new
intelligence organization would entail and the time required for it to become proficient." This
work merits "very serious consideration."

 Posner, Richard A.

1. Remaking Domestic Intelligence. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2005.

From publisher: The author "reveals all the dangerous weaknesses undermining our domestic
intelligence in the United States and offers a new solution: a domestic intelligence agency
modeled on the ... Canadian Security Intelligence Service.... He also shows how a new U.S.
domestic intelligence agency might offer additional advantages over our current structure even in
terms of civil liberties."

2. Remaking Domestic Intelligence. Hoover Institution Weekly Essays. 16 Jun. 2005.
[Downloadable PDF file at: http://www.hoover.org/pubaffairs/we/2005/posner06.html]

"This is a special web-only essay that takes up where Posner's Hoover Studies book, Preventing
Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11, leaves off."

From Abstract: "The magnitude of the terrorist threat..., coupled with the lack of coordination
among our domestic intelligence agencies and the failure of the lead agency, the FBI, to develop
an adequate domestic intelligence capability, argues compellingly for reform. Because the FBI's
failure is systemic, being rooted in the incompatibility of criminal law enforcement (the FBI's
principal mission) with national-security intelligence, the reform must have a structural
dimension. The WMD (Robb-Silberman) Commission's proposal ... is to create a domestic
intelligence agency within the FBI by fusion of its three units that at present share intelligence
responsibility. Such a fusion may or not be a good idea; but clearly it is not enough. The Director
of National Intelligence should take the coordination and command of domestic intelligence
firmly into his hands by appointing a deputy for domestic intelligence, while the President
should by executive order create outside of (but not in derogation of) the FBI a domestic
intelligence agency, modeled on such foreign agencies as the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service, that would have no law enforcement functions. The agency could be lodged in the
Department of Homeland Security."

Clark comment: As much as I admire the clarity of Judge Posner's reasoning (especially his
critique of the 9/11 Commission's work), the very thought of lodging another agency in the DHS
gives me cold shivers.

  Posner, Richard A. "We Need Our Own MI5." Washington Post, 15 Aug. 2006, A13.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Judge Posner's argument is clearly stated in the title to this Op-ed piece. The United States lacks
"a counterpart to MI5. This is a serious gap in our defenses. Primary responsibility for national
security intelligence has been given to the FBI. The bureau is a criminal investigation agency. Its
orientation is toward arrest and prosecution rather than toward the patient gathering of
intelligence with a view to understanding and penetrating a terrorist network."

 Powers, Richard Gid. Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI. New York:
Free Press, 2004.

To Peake, Studies 49.2 (2005) and I&NS 21.3 (Jun. 2006), this work is "the story of how as great
an American institution as the FBI could become so traumatized by its past that it failed in its
duty to the nation it was sworn to protect." In his review of the history of the FBI, the author
"adds new insights." Jeffreys-Jones, Chronicle of Higher Education, 21 Jan. 2005, calls this a
"brilliant study." The author's "argument is that terrorists must be stopped from using weapons of
mass destruction, and that Americans must not be unduly queasy about the methods used."
However, he "is too prone to engage in faddish liberal-bashing."

 Riebling, Mark. "Uncuff the FBI: Congress Must Undo the Church Committee's Damage."
Wall Street Journal, 4 Jun. 2002.

"The FBI's failure to aggressively investigate Zacarias Moussaoui prior to Sept. 11 ... highlights
the need for immediate repeal of congressional limits on national security surveillance."

 Sibley, Katherine A.S. Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and the Dawn of the Cold War.
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004.

Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), says that this work is "well documented," "well written," and looks
at domesic counterintelligence in America "from a new perspective." Nonetheless, the author's
thesis that the FBI was more active prior to the end of World War II than previously thought "is
not proved."

For Kirkland, JIH 5.1 (Summer 2005), the author's "scholarship is impressive, drawing upon
multi-archival research in the United States and Russia.... Her work is balanced and perceptive
and is a compelling and authoritative treatment of Soviet spying and the actions the United States
took to counter it." Craig, I&NS 21.1 (Feb. 2006), comments that while "[t]here is little new" in
the author's "generalized thesis,... [w]hat is unique ... is [Sibley's] assessment of espionage in the
manufacturing, military, and industrial sectors.... [T]he book is enlightening and a good read."

 Simeone, John, and David Jacobs. The Complete Idiot's Guide to the FBI. Indianapolis, IN:
Alpha, 2002.

 Smith, I.C. Inside -- A Top G-Man Exposes Spies, Lies, and Bureaucratic Bungling Inside the
FBI. Nashville, TN: Nelson Current, 2004.

Peake, Studies 49.3 (2005), says that the author "gives us a genuine inside look at the FBI and
his own life. Both make absorbing reading.... [I]intelligence professionals will be ... interested in
his insights into the familiar counterintelligence cases of the era." Smith also provides "very
candid comments about the directors under whom he served." This is "is a valuable contribution
to current intelligence issues and to the literature of the profession."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                             General Overviews
                                            2000s
                                               T-Z
  Theoharis, Athan G. Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelligence but Promoted
the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002.

For the first chapter of Chasing Spies see: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/theoharis.htm.

Zaid at http://writ.findlaw.com/books/reviews says that Theoharis "offers an extraordinary
amount of fascinating -- though often dry -- details of the FBI's counterintelligence efforts
against the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War.... [This] work reveals the FBI's
crucial hidden role in generating a culture of suspicion and blacklists that helped fuel
McCarthyism['s] beliefs." For Whitaker. I&NS 17.3, this work documents that "Hoover and the
FBI transformed an investigation of Soviet espionage into a conservative anti-Communist witch
hunt that missed most of the spies, but damaged American democracy."

Robarge, Studies 47.3, calls this "a useful, although at times tendentious, cautionary tale about
how the FBI conducted counterintelligence against the Soviets from the 1930s through the
1950s." According to the author, "the FBI’s investigations of Soviet espionage in the 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s were far more extensive and intrusive than we have previously known, yet few
spies were caught and even fewer tried." However, Theoharis "tends to play down the scope and
effect of Soviet espionage in America.... Although Theoharis has compiled a troubling account
of FBI abuses, he overstates the extent to which the Bureau still operates in Hoover's shadow."

To Wannell, IJI&C 16.3, the author seems fixated "against the FBI's interest in or investigation
of Communists." The FBI's history from 1924 to 1936 indicates that Theoharis's report that "FBI
officials authorized wide-ranging investigations of Communists ... is, at a minimum, an
overstatement.... Theoharis's intimate knowledge of certain FBI matters is impressive. But his
assertions that the Bureau during the Cold War failed in counterintelligence and instead served to
promote the politics of ... McCarthy lead to the conclusion that he perhaps has an agenda to be
served."

 Theoharis, Athan. The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2004.

Jeffreys-Jones, Chronicle of Higher Education (21 Jan. 2005), refers to the author as "the most
authoritative critic of the FBI's civil-liberties malpractices." Theoharis argues "says that current
scaremongering and unthinking support for the enhancement of FBI powers 'could, in the
extreme, undermine both the spirit and the foundations of our cherished democracy'.... His is an
excellent narrative of FBI excesses since 1908, but he blinkers his analysis of current security
problems by disregarding the roles of the CIA and the National Security Agency."
  Theoharis, Athan G. The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S.
Intelligence Agencies. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2007.

Keiser, Proceedings 134.3 (Mar. 2008), notes that the author believes "'absolute security' is an
illusory quest." This work "is a most useful historical review." Noting the author's claim that
"increased centralization will only lead to more abuses by the intelligence agencies," Peake,
Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), finds that the book fails in its
effort to make its point.

 Theoharis, Athan G. "Secrecy and Power: Unanticipated Problems in Researching FBI Files."
Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 271-290.

 Wannall, W. Raymond. The Real J. Edgar Hoover: For the Record. Paducah, KY: Turner
Publishing, 2000.

Clark comment: This is a good and honest man's impassioned defense of Hoover, the director
and the person. However, that defense comes primarily through attacking William C. Sullivan,
the disaffected former FBI senior manager, and Anthony Summers, whose book is most notable
for the sexual proclivities ascribed to Hoover. Blaming Sullivan for many of the FBI's ills in the
1960s does not actually make Hoover look particularly good as a manager. And too many words
are wasted on the dreck spewed by Summers. In addition, the production quality of this book is
quite low, and the organization is at time confusing. Nonetheless, getting Wannall's take on his
boss makes this a worthwhile read. (FYI: My copy of this book is missing pages 17-32.)

According to Jonkers, AFIO WIN 30-00 (28 Jul. 2000), the author "served in the FBI for 33
years," rising to the rank of Assistant Director. He "knew everybody in the organization and
where the skeletons were buried." Wannall provides "a different view ... from the prevalent
caricatures [of Hoover]. It is a picture of a man brought in as part of the effort to clean up a
corrupt Justice Department in 1924 , a man totally dedicated to a clean, effective and
incorruptible FBI, who was involved in an enormous range of activities and relationships over
half a century of service." Wannall "has done his research and does not hesitate to point out some
of the warts.... Highly recommended reading."

Fulton, IJI&C 14.4, finds that "Wannall shows Hoover to be a highly disciplined human being
with a sense of humor, a propensity to be a jokester, and a compassion for others." The author
"vigorously attacks accusations against Hoover of perversion, homosexuality, crossdressing, and
transvestite activities."

 Waterman, Shaun. "Analysis: FBI Heads New Cyber Task Force." United Press International,
21 Apr. 2008. [http://www.upi.com]

In the summer of 2007, "the FBI quietly established" the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task
Force "with U.S. intelligence and other agencies to identify and respond to cyber threats against
the United States.... [A]ccording to the man in charge, Shawn Henry, the bureau's deputy
assistant director in charge of its cyber division," the group "has 'several dozen' personnel
working together at an undisclosed location in the Washington area."
 Weiss, Murray. The Man Who Warned America: The Life and Death of John O'Neill, the FBI's
Embattered Counterterrorism Warrior. New York: HarperCollins, 2003.

Peake, Studies 48.3 (2004), comments that Weiss' approach "does more than tell the story of
John O'Neill's career. It also gives a look at the FBI and the way it functions, its traditions, its
rigid rules that often result in self-inflicted wounds, and the reasons why it was something less
than an efficient counterterrorist organ."

 Wise, David. Cassidy's Run: The Secret Spy War over Nerve Gas. New York: Random House,
2000.

Macartney, AFIO WIN 18-00 (5 May 2000), notes that this is the story of U.S. Army Master
Sergeant Joseph Cassidy who "spent 23 years as an FBI double agent, feeding misleading
information to his GRU handlers about US chemical weapons programs." According to Vernon
Loeb, "IntelligenCIA: A Spy War Exposed," Washington Post, 1 May 2000, Operation
SHOCKER was "the FBI's longest running [CI] case of the Cold War," lasting 21 years. Cassidy
"exposed 10 Russian spy handlers and surfaced three 'illegal' Russian agents," while passing
thousands of pages of "carefully vetted classified documents" to the Russians.

For Naftali, New York Times, 30 Apr. 2000, this work "is a meticulous reconstruction of a
hitherto unknown counterespionage case.... Wise raises the possibility that the Cassidy deception
operation backfired with horrendous consequences. Citing circumstantial evidence, he suggests
that it compelled the Soviets to expand production of chemical weapons.... But lacking any rich
sources in the chemical and biological weapons programs of the former Soviet Union, Wise is
not able to build a persuasive case.... Wise has done readers a service in bringing Cassidy's
remarkable tale to life."

See also, Raymond L. Garthoff, "Polyakov's Run," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 56, no. 5 (Sep.-
Oct. 2000): 37-40, which discusses the deception/disinformation aspects of the Cassidy operation
in connection with a similar operation run through Soviet Col. Dmitri Polyakov (Top
Hat/Bourbon).

 Zegart, Amy. "9/11 and the FBI: The Organizational Roots of Failure." Intelligence and
National Security 22, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 165-184.

The author argues the FBI's failures related to 9/11 were the product of three organizational
deficiencies: (1) longstanding structural weaknesses; (2) perverse promotion incentives; and (3)
internal cultural pathologies. Her conclusion: "Yes, individuals made mistakes, but it was the
system that failed us."

 Zegart, Amy B. Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007.

Pillar, FA 87.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2008), finds that the author "strains to fit the record of the CIA's and
the FBI's handling of terrorism" into her thesis that "traits inherent to any large organization,
especially a government agency, prevent it from adapting well to new challenges and a new
mission." In the process, "her straining leads to factual errors," many of which "stem from her
extremely heavy reliance on postmortem inquiries, especially the 9/11 Commission report. In
fact, much of Spying Blind is little more than a repackaging of that report." Zegart and Pillar
exchanges barbs about Pillar's review in "Letters to the Editor," FA 87.3 (May-Jun. 2008): 164-
165.

For Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), this work "is a
thought-provoking, detailed analysis of current problems that takes historical precedent and the
judgments of many distinguished thinkers into account." However, "she does not offer
convincing evidence" to prove her assertions that "organizational weakness" or "organizational
factors" account for the CIA's and FBI's failures to prevent the 9/11 attacks.

Wirtz. IJI&C 21.3 (Fall 2008), sees this as a "well-crafted analysis" and "an important and
beautifully executed book. Nevertheless, portions of [Zegart's] argument are more compelling
than others." To Hulnick, I&NS 24.5 (Oct. 2009), the author's "thesis is marred by her lack of
understanding of the realities of the intelligence world, and how change takes place in
government.... [T]he system works a bit better than she believes, but her analysis is worth
contemplating."

To Hastedt, Perspectives on Politics 7.4 (Dec. 2009), "[w]ith her emphasis on the enduring
impact of organization and the role of organizational deficiencies in contributing to intelligence
failures, Zegart has made an important contribution to the literature on intelligence."
Nevertheless, "[r]eferencing the volume and nature of recommndations made by intelligence
commissions as evidence of the well-established need for organizational reform is somewhat
problematic."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                     2000 - 2001
Click for reportage on the February 2000 Los Angeles court decision on the release of FBI
materials on John Lennon.

Click for reportage on the February 2001 arrest of Robert Philip Hanssen on charges of
espionage.

Materials arranged chronologically.
 Brewin, Bob. "FBI Beefs Up Cyberagent Squads Nationwide." Federal Computer Week, 14 Jan.
2000. [http://www.fcw.com]

"The National Plan for Information Systems Protection, released on Jan. 12[, 2000] by President
Clinton, outlines plans for the FBI's National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) to establish
a National Infrastructure Protection and Computer Intrusion Program in the agency's
counterterrorism division. The NIPC is charged with centrally managing the nation's defense of
telecommunications systems, railroads and electric power systems against attacks."

  Jonkers, Roy K. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] "FBI's Carnivore Under Pressure." AFIO Weekly
Intelligence Notes 28-00 (16 Jul. 2000). [http://www.his.com/~afio/]

"[A] recently deployed FBI system nicknamed Carnivore, designed to allow law enforcement
agents to intercept and analyze email in the course of an investigation," is coming under attack
from civil liberties and privacy groups. When the system "is placed at Internet Service Provider
[ISP] sites it can scan all incoming and outgoing emails for messages associated with a criminal
investigation."

  Associated Press. "Congress Probes F.B.I. E-Mail Snooping Device." 25 Jul. 2000.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 24 July 2000, at hearings before the House Judiciary Committee's Constitution panel,
"[l]awmakers of both parties grilled FBI officials ... over the bureau's use of 'Carnivore,' a device
designed to monitor and capture e-mail messages in a criminal investigation."

 Sniffen, Michael J. "FBI Intelligence Efforts Have Risen Sharply." Washington Post, 28 Aug.
2000, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a report from Syracuse University's Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse
(TRAC) on 27 August 2000, "[t]he number of FBI intelligence officers has grown almost
fivefold during the Clinton administration.... Citing federal employment data, [TRAC] said the
total of FBI intelligence officers increased from 224 in 1992 to 1,025 in 1999, but their exact
duties are not known."

 Vise, David A. "The FBI's New Global Reach." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 6
Nov. 2000, 29-30.

The FBI now has "a permanent presence in 44 nations." FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "is quick to
point out that the globalization of the bureau, whether it is in fighting terrorism, organized crime,
money laundering or computer hacking, mirrors the globalization of crime." Under Freeh, the
bureau has created a "sleek and secure" Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC),
which "can handle four international crises at once."

 Hopper, D. Ian. "FBI Can Spy More Widely on Web than Thought." Chicago Sun Times, 18
Nov. 2000. [http://www.suntimes.com]
"The FBI's [Carnivore] e-mail surveillance tool ... can retrieve all communications that go
through an Internet service ... a recent test found, according to bureau documents." The
Washington-based Electronic Privacy Information Center "obtained the FBI documents
providing the test results as part of [FOIA] litigation.... While law enforcement officials have
admitted that Carnivore can capture much more than e-mail, including Internet chats and Web
browsing, FBI officials insist it is only used to copy e-mail to or from a criminal suspect in
accordance with a court order. Opponents say the system's secrecy keeps the public from
knowing what it can really do."

 Munro, Neil, and Elisabeth Frater. "Figuring Out Freeh: Despite a String of Controversies, He
Has Survived and the FBI Has Extended Its Reach." National Journal, 2 Dec. 2000, 3732-3737.

 Kessler, Ronald. "Fire Freeh." Washington Post, 27 Feb. 2001, A23.

In this Op-Ed piece, the author points to the FBI Director's failure to implement FBI-wide
polygraph tests as the latest of a series of mistakes on Freeh's part. "[U]nder Freeh's leadership,
the FBI has lurched from one debacle to another. In almost every case, Freeh has been personally
involved and has often contributed to the fiascoes.... [President] Bush ... should move quickly to
replace Freeh with a director who will inspire confidence."

 Eggen, Dan. "A Tough, No-Nonsense Manager for the FBI." Washington Post National Weekly
Edition, 16-22 Jul. 2001, 30.

Background on Robert S. Mueller, III, nominated on 5 July 2001 to be FBI Director.

  Risen, James, and David Johnston. "The Wronged Man: C.I.A. Officer Mistaken for Spy Down
the Street." New York Times, 11 Aug. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The CIA has "quietly reinstated a senior counterintelligence officer who ... spent 18 months
under investigation as a suspected Russian spy. There was ... no formal apology as he returned
from professional exile. But in effect, the C.I.A was saying there had been a terrible mistake....
For a year and a half, he had lived under the shadow of suspected disloyalty as he was the target
of an intensive investigation by the F.B.I. Then, on Feb. 18, the F.B.I. arrested one of its own:
Robert P. Hanssen.... Law enforcement and intelligence officials now say that it was Mr.
Hanssen, not the C.I.A. officer, who was the mole they had been hunting."

  Eggen, Dan. "FBI Apologizes to CIA Spy Suspect." Washington Post, 11 Sep. 2001, A5.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The FBI has formally apologized to a CIA intelligence officer who had been suspended from
duty for 21 months after he was wrongly targeted as a spy." The apology came in a letter sent by
Neil J. Gallagher, assistant director in charge of the FBI's national security division, to the officer
last month. "'I sincerely regret the adverse impact that this investigation had on you and the
members of your family,' Gallagher wrote in a letter dated Aug. 16."
 Warrick, Joby, et al. "FBI Agents Ill-Equipped to Predict Terror Acts." Washington Post, 23
Sep. 2001, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

The 9/11 attacks found the FBI "ill-equipped and unprepared. An agency that must track
terrorists who rely heavily on technology lacks computers that can quickly access the Internet.
Boxes of evidence have piled up in previous terrorist plots, but the FBI has not had translators to
decipher them. It lacks Arab agents who can penetrate terrorist cells and has too few veterans
who see connections among foreign suspects and far-flung sites."

 Eggen, Dan, and Jim McGee. "FBI Rushes To Remake Its Mission: Counterterrorism Focus
Replaces Crime Solving." Washington Post, 12 Nov. 2001, A1.

"[T]he FBI is rushing to remake itself as the nation's primary line of defense against terrorism....
Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and ... [the] FBI director,
Robert S. Mueller III, have begun to refocus the bureau's efforts on detecting and thwarting
future terrorist assaults, instead of pursuing culprits after crimes are committed."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                    Lennon Files

Those with a substantial interest in this story should see http://www.lennonfbifiles.com/,
maintained by Jon Wiener, author of Gimme Some Truth (2000).

Included here:

1. Books

2. Articles

1. Books

 Wiener, Jon. Gimme Some Truth: The John Lennon-FBI Files. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2000.
Carson, WPNWE, 3 Apr. 2000, is unimpressed by the author's contention that the FBI's
surveillance of Lennon succeeded in neutralizing him as a spokesman for dissent. Nonetheless,
Lennon himself is not the focus of Weiner's book; rather, the story is about the effort to get
Lennon's files from the FBI and how that shows the tenacity of government secrecy.



2. Articles

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Harlow, John, and Nichloas Rufford.

1. "How MI5 Spied on Lennon." Sunday Times (London), 20 Feb. 2000. [http://www.the-
times.co.uk]

On 18 February 2000, a federal judge in Los Angeles ordered the FBI "to release two letters
about secret surveillance operations" on former Beatle John Lennon. The FBI had sought to keep
the documents secret "because ... the information they contain belongs to a 'foreign power'. The
unstated fact is that the documents are a summary of MI5 files....

"Evidence put before Robbins indicates that not only were Lennon and his wife ... spied on by
the FBI ... but Lennon was also monitored by Special Branch and MI5 for years before he moved
to America.... MI5 is likely to be angered by the Los Angeles court decision. It will confirm old-
guard suspicions that any information passed to America in confidence will, sooner or later, be
made public and could rebound on them."

2. "Lennon Funded Terrorists and Trotskyists." Sunday Times (London), 20 Feb. 2000.
[http://www.the-times.co.uk]

"The secrets of how MI5 spied on John Lennon are to be revealed after a ruling by a Los Angeles
federal court cleared the way for the release of British intelligence reports held by the FBI.... The
10 packages of documents ... are believed to expose how Lennon gave money to the Irish
Republican Army.... They also show that he paid £46,000 to left-wing groups including the
Trotskyist Workers' Revolutionary Party (WRP) and Red Mole, a Marxist magazine edited by
Tariq Ali, the student protest leader."

 Davies, Hugh. "Judge Orders Release of FBI File on Lennon." Telegraph (London), 21 Feb.
2000. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

"The long simmering controversy over John Lennon's contributions to the IRA and Vanessa
Redgrave's Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Party is coming to a head. A California judge has
ordered the FBI to make public top secret documents relating to MI5 surveillance of the former
Beatle. Brian Behan, 73, a former key figure in the WRP, said [on 20 February 2000] that British
intelligence was worried that the information would help reveal the 'Deep Throat' it had planted
in the party years ago, as well as the methods used to 'bug' people."
 Evans, Michael, and Grace Bradberry. "FBI Lennon File Release Breaks Security Protocol."
Times (London), 21 Feb. 2000. [http:// www.the-times.co.uk]

"An American court's decision to release classified British documents relating to John Lennon is
threatening to undermine an intelligence-sharing arrangement between the US and Britain,
government sources said" on 20 February 2000.

  Brown, Tim, and Matt Born. "Lennon Did Not Knowingly Fund IRA, Says Yoko." Telegraph
(London): 22 Feb. 2000. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

The late John Lennon's wife, Yoko Ono, "has denied reports" that Lennon "knowingly gave
money to the IRA.... [T]he widow of the former Beatle said [on 21 February 2000] that there was
no truth to claims that Lennon had directly funded the republican paramilitaries. But she did not
rule out the possibility that money he donated to the mainstream republican movement was
diverted to those engaged in the armed struggle." See also, Giles Tremlett, "Yoko Ono Denies
IRA Funding," Times (London), 22 Feb. 2000.

  Lynch, Stephen. "Do You Want To Know A Secret?" Orange County Register, 28 Mar. 2000.
[http://www.ocregister.com]

The focus here is on University of California, Irvine, professor Jon Weiner's battle to obtain
Lennon's files from the FBI through FOIA and the courts.




          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents

          Return to FBI 2000

          Return to UK Post-WWII Table of Contents




                                  TERRORISM
                                           2000s
                              Table of Contents
General Books and Articles:

A -Beq                          Ber - Ca
Cb - D                          E-G
H - Ka                          Kb - M
N-P                             Q-R
S - Sch                         Sci - T
U-Z

Reportage by Year:

2000                            2001
2002                            2003
2004                            2005
2006                            2007
2008                            2009

House-Senate Investigation of 9/11 Attack (2002-2003)

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2002-2004)

Homeland Security (DHS)

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

          Return to Terrorism Table of Contents

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents

          Return to Main Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                       2002
                                       January - May

Materials arranged chronologically.

