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The Nuclear Bible: Pakistan & Nuclear Proliferation Date Pakistani Nuclear Event 1982 China gives HEU to Pakistan (Smith & Warrick, 2009). 1987 Pakistani A.Q. Khan starts international nuclear smuggling operation with alleged sales of nuclear information to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Sudan, North Korea, Iran, and Libya (World Net Daily, 2005). 1989-1991 Pakistani scientists sell nuclear secrets to Iran (Gauhar, 2003). 1997 Pakistani nuclear scientists meet with North Korea to exchange nuclear technical assistance in return for long-range missile technology (Allison, 2004). 05/281998 Pakistan tests 1st Nuclear Bomb (Kerr & Nikitin, 2010). 2000 Pakistani nuclear scientists Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid meet with Osama Bin Laden (Blakely, 2009). 2001 Just before 9/11, Pakistani nuclear scientists Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid meet with Osama Bin Laden for a second time (Blakely, 2009). 2001 A Pakistani nuke is smuggled out of Pakistan by Al Qaeda and shipped to America (De Borchgrave, 2001). 2004 Pakistan buys (3) Agosta 90Bs Nuclear Submarines giving Pakistan ―second strike nuclear capability" (Bloom, 2004). 02/04/2004 A.Q. Khan admits selling blueprints for nuclear weapons to Libya, North Korea and Iran (World Net Daily, 2005). 12/28/2007 Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto Assassinated (MSNBC, 2007). 2007–2009 Terrorists attacked Pakistan‘s nuclear facilities 3 times at 3 different locations (Blakely, 2009). 02/05/2009 Pakistani A.Q. Khan freed from house arrest (Warrick 2009). 12/01/2009 Obama declares war on Pakistan, a fully nuclear state (Tarpley, 2009). 01/22/2010 Pakistan rejects U.S. and U.N. nuclear disarmament attempts (Nebehay, 2010). 01/22/2010 Pakistani based Lashkar-e-Taiba terror group target Pakistan‘s nuclear scientists (Puri, 2010). 01/17/2010 Elite U.S. troops deployed to combat hijacked Pakistani nuclear weapons (Lamb, 2010). 02/11/2010 U.S. Vice President Biden states that Pakistan is ―My greatest concern‖ (Press TV, 2010). 08/29/2010 Blackwater/Xe hijacks plane in an attempt to fly it into a nuclear reactor in Pakistan (Duff, 2010). 02/06/2011 Pakistan supplies a nuke to Al Qaeda to use at the Super Bowl? Date: December 10, 2001 Source: The Washington Times, Arnaud de Borchgrave Title/Headline: Al Qaeda's Nuclear Agenda Verified Abstract: Pakistani intelligence officers were assisting Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organization to develop the ability to build a "dirty" nuclear device, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agencies have concluded. Intelligence officers in Washington and Islamabad, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said they are now convinced that al Qaeda was attempting to put together a "nuclear device in the dirty bomb category.‖ Documents uncovered in Kabul and the interrogation of nuclear scientists who were frequent visitors to Taliban- ruled Afghanistan - ostensibly to perform humanitarian work - have produced conclusive evidence of the fact, the officers said. One Pakistani general who has seen the evidence described the device as a "dirty nuclear weapon," meaning one in which radioactive materials are wrapped around conventional explosives. Such a device can contaminate an area of several square blocks with radiation. The general said he also believes bin Laden obtained such materials on Russia's nuclear black market. The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna is aware of 175 cases of trafficking in nuclear materials since 1993, including 18 that involved highly enriched uranium and plutonium pellets the size of a silver dollar. There are 18 million potential delivery vehicles that could be used to smuggle a nuclear device into the United States. That is the number of cargo containers that arrive in the country annually. Of them, only 3 percent are inspected, and bills of lading do not have to be produced until the containers reach their destination, according to current regulations. An unidentified former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency is believed to be the man who coordinated bin Laden's nuclear ambitions. One local intelligence source speculated that before September 11, a dirty bomb could have been smuggled out of Afghanistan in a truck all the way to Karachi and then shipped out in a cargo container. That could be the weapon Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar was referring to when he said, after the U.S. bombing started Oct. 7, that America would soon have to face extinction. Allowing for hyperbole, he may have known what bin Laden was planning next. Another ex-ISI chief, retired Gen. Hameed Gul, predicted after September 11 that one day there would be a single Islamic state that would stretch from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan and Afghanistan and that would have nuclear weapons, as well as control of the Gulf's oil resources. The general is an ISI legend, and still popular among the agency's present crop of leaders who were his junior officers in the late 1980s. Gen. Gul, a Muslim fundamentalist, is vehemently anti-American. He acts as "strategic adviser" to Pakistan's extremist religious parties, and spent two weeks in Afghanistan just prior to September 11. Gen. Gul is slowly emerging as the spokesman for the combined opposition of Islamic fundamentalists. In Urdu-language newspapers on Friday, he was quoted as saying: "No one can tell us how to run our nuclear facilities and nuclear programs. This is being done in the interest of Pakistan, not the United States. Taliban will always remain in Afghanistan, and Pakistan will always support them. He was presumably referring to the Taliban in its guerrilla mode, following the fall of Kandahar. Gen. Gul's only daughter runs VARAN, the public transportation bus company that enjoys a monopoly in Islamabad and its twin military garrison city of Rawalpindi. Gen. Gul himself lives in "Pindi" in an army compound housing development earmarked for retired generals. Officially, the Pakistani government has accepted the explanation of three nuclear scientists about their "innocuous" relationship to the Taliban. Privately, however, some Pakistani officials, working closely with U.S. colleagues, said their activities "cannot be described as innocuous by any stretch of the imagination." On a brief visit to Islamabad early this month, George Tenet, director of CIA, conferred with President Pervez Musharraf on what was described as the need for "more and better intelligence" from ISI. The CIA has reportedly submitted a list of six more nuclear scientists whom it wants to probe for suspected links to al Qaeda. Two of them, Dr. Suleiman Asad and Dr. Muhammad Ali Muktar, are now in Burma doing undisclosed research with local scientists. Apparently anxious to avoid further U.S. probes into Pakistan's ultrasecret nuclear weapons program, these two scientists have been advised by the government to remain in Burma until further notice. Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmud, former director of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), and Chief Engineer Dr. Chaudry Abdul Majeed have been questioned by a joint FBI- ISI team. According to PAEC sources, the CIA wishes to conduct a separate interrogation based on documents seized in Kabul. Dr. Mahmud is a close associate of Gen. Gul. They were colleagues when Gen. Gul ran ISI. Dr. Mahmud is one of three scientists who befriended Taliban leaders. He is an expert in enriched uranium and plutonium, having lectured all over Pakistan with odes to the Taliban as "the wave of the future for Pakistan." Dr. Mahmud and two of his colleagues were detained in late October as a result of U.S. questions about Pakistani "relief" organizations active in Taliban-run Afghanistan, including an agricultural project near Kandahar. They admitted to meeting with al Qaeda associates of bin Laden and were officially cleared of passing on nuclear secrets. Dr. Mahmud says publicly that plutonium production is not a state secret, and advocates increasing plutonium output to help other Islamic nations build nuclear weapons. After the start of the U.S. bombing campaign, Gen. Musharraf ordered an immediate redeployment of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to six new secret locations, including separate storage facilities for uranium and plutonium cores and their detonation mechanisms. Army colleagues now say privately that Gen. Musharraf was fearful of assassination by extremists who were already accusing him of betraying Islam and selling out to the United States. There were also rumors of a coup by hard- liners in the military. The officer corps is 20 percent fundamentalist, according to a post-September 11 confidential survey by military intelligence separate from ISI. Pakistan's community of nuclear scientists is held to be "profoundly fundamentalist" and anti-American. They are particularly resentful of U.S. economic and military sanctions against Pakistan as punishment for their country's nuclear weapons program. The community's guru is Abdul Qadir Khan, the scientist who devised Pakistan's first nuclear weapon. Pakistan now has an estimated 20 such weapons in its arsenal. ISI is still widely distrusted by Western intelligence agencies and by all levels of Pakistani society, from people in the street to top political leaders. An ISI general who is regional director in one of the tribal areas told an important tribal leader known to this reporter that "after Afghanistan, Pakistan is next on America's list of countries to be conquered, and after Pakistan, Iran will be next. All that war talk about Iraq being next is just a smokescreen." Gen. Gul has been touring FATA (Federally-Administered Tribal Areas) along the border of Afghanistan with much the same message about Washington's plans for conquest in the region. ISI is undergoing a traumatic shock in the wake of the Taliban's defeat, according to knowledgeable secular political party leaders. "They have lost thousands of operatives in Afghanistan," said one key politician who asked not to be named. ISI also facilitated the transfer to Afghanistan in the past two months of thousands of young religious school students who had been proselytized by their clerical teachers to volunteer to fight with the Taliban. Gen. Musharraf had a dangerous precedent in mind: Six years ago, a group of Pakistani army officers was arrested for plotting to kill Army Chief of Staff Gen. Abdul Waheed. He had fired the ISI chief for secretly assisting Muslim rebels in several countries (De Borchgrave, 2001). Date: December 12, 2001 Source: URASIANET Title/Headline: Pakistani Nuke Scientists To Face Charges For Al Qaeda Contacts Abstract: Two detained Pakistani scientists will soon face charges for alleged cooperation with Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network, a source close to the investigation tells EurasiaNet. The scientists reportedly admitted to Pakistani authorities that they held discussions with bin Laden in August about nuclear and biological weapons. Sources tell EurasiaNet that the two scientists suspected of violating the Official Secret Acts are Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, both retired nuclear specialists. They have been in custody for almost two months, and subjected to extensive interrogation by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the CIA. If convicted, the pair face up to a seven-year prison sentence. Mahmood has reportedly suffered breakdowns on several occasions, a source told EurasiaNet. The source revealed that "initially the main suspected collaborator, Bashiruddin Mahmood denied any such cooperation and made his investigators believe that there was nothing wrong in his cooperation with Osama's men and Taliban officials." Pakistani officials insist that no potentially sensitive information was compromised, as neither of the two Pakistani scientists had any direct role in the production or processing of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. Some sources said "academic information" was exchanged among Mahmood and Majid and several al Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden, during several meetings in Kabul roughly one month before the September 11 terrorist attacks. American and Pakistani officials say there is little hard evidence to substantiate claims that Al Qaeda possesses nuclear or chemical weapons. However, American officials stress bin Laden's network was working to develop capacity to carry out attacks involving weapons of mass destruction, and that given more time, the terrorist group might have succeeded. Even now, some International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts do not rule out the possibility that al Qaeda may possess a few crude biological weapons. Mahmood was first questioned by Pakistani intelligence agencies for alleged links with Taliban militia and Osama bin Laden in the third week of October. He was released on October 26 after being "cleared" by security agencies, but was again picked again on October 28 and has remained in detention since then at an unknown location. Mahmood initially gained notoriety in Pakistan after writing several newspaper articles that protested Islamabad's consideration of signing the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1998.US officials reportedly suspect that, in addition to Mahmood and Majid, other Pakistani nuclear experts and military officers had contacts with al Qaeda. Pakistani officials dispute claims of broader collaboration with bin Laden's terrorist organization, labeling such reports as disinformation. On December 12, Pakistani officials also rejected media reports that claimed the two Pakistani scientist had sought refuge in Myanmar to avoid the probe into their al Qaeda contacts. "This is absolutely false, fabricated news," Maj. Gen. Rashid Qureshi, a spokesman for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, told a press briefing. Qureshi said no scientists other than Mahmood and Majid were currently in custody in connection with the investigation into possible al Qaeda links. The spokesman did not exclude the possibility that other scientists might face questioning in the future (URASIANET, 2001). Date: December 29, 2003 Source: The Sunday Times, Humayun Gauhar Title/Headline: Pakistan Scientists Sold Nuclear Secrets To Iran Abstract: In the late 1980‘s, rogue scientists from Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program used German go- betweens to sell their secrets to Iran, a high-level government source in Islamabad claimed last week. The scientists, motivated entirely by money, were also helped by two Sri Lankan businessmen based in Dubai when they passed on details of Pakistani nuclear technology. The disclosure follows reports that four scientists have been questioned over suspected links with Iran and lends credence to claims in Washington that Pakistan poses some of the biggest international security problems of the year ahead. Pakistan has long been suspected of responsibility for the proliferation of nuclear know-how, not only to Iran but also to North Korea. The illegal sale of nuclear secrets came to light when Musharraf visited Tehran after the Iranian government‘s decision to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to see its facilities. ―It is only Musharraf‘s personal credibility with the US and the world that has prevented a horrible backlash,‖ said one source in the Pakistani government. The embarrassment was compounded when a former army chief suggested that Pakistan sell its nuclear technology to Iran for a sum in the region of $20 billion. The Pakistani scientists who were subsequently questioned included two men regarded as being close to Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of Pakistan‘s nuclear bomb. A report from 2003 by the Brookings Institution, the independent policy analysts, warned that Pakistan had taken more risks than other nations in the war on terror, yet remained insecure about its relations with Washington. ―Insecurity can lead nations to monumental irrationality,‖ the report said. ―Pakistanis have been made to feel their nation is being bullied into working against its own interests‖ (Gauhar, 2003). Date: August 21, 2004 Source: Howard Bloom Title/Headline: Dodging the Nuclear 9/11 Abstract: Osama bin Laden may soon have his hands on three Agosta 90B next-generation stealth submarines capable of carrying sixteen sea-to-land cruise missiles each. Those missiles can deliver atomic warheads. And Osama, I suspect, will have access to the forty nuclear warheads constructed by Pakistan. Washington and New York, two primary targets for Al Qaeda, are near bodies of water from which these nuclear-tipped missiles can be launched. So are many other major American cities. In 1994, DCN, the government-owned company that builds France's naval vessels, agreed to help the Pakistanis build and learn to operate a rather amazing shipyard. It was a next-generation facility building next-tech, Agosta 90B stealth submarines. Each Agosta 90B is able to carry sixteen Harpoon Stand-Off Land Attack cruise missiles. According to the Pakistani Navy Captain Iftikhar Riaz Qureshi, who commanded both of these subs in their test phases, Pakistan purchased its Agosta 90Bs to provide itself with "second strike nuclear capability." Qureshi's words imply that from day one, Pakistan's intention has been to tip these missiles with atomic warheads. And guess what? Since Pakistan tested its first nuclear bomb in 1998, every nuclear device it's made has been a missile warhead. According to Defence Journal, Pakistan's subs have a range of close to twelve thousand miles and they can travel to the Hudson River or the Chesapeake Bay, unleash their missiles on New York and Washington, then still be able to take refuge in mid-ocean, lay low and threaten other world capitals with a similar fate. The United States operates a network of hydrophones scattered all over the Atlantic and Pacific seabed. We are listening for subs like these. But we may not be able to hear them. The Pakistani subs use a methanol-and-liquid-oxygen engine bedded on a suspension system that quiets its purr to a whisper. We may not be able to detect their silent running beneath the sounds of zebrafish fanning their tails. Many a Pakistani would love to see the nuclear destruction of America's key cities. Pakistan has one of the most violently fundamentalist and anti-American populations of any of the world's 57 Islamic states. And that's saying something. From 1979 to 1995, Pakistan was the headquarters for a group of "Afghan freedom fighters" who were not Afghans at all. They were an international army paid for by the US, Saudi Arabia, and China, armed by the CIA, and trained, in part, by China's Peoples Liberation Army. We trained an army of 50,000 men from 30 nations to bring down the Soviet Union's most advanced tanks, jets, and helicopters. Why? Our mutual goal was to embarrass a common enemy--the Russians. Chief among the recruits to our proxy Jihad were Osama bin Laden and the founding members of Al Qaeda. Pakistan is the nation whose citizens rioted in the streets in 1989 over the title of a novel they didn't like--The Satanic Verses. It was Pakistan's street activists who forced the Ayatollah Khomeini to issue a Fatwa offering five million dollars to the Moslem who killed Salman Rushdie. The Pakistanis were more extreme than the most extremist Islamic leader of his day. And that was fifteen years ago! Since then anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism has grown. Pakistan is also the nation that educated a generation of Afghan refugees who later went home to take over their country in the name of Islamic purity and justice. We know those refugees as the Taleban. Today, Osama bin Laden is one of Pakistan's two biggest pop-culture heroes. The other is "The Father of the Islamic Bomb", Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan. Khan and Osama have reportedly met in Afghanistan. Khan is the weapons expert. Osama is the weapons user. Many a Pakistani militant fundamentalist cell identifies itself as an Osama ally. One of the strongest among these Osama-loyalists is arguably Pakistan's most popular leader, Fazlur Rahman Khalil, the man who told 60 Minutes that: "God has ordered us to build nuclear weapons." On the other hand, the base of Pakistan's military dictator, Pervez Musharraf, is a slender reed. According to Syed Adeeb, head of Information Times, a militant Pakistani press outlet based in the National Press Building in Washington DC, "an Urdu-language letter written by Pakistan Army officers on a Pakistan Army letterhead and sent to many members of the Pakistan Parliament" calls, "'Pervez Musharraf and his clique…a band of thieves and looters…imposed on this nation'" by the United States. Adeeb himself calls Musharraf, "a self-appointed 'President,' military dictator, army tyrant, human rights abuser, traitor and highly paid mercenary of war criminal George W. Bush". Musharraf has been the target of at least five assassination attempts. The latest took place the very day Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003. Yet only he stands between Osama and the Islamic submarines. Only Musharraf stands between Osama and the cruise missiles Pakistan's subs can carry. And only Musharraf stands between Osama and the 40 or more nuclear warheads Pakistan has built since it