SUDAN INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY PROGRAMME FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION

Khartoum Food Aid Forum 6-8 June, 2006 BACKGROUND PAPER SUDAN: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY PROGRAMME FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION FOR ACTION (SIFSIA) Programme Document for Northern Sudan (30 November 2005) The World Food Programme (WFP) has organized a Food Aid Forum from 6-8 June 2006 in Khartoum, as part of an ongoing process to develop the long-term strategy of WFP in Sudan. In support of the Forum, a series Background papers on national food security strategies are being made available. In line with the objectives of the Forum, it is hoped that these papers will help inform a strategic framework offering direction to WFP Sudan through 2011 consistent with national priorities, and improve the understanding of the role and impact of WFP programmes in Sudan. 1 SUDAN: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY PROGRAMME FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION FOR ACTION (SIFSIA) PROGRAMME DOCUMENT FOR NORTHERN SUDAN (30 NOVEMBER 2005) 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background The Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action1(SIFSIA) is to be seen in the framework of the overall objective of the European Commission‘s development assistance to Sudan, that is consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development. The EC assistance is based on a multi-track response strategy involving the design of interventions for different timeframes (immediate, medium and long-term) and for different geographic/administrative levels. Among the medium/long term initiatives, a particular attention is attributed to the development of those institutional capacities that have been deteriorated by civil conflicts and under funding, with a priority given to institutions involved in food security and agricultural development. Among the different initiatives foreseen under the ‘Institutional Capacity’ chapter of the Framework of Mutual Obligations (FMO), SIFSIA is expected to contribute to food security by supporting the strengthening of policy and planning initiatives and of food security and market information systems. Furthermore, there are two other initiatives under the FMO that SIFSIA is expected to integrate/complement. These are the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme designed to intervene essentially at the State level; and the Community Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme that will provide support at the local and community level. In practice SIFSIA with its expected action at central/state level should contribute to the success of the two other initiatives by availing relevant information and by contributing to the creation of a sound policy and institutional environment Under this framework, FAO has been requested by the EC and by Northern and Southern Sudan authorities to provide the technical assistance necessary for the preparation of the SIFSIA Programme document and related technical annexes. . This document is part of the overall preparation exercise and covers the Northern Sudan component of the overall SIFSIA intervention. A similar document has also been prepared for Southern Sudan. 1.2 Activities Undertaken and Methodology This document is the result of four different missions in Sudan. The first mission was undertaken during the month of February 2005 and provided the basis for the preparation of the SIFSIA Inception Report (see paragraph 5 below). The second mission took place during the month of March and had essentially an organisational and logistical purpose (e.g. preparing ToRs, launching the two national task forces). The formulation mission lasted a total of 38 days and resulted in the preparation of the first draft programme document.. The fourth and last mission took place in September and aimed at gathering reactions on the draft programme document that eventually resulted in the preparation and approval of the SIFIA main programme document that has provided the basis for the preparation of the present document. Annex 1 presents the lists of the experts who have been involved in the different stages of the formulation exercise. 1 The programme original title was Sudan Institutional Capacity Support Programme for an Integrated Food Security, Vulnerability and Market Information System; this was later revised to reflect the policy and programming work that the initiative is expected to support. 2 A crucial role in the preparation exercise has been played (and will still be played) by the two national Task Forces, one in the North and another in the South. The two Task Forces are acting as technical advisory bodies providing advises, comments and orientation to the FAO team work and reports. The Task Forces include representatives of different Northern and Southern Sudanese institutions so as to reflect the fact that food security is brought about by a combinations of factors that cannot be limited to agricultural related interventions (a detailed list of participating institutions is provided in annex 1). The European Commission and some international agencies (e.g. WFP and International NGOs) are also invited to participate in the Task Force meetings as observers. The preparation of this report and of other back ground documents also benefited from a close consultation with staff of the EC Delegation in Khartoum and from specific technical contributions from various FAO technical services. A food security framework of analysis has been used since the start of SIFSIA preparation. Food security is defined in this document as the constant economic and physical access to food supplies, allowing people to lead active and healthy lives1. The concept of food security by definition encompasses longer-term concerns as it stretches across various periods and caters for all segments of a population. Food security is brought about by a combination of individual, household, community, national and international factors. These, according to FAO, can be grouped into three to four core dimensions of food security that have to be considered in any food security related initiative. Three core dimensions to be addressed in economic analysis are described in Box 12. Box 1: Dimensions of Food Security Food availability: food of sufficient quantity and quality must be available in the right place and at the right time. Availability is determined by the domestic production capacity, import capacity and food aid. Food access: reflects the entitlement of households and individuals to the resources required for producing and/or acquiring appropriate foods. Entitlements are determined by income, access to productive resources, as well as formal and informal social safety nets. Stability: reflects variability in the availability and access to food over time. The stability dimension initially focused on aspects such as weather variability and price fluctuations. More recently, however aspects relating environmental risks and political stability are also being considered, particularly in protracted crises. A fourth dimension food utilisation incorporates aspects such as adequate diet, clean water, sanitation, and health care, which highlights the importance of non-food aspects for food security. It is particularly relevant for integrated food and nutrition security frameworks. Given the different food security situations and related needs and institutional and policy frameworks that exist in Northern and Southern Sudan, the SIFSIA programme has been divided into two sub-programmes: one for the North and one for the South, that will aim at establishing in as much as possible symmetric and compatible information systems and institutional set-ups (see section 3.3). This also to reflect one of the basic tenets of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the GoS and the SPLM on 9th of January 2005 that is the One Country- Two Systems principle. As mentioned this document covers the Northern Sudan component of the proposed intervention. 1.3 Structure of the Document The report is divided into three main chapters and six annexes. After this first introductory chapter, chapter 2 presents a diagnostic of the food security situation in Northern 1 2 EC Council Resolution 1292/96. Anti-Hunger Programme 2002 (FAO Conference paper). 3 Sudan that, given the nature of the programme, pays a particular attention to the analysis of the related policy and institutional frameworks. Chapter 2 also contains a conclusion section highlighting the main food security priority areas identified by the formulation mission. Chapter 3 describes the potential contribution of SIFSIA in improving the overall food security situation in Northern Sudan; it defines key priority areas, coordination mechanisms, expected results and activities, institutional set up and implementation mechanisms. The document contains six annexes. Annex 1 presents a list of the participants in the formulation exercises and of the two TF memberships. The other five annexes are of a technical nature, they include respectively: a) a detailed description of the activities recommended for support with costs break-downs; b) an analysis of potential surveys and data collection that could be supported by SIFSIA; c) an analysis of the potential use of GIS and Remote Sensing; d) a brief description of the potential partners of the Programme; d) a draft log-frame that will be fine tuned during the inception phase of the programme. 4 2. FOOD SECURITY IN SUDAN AND PROGRAMME JUSTIFICATION This chapter is divided in six sections. It starts by presenting the overall socioeconomic context of the country, it then describes the food security situation and its likely trends following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The following three sections present an analysis of the food security related institutional set up, of the food security responses (policies, strategies and programmes) and of the role of information flows in shaping those responses. Finally, the last section makes some recommendations with respect to the potential programme areas to be covered by SIFSIA. 2.1 Socio-economic Context The country and its economy Sudan with a total area of 2.5 millions square kilometres is the largest Country in Africa with an estimated population of 34 millions people (7-8 millions living in the South). Its vast area includes tropical forests, flood plains and mountains, savannahs stone and sand deserts. The Nile, with its fertile banks, runs through the country. In Government of Sudan controlled areas,1 agriculture represented, in 2001, 39% of GDP (at Independence it contributed to 60% of GDP), industrial production was estimated at 18% and services to 42%. There are no official statistics of GDP composition in the areas of South affected by the conflict, but agriculture (characterised by subsistence farming, shifting cultivation and livestock production) is considered, by far, the most important sector whose importance is believed as having increased since the start of the conflict. 2 According to National Accounts, GDP growth averaged 3.8 % in the period 19901995 to then accelerate in the second half of the nineties (6.2%). Again these estimates refer essentially to the Northern part of Sudan and to the garrison towns in the South. However, the economic growth has not had an apparent direct effect on poverty reduction because of skewed income distribution and because military expenses have crowded out social and development expenditure. In fact, despite its economic growth rate and its economic potentialities (e.g. oil and agriculture) Sudan is a least developed country with very poor socio-economic indicators: it ranks 139 on the UNDP Human Development Index; life expectancy at birth is 56 years; adult illiteracy stands at 42% and 17% of the children under 5 are underweight. Furthermore, global statistics hide the tremendous socio-economic differences between the different regions of the country (see section 2.2). The conflict(s) Since Sudan independence, in 1956, there has been continuous civil war between the South and the North with a period of peace only between 1972 and 1983. There are different, explicit and or underlying, causes to explain such a protracted conflict that go beyond a simply North/South divide. According to analysts these basically derive from historical policies that resulted in unequal sharing of resources. The discovery and production of oil and religious and ethnic factors have further aggravated the situation. Other ethnic based conflicts (often exacerbated by conflicts over resources) have also proliferated with further negative consequences. The costs of conflicts have been heavy particularly on the civilian population. It is estimated that about 2 million people have died since 1983 and 6 million have been uprooted from 1 2 These include the all of North Sudan and some areas in the South essentially around major urban centres (the garrison towns). World Bank 2003. 5 their homesteads. Population movements and droughts added to chronic food security problems led to widespread famines. The conflicts have also caused major economic losses; in fact, road infrastructure, hospital schools and other basic services need to be reconstructed from scratch in the war affected areas, whilst households livelihoods basis have been deteriorated/destroyed. The conflict has also led to the division of the Country into sectors (Northern and Southern) with respect to international assistance (under the Operation Lifeline Sudan-OLS-see 2.3.2) covering respectively the areas controlled by GoS and SPLM. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed between GoS and SPLM/A, represents a first important step towards the reestablishment of a situation suitable for a minimal social and economic recovery. However the peace process remains fragile and no defined scenarios can be reasonably be projected at this stage (e.g. role of other parties/stakeholders not represented in the agreement, institutional set-up and capacities, civil society participation, local factional conflicts, population movements). Poverty and rural poverty GDP per capita was estimated to 395 US $ in 20011, this average masks wide regional disparities in economic and social development and skewed distribution particularly between rural and urban areas. In fact the economic growth that has been recently recorded has been essentially concentrated in central states around Khartoum that have boosted their tax basis allowing them to have higher expenditures on services than the rest of the country2. In the Northern part of the Country particularly high poverty rates are recorded in Red Sea, Eastern Darfur and Northern Kordofan with rural poverty rate over 60%3. 2.2 Food Security Situation, Trends and Future Perspectives This section is divided into three main parts describing the magnitude of the problems and its consequences on human capital, the main causes of the problem and the future trends and perspective with respect to food security Magnitude of the problem One prominent feature of the protracted crisis that has characterised Sudan over the last two decades is the widespread food insecurity, which has triggered a number of dramatic famines (e.g. in 1982, 1992 and 1998) that have been tackled, often with conspicuous delays, essentially through food aid. In fact despite its economic and agricultural potential, over the last 10 years between 1,500,000 and 3 million people per year have received/required some form of food aid. Annual food aid needs assessment have been characterised by marked regional differences and year to year variations attributable to the various regional crisis that have affected the Country (e.g. in 2004 WFP supported 3.7 million people with food aid out of which 1.9 million in Darfur region only) Food Aid deliveries to Sudan in cereal MT equivalent (000) 1995 82.4 1996 108.3 1997 114.4 1998 201.00 1999 293.5 2000 182.4 2001 202.8 2002 149.4 2003 256.1 2004 388.8 Source: WFP,’2004 Food Aid Flows’ Interfais 2005. 1 2 3 World Bank ‘World Development Indicators’. JAM Sudan, Synthesis Report Volume 1, 2005. World Bank calculation on the basis of the proportion below 40% of an economic status index based on assets ownership. 6 The most food insecure regions/ states and traditional food aid recipients are considered to be: Kassala, North Darfur, North Kordofan and Red Sea in the Northern Sudan and Jonglei, Bar el Ghazal and Upper Nile in the South. Overall the SSCSE estimates to 23 % the proportion of people regularly facing food deficit in the South1. The three transitional areas (South Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei) that are the object of specific protocols within the CPA are also to be considered as highly food insecure and have been receiving substantial amounts of food aid. Causes The different conflicts that have characterised Sudan are to be considered as the main causes of food insecurity particularly in the South and in some states of the North. In fact the war and the counterinsurgency warfare have been having a direct impact on food security through: • • • • • the damaging of the social and economic fabric and related entitlements; the destruction of the scarce infrastructure; the mass displacement of the population; the weakening of institutions providing the required services the role played by the warring factions in stopping and controlling international assistance and food relief. In addition to the effects of the conflicts, other compounding factors can also be noted: • • • • natural disasters (drought and floods) are recurrent in Southern and Northern Sudan and the worst drought that occurred in 1983/4, 1997/8, and 2000/1 caused large population displacements and high livestock mortality; lack of infrastructure impacts negatively on food security by limiting marketing possibilities with food that cannot be moved from surplus to food deficit areas limited access to basic services such as water points and health services that is particularly serious in some states of Northern Sudan, notably Red Sea2; insecurity in neighbouring countries that has caused a large influx of refugees. This coupled with e internally displaced problem (there are an estimated 5.8 millions IDPs scattered around the country3) puts a further strain on already meagre socio-economic and environmental resources. With signing of the Peace agreement there will be large population movement around the country4 adding a further variable to the food security situation; finally, shortcomings in the policy and programming framework and of the institutional set ups have also led to a set of responses that have not always been appropriate (see sections 2.4 and 2.5). • Trends and perspectives The consolidation of the peace process may be the starting point for the achievement of sustainable food security in Sudan. However, the peace process remains fragile since several issues continue to be unresolved and local conflicts are likely to occur if not to escalate. In practice the gradual process towards recovery and development is unlikely to be linear since 1 2 3 4 New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation/UNICEF 2004, ibid. JAM Livelihoods & Social Protection Cluster Report. JAM Livelihoods & Social Protection Cluster Report. New Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation (2004) estimates at 4,500,000 the possible returns in the South. JAM estimates to approximately 4.600,000 IDP and 750,000 refugees the total number of returns in the period 2005-2010. 7 elements of emergency, recovery and development situations are likely to be present contemporaneously in Sudan for many years to come. In such evolving context several changes that could modify the food security context are expected to occur, requiring an appropriate mix of responses, such as for instance: • • • • • massive population movements of IDP and returnees; conflicts over resources in particular land and water; changes/adaptations of food systems for instance with re-establishment of trade and exchange between regions; emergence of new vulnerable groups such as demobilized militias or urban settlers (youth and demobilised militias may decide to stay or re-settle in urban areas); dramatic decreases in humanitarian assistance not immediately compensated by corresponding levels of development assistance with vulnerable categories being left out of the recovery process. 