  Johnston, David. "F.B.I. Agent Ousted Over Her Handling of a Spying Inquiry." 30 Jan. 2002.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

According to "bureau officials," FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III has removed Sheila Horan
from her position as acting head of the bureau's national security division "over her handling of
an investigation into suspicions of Chinese espionage." Horan has been transferred "to an
administrative support position" and is "expected to leave the bureau." FBI officials said Mueller
"had lost patience with" Horan "for failing, in his view, to conduct a sufficiently aggressive
inquiry" into "suspicions that China tried to recruit a spy against the United States."

  U.S. Department of Justice. Commission for the Review of FBI Security Programs [Webster
Commission]. A Review of FBI Security Programs. Washington, DC: 31 Mar. 2002. Available
at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/websterreport.html.

From "Executive Summary": This commission "was established in response to possibly the worst
intelligence disaster in U.S. history: the treason of Robert Hanssen.... During our review of FBI
security programs, we found significant deficiencies in Bureau policy and practice. Those
deficiencies flow from a pervasive inattention to security.... In the Bureau, security is often
viewed as an impediment to operations, and security responsibilities are seen as an impediment
to career advancement." See also, Walter Pincus, "Hanssen Blamed for Identifying 50 FBI
Informants to Russians," Washington Post, 6 Apr. 2002, A4.

 Eggen, Dan. "Senators Criticize FBI Chief For Not Acting on Warning: Mueller Says Plot
Would Not Have Been Uncovered." Washington Post, 9 May 2002, A29. [http//www.
washingtonpost.com]

"In some of the strongest public criticism of the FBI since Sept. 11, Democratic senators [on 8
May 2002] upbraided the bureau for not aggressively pursuing an internal report last July that
suspected terrorists might be enrolling in U.S. aviation schools."

 Eggen, Dan. "FBI Director to Propose 'Super Squad' for Terror." Washington Post, 15 May
2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to those familiar with FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III's plans, an "FBI 'super
squad,' headquartered in Washington, would lead all major terrorism investigations worldwide....
The proposed shift would include the hiring of hundreds of agents and analysts as well as the
creation of an Office of Intelligence, headed by a former CIA official, that would serve as a
national clearinghouse for classified terrorism information."

 Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "CIA Analysts to Help FBI Shift Focus: Terrorism Prevention
Key to New Approach." Washington Post, 26 May 2002, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]
According to senior FBI officials, more than 25 CIA analysts and a senior manager from the
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence will be dispatched "to help the FBI upgrade its ability ... to
analyze intelligence and criminal data for use in preventing terrorist acts" and to "assist FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller III in reshaping the bureau into an agency more focused on
counterterrorism. Another group of CIA analysts will soon be dispatched to 10 major U.S. cities
to review FBI terrorist cases being pursued in field offices to see whether intelligence
information has been missed....

"The CIA transfers illustrate one of the major changes involved in Mueller's FBI overhaul, an
approach that will emphasize gathering information to prevent terrorist acts inside the United
States while reducing the bureau's traditional criminal work" on matters that the FBI Director
"believes can be handled by local law enforcement."

 Pincus, Walter. "FBI Said to Need Intelligence Help: House Panel Chairman: Terrorism
Demands 'Readjustment.'" Washington Post, 27 May 2002, A7. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

HPSCI chairman Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-FL) said on 26 May 2002 "that he does not think the
FBI is presently capable of doing the intelligence analysis work needed to head off terrorist
activities within the United States."

 Eggen, Dan. "'Carnivore' Glitches Blamed for FBI Woes: Problems With E-Mail Surveillance
Program Led to Mishandling of al Qaeda Probe in 2000, Memo Says." Washington Post, 29 May
2002, A7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to an FBI internal memorandum released on 28 May 2002, the "FBI mishandled a
surveillance operation involving Osama bin Laden's terror network two years ago because of
technical problems with the controversial Carnivore e-mail program." The FBI's Osama bin
Laden unit acquired in March 2000 a FISA warrant "for use against a suspect in an investigation
based in Denver.... The memo says that on March 16, 2000, the Carnivore 'software was turned
on and did not work properly,' capturing e-mails involving both the target and others
unconnected to the case. The memo goes on to say that 'the FBI technical person was apparently
so upset that he destroyed all the E-Mail take, including the take' from the target."

 Eggen, Dan, and Susan Schmidt. "Mueller: Clues Might Have Led To Sept. 11 Plot."
Washington Post, 30 May 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Speaking at a news conference on 29 May 2002, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III said that
"investigators might have been able to uncover part of the Sept. 11 plot if the FBI had properly
put together all the clues in the possession of the bureau and other agencies." He added, however,
"that the Minnesota arrest of alleged Sept. 11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui and warnings from
a Phoenix FBI agent about terrorists at aviation schools would not, on their own, have led
investigators to the Sept. 11 plot. But if the FBI had connected those two cases with other
evidence that Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network was keenly interested in aviation,
Mueller said, 'who is to say' what could have been discovered."
 Washington Post. "[Editorial:] The New FBI." 31 May 2002, A30. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"Taken together, the changes in law approved by Congress after Sept. 11 and the plans
announced this week to restructure the FBI constitute a shift of historic proportions: The FBI is
becoming a domestic intelligence agency. Aspects of this development are both inevitable and
needed.... [But] the new FBI taking shape as a domestic intelligence agency calls to mind past
abuses and future risks that must be soberly considered."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                            2002
                                     June - December

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Van Natta, Don, Jr., and David Johnston. "Wary of Risk, Slow to Adapt, F.B.I. Stumbles in
Terror War." New York Times, 2 Jun. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Interviews with ... current and former F.B.I., Justice Department and intelligence officials ...
suggest that [FBI Director] Mueller faces many hurdles in fulfilling his promise to transform the
agency's rigid, risk-averse culture into the kind of terror prevention agency he foresees. Some
officials even question whether the bureau can be salvaged, or whether it should be broken apart
so that the government can create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the F.B.I."

 VandeHei, Jim, and Dan Eggen. "Hill Eyes Shifting Parts of FBI, CIA: Homeland Security
Department Would Get Own Operatives." Washington Post, 13 June. 2002, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"Congressional leaders are strongly considering granting to a new Department of Homeland
Security authority over parts of the CIA and the FBI, a complex and controversial restructuring
of the nation's intelligence apparatus that President Bush opposes."

 Risen, James. "C.I.A. and F.B.I. Agree to Truce in War of Leaks vs. Counterleaks." New York
Times, 14 Jun. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Officials familiar with the talks said on 13 June 2002 that "[t]op officials of the C.I.A. and the
F.B.I. have quietly negotiated a cease-fire between the two agencies, which have been in a war of
news leaks and finger-pointing about the intelligence failures leading to the Sept. 11 attacks."

 Pincus, Walter. "Congress to Postpone Revamping of FBI, CIA; Homeland Security Agency
Becomes Legislative Focus." Washington Post, 2 Jul. 2002, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"Congress will put off a reorganization of the FBI and CIA ... until it establishes a Department of
Homeland Security, according to Bush administration and congressional sources.... The delay
underscored the increasing awareness on Capitol Hill that reorganizing the CIA, FBI, National
Security Agency and other intelligence bodies is an extraordinarily complex undertaking about
which there is little agreement on what needs to be fixed or, indeed, whether any changes are
even required."

 Whitelaw, Kevin, and David E. Kaplan. “Gumshoes and Spooks.” U.S. News & World Report,
Commemorative Issue of 9/11, Sep. 2002, 62.

“After the catastrophic terrorist attacks, government agencies banded together to fight al Qaeda.
The results were swift -- a global roundup of some suspected al Qaeda operatives. Still, it's been
a struggle at times to get the FBI and CIA to overcome their history and divergent cultures.”

  Johnston, David. "Former F.B.I. Director Faults Lawmakers on Terror Fight." New York Times,
9 Oct. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Testifying on 8 October 2002 before the joint congressional committee investigating the 9/11
attacks, former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "faulted lawmakers ... for failing to approve bigger
budgets that he said were vital to the F.B.I.'s antiterror effort.... Freeh said he fought throughout
his eight-year tenure to make terrorism a high priority, but was hobbled by a lack of money and
legal restraints that hampered the bureau in penetrating terror networks."

 Eggen, Dan. "FBI Misused Secret Wiretaps, According to Memo." Washington Post, 10 Oct.
2002, A14. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to an internal FBI memorandum obtained by Rep. William D. Delehunt (D-MA), the
"FBI illegally videotaped suspects, improperly recorded telephone calls and intercepted e-mails
without court permission in more than a dozen secret terrorism and intelligence investigations....
The errors in the first three months of 2000 were considered so egregious that FBI officials in
Washington launched a wholesale review of the agency's use of secret wiretaps and searches."

 Priest, Dana, and Dan Eggen. "Officials Question FBI Terror Readiness." Washington Post, 12
Nov. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[M]any government officials are growing concerned that the FBI is dangerously unprepared to
detect or thwart [terrorist] strikes on U.S. soil.... The FBI's ability to convert from a primarily
case-oriented criminal justice agency into a domestic investigatory body is being questioned and
debated with great urgency by the National Security Council, members of Congress and
intelligence experts who have been called in to help out. FBI officials strongly dispute critics'
assessment of their preparations."

 Priest, Dana, and Dan Eggen. "Bush Aides Consider Domestic Spy Agency." Washington Post,
16 Nov. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to government officials and intelligence experts, "President Bush's top national
security advisers have begun discussing the creation of a new, domestic intelligence agency that
would take over responsibility for counterterrorism spying and analysis from the FBI."

  Eggen, Dan. "Mueller Defends FBI's Performance." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 2002, A41.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

 Johnston, David. "FBI Director Rejects Agency for Intelligence in United States." New York
Times, 20 Dec. 2002, A16.

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                             POST-COLD WAR
                                             2002
                                     Table of Contents



 General

 PRC Presidential Aircraft Bugged (January)

 U.S. War on Terrorism and Fallout from 9/11 Attacks

 Joint House-Senate Investigation of 9/11 Attack:

   Reportage

   Panel Report - 24 July 2003
 Independent Commission

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                            POST-COLD WAR
                                            2002
                                           General


Materials presented in chronological order.

  Cilluffo, Frank J., Ronald A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi. "The Use and Limits of U.S.
Intelligence." Washington Quarterly 25, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 61-74.

 Deutch, John, and Jeffrey H. Smith. "Smarter Intelligence." Foreign Policy (Jan.-Feb. 2002):
64-69.

 Pincus, Walter, and Dan Eggen. "Probe Spawns Unparalleled Intelligence-Sharing."
Washington Post, 12 Mar. 2002, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

U.S. officials are struggling to analyze a "mountain of evidence ... from thousands of pages of
computerized and paper documents, hundreds of computer hard drives, scores of videotapes and
millions of voice and data communications scooped up since U.S. forces entered Afghanistan.
Added to the hours of interrogations of suspected al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, it amounts to
what is likely the largest and most complex intelligence operation ever mounted by the United
States.... [T]he methods for analyzing this information have become a linchpin in U.S. efforts to
thwart future attacks and track down al Qaeda members who may be planning other operations.
By bringing together analysts from the military, the CIA and the FBI, the new system also
reflects an unprecedented level of cooperation among agencies that historically have had a
difficult time sharing even crucial information."

 Mulrine, Anna. "Variety Is the Life of Spies." U.S. News and World Report, 22 Jul. 2002, 110.

This is a very brief piece noting the existence of the International Spy Museum in Washington,
DC, and some of the gadgets in the museum.

   Deutch, John. "The Smart Approach to Intelligence." Washington Post, 9 Sep. 2002, A17.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The former DCI takes issue with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's recommendation to "consolidate
authority for intelligence activities in the Department of Defense under a new undersecretary of
defense for intelligence.... To be effective, intelligence activities must be integrated with the
command, control and communication of military forces.... It would be folly to separate the 'I'
from these related C3 functions.... [I]t would make better sense to elevate the assistant secretary
(C3I) to the rank of undersecretary.... It would be logical then to have an assistant secretary for
intelligence reporting to the undersecretary for C3I."

  Re, Richard, and Kristen Eichensehr. "A Conversation with Bob Graham: U.S. Intelligence
after September 11." Harvard International Review 24, no. 3 (Fall 2002).

 Hulse, Carl. "Shuffling at the Top Is Set for Intelligence Committees." New York Times, 2 Dec.
2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Senator Pat Roberts (R-KS), "who has been highly critical of the Congressional inquiry into the
Sept. 11 attacks[,] is in line to lead the Senate Intelligence Committee.... Senator John D.
Rockefeller IV [D-WV] ... will take the place of Senator Bob Graham [D-FL] ... as the senior
Democrat on the panel.... In the House, Representative Porter J. Goss [R-FL] ... is expected to
continue as chairman, but Representative Nancy Pelosi [D-CA] ... will step aside to be succeeded
by Representative Jane Harman [D-CA] ... or Representative Sanford D. Bishop Jr. [D-GA]."

Roberts is "considered a strong intelligence agency ally," who "has described the joint inquiry as
a game of 'gotcha' and a 'runaway train' that has demoralized intelligence workers." He has also
said that "the inquiry was ... too driven by the special staff hired for the inquiry.... Lawmakers,
staff members and outside experts who follow intelligence matters predicted that Mr. Roberts
would be unlikely to engage in public confrontation with the intelligence agencies. They said his
view of intelligence operations grew from his belief that the workers are devoted risk-takers who
are not fully appreciated."

 Loeb, Vernon. "New Intelligence Post Consolidates Rumsfeld's Clout." Washington Post, 18
Nov. 2002. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"At the behest of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld," the Fiscal 2003 Defense
Authorization Act "creates a new position, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, whom ...
analysts believe will end up usurping some of the DCI's power."

         Return to 2002 Table of Contents

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                           POST-COLD WAR
                                           2002
                         PRC Presidential Aircraft Bugged


Materials presented in chronological order.

 Pomfret, John. "China Finds Bugs on Jet Equipped in U.S.: Devices Taken Off Presidential
Plane Could Become Issue at Summit." Washington Post, 19 Jan. 2002, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

According to Chinese and Western sources, quoting Chinese military officers and aviation
officials, Chinese military communications experts in October 2001 "discovered numerous high-
tech listening devices planted inside" the Boeing 767-300ER meant to be China's presidential
aircraft. "Chinese aviation officials and military officers have charged that U.S. intelligence
agencies planted the bugs aboard the plane while it was being refitted in the United States, the
sources said."

  Rosenthal, Elisabeth. "China Changes Approach in Espionage Incident." New York Times, 27
Jan. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In contrast to the reaction in April 2001 when a U.S. spy plane collided with a Chinese jet, the
Chinese have "barely made a peep after a new ... set of espionage revelations...: President Jiang
Zemin's newly delivered Boeing 767 had been surreptitiously loaded with dozens of listening
devices while its interior was being outfitted last year in San Antonio.... There are many
pragmatic reasons for such a change, from China's hope that a more conciliatory tone would help
promote its views on the divisive issue of Taiwan, to its desire to avoid the distraction of
international crises as it is prepares to host the Olympics in 2008 and to meet obligations as a
new member of World Trade Organization."

 Risen, James, and Eric Lichtblau. "Spy Suspect May Have Told Chinese of Bugs, U.S. Says."
New York Times, 15 Apr. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 14 April 2003, government officials said that "[c]ounterintelligence officials fear that an
F.B.I. informer in Los Angeles tipped off the Chinese government to a covert [U.S.] effort to
plant listening devices aboard China's version of Air Force One... The National Security
Agency,... working with the [FBI] and other intelligence organizations, led an operation to plant
bugs in a Boeing 767 used by the president of China while it was in the United States for
refitting, officials said. The listening devices were quickly discovered, and the Chinese
government disclosed the incident early last year."

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                                  TERRORISM
                                             2002
                              Table of Contents
 General

 War on Terrorism and Fallout from 11 September 2001 Attacks:

 To 30 April 2002

 To 31 May 2002

 To 30 September 2002

 To 31 December 2002

 Strike in Yemen (November)
 Arrest of "November 17" Terrorists in Greece

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                                   TERRORISM
                                              2002
                                              General
  Ball, Desmond J. "Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The International Dimension of the War
against Terrorism." In Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, eds. Ken
Booth and Tim Dunne. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2002.

 Defense Intelligence Journal. "The Role of Intelligence in Fighting Terrorism." 11, no. 1
(Winter 2002): Entire issue.

Click for the individual articles in this issue.

 Green, Joshua. "The Myth of Cyberterrorism." Washington Monthly, Nov. 2002. [http://
www.washingtonmonthly.com]

"Even before September 11, Bush was fervently depicting an America imminently in danger of
an attack by cyberterrorists.... As is often the case with a new threat, an entire industry has arisen
to grapple with its ramifications.... There's just one problem: There is no such thing as
cyberterrorism."

 Hubbard, Robert L. "Another Response to Terrorism: Reconstituting Intelligence Analysis for
21st Century Requirements." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 71-80.

The Intelligence Community needs to "return to requirements-based resourcing and develop
realistic force level planning and acquisition based on the requirements that are being laid upon
it."

 Kalugin, Oleg A. "Window of Opportunity: Russia's Role in the Coalition against Terror."
Harvard International Review 24, no. 3 (Fall 2002).
 Kauppi, Mark V. "Counterterrorism Analysis 101." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1
(Winter 2002): 39-53.

Expectations with regard to performance and accountability "should be based on a realistic
appraisal of the challenges faced by counterterrorism analysts who on a daily basis deal with
amorphous and fragmentary information."

 Levitsky, Melvyn. "Fighting Terrorism: A New Kind of Enemy and a New Kind of War."
Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 11-15.

"[W]e must view our embassies as forward deployed assets and protect their ability to function
effectively as a key objective in our overall campaign."

 O'Brien, Kevin A. "Information Operations and Counterterrorism." Jane's Intelligence Review
14 (Sep. 2002): 50-53.

 Otis, Pauletta. "The Nature of Religious Terrorism." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1
(Winter 2002): 27-36.

"There are three major targets to be addressed by the Intelligence Community: the individual
terrorist, the religious community from which participants can be drawn, and the identification of
specific situations where the necessary and sufficient conditions for a terrorist attack are met."

  Pillar, Paul R. "Fighting International Terrorism: Beyond September 11th." Defense
Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 17-26.

"[U]nlike ... most other wars the United States has waged," the war on terrorism "will not have a
clear end.... If history is a guide, even the currrent enthusiasm for counterterrorism ... will
slacken over time.... Americans will ... need much patience and persistence, into an indefinite
future."

  Powers, Thomas. "The Trouble with the CIA." New York Review of Books, 17 Jan. 2002.
[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15109]

Ostensibly a review of three books on terrorism [Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy
(2001); Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America (1999); and Reeve, The
New Jackals (1999)], the title gives the real thrust of the article. Powers concludes that there
should be a wide-ranging investigation of the "intelligence failure" associated with 9/11 and that
DCI Tenet should be replaced.

 Priest, Dana. "Abu Nidal, Once-Feared Terrorist, Reported Dead." Washington Post, 20 Aug.
2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Palestinian officials reported on 19 Aug. 2002 that Abu Nidal had died in Baghdad of multiple
gunshot wounds. Abu Nidal, whose real name was Sabri Banna, headed his own terrorist
organization, the Fatah Revolutionary Council, but had been inactive for years.
  Shelfer, Katherine M., and June M. Verner, "Improving Counterterrorism Analysis: Using
Scenarios to Support the Development and Use of Integrated Information Systems." Defense
Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 55-70.

The authors discuss "the need for the development of integrated civilian and military information
systems, especially lessons-learned databases." They emphasize "the potential value of using
scenarios to support better design and more effective use of such integrated databases."

 Waller, Douglas. "At the Crossroads of Terror." Time, 8 Jul. 2002, 28-29.

The Counterterrorism Center (CTC) "has become the CIA's busiest outfit."

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          Return to Terrorism Table of Contents




                                  TERRORISM
                                             2002
U.S. War on Terrorism and Fallout from 11 September
                    2001 Attacks
                               January - April 2002


Materials presented chronologically.

 Baer, Susan. "Tenet Survives Despite CIA Woes." Baltimore Sun, 6 Feb. 2002. [http://
www.baltimoresun.com]

"[I]f anyone was likely to take the fall" for the events of 9/11, "it would be Tenet. Yet,... few are
pointing fingers at him. Instead, lawmakers have seen Sept. 11 as a government-wide breakdown,
with plenty of blame to go around. And far from being ousted,... Tenet has emerged as a key
architect of the war on terror."
 Vogel, Steve, and Walter Pincus. "Weather Obstructing Survey of Missile Strike Site."
Washington Post, 8 Feb. 2002, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Gen. Tommy R. Franks, head of the U.S. Central Command, said on 7 February 2002 that "[b]ad
weather is preventing U.S. military forces from surveying the site of a CIA-launched missile
strike in eastern Afghanistan to verify whether a senior al Qaeda leader and other members of the
terrorist network were killed." The attack on 4 February 2002 near Zhawar Kili "was launched
by an armed Predator surveillance drone operated by the CIA. The Predator had ... followed for
two days a convoy of suburban utility vehicles.... [T]he vehicles were parked at a previously
known al Qaeda camp and the officers noticed a group, protected by security personnel.... With
no U.S. fighter aircraft in the vicinity, the CIA officers fired a Hellfire missile at the group."

 Pincus, Walter. "House, Senate Intelligence Panels Set Joint Sept. 11 Probe."Washington Post,
15 Feb. 2002, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 14 February 2002, "[t]he leaders of the Senate and House intelligence committees ...
announced a joint investigation" into the 9/11 attacks.

 Pincus, Walter, and Dan Eggen. "Probe Spawns Unparalleled Intelligence-Sharing."
Washington Post, 12 Mar. 2002, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

U.S. officials are struggling to analyze a "mountain of evidence ... from thousands of pages of
computerized and paper documents, hundreds of computer hard drives, scores of videotapes and
millions of voice and data communications scooped up since U.S. forces entered Afghanistan.
Added to the hours of interrogations of suspected al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, it amounts to
what is likely the largest and most complex intelligence operation ever mounted by the United
States.... [T]he methods for analyzing this information have become a linchpin in U.S. efforts to
thwart future attacks and track down al Qaeda members who may be planning other operations.
By bringing together analysts from the military, the CIA and the FBI, the new system also
reflects an unprecedented level of cooperation among agencies that historically have had a
difficult time sharing even crucial information."

  Berkowitz, Bruce. "War in the Information Age." Hoover Digest 2002, no. 2 (30 Apr. 2002).
[http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6781]

"U.S. military forces have changed radically in the past decade. They will likely change even
more -- and at a faster pace -- in the next few years."

 Pincus, Walter. "Staff Director for Hill's Probe Into Terrorist Attacks Resigns." Washington
Post, 30 Apr. 2002, A5. [http//www.washingtonpost.com]

L. Britt Snider, staff director for the joint House and Senate investigation into the 9/11 attacks,
resigned on 26 April 2002. See also, James Risen, "Reason Cited for Ousting of Terror Inquiry's
Director: Staff Member's Security Problem Is Blamed," New York Times, 9 May 2002, A34.
 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. "Law and the War on Terrorism." 25, no. 2 (Spring
2002): Entire issue.

Click for a listing of the Contents of this volume.

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          Return to Post-WWII 2002 Table of Contents

          Return to Post-WWII 2000s Table of Contents




                                  TERRORISM
                                             2002
U.S. War on Terrorism and Fallout from 11 September
                    2001 Attacks
                                         May 2002


Materials presented chronologically.

 McGirk, Tim. "Has Pakistan Tamed Its Spies?" Time, 6 May 2002, 32-35.

It appears that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is cooperating in the U.S. war against
terrorism. This "is quite a switch. Until Sept. 11, the organization was suspected of propping up
the Taliban and by extension its al-Qaeda guests in Afghanistan."
 Eggen, Dan. "Senators Criticize FBI Chief For Not Acting on Warning: Mueller Says Plot
Would Not Have Been Uncovered." Washington Post, 9 May 2002, A29. [http//www.
washingtonpost.com]

"In some of the strongest public criticism of the FBI since Sept. 11, Democratic senators [on 8
May 2002] upbraided the bureau for not aggressively pursuing an internal report last July that
suspected terrorists might be enrolling in U.S. aviation schools."

 Pincus, Walter, and Thomas E. Ricks. "CIA Fails in Bid to Kill Afghan Rebel With a Missile."
Washington Post, 10 May 2002, A24. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to administration sources, "[t]he CIA fired a missile from an unmanned Predator
aircraft over Afghanistan" on 8 May 2002 "in an unsuccessful attempt to kill [Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar,] a factional leader who has vowed to attack U.S. service personnel and oust the
interim Afghan government."

