Glossary
Act alternative: An act alternative is any of the mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive act‐tokens that are available to a given agent at a given time. Act-consequentialism (AC)—a.k.a. rational-desire teleology: Actconsequentialism is the view that an act’s deontic status is determined by the agent’s reasons for and against preferring its outcome to those of the available alternatives, such that, if S is morally required to perform x, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about, S has most (indeed, decisive) reason to desire that x’s outcome obtains. Act-sequence: An act-sequence is a continuous series of asynchronous acts (types or tokens) performed consecutively over a given interval of time. An example would be where a subject, S, performed a2 at t1, a5 at t2, and a8 at t3. I’ll use α1, α2, …, αn to designate act-sequences. Act-set: An act-set is a set of acts (types or tokens) that are all jointly performable by a single agent. Such a set could consist in a single act, a single act-sequence, or a collection of acts and/or act-sequences. I’ll use A1, A2, …, An to designate act-sets. Act-token: An act-token is a particular act performed by a particular agent at a particular time. Act-tokens are performable at most once and are not the sort of thing that can be instantiated. I’ll use a1, a2, …, an to designate act-tokens. Act-type: An act-type is universal that can, in general, be instantiated by a number of distinct act-tokens. I’ll use A1, A2, …, An to designate act-types. Actualism: Whether or not S ought to ϕ depends on what S would simultaneously and subsequently do if S were to ϕ, and not on what S could simultaneously and subsequently do if S were to ϕ. (Cf. possibilism.)
Last Updated: 9/30/09. This is only a draft and undoubtedly contains many errors. Comments and citations are welcome, but please do not quote without permission.
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Actual outcome: The actual outcome associated with S’s ϕ-ing is the outcome that would obtain were S to ϕ—that is, the possible world that would be actual were S to ϕ. This is the possible world that would obtain were S to ϕ given what S would in fact simultaneously and subsequently do. (Cf. possible outcome.) Agent-centered constraints: An agent-centered constraint is a constraint on maximizing the good that it would be wrong to infringe even in some circumstances where doing so would minimize comparable infringements of that constraint. (Note, though, that constraints don’t have to be absolute. It may be permissible to infringe upon a constraint if enough good is at stake, and it may be permissible to infringe upon a constraint if doing so would prevent a sufficient number of comparable infringements of that constraint.) There are two types of agent-centered constraints: agentcentered restrictions and special obligations. Agent-centered options: An agent-centered option is a moral option either to act so as to make things better overall but worse for oneself (or others) or to act so as to make things better for oneself (or others) but worse overall. These options provide agents with the freedom to give their own interests more or less weight than they have from the impersonal perspective. There are two types of agent-centered options: agent-favoring options and agentsacrificing options. Agent-centered restrictions: An agent-centered restriction is a type of constraint. There is an agent-centered restriction against performing a certain act-type (such as, murder) if and only if agents are prohibited from performing that act-type even in some circumstances in which performing that act-type is the only way to minimize comparable commissions of that act-type. Agent-favoring options: An agent-favoring option is a type of agentcentered option. Agent-favoring options are moral options either to promote one’s own interests or to sacrifice one’s own interests for the sake of doing more to promote the overall good. Agent-sacrificing options: An agent-sacrificing option is a type of agentcentered option. Agent-sacrificing options are moral options either to maximize the impersonal good or to sacrifice one’s own self-interests for
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the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others even when doing so is not what’s best overall, as where the extent of one’s own self-sacrifice would exceed the extent of the benefits thereby bestowed upon others. Aggregate utility: The aggregate utility produced by an act is the sum of all the utility it produces minus the sum of all the disutility it produces. Asymmetric relation: A relation, R, is asymmetric just in case: if xRy, then ~yRx. Available: Roughly speaking, ϕ is available to S if and only if S can perform ϕ. The basic belief: In most typical choice situations, the relevant reasons do not require performing some particular act alternative, but instead permit performing any of numerous act alternatives. Best act: An act is the best act available to an agent if and only if it’s the act that she has most reason to perform. Cf. morally best act. Best future course of action (FCA): The best FCAs are those whose outcomes the agent has both maximal requiring reason and maximal reason, all things considered, to desire. Better for: For all subjects S and all states of affairs p and q, it is better for S that p is the case than that q is the case if and only if the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer its being the case that p to its being the case that q for S’s sake is weightier than the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer its being the case that q to its being the case that p for S’s sake. Better K: For all kinds K and all things A and B of kind K, A is a better K than B is if and only if the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer A to B when selecting a K is weightier than the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer B to A when selecting a K. Better that: For all states of affairs p and q, it is better that p is the case than that q is the case if and only if the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer its being the case that p to its being the case that q is weightier than the set of all the right kind of reasons to prefer its being the case that q to its being the case that p.
