Obligations extra-contractuelles

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					Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) i

OUTLINE Obligations Extra-Contractuelles Prof. Marie-Claude Prémont Winter 2006

9. Public Authorities ....................................................................................................................... 6
Barratt c. Corp. of North Vancouver [cml] [judiciary only review policy implementation] .....................7 Prud’homme c. Prud’homme [cvl] [CCQ = droit commun ; defamation; cml defense not apply] ............8

10. Damages: Compensatory and Punitive Damages ................................................................. 10
Compensatory Damages (Restitutio in Integrum) ..................................................................................... 10 Punitive/Exemplary Damages ................................................................................................................... 10 Victim‟s Obligation to minimize the prejudice (cml + cvl) ...................................................................... 10 Augustus c. Gossett [cvl] [factors in indemnification of moral prejudice] ............................................ 10 Corriveau c. Pelletier [cvl] [girl-nurse scars, moderation of quantum of damages] ............................... 11 Type of Prejudices .................................................................................................................................... 13

11. Causation ............................................................................................................................... 14 11.1. Proof on Balance of Probabilities : legal and factual presumptions ............................. 14
Barrett v. Chelsea Hospital Mgmt [cml] [NOT sufficient proof for causation] ....................................... 15 Gburek c. Cohen [cvl] [sufficient proof, rebuttable presumption of fault] .............................................. 16 McGhee c. National Coal Board [cml] [sufficient proof, increases risk, inference of causation] ........... 16 Smith c. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. [cml] [molten metal agent in causing cancer] ..................................... 17 Farrell v. Snell [cml] [medical malpractice: indirect proof allow inference of causality] ....................... 18 Walker c. York Finch Hospital [cml] [negligence materially contribute to injury] .................................. 19

11.2. Indeterminate Tortfeasor............................................................................................... 21
11.2.1. Common Fault ..................................................................................................................................... 21 Ginn c. Sisson [cvl] [common fault, identify 1 boy on factual presumption]........................................... 21 Morin c. Blais [cvl] [infraction of norms, common fault] ...................................................................... 22 Cook c. Lewis [cml] [common fault, burden shifts, both hunters liable] ................................................. 22 11.2.2. Contribution & Market Share Thesis ................................................................................................... 23 Sindell c. Abbott Laboratories [cml] [negligent defs bear cost by market share thesis] .......................... 23 11.2.3. Multiple Tortfeasors............................................................................................................................. 24 A. Solidarity (Equal Conditions) ............................................................................................................... 25 B. Efficient/Adequate Cause (sine qua non) ............................................................................................. 26 C. Immediate Cause .................................................................................................................................. 26

12. Defenses ................................................................................................................................. 28 12.1. Victim‟s Fault ............................................................................................................... 28
Comparative Negligence ........................................................................................................................... 28 Contributory Negligence (old cml doctrine) ............................................................................................. 31

12.2. Assumption of the Risk................................................................................................. 32
Woodley v. Metropolitan Railway [cml] [“voluntarily” assented to risk of RR track] ............................ 32 Price c. Roy [cvl] [iced bridge, no voluntary assent] .............................................................................. 33 Lambert v Lastoplex [cml] [manufacturer liable where not detail risk to consumer] ............................. 33 Birch v Thomas [cml] [proper notice, thus Plf assumed risk] ............................................................... 34 Roy c. École d’escalade [cvl] [inherently dangerous, assume risk, but prove negligence] ....................... 35

12.3. Common Employment (Fellow-Servant) (old cml) ...................................................... 36
Hall v. Johnson and another [cml] [employer not liable for underlooker injuring miner] ...................... 36

13. SPECIAL REGIME : Work Accidents.................................................................................. 37

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13.1. History: Crisis of Civil Liability at the turn of the century .......................................... 37
Report of the Wainwright Commission, 1909 [judges ask legislators to remedy the inequity] ................ 37 Tunc, La Responsabilité Civile, “19e et 20e siècles” ................................................................................ 37 J.C. Lamothe, Responsabilité du patron dans les accidents du travail (1905) ........................................... 37 MC Prémont, “François Gény et les enjeux de la resp civile” .................................................................. 38 Historique de la transformation des régimes d‟assurance ......................................................................... 39 Les employeurs eux-mêmes demandent changement au régime fondé sur la risque ................................. 39 Transformation : Faute  Risque............................................................................................................. 39 Mutation du régime juridique : assistance/charité  protection légale .................................................... 40

13.2. Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases ................................ 40
Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases ............................................................. 40 Processus de réclamation (Me Katherine Lippel) ..................................................................................... 42 Vincent & Co. Inc. c. Gallo [cvl] [Court not have jurisdiction to hear case] ........................................... 42 Chaput c. STCUM [cvl] [a. 28 legal presumption of employment injury] .............................................. 42 Succ. de Guillemette c. J.M. Asbestos [cvl] [a. 29 legal presumption occupational disease] ................... 43

14. SPECIAL REGIME : Auto Accidents ................................................................................... 45
Automobile Insurance Act ........................................................................................................................ 45 Civil Liability ............................................................................................................................................ 46 T. Rousseau-Houle, « Le régime québecois d‟assurance-automobile, vingt ans après » (1998) .............. 47 S.D. Sugarman, ”Québec‟s Comprehensive Auto No-Fault Scheme and the Failure of any of the United States to Follow” (1998) ........................................................................................................................... 47 D. Gardner, “Comparer l‟incomparable: les indemnité pour préjudice corporel en droit commun et dans la Loi sur l’assurance automobile,” (1998) .............................................................................................. 47 “Deux Millions de Chauffeurs à risque?” Le Devoir (2003) ..................................................................... 47 Controverse. Le Principe du no fault. (2003) ............................................................................................ 48

15. Charter Issues: where « droit commun » and strict liability meet ......................................... 49
Beliveau St-Jacques c Fed. [cvl] [civil immunity bars action for exemplary damages] .......................... 49

16. Other Sources of ECO (1458)................................................................................................ 51
Cie immobilière Viger c Giguère [cvl] [unjustified enrichment in qc cvl] ............................................. 52

April 2000 Exam ........................................................................................................................... 56
CCLC-CCQ............................................................................................................................................... 56 SAAQ........................................................................................................................................................ 58 Mis-feasance/Non-feasance ...................................................................................................................... 60 Fault .......................................................................................................................................................... 61 Risk ........................................................................................................................................................... 62 Work Accident .......................................................................................................................................... 63

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REVIEW Civil standard of proof : on the balance of probabilities  applies to all elements: prejudice, causality, etc Causality  ex: Snell: here, all elements clear, except that impossible to demonstrate the cause scientifically. thus, judge proceeds by proof by factual presumption: there was an error (ie, not stopping the operation after the hemhorrage), that could cause precisely this risk, thus accepts the proof on the factual presumption  ex: Centre Hospitalier : if the doctor had come, would not have been able to save patient. thus lacking element of causality, even though the fault was clear.  presumption: make an inference from a known fact to an unknown fact (CCQ ___)  ex: Walker: even in complex situation, systemic phenomenon Fault
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standard of reasonable person (same in cvl & cml): not demand perfection, objective standard, may depend on professional skills cml: fault not valid against everyone, only valid against those to whom owe a duty of care o cml: ie, Donoghue: neighbor = those to whom owe duty of care o cvl: everyone is your neighbor, fault valid against all persons to whom caused a direct & immediate prejudice fault‟s connection with other elements:

Duty of care  ex: Palsgraf: fault clear, but no duty of care. Prejudice  cvl: prejudice direct & immediate result of fault, even if unforeseeable (1611)  cml: foreseeability of resulting injury, which may be direct or indirect (Wagon Mound #1) Causality  ex: Palsgraf: Andrews‟ dissent: RR cie had duty of care to all passengers. Palsgraf‟s injury as direct result of RR cie‟s negligence. **Public Authorities**  ex: Prud’homme c Prud’homme: public discourse. action in defamation based on 1457. (cml : intentional tort of defamation).  Qc Act had divided private & public law, BUT, here have meeting of private & public law (compares Laurentide under CCLC)  CCQ = droit commun. not using cml to say that CCQ applies, but CCQ itself, le droit commun, says rules of private law apply to public authorities.  ex: Barratt : political decisions not subject to judicial review for civil liability, only the implementation of the policy Ceiling for Non-Pecuniary Damages  non-pecuniary damages may or may not be limited to simply moral prejudices  restitutio in integrum: applies to pecuniary damages only  cml: pecuniary and non-pecuniary injury  cvl: moral prejudice  material, bodily injury  pecuniary + non-pecuniary prejudice

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ex: Defamation  ceiling not apply to non-pecuniary injury re: defamation  ex: lose your job. have moral prejudice  pecuniary loss (ie, no more salary) + non-pecuniary moral prejudice (ie, can‟t sleep at night) Joint liability : operates to the benefit of the victim “refonte du CCQ,” and not reform of CCQ  ex of refonte: le fait autonome des choses was not in CCLC, but yes in CCQ  Fitzpatrick J. in Doucet  ie, reflecting the actual state of the law  DO A SEARCH FOR “RISK” or “RISK THEORY” in all notes to consolidate all aspects punitive damages = exemplary damages Charter and Work Accidents  Prémont : should be mechanisms to intervene right away, and prevent the lesion prof from happening in the first place. HERE, victim should approach the Commission of Human Rights to stop the sexual harrassment before the injury materializes.  once the lesion occurs, and can be qualified as lesion prof, then the Charter action is barred.  ex: Beliveau St-Jacques: the physical & psychological incapacity to work was at stake, which was a result of the sexual harrassment. thus, sexual harrassment itself was not at issue, “just” the injury suffered. Defenses: Accepting Risks  does NOT apply to work accidents Work & Car Accidents  definitions important (work: 28, 29, 30) (car: bodily injury)  principle