 Eggen, Dan. "FBI Director to Propose 'Super Squad' for Terror." Washington Post, 15 May
2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to those familiar with FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III's plans, an "FBI 'super
squad,' headquartered in Washington, would lead all major terrorism investigations worldwide....
The proposed shift would include the hiring of hundreds of agents and analysts as well as the
creation of an Office of Intelligence, headed by a former CIA official, that would serve as a
national clearinghouse for classified terrorism information."

 Eggen, Dan, and Dana Priest. "Bush Aides Seek to Contain Furor: Sept. 11 Not Envisioned,
Rice Says." Washington Post, 17 May 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 16 May 2002, the White House "offered a detailed timeline showing that President Bush was
first told on Aug. 6 that Osama bin Laden's associates might be planning airline hijackings --
speculation that was repeated several times in briefings the president received leading up to Sept.
11.... But Rice said Bush was not told, and U.S. intelligence analysts never envisioned, that
terrorists would use jetliners in the type of suicide attacks carried out in New York and
Washington on Sept. 11. Rice and other administration officials said that the threat was not
specific enough to warrant a public warning, but that the Federal Aviation Administration urged
the airlines to be cautious."

 Gellman, Barton. "Before Sept. 11, Unshared Clues and Unshaped Policy." Washington Post,
17 May 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 5 July 5 2001, "the White House summoned officials of a dozen federal agencies to the
Situation Room. 'Something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen
soon,' the government's top counterterrorism official, Richard Clarke, told the assembled group,
according to two of those present." The group included the FAA, along with the Coast Guard,
FBI, Secret Service, and INS.
"Clarke directed every counterterrorist office to cancel vacations, defer nonvital travel, put off
scheduled exercises and place domestic rapid-response teams on much shorter alert. For six
weeks last summer, at home and overseas, the U.S. government was at its highest possible state
of readiness -- and anxiety -- against imminent terrorist attack.... As late as July 31, the FAA
urged U.S. airlines to maintain a 'high degree of alertness.' All those alert levels dropped by the
time hijackers armed with box cutters took control of four jetliners on the morning of Sept. 11."

 Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "CIA Analysts to Help FBI Shift Focus: Terrorism Prevention
Key to New Approach." Washington Post, 26 May 2002, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

According to senior FBI officials, more than 25 CIA analysts and a senior manager from the
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence will be dispatched "to help the FBI upgrade its ability ... to
analyze intelligence and criminal data for use in preventing terrorist acts" and to "assist FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller III in reshaping the bureau into an agency more focused on
counterterrorism. Another group of CIA analysts will soon be dispatched to 10 major U.S. cities
to review FBI terrorist cases being pursued in field offices to see whether intelligence
information has been missed....

"The CIA transfers illustrate one of the major changes involved in Mueller's FBI overhaul, an
approach that will emphasize gathering information to prevent terrorist acts inside the United
States while reducing the bureau's traditional criminal work" on matters that the FBI Director
"believes can be handled by local law enforcement."

 Pincus, Walter. "FBI Said to Need Intelligence Help: House Panel Chairman: Terrorism
Demands 'Readjustment.'" Washington Post, 27 May 2002, A7. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

HPSCI chairman Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-FL) said on 26 May 2002 "that he does not think the
FBI is presently capable of doing the intelligence analysis work needed to head off terrorist
activities within the United States."

 Eggen, Dan, and Susan Schmidt. "Mueller: Clues Might Have Led To Sept. 11 Plot."
Washington Post, 30 May 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Speaking at a news conference on 29 May 2002, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III said that
"investigators might have been able to uncover part of the Sept. 11 plot if the FBI had properly
put together all the clues in the possession of the bureau and other agencies." He added, however,
"that the Minnesota arrest of alleged Sept. 11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui and warnings from
a Phoenix FBI agent about terrorists at aviation schools would not, on their own, have led
investigators to the Sept. 11 plot. But if the FBI had connected those two cases with other
evidence that Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network was keenly interested in aviation,
Mueller said, 'who is to say' what could have been discovered."
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                                 TERRORISM
                                            2002
U.S. War on Terrorism and Fallout from 11 September
                    2001 Attacks
                   Reportage to 30 September 2002


Materials presented chronologically.

 Van Natta, Don, Jr., and David Johnston. "Wary of Risk, Slow to Adapt, F.B.I. Stumbles in
Terror War." New York Times, 2 Jun. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Interviews with ... current and former F.B.I., Justice Department and intelligence officials ...
suggest that [FBI Director] Mueller faces many hurdles in fulfilling his promise to transform the
agency's rigid, risk-averse culture into the kind of terror prevention agency he foresees. Some
officials even question whether the bureau can be salvaged, or whether it should be broken apart
so that the government can create a domestic intelligence agency separate from the F.B.I."

 Pincus, Walter, and Dan Eggen. "CIA Gave FBI Warning on Hijacker: Agency Told that
Almihdhar Attended Malaysia Meeting." Washington Post, 4 Jun. 2002, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]
A senior U.S. intelligence official said on 3 June 2002 that the CIA told the FBI in January 2000
that Khalid Almihdhar, one of the 9/11 hijackers, "was attending a meeting of suspected
terrorists in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and had a type of visa that should have drawn suspicion....
The disclosure contradicts repeated assertions by senior FBI officials that bureau headquarters
had no information about Khalid Almihdhar before Aug. 23, 2001."

 Risen, James. "C.I.A. and F.B.I. Agree to Truce in War of Leaks vs. Counterleaks." New York
Times, 14 Jun. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Officials familiar with the talks said on 13 June 2002 that "[t]op officials of the C.I.A. and the
F.B.I. have quietly negotiated a cease-fire between the two agencies, which have been in a war of
news leaks and finger-pointing about the intelligence failures leading to the Sept. 11 attacks."

 Risen, James, and David Johnston. "Agency Is Under Scrutiny for Overlooked Messages." New
York Times, 20 Jun. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S. intelligence officials on 19 June 2002, NSA "intercepted two cryptic
communications [from Afghanistan] on the the day before the Sept. 11 attacks that referred to a
major event scheduled for the next day." NSA analysts "did not process, translate and review the
intercepted Arabic communications until the day after the attacks." See also, Scott Shane and
Ariel Sabar, "Coded Warnings Became Clear Only in Light of Sept. 11 Attacks," Baltimore Sun,
20 Jun. 2002.

 Waller, Douglas. "At the Crossroads of Terror." Time, 8 Jul. 2002, 28-29.

The Counterterrorism Center (CTC) "has become the CIA's busiest outfit."

 Waller, Douglas. "The NSA Draws Fire." Time, 29 Jul. 2002, 14.

NSA "is already taking heat for being slow to analyze two cryptic messages it intercepted last
Sept. 10, warning that something big was going to happen the next day." Now, "a scathing
classified report" issued by the House Intelligence Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Homeland Security, an unclassified summary of which has been released, "has concluded that
the agency is badly mismanaged,... and that resulted in its failing 'to provide tactical and strategic
warning' of Sept. 11."

  Berkowitz, Bruce. "Fighting the New War." Hoover Digest 2002, no. 3 (30 Jul. 2002).
[http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/7135]

In using lethal force to combat terrorism, an option to covert action "is direct action.... [I]n direct
action the United States does not conceal its responsibility. Soldiers wear uniforms and insignia,
which is an important difference between a covert paramilitary operation and direct action....
[U]sing the CIA as a quick-response arm of the DOD is a bad idea.... It makes more sense to
better prepare U.S. military forces for direct action. The defense department must develop small,
highly mobile combat forces to attack the new threats we face. It must also develop the
specialized infrastructure it needs for logistics, communications, and supplies."
 Whitelaw, Kevin, and David E. Kaplan. “Gumshoes and Spooks.” U.S. News & World Report,
Commemorative Issue of 9/11, Sep. 2002, 62.

“After the catastrophic terrorist attacks, government agencies banded together to fight al Qaeda.
The results were swift -- a global roundup of some suspected al Qaeda operatives. Still, it's been
a struggle at times to get the FBI and CIA to overcome their history and divergent cultures.”

 Schmidt, Susan, and Thomas E. Ricks. "Pentagon Plans Shift in War on Terror." Washington
Post, 18 Sep. 2002, A1. [http//:www.washingtonpost.com]

Government sources report that "[t]he Pentagon is preparing to consolidate control of most of the
global war on terrorism under the U.S. Special Operations Command [SOCOM],... signaling an
intensified but more covert approach to the next phase in the battle against al Qaeda and other
international terrorist groups."

 Risen, James. "U.S. Failed to Act on Warnings in '98 of a Plane Attack." New York Times, 19
Sep. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to the staff director of the Congressional committee investigating the 9/11 attacks,
Eleanor Hill, the U.S. intelligence community "was told in [August] 1998 that Arab terrorists
were planning to fly a bomb-laden plane into the World Trade Center, but the F.B.I. and the
Federal Aviation Administration did not take the threat seriously."

  Risen, James. "C.I.A.'s Inquiry on Qaeda Aide Seen as Flawed." New York Times, 23 Sep. 2002.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

Congressional investigators have concluded that the CIA "failed to adequately scutinize
information it received before Sept. 11 about the growing terrorist threat posed by Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, a leader of Al Qaeda now believed to have been a central planner of the attacks on
New York and Washington."

  Morris, Vincent. "Senate OKs Follow-Up 9/11 Probe." New York Post, 25 Sep. 2002.
[http://www.nypost.com]

On 24 September 2002, the U.S. Senate by a 90-8 vote "approved creation of a new independent
commission to probe intelligence failures.... The commission has already been OK'd by the ...
House.... [A]ll 10 members of the panel will be selected by Congress."

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                                   TERRORISM
                                              2002
U.S. War on Terrorism and Fallout from 11 September
                    2001 Attacks
                     Reportage to 31 December 2002


Materials presented chronologically.

  Johnston, David. "Former F.B.I. Director Faults Lawmakers on Terror Fight." New York Times,
9 Oct. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Testifying on 8 October 2002 before the joint congressional committee investigating the 9/11
attacks, former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh "faulted lawmakers ... for failing to approve bigger
budgets that he said were vital to the F.B.I.'s antiterror effort.... Freeh said he fought throughout
his eight-year tenure to make terrorism a high priority, but was hobbled by a lack of money and
legal restraints that hampered the bureau in penetrating terror networks."

 Thomas, Evan, with Mark Hosenball, Tamara Lipper, and Michael Isikoff. "Shadow Struggle."
Newsweek, 14 Oct. 2002, 29-31.

As Washington prepares for a war against Iraq, "there are real and serious divisions between
Bush's war cabinet and the spy agencies that serve it, as well as troubling splits within the
intelligence community itself…. [T]he CIA and FBI have done better in cooperating with each
other, [b]ut close observers worry about the resistance of the intelligence community to real
reform."

At the same time, the "CIA old boys … fear that high-risk covert operations will go bad…. They
worry that if CIA analysts bend to political pressure from Bush's right-wing ideologues and play
up the Iraqi threat, they will later be accused of cooking the books. The analysts fear that they
will miss the one clue to the coming terror attack that is buried in the mountain of tips, leads and
clues that inundate the CIA and FBI every day…. The spooks are very wary that they will be
double-crossed by Congress….

"The hawks today are no more trusting of the CIA than they were in the 1970s. Though careful
to praise the agency for working well with U.S. Special Forces to chase the Taliban out of
Afghanistan…, these Bush hard-liners say the agency is both timid and wrong on Iraq…. The
Pentagon is working around the CIA's caution by relying on its own spy shop -- the Defense
Intelligence Agency -- and it may use U.S. Special Forces to handle covert operations that would
ordinarily be carried out by CIA operatives."

  Priest, Dana. "CIA Is Expanding Domestic Operations." Washington Post, 23 Oct. 2002, A2.
[http//:www.washingtonpost.com]

The CIA "is expanding its domestic presence, placing agents with nearly all of the FBI's 56
terrorism task forces in U.S. cities.... Separately, the CIA is undertaking what one intelligence
official called a 'concerted effort' to increase the number of case officers working in the agency's
domestic field offices. Those offices, directed by the National Resources Division, are staffed by
officers from the clandestine service."

  For material on the CIA's use of a missile fired from a Predator UAV to kill an al Qaeda
leader in Yemen in November 2002, click HERE.

 Priest, Dana, and Dan Eggen. "Bush Aides Consider Domestic Spy Agency." Washington Post,
16 Nov. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to government officials and intelligence experts, "President Bush's top national
security advisers have begun discussing the creation of a new, domestic intelligence agency that
would take over responsibility for counterterrorism spying and analysis from the FBI."

 Priest, Dana. “CIA Feels Strain of Iraq and Al Qaeda: Some Gaps Filled by Shifting Staff."
Washington Post, 17 Nov. 2002, A26. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

After 9/11,"the CIA pulled about 160 analysts from [other] jobs ... and turned them into
counterterrorism specialists. The transfer ... made certain things easier.... The [15] units already
had offices and computers, and they knew how to work as a team. But there were costs." For
example, "most were novices to the terrorism world."

  Nasif, Nicholas. "Tenet Given Assurances that No al-Qa'ida Cells Infiltrated Lebanon." Beirut
al-Nahar in Arabic, 28 Nov. 2002.

[Excerpts from FBIS Translated Text] "A security official has recently returned from
Washington after three days of meetings with CIA Director George Tenet and his assistants for
terrorism and Middle Eastern affairs. The talks dealt with the security cooperation between
Lebanon and the United States within the framework of the US-led international campaign on
terror....
"As a result of the discussions, Tenet and his aides expressed satisfaction with stability in
Lebanon and with the cooperation of the Lebanese security services with the CIA station in the
American Embassy in Beirut. This is a constant and accurate cooperation in the fight against
terrorism. The Lebanese authorities deal seriously with the information they receive from the
CIA station, and they regularly supply the station with information within the anti-terror plan."

 Bonner, Raymond. "Report Tracks Terror Trail of an Islamic Group." New York Times, 12 Dec.
2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The terrorist attack on the nightclub in Bali that killed nearly 200 people in October was the
work" of Jemaah Islamiyah, "a radical Islamic organization that carried out a series of bombings
of churches across Indonesia two years ago, according to a comprehensive report" released on 11
December 2002. The report was prepared by the International Crisis Group, "a private
multinational organization based in Brussels."

 Risen, James, and David Johnston. "Bush Has Widened Authority of C.I.A. to Kill Terrorists."
New York Times, 15 Dec. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The Bush administration has prepared a list of terrorist leaders the Central Intelligence Agency
is authorized to kill, if capture is impractical and civilian casualties can be minimized, senior
military and intelligence officials said. The previously undisclosed C.I.A. list includes key Qaeda
leaders like Osama bin Laden and his chief deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, as well as other
principal figures from Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, the officials said..... Despite the
authority given to the agency, Mr. Bush has not waived the executive order banning
assassinations, officials said. The presidential authority to kill terrorists defines operatives of Al
Qaeda as enemy combatants and thus legitimate targets for lethal force."

 Allen, Mike. "Gilmore Panel Backs New Terrorism Agency." Washington Post, 16 Dec. 2002,
A2. [http//:www.washingtonpost.com]

The fourth annual report by the federal terrorism commission headed by former Virginia
governor James S. Gilmore III warns against "transforming the FBI into 'a kind of secret police'
focused only on preventing attacks." The report, issued on 16 December 2002, "recommends that
the government dedicate the FBI to law enforcement and create an independent intelligence
fusion agency that would coordinate information about potential attacks and report to President
Bush. The commission suggests that the new agency, the National Counter Terrorism Center,
should be staffed by intelligence analysts transferred from the FBI, CIA and other agencies."

 Priest, Dana, and Barton Gellman. "U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations."
Washington Post, 26 Dec. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Deep inside the forbidden zone at the U.S.-occupied Bagram air base in Afghanistan,... sits a
cluster of metal shipping containers.... [They] hold the most valuable prizes in the war on
terrorism -- captured al Qaeda operatives and Taliban commanders.
"Those who refuse to cooperate inside this secret CIA interrogation center are sometimes kept
standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spray-painted goggles, according to intelligence
specialists familiar with CIA interrogation methods. At times they are held in awkward, painful
positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour bombardment of lights -- subject to what are
known as 'stress and duress' techniques.

"Those who cooperate are rewarded with creature comforts.... Some who do not cooperate are
turned over -- 'rendered' in official parlance -- to foreign intelligence services whose practice of
torture has been documented by the U.S. government and human rights organizations."

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     CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
                                             2002
                                     Strike in Yemen
Materials presented in chronological order.

 Pincus, Walter. "U.S. Strike Kills Six in al Qaeda." Washington Post, 5 Nov. 2002, A1. [http://
www.washingtonpost.com]

"A missile fired by a U.S. Predator drone over Yemen killed six suspected al Qaeda terrorists in
a vehicle about 100 miles east of the nation's capital..., sources familiar with the action said" on 4
November 2002. "A senior administration official said Yemeni defense officials had identified
one of the men killed as Abu Ali al-Harithi,... one of the suspected planners of the October 2000
attack on the USS Cole." See also, James Risen and Judith Miller, "U.S. Is Reported to Kill Al
Qaeda Leader in Yemen," New York Times, 5 Nov. 2002.
 Johnston, David, and David E. Sanger. "Yemeni Killing Based on Rules Set Out by Bush."
New York Times, 6 Nov. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"The lethal missile strike ... in Yemen was carried out under broad authority that President Bush
has given the C.I.A. over the past year to pursue the terror network" anywhere in the world,
senior government officials said on 5 November 2002. "The decision to approve the missile
launch was made by 'very senior officials' below the level of the president..., the officials said....
The strike was authorized under the same set of classified presidential findings, legal opinions
and policy directives ... that have set the rules for the administration's campaign to prevent
terror."

 Pincus, Walter. "Missile Strike Carried Out With Yemeni." Washington Post, 6 Nov. 2002,
A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to U.S. sources, the U.S. missile attack from a Predator drone in Yemen on 3
November 2002 "was carried out with the cooperation and approval of that country's leadership....
Yememi officials privately told reporters in that country that their intelligence agents were
watching and communicating to U.S. intelligence the movements of Abu Ali al-Harithi, the
senior al Qaeda operative who was the prime target in the attack."

 Washington Post. "[Editorial:] A Strike in Yemen." 6 Nov. 2002, A20. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"TheYemen operation did not target political or criminal figures, but trained combatants of an
organization that has declared war against the United States, that itself has defined the battlefield
as global and that recently has landed its own military blows in Yemen.... Al Qaeda has no
conventional cause, no homeland, no purely political leaders; there is no territory at stake in its
fight with the United States, and no possibility of negotiations or settlement. The only course,
chosen not by the United States but by al Qaeda, is a scattered and unconventional military
conflict across continents, lasting until one side is eradicated. There is no way to treat al Qaeda's
members other than as combatants, because they have no other understanding of themselves."

 Priest, Dana. "CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike." Washington Post, 8 Nov.
2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"A U.S. citizen was among the people killed in the pilotless missile strike on suspected al Qaeda
terrorists in Yemen.... Ahmed Hijazi ... held U.S. citizenship and was also a citizen of an
unidentified Middle Eastern country, a senior administration official confirmed.... The CIA ...
has become a much more central tactical tool in the terrorism war than in any previous conflict....
The CIA's separate targeting process ... is quicker, more fluid and involves fewer decision-
makers in its 'trigger-pulling' chain of command than even the nimblest military operation,
intelligence experts said."

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                       OTHER COUNTRIES
                                       Greece
                                  Table of Contents

See U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964-1968. Vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002) at
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16; and Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1969-1976. Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–
1972 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007) at
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29.

 General:

 To 1999

 From 2000

 World War II

 17 November Terrorists

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                       OTHER COUNTRIES
                                           Greece
                                             General

                                             To 1999
 Dakin, Douglas. The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913. Salonika, Greece: Institute for
Balkan Studies, 1966.

Constantinides: "Dakin gives particulars on the intelligence, assassination, and support
networks set up by the Greek side to fight the Bulgarians and the Comitadjis for control of
Macedonia.... The excellent Greek system for penetrating and bribing Turkish governmental and
police authorities is pictured as part of the unified, well-planned effort."

 Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. Greek Military Intelligence and the Crescent: Estimating the Turkish
Threat -- Crises, Leadership and Strategic Analyses 1974-1996. Plymouth, UK: University of
Plymouth Press, 2010.

From "Foreword": This work extends "the study of contemporary intelligence and crisis
management into the Aegean, providing a unique account of how Greek policymakers forged
their assessments of the Turkish threat during a tense two decades.... He draws on the conceptual
literature on intelligence and surprise attack,... and uses it as a template against which to evaluate
the performance of successive Greek governments.... [W]hile the familiar dilemmas concerning
the relationship between intelligence and policy may take on distinctive forms in quite different
political cultures[,] in many respects they are all too recognisable."

Dimitrakis has a Website at: http://www.pdimitrakis.com/.

 Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "Greek Military Intelligence and the Italian Threat, 1934-1940."
Journal of Intelligence History 7, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 1-29. [http://www.intelligence-
history.org/jih/7-1.html]

From 1934, "Greek generals and their staffs identified Italy as the most serious threat to Greek
national security.... The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 was not a surprise but an
anticipated hostile act Greek strategists had forecast[]." Nevertheless, the head of the Greek
administration, Ioannis Metaxas, "chose not to mobilize on time and to call-up the reservists
[Army General Staff chief Maj. Gen. Alexandros] Papagos had requested in the period of spring
1939-summer 1940." He "believed that a general mobilization prior to the actual Italian attack
could have serious diplomatic and financial repercussions for Greece and could provoke Rome....

"The Greek Army did not have 'all the time in the world' for defence preparations, but at least it
was not surprised. The machinery for call-up of conscripts was in place waiting Metaxas' and
King George's II signing of the relevant royal warrants on 28 October early morning. In addition,
since almost 1938, their staff officers had been operating under a war mentality."
 Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish 'Threat' During the 1987
Aegean Crisis." Journal of Modern Greek Studies 25 (2007): 99-127.

The author argues that "during the 1987 crisis, Turkish armed forces did not constitute an
imminent threat to Greece despite the hostile rhetoric of Ankara. Greek military intelligence was
able to confirm Turkish passivity and inform Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou not to
expect any Turkish hostile act over the Aegean Sea continental shelf before the Greeks might
have taken precipitous action."

 Dimitrakis, Panagiotis. "Intelligence for Crisis Management: The Case of the January 1996
Greek-Turkish Crisis." European Security 17, no. 4 (Dec. 2008): 455-493.

From abstract: "[T]he author assesses the role of Greek military intelligence" during the January
1996 Greek-Turkish crisis over the sovereignty status of two Southeast Aegean islets. He "shows
that during the crisis hours of 31 January 1996, the lack of tactical intelligence on Turkish
deployment had a direct impact on the assessment of the operational status of the Greek armed
forces and on the planned crisis response."

 Nomikos, John M. "Terrorism, Media, and Intelligence in Greece: Capturing the 17 November
Group." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007):
65-78.

"Throughout the first phase of domestic terrorism [1974-1989], the ... Greek elites" failed "to
acknowledge the seriousness ... of the terrorist threat and the need to tackle it drastically." The
assassination in September 1989 of the first Greek politician to be killed by the 17 November
group "marked the end of the tolerance of terrorism by both the political establishment and the
general public." After 1999, with the Olympic Games 2004 scheduled for Athens, the Greek
government began to demonstrate "a dedication and ... sense of urgancy to deal with the terrorist
threat."

 Papakhelas, Alexis. "Newly-Released CIA Records Shed Light on Events Leading Up to
Greece's 1967 Coup" To Vima (Athens), 17 Aug. 2002, A6-A7.

FBIS document number: FBIS-WEU-2002-0818. Translated text available at
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16.

 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Gen. ed., David S. Patterson. Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Vol. XVI. Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Ed., James E.
Miller. Washington, DC: GPO, 1999. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-
68v16]

 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Gen. ed., Edward C. Keefer. Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XXIX. Eastern Europe; Eastern
Mediterranean, 1969–1972. Eds., James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selvage, and Laurie Van Hook.
Washington, DC: GPO, 2007. [http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v29]
From "Preface": "The coverage of this volume is split almost equally between Eastern Europe
and the Eastern Mediterranean [i.e., Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey].... The second chapter [of the
Eastern Europe section] is ... a general one. It deals with U.S. Government policy and the
bureaucratic debate about -- and ultimately, the decision on how to fund -- Radio Free Europe ...
and Radio Liberty."

 Varouhakis, Miron. "Greek Intelligence and the Capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Ocalan in
1999." Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 1 (Extracts, Mar. 2009): 11-17.