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Blameworthy: S is blameworthy for performing x if and only if it is appropriate for S to feel guilt about having performed x and appropriate for others to feel indignation in response to S’s having performed x and, if they were thereby wronged, to resent S for having performed x. Can: Roughly speaking, S can perform some set of actions, Ai, if and only if, for each act in Ai, it’s true that S would perform it if S formed the intention to perform it. Choice-worthy: One future course of action (‚FCA‛ for short) is, for S, more choice-worthy than another if and only if S has more reason, all things considered, to choose it over the other. Commonsense Consequentialism (CSC): (a) S is, as of ti, morally permitted to perform some set of actions, Ai, just when, and because, there is a morally permissible FCA available to S at ti in which S performs Ai. (b) A specific future course of action, FCAi, is morally permissible just when, and because, its outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any other available alternative FCA. (c) FCAi’s outcome is not, on S’s evaluative ranking, outranked by that of any other available alternative FCA just when, and because, there is no available alternative FCA whose outcome S has both more moral reason and more reason, all things considered, to want to obtain. Consequentialism: See act-consequentialism. Consequentialist prudence: This is the view that S’s performing x is prudent if and only if it maximizes S’s utility. Consequentialize: To consequentialize a nonconsequentialist theory is to construct a substantive version of act-consequentialism that is deontically equivalent to that nonconsequentialist theory. Constraining right: By definition, a potential victim, V, has a constraining right against being ϕ-ed (e.g., murdered) if and only if V has a right not to be ϕ-ed even in some circumstances where the agent’s ϕ-ing V would minimize comparable commissions of ϕ by herself or by others. Constraint: See agent-centered constraint.
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Counter: To say that the reasons to ϕ successfully counter the reasons to ψ is to say that the reasons to ϕ prevent the reasons to ψ from being decisive by, say, equaling, outweighing, undermining, or silencing them. Another possibility is that the reasons to ϕ are incommensurable with the reasons to ψ such that there is sufficient reason both to ϕ and to ψ. Counterfactual determinism: This is the view that for each act available to the agent there is some determinate fact as to what the world would be like were the agent to perform that act. Decisive reason: S has decisive reason to ϕ if and only if S’s reasons are such as to make S objectively rationally required to ϕ. In other words, S has decisive reason to ϕ if and only if S does not have sufficient reason to ~ϕ. Defeat: To say that the reasons that favor ϕ-ing defeat the reasons that favor ~ϕ-ing is to say that the reasons that favor ϕ-ing prevail over the reasons that favor ~ϕ-ing such that the agent has decisive reason to ϕ. Deontically equivalent: Two theories are deontically equivalent if and only if they yield the exact same set of deontic verdicts in every possible world, such that, for any deontic predicate (such as permissible, impermissible, obligatory, or supererogatory), both theories are in perfect agreement as to the set of actions that are in the extension of that predicate. Deontic equivalence thesis (DET): This is the thesis that, for any remotely plausible nonconsequentialist theory, there is a version of consequentialism that is deontically equivalent to it. Deontic status: All acts have one of the following two deontic statuses: (1) permissible or (2) impermissible. All permissible acts have one of the following two deontic statuses: (1.1) optional or (1.2) obligatory. And all optional acts have one of the following two deontic statuses: (1.1.1) merely permissible or (1.1.2) supererogatory. Deontological prudence: This is the view that there are certain acts that are intrinsically imprudent such that it would be imprudent to perform them even if doing so is clearly what would best promote the agent’s utility over time.