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Examen décembre Question 1 Question 1A pollution d‟automobile  victimes : personnes âgées  plus fragiles (thin skull rule applies in cml & cvl)  recours collectif (les demandeurs)  chacune des demandeurs doit démontrer tout les éléments de la preuve  qui sont les responsables ? o l‟automobiliste  c‟est qui ? o défendeur doit être la personne responsable o la cause est le cumule des actions  la causalité des actions des automobilistes : sont-ils la cause ?  recours sans faute ? recours pour faute ?  quelle est la faute de l‟automobiliste ? leur comportement normal ne peut pas être considéré comme une faute  responsabilité stricte ? troubles de voisinage ? doit être entre voisins, les automobilistes ne sont pas des voisins  duty of care  only an accessory compared to the major elements (?)  les responsables? les villes, les autorités gouvernementales o faut identifier la faute o défaut de réglementation o responsabilité contre l‟action publique o Kamloops, Dorset Yacht : oui, l‟autorité publique peuvent faire l‟objet d‟un recours, mais la responsabilité est limité aux dimensions opérationelles des autorités publiques  cannot force them to adopt a particular law or policy (thus cannot accuse municipality of fault for not having implemented a certain policy)  les responsables ? les manufacturiers o citer les provisions de la responsabilité des manufacturiers dans le Code civil (!) o défaut de fabrication ? o problèmes insolubles de responsabilité civile Question 1B populations du nord, recouvrir les coûts d‟achat dans les supermarchés  pure economic loss : gibier n‟appartient à personne (cvl pas de problème, cml peut être un problème, Sask. Wheat Pool)  problématique centrale : quelle est la cause du diminution du gibier ? doit démontrer un long chemin de causalité (mais il faut démontrer la causalité directe et immédiat en droit cvl – ici, impossible, on est à l‟antithèse) Question 1C mondialisation, délocalisation d‟entreprises, transport augmenté  délocalisation cause transport de marchandises comme source d‟émisssions de gaz  les personnes qui perdent leur job – est-ce qu‟ils disposent d‟un recours ? pas de lien.  difficulté de cml par rapport à la perte purement économique  type de comportement que l‟on retrouve est le comportement prototypique de notre système capitaliste (donc, pas une faute)  où est la faute de l‟entreprise de répondre à la compétivité ? pas de faute, pas de recours.  régime de chômage pour les personnes qui perdent leur emploi  comprendre l‟étendue de l‟application des règles

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contre les autorités gouvernementales ? cannot say that it was a fault for the country to sign the international trade agmt difficult to prove any of the elements of a recours civil

Question 2 Holmes adapté aux défits du 20e siècle (resp pour négligence) ?  resp qui recherche la cause directe et immédiat, par rapport aux problèmes dans la question 1, aucun de ces enjeux sociaux ne peut être dans quelconque façon résolu par la responsabilité pour faute  enjeux trop complexes  « public profits by individual activity »   are Holmes‟ hypotheses valid? based on time of industrialization  responsabilité ne doit pos être imposé à cet entrepreneur, not strictly liiable, only based on fault, prejudice must lie where it falls Question 2A à l‟époque de Holmes, l‟industrialisation  bienfait : Horwitz. modification de resp stricte  faute, subvention industrielle  méfait : workers rarely get indemnification for work accident (travailleurs qui ont subventionné l‟industrialisation) Question 2B à l‟époque de Holmes cml  Holmes décrit un droit qui est en redéfinition. nominate torts. resp pour faute – il justifie.  citer des exemples et un contre-exemply comme Rylands c Fletcher. fondé sur la resp stricte. ou les recours de nuisance sans faute - mais le critère varie selon les quartiers. cvl  resp pour faute existe depuis toujours (depuis le droit commun). Tooke c Bergeron.  resp sans faute inscrit au CCBC 1053 resp du fait des choses, la théorie du risque  Doucet : juge Fitzpatrick Question 3 ville en Qc, l‟entreprise Abitor (seulement cvl) Question 3A recours pour la perte de valeur de sa maison  1e question : cause de la perte de la valeur ? deux causes : o l‟usine ferme ses portes, plus d‟emploi dans la municipalité, plus de demande o la contamination de l‟eau  recours pour la cause que l‟usine ferme ses portes o n‟a rien à voir avec sa position comme employé dans l‟usine  recours généraux pour faute o est-ce qu‟il y a une faute de l‟usine d‟avoir fermé ses portes ? a priori, non. entreprise est libre d‟ouvrir et de fermer. o Abitor lied during the mayoral election campaign, but can change its mind, perhaps made miscalculation, sold its shares, etc o if said that Abitor deliberately lied, and knew that mayor would act and Abitor would reap benefits  recours pour la cause de contamination de l‟eau

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o

contamination du lac peut être une faute. mettre des éléments dangéreux dans l‟eau, c‟est une faute.

Question 3B recours pour la contamination de l‟eau du lac  1457 : recours pour faute  oui, faute dans la contamination. déversement dans le lac, faute par rapport à la personne raisonnables. normes environmentales. contravention d‟une norme.  quelle est la conséquence de contamination de l‟eau du lac ? diminution de la valeur du maison, la santé du bébé.  où est la préjudice ? must be able to diagnose a health problem in the baby directly due to drinking contaminated water. préjudice doit être certain en droit civil.  la causalité: les présomptions de fait (mercure dans l‟usine, mercure dans le lac)  est-ce que Mme Lingot avait droit de boire l‟eau du lac ? faute contributive de sa part ? Question 3C $3,000 taxes  recours contre qui ?  contre Abitor ? o Abitor n‟a pas adopté la politique fiscale o pas de lien direct et immédiate  contre conseil municipal o la cause d‟augmentation de taxes = conseil municipal qui a adopté la politique fiscale o promesse électorale o adopter un règlement ne constitue pas une faute, donc pas de recours  est-ce que c‟est une préjudice ? payer les impôts ne constitue pas une préjudice. Breakdown of Grades Travail 1 15% Travail 2 15% Examen Dec 30% Examen Avril 40% Travail 2  thème  l‟historique du Duty of Care en cml  la dynamique du recours collectif en droit civil ( ?)  submit theme to Prémont

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9. Public Authorities liability of public authorities ELEMENTS : PUBLIC AUTHORITY  actor = public authority ? o can be individual, or organism  cvl: rules of civil liability apply (1376) (Prud’homme v Prud’homme)  cml: yes, where assume the duty of care (Kamloops v Nielsen, ) o municipality only had duty to lay, no duty to maintain, the roads (Barrat v N Vancouver) o securities regsitrar not liable where did not assume the duty of care (Cooper v Hobart) o municipal had duty to maintain roads in reasonable state of repair (Housen v Nikolaisen)  relevant statute ? o provides immunity ? o cml : establishes duty of care ?  substance v. operations/applications/implementation (Barratt v N Vancouver) o standard of reasonable person applies to implementation o do NOT evaluate the substance
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resp civile  cours de droit privé droit public : droit constitutionnel, droit criminel droit privé : obs K-uelles, obs extra-K-uelles règles de resp civile s‟appliquent aux autorité publiques o individus : fonctionnaires, policiers, conseiller municipal o organismes : municipalité, ministère, commission scolaire (Dorset Yacht v Home Office)

 distinctions à faire entre recours contre personne privé et personne publique a) STATUTE : organismes publiques régi presque toujours par les règles de droit  possibly provides immunity for certain actions ?  establishes a duty of care ?  ex : policier : en Qc, loi sur la police, prévoit les fonctions, lui accordent des immunités  ex : débat parlementaire : immunité pour les paroles (notamment re : recours en diffamation)  ex : Cooper c Hobart : objective not to protect investors  ex: Barratt c N Vancouver: municipality ≠ insurer b) est-ce que l‟organisme publique a fait tout possible pour prévenir la préjudice? **hold to standard of reasonable person re: operations/applications/implementation  distinguish b/t public policy and operations/applications/implementation  question financière  ce n‟est pas aux tribunaux de déterminer ce que les autorités publiques doivent faire  different heads of power – judiciary cannot intervene in public policy (ie, legislative powers)  no formal separation of powers, but still respect difference and judiciary cannot intervene in executive or legislative heads of power (contrary to parliamentary democracy) Les Organismes Publics  municipalities, school commissions, police officers  distinction selon les pouvoirs: o pouvoir judiciaire:

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o

o

 juge protégé par l‟immunité consacrée par les règles générales du droit public pouvoir executif/administratif  exercice s‟attache parfois à un pouvoir législatif, et parfois plutôt exécutif (tribunaux essayent de distinguer)  l‟aspect opérationelle peut faire objet de resp. civile  Roncarelli  not relevant per Prémont b/c question of droit public, not resp civile  PPP: partnerariat public privé (?)  Université McGill public ou privé ? pouvoir législatif/règlementaire:  immunité de responsabilité civile  la souveraineté parlementaire  municipalités; organisme délibératif par sa nature favorise quelques parties et défavorise d‟autres parties  ex : Qc adopte resp. stricte re : accidents d‟automobiles ; ex : Qc adopte assurance maladie obligatoire  répercussions pour les cies d‟assurance privées

CCQ 1376: The rules set forth in this Book apply to the State and its bodies, and to all other legal persons established in the public interest, subject to any other rules of law which may be applicable to them. tribunals se posent la question  quelle serait l‟impacte financière pour A ou pour B ?  tribunaux assurent que les normes sont appliqués d‟une façon de respecter la constitution, la Charte  judiciary cannot dictate what the legislature must do Barratt c. Corp. of North Vancouver [cml] [judiciary only review policy implementation] [1980] 2 R.C.S. 418 Faits  Barratt rode bicycle on heavily travelled road, ran into pothole filled w/ dirty water, injured  municipality inspected roads every fortnight, pothole did not exist at last inspection Questions en  municipality negligent? litige Dispositif  No. Analyse Martland J.  pothole was product of ordinary wear & tear of traffic, and thus NOT a cause of the excavation work going on  per Municipal Act, municipality has authority to lay out, maintain and improve highways, but does NOT have duty to maintain its highways, ie, NO duty to institute system of continuous inspection and immediate repair  municipality had well-organized system of road inspection, and did not act negligently in implementation of its policy  frequency of inspection is a matter of policy, not law Ratio  court can only intervene in implementation of policy, not in the content/creation of the policy itself Comments  court did not interfere w/ inspection frequency b/c this has great financial ramifications  100 yrs ago: “the King can do no wrong” thus general immunity for

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the King, English common law as applied in Canada COMPARE Housen c. Nikolaisen  municipality negligent : “la norme de diligence à laquelle devait se conformer la municipalité consistait à tenir le chemin dans un état raisonnable d‟entretien, de façon que ceux qui devaient l‟emprunter puissent, en prenant des précautions normales, y circuler en sécurité.”

ELEMENTS : DEFAMATION  cml: nominate tort of defamation founded on principles of strict liability (ie, not have to show fault, only have to show that words pronounced were of a nature to harm reputation)  cvl: ??? Prud’homme c. Prud’homme [cvl] [CCQ = droit commun ; defamation; cml defense not apply] [2002] 4 R.C.S. 663 Faits  action in defamation re: words spoken by municipal councillor during ordinary session of conseil municipal  secondary school construction project: overpaid for land, municipality very much in debt  reglement 1055 instituted (higher taxes), ruled illegal by superior court, but mayor wants to keep  appellants bringing action against conseiller municipal for defamation Questions en  municipal councillor liable in defamation? litige Dispositif  No, no fault, thus not liable for defamation. Analyse L‟Heureux-Dubé et Lebel J.  CCLC 356: public authorities subject to droit public, but NOW, CCQ 1376: Book V Obligations applies to the State of Qc, subject to other laws, thus plf must prove same elements (CCQ does NOT apply to federal organisms)  actions of conseiller municipal fell within the cadre of the exercise of his public function, not in his capacity as private person  Code = le droit commun du Québec (disposition préliminaire) (ie, public + private)  action in defamation falls under CCQ 1457,  action in defamation brings into play two fundamental values : freedom of expression (Qc Charter, 3) and the right to reputation (droits de personnalité)  elected municipal official must act per standard of reasonable person  2 common law defenses: relative immunity:  words spoken during session of conseil municipal protected by relative immunity, and plf must prove the malicious intention or intent to harm of the councillor  relative immunity can also apply to non-public actors, thus must distinguish b/t private common law and public common law  nominate tort of defamation founded on principles of strict liability (ie, not have to show fault, only have to show that

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Ratio

words pronounced were of a nature to harm reputation) because based on opposite principles (malveillance v bonne foi) cannot import defense of relative immunity into droit civil  cvl equivalent of defense of relative immunity = “une simple défense de justification qui invoque a priori l‟absence de faute de l‟élu, compte tenu de ses fonctions, des devoirs qu‟elles supposent et des circonstances particulières en l‟espèce.” fair comment (la défense de commentaire loyal et honnête)  accepted as cvl defense, BUT :  conduct accords with standard of reasonable person ?  cml: words at issue must be in the public interest, in good faith, and without malice (and facts to which the commentary/opinion attached must be true)  cml defense INCOMPATIBLE w/ cvl application of rules to facts  content of the declaration:  has the right to question the court‟s judgment  assertions partially true and partially false  critiqued the well-founded nature of the judgment (ie, legitimate opinion)  no bad faith, no malice, when placed in CONTEXT  acted in good faith, in the public interest, and did NOT commit a fault  defenses of relative immunity and fair comment NOT applicable in cvl b/c incompatible with determination of fault under CCQ 1457  here, not liable for defamation in cvl b/c not acting in bad faith
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Comments

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9. Damages: Compensatory and Punitive Damages Compensatory Damages (restituo in integrum)  restitutio in integrum : restoration to original condition  cvl + cml: past and future injury must have a certain character proven on the balance of the probabilities  cvl : compensate loss sustained, and profits of which deprived, including certain, assessable future injury (1611) o bodily, material, moral injury which is immediate & direct consequence of debtor‟s fault (1607)  cml : compensate past damages & future losses (single recovery rule)  medical & related expenses; lost earnings & earning capacity; pain & suffering (incl loss of enjoyment of life)  only recover damages for foreseeable injury (incl both direct & indirect prejudice)  cvl + cml: CAP on moral prejudice (non-econonic loss) of $100K in 1978  exception à l‟exception : plafonnement pour préjudice moral ne tient pas en matière de diffamation (atteinte à la réputation, dignité) source du préjudice est moral même si le préjudice peut être matériel (ie, perte d‟emploi) Punitive/Exemplary Damages  cml : punitive damages  partie de son histoire, existe depuis longtemps  cvl : limited. new phenomenon.  au Québec (mais pas en France ?) :  Qc Charte des droits et libertés: art. 49(2) demander des dommages exemplaires  CCQ 1621: where the awarding of punitive damages is provided for by law, the amount of such damages may not exceed what is sufficient to fulfil their preventive purpose.  Punitive damages are assessed in the light of all the appropriate circumstances, in particular the gravity of the debtor's fault, his patrimonial situation, the extent of the reparation for which he is already liable to the creditor and, where such is the case, the fact that the payment of the damages is wholly or partly assumed by a third person. Victim‟s Obligation to minimize the prejudice (cml + cvl)  CCQ 1479: A person who is liable to reparation for an injury is not liable in respect of any aggravation of the injury that the victim could have avoided.  affaire d‟un quadriplégique ( ??)  perte de jouissance de la vie (amant de ski)  maintenant confiné dans une chaise pour le reste de ses jours  Cour Suprême : en calculer les dommages-intérêts, indemniser au complet,  MAIS, difficulté en traduction économique Augustus c. Gossett [cvl] [factors in indemnification of moral prejudice] [1996] 3 R.C.S. 269 (Qc) Faits  19 yr old black youth shot dead, unintentionally, by police officer Gosset  victim‟s mother bringing action to recover damages for moral prejudice (préjudice exemplaire), right to parenthood, and right to life Questions en  i) solatium doloris (moral prejudice) indemnifiable under Qc cvl? litige  ii) right of parenthood ?  iii) loss of life or life expenctancy ? Dispositif  i) yes, but must establish criteria.

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Analyse

Ratio Comments

ii) no. iii) no. L‟Heureux-Dubé J.  Gosset‟s negligence as direct cause of the victim‟s death  factors to consider in determining indemnification of a moral prejudice: circumstances of the death, ages of the deceased and the parent, parent‟s personality and ability to manage the emotional consequences of the death, and the effect of the death on the parent‟s life in light, inter alia, of the presence of other children or the possibility of having others  solatium doloris NOT available as a head of compensable damage in Qc (ie, not reflect principle of restituo in integrum)  was a “historical error” that solatium doloris was recognized in Qc courts (attempted to apply cml case of Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Robinson).  moral prejudice actually suffered by the appellant must be compensated in full  right of parenthood: neither Canadian Charter nor Qc Charter protects right to maintain and continue a parent-chilrelationship  loss of life or life expectancy: right to life is extinguished when the victim dies, action cannot become part of victim‟s patrimony  “hard to justify compensating a prejudice the very nature of which will systematically ensure that the victim is unable to gain any benefit therefrom”  NOT an intentional interference : policier n‟a pas voulu tuer  pas intentionnel, donc pas de dommages exemplaires)  factors in determining moral prejudice suffered  CCQ 1621 : Lorsque la loi prévoit l'attribution de dommages-intérêts punitifs, ceux-ci ne peuvent excéder, en valeur, ce qui est suffisant pour assurer leur fonction préventive. Ils s'apprécient en tenant compte de toutes les circonstances appropriées, notamment de la gravité de la faute du débiteur, de sa situation patrimoniale ou de l'étendue de la réparation à laquelle il est déjà tenu envers le créancier, ainsi que, le cas échéant, du fait que la prise en charge du paiement réparateur est, en tout ou en partie, assumée par un tiers.  thème : abrègment de la vie (Qc Charte, art. 1 : chacun a droit à la vie.)  on ne peut pas chiffrer la droit à la vie (PAS d‟indemnisation pour raccourcissement de la vie)  Prémont : « dès qu‟on est mort, on est mort »  l‟expectative de vie
 