The effort of the Greek National Intelligence Agency (EYP) to transfer Ocalan from Greece to
Kenya to avoid his capture by Turkish authorities "ended in a debacle and strained its relations
with the United States, Turkey, and other nations."

 Wittner, Lawrence S. American Intervention in Greece, 1943 to 1949. Columbia Contemporary
American History Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Kuniholm, JAH 69.3 (Dec. 1982), notes that the author "believes that U.S. intervention,
motivated by a concern for protecting petroleum resources in the Middle East, was both
unjustified and ineffective.... Wittner's judgments, however, while thought-provoking and
insightful, are nonetheless problematic." His identification with the Left leads him to minimize
complex internal and external factors that conflict with his political views.

For Smith, FA 62 (Summer 1982), "[t]his book deals primarily with the American role in Greece
after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine.... In 1949 most Americans were euphoric about the
results of this policy. Today many must share the author's conclusion that in the long run
'American policy toward Greece ended in shambles.'"

 Xydis, Stephen G. "Coups and Countercoups in Greece 1967-1973 (with Postscript)." Political
Science Quarterly 89, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 507-538.

          Return to Greece Table of Contents




                        OTHER COUNTRIES
                                         Greece
                                            General

                                          From 2000
 Carassava, Anthee. "Accused of Kidnapping, 10 Agents Face Lawsuit." New York Times, 29
Dec. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 28 December 2005, Greek lawyer Frangiscos Ragoussis "filed a lawsuit against 10 people he
contends are British and Greek intelligence agents, on behalf of 28 Pakistanis working in the
country who say they were kidnapped and tortured by the agents after the July 7 terrorist
bombings in London." The Greek investigative newspaper Proto Thema "ran the names of a
number of the people it said were agents involved in the case [and] said the British agent it
named was the Athens station chief for British intelligence. The newspaper ... said the Briton had
led the covert operation with another British intelligence officer whom it did not name."

  Carr, John. "Greek Paper Prints Photo of 'MI6 Agent.'" Times (London), 5 Jan. 2006.
[http://www.timesonline.co.uk]

"A photograph purporting to be Britain's top MI6 agent in Greece was published today on the
front page" of the Athens newspaper Eleftherotypia. Controversy is "continu[ing] over the
alleged role of British agents in the arrest and supposed abuse of a group of Pakistanis living in
Athens."

 Lardner, George, Jr. "History of U.S.-Greek Ties Blocked." Washington Post, 17 Aug. 2001,
A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

James E. Miller, a retired State Department historian, says that the U.S. Government Printing
Office is withholding distribution of the volume of the Foreign Relations of the United States
(FRUS) series that deals with Greece in the period 1964-1968 because of CIA objections to its
publication. According to Miller, CIA officials are concerned about documents regarding "two
proposals to influence Greek politicians and elections."

  Nomikos, John M. "Greece's Intelligence Community Reform and New Challenges." American
Intelligence Journal 26, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 45-49.

The author discusses both the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Military Intelligence
Sectoral Directorate (DDSP). The coordinating body for NIS operations is the Intelligence
Council, in which the DDSP director participates.

 Nomikos, John M. "Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP): A Brief Description." European
Journal of Intelligence Studies 2 (2008): 99 ff. [http://www.ejis.eu]

 Nomikos, John M. "Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP): Past, Present and Future." National
Security and the Future 9, no. 1-2 (2008): 79-88.
  Nomikos, John M. "The Greek Intelligence Service and Post-9/11 Challenges." Journal of
Intelligence History 4, no. 2 (Winter 2004). [http://www.intelligence-
history.org/jih/journal.html]

From abstract: "This article points out the new responsibilities that the Greek Intelligence
Service (NIS-EYP) had to shoulder in the last decade because of the current reform strategy
which introduced several fundamental innovations. It also concentrates on the development of
post-9/11 Cold War challenges and how NIS-EYP could respond to the new threats in the
coming decades."

  Nomikos, John M. "The Internal Modernization of the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP)."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 435-448.

The Greek National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP) "constitutes a self-standing civil public
agency; its political head is Greece's Minister of Public Order.... The Intelligence Council is the
coordinating body of NIS-EYP operations."

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                         OTHER COUNTRIES
                                          Greece
                                         World War II
 Auty, Phyllis, and Richard Clogg, eds. British Policy Towards Wartime Resistance in
Yugoslavia and Greece. London: Macmillan,1975.

Constantinides: This work consists of the proceedings of a 1973 conference in London, with a
majority of SOE participants. "Fascinating new material on British intelligence and resistance
operations, capabilities, and relationships emerges from the proceedings."

 Beavan, Stanley. Aegean Masquerade: A Royal Air Force Odyssey. Studley, UK: Brewin
Books, 1994.

Surveillant 3.6 notes that Aegean Masquerade concerns "RAF wireless operations in the
Mediterranean ... and RAF covert operations in Turkey and Greece. It is based on the author's
first-hand experiences and RAF service."

 Bennett, Ralph
1. Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989. New York: Morrow,
1989.

Sexton says that this "[c]omprehensive study" of the impact of Ultra on Allied strategy covers
the campaigns in Greece, Crete, Iraq, Syria, the Western Desert, North Africa, Sicily and Italy.
The work stands "as a model for historians." To Ferris, I&NS 6.2, this "is the best ... book yet
written" on Ultra's effect on any aspect of the war. Ultra is presented as "only one of many Allied
sources of secret information."

2. "Intelligence and Strategy: Some Observations on the War in the Mediterranean, 1941-1945."
Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 2 (Apr. 1990): 444-464.

This is a concise presentation of the main findings of Bennett's Ultra and Mediterranean
Strategy (see above).

 Gerolymatos, André. Guerrilla Warfare and Espionage in Greece, 1940-1944. New York:
Pella, 1992. [pb]

The reviewer in Journal of Modern Greek Studies 14.2 (Oct. 1996), finds that this "book
provides what is probably the most detailed account" of covert operations and espionage in the
Greek resistance "to be found anywhere, and certainly in English..... It would probably be fair to
say that one major purpose of this book is to blame the British for not being properly able to
control [the outbreak of civil war in Athens in December 1944] or even to understand the forces
that they themselves had unleashed."

 Giannaris, John ("Yannis"). Yannis. San Jose, CA: Pilgrimage Press, 1988.

Surveillant 2.2: OSS mission into Greece during World War II.

 Goulter-Zervoudakis, Christina. "The Politicization of Intelligence: The British Experience in
Greece, 1941-1944." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 165-194.

From "Abstract": Because "a large portion of the intelligence effort had to be devoted to
gathering political intelligence,... SOE operatives became embroiled in the internecine struggles
between communist based and other resistance groups. Intelligence work was made even more
difficult by inter- and intra-departmental rivalries, and tensions among the Allied involved in
Greece."

 Hammond, Nicholas. Venture into Greece: With the Guerrillas, 1943-44. London: Kimber,
1983.

The author, who died in April 2001, commanded "underground British troops stationed in the
Pindus range during the German occupation of Greece" in World War II. Telegraph (London), 5
Apr. 2001.
 Judt, Tony, ed. Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe, 1939-1948. London:
Routledge, 1989.

Hunt, I&NS 6.3, notes that the "theme of this scholarly work is the part played by the
Communist parties of southern Europe in the resistance to German occupation" in World War II
and its immediate aftermath. The book consists of an introduction ("a spectacular piece of
writing"), a chapter on the Comintern, and chapters on France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece.

 Lind, Lew. The Battle of the Wine Dark Sea: The Aegean Sea Campaign, 1940-45. [Australia]:
Kangaroo Press, 1993.

Surveillant 3.6: This is a "concise and analytical account of the unusual war fought in the eastern
Mediterranean in WWII to secure the Aegean Sea." It is "exciting and highly readable."

 Marinos, Themistocles. Tr., Petros Ladas. Harling Mission--1942: The Gorgopotamos
Operation. Athens: Papazisis Publications, 1993.

Surveillant 3.4/5 identifies this book as an "account of the destruction of the Gorgopotamos
Bridge in Greece in WWII, one of the key railway bridges, northwest of Athens, used by
Rommel to supply troops on the African front." Although this book is about a "single special
operation," Potts, FILS 12.6, sees that operation as "one of the most effective and significant of
its kind." The book "offers much practical insight into wartime resistance in Greece," and is to be
"highly commended" for its "broad and balanced view."

 Rendel, A.M. ("Sandy") Appointment in Crete: The Story of a British Agent. London: Allen
Wingate, 1953.

 Saraphis, Stephanos G. Tr., Marian Pascoe. Greek Resistance Army: The Story of ELAS.
London: Birch Books, 1951

 Woodhouse, Christopher Montague.

Woodhouse was the commander of the Allied Military Mission to the Greek Resistance in
World War II.

1. Apple of Discord: A Survey of Recent Greek Politics in Their International Setting. London:
Hutchinson, 1951.

Pforzheimer, Studies 5.2 (Spring 1961), identifies this work as "[a]n authoritative account of
Greek resistance against the Germans in World War II."

2. Something Ventured: The Autobiography of C.M. Woodhouse. London: Granada, 1982.

Pforzheimer: This autobiography includes the author's wartime experiences and his post-war
intelligence assignments.
3. The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1948. London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976.

Pforzheimer: This is an "authoritative account of the Greek Resistance in World War II and the
internal postwar civil war which the Resistance helped to spawn."

          Return to Greece Table of Contents

          Return to Resistance Table of Contents

          Return to WWII Europe Table of Contents




                        OTHER COUNTRIES
                                          Greece
                                 17 November Terrorists

Materials presented in chronological order.

 Smith, R. Jeffrey. "U.S. Presses Greece For Action against Leftist Terror Group." Washington
Post, 3 Nov. 1999, A30. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

There have been at least five terrorist attacks carried out in Athens this year by a group known as
November 17. The United States has been pressing the Greek police to bring the members of the
group to justice since the assassination of CIA station chief Richard Welch in November 1975.
"U.S. officials say they suspect that arrests of group members have been blocked by both a lack
of official interest and active opposition within the Athens government. Senior Greek security
officials have rejected the accusation."

 Stanley, Alessandra. "British Attaché Is Assassinated on Greek Street." New York Times, 9 Jun.
2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

British defense attaché Brigadier Stephen Saunders "was the first British official assassinated in
an attack linked to November 17, but the killing was the 23rd attributed to the group, which
emerged in 1975 with the slaying of CIA station chief Richard Welch, the first of four American
officials killed by the group. "In the last 25 years, no member of November 17 has been arrested,
driving the State Department to identify Greece in an April report as 'one of the weakest links in
Europe's effort against terrorism.'" On 5 June 2000, the U.S. National Commission on Terrorism
said that Greece "was not fully cooperating against terrorism."
 Carassava, Anthee. "Greece Reports First Breakthrough against Terrorist Group that Killed
C.I.A. Agent in '75." New York Times, 5 Jul. 2002, A6.

Greek police have announced a breakthrough in the inquiry into the November 17 terrorist group
believed to have killed CIA station chief Richard Welch in 1975. According to a police official, a
botched bomb attack last weekend severely injured a foot soldier in the group and led authorities
to a hide-out and a significant weapons cache in a residential building in the heart of Athens.

 Carassava, Anthee. "Greek Police Find Another Arms Cache in 2nd Raid of Week." New York
Times, 7 Jul. 2002, A3.

On 7 July 2002, Greek police discovered a second large weapons cache, including antitank
missiles and explosives, belonging to the November 17 terrorist group. The weapons were found
in a residential apartment block in central Athens. The U.S. Embassy "went on maximum alert to
guard against retaliation from the group."

 Carassava, Anthee. "Greeks Claim a Victory in Campaign against a Band of Political
Assassins." New York Times, 19 Jul. 2002. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 17 July 2002, the Greek police arrested Alexandros Yiotopoulos, 58, identified "as one of a
handful of leaders of November 17." Three other suspects, already in custody, were charged on
18 July 2002 with offenses that included first-degree murder, bomb attacks and bank robberies.
The police say they have confessed and have described the crimes." See also, Daniel Williams,
"Greece Catches Up to Elusive Terrorists: Arrests May Snuff Out November 17 Group,"
Washington Post, 19 Jul. 2002, A1.

  Reuters. "Greece Arrests Suspect for First Nov. 17 Murder." 25 Jul. 2002. [http://news.
lycos.com]

On 25 July 2002, Greek police arrested 46-year-old Pavlos Serifis, "a suspected member of the
November 17 guerrilla band.... 'He participated with other members of the November 17 terrorist
group in the murder of Athens CIA station chief Richard Welch on December 23, 1975,' police
spokesman Lefteris Economou told a news conference."

 Mandrou, Ioanna. "17 November Historical Member Serifis Confesses to Two Murders." To
Vima (Athens), 27 Jul. 2002, 3. [FBIS-WEU-2002-0729]

[Excerpt from FBIS Translated Text] "In a confession-testimony, leading 17 November member
Pavlos Serifis spoke in detail and precisely about the historical 17 November members, the first
members, and its action since 1975[,] when CIA Station Chief Richard Welch was murdered[,]
up to 1980."

 Brousali, Dhespina, and Maria Tsoli. "Pavlos Serifis' Testimony." To Vima (Athens), 29 Aug.
2002, A8-A9. [FBIS-WEU-2002-0905]
[Excerpt from FBIS Translated Text] "Pavlos Serifis, one of the founding members of the 17
November organization,... took part in two terrorist acts (murders of Richard Welch and of
Petrou/Stamoulis)."

 Bruni, Frank, and Anthee Carassava. "Greece to Begin Trial Involving Long-Elusive Terror
Group." New York Times, 3 Mar. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The trial of the 19 defendants accused of being part of the "November 17" terrorist group will
begin on 3 March 2003.

 Landler, Mark. "Greek Court Convicts 15 in 27-Year-Old Terror Group." New York Times, 9
Dec. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 8 December 2003, a court in Athens found 15 members of the radical November 17 group
"guilty of a string of assassinations [including Richard Welch, the CIA station chief, in 1975],
car bombings and rocket attacks that stretched over nearly three decades" and claimed 23 victims.
See also, Brian Murphy, "Members of Terror Group In Greece Found Guilty," Washington Post,
9 Dec. 2003, A17.

 Carassava, Anthee. "6 From Leftist Greek Terror Group Get Multiple Life Sentences." New
York Times, 18 Dec. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 17 December 2003, "[a] A Greek court sentenced the leader, the chief assassin and four other
members of the November 17 terrorist organization to multiple life sentences ... for a string of
killings, rocket attacks, bombings and bank robberies since 1975."

  Paphitis, Nicholas. "Greek Terrorists Appeal Convictions." Associated Press, 2 Dec, 2005.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Fifteen members of the November 17 group convicted in 2003 of murder and other terrorist acts
"appeared in court [on 2 December 2005] to appeal their convictions."

 Kassimeris, George. "Last Act in a Violent Drama? The Trial of Greece's Revolutionary
Organization 17 November." Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 1 (2006): 137-157.

 Nomikos, John M. "Terrorism, Media, and Intelligence in Greece: Capturing the 17 November
Group." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007):
65-78.

"Throughout the first phase of domestic terrorism [1974-1989], the ... Greek elites" failed "to
acknowledge the seriousness ... of the terrorist threat and the need to tackle it drastically." The
assassination in September 1989 of the first Greek politician to be killed by the 17 November
group "marked the end of the tolerance of terrorism by both the political establishment and the
general public." After 1999, with the Olympic Games 2004 scheduled for Athens, the Greek
government began to demonstrate "a dedication and ... sense of urgancy to deal with the terrorist
threat."
          Return to Greece Table of Contents




                            POST-COLD WAR
                                            2002
           House-Senate Investigation of 9/11 Attack
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Allen, Mike. "Bush Seeks to Restrict Hill Probes of Sept. 11." Washington Post, 30 Jan. 2002,
A4.

 Pincus, Walter. "House, Senate Intelligence Panels Set Joint Sept. 11 Probe."Washington Post,
15 Feb. 2002, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 14 February 2002, "[t]he leaders of the Senate and House intelligence committees ...
announced a joint investigation" into the 9/11 attacks.

 Risen, James. "Panel to Review Readiness of Agencies Before Attacks." New York Times, 5
Mar. 2002, A10.

 Pincus, Walter. "Staff Director for Hill's Probe Into Terrorist Attacks Resigns." Washington
Post, 30 Apr. 2002, A5. [http//www.washingtonpost.com]

L. Britt Snider, staff director for the joint House and Senate investigation into the 9/11 attacks,
resigned on 26 April 2002. See also, James Risen, "Reason Cited for Ousting of Terror Inquiry's
Director: Staff Member's Security Problem Is Blamed," New York Times, 9 May 2002, A34.

 Priest, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "Strife, Dissent Beset Hill's Sept. 11 Panel." Washington Post,
20 May 2002, A11.

 Washington Post. "House-Senate Panel Starts Probing 9/11 Intelligence Failure." 5 Jun. 2002,
A1. [http//www.washingtonpost.com]

On 4 June 2002, a House-Senate panel opened its "inquiry into the intelligence failure"
surrounding the 9/11 attacks. The 37-member panel is co-chaired by Rep. Porter J. Goss (R-FL)
and Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL). "The panel began by setting ground rules and hearing from
members of a specially formed staff who have begun sifting through a massive cache of highly
classified documents.... Panel members heard from their new staff director, Eleanor Hill, a
former Defense Department inspector general who is in her first week on the job. She was hired
belatedly in a staff shake-up, and her arrival was delayed until she received a security clearance."

 Thomas, Pierre, and Martha Raddatz. "A Big Warning: Security Agency Intercepted Arabic
Conversation that Spoke of the Sept. 11 Attacks, But Failed to Translate It in Time," ABC
News.com, 7 Jun. 2002. [http://www.abcnews.com]

 Priest, Dana, and Juliet Eilperin. "Disputes Stall Panel Probing Sept. 11 Lapses." Washington
Post, 14 Jun. 2002, A10 . [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"After meeting for two weeks and hearing from one witness, the special House-Senate
intelligence panel investigating the Sept. 11 attacks bogged down [on 13 June 2002] amid
differences among members over the panel's direction, schedule and access to classified
information. The joint committee canceled a planned session, and Senate members met by
themselves instead to discuss their dissatisfaction with the panel's performance, with some
expressing unhappiness that their House colleagues have dominated the sessions."

 Bash, Dana, and Kate Snow. "Messages Intercepted by U.S. on September 10 Revealed."
CNN.com, 19 Jun. 2002. [http://www.cnn.com]

 Eilperin, Juliet, and Dana Priest. "Sept. 11 Plot Likely Hatched in '98, Tenet Says." Washington
Post, 19 Jun. 2002, A10.

  Allen, Mike, and Juliet Eilperin. "Cheney Blames Leaks on Congress." Washington Post, 21
Jun. 2002, p. A12.

 Balachandran, V. "Spy Who Went Cold." Asian Age, 10 Jul. 2002.

The author of this Op-ed piece in an Indian daily suggests that the U.S. Intelligence Community
is suffering from a bad case of being over scrutinized. He notes that "[s]ome of the Aspin-Brown
Commission's recommendations on the creation of posts resulted in a needless gridlock between
the Congress and the Executive. The Scowcroft panel still wants to create a separate post of
Director CIA who, with other directors of NIMA, NRO, NSA will work under the DCI. Many of
these 'reorganisations' were meaningless knee-jerk exercises.... The American IC is now worried
that they may be subjected to another dose of 'reorganisation' as a result of the present
Congressional hearing."

 Loeb, Vernon. "Independent Sept. 11 Commission Gaining Ground." Washington Post, 29 Jul.
2002. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The U.S. House has added an amendment to the FY 2003 intelligence authorization bill to
"create an independent commission to investigate possible Sept. 11 intelligence failures." This
action seemed to be "a vote of no confidence in the House and Senate intelligence committees,
which have postponed public hearings in their own probe and already concluded that the
intelligence agencies could not have averted the terrorist attacks."
 Risen, James. "White House Drags Its Feet on Testifying at 9/11 Panel," New York Times, 13
Sep. 2002, A12.

  Priest, Dana, and Dan Eggen. "9/11 Probers Say Agencies Failed to Heed Attack Signs."
Washington Post, 19 Sep. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a preliminary report of the joint congressional intelligence panel on 18 September
2002, "U.S. intelligence agencies received many more indications than previously disclosed that
Osama bin Laden's terrorist network was planning imminent 'spectacular' attacks in the summer
of 2001 aimed at inflicting mass casualties."

  Priest, Dana, and Dan Eggen. "FBI Faulted on al Qaeda Assessment: Domestic Threat Was
Underestimated, Panel Told." Washington Post, 20 Sep. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.
com]

According to testimony on 19 September 2002 from Clinton and Bush administration officials,
"[t]he FBI was confident that Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network had a limited presence in the
United States before last year's terror attacks." Thus, "the U.S. government focused on threats
posed by al Qaeda overseas and lacked specific tactical information that would have been
necessary to thwart the Sept. 11 attacks."

  Priest, Dana, and Susan Schmidt. "Intelligence Agencies Defended: CIA, FBI Called
Understaffed, Overworked and Successful." Washington Post, 27 Sep. 2002, A1. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

Speaking to the congressional panel on 26 September 2002, Cofer Black, the CIA's former
director of counterterrorism, offered "an impassioned public rebuttal to reports of intelligence
failures before the Sept. 11 terror attacks." He told the panel that "overwhelmed anti-terror
analysts have performed admirably with inadequate resources."

  Loeb, Vernon, and Dana Priest. "Tenet Expresses Ire at 'Bias' of Panel Staff." Washington
Post, 28 Sep. 2002, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In a letter to committee leaders, DCI George J. Tenet "has accused the staff of a special House-
Senate intelligence committee of 'bias' and asked its leaders to keep their aides from poisoning
the atmosphere of a public investigation into intelligence failures surrounding the Sept. 11 terror
attacks." See also, Neil A. Lewis and James Risen, "C.I.A. Chief Angrily Assails Panel Staff for
Notation Questioning Officer's Honesty," New York Times, 28 Sep. 2002, A10.

   Priest, Dana. "Panel Leaders Favor an Intelligence Czar." Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2002, A18.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In its final report, the joint congressional intelligence committee investigating the 9/11 attacks is
"expected to recommend the appointment of a Cabinet-level intelligence czar..., according to
government officials familiar with a draft of the study. The final report also will likely
recommend that the CIA and Justice Department conduct a one-year study of the creation of a
separate domestic intelligence agency, during which time the FBI would be given a last chance
to remake itself into a force capable of collecting intelligence on domestic terror groups."

  U.S. Congress. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select
Committee On Intelligence. Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and
After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. S. Rept. No. 107-351, H. Rept. No. 107-792,
107th Congress, 2d session, December 2002.
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html]

  Shelby, Richard C. "September 11 and the Imperative of Reform in the U.S. Intelligence
Community: Additional Views of Senator Richard C. Shelby, Vice Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence." 10. Dec. 2002.
[http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/shelby.html]

These are Senator Shelby's "additional views" on the joint House-Senate committee report on the
9/11 terrorist attacks. Shelby served 4 1/2 years as SSCI chairman and 1 1/2 years as vice
chairman. Here he states: "Long before the September 11 attacks, I made no secret of my
feelings of disappointment in the U.S. Intelligence Community for its performance in a string of
smaller-scale intelligence failures during the last decade. Since September 11 I have similarly hid
from no one my belief that the Intelligence Community does not have the decisive and
innovative leadership it needs to reform itself and to adapt to the formidable challenges of the
21st century."

 Loeb, Vernon, and Susan Schmidt. "Disciplinary Action Urged for Failures Before 9/11."
Washington Post, 11 Dec. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

After six months of work, the House-Senate intelligence panel investigating the 11 September
terrorist attacks has concluded that "[i]ntelligence and law enforcement officials whose blunders
may have failed to stop terrorists from mounting the Sept. 11, 2001, strikes should be
disciplined,… but decisions about punitive action should be made by the inspectors general of
their individual agencies." The panel "criticizes the FBI for doing too little to 'penetrate terrorist
organizations operating in the United States….'

"[T]he report also recommends that Congress and the administration consider the creation of a
separate domestic spying agency because of 'the FBI's history of repeated shortcomings within
its current responsibility for domestic intelligence.'" And "the report calls for the appointment of
a Cabinet-level intelligence czar to oversee the government's wide array of intelligence units."
See also, James Risen, "Dissent on Assigning Blame as 9/11 Panel Adopts Report," New York
Times, 11 Dec. 2002.