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Deontology: A moral theory is deontological if and only if it is nonconsequentialist and includes at least one agent-centered constraint. Direct consequentialism (a.k.a. act-consequentialism): On direct consequentialism, the deontic status of an action is determined by how its outcome ranks relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking of outcomes. (Cf. indirect consequentialism.) Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC): S’s performing x is morally permissible just when, and because, there is no available act alternative that produces an outcome that S has both more moral reason and more reason, all things considered, to want to obtain than to want x’s outcome to obtain. Ethical egoism: This is the view that holds both that act-consequentialism is true and that an act produces the outcome that S has the most reason to desire if and only if it maximizes S’s utility. Evaluative ranking: An evaluative ranking of outcomes is a ranking in terms of the agent’s reasons (or some subset of her reasons—e.g., her fittingness reasons) for preferring each outcome to the available alternatives. Expectably best: An act is expectably best if and only if it has the highest expected objective value. The objective value of an act is a measure of how much reason there is to perform it. And we get the expected objective value of an action ‚by multiplying the subjective probability that some practical comparative is true by the objective value of that action if it is true, doing the same for all other practical comparatives, and adding up the results‛— practical comparatives are anything of the form: the balance of reasons favors S’s doing x as opposed to y (SEPIELLI 2009, pp. 7 & 11). Cf. expectably morally best. Expectably morally best: An act is expectably morally best if and only if it has the highest expected objective moral value. The objective moral value of an act is a measure of how much moral reason there is to perform it. And we get the expected objective moral value of an action by multiplying the subjective probability that some practical moral comparative is true by the objective moral value of that action if it is true, doing the same for all other practical moral comparatives, and adding up the results—practical moral comparatives are anything of the form: the balance of moral reasons
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favors S’s doing x as opposed to y (Cf. SEPIELLI 2009, pp. 7 & 11). Cf. expectably best. Explanatory reasons for action: These are the facts that explain why the agent performed the act in question. (Cf. normative reasons for action. See also motivating reason for action.) Factual detachment: Factual detachment consists in the following inference: S ought to ϕ if it is the case that p. It is the case that p. Therefore, S ought to ϕ. Fittingness reasons: These are all and only those reasons that are relevant to determining whether, and to what extent, an outcome is valuable/desirable (i.e., fitting to desire). Foot’s thesis (FT): An act’s outcome is better than those of the available alternatives only if the act that produces it is morally obligatory. Freely performs: S freely performs x if and only if S performs x under conditions that make it appropriate (in the sense of being apt, fitting, or correct) to respond to S’s having performed x with various reactive attitudes such as blame and praise. Future course of action (FCA): At any given moment, ti, prior to death, there are various ways a subject, S, might live out the rest of her life. For each possible way of completing S’s life, there is a whole series of successive actions that S will perform if and only if S completes her life in exactly this way. Each of these possible ways of acting over the remainder of S’s life is what I call a future course of action—an ‚FCA‛ for short— available to S at ti. An FCA is a maximal act-sequence, where an actsequence, αi, is maximal if and only if there is no act-sequence available to the agent of which αi is a proper part. I’ll use FCA1, FCA2, …, FCAn to designate particular future courses of action. Future-course-of-action consequentialism (FCAC): The deontic status of some set of actions, Ai, is wholly determined by the reasons there are for and against preferring certain outcomes to others, such that, if S is, as of ti, morally required to perform Ai, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about by completing some available FCA, S has most reason to desire some