exploded the first Islamic atomic bomb. Which means that only Pervez Musharraf stands between Osama and what bin Laden, in a January 2004 speech broadcast on Al Jazeera, called, "a surprising blow…one that…due to its magnitude…will change the international balances of powers…." Here's what I strongly suspect is Osama's dream endgame: Nuke a few key cities in the United States. Blind and devastate the Great Satan. Then watch while France, Germany, Italy, and England capitulate. Capitulate to what? To Osama's dream, his passion, his vision of truth and freedom--to a global Islamic caliphate. I want a world of peace. So do you. But until our understanding of ourselves goes a good deal farther, we have to face the fact that we live in a world of violence. If we pledge to remain non-violent, those who've declared themselves our enemies and who love "death more than you love life" will chuckle at our weakness…and use it to cheer their comrades on to new atrocities. They will fight the battle of the faithful and the good--the fight for what Osama calls "justice, manners, and purity"- the battle for the truth of God's messenger. They will assert the truth expressed by an al-Qaeda-allied author, Seif Al-Din Al- Ansari, that we live on an expendable "speck of dust called Planet Earth." They will use our reticence to make the mother of all wars. And it will not be environmentally friendly (Bloom, 2004). Date: October, 2004 Source: The Atlantic, Graham Allison Title/Headline: Tick, Tick, Tick: Pakistan Is A Nuclear Time Bomb—Perhaps The Greatest Threat To American Security Today Abstract: Not since the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 have I been as frightened by a single news story as I was by the revelation late last year that Abdul Qadeer Khan, the founder of Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program, had been selling nuclear technology and services on the black market. The story began to break last summer, after U.S. and British intelligence operatives intercepted a shipment of parts for centrifuges (which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear bombs as well as fuel) on its way from Dubai to Libya. The centrifuges turned out to have been designed by Khan, and before long investigators had uncovered what the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency has called a "Wal-Mart of private-sector proliferation"—a decades-old illicit market in nuclear materials, designs, technologies, and consulting services, all run out of Pakistan. The Pakistani government's response to the scandal was not reassuring. Khan made a four-minute televised speech on February 4 asserting that "there was never any kind of authorization for these activities by the government." He took full responsibility for his actions and asked for a pardon, which was immediately granted by President Pervez Musharraf, who essentially buried the affair. Today Pakistan's official position remains that no member of Musharraf's government had any concrete knowledge of the illicit transfer—an assertion that U.S. intelligence officials in Pakistan and elsewhere dismiss as absurd. Meanwhile, Pakistani investigators have reportedly questioned a grand total of eleven people from among the country's 6,000 nuclear scientists and 45,000 nuclear workers, and have refused to allow either the United States or the IAEA access to Khan for questioning. Pakistan's nuclear complex poses two main threats. The first—highlighted by Khan's black-market network—is that nuclear weapons, know-how, or materials will find their way into the hands of terrorists. For instance, we have learned that in August of 2001, even as the final planning for 9/11 was under way, Osama bin Laden received two former officials of Pakistan's atomic-energy program—Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid—at a secret compound near Kabul. Over the course of three days of intense conversation bin Laden and his second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, grilled Mahmood and Majid about how to make weapons of mass destruction. After Mahmood and Majid were arrested, on October 23, 2001, Mahmood told Pakistani interrogation teams, working in concert with the CIA, that Osama bin Laden had expressed a keen interest in nuclear weapons and had sought the scientists' help in recruiting other Pakistani nuclear experts who could provide expertise in the mechanics of bomb-making. CIA Director George Tenet found the report of Mahmood and Majid's meeting with bin Laden so disturbing that he flew directly to Islamabad to confront President Musharraf. This was not the first time that Pakistani agents had rendered nuclear assistance to dangerous actors: In 1997 Pakistani nuclear scientists made secret trips to North Korea, providing technical support for that country's nuclear-weapons program in exchange for Pyongyang's help in developing long-range missiles. According to American intelligence, another Pakistani nuclear scientist negotiated with Libyan agents over the price of nuclear-bomb designs. Pakistan's nuclear program has long been a leaky vessel; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has deemed the country "the world's No. 1 nuclear proliferator." Clearly, there is a significant danger that the black market will put Pakistani nukes (or nuclear material and technical knowledge) in terrorist hands—if it hasn't already. But there is a second, equally significant danger: that a coup might topple Musharraf and leave all or some of Pakistan's nuclear weapons under the control of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or some other militant Islamic group (or, indeed, under the control of more than one). Part of the problem is that in order to keep its focal enemy, India, from destroying its arsenal in a pre-emptive strike, Pakistan has hidden its nuclear weapons throughout the country; some of them may be in regions that are effectively under fundamentalist Muslim control. Moreover, Pakistan's official alliance with the United States in the war on terror has only increased the danger posed by Al Qaeda sympathizers within its nuclear establishment. Although Musharraf has pledged his "unstinting cooperation in the fight against terrorism," not all the thousands of officers in Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies have signed on. After all, until 9/11 some of them were working closely with members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Nor, for that matter, does Pakistan's general population support Musharraf's alliance with the United States. A poll this past March asked Pakistani citizens which leaders in international affairs they viewed favorably. Only seven percent said George W. Bush—and 65 percent said Osama bin Laden. The uneasy contradiction between Musharraf's pro-American foreign policy and the widespread anti-Americanism within Pakistan has forced Pakistani policymakers to walk a razor's edge. Musharraf faces the clear and present threat of assassination: twice in the past year he has narrowly escaped attempts on his life. When I spoke to him not long after the second of those attempts, he said he thought he had used up many of his nine lives. It may not take a bullet to wrest control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from Musharraf. In local elections held in October of 2002 a coalition of fundamentalist parties won command of the government in the North West Frontier Province. The group, known as Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), offered a simple platform: pro-Taliban, anti-American, and against all Pakistani involvement in the war on terror. MMA is now the third largest party in Pakistan's parliament; from its new position of strength it has spoken vigorously about the need to regain the honor Pakistan has lost through its subservience to the United States and its struggle with India, with which it has been engaged in a harrowing game of nuclear brinkmanship. The region the MMA controls happens to be the very one where Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are currently believed to be hiding. Under these conditions the emergence of a nuclear-equipped splinter group from within the Pakistani establishment looks disturbingly plausible. The actions required to neutralize the threat of Pakistani proliferation are ambitious; a measure of realism is necessary. But realism need not mean defeatism. The challenge now is to achieve similar success in blocking the seemingly inexorable path to a nuclear 9/11 (Allison, 2004). Date: August 17, 2005 Source: World Net Daily Title/Headline: How Pakistan's Dr. X Sold Al-Qaida Islamic Bomb Abstract: Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father of the Islamic bomb" and the "godfather of nuclear proliferation," provided nuclear expertise, nuclear materials, and designs for atomic weapons to Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to assist in the realization of the "American Hiroshima." The American Hiroshima plan represents al-Qaida's plan for the nuclear destruction of the United States. It calls for the detonation of seven tactical nuclear devices in seven U.S. cities at the same time. Each device, according to the plan, must be equipped to produce an explosive yield of 10 kilotons to equal the 1945 blast in Hiroshima that killed 242,437 Japanese civilians. News about Dr. Khan's involvement with al-Qaida and the American Hiroshima plan first emerged with the capture of several al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan in October 2001, during the first phase of Operation Enduring Freedom, and, later, with the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, bin Laden's military operations chief, in Karachi, Pakistan, March 2, 2003. From Khalid Mohammad's laptop, CIA officials uncovered details of al-Qaida's plan to create a series of "nuclear hell storms" throughout the United States. After days of interrogation coupled with severe sleep deprivation, Khalid Mohammad told U.S. intelligence officials that the chain of command for the "American Hiroshima" answered directly to bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and a mysterious scientist whom he, at first, referred to as "Dr. X," but later identified as Dr. Khan. Tim Burger and Tim McGirk in the May 12, 2003, edition of Time managed to confirm that at least one meeting between Dr. Khan and bin Laden occurred within a safe house in Kabul. The Real Dr. Strangelove: Dr. A.Q. Khan spearheaded Pakistan's effort to build nuclear weapons to stabilize the nuclear threat from India. Five atomic bombs, developed by Khan, were successfully detonated beneath the scorched hills of the Baluchistan desert in 1998. Khan, who went on to work on the successful firings of the nuclear-capable Ghaudi I and II missiles, remains a revered figure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where his birthday is celebrated in mosques. After gaining a place for Pakistan within the elite nuclear club of nations along with the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, India and Israel, Khan proceeded to sell his centrifuge technology for the enrichment of uranium and his designs for atomic weapons to such countries as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and Sudan, and such rogue nations as North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Abundant evidence exists that the list of Khan's customers should be expanded to include Brazil, Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria, Kuwait, Myanmar, and Abu Dubai. More information was squeezed out of Khalid Mohammad in subsequent months, including accounts of continuous visits by bin Laden and company to the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan, where they gained the assistance of such renowned nuclear physicists, including Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, chairman of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Mahmood's Confession: Mahmood was taken into custody by Pakistani Inter Service Intelligence and CIA agents Oct. 23, 2001. After months of questioning, Mahmood at last admitted that he had met with bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaida officials on several occasions, including the fateful morning of Sept. 11, 2001, to discuss the means of speeding up the process of manufacturing nukes from the highly enriched uranium that al-Qaida had obtained from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and other sources. Mahmood insisted that he had provided answers to technical questions concerning tactical nuclear weapons but declined to provide bin Laden actual hands-on help for the creation of such devices. Upon voicing this denial, Mahmood was subjected to six lie-detector tests. He failed them all. The Nuclear Nest: Throughout 2002, CIA and ISI officials obtained more and more information concerning the involvement of scientists from the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in the plans for the American Hiroshima. After being threatened with seven years in prison under Pakistan's Official Secrets Act, Dr. Chaudry Abdul Majid, PAEC's chief engineer, admitted that he met with bin Laden and other al-Qaida officials on a regular basis to provide technical assistance for the construction and care of its nuclear weapons. Dr. Mirza Yusuf Baig, another PAEC engineer, made a similar confession. Yet a host of other leading scientists and technicians from Khan's facility have managed to elude arrest and interrogation by quietly slipping out of the country. Dr. Mohammad Ali Mukhtar and Dr. Suleiman Assad, nuclear engineers and close colleagues of Khan and Mahmood, escaped to Myanmar, where they are currently engaged in building a 10-megawatt nuclear reactor for the Third World country. Others have made off for unknown destinations. The list of such "absconders" includes the names of Muhammad Zubair, Murad Qasim, Tariq Mahmood, Saeed Akhther, Imtaz Baig, Waheed Nasir, Munawar Ismail, Shaheen Fareed, and Khalid Mahmood. The Missing Nukes: Still, the interrogations of the Pakistani scientists, coupled with findings from Dr. Mahmood's office for "charitable affairs" in Kabul, verified for the CIA that al-Qaida had produced several nuclear weapons from highly enriched uranium and plutonium pellets the size of silver dollars at Khan's facilities. At least one of these weapons was transported to Karachi where it was shipped to the United States in a cargo container. The story of the deployed nuke was reported by Arnaud de Borchgrave of the Washington Times Dec. 10, 2001. It was carried by United Press International but received little play in the national press and garnered scant attention from such major news outlets as ABC, NBC, CBS and CNN. The whereabouts of the weapon remains a mystery. There are more than 18 million potential delivery vehicles that could be used to bring the nuke into the U.S. This figure represents the number of cargo containers that arrive into the country every year. Of these containers, only 3 percent are inspected. Moreover, the bills of lading do not have to be produced until the containers reach their place of destination. News about other tactical nuclear weapons developed by Khan's facilities for bin Laden came with the arrest of Sharif al Masri in Pakistan in November 2004. Al Masri, an al-Qaida operative with close ties to Ayman al-Zawahiri, informed CIA interrogators that a number of nukes had been deployed to Mexico where arrangements had been made with a Latino street gang for their safe transport into the U.S. This story, which appeared in the Nov. 17 issue of the Nation, also failed to capture widespread press attention. Khan's 'Mea Culpa': On Feb. 4, 2004, Khan, after being confronted with telltale evidence obtained by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, issued a public statement in which he confessed that he had sold blueprints for nuclear weapons to Libya, North Korea and Iran. He expressed "the deepest sense of sorrow and anguish" that he had placed Pakistan's national security in jeopardy. "I have much to answer for," he said. Pakistan's federal cabinet and President Pervez Musharraf responded to Khan's confession by granting the esteemed scientist a full pardon for his acts of nuclear proliferation. Musharraf said that Khan and the scientists who worked with him were motivated by "money." The pardon, according to many observers, represented an attempt by the Musharraf government to appease Islamic extremists and senior Pakistani military officials who believe that Musharraf had become a traitor to the Muslim people by providing military support and assistance to the Bush administration. Khan remains a free and honored citizen of Pakistan, where neither U.S. military officials nor CIA agents can obtain the right to approach or question him. This situation has prompted Robert Gallucci, former U.N. weapons inspector and dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, to observe: "The most dangerous country for the U.S. now is Pakistan. ... We haven't been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814." Coda: The story of Dr. A.Q. Khan's relationship with al-Qaida comes with a coda. Acclaimed French journalist Bernard-Henri Levy amassed considerable evidence that ISI officials executed Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl after Pearl obtained inside information on the close relationship between Khan and bin Laden, the trafficking of nuclear materials from Khan's facility near Islamabad to al-Qaida cells in Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, and the plans for the American Hiroshima (WorldNetDaily, 2005). Date: December 28, 2007 Source: MSNBC News Title/Headline: Bhutto’s Assassination Rocks Pakistan: Attack Jeopardizes Elections, Path To Democracy In Nuclear-Armed Nation Abstract: The death of Bhutto, one of Pakistan's most famous and enduring politicians, sparked violence that killed at least nine people and plunged efforts to restore democracy to this nuclear-armed U.S. ally into turmoil (MSNBC, 2007). Date: February 27, 2008 Source: Sky News, Haydon Wallace Title/Headline: White House Fears Of Nuclear Terrorist Threat Abstract: There are real fears in White House circles that Al Qaeda could get hold of a nuclear bomb from Pakistan. Former US Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, a confidante of the Administration declared: "I think there is a very real threat that if Musharraf falls or is assassinated, that a radical Islamic government will take control. Then you would have a very grave threat of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal being used for international terrorist purposes." The report went on to state that Osama bin Laden has always said he hopes to detonate a nuclear device in Western cities. Pakistan has enough material for 70 nuclear weapons, an unstable military regime, strong Islamic fundamentalism in military and government circles and groups like Al Qaeda on its territory (Wallace, 2008). Date: November 2, 2008 Source: CNN Title/Headline: Fareed Zakaria GPS: Interviews With Michael Bloomberg, Madeline Albright Abstract: Madeline Albright stated on GPS with Fareed Zakaria, that, ―And then, there are other issues. Obviously, Pakistan, which I think has everything that gives you an international migraine‖ (CNN, 2008). Date: December 3, 2008 Source: Thaindian News Title/Headline: Next Terrorist Attack Against US Will Originate From Pakistan Abstract: A top U.S. Congressional panel described Pakistan as ―the intersection of nuclear weapons and terrorism,‖ the next terror attack on America is likely to originate in its ally‘s tribal areas. While observing that Pakistan is a U.S. ally, the commission on weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism said ―the next terrorist attack against the United States is likely to originate from within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas‖ in Pakistan. The U.S. says the tribal areas in northwest Pakistan, where the government exerts little control, are a haven for militants from both Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. It warned that there is a threat of nuclear terrorism, both because more countries are developing nuclear weapons and because some existing nuclear powers are expanding their arsenals. ―Terrorist organizations are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons,‖ said the report. It cited testimony before the commission from former Senator Sam Nunn, who said that the ―risk of a nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not receding.