          Return to 2002 Table of Contents
                             POST-COLD WAR
                                             2003
           House-Senate Investigation Report on 9/11
Text of the report from the joint investigation by the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Joint Inquiry into
Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001," is available in PDF format at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html;
and at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/911rept.pdf.

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Prados, John. "'Slow-walked and Stonewalled.'" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59, no. 2
(Mar.-Apr. 2003).

"The Joint Inquiry issued its final report on December 10. It contained factual, systemic, and
related conclusions, along with recommendations, but proposed no legislation.... The major
recommendation was that the jobs of CIA chief and overall intelligence chief be separated by
establishing a Director of National Intelligence as a new, Cabinet-level official with full
authority over both the Pentagon and CIA intelligence budgets."

  CNN. "Congressional Report Cites 'Missed Opportunities' Prior to 9/11." 24 Jul. 2003.
[http://www.cnn.com]

A 900-page report on the joint investigation by the House and Senate intelligence committees
into events prior to the 9/11 terror attacks was released on 24 July 2003. The report concludes
that "intelligence agencies, including the FBI and CIA, 'missed opportunities' to disrupt terrorist
planning" prior to the attacks. The report "does not point to any one single clue that could have
thwarted" the terrorist plot, but "says that 'various threads and pieces of information' were either
overlooked or not put together."

  Johnston, David. "Report of 9/11 Panel Cites Lapses by C.I.A. and F.B.I." New York Times, 24
Jul. 2003, A12.

The report of the joint panel of the House and Senate intelligence committees, released on 24
July 2003, provides "a scathing critique of the performance of the F.B.I. and C.I.A." before the
9/11 terrorist attacks and "recommend[s] several changes, including the creation of [a] cabinet
level national intelligence chief.... The report concluded that in the months before the hijackings,
the F.B.I. and C.I.A. did not comprehend the gravity and imminent nature of the threat inside the
United States and failed to assess all of the available information about the risk of an attack."
 Priest, Dana. "White House, CIA Kept Key Portions of Report Classified." Washington Post,
25 Jul. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Two "politically volatile" questions regarding the 9/11 terrorist attacks "have been how
personally engaged Bush and his predecessor were in counterterrorism before the attacks, and
what role some Saudi officials may have played in sustaining the 19 terrorists.... To varying
degrees, the answers remain a mystery....The CIA refused to permit publication of information
potentially implicating Saudi officials on national security grounds.... The White House,
meanwhile, resisted efforts to pin down Bush's knowledge of al Qaeda threats and to catalogue
the executive's pre-Sept. 11 strategy to fight terrorists."

 Risen, James. "Informant for F.B.I. Had Contacts With Two 9/11 Hijackers." New York Times,
25 Jul. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to the House-Senate committee report released on 24 July 2003, "[t]he F.B.I. may
have missed its best chance to prevent the Sept. 11 plot when one of its informants developed
close ties to two of the hijackers [Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq Alhazmi] living in San Diego,
yet never alerted the bureau to the impending attacks.... The F.B.I. missed the opportunity in
large part because the C.I.A. had failed to share information with the bureau about the two
hijackers, who had attended a meeting of al Qaeda in Malaysia."

 Schmidt, Susan, and David Von Drehle. "Hill's 9/11 Probe Finds Multiple Failures."
Washington Post, 25 Jul. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to the joint investigation report by the House and Senate intelligence committees,
released on 24 July 2003, the al Qaeda hijackers "were in contact with as many as 14 people who
had turned up in previous FBI counterterrorism investigations -- at least four of whom were
under active FBI investigation.... The U.S. intelligence community 'failed to fully capitalize' on
information that might have allowed agents to unravel the hijack plot, the joint committee
concluded, and bungled clues that should have led the FBI to two or more of the terrorists before
they could act."

  Smith, R. Jeffrey. "A History of Missed Connections: U.S. Analysts Warned of Potential
Attacks but Lacked Follow-Through." Washington Post, 25 Jul. 2003, A14.
[http://www.washingtonpost. com]

The joint report by the House and Senate intelligence committees, "particularly its detailed
chronology of events in the last weeks when the attack might have been prevented[,] makes clear
that the disaster was the result as much of lapses in government follow-through as it was the
result of defects of intelligence."

 Johnston, David. "Classified Section of Sept. 11 Report Faults Saudi Rulers." New York Times,
26 Jul. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to people who have read a classified section of the report by the Congresional joint
committee on the 9/11 hijackings, senior Saudi officials "have funneled hundreds of millons of
dollars to charitable groups and other organizations that may have helped finance the ... attacks....
The 28-page section of the report was deleted from the nearly 900-page declassified version."
People who saw the section said that "[t]he chapter focuses on the role foreign governments
played in the hijackings, but centers almost entirely on Saudi Arabia."

 Johnston, David, and Douglas Jehl. "Bush Refuses to Declassify Saudi Section of Report." New
York Times, 30 Jul. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"President Bush refused [on 29 July 2003] to declassify a 28-page chapter of a Congressional
report on the Sept. 11 attacks. He said disclosure of the deleted section, which centers on
accusations about Saudi Arabia's role in financing the hijackings, 'would help the enemy' and
compromise the administration's campaign against terror."

          Return to 2002 Table of Contents

          Return to 2003 Table of Contents




                            POST-COLD WAR
                                       2002-2004
  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
                   United States
                                     Table of Contents


"The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the
9-11 Commission), an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional
legislation and the signature of President George W. Bush in late 2002, is chartered to
prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, including preparedness for and the immediate response to the
attacks. The Commission is also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard
against future attacks." From the Commission Website at http://www.9-11commission.gov/.

 2002 - 2003
 2004

 Commission Report (22 July 2004):

 Initial Reportage and Reviews

 Follow-on Reportage

 Debate over Commission Recommendations

 2005 - 2008

        Return to Terrorism 2000s; CIA 2002, 2003, or 2004; FBI 2000s; General
Post Cold War 2002, 2003, or 2004; Reform 2000s; or Analysis Surprise/Warning




                            POST-COLD WAR
                                           2000s
  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
                   United States
                                         2002 -2003


Materials arranged chronologically.

 Best, Richard A., Jr. The Intelligence Community and 9/11: Proposals for An Independent
Commission. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Updated 6
Nov. 2002. Available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31581.pdf.

"In separate legislation, the House and Senate have endorsed proposals for an independent
commission [to assess the performance of the U.S. Intelligence Community in regard to the 9/11
attacks]. Proponents argue that an investigation by persons without ties to intelligence agencies
could provide greater assurance of an impartial assessment that could lead, if necessary, to
improvements in the nation's intelligence effort. Opponents argue that it would usurp the
responsibilities of congressional intelligence committees, burden senior intelligence officials,
and risk exposure of intelligence assets deeply involved in the current struggle against
terrorism."

  Loven, Jennifer. “Bush Taps Kissinger to Head 9/11 Probe.” Associated Press, 27 Nov. 2002.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 27 November 2002, President George W. Bush "signed legislation creating a new
independent commission to investigate the Sept. 11 attacks … and named former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger to lead the panel."

  Shenon, Philip. "Former New Jersey Gov. to Head 9/11 Panel." New York Times, 17 Dec. 2002.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 16 December 2002, President George W. Bush named Thomas H. Kean, former Republican
governor of New Jersey, to replace Henry A. Kissinger as chairman of an independent
commission to investigate the Sept. 11 attacks. Kean commented that "he did not believe he
faced the potential business conflicts that led Mr. Kissinger to abruptly withdraw last week as
chairman.... Kissinger's appointment had drawn fire in large part because of his refusal to
disclose his company's client list and his possible ties to foreign governments and companies that
could have intersts in the investigation." See also, Amy Goldstein, "9/11 Panel Gets New
Chairman; Ex-N.J. Governor Kean Named to Replace Kissinger," Washington Post, 17 Dec.
2002, A1.

 Schmidt, Susan. "Broader Probe of Terror Threat Underway; Panel Looks Beyond Intelligence
Failures, Into U.S. Government's Response." Washington Post, 27 Jul. 2003, A10. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"The bipartisan commission appointed by Congress and President Bush is conducting what
participants believe is the most ambitious government investigation in history, looking not only
into intelligence failures, as the congressional committee did, but much more broadly at how the
U.S. government responded to the terrorist threat." Commission Chairman Thomas H. Kean said
that newly available information "may provide new facts and lead to some recommendations that
are different from those of the joint [Congressional] committee."

 Eggen, Dan. "Ex-Chiefs Disagree on Intelligence Overhaul." Washington Post, 15 Oct. 2003,
A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Testifying on 14 October 2003 before a bipartisan commission investigating the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, former DCIs John M. Deutch and James R. Schlesinger disagreed on whether drastic
reform is needed in U.S. intelligence. Deutch "said that the government should create a domestic
intelligence agency to take over counterterrorism responsibilities from the FBI and vest the
director of central intelligence with more authority.... But Schlesinger ... urged caution.
'Tinkering with the organizational structure can help, but by itself will not produce major
improvement,' Schlesinger said."

 Isikoff, Michael. "PDB Battle Heats Up." Newsweek, 10 Nov. 2003, 8.
After battling for months demands by the national 9/11 commission for the President's Daily
Briefs (PDBs) from the summer of 2001, the White House is now being pressed to see them as
well by Senate investigators looking at pre-Iraq-war intelligence. "White House hard-liners ...
insist any accommodation on PDBs will set a dangerous precedent; one insider calls the
documents the 'crown jewels' of executive privilege." At the same time, "the 9/11 commission is
threatening" to subpoena the PDBs. Thus far, "commissioners have refused to accept an offer to
let only the panel's chair and vice chair, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, review them in
private."

 Eggen, Dan. "Kerrey Replacing Member of 9/11 Panel; Former Senator Taking Seat as Group
Decides Whether to Extend Deadline." Washington Post, 10 Dec. 2003, A14. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]

"Former Nebraska senator Bob Kerrey, who served as the ranking Democrat on the Senate
intelligence committee," was named on 9 December 2003 to "the independent panel investigating
the government's performance before and during the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks." Kerrey
replaces former Georgia senator Max Cleland. See also, Philip Shenon, "Ex-Senator Kerrey Is
Named to Federal 9/11 Commission," New York Times, 10 Dec. 2003.

 Milbank, Dana. "Kean Says 9/11 Attacks Could Have Been Prevented." Washington Post, 19
Dec. 2003, A25. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In remarks broadcast on 17 December 2003, Thomas H. Kean, former Republican governor of
New Jersey and chairman of the commission investigating the 9/11 terrorist attacks, said that he
believes "the strikes could have been prevented."

 Shenon, Philip. "Chief of Sept. 11 Panel Assesses Blame but Holds Off on Higher-Ups." New
York Times, 19 Dec. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Thomas H. Kean, chairman of the federal 9/11 commission, said in a telephone interview on 18
December 2003 that "information long available to the public showed that the attacks could have
been prevented had a group of low- and mid-level government employees at the F.B.I., the
immigration service and elsewhere done their jobs properly." Kean also said "that his
investigators were still studying whether senior Bush administration officials should also share
the blame."

          Return to Commission Table of Contents




                            POST-COLD WAR
                                             2000s
 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
                         States
                                                2004


Materials arranged chronologically.

  Eggen, Dan. "9/11 Panel Faults U.S. For Letting Hijackers In." Washington Post, 27 Jan.
2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a preliminary report released on 26 January 2004 by the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States "[t]he U.S. government fumbled repeated opportunities
to stop many of the men responsible for the ... attacks from entering the country, missing
fraudulent passports and other warning signs that should have attracted greater scrutiny."

 Shenon, Philip. "9/11 Commission Says It Needs More Time to Complete Inquiry." New York
Times, 28 Jan. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The independent commission investigating the 9/11 terror attacks announced on 27 January 2004
that "it was seeking an extension of its deadline to complete the investigation until at least July....
The White House and Republican congressional leaders have said they see no need to extend the
congressionally mandated deadline, now set for May 27."

  Allen, Mike, and Dan Eggen. "Extension of 9/11 Probe Backed; Bush Reverses Stand, Wants
July 26 Deadline." Washington Post, 5 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 4 February 2004, President Bush "agreed to support a two-month extension of the deadline
for completion of an independent investigation of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.... [T]he
White House set a schedule that calls for release of the unclassified version of the report by July
26." An extension must be approved by Congress.

 Eggen, Dan. "9/11 Panel Head Assails Delay: Chairman Warns That Inquiry Might Have to Be
Limited." Washington Post, 20 Feb. 2004, A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The chairman of the independent commission investigating the 9/11 terrorist attacks, former
New Jersey governor Thomas H. Kean, said in an interview on 19 February 2004 that the
commission "will have to consider scaling back the scope of its inquiry and limiting public
hearings unless Congress agrees by next week to give the panel more time to finish its work."
 Risen, James, and Eric Lichtblau. "C.I.A. Was Given Data on Hijacker Long Before 9/11."
New York Times, 24 Feb. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to U.S. and German officials, German intelligence officials in March 1999 gave the
CIA "the first name and telephone number of Marwan al-Shehhi, and asked the Americans to
track him.... After receiving the tip, the C.I.A. decided that 'Marwan' was probably an associate
of Osama bin Laden, but never tracked him down," U.S. officials say. Shehhi "took over the
controls of United Airlines Flight 175, which flew into the south tower of the World Trade
Center."

  Eggen, Dan, and John Mintz. "9/11 Panel Critical of Clinton, Bush; Officials From Both
Administrations Defend Response to Al Qaeda Threat." Washington Post, 24 Mar. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

New reports by the investigative staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States criticize "the U.S. government's failed hunt for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda
terrorist network." The reports find "that both the Clinton and Bush administrations focused too
heavily on diplomacy that did not work and were reluctant to consider aggressive military
action."

  Branigin, William, and Dan Eggen. "Rice Defends Bush Efforts to Combat Terrorism; National
Security Adviser Acknowledges Preparations Were Insufficient." Washington Post, 8 Apr. 2004.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 8 April 2004, national security adviser Condoleezza Rice "delivered a strong defense of the
Bush administration's efforts to combat terrorism" to the commission investigating the 9/11
terrorist attacks. But she also "acknowledged that the preparations of several administrations of
both parties were insufficient." In her opening statement, "Rice told the 10-member panel that
warnings about possible terrorist attacks before Sept. 11 were 'frustratingly vague' and 'there was
no silver bullet that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks.'"

  Milbank, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "Declassified Memo Said Al Qaeda Was in U.S.; Aug. 6
Report to President Warned of Hijacking." Washington Post, 11 Apr. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

An article, entitled "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US," from the 6 August 2001 President's
Daily Brief (PDB) indicates that "President Bush was warned a month before the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks that the FBI had information that terrorists might be preparing for a hijacking in the
United States and might be targeting a building in Lower Manhattan." The article was
declassified on 9 April 2004 "by the White House in response to a request from the independent
commission probing the Sept. 11 attacks." Text of the excerpt is available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3617289.stm.

 Milbank, Dana, and Mike Allen. "Bush Weighs Overhaul of Intelligence Services; Aides Say
He Will Await 9/11 Panel's Suggestions." Washington Post, 13 Apr. 2004. A3. [http://www.
washingtonpost.com]
President Bush said on 12 April 2004 "that he is contemplating a major overhaul of the nation's
intelligence services.... Bush ... said that 'now may be a time to revamp and reform our
intelligence services.' Aides said he is likely to wait for recommendations, scheduled for this
summer, from the independent commission investigating the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001."

 Duffy, Michael. "How To Fix Our Intelligence." Time, 18 Apr. 2004. [http://www.time.com]

Most of the members of the 9/11 commission have "come to think that a thorough overhaul of
the way the nation organizes, collects and distributes intelligence [is] necessary.... Perhaps
because it was the most dysfunctional agency of all, the FBI has done the most to try to heal
itself since 9/11.... Under Director Robert Mueller,... the bureau has made counterterrorism one
of its top three priorities." Acording to FBI experts, "Mueller has the right idea but ... the layers
of agents and bureaucracy beneath him are reluctant to follow his direction.... Despite Mueller's
focus on terrorism, agents are sometimes pulled away to handle traditional criminal cases. A
long-awaited and badly needed computer overhaul is overbudget and behind schedule....

"The commission [has] found that the CIA shares some of the FBI's recessive genes." For
example, "Tenet told his top managers in 1998 that the CIA was 'at war' with bin Laden, but the
word never really filtered down through the agency, much less to other arms of the intelligence
community....

"[S]ome changes are certain, particularly at the FBI." Legislation is being prepared in the House
"that would create ... a 'service within the service' at the FBI to focus on intelligence gathering,
not law enforcement." In addition, "support is growing on the Hill for a plan drafted by two-time
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft that would create a new intelligence czar with budget
and program authority over the CIA and nearly a score of other intelligence units now under the
Pentagon's control."

  Click for reportage on the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, Official Government Edition, dated 22 July 2004.

          Return to Commission Table of Contents




                             POST-COLD WAR
                                             2000s
      Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
              Attacks Upon the United States
                                           22 July 2004

                              Initial Reportage and Reviews


The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
Official Government Edition, dated 22 July 2004, is available at: http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/index.htm; and at: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/911comm.html.
It is also available in print from the Government Printing Office and commercially from
W.W. Norton & Co.

The New York Times offers "complete coverage" of the 9/11 Report, including video and
audio of some of the public testimony to the Commission, at:
http://www.nytimes.com/pages/world/worldspecial5/.

A new version of the commission's report was released on 13 September 2005. This version
includes "recently declassified information." Leslie Miller, "Revised Sept. 11 Panel Report
Released," Associated Press, 13 Sep. 2005.

Materials arranged chronologically.

  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: Norton, 2004.
[pb]

Ignatius, Washington Post, 1 Aug. 2004, finds that "in its meticulous compilation of fact, the
report makes the horrors of 9/11 even more shocking.... The strength of the report is ... in its
narrative power; by telling all the little stories, it reveals the big story in a different way... [T]his
book has a comprehensiveness that seems likely to stand the test of time.... The report's tone is
evenhanded and nonpartisan, but the facts gathered here are devastating for the Bush
administration.... [T]he report is at its weakest when it leaves the narrative behind and offers two
final chapters on 'What to Do' and 'How to Do It'.... [I]ts recommendations are questionable --
and ignore some of the lessons of the report itself."

In a tightly written and superbly argued review, Judge Richard A. Posner, "The 9/11 Report: A
Dissent," New York Times, 29 Aug. 2004, finds that "the 9/11 commission report is an
uncommonly lucid, even riveting, narrative of the attacks, their background and the response to
them.... The prose is free from bureaucratese and, for a consensus statement, the report is
remarkably forthright. Though there could not have been a single author, the style is uniform....
However, the commission's analysis and recommendations are unimpressive....
"Combining an investigation of the attacks with proposals for preventing future attacks is the
same mistake as combining intelligence with policy.... [W]ith the aid of hindsight it is easy to
identify missed opportunities ... to have prevented the attacks, and tempting to leap from that
observation to the conclusion that the failure to prevent them was the result ... of systemic
failures in the nation's intelligence and security apparatus that can be corrected by changing the
apparatus. That is the leap the commission makes, and it is not sustained by the report's
narrative....

"The commission's contention that 'the terrorists exploited deep institutional failings within our
government' is overblown.... The commission's statement that Clinton and Bush had been offered
only a 'narrow and unimaginative menu of options for action' is hindsight wisdom at its most
fatuous. The options considered were varied and imaginative.... But for political or operational
reasons, none was feasible....

"So what to do? One possibility would be to appoint as director a hard-nosed, thick-skinned
manager with a clear mandate for change.... Another would be to acknowledge the F.B.I.'s deep-
rooted incapacity to deal effectively with terrorism, and create a separate domestic intelligence
agency on the model of Britain's Security Service (M.I.5)....

"The report's main proposal ... is for the appointment of a national intelligence director.... [T]o
layer another official on top of the director of central intelligence, one who would be in a
constant turf war with the secretary of defense, is not an appealing solution. Since all executive
power emanates from the White House, the national security adviser and his or her staff should
be able to do the necessary coordinating of the intelligence agencies. That is the traditional
pattern, and it is unlikely to be bettered by a radically new table of organization....

"When the nation experiences a surprise attack, our instinctive reaction is not that we were
surprised by a clever adversary but that we had the wrong strategies or structure and let's change
them and then we'll be safe. Actually, the strategies and structure weren't so bad; they've been
improved; further improvements are likely to have only a marginal effect; and greater dangers
may be gathering of which we are unaware and haven't a clue as to how to prevent."

For Krause, Air & Space Power Journal 18.4 (Winter 2004), "the commission and its report
took the form of a hybrid mix of politics and policy, research and drama.... A strength of the
report is its great detail concerning the execution of the attacks." Nevertheless, "[w]ithout the
proper context and background, the information presented as fact and the recommendations
presented as essential are insufficient to guide America's defense policy and international
affairs."

Mazzafro, I&NS 20.4 (Dec. 2005), notes that only time will tell whether what the 9/11
Commission recommended (and did not recommend) will result in improvements in the way
America conducts its intelligence activities. Nonetheless, the Report "established a new
benchmark of cogency and readability for government reports of national ... importance." To
Clemens, Military Intelligence 31.1 (Jan.-Mar. 2005), "[t]he Commission prepared a
monumental yet readable document that serves not only to help the current U.S. population work
through the tragedy of 9/11, but future generations as well."
  Eggen, Dan. "9/11 Panel Chronicles U.S. Failures: Final Report Faults Two Administrations
and Calls for Broad Reforms." Washington Post, 23 Jul 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The 567-page final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, released on 22 July 2004, concludes that the "U.S. government was utterly unprepared on
Sept. 11, 2001, to protect the American people from al Qaeda terrorists, who outwitted and
outmaneuvered a bureaucracy that had never seriously addressed them as a threat and had never
fathomed the possibility of such a calamitous assault on U.S. soil.... Although it stops short of
blaming President Bush or former president Bill Clinton for the attacks, the document concludes
that both administrations were lackluster in their efforts to combat Islamic terrorism and derides
congressional oversight of the issue as 'dysfunctional.'...

"The 10-member bipartisan panel recommends forming a new Cabinet-level office of national
intelligence and creating a terrorism center that would not only analyze intelligence but also run
its own counterterrorism operations at home and abroad. The commission wants Congress to
completely change the way it governs the intelligence community as well." See also, Dana Priest
and Walter Pincus, "CIA-Like Counterterror Center Urged: New Command Would Report to
Intelligence Chief," Washington Post, 23 Jul. 2004, A21.

 Johnston, David, and Douglas Jehl. "Report Cites Lapses Across Government and 2
Presidencies." New York Times, 23 Jul. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, released on
22 July 2004 says that the "Clinton and Bush administrations failed to grasp the gravity of the
threat from Al Qaeda before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and left counterterrorism efforts to a
disparate collection of uncoordinated, underfinanced and dysfunctional government agencies."
According to the report, "[t]errorism was not the overriding national security concern for the U.S.
government under either the Clinton or the pre 9/11 Bush administration."

 Purdom, Todd S. "Swift Action on Advice From the 9/11 Commission Is Unlikely." New York
Times, 23 Jul. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Achieving consensus on adopting the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States will not be easy. "The partisan wrangling of a presidential
election and the capital's entrenched resistance to change make swift action unlikely.... The
Pentagon and the C.I.A., Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and some in Congress
already oppose the commission's call for a new national intelligence director to supplant some of
the functions of the director of central intelligence."

  Shane, Scott. "Excessive Caution Kept NSA Passive." Baltimore Sun, 23 Jul. 2004.
[http://www.baltimoresun.com]

"The 9/11 Commission Report portrays the National Security Agency before the terrorist attacks
as 'almost obsessive' in protecting its intelligence-gathering methods, passive in following up on
clues and excessively cautious about sharing communications intercepts with other agencies."
 Shenon, Philip. "9/11 Report Calls for a Sweeping Overhaul of Intelligence." New York Times,
23 Jul. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, released on
22 July 2004 "warned that without a historic restructuring of the nation's intelligence agencies
and a new emphasis on diplomacy, the United States would leave itself open to an even more
catastrophic attack.... [T]he 10-member panel offered a detailed proposal for reorganizing the
way the country gathers and shares intelligence."

          Return to Commission Table of Contents




                            POST-COLD WAR
                                           2000s
      Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
              Attacks Upon the United States
                                  Follow-on Reportage

Materials arranged chronologically.

  Eggen, Dan, and Helen Dewar. "Leaders Pick Up Urgency of 9/11 Panel: Congress and Bush
Vow to Speed Reforms." Washington Post, 24 Jul. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 23 July 2004, "House and Senate leaders rushed forward ... with promises to quickly
restructure the nation's intelligence agencies in the wake of damaging findings by the Sept. 11
commission, casting aside earlier doubts that Congress would tackle such complicated and
politically divisive legislation this year. The White House also signaled that President Bush may
consider intelligence reforms before the November elections, contrary to earlier suggestions that
such a move was unlikely."