2.3 Food Security Institutional Framework The Overall Institutional Framework Sudan is characterised by fragile and evolving institutional set ups. In Northern Sudan, existing structures have been eroded during the past 20 years, due to lack of means (e.g. shortage of internal resources due to military spending and lack external development funding) to implement development programmes as well as lack of exposure, leading to a certain obsolescence of the administration and information management systems. In the South, the SPLA (the Army) decided, in 1994, to develop a civil administration organised by the SPLM (the Movement). However, most of these administrative bodies were not translated into effective institutions and could not deliver the expected services essentially because of lack of support by the international community, war led priorities and limited of capacities. In such framework their inputs in terms of food security responses have been essentially focused on short term measures mainly related to food aid needs assessment and food aid distribution undertaken through the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association SRRA (to be later transformed in a Commission SRRC). The CPA, signed in January this year, envisages a specific institutional set up for Sudan for the all interim period, which is the period from the signing of the constitution to the referendum that would determine, in 2010, whether the South will remain part of Sudan or would eventually secede. The envisaged institutional set-up is asymmetrical; in fact it foresees a Federal/National Level, to be under a Government of National Unity, with a total of 26 states (16 in the North and 10 in the South) to be administered by State governments1. However, in the South there will also be an intermediate tier of government between the Federal and State level, that is the Government of Southern Sudan, with considerable level of autonomy, over Southern Sudan, with respect to the national level Furthermore major differences are likely to emerge between the North and the South in terms of the organisation of service delivery. In the North2 Civil Servants are 1 2 In Northern Sudan at the state level, there is a government (the Council of Ministers). The Council is run by a Governor, the ‘Wali’. Every State Ministry is headed by a Minister appointed by the Governor. A typical State Government is made up five State ministries: the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance and Manpower, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Housing and Engineering and the Ministry of Agriculture. See JAM Sudan, Cluster 1 Summary Report. 8 employed across a number of government institutions in the different tiers of government: the Federal Government, which consists of 30 ministries, State Governments with 6 ministries and numerous locality administrations; in addition, there are about 71 public enterprises and 25 public universities1. In practice, this institutional set up is designed to give a direct implementing role to government institutions in the delivery of public services over the long term. In Southern Sudan, the entire public service, including personnel and systems, has to be built up virtually from scratch and, unlikely in the North, many of the service delivery functions would be undertaken by private sector and decentralised local institutions.. An open issue, with respect to this, will be the integration of Southern Sudanese GoS staff working in the garrison towns into the future GoSS administration. Another important factor of uncertainty in the institutional set up of Sudan is the ongoing process of decentralisation that should promote an increased participation and accountability; but that is still to be defined in all its implications, whilst important differences from North to South are expected to emerge. In the North, local services are in fact organised according to three administrative levels (Federal, States and Localities). The latter are headed by State-appointed officials (approved at the national level) and staffed by State officers. In the South, the devolution of power at the local level is expected to be more profound, particularly with respect to the actual the level of power vested in the Counties (the Localities of the North)2 administration. The Food Security Institutional Framework in Northern Sudan Actors Annex 5 presents a detailed description of different institutions that are playing or should play a role in terms of food security. These are quite numerous and playing different functions from services providers (e.g. Meteorological Authority) to planning and policy making and programmes/projects implementation. Institutions operating at Federal level have essentially a regulatory and policy mandate whilst implementation functions are essentially delegated to the other government tiers and to the States in particular. Five institutions/ seems to be particularly relevant to food security and SIFSIA scope of work. These are the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries that are mandated with the supply/availability aspects of the food security equation and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the Ministry of Social Development and Welfare, the Strategic Reserve Corporation (under the Ministry of Finance) and the Nutrition Division of the Ministry of Health that deals with social protection issues (the demand/access side aspect of food security). Within the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry a key role with respect to food security planning and information is played by the Directorate of Agricultural Economics, Planning and Policy Analysis (DAEPPA) that is divided in a number of Departments: Economic, Statistics, Planning and Policy Analysis, and Food Security. The Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries has also a Planning Department with similar functions but with a simpler structure. At State level the two ministries and related planning functions are merged within the State Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources. The Strategic Reserve Corporation (operating under the Ministry of Finance) should play a price stabilisation function. In fact it is mandated with the management of buffer 1 2 Recent data indicates 331,000 public servants (a little over 380,000 if public universities and enterprises are included). It is also to note that a Local Government Framework document (August 2004) recommends for the South three levels of local government – the county, the payam and the boma - with the payam as the administrative unit of a county (with between 3-6 payams in a county) and the boma comprising one or more villages. 9 stocks (mainly sorghum) to ensure the consumers’ access to basic food staple (sorghum in particular) at affordable prices (basically by selling its stocks when prices are high) and at the same time support crop producers through the purchase of their produces when prices are low. Under the Ministry of Finance and Economic there is also the Poverty Reduction Unit mandated with the coordination of line ministries and mandated institutions efforts in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of the poverty reduction strategy (PRSP) The Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (and the Humanitarian Aid Commission) is mandated with the responsibility of providing food aid and assistance to vulnerable groups in collaboration with international organisations and NGOs. The Ministry of Social Development and Welfare is divided in a number of autonomous or semi-autonomous structures, such as the National Population Council, the Poverty Alleviation coordinating centre and the Zakat Chamber. A particularly relevant role in providing assistance and social protection to vulnerable groups is played by the Zakat Chamber. The Zakat chamber is a semi-autonomous civil society organisation, run by an elected Board, whose resources come from contributions that members provide on the basis on one of the pillar of Islam (provide charity to the needy). In 2004 the Zakat Chamber provided support (e.g. direct cash support and development projects) to over 7 millions vulnerable people The Department of National Nutrition (Federal Ministry of Health) has a monitoring role with respect to the policies and plans at state level and local level. The Directorate depends to a great extent from the support of international organisations (WHO and UNICEF in particular). There are finally a number of institutions that provides specific services particularly with respect to information generation and capacity building. These include the Meteorological Authority, the Remote Sensing Authority and the Central Bureau of Statistics. A number of coordinating bodies for food security related activities are also to be mentioned, these includes task forces, committees and councils established to address horizontal and vertical linkages related problems between institutions and within institutions. They are often created on a had hoc basis and are of a temporary nature. With respect to food security it is worth to note the establishment of food security committees at state level to coordinate relief activities; the Higher Council for Civil Defence that deals with disasters related problems; and the Food Security Council that should be playing a role in coordinating the different ministries on food security matters, but it is not yet operational (see discussion in section 3.3). The international community is also playing a crucial role with respect to the food security institutional set up particularly with respect to humanitarian assistance. Given the international sanctions against Sudan (that are now gradually phased out) there has been a tendency on the part of Donors, UN agencies and NGOs to create separate and often parallel structures to the government ones. Problems identified The diagnostic undertaken by the formulation mission has highlighted a number of problems with respect to the food security institutional set-up in Northern Sudan. These are the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. duplications of mandates and functions and poor coordination; weak linkages between Federal Ministries and the State Ministries; weak institutions not in the position to deliver the expected services; project-based external support is not contributing to the creation of national systems. 10 Duplications of (or unclear) mandates and functions and poor coordination are often recorded. For instance both the Ministry of Agriculture (the Early Warning unit of the Food Security Department) and HAC have a food security early warning mandate. Responsibilities over the management of key natural resources such as pastures are (not clearly) divided between the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries. Linkages and coordination (also in terms of beneficiaries’ identification) in social protection/relief activities between HAC and the Zakat are practically non existent. The Strategic Reserve Corporation operates under the Ministry of Finance and crucial links and coordination, relevant to its mandate (maintain buffer stocks in food insecure areas and support/stabilise food prices), with MoAF are extremely weak. Linkages between Federal Ministries and the State Ministries. The Local Act of 1993 established a three tiers federal system devolving considerable authority (i.e. broad autonomy in areas such as policy making and planning) and resources to the State governments. This has weakened the links between the federal and state levels of the different ministries because of lack of accountability mechanisms (such as direct budget transfers), resulting in an inadequate level of collaboration and coordination on matters pertaining to the mandates of federal ministries (e.g. collection and national analysis of agricultural statistics and related policy decision) Some of the institutions reviewed are weak and not in the position to deliver according to their mandates. The main problems reported relate to the lack of appropriate equipment, understaffing and staff expertises that need to be upgraded, and lack of operating budget to undertake routine activities. Such problems are reported both at state and federal levels with different degrees of severity that depend on the level of resources and the disposal of the different institutions. At state level these derive, among other things from the revenue raising capacities of each state and at the Federal level from Federal budget allocations and project based external support (e.g. IGAD support to the market information system or WHO/UNICEF support to the monitoring of the nutrition indicators1). However, the latter does not contribute to a sustainable solution to the problems it intends to address, since it often supports project-based temporary solutions that are not contributing to the creation of national systems. 2.4 Food Security Responses: The Policy and Programming Framework for Food Security This section is divided into three main sub-sections. The first sub-section revises the key food security responses (policies, strategies and programmes) that have characterised the conflict period. The second sub-section describes the current status, whilst the last one highlights some key policy issues that are likely to be a priority during the Interim Period. The Conflict Period Over the last twenty years Sudan has been characterised by a policy context reflecting the protracted crisis situation (civil war, conflict over resources, lack of stable institutions) that also brought about a radical shift in the support provided by international community towards humanitarian objectives, with more than 80% of donors’ resources going to relief and emergency operations leaving less than 20% for development2. 1 2 The Department survey cover 12 out of the 16 states of Northern Sudan (for 6 of them fund has been provided by Unicef). Food Security and Agricultural Rehabilitation with a Medium to Long Term Perspective in the Protracted Crisis Context of Sudan, unpublished report, FAO/ESAF 2004. 11 In the North, food security related policy and strategies have been strongly influenced by this shift in the nature of external assistance1 provided essentially through the OLS, and by the lack of policy dialogue with the international community that has left unresolved, among other things, the problems related to the external debt of Sudan. No specific food security policies and strategies were designed and implemented during that period; however some of the government initiatives had direct food security implications. For instance, food security was considered essentially a matter of national self sufficiency to be achieved through the increasing of food crops production. Thus, several development plans and strategies, aimed at the expansion of food grain production under the different farming systems existing in the country, were launched. In particular, the GoS supported programmes for the irrigated sector and started to rehabilitate a number of the large irrigated schemes to revive their capacity in producing food crops and also encouraged horizontal expansion of the commercial mechanized rainfed agriculture. These initiatives led to substantial increases in sorghum production. However, little attention2 (e.g. irrigated and mechanised agriculture absorbed up to 99 percent of formal agricultural credit3) was paid and limited results were recorded with respect to increasing staple food grains under traditional rainfed farming systems4.Domestic production shortfalls were balanced with food imports (mainly wheat), however this kind of measure did not ensure the economic access to food by all. In this framework ‘Solidarity Programmes’ on a limited scale were also supported in order to reduce the effects of poverty and malnutrition on vulnerable groups in urban and rural areas and a price stabilisation function was attributed to the Strategic Grain Reserve. The macroeconomic policy reform process that was undertaken in the nineties led to the removal of subsidies on food commodities and agricultural inputs, to the reduction of market taxes, to the floating the exchange rates, and to the expansion of credit facilities for financing agricultural activities in the country. However, the effects of reduced taxes were offset by the increased fees levied by state governments on inter state shipment of commodities; and, eventually, these macroeconomic measures resulted in an increase in the costs of production and transportation of food crops that led to an increase of prices of food commodities in the country. In Southern Sudan, during the protracted crisis, food security related policies and programmes were characterised by three essential elements. Firstly, most of the ‘official’ responses (policies, programmes and projects) to the crisis were undertaken and directed by external agencies. This weakened the capacity of local institutions and limited the effectiveness of responses that could not fully take into account local context and priorities. Secondly, the responses were principally of a humanitarian nature with over 50% of OLS resources allocated to food aid; and, thirdly, tended to be planned and conceived in a short-term perspective with a topdown approach to planning in order to produce quick and visible results on the ground. For instance, food aid was used mainly to address immediate food gaps without building assets, whilst the distribution of seeds and tools was essentially aimed at temporarily reducing household food gaps but without systematically reinforcing livelihoods5. The Current Situation 1 2 3 4 5 Until the late 1980s, Sudan enjoyed significant official development assistance (ODA), which peaked in 1985 at US $ 1,900 million but dropped to 100 million in 1996. The SPCRP diagnostic reported of farmers complaints (Blue Nile and Kordofan) on the total absence of support services to rainfed agriculture. This was also confirmed by the formulation team field visits to Red Sea, White Nile and Gedarif. World Bank 2003, ibid. The agricultural production in traditional rainfed agriculture did increase in the nineties but essentially because of oilseed production. Recent data indicate that such trend cannot be sustained due to environmental and economic reasons (World Bank 2003). FAO/ESAF 2004, ibid. 12 With the progressive consolidation of the peace process a different policy environment is likely to emerge reflecting the changing situation and providing great opportunities, and related challenges in terms of capacity building, for more conducive, long-term and locally owned food security policy framework and related initiatives. Three interlinked global initiatives are providing the overall policy framework for the Interim Period and for food security related initiatives: MDGs, ISPRP and JAM. The MDGs initiative has been translated in a specific document presenting a set of ambitious goals for the whole of Sudan (a specific document has also been prepared for Southern Sudan) and related policies and programmes. Box 1 illustrates some selected indicators for MDG. Sudan MDG 1 Proportion of undernourished population Prevalence of child malnutrition (weight for age under 5) Prevalence of acute child malnutrition (weigh for height under 5 Southern Sudan MDG 1 Current Situation 26% (2000) 35% (2001) 16% (2000) Target for 2015 16% 16% 8% Current Situation Target for 2015 45% 24% 11% Proportion of population below 1 $ ›90 % (2003) a day Prevalence of child malnutrition (weight for age under 5) Prevalence of acute child malnutrition (weigh for height under 5 Proportion of population facing food deficit 48% (2001) 22%(2000) 23% (2003) 11% An interesting and promising initiative is the on-going revision of the Interim PRSP and the formulation of PRSP, that is now being jointly undertaken by GoS and SPLM representatives and that has so far led to the preparation of a concept note. It is to be recalled, in fact, that the first IPRSP formulated by GoS was considered as not satisfactory, since, among other things, it did not sufficiently address food security issues and welfare strategies and was formulated without a proper consultation with Southern Sudan stakeholders. The concept note identified among the primary causes of poverty in Sudan: a) misconceived policies b) conflicts about natural resource control and use. The importance of comprehensive capacity building and institutional strengthening, and in particular, capacity building for policy analysis, among others, is also highlighted in the concept note as an immediate priority for poverty alleviation, restoration of livelihoods and peace building The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) initiative represents a joint effort between the international community, GoS and SPLM to define a development strategy and to establish investment priorities for the pre-interim and interim periods and identify and secure the necessary resources. The exercise has led to the definition of a Framework for Sustained Peace, 13 Development and Poverty Eradication. Particularly relevant to SIFSIA scope of work are the following clusters: a) the Productive Sectors cluster that defines the main problems and needs of the agricultural sector and that include SIFSIA among the envisaged activities; b) the Livelihoods and Social Protection cluster addressing social protection and livelihoods rehabilitation issues; c) the Information and Statistics cluster defining the information requirements for policy making monitoring and evaluation; d) the Capacity Building and Institutional Development cluster