Corriveau c. Pelletier [cvl] [girl-nurse scars, moderation of quantum of damages] [1981] C.A. 347 (Qc) Faits  18 yr old car accident victim awarded $200,000 for “préjudice esthétique, perte de jouissance des choses de la vie, traumatisme psychique et préjudice gynécologique”  action brought that award excessive relative to other awards Questions en  $200,000 in damages excessive for prejudice suffered (above) ? litige

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 12

Dispositif Analyse

 yes, excessive. $65,000 deemed appropriate. M. le juge Beauregard  suffered non-pecuniary prejudices (advised not to get pregnant, terrible scars, psychological suffering)  functional approach to the problem of non-pecuniary prejudice: individual approach which fixes an indemnity to furnish the victim with reasonable consolation for the prejudices suffered (consolation in the sense of material means to make life more bearable)  victim autonomous and can lead a normal life, aside from the scars and difficulties bearing children M. le juge Montgomery (concurs)  injuries not materially affect victim‟s future earning power  agrees w/ reduction of damages to $65,000     

Ratio Comments

la gravité des cicatrices de la jeune femme ET qu‟elle est conseillé de ne jamais avoir des enfants (comment y mettre une chiffre ?) en droit, est-ce qu‟on a droit à avoir des enfants ? mais ici, qqn lui fait PERDRE cette capacité (elle n‟est pas née comme ça) oui, indemnisable, mais comment la quantifier ?

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 13

Type of Prejudices
  

matériel : méthodes scientifique corporel : blessures, incapacité moral** : des difficultés à traduire en préjudice pécuniaire (ie, la souffrance, solatium doloris)

 

direct indirect



préjudice purement économique (distinction en cml)



la gravité de la faute (only counts in determining punitive damages, esp cml)





préjudice pécuniaire : traduire selon des méthodes scientifiques (restitutio in integrum) préjudice non-pécuniaire : ie, Corriveau

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 14

10. Causation 10.1. Proof on Balance of Probabilities : legal and factual presumptions CAUSATION  cause-in-fact, may become cause-in-law. o depends on interpretation of the facts: look at them in context, and ask what is pertinent? o triage of facts: material v immaterial facts o legal conclusion to determine the cause-in-law.
  

factual presumption: inference est. by law or court from a known fact to an unknown fact (2846) legal presumption: specially attached by law to certain facts (context), and exempts person in whose favor it exists from making any other proof (2847) rebuttable? o simple presumption derives from presumed facts, rebutted by proof to the contrary (2847) o absolute presumption derives from deemed facts, and is irrebuttable. (2847)

CASES: INFERENCE OF CAUSATION Proof on Balance of Probabilities (increased risk, or substantial factor) leads to Inference of Causation, rebuttable (ie, burden shifts) cvl  Parent c Lapointe: when, in the ordinary course of thgs, sthg should not happen, but it happens anyway and causes a prejudice to others, then onus on the Def to prove that sthg OTHER than his negligence caused the prejudice. here relates to indirect proof of FAULT. (5 men asleep)  Gburek c Cohen: sufficient presumed facts proven on balance of probabilities, est. simple legal presumption of causation, rebuttable by proof to the contrary. here relates to indirect proof of CAUSATION. cml  McGhee v Nat’l Coal Board: sufficient proof, caused dermatitis on balance of probabilities, inference of causation, rebuttable by proof to the contrary. [Note: Lord Reid claims there is no difference b/t substantial factor test and shifting burden of proof]  Barrett v Chelsea: INsufficient proof, no inference of causation b/c Barrett would have died anyway.  Farrell v Snell: sufficient proof, inference of causation, burden shifts (?)  Walker v York Finch: multiple negligent defs in blood screen substantially heightened risk, onus shift to them Infraction of Statutory Norm: inference of causation where injury suffered is precisely the injury the norm was intended to prevent, rebuttable. cvl  Morin c Blais: presumption of infraction of statutory norm (red rear light) as joint cause of car accident  Montreal Rolling Mills c Corcoran: infraction of statutory norm NOT automatically give rise to liabilty (no proof that infraction caused the injury) cml  Goodine c Maritime Lightning Rod Cie: presumption of infraction of statutory norm (installation regulations) as cause of cow deaths.  Canada v Sask. Wheat Pool: breach of statutory norm does NOT automatically give rise to liability (subsumed into tort of negligence)

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 15

Burden of Proof  traditionally rests on the Plf: he must show on the balance of the probability that the def‟s negligence caused his injury (Restmt 2d Torts §433B) (Farrell v Snell) o Plf required to produce evidence that Def‟s conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm he has suffered, and to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. o ie, Plf must make it appear that it is more likely than not that Def‟s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. o mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of pure speculation and conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.  BUT, where subject matter of allegation lies particularly w/in knowledge of 1 party, that party may be required to prove it (Farrell v Snell) Barrett v. Chelsea Hospital Mgmt [cml] [NOT sufficient proof for causation] [1968] 3 All ER 1068 (QBD) Faits  food poisoning from tea. Plf Barnett goes to casualty department, casualty officer did not see them, but said that they should go home and call in their own doctors  at the ER, on New Year‟s Day, doctor-on-call instructs Barrett to call his house doctor  Barrett sleeps, dies in his sleep of arsenical poisoning Questions en  Doctor liable for Barrett‟s death? litige Dispositif  No. Analyse Tribunal  faut identifier la faute  oui, médecin a été négligent, donc faute professionnelle amende Nield J.  deceased died due to the condition he entered the hospital for  Def negligent in not discharging the prof‟l duty of care owed to the deceased.  prof’l duty of care : must show average amount of comptence when hold yourself out to have professional skills  Was Def‟s negligence a “but for” cause of Plf‟s injuries? No, b/c Plf would have died anyway had the doctor discharged his duty of care.  Plf bears the burden of proof, and Plf has failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the deceased‟s death resulted from the negligence of the defendants (ie, had all care been taken, deceased might still have died)  OR, if there were a burden on the defs of showing that his death was not due to the negligence, they had discharged that burden, with the consequence that the plf‟s claim failed  présomptions de fait :  no legal presumption of fault Ratio  proved two elements (negligence, prejudice), but FAILED to prove the third element (causality) beyond a reasonable doubt  here, doctor’s negligence was NOT the direct cause of Barnett’s death, b/c Barnett would have died anyway had the doctor discharged

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 16



his duty of care. do NOT have sufficient proof to lead to an inference of causality

Comments



Gburek c. Cohen [cvl] [sufficient proof, rebuttable presumption of fault] [1988] R.J.Q. 2424 (C.A.) Faits  Gburek have fever, goes to St. Mary‟s Hospital  Dr. Cohen prescribes powerful antibiotics w/ side-effects, keeps Gburek in hospital for 40 days  Gburek becomes deaf, claims deafness as result of prolonged medical treatment under Dr. Cohen  règle de la preuve: Gburek doit démontrer Questions en  Doctor liable for Gburek‟s injury? litige Dispositif  Yes, b/c presumption of fault, doctor fail to rebut. Analyse  method of treatment, when done correctly, may result in deafness  usu., treatment only carried on for 10 days, and then determine if there is accumulation  thus, claims two faults: i) carried on treatment for 40 days; ii) never verified accumulation of substance  doctor: même si j‟avais fait ça, vous auriez pu devenir sourde  lorsque défendeur accroît les risques par sa faute, et type de préjudice que l’on craint se montre, présomption de lien de causalité (accroît la probabilité)  SUFFICIENT PROOF  inference of causation, shifting burden  doctor may rebut the presumption of fault if shows that his negligence did NOT cause the deafness  médecin a privé le patient de la preuve plus claire  negligence led precisely to the risks/prejudices that nonnegligence would/could have avoided  ”Quand, dans le cours normal des choses, un événement ne doit pas se produire, mais arrive tout de même, et cause un dommage à autrui, et quand il est évident qu’il ne serait pas arrivé s’il n’y avait pas eu de négeligence, alors, c’est à l’auteur de ce fait à démontrer qu’il y a une cause étrangère, dont il ne peut être tenu responsible et qui est la source de ce dommage.” Taschereau J. Parent c. Lapointe  présomption de responsabilité en faveur du demandeur. Ratio  sufficient proof to create a presumption of fault, subsequent REVERSAL of burden of proof Comments  McGhee c. National Coal Board [cml] [sufficient proof, increases risk, inference of causation] [1972] All ER 1008 (HL) Faits  exposure to heat and dust in brick kilns caused dermatitis  no washing facilities, and Plf biked home after work  immediate washing as proper precaution Questions en  Lack of washing facilities materially caused or increased risk of injury litige to Plf? Dispositif  Yes.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 17