‖ The commission was created in line with a recommendation from the 9/11 Commission on the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks on the US. But terrorists are likely to use a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the world in the next five years, former Senator Bob Graham, chairman of the commission stated to CNN (Thaindian, 2008). Date: January 11, 2009 Source: New York Times, David E. Sanger Headline: Obama’s Worst Pakistan Nightmare Abstract: To get to the headquarters of the Strategic Plans Division, the branch of the Pakistani government charged with keeping the country's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons away from insurgents trying to overrun the country, you must drive down a rutted, debris-strewn road at the edge of the Islamabad airport, dodging stray dogs and piles of uncollected garbage. Just past a small traffic circle, a tan stone gateway is manned by a lone, bored-looking guard loosely holding a rusting rifle. He oversees a security structure intended to protect Pakistan's nuclear arsenal from outsiders — Islamic militants, Qaeda scientists, Indian saboteurs and those American commando teams that Pakistanis imagine, with good reason, are waiting just over the horizon in Afghanistan, ready to seize their nuclear treasure if a national meltdown seems imminent. "When you map WMD and terrorism, all roads intersect in Pakistan," Graham Allison, a Harvard professor and a leading nuclear expert on the commission, told me. "The nuclear security of the arsenal is now a lot better than it was. But the unknown variable here is the future of Pakistan itself, because it's not hard to envision a situation in which the state's authority falls apart and you're not sure who's in control of the weapons, the nuclear labs, the materials." Nov. 6, which is when J. Michael McConnell, the director of national intelligence, showed up in Chicago to give the president-elect his first full presidential daily brief. For obvious reasons, neither Obama nor McConnell will talk about the contents of those highly classified briefings. But interviews over the past year with senior intelligence officials and with nuclear experts in Washington and South Asia and at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna provide strong indications of what Obama has probably heard. By now Obama has almost surely been briefed about an alarming stream of intelligence that began circulating early last year to the top tier of President George W. Bush's national-security leadership in Washington. The highly restricted reports described how foreign-trained Pakistani scientists, including some suspected of harboring sympathy for radical Islamic causes, were returning to Pakistan to seek jobs within the country's nuclear infrastructure — presumably trying to burrow in among the 2,000 or so people who have what Kidwai calls "critical knowledge" of the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure. "I have two worries," one of the most senior officials in the Bush administration, who had read all of the intelligence with care, told me one day last spring. One is what happens "when they move the weapons," "And the second," the official said, choosing his words carefully, "is what I believe are steadfast efforts of different extremist groups to infiltrate the labs and put sleepers and so on in there." As Obama's team of nuclear experts have discovered in their recent briefings, it is Pakistan's laboratories — one of which still bears A. Q. Khan's name — that still pose the greatest worries for American intelligence officials. It is relatively easy to teach Kidwai's security personnel how to lock down warheads and store them separately from trigger devices and missiles — training that the United States has conducted, largely in secret, at a cost of almost $100 million. It is a lot harder for the Americans to keep track of nuclear material being produced inside laboratories, where it is easier for the Pakistanis to underreport how much nuclear material has been produced, how much is in storage or how much might be "stuck in the pipes" during the laborious enrichment process. And it is nearly impossible to stop engineers from walking out the door with the knowledge of how to produce fuel, which Khan provided to Iran, and bomb designs. An autodidact intellectual with grand aspirations, Mahmood was fascinated by the links between science and the Koran. He wrote a peculiar treatise arguing that when morals degrade, disaster cannot be far behind. Over time, his colleagues began to wonder if Mahmood was mentally sound. They were half amused and half horrified by his fascination with the role sunspots played in triggering the French and Russian Revolutions, World War II and assorted anticolonial uprisings. "This guy was our ultimate nightmare," an American intelligence official told me in late 2001, when The New York Times first reported on Mahmood. "He had access to the entire Pakistani program. He knew what he was doing. And he was completely out of his mind." While Khan appeared to be in the nuclear-proliferation business chiefly for the money, Mahmood made it clear to friends that his interest was religious: Pakistan's bomb, he told associates, was "the property of a whole Ummah," referring to the worldwide Muslim community. He wanted to share it with those who might speed "the end of days" and lead the way for Islam to rise as the dominant religious force in the world. There is little doubt that Mahmood talked to the two Qaeda leaders about nuclear weapons, or that Al Qaeda desperately wanted the bomb. George Tenet, the CIA chief, wrote later that intelligence reports of the meeting were "frustratingly vague." They included an account that there was talk of how to design a simple firing mechanism, and that a senior Qaeda leader displayed a canister that may have contained some nuclear material (though almost certainly not bomb- grade). Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a longtime CIA nuclear expert, was given perhaps the most daunting job at the agency in the aftermath of 9/11: to make sure that Al Qaeda did not have a weapon of mass destruction at its disposal. "The worst nightmare we had at that time was that A. Q. Khan and Osama bin Laden were somehow working together," Mowatt-Larssen In Pakistan, the problem is made worse by the fact that the universities — where the nuclear program draws its young talent — are now more radicalized than at any time in memory, and the nuclear program itself has greatly expanded. Kidwai estimated that there are roughly 70,000 people who work in the nuclear complex in Pakistan, including 7,000 to 8,000 scientists and the 2,000 or so with "critical knowledge." If even 1 percent of those employees are willing to spread Pakistan's nuclear knowledge to outsiders with a cause, Kidwai — and the United States — have a problem. Just as Kidwai fears, every few months someone in Washington — either at the Pentagon, or the Energy Department, or on the campus of the National Defense University — runs a simulation of how the United States should respond if a terrorist group infiltrates the Pakistani nuclear program or manages to take over one or two of its weapons. "Most of them don't end well." "Only one of those countries has a hundred nuclear weapons," a primary author of the report said to me. For Al Qaeda and the other Islamists, he went on to say, "this is the home game." He paused, before offering up the next thought: For anyone trying to keep a nuclear weapon from going off in the United States, it's our home game, too (Sanger, 2009). Date: February 7, 2009 Source: The Washington Post, Joby Warrick Title/Headline: Pakistani Nuclear Scientist A.Q. Khan Is Freed From House Arrest Abstract: The Pakistani scientist at the center of one of history's worst nuclear scandals walked out of his Islamabad villa to declare his vindication after five years of house arrest. "The judgment, by the grace of God, is good," a smiling Abdul Qadeer Khan told a throng of reporters and TV crews. Moments earlier, a Pakistani court had ordered the release of the metallurgist who had famously admitted selling nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Through years of legal limbo, Khan, 72, had never been charged, and now he never will be. "The so-called A.Q. Khan affair is a closed chapter," a Pakistani government spokesman said. Worst of all, the recent discovery of nuclear weapons blueprints on computers found in Switzerland and Dubai has prompted questions about whether the damage inflicted by the network was truly contained -- or even understood. It is possible, U.S. officials concede, that Khan and his allies shared nuclear secrets with still-unknown countries and, perhaps, terrorist groups, as well. Khan himself remains a hero in his homeland, immune from further prosecution and free now to travel abroad as he wishes. That discovery was the culmination of more than a decade of secret investigation by the CIA and other agencies of the business dealings of Khan, one of Pakistan's best-known scientists and the father of the country's nuclear weapons program. At the State Department, spokesman Gordon K. Duguid said yesterday that Khan remains a "serious proliferation risk," and the White House asked for assurances from Pakistan that the scientist will never be allowed to resume his former work. Jeffrey G. Lewis, director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, said Khan's ability to essentially walk away from nuclear-smuggling charges "makes a mockery of our efforts to stop the spread" of nuclear weapons. While the investigation has yielded few arrests, it has provided disturbing insight into the sophistication of 21st-century smuggling networks and their ability to move the most sensitive weapons technology across international borders, weapons experts said. David Albright, the former nuclear inspector, said it is likely that other smugglers will eventually seek to take Khan's place, and some may already have done so. If fact, he said, it would be unwise even to count Khan out. "He likely still has or can access sensitive nuclear technology. He certainly knows how to organize nuclear smuggling internationally," Albright said. "Khan remains a serious proliferation risk‖ (Warrick, 2009). Date: April 24, 2009 Source: Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Title/Headline: Rising Tide Of Militancy Feeds Fears About Pakistan's Nukes Abstract: Advisers to U.S. President Barack Obama's administration say their worst security nightmare is the possibility that Pakistan -- a nuclear-armed country -- might fall under the control of Al-Qaeda militants. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani insists that no group will be allowed to challenge the authority of the government. Pakistani officials also insist that the country's nuclear arsenal is secure. But U.S. officials including Secretary of State Hillary Clinton this week highlighted concerns about the security situation in Pakistan. Clinton described advances by Islamic militants in Pakistan as a "mortal threat" to the security and safety of the world. George Perkovich, director of the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says he has never been more concerned about the possibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamist extremists. "I would say that I thought [the threat] was exaggerated -- that there were 10 or 12 other [threats] in Pakistan that were more probable and were also very grave -- [but] it's gotten much worse in the last few years, and you have a sense of parts of Pakistan now becoming ungovernable by the Pakistani state," Perkovich says. "Today I'm feeling like we really, really have to focus on the nuclear danger in a way that I wouldn't have said was the case until recently. It's not an exaggeration to say that there is a risk." Locked Up Tight?: Most experts say they have no doubt that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is now under tight control by Pakistan's Strategic Plan Division -- the security structure headed by 58-year-old General Khalid Kidwai and intended to keep the weapons from falling into the hands of Islamic militants, Al-Qaeda scientists, or Indian saboteurs. Jeff Lightfoot, assistant director of the Atlantic Council's program on international security, says he is not so worried about militants obtaining Pakistan's nuclear weapons under the army's current system of safeguards. Lightfoot tells RFE/RL that he sees the recent extremist advances as a danger primarily to Pakistan itself -- and by extension, the wider region with Afghanistan and India. He describes "the greatest threat" as a "gradual bleeding of Pakistani authority" that would leave large parts of the country outside central government control. Lightfoot calls the military the "glue of the country" but questions its ability to demonstrate that it can control and defend Pakistan's borders and ensure sovereignty, something he labels "an ideology problem." "In terms of the nuclear weapons and them falling into the hands of terrorists, the army may not necessarily be able to control all of Pakistan," Lightfoot adds, "but I don't think that necessarily translates into a breakdown of their nuclear-weapons command-and-control system." Key Figure: Perkovich says current safeguards should ensure that any possible collapse of the civilian government in Islamabad would not affect the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons -- at least, he says, as long as General Kidwai remains in control. "The civil government is not relevant to the control of nuclear weapons in Pakistan; it is entirely an army issue," Perkovich says. "We do have a strong sense that [Pakistan's nuclear weapons] are controlled by elements in the army that have been selected and are reliable. As long as that control by this current military leadership remains strong, then I think one can have pretty good confidence that these weapons won't be used crazily." But Perkovich says his concern centers around what could happen if pro-Islamist elements within Pakistan's military and security forces turned against Kidwai. "The risk on the nuclear side is that the country falls apart or has a civil war that the bad guys win," Perkovich says. "The fear comes if there is a coup within the military so that, somehow, the people now in charge within the military get dispossessed of their nuclear weapons by other people in the military who would be less responsible." To that "first fear," however, Perkovich adds another alarming scenario: "The second fear is [if] there is basically just a takeover by the Taliban and somehow the military crumbles and flees." Guessing Game: The size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is classified information in Islamabad. Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been careful not to disclose the exact number or locations of its nuclear weapons. Estimates by experts and researchers range from around 50 nuclear weapons to as many as 150. Former President General Pervez Musharraf declared in 2007 that the weapons were in a "disassembled state" -- most likely meaning that the warheads were kept separately from the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them to targets as far away as New Delhi, India. General Kidwai has said that the nuclear warheads could be assembled very quickly with land- and air-delivery systems. Seth Jones, a political scientist who is currently in Pakistan doing research for the RAND Corporation, tells RFE/RL that Pakistan has "dozens" of nuclear weapons dispersed in or near major cities throughout the country. He says that his recent visits to nuclear facilities in Pakistan suggest the country's weapons are still in a disassembled state. "I've visited a number of the nuclear facilities [in Pakistan] and I'm fairly confident that security procedures are actually pretty good," Jones says. "The ones I've visited have included sites that hold fissile material and also that hold ballistic-missile technology - - where one could put nuclear weapons on and [that] would give Pakistan a range to target countries like India if there was an exchange." He likens those facilities to "what one might see in China or, frankly, in the United States." Dangerous Precedent: With his firsthand views of security for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, Jones says he is most concerned about how a destabilized government in Pakistan might promote the spread of nuclear-weapons technology out of the country or to Al-Qaeda militants. "In most of these scenarios, still, the likelihood that nuclear weapons are going to be used or come in the hands of militants or terrorists is highly unlikely," Jones says. But he is quick to add that "where one might get concerned...is elements of the A.Q. Khan network that were involved in building Pakistan's atomic capability -- a range of scientists that have proliferated nuclear material to North Korea, Iran, and several other places." In that respect, he cites a lesson that was learned under previous leadership in Islamabad, before the international community was fretting publicly about any "existential threat" to the Pakistani state posed by extremists. "We know in the past that there have been talks between members of the A.Q. Khan network and militants, including Al-Qaeda several years ago," Jones says. "So is it possible that some technology at some point falls into the hands of terrorists? I think that's a more likely scenario than actual nuclear weapons coming out of [the Pakistan army's] control‖ (Synovitz, 2009). Date: May 12, 2009 Source: The Moderate Voice, Swaraaj Chauhan Title/Headline: Why USA Overlooks Pakistan’s Nuclear Plans? Abstract: In the annals of diplomacy, and now the war-on-terror, the USA‘s continued overlooking of Pakistan‘s dangerous role in proliferating nuclear arms within the country, and among rogue states, would remain a great mystery. A recent MSNBC report details more alarming news. ―Without any public U.S. reproach, Pakistan is building two of the developing world‘s largest plutonium production reactors, which experts say could lead to improvements in the quantity and quality of the country‘s nuclear arsenal, now estimated at 60 to 80 weapons. ―On the dusty plain 110 miles southwest of Islamabad, not far from an area controlled by the Taliban, two large new structures are rising, structures that in light of Pakistan‘s internal troubles must be considered ominous for the stability of South Asia and, for that matter, the world.‖ ‗Pakistan is really the only country rapidly building up its nuclear forces,‘ says a U.S. intelligence official. Moreover, he and other U.S. officials say, there long have been concerns about those who run the facility where the reactors are being built near the town of Khushab. ―They note that a month before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Khushab‘s former director met with Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and offered a nuclear weapons tutorial around an Afghanistan campfire. ―Then there are the billions in U.S. economic and military aid that have permitted Pakistan‘s military to divert resources to nuclear and other weapons projects.‖ Now some important questions? Why did USA kept silent for years when Abdul Qadeer Khan, described as Father of Pakistan Nuclear bomb, pedalled nuclear technology to rogue states (with open support from Pakistan government). In 2004 Qadeer Khan admitted to hawking nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Is the USA silent because taking on Pakistan on this issue would endanger its delicate relationship with China, which has supplied the nuclear technology to Pakistan? Are there business interests within the USA that gain from proliferation of nuclear arms? What are the implications of all this with the Taliban gaining ground? Latest reports suggest that there is a looming refugee crisis in Pakistan. Thousands of families have begun fleeing from an army offensive against Taliban militants in the Shamuzai area of Pakistan‘s Swat Valley yesterday. More than half a million refugees have been registered, reports The Independent. ―Hundreds of thousands of people are pouring out of Swat and the surrounding neighbourhoods as the military and the government of President Asif Ali Zardari – under intense pressure from Washington – move to drive the Taliban out from what, until two years ago, was a largely peaceful region. ―Aid officials say that at this point, the overwhelming majority of the displaced – 428,789 of the 510,496 registered by the authorities since 2 May – are staying with relatives or friends or else in rented rooms.‖ Meanwhile in Afghanistan there are no indications that Obama administration would leave the suicidal path which the Bush administration had been following. Obama administration seems to be opting for cosmetic changes (Chauhan, 2009). Date: May 30, 2009 Source: The Times Of India Title/Headline: Al-Qaeda Plans For Nuke Takeover In Pak Abstract: Even as Pakistan plans for its second nuke strike, reports suggested that Jihads backed by the al-Qaeda are preparing to take over the Pak's nuclear arsenal. Senior al-Qaeda leader Abu Yahya al-Libi has released a book called 'Sharpening blades against Pakistan', in which al-Libi has said that it‘s only a matter of time before the Taliban takes full control of Pakistan. Libi adds that the Mujahideen should prepare countermeasures against US' plans to prevent the fall of Pakistan's 24-48 nuclear warheads to the US by seizing, dismantling and smuggling Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Libi is confident the Mujahideen would not only control Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction, but would also gain control of copies of all the secret Pakistan-India agreements designed to prevent the targeting of nuclear facilities in any confrontation between the two countries. According to Libi preplanning for nuclear arsenal control is a lot better than planning for 30 years of Jihad (The Times Of India, 2009). Date: June 22, 2009 Source: The Moderate Voice, Swaraaj Chauhan Title/Headline: Al Qaeda & Pakistan’s Nukes: Apocalypse Soon? Abstract: It sounds like a routine alarm, but the things are getting serious. The question being asked in this part of the world is: Who would grab Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons first…the Al Qaeda or the USA? To this speculation one may add an Aesop‘s fable: Would it be the ―monkey‖ India/Israel combo snatching the nukes away from the Al Qaeda/USA ―cat‖ ? Here is a categorical statement from Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (photo above), the leader of al Qaeda‘s in Afghanistan, in an interview with Al Jazeera television: ―Al Qaeda would use Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons in its fight against the United States.