that defines the main features of the future institutional set up (GNU, GoSS, State and County/Locality level) and the related capacity building requirements. A multi-donor trust fund together with government funding should provide the necessary resources to the implementation of JAM related initiatives A last important factor relates the decentralisation framework that will be further strengthened. This will imply, among other things, that specific policy and programmes will be essentially elaborated and resourced at State level. This policy process is already in place at least in some of the states of northern Sudan but is still rather informal and would require considerable support to make it relevant to the specific problems, resources and capacities of each state whilst maintaining the appropriate linkages with the Federal and regional context. Emerging key policy issues From the analysis of the food security context and of the food security related priorities emerging from the various on-going initiatives (JAM, IPRSP, etc) and discussions with stakeholders it is possible to identify some broad thematic policy areas that may be considered as policy priorities for GNU and GoSS at least over the medium term within a wider food security policy framework. These are: 1. the need to put in place social protection measures to protect the most vulnerable; 2. the support to smallholder (traditional) agriculture and rural livelihoods as mean to address rural poverty; 3. the sustainable and equitable management of natural resources. Protecting the most vulnerable. Consolidate peace may lead over the long term to a substantial reduction of vulnerability levels in Sudan. However, during the interim period vulnerability levels are expected to remain high with the possible emergence of new vulnerable groups such as demobilised militias or returnees. For instance according to the JAM Livelihoods and Social Protection report over 6,000,000 people are likely to return, between 2005 and 2010, to those areas from which they were displaced (sometime decades ago) because of the conflicts and their return could imply the risk of conflicts with resident population over resources with consequent further displacements. Other vulnerable groups (e.g. women headed households) will also need specific support (right policies, right institutional set up). However, so far social protection measures have been essentially of a short-term nature and have not addressed vulnerability as a structural problem requiring long term strategies and policies. Poverty reduction through the support to smallholder agricultural production and rural people livelihoods. Available poverty data indicate that smallholder rural producers are the great majority of the poor and food insecure in Sudan. For instance in Northern Sudan, the highest levels of poverty and food insecurity are recorded among traditional rainfed farmers, particularly those growing staple food crops1. In fact in the North, as seen, most of the agricultural investments and policies have been directed towards the expansion of irrigated farming and semi mechanised agriculture, whilst there is now a recognition that a sustained reduction of rural 1 Source World Bank, Sudan Stabilization and Reconstruction, Country Economic Memorandum, 2003. 14 poverty will require specific actions in support of the traditional rainfed agriculture and small scale livestock production (see JAM production cluster and IPRSP) The sustainable and equitable natural resource management appears as cross cutting policy issue, to support, on the one hand, the livelihoods of rural poor that depend essentially on those resources and, on the other hand, to limit/minimise the risks of conflict over resources (e.g. between returnees and resident population or between pastoralists and farmers) that could trigger local conflicts and causes food insecurity. 2.5 The Role of Information in Shaping Food Security Responses Existing Food Security Information Flows, Users and Producers in Northern Sudan In Sudan there are several data producers (national institutions and international agencies) providing information that can be used in food security analysis and monitoring. Annex 3 and annex 4 present an analysis of some of the key aspects (e.g. shortcomings, requirements, feasibility) of food security information flows (particular with respect to GIS, remote sensing and baselines data) in Sudan. In Northern Sudan the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries are among the main producers and users of food security related information. The MoAF and Ministry of Animal Resources, giving their mandate, deal essentially with information related to food availability, though some of the information collected could also be used to signal access-to-food issues. At the moment, there are four food security related areas where information is more or less regularly collected: a) a market information system that collects, though not systematically, basic food staples prices in different markets; b) an agricultural production monitoring undertaken (not systematically) by the Statistic Department of MoAF and used as a basis for the annual crop and food supply assessment mission (CFSAM)1 and for Agricultural GDP calculation; c) natural resources management monitoring (incl. pasture, landuse) through the use of GIS and specific studies; d) livestock market information system (very limited). The Food Security Department of MoAF also undertakes specific studies/surveys to gain a better understanding of the food security situation (e.g. food consumption study). Agricultural related information is collected and analysed also by the Central Bureau of Statistics that uses MoAF data for the calculation of Agricultural GDP and its own data collectors for the collection of market prices (inflation calculation). The CBS collects also data on agricultural related foreign trade volumes. The Early Warning Unit of the Humanitarian Aid Commission gathers (from information producers such as WFP, NGOs and the Meteorological Authority) and analyse a number of food security early warning related data. The analysis of the data is presented in monthly bulletins and provides information essentially on the cereal supply demand balance (with regional break-downs), that includes the source of supply (carry over, production, import, humanitarian assistance, strategic reserve). Information on vulnerability level and on vulnerability analysis and mapping comes also from WFP VAM Unit, that utilises it to guide its internal process of food allocation. The VAM Unit is also instrumental in the Annual Needs Assessment exercise (ANA) that is conducted on yearly basis (see 3.5.3) 1 Jointly conducted by FAO and WFP to gauge crop production and to estimate macro level food availability by calculating a cereal balance. Unfortunately, in the context of Sudan and particularly in the South, crop production estimates have proved to be an extremely challenging undertaking. The size of the country and the logistical difficulties in accessing many areas make comprehensive crop assessments impracticable. In the absence of alternative crop production surveys the CFSAM provides a valuable indicator of national food availability. 15 Another institution that, according to its mandate, should gather food security related information is the Strategic Reserve Corporation. Information should be used in assessing: the level of buffer stocks required in different areas of Sudan to ensure availability of food supplies, as well as, the need to undertake market stabilisation initiatives when the level of market prices threatens the economic access to food of the poorest sector of the population. However the necessary information is not systematically collected. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Development and Welfare also produces food security related information, particularly in relation to the level of access to food by the poorest segments of the population. In fact the Nutrition Department collect though not systematically information on child malnutrition level (weight for age), whilst the Zakat Chamber identifies the most vulnerable groups through a system of local committees up to the village level. Secondary data on food security are also utilised (or should by utilised) by the National Population Council and the PRSP Unit to establish baselines and eventually monitor the progress made with respect to MDGs and PRSP goals. Finally other two key sources of data generation and elaboration are the Sudan Meteorological Authority (SMA) and the Remote Sensing Authority (RSA). The former provide an analysis of the timing of the rainy season, its progression through Sudan and highlight areas of early or late onset of season. They report on a monthly and yearly basis on the following: a) rainfall estimates over 10 days; b) number of rain days; c) vegetation index; d) cumulative amounts. The RSA mandate is to distribute RS and GIS data to all line ministries and interested parties through training and research. They have experts available in the fields of GS, RS, natural resources and agriculture. They conduct training all over the country and are mainly working with Universities and Ministries for research and training. Gaps and shortcomings identified The formulation mission has identified some main gaps/shortcomings for what concern food security information generation and utilisation in Northern Sudan. These are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. out of date census and baseline data; lack of standardisation in information collection and analysis; duplications and lack of coordination; crucial information gaps (qualitative and quantitative); poor access to information by food security stakeholders; poor linkages between information on short term/transient food insecurity and structural/long term food insecurity; 7. disconnection between policy, programming and planning and food security information and analysis. Out of date census and baseline data. The last population census in Northern Sudan was undertaken in 1993 whilst the last agricultural and livestock census took place in the 70s. This, on the one hand, seriously hinders the accuracy of statistical inference in the preparation of surveys and the updating of existing data (e.g. annual food crops) and, on the other hand, make it impossible to undertake statistically sound studies (e.g. household budgetary survey) because of lack of a reliable sampling frame Lack of standardisation in information collection and analysis. Data are collected by different institutions with different methodologies and sampling frames. For instance both MoAF and CBS collect agricultural market prices but these cannot be aggregated because of different methodologies; NGOs collect vulnerability information, but the vulnerability parameters utilised are different (and often ill defined) and this makes it difficult an aggregation of data by 16 HAC; poverty studies undertaken in Sudan in the 90ties have been using different poverty lines thus generating contradictory results1. Duplications and lack of coordination problems have also been reported, particularly in Northern Sudan where the already mentioned lack of clear mandates with respect to food security are also reflected in information collection and analysis. For instance, agricultural market prices are collected both by the MoAF and CBS. The Food Security Department of MoAF collects, though irregularly, early warning information similar to the one collected by HAC. In practice public institutions tend to collect information for their internal use with little coordination with others. The constitution of ad hoc consultation mechanisms are generally not a sustainable solution to this kind of problems. Access to information: only a limited part of the information produced is made available to stakeholders both from the private and public sectors. For instance farmers unions in Northern Sudan reportedly do not have access to the market information they require. Data produced by CBS are hardly shared with potential users. Crucial information gaps. There are several gaps and shortcomings with respect to the quality, availability and coverage of the existing information. They include: a) the lack of food security baselines; b) inadequate mapping of vulnerabilities; c) the lack of information and mapping of natural resources; d) lack of systematic data collection and analysis of vital agricultural related information (e.g. food prices and food production). Poor linkages between information on transient and structural food insecurity: in Northern and Southern Sudan most of the information generated and analysed during the conflict concerned the transient or short term aspects of food insecurity and led essentially to short term responses (e.g. emergency food aid). In Northern Sudan information relevant to problems of a more structural nature is also collected (though with a bias in favour of supply/availability aspects of food security). However the analysis of transient and structural food insecurity is not linked and often undertaken by different institutions. This seriously limits the design and development of responses that would require an appropriate mix between short term and medium long term actions. Disconnection between policy, programming and planning and food security information and analysis. In fact, whilst in some cases the links between food security analysis and responses are clear (e.g. in the case of the Annual Needs Assessment and the quantity of food pledged and distributed), in other cases links are difficult to find if they exist at all. In practices decision making processes are based on criteria that are not always clear, transparent and straightforward. For instance, in Northern Sudan decisions made by the SRC on the quantity of food to be purchased or sold/distributed are hardly based on widely shared and understood analyses of food prices and food shortages.. 2.6 Potential programme areas identified The diagnostic, outlined in the previous sections, has highlighted a number of problems and areas for action with respect to the improvement of the food security situation in Sudan. Most of these areas of work are relevant to SIFSIA potential scope of intervention as foreseen by the FMO. This section presents a set of possible actions (some of which could be supported by SIFSIA) that should be undertaken over the medium period to tackle those problems. It is divided into four sub-sections: 1. institutional and policy framework; 1 See JAM Productive Cluster Report. 17 2. food security information systems; 3. key policy and programming areas; 4. role of key stakeholders. Institutional and policy framework The improvement of the institutional and policy framework for food security will require a set of measures that can be summarised as follows: • Strengthening links between the state and the federal level, that are currently weak in Northern Sudan and yet to be established in Southern Sudan, through a systems of appropriate institutional arrangements and accountability and incentives mechanisms • Establishing horizontal linkages between institutions and within institutions that are currently non existent or requiring strengthening and institutionalisation (see for instance the role played by different task forces and technical committees) • Define clearer mandates. In Northern Sudan there is a need to fine tune (and reduce duplications) with respect to food security related mandates; whilst in Southern Sudan these have still to be clearly established • Making of food security a key policy concern to be possibly mainstreamed within different sectoral policies (see 3.1.3) and be the object of specific policies, strategies and programmes • Enhancing coordination through the constitution/strengthening of an inter ministerial higher council. This council already exist in the North and will need to be established in the South and may also serve the purpose of promoting a systematic cross sectoral approach to food security. Food security information systems • Strengthening data collection and analysis to fill the existing gaps with respect, in particular, to the lack of key baseline data to monitor the impact of food security interventions to facilitate decision making • Promote standardisation and reduce duplication of information to facilitate a better and more effective aggregation and analysis of the data generated by different stakeholders • Strengthening information flows between the state and the federal level and between line ministries that at the moment is not systematic and is only in one direction (from state to federal level) with no feed back mechanisms • Strengthening the links between transient and structural food insecurity information and analysis that at the moment are basically non existent and thus do not support the design of interventions that, in current situation of Sudan, would require a mix of short term and long terms measures • Strengthening the links between information generation and analysis and decision making that, at the moment are limited, through a better quality information; a closer involvement of planners and decision makers in information 18 analysis; the establishment of the appropriate institutional set up to minimise the risk of delinking information and decision making. Key Policy Priorities in the Interim Phase Tackling of three broad policy priorities outlined in section 2.4.3 will require a set of initiatives that could be broadly related to SIFSIA scope of work: Protecting the most vulnerable • Understanding who they are, how many they are and where they are through appropriate information systems (e.g. EWS, sentinel sites) • Understanding causes of vulnerability and their livelihoods basis and coping strategies through an appropriate information and analytical tools • Design and implement social protection measures: food aid, traditional safety net systems (e.g. religious based- Zakat), food prices subsidies and control, support to households with HIV/AIDS affected members • Design and implement livelihoods rehabilitation and strengthening measures: inputs and productive assets distribution, quick impact community based reintegration programmes, etc. • Reduce the risks of shocks through the strengthening of early warning, disaster prevention and preparedness measures, and by minimising the risks of conflict over resources • Monitoring vulnerabilities Poverty reduction though the support to smallholder (traditional) agriculture and rural livelihoods • Improved livelihoods analysis of food insecure through a more systematic use of livelihoods frameworks of analyses • Improved agricultural vital information basis: markets prices and access, production, rainfall, land use pattern • Appropriate food security, livelihoods and pro-poor policies and programmes design monitoring and evaluation • A substantial increase and related monitoring of pro poor rural investments Sustainable and equitable management of natural resources • Natural resources surveys and mapping: proper planning will require proper information land tenure and land use, pastures availability, livestock routes, water availability and rights, forest resources etc. • Appropriate policies designed: land, forestry, rangelands, water, etc. • Prevention and resolution mechanisms for conflicts over resources as for instance in the conflicts between pastoralists and farmers and between returnees and resident population • Environmental considerations mainstreamed in food security and livelihoods support interventions. Finally, an overarching concern with respect to the policy context needs to be underlined. In fact, the Sudan case (and its expected transition towards a ‘stable’ peace) presents important challenges to the traditional policy frameworks for recovery processes that view relief, rehabilitation and development as sequential efforts (the relief, rehabilitation, development continuum). In fact, the gradual process towards recovery and development is unlikely to be linear 19 since elements of emergency, recovery and development situations are likely to be present contemporaneously in Sudan for many years to come. This will require an appropriate policy and planning framework based on a flexible mix of approaches and interventions taking elements from relief (e.g. food aid based safety nets), rehabilitation and development as complementary measures. At the start of the process relief and rehabilitation measures can be prevalent with respect to long-term development activities but should be development oriented. Such a holistic approach may be a challenge for public institutions, agencies and donors and in the way their respective organizational structures operate with mandates that are generally specific for relief, recovery and development. Coordination with Different Stakeholders with Respect to the Areas Identified The potential areas of intervention for SIFSIA need to be seen in the framework of the various initiatives that are envisaged in the framework of the CPA