Analyse

Ratio

Comments

Lord Wilberforce  ”where a person has, by breach of duty of care, created a risk, and injury occurs within the area of that risk, the loss should be borne by him unless he shows that it had some other cause.” (ie, burden shifts)  cause : la poussière + la chaleur  dermatite (mais ceci n‟est PAS une faute de l‟employeur)  McGhee shows on balance of probabilites that cie‟s negligent act (no showers available) substantially increased the risks of injury (dermatitis)  thus, burden shifts to the def that his negligence did not cause the injury  cie must meet the standard of a RP  legal presumption of fault: no showers, increases the risk of injury, and that injury appears. rebuttable if def shows his negligence did not cause the dermatitis.  prépondérance de la preuve  inférer la probabilité de la cause Lord Reid  CAUSALITY : pursuer succeeds if he can shew the fault of the defender caused or materially contributed to his injury  medical evidence: fact that man had to cycle home caked with grime and sweat added materially to the risk that this disease might develop  no substantial difference b/t saying that what respondents did materially increased the risk of injury to the appellant and saying that what the respondents did made a material contribution to his injury (ie, Lord Reid contest the distinction b/t the “substantial factor” test and a shifting burden of proof)  reversed the burden of proof re: causation  proof showed on the balance of the probabilities that negligence increased the risk of the injury suffered, and thus the burden SHIFTS to the def to show that no showers did NOT cause the injury  under English law, have option to choose to sue under lois du travail or cml. here, chose cml.  compare Smith c. Leech Brain: cancerous spot. causalité ? conditions de travail dangéreuse ? condition pré-cancéreuse ?

Smith c. Leech Brain & Co. Ltd. [cml] [molten metal agent in causing cancer] [1962] 2 QB 405 (QBD) Faits  poor shield for Plf Smith‟s husband employee at galvanizing factory  employee gets molten metal on lip, burn ulcerates & becomes cancerous, employee dies Questions en  i) employer negligent? litige  ii) employer liable for death? Dispositif  i) yes, negligent in improper shield  ii) yes, liable for death Analyse Lord Parker C.J.  employer negligent: reasonable employer must have foreseen risks of being 3 ft away from molten metal tank, natural to stick head out, and make-shift bit of corrugated iron as poor shield (breach of duty of care re: work conditions)

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 18







 

Ratio Comments

    

contributory negligence of employee? plf stuck his head out  natural for employee to stick his head out, so NO contributory negligence (natural conduct cannot be negligent conduct)  UK only adoped law of contributory negligence after certain time (?)  adopted law similar to that in droit civil: victim‟s fault can reduce damages def resp for negligence cause prejudice of death: Plf‟s husband, “but for” the burn would not necessarily ever have developed cancer and subsequently died. Plf‟s husband most likely suffering from pre-malignant changes due to 9 yrs working in gasworks, and burn was promoting agency causing cancer to develop  other hypotheses: i) brûlure  cause du cancer; ii) presence of cancerous cells employer liable for damages b/c “tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him” court reduces damages b/c Smith‟s pre-malignant changes would have led to cancer (& death), even if he had not been burned  destined to premature death on basis of medical condition thin skull rule: “tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him” Smith poursuit sous les règles de délits et PAS sous les règles des accidents de travail thin skull rule applies in common law & droit civil if did not have thin skull rule, then would be discriminating against a class of people b/c of their susceptibility, etc droit civil: not have to prove foreseeability of the prejudice, only have to show “direct et immédiat”

Farrell v. Snell [cml] [medical malpractice: indirect proof allow inference of causality] [1990] 2 R.C.S. 311 (N.-B.) Faits  hemorrhage during eye operation, Doctor pause for 30 mins, then continue operation, and patient subsequently blind. Questions en  Did the onus to disprove causation shift to the defendant in this litige medical malpractice case, per McGhee? Dispositif  No. Instead, have an inference of causation. Analyse Sopinka J.  by proceeding with the operation, the doctor increased the risk b/c permitted bleeding to continue undetected b/c eye was occluded by blood and patched  REFORMULATION OF MCGHEE : indirect proof allows for an inference of causation, and NOT reversing the burden of proof.  burden of proof (traditionally):  i) onus on party who asserts a proposition (usu. Plf);  ii) where subject matter of allegation lies particularly w/in knowledge of 1 party, that party may be required to prove it.  HERE, (here, with the doctor), THUS, in medical malpractice cases  proof of causation difficult for the patient  “legal or ultimate burden remains with the Plf, but in the absence

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 19



Ratio

 

of evidence to the contrary adduced by the Def, an inference of causation may be drawn although positive or scientific proof of causation has not been adduced.” not speculation but “commmon sense” to draw such an inference where, as here, the circumstances, other than a positive medical opinion, permit. reformulation of McGhee standard of proof of causation : not reversing the burden of proof, but allowing an inference of causation where there is no contrary evidence adduced by the Def

Comments



Walker c. York Finch Hospital [cml] [negligence materially contribute to injury] [2001] 1 R.C.S. 647 (Ont.) Faits  Walker, Osborne and AMM received blood transfusions between 1983 and 1985. blood was HIV-infected, and can make direct link to the specific donor. Walker and Osborne have since died. (blood screening procedures pre-ELISA)  W‟s donor filled out an April 1983 questionnaire which made no reference to persons at high risk for contracting AIDS, or to signs/symptons of AIDS  O‟s and M‟s donor (single donor) filled out a May 1984 questionnaire, which requested homosexual or bisexual males who have multiple partners refrain from donating blood. donor did not regard himself as sexually active.  November 1985 questionnaire: male who has had sex with another male since 1977 Questions en  CRCS negligent in screening procedures? litige Dispositif  Yes. Analyse Major J. O and M actions  negligence of CRCS established: May 1984 questionnaire did NOT meet appropriate standard of care. should have used same standard as US questionnaire. the focus on “good health” was inadequate.  causation: if description had been less ambiguous and more precise, or if infected donor had been asked if he suffered any symptoms of AIDS, then donor would have been precluded from donating. thus causation established. W action  negligence of CRCS established: April 1983 questionnaire contain no reference to persons at high risk for contracting AIDS.  causation:  may be difficult/impossible to determine hypothetically what the donor would have done had he been properly screened.  not ask whether CRCS‟s conduct was a necessary condition for plf‟s injuries using the “but-for” test, but whether that conduct was a sufficient condition.  ask: whether def’s negligence materially contributed to the occurrence of the injury. HERE, definitely yes.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 20



Ratio





whether donor would have self-deferred or been excluded if CRCS had followed appropriate standard of care for a professional voluntary blood bank in N America causation: if CRCS had had proper notices (ie, ask infected donor given descriptions of persons at high risk for contracting AIDS, including descriptions of symptoms), then donor would have been precluded from donating infected blood. proper test of causation in negligent blood screening: whether def‟s negligence materially contributed to the occurrence of the injury.

Comments



Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 21

10.2.

Indeterminate Tortfeasor

10.2.1. Common Fault


cml o true joint tortfeasors : hold actors involved in joint negligent conduct (ie, parties who agree to engage in a course of tortious conduct) liable for the acts of either (Restmt 2d Torts §876) RULE: Summers v Tice:  where 2+ defs commit substantially similar negligent acts, one of which caused the plf‟s injury, burden of proof shifts to each def to show that he did not cause the harm. Applied:  Cook c Lewis: 2 negligent hunters, their negligence caused injury, burden shifts..  Sindell v Abbott: many negligent defs, whose negligence caused injury, burden shifts.



cvl o SOLIDARITY: faute commune: (CCQ 1480): several persons jointly taken part in wrongful act which has resulted in injury or have committed separate faults each of which may have caused the injury, and where impossible to determine, in either case, which of them actually caused it, they are solidarily liable for reparation thereof.  Ginn c Sisson: factual presumption, where proof show on the balance of the probabilities, may operate to identify 1 tortfeasor  Morin c Blais: common fault, held solidarily liable

Ginn c. Sisson [cvl] [common fault, identify 1 boy on factual presumption] [1969] C.S. 585 (Qc) Faits  Howard, 6 yr 9 mo. old boy, and at least one other boy throwing stones in vicinity of girl. girl wounded. Questions en  Which 6-yr old liable? litige Dispositif  Howard. Analyse Proof  “malgré l‟absence d‟une preuve idéale, des présomptions de fait suffisament concluantes permettent d‟affirmer ceci: la pierre qui a blessé la victime est l‟une de celles qu‟à lancées le jeune Howard.”  Suzan asked the boys to stop, Billy stopped, but Howard did not. Girl injured shortly thereafter.  participated in faute collective: Howard threw rocks, and his attitude encouraged his friend to also throw rocks. Standard of RP in the circumstances:  Boy mature enough to tell good from bad  Father live up to standard of reasonable man: educated boy well, and not expected to supervise 24/7 Ratio  factual presumption that Howard threw the rock that injured the girl, because he continued to throw rocks after being told to stop, while Billy stopped upon having been asked. Comments 