 Carney, James. "If You Don't Have Time to Read It ...: The 9/11 Report Is a Riveting -- and
Dispiriting -- Read." Time, 25 Jul. 2004. [http://www.time.com]

"The 9/11 Commission Report ... has produced one of the most riveting, disturbing and revealing
accounts of crime, espionage and the inner workings of government ever written.... The narrative
of what happened [on 11 September 2001] and in the months and years leading up to it will
enthrall readers.... The chapters on how the government tracked and dealt with the threat from al-
Qaeda before 9/11 fascinate and dispirit."

 Pincus, Walter. "9/11 Panel's Plan Would Reduce Influence of CIA: Experts Predict
Realignment of Roles." Washington Post, 29 Jul. 2004, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The intelligence reorganization proposed by the Sept. 11 commission would have the overall
effect of sharply reducing the influence of the CIA while increasing the importance of the
Pentagon and giving the White House more direct control over covert operations, according to
assessments by a range of experts including commission and congressional staff members,
legislators and current and former intelligence officials."

  Eggen, Dan, and Walter Pincus. "Key Idea of 9/11 Panel Is Faulted: Commission Seeks
Intelligence Chief in White House." Washington Post, 31 Jul. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 30 July 2004, "[t]he White House and senators from both parties raised objections" to the
recommendation of the 9/11 commission that the war on terrorism should be coordinated by a
single intelligence director working out of the president's office.

 Washington Post. "From the Top . . ." 1 Aug. 2004, B1, B4, B5.

Stansfield Turner, William S. Cohen, John Deutch, Robert C. McFarlane, Phyllis Oakley,
William E. Odom, and John J. Devine react to the 9/11 commission recommendations.

Turner: "We don't need a new layer of bureaucracy. What we do need is a review of what
authority a coordinator of intelligence should have, whether we call him or her an NID or a
DCI.... [A] fixed term is a bad idea."

Cohen: "One of my principal concerns ... is making sure that the NID office, however it is
structured, is prohibited from having any advocacy role on operational matters.... I also suggest
that the director have a fixed term, rather than be subject to the political fortunes of any given
president."

Deutch: "Establishing a cabinet-level position -- a national intelligence director (NID) -- is no
substitute for properly aligning authority with responsibility.... [T]he proposal for a civilian-led
unified joint command for counterterrorism works better for counterterrorism than for managing
intelligence regarding other security issues."

McFarlane: "The military's unified command structure ... is a sound model for the new director's
office.... Giving the new director a fixed term that overlaps administrations ... is the right way to
go to avoid the post's becoming politicized."

Oakley: "With an intelligence czar and a unified intelligence center, the system would lose the
competitiveness that's been an important element of its successes until now.... Not everything
about the present situation is bad."
Odom: "[S]ome [organizational] designs prevent competent incumbents from performing well.
[This is what] the 9/11 commission's design for a new national intelligence director (NID) is sure
to accomplish.... [A] fixed term for the NID ... [i]s a bad idea."

Devine: The "recommendations [of the 9/11 commission] regarding the intelligence community -
- and specifically the CIA -- are potentially destructive.... The establishment of a national
intelligence director and the national counterterrorism center (NCTC) would add a cumbersome
bureaucracy without improving performance on the core issue.... [T]he DCI should be given the
broad authority to direct the priorities and budgets of the other agencies in the intelligence
community."

  Allen, Mike, and Walter Pincus. "Bush Backs Creation of Intelligence Director; President Also
Supports Counterterrorism Center Proposed by 9/11 Panel." Washington Post, 3 Aug. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 2 August 2004, "President Bush called on Congress ... to create a national intelligence
director and announced that he would build a national counterterrorism center.... Bush's
statement embraced the two most significant of the 37 recommendations by the commission that
investigated the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but with significant limitations. Under his plan, the
new intelligence chief would lack the authority over budgets, hiring and firing that the
commission had envisioned." See also, Elisabeth Bumiller, "Intelligence Chief Without Power?
Support Leaves Questions," New York Times, 3 Aug. 2004.

 Dewar, Helen. "Senate Names Intelligence Panel: Frist, Daschle Appoint 22 to Work on 9/11
Recommendations." Washington Post, 25 Aug. 2004, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 24 August 2004, "Senate leaders tapped 22 of the chamber's most powerful members to
undertake the highly sensitive task" of reorganizing its intelligence and homeland security
operations. The report of the Sept. 11 commission "described congressional oversight of
intelligence and counterterrorism operations as 'dysfunctional' and said major changes are
needed."

 Falkenrath, Richard A. "'The 9/11 Commission Report': A Review Essay." International
Security 29 (Winter 2004-2005): 170-190.

Cited in Pillar, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006): 1043/fn.5.

  Miller, Leslie. "Revised Sept. 11 Panel Report Released." Associated Press, 13 Sep. 2005.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 13 September 2005, "[a] new version of the Sept. 11 commission's report ... was released ...
with recently declassified information about terrorist threats and holes in airport security before
the attacks. At the request of the Sept. 11 commissioners, the Bush administration declassified
much, but not all, of the material it had blacked out before turning the report over to the National
Archives in January."
  Pillar, Paul R. "Good Literature and Bad History: The 9/11 Commission's Tale of Strategic
Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (Dec. 2006): 1022-1044.

Clark comment: There are only a few articles among the many dealing with diverse aspects of
intelligence that I wish I had written. This is one of them.

Pillar calls the 9/11 Commission's report a "detailed and well-crafted account of the terrorist
plot" behind the 9/11 attacks. However, he views "other parts of the account" as "not only wrong
but willfully wrong." In addition, there were and are "serious flaws in the commission's
reorganization plan" for U.S. intelligence.

As it related to the performance of the intelligence community, the commission's report "was
advocacy of a particular proposal, and an effort to manipulate public opinion in support of that
proposal." There were "a large number of factual errors and omissions in the commission staff's
draft statement on intelligence." Although the intelligence community had the opportunity to
point out those mistakes, the corrections were largely ignored; and "[m]ost of the errors in the
staff statement on intelligence were repeated in the report." In contrast, the Silberman-Robb
Commission (WMD Commission) was much more willing to listen to and heed "the observations
of officers who were not only experts on the events and subject matter at hand but also at least as
committed as anyone else to trying to make intelligence better."

          Return to Commission Table of Contents




                 INTELLIGENCE REFORM
                                            2004
 Debate over Recommendations of National Commission on Terrorist
                 Attacks Upon the United States

                                     Table of Contents

 August

 September - November

 December

          Return to Reform 2000s Table of Contents
          Return to Reform Table of Contents




                  INTELLIGENCE REFORM
                                            2004
 Debate over Recommendations of National Commission on Terrorist
                 Attacks Upon the United States

                                         August 2004

Materials arranged chronologically.

  Pavitt, James. "Change and the CIA." Washington Post, 6 Aug. 2004, A19.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In this Op-Ed piece, the newly retired DDO argues that "we must avoid a rush to change for the
sake of change.... If we rush to implement sweeping change, especially at a time when the threats
to America are as great or greater than they have been at any time since Sept. 11, we may do
more harm than good.... That we need to do intelligence better is not in question. But we need to
act thoughtfully and not harm U.S. national security in some vain effort to perfect the country's
intelligence capabilities. Intelligence can never be perfect."

Pavitt also notes that "[t]he post-Cold War 'peace dividend' resulted in a 30 percent decline in
funding for the CIA's Directorate of Operations ... and a personnel downsizing of nearly 20
percent."

 Dewar, Helen, and Walter Pincus. "Congress Split on Pace of Intelligence Reforms: Feeling
Pressure From 9/11 Commission, Lawmakers Urge Speed and Caution." Washington Post, 8
Aug. 2004, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Members of Congress are sharply divided over how fast to proceed in drafting legislation to
restructure the nation's intelligence services -- torn between political demands for speed and
caution arising from the complexity of their task. They also appear split over some of the major
recommendations that the national commission charged with investigating the Sept. 11, 2001,
attacks, made in its 567-page report."

 Pincus, Walter. "Critics Question Panel's Study of New Measures: Report Said to Overlook
Changes." Washington Post, 10 Aug. 2004, A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Active and retired intelligence and defense officials are questioning whether the Sept. 11
commission adequately considered the many changes made since the attacks on the World Trade
Center and Pentagon in recommending the U.S. intelligence community be restructured."

  Graham, Bradley. "Intelligence Changes Concern Pentagon; Creation of New Director May
Hurt Military Operations, Officials Warn." Washington Post, 11 Aug. 2004, A19.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on 10 August 2004, Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and Army Gen. Bryan D. Brown, head of the U.S. Special
Operations Command, "warned ... against allowing the proposed creation of a powerful national
intelligence director to obstruct the flow of timely information to troops in the field." However,
"Commission Chairman Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton testified that the
proposed reforms were meant to ensure greater cooperation among the government's 15
intelligence agencies, not interfere with military operations. The Pentagon's intelligence needs,
they said, would be protected by the appointment of a top Pentagon official as a deputy to the
new intelligence director and by keeping 'tactical intelligence' activities in military agencies."

 Cumming, Alfred. The Position of Director of National Intelligence: Issues for Congress.
Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 12 Aug. 2004.
[Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32506.pdf]

This report provides an historical overview of efforts to strengthen centralized authority over the
U.S. Intelligence Community, as well as a summary of the arguments for and against the various
current proposals to create a Director of National Intelligence.

 White, Josh, and Mike Allen. "Rumsfeld: Use Caution in Reform of Intelligence." Washington
Post, 18 Aug. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 17 August 2004, Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld "warned ... that moving hastily to centralize all U.S. intelligence-gathering
efforts under a new national director could spawn confusion while the country is at war and
could prevent vital information from getting to those on the battlefield."

 Eggen, Dan. "GOP Plan Calls for Revamping Intelligence; Pentagon, CIA Would Give Up
Many Duties." Washington Post, 23 Aug. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 22 August 2004, SSCI Chairman Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) "unveiled a radical proposal ... to
remove most of the nation's major intelligence-gathering operations from the CIA and Pentagon
and place them directly under the control of a new national intelligence director.... [T]he CIA's
three main directorates would be torn from the agency and turned into separate entities reporting
to separate directors. The Pentagon would lose control of three of its largest operations as well,
including the ... National Security Agency." See also, Philip Shenon, "A G.O.P. Senator
Proposes a Plan to Split Up C.I.A," New York Times, 23 Aug. 2004.
 Shenon, Philip. "Criticism From Many Quarters Greets Plan to Split C.I.A." New York Times,
24 Aug. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The "proposal by Republican senators to break up the C.I.A. and transfer other intelligence
agencies out of the Pentagon met with an expected rush of strong criticism" from "Republicans
and Democrats alike, and drew a noncommittal response from President Bush." Former DCI
George J. Tenet said that "Senator Roberts's proposal is yet another episode in the mad rush to
rearrange wiring diagrams in an attempt to be seen as doing something." See also, Dan Eggen
and Charles Babington, "Many Are Cool to Intelligence Plan: Bush Expresses Reservations;
Tenet Says GOP Senate Proposal Would 'Gut the CIA,'" Washington Post, 24 Aug. 2004, A3.

 Shenon, Philip. "9/11 Panel Leader Has Praise for Plan to Split C.I.A." New York Times, 25
Aug. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission, Thomas H. Kean said on 24 August 2004 that the
"proposal by several Senate Republicans to break up the C.I.A. and move other intelligence
agencies outside the Pentagon appeared to be a 'constructive alternative' to the commission's
proposals and reflected a growing view that 'the present situation is unacceptable.'"

  Curl, Joseph. "Bush Signs Intelligence Orders." Washington Times, 28 Aug. 2004.
[http://www.washingtontimes.com]

On 27 August, 2004, President Bush signed a executive order granting the DCI "many of the
functions" of the proposed national intelligence director. According to a senior administration
official, the move gives "the CIA director temporary authority over budgetary issues" at NSA,
DIA, and NRO.

Another executive order creates "a new National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) tasked with
enhancing information sharing among intelligence agencies." The DCI "will appoint the NCC
director, with the approval of the president, and oversee the new agency." See also, Dan Eggen,
"Bush Gives CIA Director More Power," Washington Post, 28 Aug. 2004, A1.

  New York Times. "[Editorial:] Beware of Tinkering Lawmakers." 28 Aug. 2004.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"Underpinning the 9/11 commission's call to reform the nation's intelligence services is the
parallel warning that Congress must reform itself. The commission called on Congress to junk its
17-committee jungle of jurisdictional fiefs, which have failed miserably in their responsibility of
oversight.... [A]ny real attempt at oversight means Congress must stop signing blank checks for
the Pentagon, which controls most of the annual $40 biillion intelligence budget in various
secretive ledgers. For openers, the budget should be made public."

  Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Too Much Secrecy." 28 Aug. 2004, A24.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Unnecessary secrecy erodes public confidence in government.... [I]n a post-Sept. 11 world,
needless secrecy is downright dangerous insofar as it prevents the open sharing of information
that ought to have many different pairs of eyes examining and analyzing it. The Sept. 11
commission recently recommended declassifying intelligence community budget information.
This would be a good place to start."

          Return to Reform Debate Table of Contents




                  INTELLIGENCE REFORM
                                             2004
 Debate over Recommendations of National Commission on Terrorist
                 Attacks Upon the United States
                               September-November 2004

Materials arranged chronologically.

  Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Stampede on Intelligence." 2 Sep. 2004, A22.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Many of the recommendations by the Sept. 11 commission ... could tangibly improve the
country's security.... Yet, rather than tackle ... mundane steps..., congressional leaders, joined by
the White House, have begun a stampede to push through the commission's most attention-
grabbing recommendation: a far-reaching and complex reorganization of the national intelligence
community.... [T]his mad rush is occurring in the absence of consensus among leaders of the
intelligence community or outside experts about whether the reorganization is necessary, much
less how it should work.... Congress and the administration would be wise to resist the pressures
of the political season and limit the extent of organizational change."

Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA), "[Letter to the Editor:] No 'Mad Rush' to Reform," Washington Post,
3 Sep. 2004, A18, takes issue with the assertion that "Congress is engaged in a 'mad rush' to
enact intelligence reform 'in the absence of consensus.'"

 Dewar, Helen, and Charles Babington. "Intelligence Retooling on Agenda as Congress
Returns." Washington Post, 8 Sep. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 7 September 2004, a bill to approve all the 9/11 commission's proposals was introduced in
the Senate by John McCain (R-AZ) and Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT). Republican leaders in the
House "dismissed the McCain-Lieberman bill as a 'rubber stamp' of the commission that leaves
little room for congressional ideas. They said a 'leadership bill' will be introduced by the end of
the month, probably by Speaker J. Dennis Hastert" (R-IL). See also, Philip Shenon, "Bipartisan
Bill Offered on 9/11 Panel's Proposals," New York Times, 8 Sep. 2004.

 Bumiller, Elisabeth, and Philip Shenon. "Bush Now Backs Budget Powers in New Spy Post."
New York Times, 9 Sep. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 8 September 2004, participants in a White House meeting with congressional members from
both parties said that President Bush and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice "told them
that the administration wanted the new intelligence director to have authority over the budget of
the national program for collecting and sharing foreign intelligence. Effectively, that would give
the new director control over as much as 75 percent of the estimated $40 billion that the
government spends each year on intelligence, while the Pentagon would control the remaining 25
percent."

See also, Walter Pincus and Dana Milbank, "Bush Plan Draws on Advice of 9/11 Panel: New
Proposal Gives Intelligence Chief More Budget Power," Washington Post, 9 Sep. 2004, A1.

  Babington, Charles. "Hill Wary of Intelligence Oversight Changes: Lawmakers from Both
Parties Resist Recommendations of 9/11 Commission." Washington Post, 12 Sep. 2004, A5.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

 Pincus, Walter. "Support for Intelligence Plan: Powell, Ridge Back One Director but Defer to
Bush on Specifics." Washington Post, 14 Sep. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com}

Appearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on 13 September 2004, Secretary
of State Colin L. Powell said "that creating a new national intelligence director could guard
against the type of faulty intelligence that led him to tell the United Nations in February 2003
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.... In testimony, [both] Powell and Homeland
Security Secretary Tom Ridge expressed support for appointment of a national intelligence chief,
though each said there are still details to be worked out in the approach that will be supported by
Bush."

 Shenon, Philip. "Powell Rejects 9/11 Panel's Plan for Intelligence Office." New York Times, 14
Sep. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 13 September 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell disclosed that the Bush administration
disagrees "with a major recommendation of the Sept. 11 commission and that the president did
not want officials of the C.I.A., the F.B.I. and the Pentagon to serve in the inner circle of a new
national intelligence director.... He said President Bush thought 'that we need clear lines of
authority' and that it would be a mistake to have officials who 'report to two different masters.'"
 Gorman, Siobhan, and Richard E. Cohen. "Hurtling Toward an Intelligence Overhaul."
National Journal, 18 Sep. 2004, 2807-2810.

 Pincus, Walter, and Charles Babington. "Group Calls for Slowing Intelligence Reform."
Washington Post, 22 Sep. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 21 September 2004, "[a] bipartisan group of former senior Cabinet members, senators and
national security officials, including former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George P.
Shultz,... urged Congress not to rush to pass legislation restructuring the intelligence community
based 'on an election timetable.'"

  Best, Richard A., Jr. Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization, 1949-2004. Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 24 Sep. 2004. Available at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf.

"Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly
emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative
branches. The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great
influence of the Departments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major
reorganization plans from within the Intelligence Community itself."

 Babington, Charles. "Intelligence Bill Passed By Senate; House to Consider Differing
Measure." Washington Post, 7 Oct. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The U.S. Senate voted on 6 October 2004 "to revamp the structure of the nation's intelligence
community by creating a national intelligence director, a counterterrorism center and other
agencies." See also, Philip Shenon, "Senate Approves 9/11 Bill at Odds With House Version,"
New York Times, 7 Oct. 2004.

  Babington, Charles, and Helen Dewar. "New Intelligence Chief Backed; But Reform Package
Hinges on Congressional Negotiations." Washington Post, 9 Oct. 2004, A13.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The U.S. House of Representatives voted on 8 October 2004 to create the position of intelligence
director and to adopt "contentious provisions that would make it easier to detain and deport
illegal immigrants.... [T]he House and Senate versions of the intelligence reform legislation
differ in many significant ways." The Senate bill omits many of the immigration and law
enforcement provisions. See also, Brian DeBose, "House Passes Overhaul of Intelligence."
Washington Times, 9 Oct. 2004; and Philip Shenon and Rachel L. Swarns, "House Approves
Intelligence Bill," New York Times, 9 Oct. 2004.

 Gorman, Siobhan, and Sydney J. Freedberg. "Carter and Turner on Intelligence Reform."
National Journal, 9 Oct. 2004, 3080-3082.

 Lipton, Eric. "Spy Chiefs Say Cooperation Should Begin at the Bottom." New York Times, 14
Oct. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 13 October 2004, former DCI George J. Tenet, DIRNSA Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, and
NGA Director Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper Jr. told a symposium sponsored by the United States
Geospatial-Intelligence Foundation "that the way to defend the United States against terrorist
attacks was not to reshuffle the top management but to improve cooperation among rank-and-file
analysts, spies, investigators and military officers."

  Pappalardo, Joe. "Pentagon Balking at Intel Reform Recommendations." National Defense 89
(17 Oct. 2004): 16-17.

 Pincus, Walter. "CIA Chief's Power a Hurdle in Intelligence Reform: Control Over Agency,
Budget Authority Among Issues Still Unresolved by Congress, White House." Washington Post,
17 Oct. 2004, A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Congressional leaders and the White House have yet to reach agreement on two major elements
of intelligence reform legislation -- the powers of the new national intelligence director, and the
specific roles of the new national counterterrorism center.... Porter J. Goss, as a result of
executive orders signed by the president in August, already has much of the power and authority
in his role" as DCI that the new legislation would give to the proposed national intelligence
director.

  Congressional Research Service. H.R. 10 (9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act) and S.
2945 (National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004): A Comparative Analysis. Washington, DC:
Library of Congress, Updated, 21 Oct. 2004. [Available at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32635.pdf]

This report lays out the substantial differences between the two bills that have been passed in the
respective chambers.

  Shenon, Philip. "Delays on 9/11 Bill Are Laid to Pentagon." New York Times, 26 Oct. 2004.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

According to Congressional officials and commission members on 25 October 2004, "[a]
months-long, behind-the-scenes lobbying effort by the Pentagon to water down the powers of a
new national intelligence director is largely responsible for a stalemate threatening to derail
Congressional efforts to enact the major recommendations of the independent Sept. 11
commission." See also, Walter Pincus, "Turf War Stalls Intelligence Bill: Pentagon Allies at
Odds With Advocates of New Director," Washington Post, 27 Oct. 2004, A4.

 Babington, Charles, and Walter Pincus. "Intelligence Overhaul Bill Blocked: House
Conservatives Deal Blow to President, Speaker in Rejecting Compromise." Washington Post, 21
Nov. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Legislation to reshape the U.S. intelligence community "collapsed in the House" on 20
November 2004, "as conservative Republicans refused to embrace a compromise ... they said ...
could reduce military control over battlefield intelligence and failed to crack down on illegal
immigrants." See also, Philip Shenon and Carl Hulse, "House Leadership Blocks Vote on
Intelligence Bill." New York Times, 21 Nov. 2004.

          Return to Reform 2004 - Debate Table of Contents




                  INTELLIGENCE REFORM
                                            2004
 Debate over Recommendations of National Commission on Terrorist
                 Attacks Upon the United States
                                      December 2004

Materials arranged chronologically.

 Coffman, Richard. "Is U.S. Intelligence Headed in the Wrong Direction?" U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 130, no. 12 (Dec. 2004): 2.

"The 9/11 Commission's misguided intelligence recommendations and election-year pressures in
a divided nation have intimidated politicians into supporting ill-conceived but politically popular
measures." Clark comment: Well said!

  Babington, Charles. "House Approves Intelligence Bill: Landmark Measure Passes by 336 to
75 Vote; Senate to Consider Legislation Today." Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 7 December 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives approved "legislation to restructure the
nation's intelligence community, creating a director of national intelligence and a
counterterrorism center.... [S]enators appear ready to pass the measure, send it to President
Bush's desk and adjourn the 108th Congress." See also, Brian DeBose, "House OKs Intelligence
Reform Bill," Washington Times, 8 Dec. 2004; and Philip Shenon, "House Overwhelmingly
Approves Broad Overhaul of Intelligence," New York Times, 8 Dec. 2004.

  Foley, Tom, and Newt Gingrich. "Protecting the Homeland." Washington Times, 8 Dec. 2004.
[http://www.washingtontimes.com]

The two former House speakers argue for establishing a permanent Committee on Homeland
Security. Congress and the President created the DHS "to focus the government's counterterrorist
efforts. Congress must now align itself with the new structure of the executive branch, or it will
lose influence and DHS will lose focused congressional guidance at the most vulnerable early
stages of its development."

  Jehl, Douglas. "The Spymaster Question." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2004.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

"The question is whether the changes [to the U.S. intelligence community] will make much of a
difference in combating terrorism and weapons proliferation.... [E]ven some supporters of the
legislation ... acknowledge their own agnosticism.... [T]here is much that remains uncertain
about the plan, with the legislation itself leaving much to be worked out by the agencies affected.
Among these is the precise division of authority between the intelligence chief and the Pentagon,
which until now has controlled 80 percent of the overall intelligence budget, and how much
authority the intelligence chief will exert on operational matters."

See also, Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, "Director's Control Is a Concern," Washington Post, 8
Dec. 2004, A1.

  Washington Post. "[Editorial:] Reform in Haste." 8 Dec. 2004, A30.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The rhetoric emanating from Capitol Hill ... may have created the impression that ... Congress
[has] worked its way to a sensible plan for reorganizing the U.S. intelligence community. Sadly,
that is far from the truth.... What passed for a debate ... was actually little more than a turf battle
by Pentagon satraps and the congressmen who share their interests on issues that are marginal to
the broad reorganization outlined in the legislation. That shake-up ... may improve the quality of
intelligence information supplied to the president and other key policymakers; we have our
doubts."

 Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Bill Clears Congress: Bush Expected to Approve Post-9/11
Reforms Next Week." Washington Post, 9 Dec. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The U.S. Senate approved the intelligence restructuring bill on 8 December 2004 and "sent it to
the White House, where President Bush is expected to sign it into law next week." See also,
Philip Shenon, "Senate Approves Intelligence Bill," New York Times, 9 Dec. 2004.