and by different donors. For instance livelihoods rehabilitation and social protection issues are an overarching concern of the preparatory PRSP documents, of the two MDG papers and are spelt out in a specific JAM document. The latter describes the key initiatives that should be supported by GNU/GOSS and donors resources over the short and medium period. The main focus of the initiatives proposed is the support to the process of reintegration of IDP. It encompasses a set of criteria and tools (e.g. access to basic services, food security, environmental vulnerability mapping) to select the areas of intervention and a set of specific measures to support/protect the livelihoods of those vulnerable groups. The latter include: the protection of voluntary returns, safety nets measures (including food aid) and community based livelihood recovery strategies (e.g. basic services provision, support to subsistence and small holder agriculture and other rural people livelihoods –fisheries, skills creation for off farm income etc.). All the envisaged measures and delivery mechanisms will have to be better defined during implementation, on the basis of sound information and a close involvement of decentralised local institutions. Closely linked to social protection issues is the UN joint initiative (coordinated by WFP) to strengthen the country and donors capacities in disaster prevention and preparedness. The initiative envisages a series of undertakings closely linked to food security, such as the constitution of a Disaster Council under the Vice-President Office, the preparation of policy briefs to cover different aspects of disaster prevention and preparedness and the redefinition of institutional mandates. It also envisages an inter-sectoral and inter ministerial initiative for the establishment of an Early Warning Unit under the future Disaster Council. The support to agricultural production and rural livelihoods is a key policy concerns highlighted in various policy documents. The JAM Productive Sectors cluster and, partly, the JAM Livelihoods cluster reports underline the importance of the support to this sector as a key for economic development and poverty reduction. In particular a wide range of interventions are proposed and costed. These include, among other things, specific support interventions (and the development of the related policy framework) for the strengthening of the livelihoods basis of small scale rural producers (e.g. pastoralists, fishermen, rainfed farmers). These programmes encompass the development of support services (veterinary clinics, rural financing institutions) and basic productive infrastructure (feeder roads, rural markets etc). To note that all the proposed interventions will still need to be detailed in terms of contents and implementation modalities and tailored to the local context The sustainable and equitable management of natural resources is again an overarching concern of most of the initiatives to be undertaken in the framework of the CPA. Specific initiatives in terms of natural resources mapping, land tenure, land use, sustainable utilisation of productive natural resources and conflicts resolution mechanisms are indicated as key 20 priorities in different JAM cluster documents (Productive Sectors, Capacity Building and Institutional Development, Livelihoods and Social Protection). Another key area of intervention, and a cross cutting issue, is the improvement of the information and statistic basis. This should allow the monitoring of the progress in PRSP and MDGs implementation and related policies and programmes and provide decision makers with sound and reliable information and analysis. The JAM Information & Statistics cluster report identifies four key areas of focus: a) the improvement of the statistical information basis; b) the improvement and access to and use of statistical information; c) building statistical capacity; d) strengthening institutional capacities. It also indicates a set of key activities to be supported. These are divided into two broad categories: the pre-census1 and post census activities. The pre-census activities have two main purposes: preparing the census (e.g. sampling frames, training etc) and establishing, particularly in the South, a minimum level of baseline information on key policy areas (e.g. poverty reduction, access to basic services etc). The post-census activities include more structured and comprehensive data collection exercise (e.g. agricultural survey, household income and expenditure survey). Finally capacity building is another cross cutting issue of all envisaged activities. In Southern Sudan institutions will have to be built virtually from scratch whilst in Northern Sudan they will need to be streamlined. In such context (see JAM Capacity Building and Institutional Development Cluster), given the decentralisation framework of the country, particular attention is given to the development of decentralised capacities for planning monitoring and evaluation of poverty reduction interventions particularly in the South were institutional capacities have to be built from scratch. In the North a concentration of CB activities is expected to take place in the most ‘disadvantaged states’ (e.g. Red Sea, Kassala and North Kordofan). 1 The Census according to the CPA should take place in 2007 (within two years from the approval of the new Constitution). 21 3. PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION This chapter presents the formulation mission’s key recommendations for the design and implementation of SIFSIA in Northern Sudan. The chapter is divided into eight sections describing: a) the recommended key features for SIFSIA; b) the ‘desired’ situation resulting from SIFSIA intervention; c) the proposed institutional set-up; d) the proposed components of the Programme; e) the recommended implementation modalities; f) a preliminary estimation of the costs of the programme; g) a risk analysis; h) next steps.. 3.1 Recommended key features for SIFSIA This section outlines, on the basis of the diagnostic presented in chapter 2, the key recommended features of SIFSIA design. These will be then detailed in the other sections of this chapter. They include the key principles and approach suggested, the recommended areas of focus for SIFSIA, and the institutional and implementation considerations Approach/principles The analysis of transient and structural FS and livelihoods vulnerability should support policy and programme design, review, monitoring and evaluation. This first basic principles is to indicate the need to promote a demand driven (by policy makers, planners and civil society organisations) approach to the generation of information to ensure, on the one hand, the appropriate linkages between information generation and decision making, and, on the other hand, transparency and accountability with respect to the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of food security policies and programmes. This will also require that planners gain a better understanding of the importance of information generation and analysis in the decision making processes. Building on the existing whenever possible. As seen, particularly in Northern Sudan, many food security related initiatives are already in place, though suffering from a number of problems, whilst specific plans (e.g.: JAM) are also in place. It will be thus important to build on them to ensure ownership, avoid duplications, build on experience and ensure sustainability. Creating/strengthening systems rather than supporting individual projects. Many externally promoted food security initiatives, undertaken in the past, have proved not to be sustainable because they have tried to by-pass perceived or existing institutional weaknesses by creating parallel project-based structures. Thus SIFSIA, in a long term sustainability perspective, should aim at strengthening or reforming existing systems. Given the cross sectoral nature of food security, several stakeholders will be involved and benefits from SIFSIA resources. In order to ensure that their involvement will lead to the expected improvement of the quality of the services provided a delivery based incentive system for participating institutions is recommended (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). Information generation, analysis and use should ensure horizontal and vertical linkages and be cross sectoral, locally owned and be a public good in order to respond to some of the main weaknesses identified by the diagnostic that are the sectoralisation of information and lack of ownership. By making of the information generated a public good, it is assumed that processes of transparency and accountability will be strengthened (e.g. monitoring PRSP achievements), whilst local stakeholders, starting from the state level, will be empowered to become the primary actors in food security information and analysis. 22 Finally capacity building should be the overarching concern of all SIFSIA promoted activities to ensure the overall sustainability of the systems created. The creation of capacities in analysis and use of food security and livelihoods information should be ensured at all levels (e.g. line ministries at Federal and state level). Innovative approaches to capacity building will be adopted to this end with an emphasis on the training ‘on the job’; in fact this approach is considered as the most appropriate in providing ‘rapid’ and sustained solutions to the current needs in terms of capacity building . Focus and priority areas During the inception phase it was agreed that SIFSIA should be built around key food security issues that Sudan will have to face, or is already facing, and that both information systems and capacity building for policy and planning work would be designed jointly around these key issues. However, there is a need to limit the scope of the different activities to be supported by SIFSIA in order to concentrate efforts and investments in areas of interventions and towards target groups that are only marginally covered by other on-going or envisaged initiatives but that are considered a priority by GNU.. Based on the diagnostic the following recommendations concerning SIFSIA areas of focus are made: • the main end beneficiaries of the programme should be those food insecure people and areas most in need of appropriate services delivery and food security related policy and programmatic responses and therefore SIFSIA activities at Country and State level should be designed essentially to this end; • the MDGs and PRSP goals should provide the overall framework for SIFSIA intervention. Whilst gender, HIV-Aids related problems and environmental sustainability should be considered as cross cutting issues whenever relevant; • SIFSIA efforts for what concern both information and policy, planning and programming work should aim at supporting the definition of appropriate frameworks for food security whilst concentrating around a few selected food security issues that are considered short and medium term priorities by national stakeholders. These, in line with diagnostic, are essentially three: o protecting the most vulnerable; o poverty reduction through the support to smallholder agriculture and rural livelihoods; o sustainable and equitable management of natural resources; o other relevant food security issues may be tackled at a later stage of programme implementation. • whilst all levels of information generation and decision making are important, most SIFSIA work should essentially, although not exclusively, concentrate at Central and, partly, at State level; taking also into account that food security issues at state and local/community level will be covered, as far as the EC support is concerned, by the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme and by the Community Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme-Call for Proposals initiative respectively, or by other specific initiatives (e.g. the World Bank Community Driven Development-CDD-initiative); • furthermore, whilst some of the activities to be supported will have a national coverage because of their nature (e.g. market and production information and statistics), it is recommended (see section 3.4) to focus, in as much as much as possible, efforts and investments towards food insecure regions and states. Institutional considerations 23 Given the nature of the problems to be tackled, the implementation of SIFSIA will require the involvement of a large number of institutions and the establishment of linkages with several partners. In order to avoid the dispersion of investment, it is recommended to concentrate efforts in the support to a limited number of core institutions (e.g. the Directorate of Agricultural Economics Planning and Policy Analysis of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) and the identification of other key partners (see sections 2.2, 2.5 and 3.3) based on the relevance of the services provided, of their mandates and of the capacities to deliver such services . Four key problems will have to be taken into account in defining the SIFSIA institutional set up: a) the need to strengthen horizontal and vertical linkages between institutions whose mandate is relevant to food security; b) the need to establish linkages between transient/short term and structural/long term food security analysis and responses; c) the need to ensure an intersectoral approach to food security and its links with highest level of decision making (see section 3.3); and d) the need to ensure the proper coordination and links of SIFSIA promoted initiatives with other stakeholders initiative (e.g. JAM, PRSP). The One Country-Two systems concept defined by the CPA will also have to be taken into account in defining the institutional set up. In practice it will be important, on the one hand, to ensure the compatibility of the two set ups by defining institutional arrangements that are in as much as possible symmetrical and, on the other hand, to take into account the specific mandates and priorities of the institutions involved. Implementation considerations As noted by the diagnostic, there are still many uncertainties that will persist with regard to institutional set-ups, while security and shocks are expected to remain major constraints during implementation of the programme. Therefore a flexible output oriented approach to implementation is recommended. This entails the contracting of an Executing Agency to support (technical assistance, procurements, disbursements, etc. smooth implementation of the programme (see section 3.3 and 3.5), and the identification and costing of the main activities to be supported, particularly during the first two years of the programme, and related implementation modalities that should embody flexible and transparent mechanisms to adjust to institutional and food security changes at all levels. These are detailed in section 3.5 and include: • • • • the preparation of annual work plans dealing activities to be supported transparent, intersectoral and locally owned review-mechanisms an incentive based approach for participating institutions the definition of milestones and indicators against which to monitor the overall progress of the programmes • the subdivision of the programme into two phases that will also be in line with JAM planning. The first phase (for which activities can already be broadly defined) should cover the first two years of implementation when important institutional changes are likely to occur. The second phase is defined in its broad features in this document and will be then detailed as a result of a mid-term evaluation, which will use a set performance based indicators to define the level and the focus of the investments. 3.2 SIFSIA Objectives In line with the diagnostic and key programme features described above SIFSIA implementation should contribute to MDG 1 and lead to following desired situation: human, physical and organisational capacities strengthened in the generation and utilisation of 24 information for the analysis, design, monitoring and evaluation of food security related policies and programmes. This purpose should be attained essentially through the following specific objectives: 1. Overall policy framework for food security defined and operational 2. Institutional set-up for food security established and functioning to enhance coordination and strengthen vertical and horizontal linkages 3. Effective policies and programmes designed monitored, evaluated and up-dated for: 3.1. rehabilitating and strengthening smallholders livelihoods 3.2. managing natural resources in a sustainable and equitable manner 3.3. protecting the vulnerable 3.4. monitoring relevant MDGs and PRSP/PESP indicators 4. Relevant food security information easily accessed and used by all relevant stakeholders (quantity, quality and timeliness). Annex 6 presents a preliminary programme log-frame that, during the inception phase of SIFSIA, will have to be fine tuned and further elaborated, particularly for what concerns indicators and bench marks. 3.3 SIFSIA Recommended Institutional Set up Two specific institutional set ups (one for the North and another for the South) for the definition, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of appropriate food security responses are recommended and described in this section. . The two proposed institutional set ups take into account the need of creating symmetric and compatible structures, but also the specific mandates of the institutions involved. The rationale behind this proposal relates to the three institutional problems identified by the diagnostic and described in section 2.6: a) the need to ensure an intersectoral approach to food security and its links with highest level of decision making; b) the need to strengthen horizontal and vertical linkages between institutions whose mandate is linked to food security; and c) the need to establish linkages between transient/short term and structural/long term food security analysis and responses. Therefore, it is recommended, both for the North and for the South the constitution/reviving of two Food Security Councils as the highest decision making bodies for food security and whose key mandate will be to ensure the overall alignment and harmonisation of food security initiatives and provide guidance for national food security policies and programmes such for instance SIFSIA. The Councils will be intersectoral and placed under the Office of the President to ensure that food security is provided with the necessary attention. In such framework, as illustrated in sections 3.3 and 3.4, one of the main activities of SIFSIA should be to support to the creation of such institutional set ups. Within each Council there will be a Technical Committee1 that will be more directly involved in technical matters pertaining to the Council mandate such as for instance the monitoring of food security programmes being implemented in Sudan. The Technical Committee will constitute, as temporary body, a SIFSIA Steering Committee that will meet regularly to revise SIFSIA work, approve work plans and reports and to direct activities and ensure their continuous relevance to the evolving context based on flexibility, transparency and accountability principles and the coordination with other food security related initiatives. The SIFSIA Steering Committee 1 In Northern Sudan a Food Security Technical Committee already exists. Despite the fact that the Food Security Council is not active, its technical committee meets regularly to coordinate some food security related interventions. 