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subset of those that would result from S’s performing an FCA that includes S’s performing Ai. Future-course-of-action theory of morality (FCATM): S is, as of ti, morally permitted to perform some set of actions, Ai, just when, and because, there is a morally permissible FCA available to S at ti in which S performs Ai. Future-course-of-action theory of objective rationality (FCAT): S is, as of ti, rationally permitted to perform some set of actions, Ai, just when, and because, there is a rationally permissible FCA available to S at ti in which S performs Ai. Good: A state of affairs, p, is good if and only if it is better than most of the states of affairs in some contextually supplied comparison class. Good for: A state of affairs, p, is good for a subject, S, if and only if it is better for S than most of the states of affairs in some contextually supplied comparison class. Good of a kind: A thing, A, of kind K is a good K if and only if it is a better K than most of things of kind K in some contextually supplied comparison class. Imperfect reason: Facts about what there is maximal reason to achieve often fail to support any specific act-token, for there is often more than one way to achieve the same result. Such facts constitute what I call imperfect reasons, for they are analogous to imperfect duties in that they allow for significant leeway in how one chooses to comply with them. Just as the imperfect duty of beneficence requires only that one be beneficent to a certain extent but leaves it up to one’s discretion to whom and on which occasions to be beneficent, imperfect reasons speak in favor of achieving some worthy end but leave it up to one’s discretion which of the equally effective means to achieving this worthy end to take. Impermissible: S’s ϕ-ing is impermissible if and only if S’s ϕ-ing is not permissible. Impersonal-value teleology: This is the view an act’s deontic status is determined by the impersonal value of its outcome, such that, if S is
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morally required to perform x, then S’s performing x would maximize the good. (Cf. personal-value teleology and rational-desire teleology.) Indirect consequentialism: On indirect consequentialism, the deontic status of an action is determined by whether or not it (a) accords with the ideal set of rules (rule-consequentialism), (b) stems from the ideal set of motives (motive-consequentialism), or (c) is contained within the ideal set of FCAs (future-course-of-action-consequentialism), where the ideal set of rules, motives, or FCAs is in turn selected on the basis how their associated outcomes rank relative to those of the available alternatives on some evaluative ranking. (Cf. direct consequentialism.) Infringement: If there is a constraint against performing a certain act-type, then any commission of an act of that type constitutes an infringement of that constraint. (Cf. violation.) Judgment-sensitive attitude: A judgment-sensitive attitude is an attitude that is sensitive to one’s judgments about reasons for and against it. Knowledgeably performs: S knowledgeably performs x if and only if S performs x knowing all the relevant facts—the relevant facts being the facts the ignorance of which could otherwise either inculpate or exculpate S for performing x. Maximal reason: S has maximal reason to perform x if and only if S does not have more reason to perform some available act alternative. (Cf. most reason.) Maximizes: An act maximizes utility (or value) if and only if there is no available act alternative that produces more utility (or value) than it does. Note, then, that more than one available act alternative can maximize utility (or value). Maximizing act-utilitarianism (MAU): Maximizing act-utilitarianism is the view according to which both (1) traditional act-consequentialism is true and (2) an act maximizes the good if and only if it maximizes utility. Maximizing, teleological FCAT (MT-FCAT): (a) S is, as of ti, rationally permitted to perform some set of actions, Ai, just when, and because, there is a rationally permissible FCA available to S at ti in which S performs Ai.
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(b) A specific future course of action, FCAi, is rationally permissible just when, and because, it is, for S, maximally choice-worthy. (c) FCAi, is, for S, maximally choice-worthy just when, and because, there is no available alternative FCA that produces a life that S has more reason to desire than to desire the life that FCAi would produce. Merely permissible: S’s ϕ-ing is merely permissible if and only if S’s ϕ-ing is permissible but not supererogatory. Meta-criterion of rightness: Assuming that the deontic status of an action is a function of both moral and non-moral reasons, then a meta-criterion of rightness is what specifies what that function is, providing both necessary and sufficient conditions for an act’s being morally permissible in terms of both moral and non-moral reasons. Moral dilemma: As Peter Vallentyne notes, a ‚moral dilemma arises when an agent is in a choice situation in which he/she cannot satisfy the dictates of morality‛ (1989, 301). (See also obligation dilemma and prohibition dilemma.) Moral justifying strength: R1 has more moral justifying strength than R2 if and only if: (i) R1 would make it morally permissible to do anything that R2 would make it morally permissible to do. (ii) R1 would make it morally permissible do some things that R2 would not make it morally permissible to do. Morally best act: An act is the morally best act available to an agent if and only if it’s the act that she has most moral reason to perform. Morally overriding: Moral reasons are morally overriding if and only if S has more moral reason to perform x than to perform y only if S is not morally permitted to perform y. Cf. rationally overriding. Morally relevant reason: Any reason that is relevant to determining an act’s deontic status is a morally relevant reason. This includes any nonmoral reasons with moral justifying strength.