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 22

Morin c. Blais [cvl] [infraction of norms, common fault] [1977] 1 R.C.S. 170 (Qc) Facts  80% dark, tractor Blais travelling at 20 mph w/ 1 rear red light (missing other light)  car Morin behind tractor at 55-60 mph (ie, obey speed limit)  car Morin hit tractor and veer into oncoming traffic, namely car L  passenger (wife) in car Lagacé killed Issues  what was the direct cause of the accident?  if disobey the law, then automatically responsible?  if obey the law, then automatically exonerated from responsibility? Held  cause: two negligent acts: i) Morin‟s failure to see tractor + ii) tractor‟s missing light. THUS, liability divided equally amongst tractor driver and car M driver  tractor disobeyed, but not automatically responsible  Morin obeyed speed limit, but not automatically exonerated from responsibility Reasoning Pigeon J.  statutory norms: speed limit, tractor lights  common fault = negligence #1 + negligence #2:  negligence #1: Morin respected speed limit, said other light prevented him from seeing tractor, BUT Morin should have seen the tractor, should be more attentive in agricultural sector (norm of prudence)  negligence #2: Blais missing red light on tractor is breach of regulation (ie, fault), and this fault cause accident  object of the norm of lights: to be visible. here, the accident caused precisely by the lack of visibility. THUS, presumption that infraction of norm as cause of accident. Ritchie J. (dissent)  determining cause is the appellant‟s failure to see the tractor Ratio  obeying (or disobeying) statutory norm not immediately exonerate (or inculpate) from liability Comments  Cook c. Lewis [cml] [common fault, burden shifts, both hunters liable] [1951] R.C.S. 830 (C.-B.) Faits  hunters shooting grouse, both Defs Cook and Akenhead fire simultaneously in direction of grouse, Plf Lewis received several shots in the face, lost an eye. Questions en  Cook and/or Akenhead liable for Lewis‟ injuries? litige Dispositif  Yes, both. Analyse Cartwright J.  Moxley v Canada Atlantic Rail: ”Thus in practice, when it is certain that one of two individuals committed the offence charged, but it is uncertain whether the one or the other was the guilty agent, neither of them can be convicted.”  Summers v. Tice: where 2+ defs commit substantially similar negligent acts, one of which caused the plf‟s injury, burden of proof shifts to each def to show that he did not cause the harm.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 23

Ratio

defs performing same act, and equal chances that either caused the harm  should follow Summer v. Tice, and thus hold both Defs liable b/c cannot tell which one shot the Plf, but know that they were both shooting negligently in Plf‟s direction Rand J.  by confusing his act with environmental conditions, he has, in effect, destroyed the victim‟s power of proof  onus is then shifted to the wrongdoer to exculpate himself Locke J. (dissent)  Cook and Akenhead merely hunting in each other‟s company; no common design  each pursuing their own design of shooting grouse  both engaged in negligent conduct, injury resulted, cannot identify which of them caused the injury, thus both are liable for reparation of the injury.
 

Comments

10.2.2. Contribution & Market Share Thesis Contribution cml  right of contribution: where 2+ persons jointly/severally liable in tort for same injury o right of contr in favor of tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of common liability, and his total recovery limited to amt paid by him in excess of his pro rata share  may enforce right of contribution by i) impleading a joint tortfeasor for contribution in the original suit, or ii) bring a new suit for contribution (from Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 1955)  market share thesis : (Sindell v Abbott) o of 200 companies manufacturing the product, 6 cies named in the case who constitute 90% du marché (responsable pour 100% du préjudice) o A (40) ; B (10) ; C (10) ; D (10) ; E (15) ; F (5) o divide the liability based on market share cvl  solidary obligation: where debtors obligated to creditor for same thing, o each of them may be compelled separately to perform the whole obligation, and o performance by one debtor releases the others towards the creditor. (CCQ 1523)  liable for the whole obligation (restituo in integrum)  similar to proof of causality on the balance of probabilities, or by factual presumption  les difficultés auxquels  préjudice sur une population importante (pas obscure)  un produit a causé des préjudices importantes à une population importante Sindell c. Abbott Laboratories [cml] [negligent defs bear cost by market share thesis] 607 P2d 924 (Cour suprême de la Californie, 1980) Faits  women brought class action against drug companies seeking to recover for injuries sustained as result of administration of drug DES to their mothers during pregnancy

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 24

Questions en litige

Dispositif Analyse

Ratio Comments

May a Plf, injured as a result of a drug administered to her mother during pregnancy, who knows the type of drug involved but cannot identify the manufacturer of the precise product, hold liable for her injuries a maker of a drug produced from an identical formula?  Yes, by “market share” thesis. Mosk J.  “in our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in science and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.”  adopt Summers: as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury. here, plf not at fault, and defs conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many years played a significant role in the unavailability of proof  plf brings claim against substantial percentage of manufacturers of the DES which her mother might have taken (thus, solidarity)  presence of substantial share of appropriate market also provides a ready means to apportion damages among the defs (ie, market share thesis) Richardson J. (dissent)  Plfs openly conceded that unable to identify particular entity which manufactured the drug consumed by their mothers  substantial percentage of manufacturers held jointly liable for injuries to Plf‟s mother  juge détermine si solidaire ou pas solidaire  *** différentes étapes qu‟on doit faire ***  FDA n‟a pas approuvé la commercialisation, seulement des études à propos de DES


10.2.3. Multiple Tortfeasors Categorization (where negligence on the part of persons F1, F2, F3 cause a prejudice) A. Solidarity (Equal Conditions) cml  joint and several liability : each def, whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured party for the entire harm. (Restmt 2d Torts §875)  may be sued for those damages either singly or along with the other tortfeasors  solidarity of multiple tortfeasors  cml Price v Milawski : solidarity of the 3 doctors cvl  multiple tortfeasors jointly liable for damages where cannot determine relative fault (1480) o Deguire c Adler : where cannot determine fault, fault of multiple parties equal (1480)  solidarity of multiple tortfeasors: in extra-Kual obligations, have solidary obligation to make reparation where fault of 2+ persons cause injury to another (1526) B. Efficient/Adequate Cause (causa sine qua non)  several causes, but one of the causes is “more” the cause of the injury

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 25

 

 

la cause efficiente, la cause adéquate est F2 (donc, exonère F1 et F3) cause in fact o causa sine qua non : without which it is not; an indispensable requisite o ”but for” test : def‟s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct ; conversely, the def‟s conduct is not a cause of the event if the event would have occurred without it. (sine qua non: without which it is not; an indispensable requisite) o Smith c Leech Brain: without the promoting agent of the burn, cancer would not have developed. cause-in-law b/c cml: does NOT apply if defs caused separate damages (Restmt 2d Torts §881) this is cause in fact, and ONLY counts as a cause in law when qualified as a causa causans

C. Immediate Cause : cvl causa causans, cml novus actus interveniens o la cause la plus proche au préjudice (F3, par exemple) o cvl causa causans : the immediate or effective cause  Syndicat Hydro Qc c Eastern Papers: can identify the damages each def caused  Tooke c Bergeron: girl‟s imprudence as direct cause  Hydro Qc c Girard : novus actus Girard put plastic bag over the live wire  Fréchette: went between the cars o cml novus actus interveniens : évènement qui casse le lien de la causalité  Wagon Mound No. 1 : novus actus of piece of cotton in igniting the oil A. Solidarity (Equal Conditions) Price v. Milawski et al [cml] [joint liability of multiple actors at fault] [1977] 82 DLR (3d) 130 (C.A. Ont.) Faits  ankle broken, x-rayed foot by mistake, permanent disability  personne n‟est responsable pour la blessure (blessure = accident, donc personne n‟est responsable)  Dr. Murray : faute en écrivant « right foot » au lieu de « la cheville droite »  incapacité partielle temporaire  incapacité totale temporaire (peut pas travailler)  Dr. Milawski :  Dr. Cardin : spécialiste  Dr. Hofman : procède à l‟opération  incapacité partielle permanente (diminution de salaire)  recours contre Murray, Milawski et Cardin (PAS poursuivre Hoffman) Questions en  qui est responsable pour le préjudice de Price ? l‟un, l‟autre ou les litige deux ? Dispositif  Tous les trois. Analyse  Murray dit : erreur comme médecin d‟urgence (d‟inattention), mais si Milawski ou Cardin aurait vu la faute, situation aurait pu être corrigé. responsabilité s‟arrête là où Milawski et Cardin commence.  Milawski dit : pas de ma faute du tout, si Murray n‟avait pas fait de faute, n‟aurait pas eu de préjudice. normale, comme médecin, de fier à une radiographie qui a été prise et vu par le médecin. donc, pas commis de faute  montant du préjudice pas en cause Arnup J.A.  faute distincte ? fautes indépendantes de Murray et Milawski ?