25 will include the EC as per STABEX regulation. As a temporary measure it is also recommended that the existing SIFSIA Task Force acts as Steering Committee until the formal establishment of the Food Security Council. The Food Security Council already exists in Northern Sudan but it has never been operational and will have to be revived through a presidential decree. In the South the Council is still to be established. It will be important, whilst establishing/reviving the Councils, to closely look at their mandates and explore the possibility of creating appropriate linkages with other councils and in particular (see2.6.4) with envisaged creation of a Council for Disaster Prevention and Preparedness. The mission, given the different nature1, of the two councils recommends keeping them separate, though their merging in a single entity with a wider mandate could also be considered. The work of the Food Security Councils and the implementation of SIFSIA activities will require the establishment of appropriate Support Units; it is therefore recommended to constitute two Food Security Technical Secretariats (FSTSs) that will have two key characteristics: a) they will be cross sectoral; and b) their mandate and scope of work should include information analysis (both for transient and structural vulnerability) and policy and planning work. In Northern Sudan the Food Security Technical Secretariat will have a higher unit of coordination and three technical sections that will be staffed with staff seconded by the different ministries and/or directly recruited. The recommended technical sections are: • Food Security in Crisis Analysis Section that may provides services also to the future Disaster Prevention and preparedness Council; • Structural Food Security Analysis Section; • Food Security Policy and Planning Section. Core line ministries at Federal and State level and resource-institutions, generating and using food security based information to design monitoring and evaluation poverty reduction and food security policies and programmes, will regularly interact with the Technical Secretariat, providing services and utilising the services that the unit will be delivering. The mission recommends the participation of the following institutions: • Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (with its Planning Directorate) as the leading institution having also Secretariat functions; • Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries (Planning Department); • Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (HAC); • Strategic Reserve Corporation; • Ministry of Health (National Nutrition Department); • Ministry of Finance (PRSP Unit); • Ministry of Social Development and Welfare (Poverty Unit); • Ministry of International Cooperation; • Ministry of Science and Technology; 1 The Disaster Council is expected to be mandated also with addressing issues not related to food security, whilst food security may be dealt with mainly with respect to disaster related transient issues. 26 • Ministry of Trade and Commerce; • Chamber of Federal Governance; • Meteorological Authority; • Remote Sensing Authority; • Central Bureau of Statistics. Furthermore the mission recommends considering the establishment of State level Food Security Councils1, particularly in those states that are considered as the most food insecure. Those bodies will allow the design and implementation of more effective and context specific food security responses whilst improving linkages with the Federal/Central level. The constitution of Food Security Councils at State level should take place after the constitution of the Federal Food Security Council and may be supported by SIFSIA. The Food Security Technical Secretariat will be a lightly staffed body (see 3.4.1.2) and will be in charge of supporting the Food Security Council in the execution of its mandate and of the overall implementation of SIFSIA; in this framework they will have the following main functions (some of which should go beyond SIFSIA specific supported activities) • • • • • support and coordinate specific data collection exercises related to transient and structural food insecurity and vulnerability; assist with technical and financial support the work of other public institutions in data collection and analysis; undertake specific analyses of the information collected with regards to livelihoods and transient and structural vulnerability; store and disseminate the information collected; provide on the job training to line ministries staff (staff will be posted in the unit/section and will upgrade their skills by working on topic specific to their mandates with respect to data collection and analysis planning, see 3.4.1); policy advise to line ministries on food security related matters; assist the mandated institutions in monitoring the impact of policies and programmes for what concerns food security; early warning functions with respect to food security issues; preparation of specific policy brief for the Food Security Council; provide other forms of support to the Food Security Council as directed by its members. • • • • • All the structures proposed above will be of a permanent nature. Only one temporary structure, specific to SIFSIA implementation, will be established both in the North and in South that is the Programme Support Unit. The unit will be staffed with international and national experts and will be located in the hosting institutions and report to the Executing Agency (see 1 The institutional set up of these councils will be defined during SIFSIA implementation; it is however likely that they will be located under the Governors (Walis) Offices at States levels, and under Commissioners offices at Localities levels. 27 section 3.5) and will have the function of ensuring the smooth implementation of SIFSIA activities. These include • • • • • preparation of work plan and progress report for SIFSIA activities; provision of specific technical assistance and backstopping; programme funds disbursements and procurements; identification, in agreement with Sudanese Institutions, and recruitment of international experts; training of the staff working in the FSTS. The coordination of activities between the two Northern and Southern Sudan SIFSIA programmes will be ensured through the work of the Executing Agency and a series of measures to be defined during the inception phase of the Programme (e.g. consultation mechanisms between the two SIFSIA Committees, common reporting templates, common methodologies for data collection, analysis and storage). President Office Food Security Council Technical Committee for Food Security SIFSIS Steering Committee Disaster Council Food Security Technical Secretariat _________________________________________ Coordination Unit Projramme Unit (PSU) Support Food Security Policy and Planning Section Structural Food Security Analysis Section Food Security in Crisis Analysis Section Core and Resource Institutions Northern Sudan Federal level 3.4 SIFSIA Recommended Activities and Components The preparation of this section is based on the following: 28 • activities have been broadly defined for the first two years of the programme (details are provided in annexes 2, 3, and 4 and a preliminary work plan for year 1 is presented in annex 7); • areas of interventions for the second phase are also briefly described; • the use GIS and Remote Sensing has been considered essentially as a tool to support the different specific activities and it has been generally covered under different relevant headings (unless otherwise indicated); • the approach to capacity building is described under 3.4.1, however since capacity building has been considered a cross cutting issue to be undertaken in all the activities specific references are made in the respective paragraphs; The attainment of the results indicated in section 3.2 will require a mix of interventions from capacity building, to information generation and analysis. For ease of reference activities recommended for support in Northern Sudan have been defined according to three broad components. These are: 1. Food security policy and planning making systems component, that covers the support to the various processes necessary to convert data collection into food security and livelihoods analysis and decision making; 2. Baselines and information systems component , that covers the surveys that will be supported by SIFSIA; and the support that SIFSIA will provide to existing and future food security related information systems; 3. Food security research and capacity building fund, that describes the recommended mechanisms for the funding of small scale interventions in food insecure areas. Support to Food Security Policy and Planning Systems Based on Food Security and Livelihoods Analysis Component This sub-section of the document essentially describes the process that should eventually lead to better policy and programme outputs and outcomes. It is presented at the beginning of this section because it focuses on information analysis and related decision making processes, that is the main issue that SIFSIA intends to address. It is divided into four main paragraphs: 1. Recommended overall approach; 2. Measures necessary for the establishment of the Food Security Council Secretariat; 3. Scope of the information analysis work; 4. Scope of the food security policy, planning and programming work. Recommended Approach A key challenge for SIFSIA, as described in section 3.3, will be to move beyond a classical approach to information generation and analysis that tends (when it exists) to be sectoral and poorly linked to decision making processes. In practice, all the information to be generated through SIFSIA support will have to be properly stored and then analysed by using a cross sectoral approach, in order to ensure the generation of policy and programme outputs relevant to the current context. Furthermore, the process of information analysis and policy making will have 29 to be driven by local stakeholders and, in this context, SIFSIA is expected to provide a comprehensive support to the capacity building of local institutions. In the Sudanese context, capacity building with respect to food security and livelihoods related information analysis and policy, planning and programming presents a number of key challenges that require innovative approaches. In fact, an effective and output oriented capacity building effort will have to: • be context specific; • be able to rapidly produce relevant and demand driven outputs, whilst at the same time ensuring the ownership over those outputs and the capacity building of local stakeholders; • promote a cross sectoral analysis and inter-ministerial collaboration over food security related issues; • ensure appropriate linkages between transient and structural food security and livelihoods vulnerability analysis; • ensure appropriate linkages between programming and policy making related outputs and food security and livelihoods analysis. Two key measures to face the above challenges are recommended. Firstly, the establishment of the proposed Food Security Council’s Technical Secretariat as a fundamental step in creating sustainable, cross sectoral and locally owned and controlled capacities for what concerns food security and livelihoods information analysis and related policy and programming processes. The key measures required for their establishment are presented in 3.4.1.2. Secondly, it is recommended to base skill development on an ‘on the job’ training approach. This will be undertaken essentially in three ways: 1. ‘on the job’ training directly undertaken by the Food Security Councils’ Technical Secretariats for public institutions staff who will be seconded to work in these units: 2. ‘on the job’ training undertaken in training, research centres and institutions working on relevant matters; 3. on the job training undertaken at decentralised/state level by mobile teams. 4. Furthermore, in some cases ‘class type’ training, tailored to the needs of local institutions, may be also envisaged, whilst the provision of equipment will also be necessary. The basic idea is that core institutions participating in SIFSIA, and more in general with a food security related mandate, will identify a series of food security analysis and policy and programming topics and, that, instead of undertaking all the analytical, policy and programming work ‘in-house’, they will ask the collaboration and support of the FSTS. The analytical and policy and programming work based on information generated with SIFSIA support or by other stakeholders, will be thus undertaken by multidisciplinary teams, under the direction of the FSTS that will be accountable to the SIFSIA SC for the outputs produced. The teams would include core staff experts (local and international) who normally work in the specific sections of the Secretariat or in the PSU who will have a capacity 30 building role1, and by the staff from a relevant public institution (seconded to the units/sections for a certain period of time). The latter, on the hand, will receive on the job training, and, on the other hand, will ensure that his/her institution’s priorities will be duly taken into account in the analytical, policy and programming work. The recommended approach will allow the training of medium/senior level information analysts, planners and policy makers from the different core institutions coming both from the federal or state level. It is foreseeable that the FSTS2 and related sections will identify (or be asked to deal with by core institutions) approximately five to seven food security related topics per year (related to the policy priorities presented in section 3.1). It is thus possible to imagine having a team of ten-fifteen people (10 of which on ‘internership basis’ and 5 experts from the PSU and the FSTS) working on each of this topic. A similar exercise, though on a lesser scale, could be undertaken at the state level, particularly in the most food insecure states, essentially by the staff who had previously received training from the FSTS. This staff could be organised in mobile units that could move from one state to the other and help state level staff in undertaking specific food security and livelihoods related analytical and programming work whilst, at the same time, strengthening their capacities and strengthening the links between the central and the state level in terms of information analysis and decision making. The recommended constitution of State level Food Security Councils could contribute to the creation of a conducive environment for such exercise. A third option to ensure on the job skill development in food security data analysis and related planning and policy making monitoring and evaluation will be the possibility of undertaking stages in ‘sister’ institutions in the region (e.g. Africover for GIS and remote sensing training or the FAO Somalia Food Security Analysis Unit for vulnerability analysis work). Some of the GIS capacity building activities are indicated in section 3.4.3, whilst other ones will be identified on the basis of annual work plan (section 3.5 provides a description of planning mechanisms). Furthermore skill development of the of FSTS and line ministries staff could also receive some class type training in various skills (e.g. PCM, policy design, etc.) if this is required. Training courses could tailored to the specific needs of the institutions and undertaken by the PSU or by experts the Executing Agency technical departments. It is recommended to make some budgetary allocation for such kind of training whose contents and modalities will be defined in the annual work plans. The establishment of the Food Security Council Technical Secretariat The recommended mandate the Food Security Council Technical Secretariat-FSTS is described under section 3.3. As seen the establishment of the Secretariat is considered by the mission as the key measure to create locally owned, intersectoral capacities in food security and livelihoods information analysis and related policy and programming actions. This section of the report briefly describes the recommended measures (staffing, equipments, training etc.) for the constitutions of the Secretariat and of the respective sections. In as much as possible the two Secretariats (North and South) will have a symmetrical set up, and, therefore the recommended measures described below with regards to staffing, equipments and technical assistance and training are expected to be similar and valid for both Secretariats unless indicated. It is finally to recall that the two Technical Secretariats, unlikely the PSUs, are to be considered as permanent structures whose mandates particularly over the medium term will encompass a series of responsibility that go beyond the implementation of SIFSIA. 1 2 In some cases experts from other institutions could also be invited to provide specialised support relevant to the issue being analysed. Under the guidance of the two SIFSIA Steering Committee. 31 It is envisaged that a preparatory/interim period will be needed before that the Northern Sudan Secretariat will be fully operational with all the necessary administrative procedures and legislative decrees in place; during such a period staff could be recruited or seconded to SIFSIA and their salaries covered with Programme resources. The recommended duration of the interim period for Northern Sudan is for a maximum of 18 months; in order words it is expected that during the third year of programme implementation the GNU will be fully responsible of the FSTS (including the coverage of staff costs). The overall estimated costs (equipments and salaries for the interim period) for this component (year 1 and 2) are €1.09 million 1 and €1.37 million for the entire implementation period (see section 3.6 and annex 2). Staffing2 In general staff may be directly recruited by the FSTS or seconded by line ministries. Salaries should take into account the need to attract qualified and committed staff but will have to be in line with government scale to ensure sustainability. As described above, working teams will be formed to deal with specific food security issues with staff from line ministries who will join the Secretariats on temporary internership basis; therefore the Secretariat will be staffed by core staff and interns. This sections deal only with the core staff that is expected to work on SIFSIA related issues. As seen the coordinating work will mandated to the Coordination Unit of the Technical Secretariat. This will be staffed with senior experts that should possibly include : a) a Director; b) a Food Security Policy Specialist; c) a Food Security and Livelihoods Analyst for what concern structural vulnerabilities; d) a Specialist for what concern food security and livelihoods analysis in emergency situation; e) a Senior Capacity Building Specialist; and e) a Communication/Report writing specialist. The section dealing with early warning and transient food insecurity analysis will be staffed with limited number of staff, these could include: a) livelihoods and vulnerability analysts; b) data analysts and statisticians; d) meteorologists/agro-meteorologists; e) trainers; f) communication and report writing specialists. The section dealing with longer term food security, livelihoods and vulnerability issues should be staffed with a limited number of staff, such as: a) statisticians; b) market information specialists; c) sector specialists (smallholder agriculture, livestock, fisheries); d) communication and report writing specialists. The policy and planning section will be staffed with: a) sector policies specialists; b) planning and programming specialists (e.g. PCM); c) communication and report writing specialists. Technical assistance and capacity building The coordination unit and its sections will receive technical assistance and on the job training by the international and national staff working in the Programme Support Unit (PSU) as indicated in section 3.3. The technical assistants will be recruited on long term and short term basis and their profiles will depend on the activities to be undertaken by SIFSIA as indicated in the next sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3. Equipments 1 2 Budget estimates have been calculated in US $ and converted in Euro at rate of exchange of 1 Euro for 1,2 US $. During the ‘interim’ period salaries will be covered by the Programme, the staffing of the Secretariat will be done in phases given the shortage of qualified manpower. 32 A detailed list of equipment for the Food Security Technical Secretariat will be prepared during the inception phase of SIFSIA (see 3.5). At this stage of programme design, costs have been estimated on the basis of the equipment requirements of similar entities (see section 3.6). However, in addition to standard equipment such as computers, fax machine, photocopiers and office furniture, the mission recommends the purchase of software for maintaining and storing the documentation as well as information sharing tools (e.g. GeoNetwork software1/ metadata compilation and publishing) as indicated in annex 2 and 4. The purchase of vehicles will not be covered by SIFSIA except for a limited number. Scope of the food security information analysis work Participating institutions Most of the institutions participating are those described under section 3.3. In Northern Sudan, a leading and coordinating role is expected to be played by the Early Warning Unit of HAC for what concern the analysis of transient vulnerability; whilst the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will coordinate activities related to the analysis of structural vulnerability. Public institutions that are likely to be interested in undertaking a more in depth analytical work of the information they have generated or they have at their disposal are the Ministry of Finance (PRSP Unit), the Strategic Reserve Corporation, the Ministry of Social Development and Welfare, the Nutrition Department of the Ministry of Health. The Central Bureaus of Statistics (ensuring data standardisation), the Sudan Meteorological Authority and the Remote Sensing Authority will also participate as capacity builders and services deliverers. Topics to be tackled As for what concerns information analysis it is recommended that food security and livelihoods work should focus around the three policy issues that have been indicated in section 3.1, namely: a) protecting the most vulnerable, b) poverty reduction through the support to smallholder agriculture and rural livelihoods; c) sustainable and equitable management of natural resources. Specific topics will then be defined through a mechanism of annual work plans. In particular, on the basis of the preliminary analysis undertaken by the mission, the following topics are likely to be tackled: • • • • • • • • 1 vulnerability analysis: quantification, profiles, factors affecting vulnerability, geographical distribution; livelihoods analysis of vulnerable groups; monitoring of IDP/refugees returns and reintegration (e.g. livelihoods rehabilitation, conflicts with local population); natural resources (water, pastures etc) uses and users and critical factors in natural resources management; food system resilience analysis; food gaps analysis and definition of requirements in terms of food aid and buffer stocks level; analysis of staple food production forecast; analysis of nutritional status of vulnerable groups; Geonetwork is an open source metadata catalogue software that allows institutions to catalog and publish the metadata of all documents and spatial data that is available. Metadata standards are considered fundamental for effective and efficient data sharing. 