‖ Considering the increasing overt and covert support that the extremist fringe enjoys within the Pakistan polity, including the Army, this Al Qaeda threat assumes menacing proportions. All the generous aid that the US administration is pouring out to Pakistan in the hope of winning over this radicalized section is unlikely to work. Expressing concern over Pakistan‘s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, General Deepak Kapoor, India‘s chief of army staff, recently called on the international community to prevail on Pakistan to cap its warheads at present levels. India‘s DNA newspaper comments: ―Pakistan‘s nuclear command and control passed into army hands when General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in a military coup d‘etat on July 5, 1977 and has remained with the army ever since. ―With Taliban and jihadi terrorism having taken hold of large parts of Pakistan‘s polity, there are serious doubts whether Pakistan‘s nuclear warheads are safe from falling into jihadi hands. ―As long as the warheads are under the custody of the Pakistan army, such reservations are misplaced. However, in case there is ever a successful coup led by radical extremists with the support of disgruntled elements in the Pakistan army, or a colonels‘ coup, it will be necessary to either capture the nuclear warheads or bomb the suspected nuclear storage sites to render the warheads ineffective.‖ Pakistan‘s Dawn newspaper writes: ―The correct position convincingly stated by scientist Pervez Hoodbhoy and human rights activists (call them pacifists if you like) is that nuclear weapons, in our situation, are not an asset as is generally said but a liability. ―Hillary Clinton‘s declaration that a nuclear Pakistan is a ‗mortal threat to international security‘ leaves one wondering whether one day, if the Taliban are not exterminated, America will intervene militarily to save the weapons from falling into their hands. ―After all the Americans keep firing missiles at the Taliban‘s suspected hideouts in Pakistan but our army cannot, or does not want to, stop them. And our political leaders keep protesting only for the record.‖ Meanwhile an American think tank says: ―Pakistan‘s military establishment remains focused on conventional conflict with its neighbor India, and cooperation between civilian and military leaders on counterterrorism action remains mixed, despite increasing domestic anxiety about the actions of militants in the country‘s northwest.‖ (Chauhan, 2009). Date: June 22, 2009 Source: Reuters, Inal Ersan Title/Headline: Al Qaeda Says Would Use Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Abstract: If it were in a position to do so, Al Qaeda would use Pakistan's nuclear weapons in its fight against the United States, a top leader of the group said in remarks aired Sunday. Pakistan has been battling al Qaeda's Taliban allies in the Swat Valley since April after their thrust into a district 100 km (60 miles) northwest of the capital raised fears the nuclear-armed country could slowly slip into militant hands. "God willing, the nuclear weapons will not fall into the hands of the Americans and the mujahideen would take them and use them against the Americans," Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, the leader of al Qaeda's in Afghanistan, said in an interview with Al Jazeera television. Abu al-Yazid was responding to a question about U.S. safeguards to seize control over Pakistan's nuclear weapons in case Islamist fighters came close to doing so. "We expect that the Pakistani army would be defeated (in Swat) ... and that would be its end everywhere, God willing." Asked about the group's plans, the Egyptian militant leader said: "The strategy of the (al Qaeda) organization in the coming period is the same as in the previous period: to hit the head of the snake, the head of tyranny -- the United States. "That can be achieved through continued work on the open fronts and also by opening new fronts in a manner that achieves the interests of Islam and Muslims and by increasing military operations that drain the enemy financially." The militant leader suggested that naming a new leader for the group's unit in the Arabian Peninsula, Abu Basir al-Wahayshi, could revive its campaign in Saudi Arabia, the world's top oil exporter. "Our goals have been the Americans ... and the oil targets which they are stealing to gain power to strike the mujahideen and Muslims." "There was a setback in work there for reasons that there is no room to state now, but as of late, efforts have been united and there is unity around a single leader." Abu al-Yazid, also known as Abu Saeed al-Masri, said al Qaeda will continue "with large scale operations against the enemy" -- by which he meant the United States. "We have demanded and we demand that all branches of al Qaeda carry out such operations," he said, referring to attacks against U.S.-led forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The militant leader said al Qaeda would be willing to accept a truce of about 10 years' duration with the United States if Washington agreed to withdraw its troops from Muslim countries and stopped backing Israel and the pro-Western governments of Muslim nations. Asked about the whereabouts of al Qaeda's top leaders, he said: "Praise God, sheikh Osama (bin Laden) and sheikh Ayman al- Zawahri are safe from the reach of the enemies, but we would not say where they are; moreover, we do not know where they are, but we're in continuous contact with them‖ (Ersan, 2009). Date: July 3, 2009 Source: Thaindian News, Arun Kumar Title/Headline: Loose Nukes Greatest Danger In Pakistan’ Abstract: The threat of insiders in the nuclear establishment working with outsiders seeking a bomb is nowhere greater than in Pakistan, according to a former officer of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ―Pakistani authorities have a dismal track record in thwarting insider threats,‖ writes Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, who served as a CIA officer for 23 years, in the July/August issue of Arms Control Today, published by the Arms Control Association. For example, the network run by the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, channeled sensitive nuclear technologies to Iran, Libya, and North Korea for years under the noses of the establishment before it was taken down in 2003, to the best of our knowledge, he noted. ―The Umma-Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), founded by Pakistani nuclear scientists with close ties to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, was headed by Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, who had been in charge of Pakistan‘s Khushab reactor.‖ Mahmood discussed Al Qaeda‘s nuclear aspirations with Osama bin Laden, Mowatt-Larssen wrote. He also cites Mahmood as saying, bin Laden asked him how he could construct a bomb if the group already had the material. ―It is stunning to consider that two of the founding fathers of Pakistan‘s weapons programme embarked independently on clandestine efforts to organize networks to sell their country‘s most precious secrets for profit,‖ he says. ―There are troubling indications that these insider threats are not anomalies,‖ writes Mowatt-Larssen, a senior fellow at Harvard University‘s Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, who until January 2009 headed the US Department of Energy‘s intelligence and counterintelligence office. ―In the Khan and UTN cases, the rogue senior officers and their cohorts in the nuclear establishment were not caught by Pakistan‘s security establishment. It would be foolhardy to assume that such lapses could not happen again,‖ he says. The Pakistani military, intelligence, and nuclear establishments are not immune to rising levels of extremism in the country, Mowatt-Larssen says suggesting, ―there is a lethal proximity between terrorists, extremists, and nuclear weapons insiders.‖ Thus ―The greatest threat of a loose nuke scenario stems from insiders in the nuclear establishment working with outsiders, people seeking a bomb or material to make a bomb. Nowhere in the world is this threat greater than in Pakistan. As Pakistan moves forward to face an uncertain future, the government faces an ongoing challenge to its authority and myriad threats against which it must defend, the US expert says. ―With the passage of time, the odds steadily increase that Pakistan will face a serious test of its nuclear security,‖ he says suggesting, ―for its part, the United States must be fully prepared to respond to this eventuality.‖ ―Increasing the level of transparency and predictability between India and Pakistan is (also) absolutely vital,‖ Mowatt-Larssen says. ―Neither party can afford to make a miscalculation in the heat of the moment that might escalate into a nuclear confrontation‖ (Kumar, 2009). Date: August 11, 2009 Source: The Sunday Times, Rhys Blakely Title/Headline: Terrorists 'Have Attacked Pakistan Nuclear Sites Three Times' Abstract: Terrorists have attacked three of Pakistan‘s military nuclear facilities in the past two years and there is a serious danger that they will gain access to the country‘s atomic arsenal, according to a journal published by the US Military Academy at West Point. The report, written by Professor Shaun Gregory, a security specialist at Bradford University, comes amid mounting fears that the Taleban and al-Qaeda will breach Pakistan‘s military nuclear sites – most of which are in or near insurgent strongholds in the north and west of the country. The most serious attack was a strike by two suicide bombers on the Wah Cantonment Ordnance Complex, thought to be one of Pakistan‘s main nuclear weapons assembly plants, about 18 miles northwest of Islamabad, in August 2008. The incident, which claimed 70 lives, was widely reported but little mention was made of the nuclear risk. Other attacks included the suicide bombing of a nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha, in central Punjab, in November 2007 and a suicide attack on Pakistan‘s nuclear airbase at Kamra, near Wah, on December 10, 2007. In the Counter Terrorism Center Sentinel, Professor Gregory writes that the attacks illustrate ―a clear set of weaknesses and vulnerabilities‖ in Pakistan‘s nuclear security regime. The strikes occurred as Pakistan sought to ramp up its nuclear capability — and as US special forces formulated contingency plans in the event of the country falling to insurgents. In June of 2009, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an al-Qaeda commander in Afghanistan, suggested that the group would show no hesitation in using nuclear weapons. ―God willing... the mujahideen would take them and use them against the Americans,‖ he told al-Jazeera television. Pakistan‘s security regime is modeled on the American system and includes the separation of warheads from detonators, which are stored in underground bunkers staffed by highly vetted personnel. Many details of the country‘s nuclear program — including the location of many warheads and their exact number — remain unknown. However, most of the country‘s nuclear weapons sites were built in the north and west of the country in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly to distance them from India — a ploy which now means many are located in insurgent areas. There are also concerns that vetting programs may not identify Islamist sympathizers, whose influence extends far up Pakistan‘s military hierarchy. Professor Gregory writes: ―There is already the well-known case of two senior Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission scientists, Sultan Bashirrudin Mahmood and Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, who travelled to Afghanistan in 2000 and again shortly before 9/11 for meetings with Osama bin Laden himself, the content of which has never been disclosed‖ (Blakely, 2009). Date: September 16, 2009 Source: Indian Express Title/Headline: Al-Qaeda Seeking Nuclear Secrets From Pakistan: Holbrooke Abstract: Al-Qaeda is trying to seek nuclear secrets from Pakistan and it remains as dangerous as ever, Special US Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke said on Wednesday. "Al-Qaeda is still there in the region, ever dangerous and publicly asking people to attack the US and publicly asking nuclear engineers to give them nuclear secrets from Pakistan," Holbrooke said at a reception hosted by the Congressional Caucus on Afghanistan at the Capitol Hill. Holbrooke ? The point man of the Obama Administration for Afghanistan and Pakistan - said the US is not in Afghanistan to support the elections, but it is there for its own national interest and security. "We are not in Afghanistan for the election‖ (Indian Express, 2009). Date: November 13, 2009 Source: The Washington Post, R. Jeffrey Smith, Joby Warrick Title/Headline: A Nuclear Power's Act Of Proliferation Abstract: A.Q. Kahn asserted that China gave Pakistan enough enriched uranium in '82 to make nuclear 2 bombs. Worst of all, the recent discovery of nuclear weapons blueprints on computers found in Switzerland and Dubai has prompted questions about whether the damage inflicted by the network was truly contained -- or even understood. It is possible, U.S. officials concede, that Khan and his allies shared nuclear secrets with still-unknown countries and, perhaps, terrorist groups, as well. In 1982, a Pakistani military C-130 left the western Chinese city of Urumqi with a highly unusual cargo: enough weapons-grade uranium for two atomic bombs, according to accounts written by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and provided to The Washington Post. The uranium transfer in five stainless-steel boxes was part of a broad-ranging, secret nuclear deal approved years earlier by Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that culminated in an exceptional, deliberate act of proliferation by a nuclear power, according to the accounts by Khan. According to Khan, the uranium cargo came with a blueprint for a simple weapon that China had already tested, supplying a virtual do-it-yourself kit that significantly speeded Pakistan's bomb effort. The transfer also started a chain of proliferation: U.S. officials worry that Khan later shared related Chinese design information with Iran; in 2003, Libya confirmed obtaining it from Khan's clandestine network. U.S. officials say they have known about the transfer for decades and once privately confronted the Chinese -- who denied it -- but have never raised the issue in public or sought to impose direct sanctions on China for it. "Upon my personal request, the Chinese Minister had gifted us 50 kg [kilograms] of weapon-grade enriched uranium, enough for two weapons," Khan wrote in a previously undisclosed 11-page narrative of the Pakistani bomb program that he prepared after his January 2004 detention for unauthorized nuclear commerce. "The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave us kg50 enriched uranium," he said in a separate account sent to his wife several months earlier. Pakistan has never allowed the U.S. government to question Khan or other top Pakistani officials directly, prompting Congress to demand in legislation approved in September that future aid be withheld until Obama certifies that Pakistan has provided "relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals" involved in past nuclear commerce. "The speed of our work and our achievements surprised our worst enemies and adversaries and the West stood helplessly by to see a Third World nation, unable even to produce bicycle chains or sewing needles, mastering the most advanced nuclear technology in the shortest possible span of time," Khan boasts in the 11-page narrative he wrote for Pakistani intelligence officials about his dealings with foreigners while head of a key nuclear research laboratory. According to one of the documents, a five-page summary by Khan of his government's dealmaking with China, the terms of the nuclear exchange were set in a mid-1976 conversation between Mao and Bhutto. Two years earlier, neighboring India had tested its first nuclear bomb, provoking Khan -- a metallurgist working at a Dutch centrifuge manufacturer -- to offer his services to Bhutto. Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, the nation's military ruler, "was worried," Khan said, and so he and a Pakistani general who helped oversee the nation's nuclear laboratories were dispatched to Beijing with a request in mid-1982 to borrow enough bomb-grade uranium for a few weapons. After winning Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's approval, Khan, the general and two others flew aboard a Pakistani C- 130 to Urumqi. Khan says they enjoyed barbecued lamb while waiting for the Chinese military to pack the small uranium bricks into lead- lined boxes, 10 single-kilogram ingots to a box, for the flight to Islamabad, Pakistan's capital (Smith & Warrick, 2009). Date: January 17, 2010 Source: The Sunday Times, Christina Lamb Title/Headline: Elite US Troops Ready To Combat Pakistani Nuclear Hijacks Abstract: The US army is training a crack unit to seal off and snatch back Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event that militants, possibly from inside the country‘s security apparatus, get their hands on a nuclear device or materials that could make one. The specialized unit would be charged with recovering the nuclear materials and securing them. The move follows growing anti- Americanism in Pakistan‘s military, a series of attacks on sensitive installations over the past two years, several of which housed nuclear facilities, and rising tension that has seen a series of official complaints by US authorities to Islamabad in the past fortnight. ―What you have in Pakistan is nuclear weapons mixed with the highest density of extremists in the world, so we have a right to be concerned,‖ said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer who used to run the US energy department‘s intelligence unit. ―There have been attacks on army bases which stored nuclear weapons and there have been breaches and infiltrations by terrorists into military facilities.‖ Professor Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan security research unit at Bradford University, has tracked a number of attempted security breaches since 2007. ―The terrorists are at the gates,‖ he warned. The Al-Qaeda leadership has made no secret of its desire to get its hands on weapons for a ―nuclear 9/11‖. ―I have no doubt they are hell-bent on acquiring this,‖ said Mowatt- Larssen. ―These guys are thinking of nuclear at the highest level and are approaching it in increasingly professional ways.‖ Nuclear experts and US officials say the biggest fear is of an inside job amid growing anti-American feeling in Pakistan. Last year 3,021 Pakistanis were killed in terrorist attacks, more than in Afghanistan, yet polls suggest Pakistanis consider the United States to be a greater threat than the Taliban. ―You have 8,000-12,000 [people] in Pakistan with some type of role in nuclear missiles — whether as part of an assembly team or security,‖ said Gregory. ―It‘s a very large number and there is a real possibility that among those people are sympathisers of terrorist or jihadist groups who may facilitate some kind of attack.