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Moral option: A moral option exists whenever an agent is morally permitted to perform more than one act alternative. Moral rationalism (MR): An act’s deontic status is determined by the agent’s reasons for and against performing it, such that, if a subject, S, is morally required to perform an act, x, then S has most (indeed, decisive) reason to perform x. (See also the revised version of moral rationalism.) Moral reason: A moral reason to ϕ is a reason that, morally speaking, counts in favor of ϕ-ing. Such a reason would, if unopposed and sufficiently weighty, be capable of making the act that it supports either morally obligatory or morally supererogatory. Moral requiring strength: R1 has more moral requiring strength than R2 if and only if: (i) R1 would make it morally impermissible to do anything that R2 would make it morally impermissible to do. (ii) R1 would make it morally impermissible do some things that R2 would not make it morally impermissible to do. More requiring reason: ‘S has more requiring reason to ϕ than to ψ’ is short for ‘the set of all the reasons that S has to ϕ has greater moral requiring strength than the set of all the reasons that S has to ψ’. Most reason: S has most reason to perform x if and only if S has more reason to perform x than to perform any other available act alternative. (Cf. maximal reason.) Motivating reasons for action: This is an important subclass of explanatory reasons for action. These are the facts that motivated the agent to perform the act in question—that is, the facts that the agent took to be her reasons for performing the action. Multiple-option cases: Multiple-option cases are cases where some end is what there is maximal reason to achieve and where there is more than one equally attractive means to achieving that end (2003, 10). An example would be a case in which I need to get to the airport and the following are all equally attractive means to my getting there: a taxi, a bus, or a train—
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assume that these are all equally attractive given their comparative cost, comfort, and convenience. Murder: Murder is the intentional killing of an innocent human being. Nonconsequentialist: ‘Nonconsequentialist’ is, on my usage, short for ‘non-act-consequentialist’. Thus, any moral theory that is not an actconsequentialist theory is a nonconsequentialist theory, and this means that even rule-consequentialism is, in this stipulative sense, a nonconsequentialist theory. Non-moral reason: A non-moral reason to ϕ a reason to ϕ that, morally speaking, neither counts for nor against ϕ-ing. Non-requiring reason: A non-requiring reason is a reason that has absolutely no moral requiring strength. Normative reasons for action: A normative reason for action is some fact that counts in favor of the agent’s performing that action. (Cf. explanatory reasons for action.) Objective ought: An agent objectively (morally) ought to perform an act if and only if it’s the (morally) best act available to her. Cf. subjective ought. Objective rationality: An act is objectively irrational if and only if there are decisive reasons for the agent to refrain from performing it—that is, if and only if the agent objectively ought to refrain from performing it. The objective rational status of an act is, then, purely a function of the reasons there are for and against performing it, irrespective of whether or not the agent is aware of them. Cf. subjective rationality. Objective reason: see reason. Obligation dilemma: An obligation dilemma is a choice situation in which more than one of an agent’s available act alternatives is obligatory. (Cf. prohibition dilemma.) Obligatory: S’s ϕ-ing is obligatory if and only if ϕ is the only permissible alternative available to S. In other words, S’s ϕ-ing is obligatory if and only if it is permissible for S to ϕ and impermissible for S to refrain from ϕ-ing.