33 • establishment of relevant food security related bench marks for MDGs and PRSP. Expected outputs The expected outputs will be essentially of the following • • • • • • creation of sustained food security and livelihoods analysis capacities on the part of local institutions; strengthened partnership between participating institutions; production of bulletin reports, research brief and maps on the topics above to be utilised in policy and programming; information stored and shared among stakeholders through appropriate software (GeoNetwork software for metadata compilation), web site, radio etc.; increased data collection coverage; updated baselines and profiles. 34 Scope of the food security policy planning and programming work Participating institutions Most of the institutions participating are those described under section 3.3. In Northern Sudan, the Agricultural Economics, Planning and Policy Analysis Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is expected to play a leading role in the Policy and Programming section of the Food Security Technical Secretariat. Public institutions that are likely to be interested in food security policy and programming work are the Strategic Reserve Corporation, the Ministry of Social Development and Welfare, the Nutrition Department of the Ministry of Health, the PRSP Unit of the Ministry of Finance and the National Population Council. Topics to be tackled As in the case of information analysis it is recommended that food security and livelihoods policy and programming work should focus around the three policy issues that have been indicated in section 3.1. Specific topics will then been defined through a mechanism of annual work plans. Given the approach advocated by SIFSIA (linking information analysis to decision makings), the policy and programming issues to be tackled should be closely links to the information analysis and vice versa. Therefore it could be envisaged that most of the policy and programming work at central and state level will relate to measures to: reduce vulnerabilities, strengthening rural people livelihoods and food systems, supporting a sustainable return and reintegration, define commonly agreed criteria on food aid delivery mechanisms, supporting rural markets, food prices fluctuation control mechanisms and overall policies and programmes monitoring. Expected outputs The support to the policy and planning system component should eventually result in a number of policy outputs. These cannot be fully anticipated at this stage, since they will be determined by the different stakeholders, could be broadly related to the following: • • capacities created in food security and livestock related policy and programme design, monitoring and evaluation strengthened; the design, monitoring and evaluation of an appropriate policy/ programme mix of long/short term food security and livelihood support interventions based on sound information and appropriate analyses; a rationalisation of responses to short-term crises such as appropriate quantity of food aid and timely deliveries, appropriate buffer stock levels and management of this stocks by the Strategic Reserve Corporation, introduction of a developmental relief approach, etc; preparation of maps (e.g. livelihoods and food security vulnerability; poverty; access to and use of assets and natural resources) to guide policy design and monitoring and public and donors investments; specific policy briefs or sectoral analysis to orient/fine tune the preparation/revision of sectoral policies; monitoring MDGs and PRSP food security related indicators; establishing and mainstreaming food poverty bench marks in the monitoring of the impact of different policies; • • • • • 35 • redefinition and rationalisation at all levels of the institutional set up for food security. Baselines and Information Systems Component A number of options concerning the improvement of the food security information basis through specific surveys and the strengthening of public institutions and other relevant stakeholders’ capacities in the generation, analysis and use of information have been reviewed by the formulation mission. The basic points and guiding principles that have been analysed in the appraisal of the different systems (existing or to be created) or surveys to be supported are : : a) collect and organise the baseline data necessary to planners to take key decisions (policy and planning) on food security related matters; b) contribute to establish the basis for the population census; c) the relevance and demand for the information to be generated; d) existing gaps and shortcomings in the information generated; e) the actual level of the capacities of existing institutions in delivering information On this basis, and on the basis of a number of technical considerations and context specific analysis, a number of systems/activities to be supported in Northern Sudan have been identified and are recommended for support. These are: 1. The household food consumption and welfare survey; 2. Agricultural and livestock market information systems; 3. Agricultural production monitoring and forecasts system; 4. Natural resources monitoring and mapping system; 5. Basic capacity building activities for public institutions. In all the systems/activities above great attention will paid to the strengthening of the links between the central and the state level, through: a) capacity building at all levels; b) participation of state level public institutions in the systems design and implementation; c) provision of performance based incentives-to-participate to state level institutions (e.g. equipment, training); d) feed back mechanisms from the central to the state level in terms of data analysis and data sharing. Household food consumption and welfare survey Description The proposed survey will cover all the sixteen states of Northern Sudan and will be conducted essentially through interviews at community and at household level. It will cover a number of food security related topics, such as, for instance, the level of access to basic services by the community, household food expenditure, and household welfare indicators (e.g. dwelling, access to water, etc.). The estimated cost for this survey is about €917,000 Euros during the start up phase and € 1.46 million during the entire implementation period (see section 3.6 and annex 2). The monitoring system will be implemented under the responsibility of the MoAF that will be supported in the exercise by the Food Security Council Technical Secretariat. The indicated budget is to cover additional costs (equipment, specific technical assistance, travelling, data collection, etc.) to those that the FSTS and MoAF and other partners would have to cover in the absence of this activity. Rationale for selection The proposed survey is part of the set of pre-census activities, planned by the GoS/GNU, in support of MDGs and PRSP design and monitoring for what concern food security 36 and welfare indicators. Other envisaged surveys include a Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (to which the proposed survey should contribute) to collect household data in a limited number of states; and a Poverty Baseline Survey. The preference and priority given by the formulation team to the household food consumption and welfare survey is due to the following: • indications from stakeholders; • the fact that the proposed survey combines the requests and the information needs of at least three SIFSIA key partners: MoAF (for what concern food security issues), the NPC (that planned to undertake a CWQI, whose questions have been integrated in this survey) and the Nutrition Directorate (food consumption questions); • the fact that the survey will build upon, complete and integrate the on going food consumption survey, being undertaken by the Food Security Department of MoAF; • the fact that other surveys may be supported by other donors (e.g. African Development Bank for the Poverty Baseline Survey); • the relevance of the information collected to food security; • the coverage that allows policy making both at the local level and GNU level; • the relative rapidity of the exercise that can thus feed the policy process within a reasonable timeframe. Expected users and uses of the information generated The information generated will be used for different purposes and by different users: • in general, the survey findings will be used to establish a series of baselines against which to measure the progress in the implementation of different policies and programmes (e.g. access to basic services, access to food, etc.); • survey findings will also be used as the basis for the preparation of GIS thematic maps to help planners; • planners and policy makers (in particular from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Social Development and Welfare and the Ministry of Health) will use the information generated in the design1 fine tune and monitoring of specific policies and programmes (also in terms of level of investments across the different states); • state level authorities and ministries may also use the information to develop local development plans. Participating institutions 1 Information collected could be used for simulating outcomes of various policy reforms that the government may want to consider. Such simulations would evaluate the economic, political and technical feasibility of reforms targeted to improving the welfare of the poor, reducing infant mortality and malnutrition and promoting social equity. 37 The survey will be undertaken under the responsibility of the proposed Food Security Technical Secretariat, under the coordination of the MoAF. Given the nature of the survey, a direct participation of other GNU institutions (as members of had hoc task force and as direct contributor to data collection) is envisaged. These include, among others, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Development and Welfare (NPC in particular), the Humanitarian Aid Commission, etc. Key features of the design After evaluating different alternative sample surveys, the mission recommends an integrated household survey, food security oriented, with some community level information and welfare indicators involving all the 16 Northern Sudan states. The recommendation is based on the fact that it allows for different kind of analysis: a simple and quick one, targeted to identify vulnerable areas for a rapid intervention; and, a more sophisticated analysis that provides policy makers with instruments for short-run and long-run reforms, mainly targeted to reduce poverty and improve welfare. The possible alternatives, taken into consideration, were a more detailed community level survey or a simple welfare indicators survey. Both of them are useful to give a general view of the situation for each state: infrastructures, illiteracy, access to facilities, health of the population, etc. However, they do not allow for evaluating alternative reform and intervention scenarios in the short run as well as in the long run. The questionnaires will be finalised during the inception phase of the Programme and will be composed of three sections: one for households, to obtain all the information necessary for a complete food security analysis; another, destined to village counsellors, to obtain information about the access to the main facilities and services in the village; finally, a last one destined to households, containing questions about living standards. Enumerators will be provided with palms with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. These computer assisted environments will be programmed with a spreadsheet covering the questionnaire. Each entry will contain a list of bracketed possible answers that can be easily selected by the enumerators, and that can be directly transferred into an electronic format, thus reducing data entry errors and the time for data cleaning operations In Northern Sudan many administrative registers and files exist, are available and can be merged in order to construct a sampling frame for the survey. However, these may have different formats, refer to different time periods and may carry different identification indicators for the units to be surveyed. Furthermore, locating housing units in the field can be hard, especially in recently developed neighbourhoods, when maps are out of date, when population is migrating or when address information for the sample unit is incomplete or inaccurate. To overcome such a problem it is recommended to make use of digital geospatial information for updating existing maps to estimate population agglomerates and densities, in order to stratify Northern Sudan population and to obtain more accurate sample weights. All the states will be included in the sample. The number of units to be sampled in each state will depend on its population, its accessibility and its will to participate. The basic sampling plan should consists of the following steps: a) stratify each of the Northern Sudan states Sudan into 5 strata (metropolitan area, upper-urban, lower-urban, upper-rural and lower-rural); b) from each strata, a village (primary sampling unit) is selected with probability proportional to its size; c) from each village, a given number of households (secondary sampling unit) is selected and interviewed; d) the village counsellor of each of the selected village is interviewed. Capacity building and technical assistance requirements The main target of the capacity building activities will be team of enumerators/interviewers (approximately 120) that will be undertaking data collection, and the staff of the Food Security Technical Secretariat and other line ministries that will be provided with on the job training on statistics, data collection and analysis (see also section 3.4.1). 38 The technical assistance support team will include a part time international expert on statistics who will participate in all the crucial moments of the survey, an international expert that will provide training in the use of Global Position System receivers. Furthermore staff members of the PSU and of the Food Security Technical Secretariat (three statistical analyst/econometricians) are also expected to provide specific technical inputs, for instance in the design of the questionnaire, in the analysis of data and in the preparation of maps. Activities/component Activities will be undertaken in all the sixteen states. The start up activity, after staff recruitment, will be the design of a full fledged questionnaire, this will be followed by the recruitment and training of enumerators and by the start of surveys at state level. States will be surveyed on a group-of-three basis, therefore survey findings of some states will be already available before the completion of the whole data collection exercise. The support of SIFSIA is required to fund the costs of enumerators and enumerators training, logistic of data collection, technical assistance, consumable and equipment (computers, GPS). 39 Agricultural and livestock market information systems Description and justification The market information system (MIS) proposed for support is designed to provide regular and up to date information on the market prices of basic agricultural and livestock products, collected from the main markets currently existing in all states of Sudan. In the North it is proposed to strengthen the existing market information systems and reduce duplications, whilst in Southern Sudan the system will have to be built from scratch. The estimated costs for the first two years of the MIS for Northern Sudan are €573,000 and they are about €761,000 during the entire implementation period (see section 3.6 and annex 2) In Northern Sudan there are already in place two systems for market data information collection managed by the Ministry of Agricultural and Forestry and by the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries. However, the collection of information is not systematic and particular for livestock the coverage is limited. Furthermore there are key information gaps related to the quality of the agricultural products, the actual level of demand for the products and their storage level. Furthermore, the information generated is not disseminated nor made available to key potential users such as Farmers Unions. Finally there exists a duplication with the work undertaken by the CBS.. Participating institutions In Northern Sudan, the proposed MIS will be managed by State Level Departments of Agricultural Planning (that will cover also the livestock aspects). These departments will then send the information to the Planning Directorates of the MoAF and Ministry of Animal Resources for data aggregation and analysis. In such a context a key role is expected to be played by the Department of Agricultural Economics and its Marketing Section. Consultation mechanisms and possibly technical assistance from CBS will ensure the standardisation of the information collected. Further and more cross sectoral and food security analysis of the data generated should be played by the Food Security Technical Secretariat whose establishment will be supported by SIFSIA. Users and uses of the information generated The information generated is expected to serve various food security related purposes such as for instance: • informing planners and policy makers (e.g. ministries of agricultural and animal resources) on the level of demand for products and related prices in order to provide advise to farmers, promote certain productions, address market bottlenecks, etc.; informing farmers so as to make the right production decisions; strengthening early warning systems and directing food aid distributions; assist decision makers in undertaking appropriate measures (e.g. through the sales or purchase of grains by the Strategic Reserve Corporation) to support agricultural producers and consumers; inflation calculation. • • • • System design and activities to be undertaken 40 The development of the proposed MIS will require a series of measures (see annex 2). These include: • the design of a new software for MIS to replace the existing one that is considered to be obsolete. The software should be flexible enough to be adapted to the different regional and states contexts (e.g. type of information to be collected, skills of staff) whilst allowing an aggregation at central level; the renovation of the equipment of the Marketing Section of DAE in Khartoum; the provision of basic equipments (e.g. fax and computers) to all 16 states departments of planning of the ministries of agriculture (based on their interest to participate and their contribution to the system); the provision of specialised technical assistance (marketing surveys, software) the training (120 staff) in data collection and processing of states and wholesale market staff; the training in data analysis to be undertaken essentially by the Food Security Council’s Technical Secretariat under the modalities described under 3.4.1.; the dissemination of the data generated to all interested stakeholders through radio, bulletins, etc. • • • • • • Agricultural production monitoring and forecasting system Description and justification The proposed system will be based on two separate components: a) strengthening the capacities in agricultural production monitoring of the Ministries of Agriculture through the support to yearly crop assessment surveys; b) utilisation of agro-meteorological and rainfall data for early warning and agricultural planning, through the strengthening of the capacities of the Sudan Meteorological Authority in delivering appropriate services and support to the mandated institutions. The two components are at the moment managed by different bodies and the analysis of the data generated is hardly aggregated; it is therefore proposed to use the work of the proposed FSTS to aggregate the data and undertake the related analyses. In Northern Sudan the Statistics Department of the DAEPPA undertakes crop assessments (mainly sorghum) by essentially using crop cutting techniques. However these are undertaken irregularly and with a limited coverage in terms of states (6 out of 16). The estimated costs for this activity for Northern Sudan are €725,000 in phase 1 and €967,000 for the entire implementation period (see section 3.6 and annex 2). The Sudan Meteorological Authority provides information (rainfall, NDVI) that can be used in crop production forecasting and monitoring. However, staff skills need to be updated and some of the equipment and software are obsolete; improvements can be made with respect to the accuracy and the users-friendliness of the information generated and access to such information. The estimated costs for this activity (phase 1) in Northern Sudan are €542,000 Euros in phase 1 and €625,000 for the entire implementation period. Participating institutions In Northern Sudan, the crop surveys will be undertaken by the Department of Statistics of the DAEPPA that will collaborate with state level Ministry of Agricultural staff. 