 Pinck, Charles T., and Dan Pinck. "The Best Spies Didn't Wear Suits." New York Times, 10
Dec. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

This Op-Ed piece from the a son-father tandem proposes OSS, rather than CIA, as the model for
reorganizing the U.S. intelligence community. Specifically, they argue for a Donovan-like leader
("unconventional warfare requires unconventional people"). Clark comment: Not a bad thought
standing by itself. However, if the Pincks truly believe that Donovan was "above the [political]
infighting," they are reading Donovan differently than he is seen by many others.
 Pincus, Walter. "President Gets to Fill Ranks of New Intelligence Superstructure: Reform
Legislation Is Set to Be Signed Into Law on Friday [17 December 2004]." Washington Post, 16
Dec. 2004, A35. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"President Bush is searching ... for a new director of national intelligence [DNI]..., a principal
deputy DNI, a director of a new national counterterrorism center, and a general counsel to the
DNI, all of whom must be presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation. In addition, the
new chief information officer for the DNI ... will also be a presidential appointee confirmed by
the Senate, under a provision of the fiscal 2005 intelligence authorization bill. Further, the
intelligence reform bill requires the president to name a chairman and a vice chairman of the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Board.... They, too, are subject to a Senate vote."

  Baker, Peter, and Walter Pincus. "Bush Signs Intelligence Reform Bill: President Now Must
Find an Experienced Hand to Guide 15 Agencies." Washington Post, 18 Dec. 2004, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 17 December 2004, President Bush signed into law "the broadest reorganization of the
nation's intelligence community in more than half a century.... [T]he legislation left many
recommendations of the Sept. 11 commission still unfulfilled, including restructuring
congressional oversight as well as broader strategic efforts to prevent proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Nor did it address commission recommendations to rethink U.S. relations with
Saudi Arabia or to expand diplomatic efforts to win friends in the Muslim world."

  Best, Richard A., Jr. Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DoD
Intelligence Agencies. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
21 Dec. 2004. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32515.pdf.

 Shenon, Philip, and Eric Lipton. "9/11 Panel Members to Lobby for a Restructured Congress."
New York Times, 21 Dec. 2004, A20.

 Clark comment: Thus endth the "will they or won't they" debate. Further coverage is available
under the heading of Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.

          Return to Reform 2004 - Debate Table of Contents




                            POST-COLD WAR
                                           2000s
 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
                         States
                                         2005 - 2008


Materials arranged chronologically.

   Carpenter, Ted Galen. "Missed Opportunities: The 9/11 Commission Report and US Foreign
Policy." Mediterranean Quarterly 61, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 52-61.
[http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/16/1/52.pdf]

The "most serious deficiency" in the 9/11 Commission's report "was the failure ... to adequately
address the most crucial foreign policy issues pertaining to the threat that radical Islamic
terrorism poses to the security of the American people."

 Ridgeway, James. The 5 Unanswered Questions about 9/11: What the 9/11 Commission Report
Failed to Tell Us. New York: Seven Stories, 2005.

 Johnson, Loch K. "An Elephant Rolling a Pea." Diplomatic History 30 (Apr. 2006): 327-333.

This is Professor Johnson's critique of the report of the 9/11 Commission.

 Kean, Thomas H., and Lee H. Hamilton. Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11
Commission. New York: Knopf, 2006.

The Publishers Weekly (via Amazon.com) reviewer finds the tone of this work by the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the 9/11 to be "evenhanded and diplomatic.... The authors cogently defend
the compromises they made and swat conspiracy theories about coverups.... [T]his lucid,
absorbing account" of the commission's work is "very timely." Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007),
finds that this book "gives us an unusual glimpse of a government commission at work. The
report card on intelligence work in the final chapter is not one any college student would want,
but it makes clear what the authors think has been and still needs to be done."

  Pillar, Paul R. "Good Literature and Bad History: The 9/11 Commission's Tale of Strategic
Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 6 (Dec. 2006): 1022-1044.

Clark comment: There are only a few articles among the many dealing with diverse aspects of
intelligence that I wish I had written. This is one of them.

Pillar calls the 9/11 Commission's report a "detailed and well-crafted account of the terrorist
plot" behind the 9/11 attacks. However, he views "other parts of the account" as "not only wrong
but willfully wrong." In addition, there were and are "serious flaws in the commission's
reorganization plan" for U.S. intelligence.
As it related to the performance of the intelligence community, the commission's report "was
advocacy of a particular proposal, and an effort to manipulate public opinion in support of that
proposal." There were "a large number of factual errors and omissions in the commission staff's
draft statement on intelligence." Although the intelligence community had the opportunity to
point out those mistakes, the corrections were largely ignored; and "[m]ost of the errors in the
staff statement on intelligence were repeated in the report." In contrast, the Silberman-Robb
Commission (WMD Commission) was much more willing to listen to and heed "the observations
of officers who were not only experts on the events and subject matter at hand but also at least as
committed as anyone else to trying to make intelligence better."

  Theoharis, Athan G. The Quest for Absolute Security: The Failed Relations Among U.S.
Intelligence Agencies. Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 2007.

Keiser, Proceedings 134.3 (Mar. 2008), notes that the author believes "'absolute security' is an
illusory quest." This work "is a most useful historical review." Noting the author's claim that
"increased centralization will only lead to more abuses by the intelligence agencies," Peake,
Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), finds that the book fails in its
effort to make its point.

 Shenon, Philip. The Commission: The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation. New
York: Twelve, 2008. [http://www.cnn.com]

Associated Press, 3 Feb. 2008, reports that this book by a New York Times investigative reporter
includes the information that the 9/11 commission's executive director, Philip Zelikow, "had
closer ties with the White House than publicly disclosed and tried to influence the final report in
ways that the staff often perceived as limiting the Bush administration's responsibility." For
Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), "there is little new" here.
This is a "readable account" of the history of the 9/11 Commission. However, the author "has
avoided taking sides or commenting on the quality of the commission's recommendations, even
in hindsight."

          Return to Commission Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                            2005
Materials arranged chronologically.
  Schmitt, Richard B., and Greg Miller. "FBI in Talks to Extend Reach." Los Angeles Times, 28
Jan. 2005. [http://www.latimes.com]

According to intelligence and congressional sources on 27 January 2005, "[t]he FBI is
significantly expanding its intelligence-gathering activities in the U.S., including stepped-up
efforts to collect and report intelligence on foreign figures and governments, a function that long
has been principally the CIA's domain."

  Burger, Timothy J., and Brian Bennett. "The Russians Are Coming." Time, 30 Jan. 2005.
[http://www.time.com]

Russia continues to field "an army of spooks in the U.S. that is at least equal in number to the
one deployed by the old, much larger Soviet Union." According to senior U.S. intelligence and
law-enforcement officials, "Russia runs more than 100 known spies under official cover in the
U.S.... As the FBI has remade itself in the wake of 9/11 into a counterterrorism agency, the
bureau's long-standing counterintelligence mission has been bumped down a notch on the
priority list. During this time, Russia has been among the U.S.'s rivals most aggressively
exploiting the opening to build up its spying capabilities."

  Priest, Dana. "FBI Pushes to Expand Domain Into CIA's Intelligence Gathering: Common
Ground Not Yet Reached on Agency Roles in U.S." Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2005, A10.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III is pushing to rewrite the rules under which the CIA and FBI
have operated domestically for decades and to assert what he views as the FBI's proper authority
over all domestic intelligence gathering.... [F]or decades, the CIA has been allowed under U.S.
law to recruit foreign officials, business executives and students living in or visiting the United
States to spy for the agency when they return home. CIA case officers working in the National
Resources Division, which has stations in major U.S. cities, routinely debrief, on a voluntary
basis, U.S. business executives and others who work overseas."

 Johnston, David, and Douglas Jehl. "F.B.I.'s Recruiting of Spies Causes Rift with C.I.A." New
York Times, 11 Feb. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Senior government officials have said that a "new effort by the F.B.I. to recruit foreigners in the
United States and use them as spies overseas has created new frictions" with the CIA. According
to senior intelligence officials, there "have been several episodes in which the F.B.I. failed to
inform the C.I.A. fully about its relationships with intelligence sources overseas or practiced
poor tradecraft in its dealing with them."

  Burger, Timothy J., and Brian Bennett. "Negroponte's First Test?" Time, 29 Apr. 2005.
[http://www.time.com]

DNI John Negroponte "already has a major shouting match between the FBI and CIA to referee.
The disagreement is about human spies -- who's in charge of recruiting them inside the U.S. and
then handling them abroad against terrorists and foreign governments."
  Eggen, Dan. "FBI Fails to Transform Itself, Panel Says: Former Sept. 11 Commission 'Taken
Aback' by Personnel, Technology Problems." Washington Post, 7 Jun. 2005, A4.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Former members of the 9/11 commission have "reorganized as a private nonprofit group, the
9/11 Public Discourse Project.... The 10-member bipartisan panel plans to issue a 'report card' on
the government's performance in improving its counterterrorism efforts." On 6 June 2005, the
group convened the "first in a series of hearings to be held this summer." Former Deputy
Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick said that the group "was 'taken aback' by the extent of FBI
failures..., including the FBI's scrapping of an expensive computer upgrade and its continued
difficulty hiring qualified intelligence analysts."

 Eggen, Dan. "Pre-9/11 Missteps By FBI: Detailed: Report Tells of Missed Chances To Find
Hijackers." Washington Post, 10 Jun. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a report by Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine, released on 9 June
2005, the FBI's "inability to detect the Sept. 11, 2001, hijacking plot amounts to a 'significant
failure' ... and was caused in large part by 'widespread and longstanding deficiencies' in the way
the agency handled terrorism and intelligence cases." See also, Eric Lichtblau, "Report Details
F.B.I.'s Failure on 2 Hijackers," New York Times, 10 Jun. 2005.

  Johnston, David. "Antiterror Head Will Help Choose an F.B.I. Official." New York Times, 12
Jun. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The FBI "will allow" DNI John D. Negroponte "to help choose" jointly with FBI Director Robert
S. Mueller III the FBI's associate director for intelligence. The recommendation to appoint a
head of intelligence was contained in the report of the Silberman-Robb presidential commission
on U.S. intelligence in Iraq.

 Johnston, David. "F.B.I. Counterterror Officials Lack Experience, Lawyer Says." New York
Times, 20 Jun. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In a letter to three senators, Stephen M. Kohn, "[a] lawyer who interviewed a number of top
current and former counterterrorism officials at the F.B.I. in connection with a lawsuit against
the bureau," says that "the officials lacked a detailed understanding of terrorism and had been
promoted to top jobs despite having had little experience in the field."

 CNN. "Bush Creates National Security Service." 29 Jun. 2005. [http://www.cnn.com]

On 29 June 2005, "President Bush ... directed the creation of a new National Security Service
within the FBI." The "service will specialize in intelligence and other national security matters
and follow the priorities laid out" bythe DNI. "The service will operate within the FBI and
combine the disparate assets of the Justice Department's counterterrorism, intelligence and
espionage units." See also, Douglas Jehl, "Bush to Create New Unit in F.B.I. for Intelligence,"
New York Times, 30 Jun. 2005.
  Mueller, Robert S., III. "Congressional Testimony: Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, July 27, 2005." Available at:
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller072705.htm.

The FBI Director addresses a range of issues concerning his organization. He begins with the
President's announcement of the creation of an intelligence service within the FBI (National
Security Branch), an amalgam of the Bureau's Directorate of Intelligence, Counterterrorism
Division, and Counterintelligence Division. He also discusses "three areas that directly impact
the success of this new intelligence service: our Language Program, our Information Technology
capabilities, and our ability to recruit, hire, train, and retain the expertise we need to build this
service."

  Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I.'s Translation Backlog Grows." New York Times, 28 Jul. 2005.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 27 July 2005, Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine told the Senate Judiciary
Committee that the FBI's "backlog of untranslated terrorism intelligence doubled last year, and
the time it takes the bureau to hire translators has grown longer."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Picks Chief for New National Security Unit." New York Times, 13 Aug.
2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 12 August 2005, the FBI named Gary M. Bald, currently chief of the FBI's counterterrorism
division, to lead its newly created division on national security. Philip Mudd, currently the
deputy of the CIA's counterterrorism center, will be Bald's deputy.

  Cumming, Alfred, and Todd Masse. Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau
of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, 16 Aug. 2005. Available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33033.pdf.

"This report analyzes the FBI's overall intelligence reform effort, focusing on the implementation
of intelligence reform initiatives in the field. Reform policies designed at FBI Headquarters, with
field input, may be of marginal utility unless they are fully and effectively implemented across
the 56 FBI field offices.... While areas of promise exist, field research indicates that the FBI's
ability to formally harness intelligence collection (including systemic accountability
mechanisms) to analytically identified intelligence gaps, remains nascent." (Italics in original)

 Harris, Francis. "FBI Cracks Down on China's Elusive Army of Amateur Spies."
Telegraph.co.uk, 17 Aug. 2005. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

"The FBI is deploying hundreds of new agents across America to crack down on spying by a
small army of Chinese agents who are stealing information designed to kick-start high-tech
military and business programmes. The new counter-intelligence strategy reflects growing alarm
at the damage being done by spies hidden among the 700,000 Chinese visitors entering the US
each year."

 Eggen, Dan. "FBI Papers Indicate Intelligence Violations: Secret Surveillance Lacked
Oversight." Washington Post, 24 Oct. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to heavily censored documents provided to the Washington Post by the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, which acquired them through an FOIA lawsuit, "[t]he FBI has
conducted clandestine surveillance on some U.S. residents ... without proper paperwork or
oversight." However, FBI officials argued "that none of the cases have involved major violations
and most amount to administrative errors. The officials also said that any information obtained
from improper searches or eavesdropping is quarantined and eventually destroyed."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "Report Finds Cover-Up in an F.B.I. Terror Case." New York Times, 4 Dec.
2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to a draft report of an investigation by the Justice Department inspector general's
office, dated 15 November 2005, FBI officials "mishandled a Florida terror investigation,
falsified documents in the case in an effort to cover repeated missteps and retaliated against an
agent who first complained about the problems."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Watched Activist Groups, New Files Show." New York Times, 20 Dec.
2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to newly available documents, FBI "[c]ounterterrorism agents ... have conducted
numerous surveillance and intelligence-gathering operations that involved, at least indirectly,
groups active in causes as diverse as the environment, animal cruelty and poverty relief."

 Wald, Matthew L. "Widespread Radioactivity Monitoring Is Confirmed." New York Times, 24
Dec. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 23 December 2005, the Justice Department confirmed that "[t]he F.B.I. and the Energy
Department have conducted thousands of searches for radioactive materials at private sites
around the country in the last three years." According to a federal official speaking on condition
of anonymity, "the investigators have visited hundreds of sites in Washington, New York,
Chicago, Detroit, Las Vegas and Seattle on multiple occasions, as well other locations for high-
profile events like the Super Bowl. The surveillance was conducted outdoors, and no warrants
were needed or sought."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                            2006
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Bergman, Lowell, Eric Lichtblau, Scott Shane, and Don Van Natta, Jr. "Spy Agency Data After
Sept. 11 Led F.B.I. to Dead Ends." New York Times, 17 Jan. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]

After the 9/11 attacks, NSA "began sending a steady stream of telephone numbers, e-mail
addresses and names to the F.B.I. in search of terrorists. The stream soon became a flood,
requiring hundreds of agents to check out thousands of tips a month. But virtually all of them,
current and former officials say, led to dead ends or innocent Americans. F.B.I. officials
repeatedly complained to the spy agency that the unfiltered information was swamping
investigators."

  Gertz, Bill. "Intelligence Intransigence." Washington Times, 5 Feb. 2006.
[http://www.washingtontimes.com]

Intelligence officials say that there "has been opposition to restructuring and reform from
bureaucrats within the DNI, CIA and FBI." The FBI "opposed the creation" of a National
Security Branch (NSB), combining "the counterterrorism, counterintelligence and intelligence-
analysis sections." NSB head Gary W. Bald said "FBI agents have accepted other mission
changes through the years, although the new NSB is the latest and most significant." Bald is "a
career criminal investigator with little intelligence experience.... The new NSB is working on a
comprehensive intelligence-training program and has changed its method of training agents as
generalists, instead making two types: specialists devoted to national security work and those
who will do criminal investigative work."

 Lipton, Eric. "Report Sees Confusion Likely in a Sea Attack by Terrorists." New York Times, 4
Apr. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]

A report released on 3 April 2006 by the Department of Justice inspector general warned that
"[p]otentially disastrous confusion could arise during a terrorist attack on a cruise ship or ferry
because of a power struggle" between the FBI and the Coast Guard "over who would be in
charge." After 2001, the Coast Guard, a part of DHS, "created 13 specialized teams based at
major ports around the nation ... [and] trained to respond to a hostage situation or other maritime
terrorism.... The F.B.I., a division of the Justice Department, has 14 of what it calls enhanced
maritime SWAT teams and a separate hostage rescue team trained to respond to maritime
terrorism....

"The government tried to clarify the roles through an October 2005 document called the
Maritime Operational Threat Response." It says the DHS and its agencies, including the Coast
Guard, "take the lead 'for the interdiction of maritime threats in waters where D.H.S. normally
operates,' American ports and coastal waters. The document says the role of the Justice
Department and the F.B.I. is to search for clues to prevent maritime terrorism and, if there is an
attack, to investigate and prosecute. But the new report says the 2005 document has 'not
eliminated the potential for conflict and confusion in the event of a terrorist incident at a
seaport.'"

 Stein, Jeff.

1. "Bureau Pines for Labors of Hercules." CQ Weekly, 1 May 2006, 1156-1157.

"[D]espite spending hundreds of millions of dollars on an upgrade [of its computer system] that
was supposed to allow agents and analysts to share criminal and terrorism files," the FBI still
does not have a system to match the CIA's Hercules system. Nonetheless FBI Director Mueller
"is dedicated to installing state-of-the-art systems, despite lingering problems." But "for the time
being, agents and intelligence analysts are stuck with the present Automated Case Support
system, or ACS, which the inspector general calls 'obsolete.'"

2. "FBI Under the Gun." CQ Weekly, 1 May 2006, 1152-1159.

Gary M. Bald's statement in a legal deposition that substantive expertise is not prerequisite for
working in the FBI's counterterrorism unit opens this critique of where the FBI is in remaking
itself as a domestic intelligence service. Conclusion: "[I]t still has a long way to go"; yet, "[f]or
better or worse, counterterrorism is the FBI's game now.... Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the FBI's
annual budget has shot up more than 80 percent, from $3.1 billion in fiscal 2000 to $5.7 billion
in fiscal 2006.... The FBI's continuing analytical shortcomings have contributed to a number of
well-publicized counterterrorism pratfalls."

3. "New Breed of Journeymen G-Men." CQ Weekly, 1 May 2006, 1155.

"New agents now train side by side with budding counterterror analysts."

  Waterman, Shaun. "Congress: 'Little Progress' on Intelligence Reform." United Press
International, 27 Jul. 2006. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]

A report prepared by HPSCI staff, released on 27 July 2006, says that the DNI "has largely failed
so far to put in place strategic planning and acquisition systems for the 16 U.S. spy agencies he
manages, and 'heavy-handed' efforts to expand his budgetary powers risk provoking a turf war."
The report goes on to say that "much progress has been made in better managing the intelligence
community's analytic resources, and in identifying 'unintended and unwanted overlaps and, more
importantly, critical gaps' in the capabilities of its different agencies. It also praises the changes
made by the FBI in restructuring itself and reorienting its mission more towards domestic
intelligence gathering, while insisting that much more remains to be done."

  Eggen, Dan, and Griff Witte. "The FBI's Upgrade That Wasn't: $170 Million Bought an
Unusable Computer System." Washington Post, 18 Aug. 2006, A1.
[http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The reporters review the failure of the FBI's "Virtual Case File (VCF), a networked system for
tracking criminal cases that was designed to replace the bureau's antiquated paper files.... The
collapse ... stemmed from failures of almost every kind, including poor conception and muddled
execution of the steps needed to make the system work, according to outside reviews and
interviews with people involved in the project....

"Lawmakers and experts have faulted the FBI for its part in the failed project. But less attention
has been paid to the role that the contractor [Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC)]
played in contributing to the problems." An audit "found that the system delivered by SAIC was
so incomplete and unusable that it left the FBI with little choice but to scuttle the effort
altogether."

 Shane, Scott, and Lowell Bergman. "F.B.I. Struggling to Reinvent Itself to Fight Terror." New
York Times, 10 Oct. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"Five years after the Sept. 11 attacks spurred a new mission, F.B.I. culture still respects door-
kicking investigators more than deskbound analysts sifting through tidbits of data. The uneasy
transition into a spy organization has prompted criticism from those who believe that the bureau
cannot competently gather domestic intelligence, and others, including some insiders, who fear
that it can."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                            2007
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Eggen, Dan. "FBI Reports on Missing Laptops and Weapons." Washington Post, 13 Feb. 2007,
A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a report released on 12 February 2007 by Justice Department Inspector General
Glenn A. Fine, the FBI had 160 laptop computers lost or stolen from February 2002 to
September 2005. At least 10 of these contained sensitive or classified information. In the same
timeframe, the Bureau also had 160 missing weapons, including shotguns and submachine guns.
"The results are an improvement on findings in a similar audit in 2002, which reported that 354
weapons and 317 laptops were lost or stolen at the FBI over about two years."
  Johnston, David, and Eric Lipton. "U.S. Report to Fault F.B.I. on Subpoenas." New York Times,
9 Mar. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 9 March 2007, the Justice Department’s inspector general will issue "a scathing report
criticizing how the F.B.I. uses" national security letters "to obtain thousands of telephone,
business and financial records without prior judicial approval.... Under the USA Patriot Act, the
bureau each year has issued more than 20,000" such letters. "The report is said to conclude that
the program lacks effective management, monitoring and reporting procedures." National
security letters "were once used only in espionage and terrorism cases, and then only against
people suspected as agents of a foreign power. With the passage of the Patriot Act, their use was
greatly expanded and was allowed against Americans who were subjects of any investigation.
The law also allowed other agencies like the Homeland Security Department to issue the letters."
See also, John Solomon and Barton Gellman, "Frequent Errors In FBI's Secret Records
Requests: Audit Finds Possible Rule Violations," Washington Post, 9 Mar. 2007, A1.

 Singel, Ryan. "Point, Click ... Eavesdrop: How the FBI Wiretap Net Operates." Wired, 29 Aug.
2007. [http://www.Wired.com]

According to nearly a thousand pages of documents released under FOIA, the FBI's surveillance
system, the Digital Collection System Network or DCSNet, is a "sophisticated, point-and-click
surveillance system that performs instant wiretaps on almost any communications device."
DCSNet "connects FBI wiretapping rooms to switches controlled by traditional land-line
operators, internet-telephony providers and cellular companies. It is far more intricately woven
into the nation's telecom infrastructure than observers suspected."

  Liptak, Adam. "Judge Voids F.B.I. Tool Granted by Patriot Act." New York Times, 7 Sep. 2007.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 6 September 2007, Judge Victor Marrero of the Federal District Court in Manhattan "struck
down the parts of the recently revised USA Patriot Act that authorized" the FBI "to use informal
secret demands called national security letters to compel companies to provide customer
records." He "ruled that the measure violated the First Amendment and the separation of powers
guarantee."

 Bohn, Kevin, and Kelli Arena. "With 300,000 Names on List, Terrorist Center Always on
Alert." CNN, 25 Sep. 2007. [http://www.cnn.com]

At the Terrorist Screening Center, "a highly secure" facility "in a classified location in northern
Virginia," dozens of operations specialists use a "secret terror watch list" to respond to queries
about possible terrorists. Officials said that "the consolidated watch list has 300,000 names....
The center's director, Leonard Boyle, said about 5 percent of the names on the list are U.S.
citizens.... The majority of calls to the center come from border agents, Boyle said.... [T]he 4-
year-old center ... is staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week by FBI personnel, along with
others on loan from various government agencies."
 Shenon, Philip. "C.I.A. Officer Admits Guilt Over Hezbollah Files." New York Times, 14 Nov.
2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 13 November 2007, Nada Nadim Prouty, "[a] Lebanese-born C.I.A. officer" who previously
worked for the FBI, "pleaded guilty ... to charges that she illegally sought classified information"
from FBI computers about the radical Islamic group Hezbollah. Prouty "also confessed that she
had fraudulently obtained American citizenship." She "faces up to 16 years in prison." The plea
agreement "appeared to expose grave flaws in the methods used" by the CIA and FBI "to
conduct background checks."