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Optional: S’s ϕ-ing is optional if and only if S is both permitted to ϕ and permitted to refrain from ϕ-ing. Outcome: See actual outcome. Overridingness: To say that one type of reason, say, m-reasons, overrides another, say, n-reasons, with respect to a certain kind of normative status, N, is to say that, in any situation where both types of reasons are present and an act, x, has a certain N-status, no modification of the situation that involves affecting only what n-reasons there are will change x’s N-status. That is, if m-reasons override n-reasons with respect to an act’s N-status, then even the weakest m-reason overrides the strongest n-reason in the determination of that act’s N-status. Permissible: S’s ϕ-ing is permissible if and only S is not obligated to refrain from ϕ-ing. In other words, S’s ϕ-ing is permissible if and only S’s ϕ-ing is not impermissible. Personal-value teleology: This is the view an act’s deontic status is determined by the personal value of its outcome, such that, if S is morally required to perform x, then S’s performing x would maximize S’s good. (Cf. impersonal-value teleology and rational-desire teleology.) Possibilism: Whether or not S ought to ϕ depends on what S could simultaneously and subsequently do if S were to ϕ, and not on what S would simultaneously and subsequently do if S were to ϕ. Cf. actualism. Possible outcome: The possible outcomes associated with S’s ϕ-ing are all the outcomes that could obtain were S to ϕ. These are all the outcomes that could obtain depending on what S simultaneously and subsequently does. Cf. actual outcome. Prohibition dilemma: A prohibition dilemma is a choice situation in which all the available act alternatives are impermissible. (Cf. obligation dilemma.) Rational-desire teleology: See act-consequentialism. (Cf. impersonal-value teleology and personal-value teleology.)
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Rational egoism: This is the view that S has decisive reason to perform x if and only S’s performing x would maximize S’s utility. Rational justifying strength: R1 has more rational justifying strength than R2 if and only if: (i) R1 would make it rationally permissible to do anything that R2 would make it rationally permissible to do. (ii) R1 would make it rationally permissible do some things that R2 would not make it rationally permissible to do. Rationally overriding: Moral reasons are rationally overriding if and only if S has more moral reason to perform x than to perform y only if S is not rationally permitted to perform y. Cf. morally overriding. Rational requiring strength: R1 has more rational requiring strength than R2 if and only if: (i) R1 would make it rationally impermissible to do anything that R2 would make it rationally impermissible to do. (ii) R1 would make it rationally impermissible do some things that R2 would not make it rationally impermissible to do. Reason (objective reason): There is a reason for S to ϕ if and only if there is some fact that counts in favor of S’s ϕ-ing, where ϕ is some judgmentsensitive attitude. Reasons for action: See normative reasons for action. Requiring reason: A requiring reason is a reason that has some moral requiring strength. All requiring reasons are moral reasons, but it isn’t necessarily the case that all moral reasons are requiring reasons. There may be morally enticing reasons: reasons that, morally speaking, count in favor of ϕ-ing but that don’t have any moral requiring strength. Restrictions: See agent-centered restrictions. Revised version of moral rationalism (MR*): The deontic status of an actset, Ai, is determined by the agent’s reasons for and against performing Ai, such that, if S is, as of ti, morally required to perform Ai, then S has most
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(indeed, decisive) reason, all things considered, to perform Ai. See also the revised version of moral rationalism. Revised version of the teleological conception of practical reasons (TCR*): The agent’s reasons for and against performing Ai are determined by her reasons for and against preferring certain outcomes to others, such that, if S has most (or decisive) reason to perform Ai, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about by completing some available FCA, S has most (or decisive) reason to desire some subset of those that would result from S’s performing an FCA that includes S’s performing Ai. Or to put it another way: S has more reason to perform ai at ti than to perform aj at ti just when, and because, S has more reason, at ti, to desire that some possible outcome associated with S’s performing ai obtains than to desire that any possible outcome associated with S’s performing aj obtains, and S has a reason to perform ai just when, and because, S has a reason to desire that some possible outcome associated with S’s performing ai obtains. See also the teleological conception of practical reasons. Rule prudence: This is the view according to which an act is imprudent if and only if it violates the ideal code of prudential rules—i.e., the code that, if internalized by the agent, would produce, over time, more utility for her than any other available alternative code would. Schefflerian utilitarianism (SU): Schefflerian utilitarianism is the view according to which all of the following hold: (1) dual-ranking actconsequentialism is true; (2) S has more moral reason to want oi to obtain than to want oj to obtain if and only if oi contains more utility for others (i.e., for those other than S) than oj does; and (3) S has more reason, all things considered, to want oi to obtain than to want oj to obtain if and only if oi contains more egoistically-adjusted utility than oj does, where egoistically-adjusted utility includes everyone’s utility but adjusts the overall total by giving S’s utility, say, ten times the weight of anyone else’s. Self-other asymmetry: Whereas the fact that S’s performing x would further S’s self-interest does not constitute a moral reason for S to perform x, the fact that S’s performing x would further someone else’s self-interest does constitute a moral reason for S to perform x. Special obligations: According to some moral theories, agents have certain special obligations that are specific to them as individuals given their