41 Technical assistance and supervision will be provided by the Food Security Technical Secretariat (particularly the section dealing with transient food insecurity and early warning). The Sudan Meteorological Authority will act as a service provider and its capacities will be strengthen to this end. Other institutions that mission would like to recommend as services providers (see below) are the Joint Research Centre and the Remote Sensing Authority. Users and uses of the information generated The information generated is expected to serve various food security related purposes such as for instance: • • • • strengthen the capacities of the ministries of agriculture in providing farmers with the right advises (type of crops, time of planting); provide a more solid, reliable, and locally owned base of information for the annual crops and food supply assessments; strengthening early warning systems and directing food aid distributions; assist decision makers in undertaking appropriate measures (e.g. by indicating surplus and deficit areas for the purchase and sales of grains by the Strategic Reserve Corporation) to support agricultural producers and consumers; monitor the effects on agricultural production of the various support measures and agricultural GDP calculation. • System design and activities to be undertaken The support to the annual exercise of crop surveys will require a series of measures (see annex 2). These include: • the extension of the current coverage of 6 states to 16 states. Given the food security contents of SIFSIA is recommended to assess the production of the following crops: sorghum (16 states), millet (6 states), wheat (5 states); an up date of sampling frames is also recommended; the training (preferably on the job) of core staff in data collection and processing, sampling techniques, crop cutting techniques. In Northern Sudan there are six training centres that could provide such kind of training; the provision of basic communication equipments (faxes, mobile telephones) for all 16 states1; the leasing of vehicles for field work; food security related data analysis to be undertaken essentially by the Food Security Council’s Technical Secretariat under the modalities described in section 3.4.1. • • • • The support to the use of agro-meteorological data to improve crop forecast and monitoring will require a series of measures (see annex 4). These include: 1 Care should be taken to avoid duplication with MIS equipment supply or with the support provided by other initiatives. 42 • skill development (on the job) for SMA staff in GIS, data processing and management, computer, and acquisition and analysis of remotely sensed data. Training to be provided by the Remote Sensing Authority; the improvement of food security research capabilities of SMA Staff through an internship in a regional training institution; awareness seminars for concerned institutions on the importance of agrometeorological data in food security and agricultural planning; updating of SMA CLICOM data base to new CLIMSOFT data base to improve the quality, use and consistency of meteorological data archives; purchase of recording and ordinary rain gauges to extend the coverage and accuracy of rainfall data; provisions of computer and printers; 3 automatic weather stations; to update the current SMA Website for the timely dissemination of information with regard to rainfall, NDVI and other related products (e.g. climate maps); technical assistance from JRC (international consultants in remote sensing and agro -meteorology) to establish a rainfall and crop monitoring office to perform real time monitoring and allow an early assessment of the crop situation, on the basis of the experience developed by the Monitoring Agriculture with Remote Sensing MARS-project. The technical assistance should be geared towards on the job training (one agro-meteorologist, one meteorologist and one data processing) in the use of meteorological and remote sensing data. The office should be located in the proposed FS in Crisis Analysis Section that will deal with transient vulnerability and early warning issues. • • • • • • • • Natural resources monitoring and mapping Description and justification The proposed intervention is designed to provide mandated institutions at central and state level with enhanced capacities for what concerns location specific assessments and monitoring of natural resources, through specific training and equipment. At the moment these capacities are extremely limited in Northern Sudan because of lack of means, poor coordination and lack of access to the information generated by a number of international initiatives. The estimated cost for this activity in Northern Sudan are € 108,000 (phase 1) and € 208,000 for the entire implementation period (see section 3.6 and annex 2). It is recommended, given the food security focus of SIFSIA, at least in the first phase of the programme, to concentrate efforts towards the assessment and monitoring of those natural resources that are more relevant to vulnerable people livelihoods such as pastures (and related carrying capacities), water for livestock use, forests and land uses in traditional/smallholders farming areas in food insecure areas/states. Participating institutions In Northern Sudan, the main participating institutions will be the Ministries of Agriculture and Animal Resources. The analysis of data gathered will be undertaken directly by 43 the line ministries for what concern the sectoral use of the information and by the Food Security Council’s Technical Secretariat for more cross-sectoral analyses. Users and uses of the information generated The information generated is expected to serve various food security related purposes such as for instance: • • • • • • the identification of areas where resources degradation threatens food security; the planning of agricultural and livestock support interventions; the assessment and monitoring of livestock herds; the planning of returns of IDPs (e.g. by Sustainable Return Teams); the reduction of risks of conflicts over resources (e.g. between pastoralists and farmers); the design of relevant, sustainable and equitable NRM policies. 44 System design and activities to be undertaken The support to the strengthening of natural resources monitoring and mapping capacities will require a series of measures (see annex 2 and 4). These include: • • • equipment upgrade for the Remote Sensing Authority (GIS capable PCs, ArcGIS software, ERDAS Imagine Software, etc.); GIS and remote sensing training undertaken by RSA for line ministries and Food security Councils’ Technical Secretariats staff; Provision of basic equipment to relevant state level institutions. Basic capacity building activities for public institutions Description and justification The analysis undertaken by the formulation mission pointed out to a number of across the board weaknesses of Northern Sudanese institutions for what concern the collection, processing and analyses of the information they are mandated to generate. These relate essentially to the lack of equipments and lack of capacities (or outdated capacities) for what concern data entry and analysis and the application of GIS. Some institutions have presented a specific request for support in strengthening their data collection and analysis work (e.g. the Nutrition Directorate) others have simply forwarded training or equipment requests. It is recommended to allocate a portion of SIFSIA resource to the support of small scale CB and data generation and analysis projects, provided that this support is approved by the SIFSIA Steering Committee and that it could be translated in a series of services or outputs useful to SIFSIA scope of work. Participating institutions All the entities indicated as core institutions in the institutional set-up presented in section 3.3 could participate. During the formulation mission particularly relevant request for support, in Northern Sudan, were formulated by the Nutrition Directorate (training and equipment for nutritional monitoring), the National Population Council (GIS training and equipments), the Ministry of Social Development and Welfare and the Zakat Chamber (capacity building for the systematisation of vulnerable group data). The Central Bureau of Statistics and the Remote Sensing Authority could provide most of the required training support. System design and activities to be undertaken The support to the development of the basic capacities in information collection and analysis of Sudanese institutions include a set of activities and steps: • the earmarking of resources in SIFSIA budget to be utilised to this end. On the basis of the cost estimates presented in annex 2, it is recommended to set aside 100,000 Euros for year 1 and 150,000 Euros for years 2 to 4 in Northern Sudan; the preparation of specific request for support and related work plan to be presented to the SIFSIA Steering Committee at the beginning of each year so as to be included, if approved, in the annual work plan. These include: o Equipment provision • 45 o Training modules, possibly on the job, of the selected staff in: a) basic statistics and econometrics; b) data analysis and interpretation; c) computer literacy; d) applied GIS and remote sensing; e) project planning. The Remote Sensing Authority and the Central Bureau of Statistics could possibly undertake such type of training. Annexes 2 and 4 present estimates of the standard costs of these training activities. Food Security Research and Capacity Building Fund Component The diagnostic, made in chapter 2, has pointed to the fact that the overall context for food security in Sudan will remain quite volatile, at least over the medium term. Therefore a flexible results oriented approach to implementation is required. This may imply, among other things, that not all the activities to be supported could be identified at this stage particularly with respect to the state/local level where institutions are being created or reformed. Therefore the mission recommends the constitution of an un-earmarked fund for the support to food security research and capacity building initiatives identified at the local level. The fund should be a demand driven fund utilised essentially to support initiatives identified at (or relevant to) local/state level by public institutions and NGOs. The fund could support food security related capacity building initiatives to the benefit of decentralised institutions (e.g. vulnerability analysis) or specific research work that could contributed to a better analysis of the food security situation in a specific context. For instance visits at state level (e.g. Red Sea), pointed out at the importance that fish could play in addressing the food security problems of vulnerable group and the analysis of such aspect of people livelihoods could lead to the design of appropriate and relevant support interventions. The fund should probably concentrate its activities in areas/states considered as structural food insecure or in areas affected by transient food insecurity problems. The main expected result of the fund should thus be an enhanced decentralised capacities in food security analysis and in food security policy and planning The detailed mechanisms for the management of the fund will be prepared during the inception phase of the Programme. The fund will be under the overall supervision of the SIFSIA Steering Committees and will be managed by the Programme Support Unit. Basic features of the design will be as follows: • • • • • • eligibility of activities to be supported; geographical coverage of the fund (it is recommended that the fund should concentrate in not more than 4 food insecure states of Northern Sudan); financial size of the initiatives to be funded; criteria for the prioritisation of activities to be funded; monitoring mechanisms an global allocation of € 100,000 in Year 1 and € 200,000 per year in Year 2, 3 and 4 has been budgeted. Potential Initiatives to be Supported during the Second Phase of the Programme The activities described above will be supported during the first phase of the programme. Towards the end (18 months) of the first phase, a mid term evaluation will be undertaken (see section 3.5) that will define the initiatives to be supported during the second phase on the basis of the emerging results and performances, and on the basis of the evolution of the food security context. However some hypothesis of the core work for SIFSIA in its second phase can be identified at this stage. 46 • The envisaged execution of the population census will open new perspectives with respect to SIFSIA activities in support to strengthening the baseline information basis. In particularly SIFSIA could be expected to be involved in (and to bring a food security perspective to) a series of planned post census surveys such the agriculture census and the household income and expenditure survey. The support to the information systems indicated in section 3.4.2 is likely to continue. Changes with respect to coverage and implementation modalities are likely to occur. In particular the GNU contribution to the funding of the systems are expected to gradually increase and the additional resources may possibly be used to extend the coverage of the support provided (e.g. information collection at locality/county level or the support to other food security related information systems) and to reduce the level of contribution of the donor to the cost of activities. With respect to the support to food security policy and planning activities the support of SIFSIA may gradually move from a work in support to the definition of broader policy frameworks to a more programme design oriented action. The results of the census could also allow the development of policy tools such as poverty mapping. Finally other broad policy areas (in addition to the three mentioned in various section of this document) could be at least gradually tackled. These could include for instance: regional trade issues, implications of World Trade Organisation negotiations on food security, etc. • • • 3.5 SIFSIA Implementation Modalities This section of the document presents the main preliminary features of SIFSIA recommended implementation modalities; it includes : a) key principles; b) implementation and management structure; c) planning mechanisms; d) disbursement and procurement mechanisms; e) handover managerial responsibilities; f) M&E modalities. 47 Key principles National and local ownerships will guide the implementation of the Programme. However, the limited capacity of Sudanese counterparts in programme and financial management has to be acknowledged. Therefore, there is a need for external assistance during a transition period to ensure an efficient, timely and qualitative implementation of programme activities, while at the same time building the capacities of Sudanese experts and administration. This external assistance should be provided by a specialised agency, thereafter referred as the Executing Agency. As described in the section 3.4 part of the implementation activities will take place at the state level, that is consistent with the decentralisation framework of the Government of Sudan. However, state administration are often weak, thus emphasis will be given to capacity building, mainly through mobile teams that would support local institutions staff with on the job training (see section 3.4). Particular investments in terms of CB will be undertaken in food insecure and disadvantaged states. Collaboration in CB with the SPCRP will also be sought. The Northern and Southern Management structures (see section 3.3) will be separated and autonomous one from the other. However, they will share the same structure, they will partly share the same international technical assistance and will be coordinated through a number of mechanisms. A thorough mid-term evaluation (after 18 months of implementation) will appraise the progress made on the basis of set of performance indicators (see paragraph below on M&E). Findings will serve as a basis for decision to allocate the resources of the second phase of SIFSIA between sectors and regions. The evaluation will also be essential in analysing implementation efficiency, adapting a revised structure and modalities to the new context and progressively transferring SIFSIA management functions to the Sudanese institutions. Implementation and management structure and mechanisms The key different entities that will be involved in SIFSIA management and implementation are described under section 3.3. The supervisory body will be the steering committee. The main role in the overall management of SIFSIA assistance will be played by the Programme Support Unit. The PSU is a temporary structure that will stop its activities at the end of SIFSIA. The PSU will be under the direct responsibility of the Executing Agency that will be in charge with the overall execution of the Programme. The PSUs will have essentially three functions: • • • • providing technical assistance and support to the local institutions participating in the programme; monitoring and review; procurements and funds disbursement. to this end they will be staffed with qualified international and national staff. These will include the following: o one Programme Manager (national) and one Chief Technical Adviser (international). The selected experts will preferably be policy and capacity building specialists and will provide the overall technical support to the Programme; one international and one national Food Security Information Analysts; o 48 o o o one Financial Controller (national); one Procurement Officer (national) and a ‘part-time’ international ; a pool (5 person-months per year)of short term international experts (e.g. marketing specialists, sector policy specialists, livelihoods analysts, econometricians, etc.); • the Executing Agency Team at HQ level will include: o a part time Task Manager (2 months per year) who will provide the overall strategic guidance to programme implementation, ensure the liaison with the different technical divisions that will support the programme, and ensure the coordination between the two sub programmes and to whom the CTA will report; a part time (2 months per year) Operation Officer; o The implementation of programme activities will be undertaken by the Food Security Council’s Technical Secretariat and by the Line ministries and services delivery bodies. The former will essentially undertake the food security information analytical, dissemination and related policy work and will provide on the job training and other had hoc assistance to the mandated institutions. The initial investment cost of the FSTS will be essentially covered with SIFSIA resources, that will also cover the costs of staff salaries during the interim/constitution phase of the FSTS, on the understanding that these will be covered by GNU once the Secretariat will be fully established and the necessary legislative and administrative arrangements finalised. The line ministries and other institutions interested in receiving SIFSIA support and to participate in its implementation, as well as the FSTS will enter specific Letters of Agreements with the PSU, whose terms and conditions will be prepared by the local team. Renewal or extension of the LoAs will depend upon the performance of the implementing partners, defined on the basis of a set of commonly agreed indicators, and will be decided by the SIFSIA Steering Committee that will include also the EC (as already mentioned the existing SIFSIA TF could act as SC till the formal establishment of the Food Security Council). Planning mechanisms The recommended duration of the SIFSIA Programme is 4 years (2006-2010) divided into two phases. The recommended duration takes into account the need to harmonise the SIFSIA project