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Ratio Comments

Wagon Mound, Lord Advocate la prévisibilité : prévoir l‟impacte de l‟erreur de Murray  Murray : faute commise, prévisible que d‟autres docteurs se fieraient à la radiographie ? effets tendance a snowball.  l’un s’appui sur la faute de l’autre – on ne peut plus distinguer  une équipe qui s‟occupe du patient  solidarité: here, cannot identify which doctor is responsible for which portion of the prejudice suffered. THUS, jointly liable, and each doctor responsible for 33% of the damages.  prévisibilité de l’erreur des acteurs multiples mène à la solidarité  SOLIDARITÉ : théorie de l’équivalence des conditions qualifications de l‟incapacité (différents combinaisons des deux types):  incapacité temporaire ou permanente  incapacité partielle ou totale solidarité  joint or several liability
 

Deguire c. Adler [cvl] [continued fault, cannot differentiate] [1963] B.R. 101 (Qc) Faits  painters (of Adler bldg) close natural gas valves. they don‟t re-attach the gas pipe in the interior of the apartment.  later, concierges Deguire did work in another apartment, and re-opened all gas valves, including the previously closed valve to the unoccupied apartment.  gas now running into apartment with faulty, unconnected pipe  visitors to the empty apartment, smell gas, open windows, explosion, fire, damages Questions en  Deguire and Adler jointly liable for injuries suffered by Plf visitors ? litige Dispositif  Yes, because cannot differentiate b/t the two faults. Analyse M. le juge Choquette  faute continue : faute crée une risque qui continue  on the spectrum, not talking about discrete points with fault, but a fault that results in CONTINUED risk, thus canNOT DIFFERENTIATE between the two faults, and defendants held jointly liable  deux fautes dont la coexistence est responsable pour la préjudice Mr. Justice Casey:  cannot decide to what extent the negligence of each contributed to the explosions, thus, where cannot determine relative fault, then fault of multiple parties considered equal Ratio  SOLIDARITÉ: Comments  compare Vandry : fil d‟électrique exposé à la branche glaçée = menace continue B. Efficient/Adequate Cause (sine qua non) Smith v Leech Brain [cm] [molten metal agent of cancer] C. Immediate Cause

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 27

cvl causa causans Syndicat HydroQc, Duranceau c. Eastern Coated [cvl] [caused separate damages] Faits


Questions en litige Dispositif Analyse

   

travaux sur la route, cause la panne d‟électricité, grève illégale en cours des membres du syndicat d‟Hydro Qc: ordonnance de retour au travail (est-ce une faute ?) Duranceau responsible for Paper cie‟s lost profits ? Union ? Both – but no solidarity b/c can identify the precise quantum of damages each injury caused. perte de production quantifiable ($42 000) les faits permettent une analyse précise : Duranceau responsable jusqu’où les réparations auraient été faites pendant 24 heures, APRÈS, le syndicat responable pour le retard préjudice faute claire de Duranceau  la cause de quelle préjudice ? Hydro Qc responsable de réparer le préjudice distinguer entre les cadres d‟Hydro Qc, et les membres du syndicat même si la grève est illégale, le comportement d’empêcher les cadres à procéder aux réparations est fautif en lui-même (comportement commandé par le syndicat) que la grève est légale ou illégale n‟est pas important (NOT a material fact) faute lourde de la part d‟Hydro Qc ? non, parce qu‟ils ont essayé de procéder aux réparations (donc, pas de resp extra-K-uel, ni K-uel) distinction entre faute lourde et faute intentionnel (Gossett ??) faute lourde : comportement grossier négligent ; faute intentionnelle : exige comportement grossier négligent ET intention (ONLY matters re : violation of a right protected in the Charter, leading to possible exemplary damages) no solidarity because the proof permits a precise division of the liability causa causans la causalité immédiate : each actor held responsible for the prejudice he directly caused

   

  

Ratio Comments

  

Tooke c Bergeron [cvl] [girl‟s imprudence as direct cause] Hydro Qc c Girard [cvl] [novus actus Girard put plastic bag over the live wire] Fréchette [cv] [went between cars] cml novus actus interveniens Wagon Mound No. 1 [cml] [novus actus of piece of cotton in igniting the oil]

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 28

11. Defenses Moyens de Défense (cvl + cml) 1. Victim‟s fault  conséquences beaucoup plus sérieux en cml 2. Assumption of the risk  volenti non fit injuria : celui qui accepte volontairement une risque, ne peut se plaindre après 3. Common employment 11.1. Victim’s Fault

Faute de la victime et son interaction avec la causa causans Comparative Negligence cvl  multiple tortfeasors, then liability shared in proportion to seriousness of fault of each, and victim‟s fault included in apportionment when injury partly the effect of his own fault (1478)  person liable to reparation for an injury is NOT liable in respect of any aggravation of the injury that the victim could have avoided (1479) o Price v Roy: divide damages according to negligence o Hôpital Notre-Dame c Laurent: husband 25% negligent in waiting too long to seek care, surgeon 75% negligent in diagnosis & no X-rays  causa causans : faute contributive peut mener à l‟exonération complète o Tooke c Bergeron : girl‟s imprudence in picking up the comb o Hydro Qc c Girard : novus actus of plastic bag over live wire o Fréchette: went between the cars, 100% liable o Ouellet c Cloutier: boy imprudently stick arm in shaft cml  historically : contributory negligence : la présence d‟une faute contributive de la part du demandeur emportait nécessairement rejet de la demande (contributory negligence)  influence au Qc : confusion entre cml & cvl  « historical error » d‟application de contributory negligence  today: comparative negligence, b/c contributory negligence revoked in Canada in 1924 Hydro Qc c. Girard [cvl] [novus actus of plastic bag over live wire] [1987] R.R.A. 80 (C.A., Qc) Faits  fil d‟électricité pend sur la route, Girard passe, téléphone à Hydro Qc, pas de réponse dans les 30 mins après, Girard passe encore une fois, et met un sac en plastique autour du fil, explosion. Questions en  Hydro Qc resp for Girard‟s injuries? litige Dispositif  No. Analyse L‟Heureux-Dubé J.  danger of live wire was perfectly visible and did not represent an immediate danger to the Plf  no link of causality b/t negligence of the defs and injury suffered by the Plf  novus actus interveniens: la témérité de mettre le sac en plastique autour du fil

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 29

  

BUT FOR : « N‟eût été de cette imprudence téméraire, l‟accident n‟aurait pas eu lieu. » « la témérité et l‟imprudence grossière de l‟intimé a été la seule cause, la cause effective, des dommages qu‟il a subi » causa causans: la cause qui cause (la cause directe, la dernière faute) délai entre le moment où Girard a mis le sac et l‟explosion – donc, estce que l‟acte de Girard était la cause de l‟explosion? débat entre les assureurs resp du fait des choses : strict liability of Hydro Qc for its wires ? COMPARE Eaton c Moore :  intervention of employees w/in 3 minutes, whereas in Girard have intervention w/in 30 mins

Ratio Comments

    

Price c. Roy [cvl] [common fault, divide damages by degree of negligence] [1899] 29 R.C.S. 494 (Qc) Faits  def sawmill owner asked employees to help him with the bridge that was covered in ice. 3 men help, one died (Gédéon Trudel), the son of one of the men. Questions en  Def guilty of negligence? Plf assume the risk? litige Dispositif  Yes; No. Analyse Girouard J.  def negligent in ordering the work. everyone knew of the dangers, including the deceased.  case of common fault and divide the damages incurred according to Qc‟s equitable jurisprudence  did NOT voluntarily assume the risk: looks at quality of son‟s consent “on peut difficilement dire que l‟ouvrier s‟est exposé de son chef.” his father came to get him, could have refused, but wanted to prove himself in order to show his dedication to the work. Gwynne J. (dissent)  deceased did voluntarily assume the risk. Ratio  distinguishes cml contributory negligence from cvl causation Comments  Tooke c. Bergeron [cvl] [imprudence of girl as causa causans] [1897] R.C.S. 567 (Qc) Facts  fille mineure Bergeron fait la toilette de sa chevelure à son siège en face de sa machine  chevelure prise par la courroie, de-scalped and lost an ear Issues  Employer liable for girl‟s injury? Held  No. Reasoning  causation: principal and immediate cause of accident was girl‟s imprudence, she acted contrary to company policy  yes, there was infraction à la loi des manufacturiers, but this is immaterial where direct cause of accident was girl’s imprudence  penal norm for infraction of statute = imposition of a fine  causa causans : faute contributive peut mener à l‟exonération complète

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Ratio Comments

 

infraction à la loi évident, mais cette infraction complètement dissocié de la resp civile par le billet du mécanisme de la CAUSALITÉ law of manufacturers required protection to be in place b/t employee and machine. Tooke NOT have required protection.