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particular relationships and history. These include obligations arising out of past acts (e.g., the obligation to keep one’s promises) and also those obligations that come with occupying certain roles (e.g., professional and familial obligations). A special obligation is a type of constraint. There is a special obligation to perform a certain act-type (e.g., a special obligation to save one’s own child) if and only if agents are required to perform that acttype even in some circumstances in which failing to perform that act-type is the only way to minimize comparable failures to perform that act-type. Subjective ought: An agent subjectively (morally) ought to perform an act if and only if it’s the expectably (morally) best act available to her. Cf. objective ought. Subjective rationality: On Parfit’s view, an act is subjectively irrational if and only if the agent has beliefs whose truth would give her decisive reasons not to perform the act. And when the agent has inconsistent beliefs, the act will be subjectively rational relative to some beliefs but subjectively irrational relative to others (PARFIT 2008). On Gert’s view, an act is subjectively irrational if and only if it indicates some failure in the practical mental functioning of the agent (GERT 2004, p. 160). (Cf. objective rationality.) Successfully counter: See counter. Sufficient reason: S has sufficient reason to ϕ if and only if S’s reasons are such as to make S objectively rationally permitted to ϕ. In other words, S has sufficient reason to ϕ if and only if S does not have decisive reason to ~ϕ. Sufficient requiring reason: A sufficient requiring reason is a reason that has sufficient moral requiring strength to generate, absent countervailing reasons, a moral requirement to perform the act of which it counts in favor. Supererogatory: S’s ϕ-ing is supererogatory if and only if, in ϕ-ing, S goes above and beyond the call of (perfect and imperfect) duty. Superperfecterogatory act: S’s ϕ-ing is superperfecterogatory if and only if, in ϕ-ing, S goes above and beyond the call of perfect duty.
Glossary
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Teleological conception of (practical) reasons (TCR): The agent’s reasons for and against performing a given act are determined by her reasons for and against preferring its outcome to those of the available alternatives, such that, if S has most (or decisive) reason to perform x, then, of all the outcomes that S could bring about, S has most (or decisive) reason to desire that x’s outcome obtains. Or to put it another way: S has more reason to perform ai at ti than to perform aj at ti just when, and because, S has more reason, at ti, to desire that oi (ai’s actual outcome) obtains than to desire that oj (ai’s actual outcome) obtains, and S has a reason to perform ai just when, and because, S has a reason to desire that oi obtains. (See also the revised version of the teleological conception of practical reasons.) Traditional act-consequentialism (TAC): Traditional act-consequentialism is the view is the view according to which both (1) act-consequentialism is true and (2) an act produces the outcome that the agent has the most reason to desire if and only if it maximizes the good. Transitive: A relation, R, is transitive just in case: if xRy and yRz, then xRz. Ultimate end: An ultimate end is ‚an intrinsic end that is a fundamental and indispensible part of the agent’s life‛ (NOGGLE 2009, p. 8). Utile: A utile is the smallest possible measure of utility—equivalent to someone’s experiencing the mildest of pleasures for the briefest of moments. Undefeated reason: S has an undefeated reason to ϕ if and only if S has sufficient reason to ϕ. Utilitarianism: See maximizing act-utilitarianism. Utility: Utility is a measure of whatever it is that enhances a subject’s welfare, and disutility is a measure of whatever it is that diminishes a subject’s welfare. Value abstractism: This is the view that the sole or primary bearers of intrinsic value are certain abstracta—facts, outcomes, states of affairs, or possible worlds. On value abstractism, there is only one kind of value, the kind that is to be promoted, and so the only proper response to value is to
Douglas W. Portmore
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desire and promote it, ensuring that there is as much of it as possible. (Cf. value concretism.) Value concretism: This is the view that the fundamental bearers of intrinsic value are concrete entities (e.g., persons, animals, and things). (Cf. value abstractism.) Violation: Any infringement of a constraint that is morally wrong is a violation of that constraint.