cycle with those of other key initiatives (e.g. JAM). It is also recommended to base the decision on the funding and on the key areas of investments for the second phase and for similar future initiatives on the results of a Midterm evaluation that will review the performances of the Programme components on the basis of a set of commonly agreed performance indicators to be defined during the Inception phase. The SIFSIA inception phase (estimated duration 6 months) will have five main objectives: a) to prepare a detailed work plan for year 1, that will also verify the actual needs in terms of equipments of the different stakeholders since support may also be provided by the other donors in the period of time that will occur between this formulation exercise and the actual start of implementation; b) to establish commonly agreed indicators against which to assess SIFSIA performance; c) to ensure that the GNU has put in place the legislative measures for the proposed institutional set up; d) to complete the staffing of the PSU and FSTS; e) to start Programme activities (e.g. support to data collection and analysis) identified as urgent priories by the SC. 49 The basic requirement with respect to the SIFSIA implementation is the establishment of a planning system providing all the necessary flexibility to programming activities that is needed in a rapid evolving and uncertain context, whilst ensuring the necessary transparency and accountability. In this framework the following recommendations are made: − preparation for SIFSIA activities by the PSU and FSTS of annual detailed rolling work plans and related budgets and performance indicators to be approved by the SIFSIA Steering Committee; an annual review (see M&E paragraph below) of progresses made that will provide the basis for the following year work plan (with resources allocation mechanisms based on performances). The SIFSIA donor (the EC) will be invited to such a review; the constitutions of a Food Security Research and Capacity Building Fund to support relevant activities that cannot be identified at the beginning of each year (see section 3.4.3); the possibility, if need be, with the approval of the SC, of rapidly revising on going annual work plans to adjust them to the rapidly evolving context; a transparent and locally controlled system of decision making with respect to the planning of SIFSIA, through the Steering Committee. − − − − Disbursement and procurement mechanisms The Executing Agency rules for procurement, financial management, recruitment will have to be followed. These rules should be compatible with EDF procedures and allow for decentralized procedures to ensure the maximum efficiency and timeliness in the implementation of activities. The day to day management will be the role of the PSU. Key decisions, work programmes and reports will be cleared and endorsed by the PSU in Khartoum and in particular by the CTA who will receive the necessary Delegation of Authority from the Executing Agency. The PSU will be supervised and guided by the Steering Committee which will review and approve work plans. The role of the Executing Agency Headquarters should be mainly twofold: a) liaise with the technical divisions and get their technical advice, guidance and clearance so as to ensure optimum quality standards of project and programme activities; b) ensure that the Executing Agency rules and process for procurement, contracting, recruitment of experts are respected and in an expedite manner. In summary all implementation and managerial decisions would be made in country while the Executing Agency HQs would provide technical and administrative support and clearance based on the requests from the field. The management tools used during implementation should be adapted to the volatility of the Sudanese environment and be best designed to service timely implementation while keeping quality. The recommended tools and means are the following: • Procurement of goods and services. This should follow procurement rules as agreed upon between the Executing Agency and the EC. Technical specifications should be the responsibility of the local programme teams (with technical advice and clearance from technical divisions when relevant) as well as the preparation of the tender documents (under the supervision of the Executing Agency procurement service). An international procurement officer could support the Programme directly in Sudan. This procedure will allow adequate Delegation of Authority to 50 undertake procurements locally. The presence of national officers to manage procurements will ensure that such activities are handled expeditiously while ensuring required transparency and adherence to the Organization’s rules and procedures. The officers will be supported by the Procurement Service at Headquarters. The procurement officers will also be responsible for ensuring training and capacity building in the procurement function for the local institutions staff which will ensure continued ability to undertake procurement activities over the longer term. • Budget Flows / payments. Payments for services, work or goods internationally procured are to be made by the Executing Agency headquarters. All other expenses are made by the field entities (PSUs) through field budget authorizations which delegate the authority and management of the funds to the field offices. An imprest account could be opened specifically for the SIFSIA sub-programmes and managed by the CTA. • Letters of Agreements (LoAs). This is a relatively flexible tool that most UN Agencies uses to contract well focused services to implementation partners such as public institutions. Again the terms of reference, terms and conditions of the LoAs will be prepared by the local teams while the level of formal clearance depends on the size of the contract according to Executing Agency procedures. Handover managerial responsibilities This is probably the most difficult mechanism to plan for, as it will very much depend on three elements that are difficult to fully appraise at this stage: a) the institutional set up of Sudan that will result from the first 2-3 years of the interim period; b) the actual capacities of the future administration which will have to be built by SIFSIA and other interventions; c) the financial means at the disposal of GNU over time resulting from external budget support, oil revenues and fiscal revenues. In terms of the definition of SIFSIA areas of intervention, priorities, geographic focus, activities, the Sudanese have been the owners from the beginning of programme formulation and will continue to do so throughout implementation. However, so far, FAO has mostly been managing the design of activities. The transfer of these management functions to national counterparts is an absolute necessity to institutionalise programme interventions and ensure their sustainability. This will be achieved through the following mechanisms: • an appropriate institutional set up (see section 3.3) that puts Sudanese Institutions in the driving seat since the start of the Programme; • a progressive transfer through appropriate training (and on the basis of commonly agreed financial standard requirements) of the management functions from the PSU to the Food Security Council’s Technical Secretariat; • the mid term evaluation (see paragraphs below) will include an institutional review to assess the local institutions capacities to handle the managerial (including finance) functions of SIFSIA. On this basis, new responsibilities will be assigned during the second phase of the Programme. M&E modalities A strong and reliable Monitoring and Evaluation System is essential to the success of SIFSIA because of: 51 • the need to ensure a transparent process of decision making concerning resources allocation, based on the performance of participating institution; • the need to draw useful lessons from the first phase of the Programme, to guide the second phase and for the extension of those activities that will prove more relevant in providing sustained solutions to the food insecurity problems of Sudan; • the need to adjust to the evolving political situation; monitoring will be a key element for adapting, adjusting and rescheduling the programmed activities and, where possible, to take appropriate action at higher level to address any problem; • the programmatic nature of the SIFSIA which involves a number of separate activities and therefore requires a careful monitoring to ensure coherence and information and experience sharing. The M&E system should comprise three major activities: a) on-going monitoring; b) annual reviews and reports; c) external evaluations. These will lead to the preparation of three major types of reports: quarterly reports, annual reports, and evaluation reports. • On-Going Monitoring / Quarterly Progress Reports: on-going monitoring will involve the preparation of quarterly progress reports by the FSTS and PSU. They should provide detailed highlights on the pace of project implementation, project achievements, project performance and level of satisfaction of project stakeholders. The progress reports should both include: a) a careful description of progress in physical, financial and human terms; b) reporting implementation constraints and difficulties and their consequent specific queries and recommendations from implementing partners, PSU and higher management levels (e.g. the Steering Committee) in order to improve the efficiency and impact of SIFSIA interventions. • At the inception phase, templates will be prepared by the PSU for the quarterly progress reports that will include a list of key implementation and performance parameters to be monitored. In summary, these quarterly reports will cover the following areas / sections: o o o o o financial monitoring: disbursement of funds and their use, government contribution (when applicable), monitoring in unit costs (vs. projected costs); process indicators monitoring: procurement of goods and other items, their use, distribution, physical accomplishment, etc; institutional monitoring including the pace of strengthening of institutions assisted by the programme level of satisfaction of major stakeholders (e.g. information users, policy makers); the identification of constraints faced during implementation and recommendations for changes/improvements. • Annual Reviews/Reports: at the end of each year (month 10), the PSU and the Technical Secretariat of the Food Security Council, under the direction of the SIFSIA Steering Committee, will undertake a review of the progress made with respect to annual work plans. As mentioned the SIFSIA donor (the EC) will be invited to such review. The review will be based on the quarterly reports and on a process of consultation with all core institutions participating in the Programme (e.g. stakeholders’ workshop). The findings of the review will be translated into an annual report that will also include a work plan for the following year. 52 • External Evaluations: there should be two evaluations: a mid-term evaluation after 18 months of implementation and a final evaluation at the completion of the Programme. The first mid term evaluation should provide elements for orienting decisions for the second phase of SIFSIA implementation and possibly identify areas for further external support beyond the duration of SIFSIA. The evaluation responsibility should be outside of the project office in order to ensure the independence of the analysis and of the recommendations. These two evaluations would build on the regular monitoring reports, interviews with project staff and other stakeholders as well as in-depth field visits and investigations with beneficiaries. The following areas would be investigated: o o o o o o o o appropriateness and relevance of the Programme design; institutions and other stakeholders progresses in service delivery; GNU capacities in progressively taking up some of the functions of the Executing Agency (mid-term evaluation); GNU financial capacities in covering part of programme costs (mid-term evaluation); performance of implementers and level of satisfaction of beneficiaries; likelihood of project sustainability and possibilities for up-scaling; draw useful lessons and recommendations for the next phase (Mid Term Evaluation) or for long term sustainability (Final Evaluation); socio-economic impact of the improved level of services resulting from the Programme (final evaluation). 3.6 Cost of the Programme and Government Contribution Costs have been processed using the software COSTAB and are presented in the Appendix tables of Annex 2. Only the EC contribution has been calculated at this stage and totals € 10 millions for the Southern Sudan sub-programme. Detailed costs for programme activities have been estimated for the first two years to a total of € 6.16 million, while most of the costs for the remaining two years have been bulked and should be further detailed at the completion of the first phase. Detailed and summary cost tables are provided in the Appendix of Annex 2 and are summarized below. In the preparation of the budget below the following elements have been taken into account: • the budget refers only to the donor’s contribution; • the staffing of the FSTS will be done in stages (also to take into account the difficulties in finding qualified personnel) and will be completed in year 2; • The SFTS will be a project-supported structure until the GNU is ready to take over, i.e. not beyond the end of year 2. Thereafter its costs should be covered by GNU as the FSTS will be become fully part of the administration; • the budget of the various SIFSIA components for Programme years 3 and 4 have been based on projection of years 1 and 2 cost estimates taking account GNU potential contribution. As described in the previous sections, these components/activities will be identified during year 2 through the mid-term evaluation and therefore estimates are provided only as a preliminary orientation. • Budget estimates have been prepared in US $ and converted in Euro at the exchange rate 1 €=1.2 $ 53 • No physical or price contingencies have been added to the estimated base costs. The unallocated budget line mostly includes expenses for the second phase. Cost of the Northern SIFSIA by Activities Activity Information Analysis and Policy and Planning, of which Coordination Unit Food Security in Crisis Analysis Section Structural Food Security Analysis Section Policy and Planning Section Survey and Information System, of which Food Security and Welfare Survey Market Information System Crop Production Monitoring and Forecast (Crop cutting) Crop Production Monitoring and Forecast (SMA) Natural Resource Management Monitoring and Mapping Basic Capacity Building for Public Institutions Food Security Research and Capacity Building Fund Northern Programme Support Unit Executing Agency Overhead TOTAL BASE COST US$ Thousand 1,640 554 385 358 343 5,504 1,771 913 1,161 750 250 660 840 3,212 784 11,980 € Thousand 1,367 462 321 298 286 4,620 1,476 761 967 625 208 550 700 2,677 653 9,984 % of total 13.7% 4.6% 3.2% 3.0% 2.9% 46.3% 14.8% 7.6% 9.7% 6.3% 2.1% 5.5% 7.0% 26.8% 6.5% 100.0% Cost of the Northern SIFSIA by Expenditure Categories Expenditure Category Civil Works Equipment Training, Workshops, Study Tours Surveys and Studies Vehicles International Technical Assistance National Technical Assistance Travel Cost Research and Capacity Building Fund Unallocated Expenses Operating Expenses Salaries / allowances Project Support Costs TOTAL BASE COST US$ Thousand 80 1,033 1,281 1,087 325 1,345 2,294 781 840 1,405 570 156 784 11,980 € Thousand 67 861 1,067 906 271 1,121 1,911 651 700 1,171 475 130 653 9,984 % of Total 0.7% 8.6% 10.7% 9.1% 2.7% 11.2% 19.1% 6.5% 7.0% 11.7% 4.8% 1.3% 6.5% 100.0% GNU is expected to provide a direct contribution to the cost of the envisaged activities. The modalities of such contribution will be better defined during the inception phase of the Programme and further appraised during the mid-term evaluation and will take into account the current and projected level of financial capacities of the different institutions. They will include: a) the covering of salaries of the FSTS staff after the interim period (in year 3); and b) a direct 54 contribution to programme activities (starting from year 3) that should progressively increase as the programmes nears its completion (recurrent costs should be entirely covered by GNU in year This could include: (i) 50 % of the project cost of a survey (to be defined during the mid-term evaluation); (ii) 33% in year 3 and 100% in year 4 of the projected costs for MIS and crop assessment (crop cutting); (iii) projected CB costs in year 3 and 4 for the support to SMA and NRM. Furthermore the GNU is expected to provide the Food Security Secretariat with adequate office space and cover its running costs starting (as per staff salaries) from year 3. The GNU should also ensure work permits and the other benefits foreseen by the Law (e.g. tax exemption) for international staff and duty exemption for project goods. In the preparation of the budget below the following elements have been taken into account: 3.7 Risks Analysis A careful risk analysis is necessary to account for the foreseeable evolving (and volatile) context that is expected to characterise Sudan over the whole interim period. There are five main risks that the Programme could face and that stakeholders will need to address prior to and during programme implementation: • return to civil unrest. Despite the CPA, the return to civil unrest, particularly at the local level, is not unlikely. With respect to SIFSIA this may imply the disruption of activities in some of the states affected by local conflicts and, at more global level, a delay in (or less attention to) the design and implementation of initiatives to tackle structural food security problems with, instead, a higher emphasis paid to short term transient food security initiatives. Such a risk could possibly be addressed by the proposed institutional set up that allows the links in terms of analysis and responses of transient and structural food insecurity; • break down/delays in the implementation of CPA which, in the case of SIFSIA, could make more difficult the integration between the two sub-programmes, that, in any case, will be designed as to stand alone programmes; • low absorption capacities on the part of local institutions. This is a key risk particularly in the poor and food insecure states, where capacities are weaker and where massive external investments and programmes requiring important implementation capacities are expected. The constitution of a PSU, the programme CB components, the proposed institutional set up favouring the alignment and harmonisation of interventions, and the envisaged flexible planning mechanisms may mitigate such a risk; • change in the policy and institutional priorities. There is also a risk that the level of priority attributed to the policy issues identified by SIFSIA and to overall policy framework for food security may change due to new arising priorities. This could imply, on the hand, a lower level of commitment on the part of local institutions and, on the other hand, a loss of relevance for the institutional set up proposed for the Programme. Annual reviews and the mid-term evaluation may help to address this risk, to the extent that the second phase of the Programme may be conditional on the actual levels of commitment of GNU to programme implementation and related policy implications; • local contributions. A substantial financial contribution on the part of GNU will be fundamental to programme implementation (since SIFSIA resources will no be sufficient to cover all costs) and to the overall sustainability of the activities and 55 institutional set up promoted. Lower or delayed contributions may thus lead to a delay in implementation that will have to be carefully monitored and in specific cases (e.g. when the government is not in the position to fulfil its commitments due to serious economic constraints) addressed with additional funding or reallocation of resources. 3.8 Next Steps This programme document represents one of the last steps in the exercise of programme formulation. There are however still a number of actions that will have to be undertaken prior to the start of SIFSIA implementation. These are: 1. 2. the formal approval of the this programme document by mandated bodies; the preliminary definition of the coordination and consultation mechanisms between the two sub programmes, based on Northern and Southern stakeholders views (a meeting could be organised to this end); the final selection of the Executing Agency; the preparation of the implementation contracts; 3. 4. 5. during this preparatory phase to implementation, FAO1 is also expected to support the establishment of the basis for an effective start of the programme by supporting some preparatory activities for the definition of a food security policy and institutional framework for food security.. 1 With EC resources. 56