‖ Pakistan is thought to possess about 80 nuclear warheads. Although the weapons are well guarded, the fear is that materials or processes to enrich uranium could fall into the wrong hands. ―All it needs is someone in Pakistan within the nuclear establishment and in a position of key access to become radicalized,‖ said MowattLarssen. ―This is not just theoretical. It did happen — Pakistan has had inside problems before‖ (Lamb, 2010). Date: January 18, 2010 Source: World Net Daily Title/Headline: Al-Qaida Seeking Tools For Nuclear 9/11: Intel Agents 'Certain' Terrorists Will Try For Pakistan's Bombs Abstract: Agents for Britain's MI6 Secret Intelligence Service say they are "certain" al-Qaida is poised to try and grab some of the 80 nuclear weapons that Pakistan possesses, according to a report from Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin. The al-Qaida leadership – Osama bin Laden and Ayman a-Zawahri – are believed to have spent the winter months in Pakistan's Tribal Areas finalizing their plans for an attack. It will spearhead al-Qaida's global network and its capability to carry out a wide range of terrorist onslaughts. The MI6 analysis is based on what the agency calls "al-Qaida's zone of terrorism." It includes the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in East Turkistan and al-Shabaab in Somalia. In the Sahara region al-Qaida has reformed Islamic Magreb (AQIM) which has grown out of Algerian resistance movement. But nothing poses more of a threat than al-Qaida's plan to steal Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons. MI6 agents in Pakistan say there is mounting evidence "the leadership is thinking of a nuclear 9/11 and are approaching it in increasingly professional ways." Nuclear experts have told the Secret Intelligence Service that the biggest fear is of "an inside job." One analyst said, "There are up to 12,000 people in Pakistan with some kind of role which brings them into nuclear facilities, whether as part of a team of scientists or working in security." Professor Shaun Gregory, director of the Pakistan security research center at Bradford University in England, has tracked a number of attempted security breaches in the past four years at Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Past attacks have included a suicide bomber striking Kamra where Pakistan Air Force F-16 jet aircraft are stationed with nuclear bombs. Another attack was against a nuclear weapons complex in Punjab where a nuclear warhead assembly plant is based (World Net Daily, 2010). Date: January 20, 2010 Source: Dow Jones Title/Headline: Al Qaeda Seeking To Provoke New India-Pakistan War – Gates Abstract: Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that Al Qaeda is seeking to destabilize the entire South Asia region and could trigger a new war between Pakistan and India, and that under Al Qaeda's "syndicate" in Afghanistan and Pakistan are trying "to destabilize not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but potentially the whole region by provoking a conflict perhaps between India and Pakistan through some provocative act"(Dow Jones, 2010). Date: January 21, 2010 Source: Bloomberg, Viola Gienger Title/Headline: Gates In Pakistan To Discuss New Strikes On Taliban Abstract: Secretary Gates stated that that Islamists working under ―the umbrella of Al Qaeda‖ want to destabilize the entire South Asian region by provoking a conflict between India and Pakistan. That law requires a cutoff of aid if Pakistan fails to provide civilian control of its military, cooperate with the U.S. on counter-terrorism, protect its nuclear arsenal and enforce international nuclear non- proliferation rules. Those conditions triggered accusations from opposition politicians and Pakistan‘s military of interference in the country‘s internal affairs. Such conditions on U.S. aid evoke bitter memories in Pakistan of the 1990s, when the so-called Pressler amendment forced a halt to most U.S. aid because of evidence that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons. The cutoff in U.S. military aid hampered American efforts to influence Pakistan‘s powerful armed forces, and led many Pakistani leaders to call the U.S. an unreliable ally. Al Qaeda leaders are believed to have holed up in ungoverned tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border since the U.S. toppled the group‘s Taliban protectors in the wake of the September 11th attacks. Obama last year ordered 30,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan to battle the Taliban insurgency. The U.S. is trying to balance its rapidly expanding ties with India, the world‘s largest democracy and the fastest- growing economy after China, even as the Obama administration strengthens links with Pakistan (Geinger, 2010). Date: January 22, 2010 Source: Reuters, Stephanie Nebehay Title/Headline: Pakistan Rules Out Nuclear Fissile Talks Abstract: Pakistan informed world powers that it cannot accept the start of global negotiations to halt production of nuclear bomb- making fissile material in the near future, diplomats told Reuters. The move represents a potential setback for efforts by both the Obama administration and United Nations to forge ahead with what is widely seen as the next step in multilateral nuclear disarmament. Zamir Akram, Pakistan's ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva, disclosed Islamabad's position during a diplomatic lunch hosted by Chinese ambassador Wang Qun. "We are not in a position to accept the beginning of negotiations on a cut-off treaty in the foreseeable future," Akram was quoted as saying. The U.N.-sponsored Conference on Disarmament (CD) is trying to launch negotiations to halt production of fissile material (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium) and clinch what is known in the jargon as a fissile material "cut-off" treaty or FMCT. Pakistan is resisting U.S. pressure to dismantle militant groups, including Afghan Taliban based on its soil, because it sees them as potential allies in its rivalry with India."Clearly they have very strong concerns," a diplomat said, referring to the fissile issue. "This is a very fundamental and sensitive issue back in Pakistan." Pakistan blocked adoption of the conference's agenda for 2010, calling for the inclusion of additional items, after holding up negotiations last year because of national security concerns about the focus of the talks. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates sought to build bridges with the next generation of military leaders in Islamabad on Friday and end a "trust deficit" he said has hampered cooperation against Islamist militancy (Nebehay, 2010). Date: January 22, 2010 Source: The Diplomat, Luv Puri Title/Headline: India And Pakistan Are Nuclear States – Time To Accept It Abstract: In May 1998, surprise nuclear tests by India and Pakistan transformed regional strategic calculations and added a dangerous new dimension to tensions between the two. According to Taylor Branch, writing in The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History with the President, Indian officials who spoke with Bill Clinton were fully aware of the potential devastation a clash between the two nations could lead to, calculating that a doomsday nuclear volley would kill 300 to 500 million Indians while annihilating all 120 million Pakistanis (although the Pakistani side insisted its rugged mountain terrain would shield more survivors than the exposed plains of India). But regardless of the accuracy of these numbers, and although the two countries‘ military strategies differ, (India‘s is based on conventional superiority, while Pakistan tends to emphasize nuclear deterrence to cancel out this advantage) one thing is clear- the threat of nuclear terrorism looms large over both. In December 1998, Osama Bin Laden told Time magazine that acquiring weapons for the defence of Muslims is a religious duty. ‗If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty,‘ he is reported as saying. Even if the statement was merely rhetoric, it demonstrates intent. However, a number of reports suggest that Bin Laden‘s statement was more than just talk. In August 2001, two Pakistani scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudary Abdul Majeed, met Bin Laden and Mullah Omar in Afghanistan. The two scientists were detained on October 23, 2001, ‗for questioning.‘ Majid was a retired nuclear fuel expert from the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, while Mahmood worked on the secret Pakistani gas centrifuge program that ultimately produced the highly enriched uranium used in Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons. But even without acquiring access to weapons, there are other means of groups such as al-Qaeda engaging in nuclear terrorism. Radioactive dispersal devices, for example, are particularly suited to non-state actors as they are portable and can be used to meet one of the common aims of terrorism, which is to cause significant economic damage. Combined with an explosive device, RDDs can be used to create dirty bombs, which can cause both immediate casualties from their explosions and long-term health and psychological damages from radiation. Many analysts see Pakistan, and specifically Punjab province, as the most likely source of materials for extremists to undertake such attacks, and the precision of the recent terrorist attacks in Punjab on several Pakistani military facilities suggest there has been some inside help for militants. On October 10, for example, terrorists dressed as Pakistani soldiers entered the Pakistani Army‘s headquarters at Rawalpindi and killed six soldiers, including a brigadier. Subsequent investigations pointed to Illyas Kashmiri, who once served in the Army, as a potential suspect. Back in 2003, meanwhile, there was a suicide assassination attempt on then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf‘s convoy, from which he narrowly escaped. The investigation, as recorded in a book authored by Musharraf, led to the arrest of low-level army officers who had conspired with Islamists, and who were angry over his co-operation with the United States in cracking down on extremists in the tribal areas. In India, though, the threats have been more recent, and point to the bigger danger of the link between nuclear facilities and militants. Earlier this month, it was reported that the Lashkar-e-Taiba, an extremist group, is planning to target nuclear scientists (security has reportedly been tightened around several of the alleged targets) while there have also been reports of plans to strike the country‘s nuclear infrastructure. This all comes as India works to expand its nuclear capacity after receiving a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group‘s rules that allow its civilian nuclear deal with the United States to proceed, following strong US lobbying. India has signed treaties with several countries that will help it expand its nuclear infrastructure, but such an expansion needs to be matched by upgrades in security. Meanwhile, Bangladesh is also working to establish a civilian nuclear power plant after signing a memorandum of understanding on peaceful use of nuclear energy with Russia. Like India and Pakistan, it also faces the challenge of dealing with radicalized groups. Bringing India into the non-proliferation regime will be crucial if Pakistan is also to be drawn in, moves that would both help reduce the risk of nuclear conflict as well as the risk of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. India and Pakistan made a good start in the field of nuclear cooperation when they signed an agreement in 1989 not to attack each other‘s nuclear facilities. And in a more recent positive sign, in November 2008, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari stated Pakistan was willing to commit to a no first-use policy for its nuclear weapons-a policy he said he could secure backing from parliament for. However, only 4 days after the suggestion terrorists struck Mumbai, killing 176 people and stirring up tensions between the two. Pakistan‘s refusal to join the nuclear proliferation regime is also linked to India‘s rejection of the same system. Both countries are not bound by the conditions reached after the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was agreed, such as the 1997 Additional Protocol, to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. As a consequence, the continued exclusion of Pakistan and India from the non-proliferation regime is actually intensifying the nuclear arms race in South Asia. Bringing India into the regime will mean addressing its objections to becoming part of the arrangement-it believes that the non-proliferation regime is discriminatory as it is rooted in the NPT, which only gives nuclear weapons status to five countries. The United States has already taken a significant step toward accepting India through the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement, the framework for which was agreed in 2005. Here, the US defended the exception for India because of its impeccable record in non-proliferation. But the move in turn upset Pakistan, which argued the exceptional treatment for India risked triggering an arms race. It seems clear then that granting both countries de-facto nuclear weapons state status through suitable amendments to the NPT would be the best way of curbing the on-going arms race and reducing the threat of nuclear terrorism by making it easier for the International Atomic Energy Agency to hold the nuclear infrastructures of both countries to the highest scrutiny. Many nations may baulk at such a move. But the stakes are too high to not let pragmatism be the guiding basis for policy (Puri, 2010). Date: January 23, 2010 Source: Press TV Title: Pakistan Govt. Urged To Explain Blackwater Presence Abstract: US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates admitted that Xe Services and DynCorp have been operating in Pakistan. (Press TV, 2010). It is widely rumored that a majority of the ―terrorist‖ attacks in Pakistan are being committed by CIA and Blackwater/Xe Services. Should a Pakistani nuclear weapon disappear, the CIA and Xe Services should be the top suspects. Date: February 11, 2010 Source: Press TV Title/Headline: Biden: Pakistan Is My Greatest Concern Abstract: U.S. Vice President Joe Biden expressed serious concerns over the growing militancy in Pakistan and the fate of that country‘s nuclear weapons. Biden stated that, "I think it's a big country. It has nuclear weapons that are able to be deployed. It has a real significant minority of radicalized population." Biden added that Pakistan is not a completely functional democracy. "It is not a completely functional democracy in the sense we think about it, and so that's my greatest concern." His remarks came as the US Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair reassured that the Pakistani military is aware of the consequences of its nuclear arsenal falling into the wrong hands. Senior officials in Washington have long accused elements in the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of supporting extremists. President Barack Obama's administration has accused Pakistan of not doing enough to stem the flow of arms and support to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda across its borders (Press TV, 2010). Date: February 23, 2010 Source: CRS Report for Congress, Paul K. Kerr, Mary Beth Nikitin Title/Headline: Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation And Security Issues Abstract: Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent Pakistan‘s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed nuclear doctrine, but its ―minimum credible deterrent‖ is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent to Indian military action. Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs have improved Pakistan‘s security situation in recent years. Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan‘s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. Background: Chronic political instability in Pakistan and the current offensive against the Taliban in the northwest of the country have called attention to the issue of the security of the country‘s nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistan‘s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen described U.S. concern about the matter during a September 22, 2008, speech: To the best of my ability to understand it—and that is with some ability—the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven't changed. That said, they are their weapons. They're not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I've spoken with on both the military and civilian side understand that. U.S. officials continue to be concerned about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons in a destabilized Pakistan. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, testified March 31, 2009, that ―Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks.‖ Nevertheless, U.S. officials have generally expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons. President Obama addressed this issue in an April 29, 2009, press conference, stating, ―I‘m confident that we can make sure that Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily, initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We've got strong military-to-military consultation and cooperation.‖ He also recognized the sensitivity of the issue for Pakistan, saying, ―We want to respect their sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don't end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.‖ Declining to engage in ―hypotheticals‖ when asked if the United States is ready to secure the nuclear arsenal if the Pakistani government could not do so, President Obama said he felt ―confident that that nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.‖ General Petraeus reaffirmed this confidence on May 10, 2009: ―With respect to the—the nuclear weapons and—and sites that are controlled by Pakistan … we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.‖ Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a May 14, 2009, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. More recently, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence February 3, 2010, that ―from what we see of measures that they take,‖ Pakistan is keeping its nuclear weapons secure. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told a journalist that Islamabad has ―given State Department nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its onsite safety and security procedures,‖ but U.S. knowledge of Pakistan‘s arsenal remains limited, according to U.S. officials. Mullen stated that ―we‘re limited in what we actually know‖ about Islamabad‘s nuclear arsenal. Leon Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, similarly acknowledged in a May 18 speech that the United States does not possess the intelligence to locate all of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons-related sites. Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been on-going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Islamabad has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders. Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities, as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles—steps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad‘s nuclear arsenal. Nuclear Weapons: Pakistan‘s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that probably triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program.4 Deterring India‘s nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistan‘s inferior conventional forces are widely believed to be the primary missions for Islamabad‘s nuclear arsenal. Observers point to India‘s 1974 ―peaceful‖ nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is plutonium. The country‘s main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta; Pakistan may have other enrichment sites. Islamabad gained technology from many sources. This extensive assistance is reported to have included uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China, and missile technology from China. The United States had information during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing nuclear weapons designs, but exactly when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive device is unclear. A 1985 National Intelligence Council report stated that Pakistan ―probably has a workable design for a nuclear explosive device‖ and was ―probably ... a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough‖ highly enriched uranium for such a device. A 1987 National Security Council (NSC) memorandum described Pakistan‘s ―continued pursuit ... of its nuclear weapons option.‖ A 1993 NSC report to Congress stated that Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons efforts ―culminated with the capability to rapidly assemble a nuclear device if necessary by the end of the 1980s.‖ A.Q. Khan stated in an interview published in May 1998 that Islamabad ―attained‖ the capability to detonate such a device ―at the end of 1984.‖ Similarly, Khan reportedly stated during a January 2010 speech that Pakistan ―had become a nuclear power‖ in 1984 or 1985. U.S. and Pakistani officials who were in government in 1990 indicated during a 1994 meeting that Islamabad decided sometime after October 1989 to resume producing HEU11 (Pakistan had previously told the United States that it would produce only LEU12). However, another Pakistani official suggested during the same meeting that the decision may have happened sooner. In any case, President Bush‘s failure to certify in 1990 that Pakistan did not ―possess a nuclear explosive device‖ led to a cut-off in military and financial aid under the Pressler Amendment. When India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12, 1998, Pakistan‘s government responded two weeks later on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis.15 The United States imposed additional sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. According to most public estimates, Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons, though it could have more;16 a recent public estimate from two prominent experts on the subject stated that the country has between 70 and 90 nuclear weapons.17 Pakistan‘s nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU. Islamabad reportedly continues to produce HEU for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kilograms per year. Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads and continues to produce plutonium for weapons. Islamabad has received Chinese and European assistance for at least some of its plutonium program. The 40-50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor has been operating since 1998.20 It appears that Islamabad is constructing two additional heavy-water reactors, which will expand considerably Pakistan‘s plutonium production capacity, at the same site. Additionally, Pakistan has a reprocessing facility22 at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and is apparently constructing other such facilities. Nuclear Fuel reported in 2000 that, according to ―senior U.S. government officials,‖ Islamabad had begun operating a ―pilot-scale‖ reprocessing facility at the New Laboratories facility at PINSTECH. Pakistan also appears to be constructing a second reprocessing facility at the site and may be completing a reprocessing facility located at Chasma. Islamabad‘s construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities could indicate plans to increase and improve Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons arsenal in the near future. Indeed, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Maples told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that ―Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems.‖ Similarly, Admiral Mullen confirmed during the May 14 hearing that the United States has ―evidence‖ that Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal. Responding To India?: Pakistani officials have indicated that they have already determined the arsenal size needed for a minimum nuclear deterrent and that they will not engage in an arms race with India. The government‘s National Command Authority (NCA) ―expressed satisfaction‖ regarding ―the effectiveness of Pakistan‘s strategic deterrence,‖ according to a January 13, 2010, statement. Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India‘s nuclear arsenal. Islamabad may also accelerate its current nuclear weapons efforts. India has stated that it needs only a ―credible minimum deterrent,‖ but New Delhi has never defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both the agreement and associated 2008 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from some of its export guidelines will renew New Delhi‘s access to the international uranium market. This access will result in more indigenous Indian uranium available for weapons because it will not be consumed by India‘s newly safeguarded reactors. Pakistani officials have stated that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same. According to an April 2006 television broadcast, Pakistani officials from the government‘s NCA expressed ―concern‖ that the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement could tilt the strategic balance between India and Pakistan in favor of the former. The officials suggested that Islamabad may need to increase or improve its nuclear arsenal in order to ―to meet all requirements of minimum credible defencedeterrence.‖ Similarly, Pakistan‘s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wrote in July 2008 that the agreement could cause a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India. Moreover, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson indicated during a May 21, 2009, press briefing that, despite the government‘s continued opposition to a ―nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia,‖ Pakistan may need to increase its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian conventional and nuclear arms expansion. Illustrating this point, a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson reacted to India‘s July 26, 2009, launch of its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine by asserting that ―continued induction of new lethal weapon systems by India is detrimental to regional peace and stability,‖ adding that ―[w]ithout entering into an arms race with India, Pakistan will take all appropriate steps to safeguard its security and maintain strategic balance in South Asia.‖ The submarine, which has not yet been deployed, will reportedly be capable of carrying nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Similarly, according to the January 2010 statement, the NCA identified ―developments detrimental to the objectives of strategic stability in the region,‖ including India‘s acquisition of ―advanced weapons systems‖ and missile defense systems. The NCA also noted that the 2008 NSG decision described above, as well as subsequent nuclear fuel supply agreements that New Delhi has concluded with several governments, ―would enable India to produce substantial quantities of fissile material for nuclear weapons by freeing up its domestic resources.‖ The statement suggests that Pakistan could increase or improve its nuclear weapons in response to these developments, but does not explicitly say so. Whether and to what extent Pakistan‘s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the U.S.-India agreement is unclear, partly because descriptions of the government‘s decisions regarding those facilities are not publicly available. In addition to making qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could increase the number of circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons. For example, Peter Lavoy has argued that India‘s efforts to improve its conventional military capabilities could enable New Delhi to achieve ―technical superiority‖ in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as precision targeting, providing India with ―the capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically important targets in Pakistan.‖ Islamabad could respond by lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons, according to Lavoy. Indeed, a Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson warned in May 2009 that Islamabad could take this step. Nevertheless, Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons program apparently faces some budget constraints. Maples testified that ―the economic decline will likely slow‖ the government‘s progress in improving its nuclear and conventional military forces. Furthermore, Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program is reportedly facing ―severe financial cuts.‖ Delivery Vehicles: Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft controlled by the Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army. Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s purchased from the United States, provided that modifications are made. It is widely believed that Islamabad has made modifications to the F-16s previously sold to them.33 Although concerns have been raised about the impact of these sales on the strategic balance in South Asia,34 the U.S. government maintains that the sale of additional F- 16s to Pakistan will not alter the regional balance of power. The contract for provision of an additional 36 aircraft was signed on September 30, 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for those aircraft and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan‘s F-16A/B model aircraft. Pakistan‘s F-16 fleet will therefore be expanded, but it is unclear what portion of the fleet will be capable of a nuclear mission. Mirage III and V aircraft could also be used, although would have limited range. A-5‘s may have been modified to carry a nuclear payload. After India‘s first test of its Prithvi ballistic missile in 1988, Pakistan jump-started its own missile program and has three types of ballistic missiles thought to be nuclear-capable: the solid-fuel Hatf-III (Ghaznavi), with a range of about 400 kilometers; the solid-fuel Hatf-IV (Shaheen), with a range of over 450 kilometers; and the liquid-fuel Hatf-V (Ghauri), with an approximate range of almost 1,300 kilometers. The solid-fuel Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2) missile, when deployed, will be ―capable of reaching targets out to 2,000 kilometers,‖ Maples stated March 10, adding that Islamabad has made ―significant progress‖ on the missile. A 2009 National Air and Space Intelligence Center report appears to support this conclusion, stating that the missile ―probably will soon be deployed.‖ Islamabad continues to carry out ballistic missile tests, but notifies India in advance in accordance with an October 2005 bilateral missile pre-notification pact.41 Maples also indicated that Pakistan is developing nuclear-capable cruise missiles; the Babur (groundlaunched) and the Ra’ad (air-launched), both of which will have estimated ranges of 320 kilometers. Nuclear Doctrine: Pakistan‘s strategic doctrine is undeclared, and will probably remain so, but prominent officials and analysts have offered insights concerning its basic tenets. Describing the guiding principle as minimum credible nuclear deterrence, high-level officials‘ statements point to four policy objectives for Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia. Pakistani officials have also indicated that this nuclear posture is designed to preserve territorial integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter its main rival‘s conventional superiority. Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out firstuse against a nuclear-armed aggressor, such as India. Some analysts say this ambiguity serves to maintain deterrence against India‘s conventional superiority; the Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21 that ―there are acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry by our neighbour which will disturb the conventional balance between our two countries and hence, lower the nuclear threshold.‖ Other analysts argue that keeping the first-use option against New Delhi allows Islamabad to conduct sub-conventional operations, such as support for low intensity conflict or proxy war in Kashmir, while effectively deterring India at the strategic level. Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through pursuing a second strike capability, possibly building hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, deploying road-mobile missiles, deploying air defenses around strategic sites, and utilizing concealment measures. Command & Control: Pakistan‘s command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes strict operational security. The government‘s command and control system is based on ―C4I2SR‖ (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). Islamabad‘s Strategic Command Organization has a three-tiered structure, consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands. The NCA, established in 2000, supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan‘s organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as well as the military services that operate the strategic forces. The Prime Minister, as Head of Government, is Chairperson of the NCA. The NCA also includes the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Finance, the Director General of the SPD, and the Commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The final authority to launch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the NCA; the Chairperson must cast the final vote. The NCA is comprised of two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), each of which includes a mix of civilian and military officials. The ECC‘s functions include establishing a command and control system over the use of nuclear weapons. The DCC ―exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons.‖ The SPD is headed by a Director General from the Army and acts as the secretariat for the NCA. The SPD‘s functions include formulating Islamabad‘s nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine; developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their own strategic force command, but operational planning and control remains with the NCA. The SPD coordinates operational plans with the strategic forces commands. According to current and former Pakistani officials, Islamabad employs a system which requires that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons. On December 13, 2007, then- President Musharraf formalized these authorities and structure in the ―National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007.‖ The NCA was established by administrative order, but now has a legal basis. Analysts point out that the timing of this ordinance was meant to help the command and control system weather political transitions and potentially preserve the military‘s strong control over the system. The ordinance also addresses the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and personnel reliability. It outlines punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or leakage of ―secured information,‖ gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, states that punishment for these offenses can be up to 25 years imprisonment, and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws. As a result, Pakistani authorities say that the ordinance should strengthen their control over strategic organizations and their personnel. Security Concerns: According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons ―are probably stored in component form,‖ which suggests that the nuclear warheads are stored separately from delivery vehicles. According to some reports, the fissile cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives. But whether this is actually the case is unclear; one report states that the warheads and delivery vehicles are probably stored separately in facilities close to one another, but says nothing about the fissile cores. And, according to an account of a 2008 experts‘ group visit to Pakistan, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of the SPD, suggested that the nuclear warheads (containing the fissile cores) may be mated with their delivery vehicles. According to Kidwai, the report says, the SPD‘s official position is that the weapons ―will be ready when required, at the shortest notice; [but] the Pakistani doctrine is not endorsing a US-USSR model with weapons on hair trigger alert.‖ The 2001 Defense Department report says that Pakistan can probably assemble its weapons fairly quickly. It warrants mention that, although separate storage may provide a layer of protection against accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorized people to remove a weapon‘s fissile material core if it is not assembled. Dispersal of the assets may also create more potential access points for acquisition and may increase the risk of diversion. As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after September 11, 2001, President Musharraf reportedly ordered that Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal be redeployed to ―at least six secret new locations.‖ This action came at a time of uncertainly about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Islamabad‘s leadership was uncertain whether the United States would decide to conduct military strikes against Pakistan‘s nuclear assets if the government did not assist the United States against the Taliban. Indeed, President Musharraf cited protection of Pakistan‘s nuclear and missile assets as one of the reasons for Islamabad‘s dramatic policy shift. These events, in combination with the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 conflict with India at the Line of Control, and revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, inspired a variety of reforms to secure the nuclear complex. Risk of nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999 Kargil crisis, when the Pakistani military is believed to have begun preparing nuclear-tipped missiles. It should be noted that, even at the high alert levels of 2001 and 2002, there were no reports of Pakistan mating the warheads with delivery systems. In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of the country‘s arsenal if political instability were to persist. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then-President Musharraf claimed to be in firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the country. Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that ―a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country‘s President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief‖ could jeopardize the army‘s unity of command, which ―is essential for nuclear security.‖ During that time, U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons. Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, also has expressed fears that a radical regime could take power in Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons. Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis. However, U.S. intelligence officials have expressed greater confidence regarding the security of Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to Congress on November 7, 2007 said he believed that there is ―plenty of succession planning that‘s going on in the Pakistani military‖ and that Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons are under ―effective technical control.‖ Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience May 29, 2008, that the Pakistani military‘s control of the nuclear weapons is ―a good thing because that‘s an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years.‖ A Department of Defense spokesperson told reporters December 9, 2008, that Washington has ―no reason at this point to have any concern with regards to the security‖ of Islamabad‘s nuclear arsenal. More recently, Maples stated March 10, 2009, that Islamabad ―has taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons,‖ although he pointed out that ―vulnerabilities exist.‖ Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 21, 2010, interview that the United States is ―very comfortable with the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons.‖ Other governments have also voiced opinions regarding the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal. For example, Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said that the arsenal is safe and has adequate checks and balances. Similarly, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons ―are under pretty close lock and key.‖ Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, however, sounded somewhat less optimistic in a March 24, 2009, television interview, stating that Moscow is ―very much concerned‖ about the security of Pakistan‘s arsenal. Pakistani officials have consistently expressed confidence in the security of the country‘s nuclear arsenal. Then-President Musharraf stated in November 2007 that Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons are under ―total custodial controls.‖ More recently, President Asif Ali Zardari told CNN December 2, 2008, that the country‘s nuclear command and control system ―is working well.‖ Additionally, a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21, 2009, that ―there is simply no question of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. We have full confidence in our procedures, mechanisms and command and control systems.‖ In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons could also be jeopardized by another conflict between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argued, explaining that an ―escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons.‖ This is because [w]hen tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan‘s nuclear deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan‘s main nuclear weapon storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites—and therefore targeted by opposing forces—the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily-guarded storage sites. Weapons and launchers in motion are also more susceptible to ―insider‖ threats and accidents. Such a war, Krepon added, would also place stress on the army‘s unity of command. Krepon has also pointed out that Islamabad faces a dilemma, because less-dispersed nuclear weapons may be more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India. U.S. Assistance & Pakistani Nuclear Security: U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of control by the Pakistani government were famously addressed during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice‘s confirmation hearing in January 2005. In response to a question from Senator John Kerry asking what would happen to Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons in the event of a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad, Secretary Rice answered, ―We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it.‖ On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson said, ―Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its strategic assets and sovereignty,‖ emphasizing that Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons have been under ―strong multi-layered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998.‖ The issue of U.S. contingency plans to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto‘s assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan‘s government. More recently, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, responding to a report detailing alleged U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabad‘s nuclear weapons, stated November 8, 2009, that Pakistan ―does not require any foreign assistance in this regard.‖ Pakistan will never ―allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities,‖ the spokesperson said, adding that ―no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenal with US officials.‖ U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stated the same day that the United States ―has no intention to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons or material.‖ Gates stated during the January 2010 television interview that the United States has ―no intention or desire to take over any of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons.‖ The United States reportedly offered Pakistan nuclear security assistance soon after September 11, 2001. U.S. assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines, has reportedly included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of storage facilities and personnel reliability. Some press reports say that the United States provided Pakistan with Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003, although former Pakistani military officials have said Pakistan has developed PALs for its warheads without assistance. PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. As noted above, Islamabad employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons. Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad is the responsibility of a 10,000- member security force, commanded by a two-star general. Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview that there has been U.S. assistance in this area, explaining that the United States was unlikely to intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because ―we have spent considerable time with the Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those.‖ Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed out in May 2009 that ―there‘s not a lot of transparency into‖ how Islamabad spends the U.S. funds, but he nevertheless characterized them as ―money well spent.‖ A Pakistani official said in November 2009 that Pakistan reserves the right to ―pick and choose‖ the nuclear security measures it will undertake, adding that Islamabad will only accept such measures that are ―nonintrusive.‖ The extent to which Pakistan has shared information about its nuclear arsenal with the United States is unclear. Although, as noted, former President Musharraf has acknowledged Islamabad‘s sharing of some information, General Tariq Majid, Chair of Pakistan‘s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated November 9, 2009, that ―there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear assets.‖ The U.S. government has also reportedly offered assistance to secure or destroy radioactive materials that could be used to make a radioactive dispersal device, and to ship highly enriched uranium used in the Pakistani civilian nuclear sector out of the country. Pakistan‘s response to these proposals is unclear. It is worth noting that, according to some observers, spent fuel from Pakistan‘s Karachi and Chasma nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to theft or attack. Pakistani officials have expressed confidence in the security of its facilities, however. Proliferation Threat: Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment. Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States ―received fragmentary information from an intelligence service‖ that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had ―sent emissaries to establish contact‖ with the network. Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda ―had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.‖ Tenet explains that these scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network. The current status of Pakistan‘s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official U.S. reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007, statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that ―Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.‖ More recently, a January 12, 2009, State Department press release said that the network ―is no longer operating.‖ For its part, Pakistan‘s Foreign Office stated February 7, 2009, that Pakistan ―has dismantled the nuclear black market network.‖ Asked during a July 20, 2009, interview whether North Korea was transferring ―nuclear weapons‖ or related advice to North Korea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton replied that there is ―no evidence‖ that Pakistan is doing so. However, when asked about the network‘s current status during a July 25, 2007, Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that: I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it‘s my understanding based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I‘m not sure I could say that. Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007 report that ―at least some of Khan‘s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could ... resume their black-market business.‖ Asked about Pakistan‘s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States has not had ―personal, consistent access‖ to Khan, but added that he did not ―have all the details of everything we‘ve done.‖ Similarly, the IAEA has not yet been able to interview Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative with the agency‘s investigation of Iran‘s nuclear program. Khan himself told Dawn News TV May 29, 2008, that he would not cooperate with U.S. or IAEA investigators. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan investigation ―closed‖—a position an Office spokesperson reiterated February 6, 2009. The State Department announced January 12, 2009, that it was imposing sanctions on 13 individuals and three companies for their involvement in the Khan network. The sanctions were imposed under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and Executive Orders 12938 and 13382. Pakistan‘s Response To The Proliferation Threat: Undersecretary Burns testified in July 2007 that the Bush administration has ―told the Pakistani government that it is its responsibility ... to make sure‖ that neither the Khan network nor a ―similar organization‖ resurfaces in the country. Since the revelations about the Khan network, Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But whether and to what extent these efforts have been successful is not yet clear. It is worth noting that, because Khan conducted his proliferation activities as a government official, they do not necessarily indicate a failure of Islamabad‘s export controls. Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. For example, Islamabad adopted in September 2004 new national export controls legislation which includes a requirement that the government issue control lists for ―goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, [and] use‖ of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. According to a February 2008 presentation by Zafar Ali, Director of Pakistan‘s Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV), the lists, which were issued in October 2005 and are to be periodically updated, include items controlled by multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and end-user certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its adoption, Pakistan has established the SECDIV and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for formulating rules and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of officials from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan‘s Foreign Secretary. Islamabad says that it has also taken several other steps to improve its nuclear security. For example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is ―implementing a National Security Action Plan with the [IAEA‘s] assistance.‖ That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S.- and Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. As noted above, the December 2007 National Command Authority Ordinance also includes measures to prevent the spread of nuclearrelated materials and expertise. Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making security clearance procedures more stringent. Issues For Congress: Members of Congress have also expressed concerns regarding the security of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons and related material. Senator Richard Lugar has spoken out in favor of using the cooperative threat reduction tools in Pakistan to help with the security of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials and weapons in the country. Additionally, a number of pieces of legislation appear designed to influence Islamabad‘s policies regarding the Khan network. Section 2 of H.R. 1463, which was introduced March 12, 2009, and referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the same day, states that U.S. military assistance may be provided to Pakistan only if the President certifies that Islamabad is both making A.Q. Khan available to the United States for questioning and ―providing adequate assurances to the United States Government that it will monitor Khan‘s movements and activities in such a manner as to prevent his participation in any efforts to disseminate nuclear technology or know-how.‖ This section allows the President to waive restrictions on U.S. assistance imposed pursuant to the proposed legislation if the President ―certifies to Congress that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so.‖ H.R. 2481, the United States-Pakistan Security and Stability Act, which was introduced May 19, 2009, and referred the same day to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Intelligence Committee, would require the President to ―develop and transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan for long-term security and stability in Pakistan.‖ The strategy is to include a ―description of how United States assistance‖ authorized by the bill ―will be used to achieve the objectives of United States policy toward Pakistan,‖ one of which is ―to empower and enable‖ Islamabad to ―maintain robust command and control over its nuclear weapons technology.‖ The bill would authorize foreign assistance for Pakistan, including funds for improving the government‘s counter- insurgency capability. H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009, would authorize U.S. assistance to Pakistan for a variety of purposes. These include strengthening democratic institutions and law enforcement, as well as supporting economic development, education, human rights, and heath care. The bill would also authorize additional U.S. security assistance for Islamabad. However, Section 206 of the bill places conditions on some of this assistance; it states that no U.S. military assistance shall be provided to Pakistan if the President has not made a series of determinations, one of which is that the government ―is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons related materials, including, as necessary, providing access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.‖ The section includes a national security waiver. The bill also requires a report to Congress that includes a ―description of Pakistan‘s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise‖ and an ―assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan pursuant to this Act has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program.‖ The committee report underlines continuing concerns about getting full information about the activities of the Khan network and development of Pakistan‘s own nuclear arsenal: Pakistan‘s history of nuclear development and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan‘s establishment of a nuclear proliferation network remain a source for concern to many in the United States, particularly since the Committee understands that representatives of the United States have not interviewed certain individuals involved in the network. The Committee believes the United States should continue to engage the Government of Pakistan on the network, and should, as necessary, obtain direct access to the individuals covered by this subsection, including Dr. Khan. The Committee also maintains strong concerns regarding recent reports of Pakistan expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Given the expanding threat of Pakistan‘s domestic insurgency, the Government of Pakistan‘s further development of nuclear materials appears inconsistent with its immediate security threats and is unhelpful in the context of efforts to strengthen U.S.-Pakistani relations. H.R. 1886 was introduced April 2, 2009, and referred the same day to both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Rules Committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported the bill May 22, and the Rules Committee discharged it the same day. The bill was referred to the House Armed Services Committee May 22 and discharged June 2. On June 11, the House passed H.R. 1886, which was appended to H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011. H.R. 2410 has been received by the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Senate passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 962) unanimously on June 24, 2009. This bill would provide aid to Pakistan but does not include conditions regarding the nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear weapons activities. The Senate report (S.Rept. 111-33) says that ―Any use of funds contained in this legislation for the purpose of augmenting Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program would be directly contrary to Congressional intent.‖ S. 1707, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 represents a compromise between H.R. 1886 and S. 962. It passed the Senate by unanimous consent on September 24, 2009. The House passed the bill on September 30. It became public law (P.L. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060) on October 15, 2009. Section 203 (c) of S. 1707 requires that the President certifies that Pakistan is ―continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.‖ It also requires a Semi- Annual Monitoring Report that would include a detailed description of Pakistan‘s nuclear nonproliferation efforts and an assessment of whether assistance has ―directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan‘s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program.‖ In response to concerns expressed in Pakistan over the intent of the bill, a ―Joint Explanatory Statement‖ was submitted for the Congressional Record by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Howard Berman. The Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues Congressional Research Service 20 statement emphasizes that ―the legislation does not seek in any way to compromise Pakistan‘s sovereignty, impinge on Pakistan‘s national security interests, or micromanage any aspect of Pakistani military or civilian operations.‖ Regarding reporting requirements on nuclear nonproliferation cooperation, the statement says: The many requirements of this report are intended as a way for Congress to assess how effectively U.S. funds are being spent, shortfalls in U.S. resources that hinder the use of such funds, and steps the Government of Pakistan has taken to advance our mutual interests in countering extremism and nuclear proliferation and strengthening democratic institutions. There is no intent to, and nothing in this Act in any way suggests that there should be, any U.S. role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military. Date: May 3, 2010 Source: Infowars Title/Headline: Taliban Claim Unverified Responsibility: Times Square Car Bomb, Prelude To Nuclear Attack? Abstract: Saturday evening a car was found by police to contain gunpowder, propane and a crude timer according to the NYPD. A mounted police officer now identified as Wade Rattagan, observed smoke coming from a sport utility vehicle with hazard lights flashing at 6:30 pm, in addition to a statement that an official made from Department of Homeland Security who wasn‘t authorized to release the information and spoke on condition of anonymity to reporters. Police evacuated a number of residential and commercial buildings and cleared the streets of thousands people with militarized police deployed around the area with what is described as heavy automatic weapons according to bystanders. One male tourist said it looked like something you would see in a hollywood movie. Federal agents responded with the NYPD and Paul Bresson, head of public affairs office at FBI headquarters in Washington said, ―the matter is being taken seriously‖. Tourists reported hearing a small explosion hours after the car was first located. The area that was closed is home to several major Broadway shows, with seven theaters. The SUV itself is unidentified and the license plate was stolen from another vehicle. Police made contact with the person that had taken the original car with the plate to a junk yard. The Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) was removed and the fact that the hazard lights were left on raise questions about the premeditation of this event. Earlier this week a story broke with U.S. Military sources leaking a document detailing an exercise simulating a military response to Tea Party activists and tax protestors at Fort Knox. The document demonstrated that detention centers would be readied for mass arrests as well as other Military LEO‘s being on standby. The document though an exercise, simulated activists as an enemy as military would have access to ammunition draws for engagement. It is now public that the attempted bombing of a Detroit bound airliner in December 2009 had been orchestrated by rogue elements inside the U.S. Federal Government with ties to Israel, to further the expansion of domestic police state measures. It is also notable that about a week ago a man was arrested for possessing sodium cyanide on the NY Subway raising questions regarding whether both events are linked and if there is federal involvement. Military sources tell us there is little practical use for a terrorist to target civilians as it would only garner public support for the U.S. Government suggesting that this could likely be staged or the work of a disgruntled amateur. Claims that Pakistani Taliban admit responsibility for the New York attack in revenge for the two leaders al-Baghdadi and al-Mahajer and Muslim martyrs is unverified and purportedly said a statement on a website commonly used by Islamists as reported by Reuters Sunday. Conflicting reports indicate that Pakistani Taliban deny responsibility for the attack. Fears that Pakistani Taliban may obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan‘s Government have been expressed by the Obama Administration. It is highly likely that a nuclear or biological device will be detonated in a major U.S. city by 2013 according to a bipartisan panel on Tuesday, December 02, 2008. The report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, led by former Sens. Bob Graham of Florida and Jim Talent of Missouri, acknowledged that terrorists still lack the needed scientific and technical ability to make weapons out of pathogens or nuclear bombs (Infowars, 2010). Date: August 29, 2010 Source: Veterans Today, Gordon Duff Title/Headline: Crash Of Airbus 320 Outside Islamabad Now Believed Hijacked, Heading For Nuke Facility Abstract: Informed sources in the Government of Pakistan have told Veterans Today that they are developing ―hard evidence‖ indicating the Air Blue Airbus 320 that crashed July 28th outside Islamabad was a terrorist hijacking tied to rogue American security forces operating inside that country. Sources indicate that the plane crash was an unsuccessful hijacking attempt intended to crash into the nuclear weapons facility at Kahuta, outside Islamabad. Such an attack may have been blamed on India and would likely have led to retaliation which could easily have escalated to a nuclear exchange between these two nations that have spent decades at each other‘s throats. Suspicions were raised inside Pakistan‘s military and intelligence organizations when American military contractors employed by Blackwater/Xe showed up on the scene immediately after the crash, seizing the black box and ―other materials.