See also, Michael Isikoff, et al. "Dangerous Liaisons: Nada Prouty Worked for the FBI and CIA.
Now There's Worry She's Not Who They Thought She Was," Newsweek, 26 Nov. 2007, 35; and
Joby Warrick and Dan Eggen. "Ex-FBI Employee's Case Raises New Security Concerns: Sham
Marriage Led to U.S. Citizenship," Washington Post, 14 Nov. 2007, A3.

  Weiner, Tim. "Hoover Planned Mass Jailing in 1950." New York Times, 23 Dec. 2007.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

According to a collection of cold-war documents declassified on 21 December 2007, FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover "had a plan to suspend habeas corpus and imprison some 12,000
Americans he suspected of disloyalty. Hoover sent his plan to the White House on July 7, 1950,
12 days after the Korean War began." The names of the individuals to be arrested "were part of
an index that Hoover had been compiling for years. 'The index now contains approximately
twelve thousand individuals, of which approximately ninety-seven per cent are citizens of the
United States,' he wrote."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                             2008
Materials arranged chronologically.

 CNN. "Phone Companies Cut FBI Wiretaps Due to Unpaid Bills." Associated Press, 10 Jan.
2008. [http://www.cnn.com]

According to an audit by Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine released on 10
January 2008, "[t]elephone companies have cut off FBI wiretaps used to eavesdrop on suspected
criminals because of the bureau's repeated failures to pay phone bills on time." The audit
"blamed the lost connections on the FBI's lax oversight of money used in undercover
investigations. Poor supervision of the program also allowed one agent to steal $25,000, the audit
said." That agent "pleaded guilty [to the theft] in June 2006."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "Error Gave F.B.I. Unauthorized Access to E-Mail." New York Times, 17 Feb.
2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

According to an internal report, a "technical glitch" in 2006 gave the FBI "access to the e-mail
messages from an entire computer network -- perhaps hundreds of accounts or more -- instead of
simply the lone e-mail address that was approved" by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
"as part of a national security investigation.... The records were ultimately destroyed, officials
said."

 Eggen, Dan. "FBI Chief Confirms Misuse of Subpoenas: Security Letters Used to Get Personal
Data." Washington Post, 6 Mar. 2008. A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 5 March 2008, "FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III told senators ... that agents improperly
used" national security letters, a type of administrative subpoena, "to obtain personal data about
Americans until internal reforms were enacted last year."

 Jordan, Lara Jakes. "Audit: FBI Watchlist Data Error-Riddled." Associated Press, 17 Mar.
2008. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

An audit released on 17 March 2008 by "Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine
gave the FBI a mixed review for its process of submitting an estimated 8,000 names and other
data to the terror watchlist that is compiled by U.S. intelligence agencies. It found that the FBI
has proper training and other internal controls in place to help make sure names of suspected
terrorists were accurately added to the list. However, Fine's report rapped the FBI for failing to
consistently pass along newly discovered information about people on the watchlist, or to
remove those who were no longer deemed a threat."

  United Press International. "New FBI Washington Intel Head Named." 19 Mar. 2008.
[http://www.upi.com]

FBI Director Robert Mueller has named Michelle Jupina as the special agent in charge (SAC) of
intelligence for the Washington field office. She replaces Timothy Healy, who will be the new
deputy assistant director of the Directorate of Intelligence at FBI headquarters.

 Nakashima, Ellen. "FBI Backs Off From Secret Order for Data After Lawsuit." Washington
Post, 8 May 2008, D1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The FBI has withdrawn a national security letter (NSL) "seeking the name, address and online
activity of a patron of the Internet Archive after the San Francisco-based digital library filed suit
to block the action." The FBI also agreed to drop the accompanying gag order.
  New York Times. "F.B.I. Says It Obtained Reporters' Phone Records." 9 Aug. 2008, A15 (NY).
[http://www.nytimes.com]

The FBI said on 8 August 2008 that "that it had improperly obtained the phone records of
reporters for The New York Times and The Washington Post in the newspapers' Indonesia
bureaus in 2004.... F.B.I. officials said the incident came to light as part of the continuing review
by the Justice Department inspector general's office into the bureau's improper collection of
telephone records through 'emergency' records demands issued to phone providers."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "New Guidelines Would Give F.B.I. Broader Powers." New York Times, 21
Aug. 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"[F]our Democratic senators told Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey in a letter on [20
August 2008] that they were troubled by what they heard" about a Justice Department plan that
"would loosen restrictions" on the FBI "to allow agents to open a national security or criminal
investigation against someone without any clear basis for suspicion.... The Justice Department
said ... that in light of requests from members of Congress for more information," Mukasey
"would agree not to sign the new guidelines before a Sept. 17 Congressional hearing."

  Lichtblau, Eric. "Terror Plan Would Give F.B.I. More Power." New York Times, 13 Sep. 2008.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

On 12 September 2008, the Justice Department announced "a plan to expand the tools the
Federal Bureau of Investigation can use to investigate suspicions of terrorism inside the United
States, even without any direct evidence of wrongdoing.... Under existing guidelines, F.B.I.
agents cannot use certain investigative tools in conducting so-called threat assessments as a
precursor to a preliminary or full inquiry. The revisions would allow agents to conduct public
surveillance of someone, do 'pretext' interviews -- pose as someone other than an agent or
disguise the purpose of the questions -- or send in an undercover source to gather information."

  Gorman, Siobhan, and Evan Perez. "FBI Wrestling With Remake as Intelligence Agency:
Critics Say Bureau Needs Culture Shift; Director to Testify." Wall Street Journal, 16 Sep. 2008.
[http://online.wsj.com]

According to documents reviewed by the Wall Street Journal, an internal study performed last
year found a number of weak points in the FBI's efforts to "remak[e] itself into a domestic-
intelligence organization." These include "an insufficient number and quality of intelligence
sources; a lack of understanding of what information should be collected; intelligence officers
with limited awareness of their local areas; and quality-control problems with analysis.... FBI
officials said they are implementing fixes to address the problems."

 Gertz, Bill. "Ex-Official Reports Counterintelligence Is Weak." Washington Times, 30 Sep.
2008. [http://www.washtimes.com]

In a report made public on 29 September 2008, former National Counterintelligence Executive
(NCIX) Michelle Van Cleave said that "U.S. government efforts to counter foreign spies remains
fragmented and weak.... [T]he FBI, CIA and other federal counterspy units lack both a needed
focus and strategy for thwarting the growing foreign intelligence threat."

Written for "the private Project on National Security Reform, a nonprofit and nonpartisan
group," the report notes that while "the FBI is skilled at enforcing counterespionage and related
laws," it is not 'organized, trained or equipped to collect or analyze intelligence on the extensive
foreign intelligence presence in the United States beyond those personnel here under official or
journalistic cover, or to develop or execute offensive operations to mislead, deny or otherwise
exploit foreign intelligence activities against the United States.'"

 Lichtblau, Eric, David Johnston, and Ron Nixon. "F.B.I. Struggles to Handle Financial Fraud
Cases." New York Times, 19 Oct. 2008. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The FBI "is struggling to find enough agents and resources to investigate criminal wrongdoing
tied to the country's economic crisis.... The bureau slashed its criminal investigative work force
to expand its national security role after the Sept. 11 attacks, shifting more than 1,800 agents, or
nearly one-third of all agents in criminal programs, to terrorism and intelligence duties. Current
and former officials say the cutbacks have left the bureau seriously exposed in investigating
areas like white-collar crime, which has taken on urgent importance in recent weeks because of
the nation's economic woes."

  CNN. "U.S. Policymakers Mull Creation of Domestic Intelligence Agency." 20 Oct. 2008.
[http://www.cnn.com]

On 20 October 2008, "at the request of Congress, the RAND Corporation outlined the pros and
cons of establishing a domestic intelligence agency. It also discussed different ways to organize a
new entity, either as part of an existing department or as a new agency."

 Mueller, Robert S., III. "Protecting the United States from Terrorism and Crime...It Always
Begins with Intelligence." Intelligencer 16, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 27-30.

Based on a speech given to the International Association of Chiefs of Police in San Diego, CA,
10 November 2008, the FBI Director focuses on partnerships with local law enforcement and
"tools," including geospatial mapping, task forces, and COMPSTAT.

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                      2003 - 2004
Materials arranged chronologically.

 Associated Press. "FBI Planning to Add Offices Overseas." Washington Post, 1 Apr. 2003,
A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In a $47 million expansion going to Congress, the FBI would open offices in Sarajevo, Jakarta,
Tashkent, Kabul, Belgrade, and "other foreign capitals as part of a decade-long overseas
expansion.... The blueprint also calls for adding 30 new FBI personnel, including 17 agents, to
the nearly 200 stationed at 46 locations around the world.... Earlier this year, Congress agreed to
give the FBI money to open new legat [legal attaché] offices" in Abu Dhabi, Kuala Lumpur,
Tunis, Sanaa, and Tbilisi. "They will be in operation in coming months."

  Eggen, Dan. "FBI Picks Another Outsider for Key Post: NSA Official Will Oversee
Intelligence." Washington Post, 4 Apr. 2003, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 3 April 2003, the FBI announced the appointment of Maureen S. Baginski, currently signals
intelligence director at the NSA's Central Security Service, as the bureau's executive assistant
director for intelligence. Steven C. McCraw was named to head the FBI's Office of Intelligence
under Baginski. McCraw is a 20-year FBI veteran and currently heads the San Antonio field
office.

 Ragavan, Chitra, et al. "Special Report: Mueller's Mandate." U.S. News & World Report, 26
May 2003, 18-25.

The mandate of FBI Director Robert Mueller III is essentially to prevent terrorist attacks like
those on 9/11. If he can fulfill this mandate, it "will represent the most sweeping structural and
philosophical shift in the FBI's history. In a series of exclusive interviews with U.S. News,
Mueller and his top aides detailed the steps they have begun to take. The changes, they say, mean
transforming an investigative agency into an intelligence-gathering service and reorienting
virtually everything about the FBI's institutional culture and its traditional operating procedures."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Is Reshaping Itself but Stretched Thin, Reports Say." New York Times,
19 Jun. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Separate studies by the General Accounting Office and the National Academy of Public
Administration have concluded that the FBI "has made strong progress in reinventing itself since
the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but doubts remain over its ability to balance terrorism
investigations with its traditional crime-fighting duties." Together, the reports represent "the
most comprehensive progress report to date" on the FBI's "efforts to remake itself into a front
line of defense against terrorism."

 Van Natta, Don. "Intelligence Critics Urge U.S. to Look to British Spy Agency." New York
Times, 26 Jul. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The joint House-Senate committee report on the 9/11 terrorist attacks "have caused some critics
to renew demands" for creation of "a domestic intelligence agency whose primary mission would
be countering the terrorist threat at home." Sen. John Edwards (D-NC) and others "have said
such an agency should be modeled after MI5.... The movement ... to create an organization like
MI5 gained momentum in November [2002] after an advisory group led by [former Virginia
governor] James S. Gilmore III ... recommended that a new agency should take over domestic
intelligence gathering."

 Shannon, Elaine, Timothy J. Burger, and Massimo Calabresi. "FBI Sets Up Shop in Yemen."
Time, 9 Aug. 2003. [http://www.time.com]

The Yemeni government "has quietly allowed the FBI to open an office in its capital city, San'a."
Along with the CIA and the U.S. military, the FBI "is urgently trying to disrupt efforts" by al-
Qaeda fighters "to reconstitute command and control structures in parts of rural Yemen
controlled by clans hostile to the government in San'a and sympathetic to Osama Bin Laden."
[Clark comment: And the military and CIA cannot do this because they lack the FBI's
experience overseas?]

 Hitz, Frederick P., and Brian J. Weiss. "Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots in the War
on Terrorism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring
2004): 1-41.

"For cooperation to succeed,... both law enforcement and intelligence agencies must become
more open and more flexible, and understand that, in an age of abundant information, their value
is not the information they hold, but their analysis and use of that information.... [T]he U.S.
needs to organize itself, not against a specific threat, but on a reasonable division of labor."

 Cumming, Alfred, and Todd Masse. FBI Intelligence Reform Since September 11, 2001: Issues
and Options for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of
Congress, 6 Apr. 2004. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32336.html.

In response to criticism from the Congressional Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, the FBI is "attempting to transform itself into an agency that can prevent
terrorist acts, rather than react to them as crimes. The major component of this effort is
restructuring and upgrading of its various intelligence support units into a formal and integrated
intelligence program, which includes the adoption of new operational practices, and the
improvement of its information technology."

 Duffy, Michael. "How To Fix Our Intelligence." Time, 18 Apr. 2004. [http://www.time.com]

Most of the members of the 9/11 commission have "come to think that a thorough overhaul of
the way the nation organizes, collects and distributes intelligence [is] necessary.... Perhaps
because it was the most dysfunctional agency of all, the FBI has done the most to try to heal
itself since 9/11.... Under Director Robert Mueller,... the bureau has made counterterrorism one
of its top three priorities." Acording to FBI experts, "Mueller has the right idea but ... the layers
of agents and bureaucracy beneath him are reluctant to follow his direction.... Despite Mueller's
focus on terrorism, agents are sometimes pulled away to handle traditional criminal cases. A
long-awaited and badly needed computer overhaul is overbudget and behind schedule....
"The commission [has] found that the CIA shares some of the FBI's recessive genes." For
example, "Tenet told his top managers in 1998 that the CIA was 'at war' with bin Laden, but the
word never really filtered down through the agency, much less to other arms of the intelligence
community....

"[S]ome changes are certain, particularly at the FBI." Legislation is being prepared in the House
"that would create ... a 'service within the service' at the FBI to focus on intelligence gathering,
not law enforcement." In addition, "support is growing on the Hill for a plan drafted by two-time
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft that would create a new intelligence czar with budget
and program authority over the CIA and nearly a score of other intelligence units now under the
Pentagon's control."

 Rowley, Coleen. "What the FBI Needs -- and Doesn't Need." Time, 26 Apr. 2004, 33.

 Eggen, Dan. "Intelligence Unit for FBI Is Proposed; Service Would Be Entity In Agency,
Mueller Says." Washington Post, 4 Jun. 2004, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 3 June 2004, at a hearing of the House Appropriations subcommittee on commerce, "FBI
Director Robert S. Mueller III ... proposed the creation of an intelligence service within the FBI
that would have its own director and budget and would operate separately from other parts of the
law enforcement agency." The move "is aimed in large part at heading off proposals that would
strip the bureau of its responsibilities for intelligence and espionage investigations in the United
States and turn them over to a new agency akin to Britain's domestic intelligence service."

 Lichtblau, Eric. "F.B.I. Said to Lag on Translations of Terror Tapes." New York Times, 28 Sep.
2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The summary of a Justice Department investigation, released on 27 September 2004 by FBI
Inspector General Glenn A. Fine, says that "more than 120,000 hours of potentially valuable
terrorism-related recordings have not yet been translated by linguists" at the FBI. In addition,
"computer problems may have led the bureau to systematically erase some Qaeda recordings."

 Walsh, Elsa. "Learning to Spy: Can Maureen Baginski Save the F.B.I.?" Intelligencer 14, no. 2
(Winter-Spring 2005): 31-38. Reprinted from New Yorker, 8 Nov. 2004, 96-103.

In May 2003, Maureen A. Baginski left NSA to run the FBI's new Office of Intelligence. She
had been head of Signals Intelligence at NSA since October 2000, in which position she seems to
have been a significant change-agent. The article looks at some of the problems Baginski has
sought to address at the FBI, and quotes from Philip D. Zelikow, John MacGaffin, and others on
some of the difficulties still facing the Bureau as an intelligence organization.

  Mueller, Robert S., III. "The FBI: Improving Intelligence for a Safer America." Vital Speeches
of the Day 71 (1 Dec. 2004): 106-109.

FBI Director.
          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                                             2009
Materials arranged chronologically.

  Lichtblau, Eric. "Justice Dept. Finds Flaws in F.B.I. Terror List." New York Times, 7 May 2009.
[http://www.nytimes.com]

A report by Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine, released on 6 May 2009, says
that the FBI "has incorrectly kept nearly 24,000 people on a terrorist watch list on the basis of
outdated or sometimes irrelevant information, while missing people with genuine ties to
terrorism who should have been on the list.... By the beginning of 2009, the report said, this
consolidated government watch list comprised about 400,000 people, recorded as 1.1 million
names and aliases, an exponential growth from the days before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001."

 Meyer, Josh. "FBI Planning a Bigger Role in Terrorism Fight." Los Angeles Times, 28 May
2009. [http://www.latimes.com]

Under the still developing "global justice" initiative, the FBI and Justice Department will
"significantly expand their role in global counter-terrorism operations, part of a U.S. policy shift
that will replace a CIA-dominated system of clandestine detentions and interrogations with one
built around transparent investigations and prosecutions.... The approach effectively reverses a
mainstay of the Bush administration's war on terrorism, in which global counter-terrorism was
treated primarily as an intelligence and military problem, not a law enforcement one."

  Blood, Michael R. "FBI Director Defends Use of Informants in Mosques." Associated Press, 8
Jun. 2009. [http://www.ap.com]

On 8 June 2009, FBI Director Robert Mueller "defended the agency's use of informants within
U.S. mosques, despite complaints from Muslim organizations that worshippers and clerics are
being targeted instead of possible terrorists."

 Schmitt, Eric. "F.B.I. Agents' Role Is Transformed by Terror Fight." New York Times, 19 Aug.
2009. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The author spent two days with a 21-member FBI threat squad, known as Counterterrorism 6, or
CT-6, based out of Norwalk, CA. The FBI "now ranks fighting terrorism as its No. 1 priority. It
has doubled the number of agents assigned to counterterrorism duties to roughly 5,000 people,
and has created new squads across the country that focus more on deterring and disrupting
terrorism than on solving crimes. But the manpower costs of this focus are steep, and the benefits
not always clear.... The threat squad here is just one part of the F.B.I.'s sprawling Los Angeles
field office. About 30 percent of the office's 750 agents work on terrorism cases, including Al
Qaeda, Hamas, terrorism financing and animal rights extremists."

 Savage, Charles. "F.B.I. Is Slow to Translate Intelligence, Report Says." New York Times, 27
Oct. 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com]

A report issued on 26 October 2009 by the office of Justice Department Inspector General Glenn
A. Fine says that the FBI's "collection of wiretapped phone calls and intercepted e-mail has been
soaring in recent years, but the bureau is failing to review 'significant amounts' of such material
partly for lack of translators." In a statement, the FBI "said that it was working to reduce its
backlog of unreviewed audio recordings and electronic documents, and that it continued seeking
to hire or contract with more linguists."

 Savage, Charles. "Loosening of F.B.I. Rules Stirs Privacy Concerns." New York Times, 29 Oct.
2009. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Released in response to a Freedom of Information lawsuit, the FBI's "Domestic Investigations
and Operations Guide" has "opened the widest window yet onto how agents have been given
greater power in the post-Sept. 11 era.... One section lays out a low threshold to start
investigating a person or group as a potential security threat. Another allows agents to use
ethnicity or religion as a factor -- as long as it is not the only one -- when selecting subjects for
scrutiny....

"The manual authorizes agents to open an 'assessment' to 'proactively' seek information about
whether people or organizations are involved in national security threats. Agents may begin such
assessments against a target without a particular factual justification.... Assessments permit
agents to use potentially intrusive techniques, like sending confidential informants to infiltrate
organizations and following and photographing targets in public. F.B.I. agents previously had
similar powers when looking for potential criminal activity. But until the recent changes, greater
justification was required to use the powers in national security investigations because they
receive less judicial oversight....

"When selecting targets, agents are permitted to consider political speech or religion as one
criterion. The manual tells agents not to engage in racial profiling, but it authorizes them to take
into account 'specific and relevant ethnic behavior' and to 'identify locations of concentrated
ethnic communities.'"

 Johnson, Carrie. "FBI to Probe Panels that Reviewed E-mails from Alleged Fort Hood
Gunman." Washington Post, 9 Dec. 2009. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The FBI announced on 8 December 2009 that William H. Webster, former FBI director and DCI,
will conduct "an independent investigation into the policies and actions of two bureau task forces
that reviewed e-mails from the alleged Fort Hood shooter [Army Maj. Nidal M. Hasan] in the
months before the Nov. 5 massacre at the Army base." Webster "will have the authority to make
recommendations about FBI guidelines for national security probes and possible changes to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

          Return to FBI 2000s Table of Contents




FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                            Domestic Security
                                   Table of Contents

The "domestic security" topic area has not been developed in detail for this bibliography.
Related entries can be found in the general "counterintelligence" and "FBI" files, as well
as under such headings as "Constitutional/Legal" and "U.S. Spy Cases."

Readers with a strong interest in the domestic security area are referred to Neal H.
Petersen, "Chapter 5. Counterintelligence, Internal Security, 1945-1990. F. Internal
Security and Domestic Intelligence, 1945-1990," American Intelligence 1775-1990: A
Bibliographical Guide (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1992). Petersen lists 233 entries
under the headings "1. Domestic Intelligence and Civil Liberties - General," "2.
Government Loyalty and Security Programs," "3. Vietnam Era," and "4. Domestic
Intelligence Since the Vietnam War." Some of these listings are relatively broad based;
others cover specific incidents.

 To 2000s

 CISPES Affair

 2000s:

 2000 - 2005

 2006 - 2007

 2008 - 2009

 2010s
 Miscellaneous: Anti-Communism; Loyalty Programs

         Return to FBI Table of Contents



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
                             Topical Materials
Included here:

1. Legal and Constitutional Issues

2. Waco and Ruby Ridge

1. Legal and Constitutional Issues

  Berman, Jerry J. "FBI Charter Legislation: The Case for Prohibiting Domestic Intelligence
Investigations." University of Detroit Journal of Urban Law 55 (Summer 1978): 1041-1078.
[Petersen]

 Blackstock, Paul W. "Counterintelligence and the Constitutional Order." Society 12 (Mar./Apr.
1975): 8-10. [Petersen]

 Charns, Alexander. Cloak and Gavel: FBI Wiretaps, Bugs, Informers, and the Supreme Court.
Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1992.

       Surveillant 2.6: This book is part of an "ongoing project" for the North Carolina attorney,
       "whose writing on the FBI penetration of the Supreme Court first appeared on December
       3, 1989 in a long piece in The Washington Post. His early research also aired in an
       independently syndicated TV program titled Now It Can Be Told on September 16,
       1991."

  Olmstead, Katherine S. Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigation
of the CIA and FBI. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996. JK468I6O45

According to Choice, May 1996, this book focuses on the Church and Pike "committee
investigations of CIA abuses (less extensively those of the FBI) in the wake of Watergate....
[Olmstead] applauds Pike more than Church ... and laments that, in the final analysis, the
revelations produced few meaningful reforms. Her judgments are controversial, and some will
argue naive, but they warrant careful consideration."
Marshall, JAH 83.4, finds Olmstead's work "perceptive and gracefully written." Although it
"suffers from a shortage of available archival sources" and "could have discussed more deeply
the foreign policy context of the hearings' ultimate demise," this book "is the most
comprehensive account" of the congressional investigations.

 Salzburg, Stephen. "National Security and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments." In National
Security Law, eds. John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson, and Robert F. Turner, 1001-1032.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1990.

 Sherman, Lawrence W. "Chartering the FBI." Criminal Law Bulletin 16 (Jan.-Feb. 1980): 53-
58. [Petersen]



2. Waco and Ruby Ridge

 Hancock, Lee. "Delta Force Had Active Role in Raid, Ex-CIA Officer Told: Pentagon Won't
Discuss Army Commando Unit." Dallas Morning News, 27 Aug. 1999. [http://www.
dallasnews.com]

A former CIA officer, Gene Cullen, told The Dallas Morning News on 26 August 1999 that "he
learned from Delta Force commandos that members of the secret Army unit were 'present, up
front and close' in helping the FBI in the final tear-gas assault on the Branch Davidian
compound." Cullen said that "he heard the detailed accounts of the military's active involvement
from 'three or four' anti-terrorist Delta commandos as he worked with them on an overseas
assignment in 1993."

 Walter, Jess. Every Knee Shall Bow: The Truth and Tragedy of Ruby Ridge and the Randy
Weaver Family. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

       Surveillant 4.2: An award-winning journalist tells the "highly charged and complex story
       of the Weaver family and the tragic deaths at Ruby Ridge."

 Wright, Stuart A. Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch Dividian Conflict.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.

       Surveillant 4.2: This work presents a "detailed analysis of the events surrounding the
       confrontation in Waco.... Contributors to this volume ... consider the legal and
       constitutional implications of the government's actions."

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