‖ There is no confirmation that parachutes or electronic equipment had been removed when Blackwater/Xe security relinquished control of the crash scene to Pakistani investigators. Royal Television in Islamabad, owned by the brother of the head of Pakistan‘s powerful JI (Jamate Islami), the Islamic political party, has reported that investigations are underway tying American based contractors to the planning of the attack. Pakistan‘s ISRP (Inter-Services Public Relations) has failed to confirm this but private sources indicate that an active investigation of these allegations is, not only underway but has established ties between an American group and the hijackers. Military and intelligence officials inside Pakistan, in concert with the American embassy, are withholding all official details of the investigation and are likely to continue doing so. This same facility had been the subject of an armed penetration by American contractors, believed to be employed by the State Department, in 2009. Four Blackwater employees, armed and possessing explosives were arrested outside the Kahuta nuclear facility in 2009. The four, driving a Jeep 4×4 and possessing advanced surveillance and jamming equipment of Israeli manufacture, were intercepted 1.5 miles from the Kahuta nuclear facility. The four spoke fluent Pushtu and were dressed in a manner as to resemble Taliban fighters. The order for their release, given by Minister of the Interior Rehman Malik, is an issue of considerable controversy between the civilian government in Pakistan and the powerful military. The passenger jet with 152 on board slammed into a hillside in what was believed to be Pakistan‘s most serious air crash. At least 2 Americans were believed to be on board but, a month later, the US Embassy in Islamabad has left this unconfirmed. Reports received today, however, confirm that at least 5 Americans, military contractors said to be employed by Xe, may also have been on the craft but could not be identified as they had been traveling in local garb and had boarded with false identification. Xe is an American based military and intelligence contracting firm formerly known as Blackwater and has been the subject of considerable controversy for activities inside Pakistan. Sources indicate that the attackers stormed the cockpit in a hijacking attempt. The pilot is said to have jammed the flight controls, careening the Airbus 320 and all aboard into a hillside rather than allowing the plane to be used in a ―9/11″ type attack inside Pakistan or flown into Indian air space for a repeat of the 2008 Mumbai attack. Pakistan has, at times in error, referred to American contractors employed by the Departments of Defense, State or the Central Intelligence Agency as Blackwater. However, it is believed the majority of such employees are, in fact, members of that organization or is derivitive, Xe. The same group, often criticized for irregularities in Iraq, has been contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency to operate Predator drones inside Pakistan, operations that have resulted in a significant number of civilian deaths and said by political leaders of several factions to do little but recruit terrorists (Duff, 2010). Date: October 10, 2010 Source: Telegraph, Praveen Swami Title/Headline: Pakistan's Nuclear Arms Push Angers America Abstract: The Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based nuclear watchdog, has obtained satellite images showing that a row of cooling towers at Pakistan's secret Khushab-III reactor has been completed. This suggests the plant could begin operation within months, allowing Pakistan substantially to increase its stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium. Last year, Barack Obama, US president, called for "a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials". In response, the Conference on Disarmament, a 64-nation coalition that negotiated the 1992 Chemical Weapons convention and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, agreed to negotiate a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, intended to cap production of weapons-grade enriched uranium and most forms of plutonium. But Pakistan, which is deepening its nuclear ties to China, has blocked the Conference on Disarmament from starting discussions, saying a cut-off would hurt its national security interests. Ashley Tellis, a scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "Pakistan thinks it‘s going to be forced to cap its fissile material stocks and wants to make sure it has as much as it can get before then." The country's position has frustrated many states. Rose Gottmeiler, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, recently warned that her country's "patience is running out". Khushab-III is the latest in a series of reactors built to feed Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Khushab-II, located next to its new sister plant, became operational in February. The plutonium produced at the complex allows for the construction of small but lethal weapons: a single kilogram can produce an explosion equal to 20,000 tons of conventional explosives. Work at Khushab III has forged ahead even as Pakistan struggles to cope with floods that have inflicted damage estimated at £27 billion–and amid mounting concerns over the long-term security of the strife-devastated country's nuclear arsenal. Pakistan argues that its nuclear weapons programme is necessary to counter the superior conventional forces of India, its historic adversary. In a recent report published by the prestigious Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris estimated it had assembled 70-90 nuclear warheads to India's 60-80, and had produced enough fissile material to manufacture another 90 more. The Obama administration is also disturbed by Chinese plans to build two new nuclear reactors in Pakistan, bypassing Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules that bar sales of nuclear equipment to states that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India, which along with Israel and Pakistan has refused to sign the NPT, recently obtained a waiver from the NSG allowing sales under international safeguards. China, however, says it does not need NSG permission to sell reactors to Pakistan, arguing it had committed to the deal before it joined the NSG in 2004–a claim the United States disputes (Swami, 2010). Date: November 29, 2010 Source: The New York Times, Jane Perlez, David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt. Title/Headline: Nuclear Fuel Memos Expose Wary Dance With Pakistan Abstract: Less than a month after President Obama testily assured reporters in 2009 that Pakistan‘s nuclear materials ―will remain out of militant hands,‖ his ambassador here sent a secret message to Washington suggesting that she remained deeply worried. The ambassador‘s concern was a stockpile of highly enriched uranium, sitting for years near an aging research nuclear reactor in Pakistan. There was enough to build several ―dirty bombs‖ or, in skilled hands, possibly enough for an actual nuclear bomb. In the cable, dated May 27, 2009, the ambassador, Anne W. Patterson, reported that the Pakistani government was yet again dragging its feet on an agreement reached two years earlier to have the United States remove the material. She wrote to senior American officials that the Pakistani government had concluded that ―the ‗sensational‘ international and local media coverage of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons made it impossible to proceed at this time.‖ A senior Pakistani official, she said, warned that if word leaked out that Americans were helping remove the fuel, the local press would certainly ―portray it as the United States taking Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons.‖ The Fuel Is Still There: It may be the most unnerving evidence of the complex relationship — sometimes cooperative, often confrontational, always wary — between America and Pakistan nearly 10 years into the American-led war in Afghanistan. The cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to a number of news organizations, make it clear that underneath public reassurances lie deep clashes over strategic goals on issues like Pakistan‘s support for the Afghan Taliban and tolerance of Al Qaeda, and Washington‘s warmer relations with India, Pakistan‘s archenemy. Written from the American Embassy in Islamabad, the cables reveal American maneuvering as diplomats try to support an unpopular elected government that is more sympathetic to American aims than is the real power in Pakistan, the army and intelligence agency so crucial to the fight against militants. The cables show just how weak the civilian government is: President Asif Ali Zardari told Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. that he worried that the military might ―take me out.‖ Frustration at American inability to persuade the Pakistani Army and intelligence agency to stop supporting the Afghan Taliban and other militants runs through the reports of meetings between American and Pakistani officials. That frustration preoccupied the Bush administration and became an issue for the incoming Obama administration, the cables document, during a trip in January 2009 that Mr. Biden made to Pakistan 11 days before he was sworn in. In a meeting with Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army chief of staff, Mr. Biden asked several times whether Pakistan and the United States ―had the same enemy as we move forward.‖ ―The United States needs to be able to make an objective assessment of Pakistan‘s part of the bargain,‖ Mr. Biden said, according to a Feb. 6, 2009, cable. General Kayani tried to reassure him, saying, ―We are on the same page in Afghanistan, but there might be different tactics.‖ Mr. Biden replied that ―results‖ would test that. The cables reveal at least one example of increased cooperation, previously undisclosed, under the Obama administration. Last fall, the Pakistani Army secretly allowed 12 American Special Operations soldiers to deploy with Pakistani troops in the violent tribal areas near the Afghan border. The Americans were forbidden to conduct combat missions. Even though their numbers were small, their presence at army headquarters in Bajaur, South Waziristan and North Waziristan was a ―sea change in thinking,‖ the embassy reported. The embassy added its usual caution: The deployments must be kept secret or the ―Pakistani military will likely stop making requests for such assistance.‖ Within the past year, however, Pakistan and the United States have gingerly started to publicly acknowledge the role of American field advisers. Lt. Col. Michael Shavers, an American military spokesman in Islamabad, said in a statement that ―at the request of the Pakistanis,‖ small teams of Special Operations forces ―move to various locations with their Pakistani military counterparts throughout Pakistan.‖ Moreover, last week in a report to Congress on operations in Afghanistan, the Pentagon said that the Pakistani Army had also accepted American and coalition advisers in Quetta. The cables do not deal with the sharp increase under Mr. Obama in drone attacks against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the tribal areas with Pakistan‘s tacit approval. That is because the cables are not classified at the highest levels. A Deep Skepticism: Over all, though, the cables portray deep skepticism that Pakistan will ever cooperate fully in fighting the full panoply of extremist groups. This is partly because Pakistan sees some of the strongest militant groups as insurance for the inevitable day that the United States military withdraws from Afghanistan — and Pakistan wants to exert maximum influence inside Afghanistan and against Indian intervention. Indeed, the consul general in Peshawar wrote in 2008 that she believed that some members of the Haqqani network — one of the most lethal groups attacking American and Afghan soldiers — had left North Waziristan to escape drone strikes. Some family members, she wrote, relocated south of Peshawar; others lived in Rawalpindi, where senior Pakistani military officials also live. In one cable, Ms. Patterson, a veteran diplomat who left Islamabad in October after a three-year stint as ambassador, said more money and military assistance would not be persuasive. ―There is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance levels in any field as sufficient compensation for abandoning support for these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India.‖ In a rare tone of dissent with Washington, she said Pakistan would only dig in deeper if America continued to improve ties with India, which she said ―feeds Pakistani establishment paranoia and pushes them closer to both Afghan and Kashmir focused terrorist groups.‖ The groups Ms. Patterson referred to were almost certainly the Haqqani network of the Afghan Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group financed by Pakistan in the 1990s to fight India in Kashmir that is accused of the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India. The highly enriched uranium that Ms. Patterson wanted removed from the research reactor came from the United States in the mid-1960s. In those days, under the Atoms for Peace program, little thought was given to proliferation, and Pakistan seemed too poor and backward to join the nuclear race. But by May 2009, all that had changed, and her terse cable to the State and Defense Departments, among others, touched every nerve in the fraught relationship: mutual mistrust, the safety of the world‘s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, broken promises and a pervasive fear that any talk about Pakistan‘s vulnerability would end whatever cooperation existed. The reactor had been converted to use low-enriched uranium, well below bomb grade, in 1990, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or I.A.E.A. But the bomb-grade uranium had never been returned to the United States and remains in storage nearby. Ms. Patterson‘s cable noted that Pakistan had ―agreed in principle to the fuel removal in 2007.‖ But time and again the Pakistanis balked, and she reported that an interagency group within the Pakistani government had decided to cancel a visit by American technical experts to get the fuel out of the country. She concluded that ―it is clear that the negative media attention has begun to hamper U.S. efforts to improve Pakistan‘s nuclear security and nonproliferation practices.‖ Any progress, she suggested, would have to await a ―more conducive‖ political climate. On Monday, Pakistan‘s Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement confirming that ―the US suggestion to have the fuel transferred was plainly refused by Pakistan.‖ It said that the United States had provided the fuel but did not mention that, under the terms of such transfers, the United States retained the right to have the spent fuel returned. The ambassador‘s comments help explain why Mr. Obama and his aides have expressed confidence in Pakistan‘s nuclear security when asked in public. But at the beginning of the administration‘s review of its Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy, a highly classified intelligence report delivered to Mr. Obama said that while Pakistan‘s weapons were well secured, there was deep, continuing concern about ―insider access,‖ meaning elements in the military or intelligence services. In fact, Ms. Patterson, in a Feb. 4, 2009, cable, wrote that ―our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in GOP [government of Pakistan] facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon.‖ Mr. Obama‘s review concluded by determining that there were two ―vital‖ American interests in the region. One was defeating Al Qaeda. The second, not previously reported, was making sure terrorists could never gain access to Pakistan‘s nuclear program. That goal was classified, to keep from angering Islamabad. Asked about the status of the fuel at the research reactor, Damien LaVera, a spokesman for the National Nuclear Security Administration of the Energy Department, said, ―The United States supplied Pakistan with fuel for a research reactor decades ago for the purpose of producing medical isotopes and scientific research.‖ Implicitly acknowledging that the material remains there, Mr. LaVera said ―the fuel is under I.A.E.A. safeguards and has not been part of Pakistan‘s nuclear weapons program.‖ One secret cable offers another glimpse into another element of the nuclear gamesmanship between the United States and its Pakistani allies: Even while American officials were trying to persuade Pakistani officials to give up nuclear material, they were quietly seeking to block Pakistan from trying to buy material that would help it produce tritium, the crucial ingredient needed to increase the power of nuclear weapons. After providing specific details of the proposed sale, a Dec. 12, 2008, secret cable to the American Embassy in Singapore, seeking help to stop a transaction that was about to take place, concluded, ―We would have great concern over Pakistan‘s potential use of tritium to advance its nuclear weapons program.‖ Reports Of Army Abuses: The cables also reveal that the American Embassy had received credible reports of extrajudicial killings of prisoners by the Pakistani Army more than a year before the Obama administration publicly acknowledged the problem and before a video that is said to show such killings surfaced on the Internet. The killings are another source of tension, complicated by American pressure on Pakistan to be more aggressive in confronting militants on its own soil. In a Sept. 10, 2009, cable labeled ―secret/noforn,‖ meaning that it was too delicate to be shared with foreign governments, the embassy confronted allegations of human rights abuses in the Swat Valley and the tribal areas since the Pakistani Army had begun fighting the Taliban a few months earlier. While carefully worded, the cable left little doubt about what was going on. It spoke of a ―growing body of evidence‖ that gave credence to the allegations. ―The crux of the problem appears to center on the treatment of terrorists detained in battlefield operations and have focused on the extrajudicial killing of some detainees,‖ the cable said. ―The detainees involved were in the custody of Frontier Corps or Pakistan army units.‖ The Frontier Corps is a paramilitary force partly financed by the United States to fight the insurgents. The Pakistani Army was holding as many as 5,000 ―terrorist detainees,‖ the cable said, about twice as many as the army had acknowledged. Concerned that the United States should not offend the Pakistani Army, the cable stressed that any talk of the killings must be kept out of the press. ―Post advises that we avoid comment on these incidents to the extent possible and that efforts remain focused on dialogue and the assistance strategy,‖ the ambassador wrote. This September, however, the issue exploded into public view when a video emerged showing Pakistani soldiers executing six unarmed young men in civilian clothes. In October, the Obama administration suspended financing to half a dozen Pakistani Army units believed to have killed civilians or unarmed prisoners. The cables verge on gossipy, as diplomats strained to understand the personalities behind the fractious Pakistani government, and particularly two men: General Kayani and President Zardari. Often, the United States finds that Mr. Zardari, the accidental leader after the assassination of his wife, Benazir Bhutto, is sympathetic to American goals — stiff sanctions on terrorist financing, the closing down of terrorist training camps — but lacks the power to fulfill his promises against resistance from the military and intelligence agencies. Mr. Zardari‘s chief antagonist, General Kayani, emerges as a stubborn guarantor of what he sees as Pakistan‘s national interest, an army chief who meddles in civilian politics but stops short of overturning the elected order. Early in the Obama administration, General Kayani made clear a condition for improved relations. As the director general of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, from 2004 to 2007, he did not want a ―reckoning with the past,‖ said a cable in 2009 introducing him to the new administration. ―Kayani will want to hear that the United States has turned the page on past ISI operations,‖ it said. General Kayani was probably referring to the peace accords with the Taliban from 2004 to 2007 that resulted in the strengthening of the militants. If the general seems confidently in charge, the cables portray Mr. Zardari as a man not fully aware of his weakness. At one point he said he would not object if Abdul Qadeer Khan, revered in Pakistan as the father of its nuclear weapons program, were interviewed by the International Atomic Energy Agency but tacitly acknowledged that he was powerless to make that happen. Mr. Zardari, who spent 11 years in prison on ultimately unproved corruption charges, feared for his position and possibly — the wording is ambiguous — his life: the cables reveal that Vice President Biden told Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain in March 2009 that Mr. Zardari had told him that the ―ISI director and Kayani will take me out.‖ His suspicions were not groundless. In March 2009, a period of political turmoil, General Kayani told the ambassador that he ―might, however reluctantly,‖ pressure Mr. Zardari to resign and, the cable added, presumably leave Pakistan. He mentioned the leader of a third political party, Asfandyar Wali Khan, as a possible replacement. ―Kayani made it clear regardless how much he disliked Zardari he distrusted Nawaz even more,‖ the ambassador wrote, a reference to Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister. By 2010, after many sessions with Mr. Zardari, Ms. Patterson had revised the guarded optimism that characterized her early cables about Mr. Zardari. ―Pakistan‘s civilian government remains weak, ineffectual and corrupt,‖ she wrote on Feb. 22, 2010, the eve of a visit by the F.B.I. director, Robert S. Mueller III. ―Domestic politics is dominated by uncertainty about the fate of President Zardari.‖ That assessment holds more than eight months later, even as Mr. Obama in October extended an invitation to Mr. Zardari to visit the White House next year, as the leader of a nation that holds a key to peace in Afghanistan but appears too divided and mistrustful to turn it for the Americans (Perlez, Sanger, & Schmitt, 2010). Date: December 21, 2010 Source: Telegraph Title/Headline: Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile Abstract: Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani said the successful missile test proved that the country's defence capability is invincible and "should never be challenged". The Pakistan military released a statement which said that the Ghauri Hatf 5 missile has a range of 800 miles, and has the capability to carry nuclear and conventional warheads. Mr Gilani made it clear that nuclear deterrence would form the basis of Pakistan's security policy, assuring that the programme would be developed and its nuclear capabilities enhanced. He stated that Pakistan had no intention of using the missiles aggressively. Pakistan and their neighbours, India, have routinely carried out missile tests since both displayed nuclear capabilities in 1998. The Prime Minister congratulated the engineers and scientists who built the bomb for making the nation "proud", stating that they had help ensure the future safety of Pakistan (Telegraph, 2010). Conclusion: Pakistan is clearly the Nuclear Terror Scapegoat, and will be definitely be retaliated against with nuclear weapons by the Obama administration if a nuke goes off in America. Millions of people will die in this scenario, and America will then be scapegoated as the aggressor who attacked with no sustentative evidence. In this scenario, Pakistan and the American people lose. The sole winners in this particular scenario are individuals laid out in Chapter 43: The Unusual Suspects.
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