Daudelin c Roy [cvl] [cas fortuit ≠ element common fault] [1974] C.A. 95 (Qc) Faits  child hit by truck Questions en  child contributorily negligent? litige Dispositif  no. Analyse Mr. Justice Kaufman  child was visible to the driver, driver had sufficient time to honk his horm, slow down and stop the  yes, child partially at fault, but child not capable of fault. CAS FORTUIT? Only if child had been the sole cause of the accident.  child‟s conduct does NOT constitute a cas fortuit  cas fortuit: l‟imprévisibilité (fortuit) + l‟irrésistibilité (force majeure)  les notions de faute et de cas fortuit sont antinomiques : s‟il y a cas fortuit, il n‟y a plus faute ; si une faute exite, on ne peut plus parler de cas fortuit.  s‟il n‟y a pas de faute ça ne peut pas engager un partage de responsabilité Ratio  cas fortuit canNOT be considered an element of common fault Comments 

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Contributory Negligence (old cml doctrine) Grand Trunk c. Earl [cml] [biker‟s contributory negligence bars recovery] [1923] R.C.S. 397 (Alberta) Faits  “shunting” of trains, Earl on bike Questions en  Plf contributorily negligent? litige Dispositif  Yes, thus NOT COMPENSATED b/c old cml rule contributory negligence. Analyse Duff J.  must apply theory of contributory negligence b/c Earl‟s fault in crossing the tracks  contributory negligence: i) infraction of statutory norm of RR cie; ii) reckless conduct of biker Anglin J.  no watchman on duty  Plf guilty of reckless conduct: “at the trial he could not himself say whether the train hit him or he hit the train.”  “the negligent running into danger of the unfortunate plf, if not the sole proximate cause of his being injured, was at least a contributing cause quite as proximate and immediate as the breach of the order of the board by the defs.”  if the unlawful switching should be regarded as a contributing cause, the accident was the result of the joint fault of the def and the plf; without the negligence of the latter operating as a causa causans it could not have happened.  contributory negligence will defeat recovery, even though the negligent act consisted in the violation of a statute or ordinance, and though such violation is held to be negligent per se. Mignault J.  the doctrine of the civil law, in force in the province of Qc and also adopted in admiralty matters, is much more equitable, for where there is common fault the liability of each party is measured by his degree of culpability Ratio  where Plf contributorily negligent, could not recover for damages under old cml doctrine of contributory negligence Comments  encore une fois, la qualification des faits est déterminante (Brodeur J., dissenting judge, formulates the cause as the RR‟s fault, and thus sees no need to enter into a discussion on the theory of contributory negligence) Smith c Leech Brain [cml] [natural act ≠ negligent act, no contributory negligence]  no contributory negligence when employee stick head out from behind the shield. was natural for him to do so, and a natural act ≠ negligent act. Contributory Negligence Act, S.O. 1924, c. 32

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11.2.
    

Assumption of the Risk

volenti non fit injuria : that to which a person assents is not deemed in law an injury NOT a very strict or powerful defense in cvl (1477) or cml (look at quality of assent) history: originally appeared in context of work accidents, but these work accidents now fall under a special regime cml historically not open to risk theory (assumption of the risk, contributory negligence) cvl: o codification of risk theory (CCQ 1477) assumption of risk by the victim, though imprudent in the circumstances, does NOT entail renunciation of his remedy against the person who caused the injury.  Price v Roy: boy on iced-over bridge knew of risk, but STILL has remedy La théorie que l‟on a étudié au 1er semestre (J. Fitzpatrick) est l‟inverse, le miroir de la théorie des risques. L‟employé à qui on va opposer l‟acceptation des risques et donc l‟interdiction de recours contre l‟employer. manufacturer’s liability for safety defects (CCQ 1468, 1469, 1473), though this liability is not strict, esp when victim appropriately informed of risks, or manufacturer not aware. express assumption of the risk :  i) freely consent to accept the risk (ie, no consent if there is no meaningful alternative)  Woodley v Met Railway: RR worker assumed risk (modern interprt‟n)  Birch v Thomas: car sticker give proper notice  ii) risk assumption clauses must clearly state the risk. Ks: must have risk in mind at time of K-ing.  Lambert v Lastoplex: paint can‟s warning too general, thus Plf not assume risk of leaving pilot light on  def has burden of proof to show Plf explicitly assumed the risks implied assumption of the risk: assume risk from the inherent dangers of the activity, even if conducted w/ due care (but does NOT assume risks from negligence)  Roy c Ecole d’escalade: mountaineering inherently dangerous, but mtn owners negligent in ignoring dangerous rock warnings. secondary implied assumption: negligent def, and plf knowingly encounter the risk, and suffers injury as a result (bars Plf from recovering)

o o


cml: o

o

o

Note re : Insurance  served to protect the EMPLOYER, not necessarily compensate the victim  doctrines of contributory negligence and common employment barred victim‟s recovery Woodley v. Metropolitan Railway [cml] [“voluntarily” assented to risk of RR track] [1877] 2 Ex.D. 384 Faits  contractor working on RR tracks in tunnel, poor lighting, at a curb for two weeks. no look-out man to warn of oncoming train, suffered injury. wins damages at trial for injury on negligence and breach of duty of care. Questions en  RR cie negligent? Defense of Plf assuming the risk? litige Dispositif  Yes, negligent, but Plf assumed the risks, thus cannot recover. Analyse Cockburn CJ

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 33

Negligence? Yes, jury decided negligence at trial, and NOT up to the judge to overturn this. (MCP: similar to Nikolaisen)  Defense of Assumption of the Risk? Yes, assumed the risk, cannot recover damages.  precaution of look-out man was discontinued, and admits that morally reprehensible that RR cie not do everything in its power to alleviate the danger  Plf was servant of contractor, and NOT a railway employee, thus owed him no duty of care.  Plf aware of nature & character of the work, and “voluntarily consented,” thus cannot hold company liable for injuries suffered  no negligent conduct on the part of the RR cie Mellish J. (dissent)  yes, RR cie liable for injury suffered by servants of contractors  “every person” who carries on a dangerous trade is liable to all others


Ratio Comments

 



today, more restricted application: theory of volenti non fit injuria has evolved today to ask whether person VOLUNTARILY exposes himself to the risk. case subject to constant criticism due to inequity

Price c. Roy [cvl] [iced bridge, no voluntary assent] [1899] 29 R.C.S. 494 (Qc) Faits  def sawmill owner asked employees to help him with the bridge that was covered in ice. 3 men help, one died (Gédéon Trudel), the son of one of the men. Questions en  Def guilty of negligence? Plf assume the risk? litige Dispositif  Yes; No. Analyse Girouard J.  def negligent in ordering the work. everyone knew of the dangers, including the deceased.  case of common fault and divide the damages incurred according to Qc‟s equitable jurisprudence  did NOT voluntarily assume the risk: looks at quality of son‟s consent “on peut difficilement dire que l‟ouvrier s‟est exposé de son chef.” his father came to get him, could have refused, but wanted to prove himself in order to show his dedication to the work. Gwynne J. (dissent)  deceased did voluntarily assume the risk. Ratio  distinguishes cml contributory negligence from cvl causation Comments 

Lambert v Lastoplex [cml] [manufacturer liable where not detail risk to consumer] [1972] R.C.S. 569 (Ont.) Faits  vapors from lacquer + pilot light  explosion. Plf had read the instructions, and used the product as intended. Plf had engineering background. lacquer w/ low flash point. Questions en  Manufacturer liable for plf‟s injuries?

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 34

litige Dispositif Analyse

Yes. Laskin J.  manufacturer have duty to provide detailed enough notice of risks to consumers (duty increases as the risks increase)  general warning does NOT suffice.  NO proof of voluntary assumption of the risk of injury  would need to show that appellant appreciated the risk involved in leaving pilot lights on, and willingly took that risk.
 

Ratio Comments

compare cvl re: manufacturer‟s liability  1468: liable for reparation for safety defect.  1469: safety defect = not afford safety person normally entitled to expect b/c defect in design, poor preservation, or lack of sufficient safety precautions  1473: manufacturer not liable where victim knew of defect, could have known, or could have foreseen the injury  sui generis regime: not entirely fault, not entirely risk.

Birch v Thomas [cml] [proper notice, thus Plf assumed risk] [1972] 1 All ER 905 (CA) Faits  Def driver had sticker in windshield in passenger-side of car “Passengers ride at their own risk.” Plf passenger injured (suffered personality change). Driver claim not liable for injury b/c passenger ride at his own risk.  Driver‟s insurance cie cover for ordinary liability to 3d persons, but not passenger liability. Birch put sticker in his car per insurance cie‟s advice. Questions en  Plf entitled to damages? litige Dispositif  No. Analyse Lord Denning  Def guilty of ordinary negligence (careless driving), not reckless conduct.  driver did all that was reasonably necessary to bring Plf‟s att‟n to the sticker: passenger saw the sticker, Driver told passenger he was not insured against passenger liability (ie, if passenger injured, even by driver‟s negligence, passenger have no claim against driver)  Exemption clause covers precisely this ordinary negligence.  careless driving does NOT come under doctrine of fundamental breach, where conduct would have to be sthg outside the contemplation of the parties. Megaw L.J.  trial judge satisfied that Def pointed out to Plf the notice: inferred on the balance of probabilities)  notice was there to be seen, form was distinct, and inference that Plf must have read it.  IF, on balance of probability proper inference was that Plf NOT read the notice, then Lord Denning correct in asserting that Plf did all that was reasonably necessary in the circumstances to bring Plf‟s att‟n to

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 35

Ratio

 

Comments

 

exemption from liability. car sticker gave proper notice to passenger, passenger assumed the risk of not holding driver liable for negligence here, negligence ordinary, and precisely the type of negligence included in the exemption compare Fitzpatrick: driver creates the risk, he should assume the risk problem of LACK OF LEGISLATION (ie, car insurance covering passengers should be compulsory)  this would protect pedestrians, passengers

Roy c. École d’escalade [cvl] [inherently dangerous, assume risk, but prove negligence] [1988] R.J.Q. 663 (C.A., Qc) Facts  Plf woman rendered paraplegic by rock falling during ski lesson  Def mtn owner warned several days previously that rock had moved  Def sent 3 quasi-experts to investigate rock and they determined no danger Issues  Def liable for injury? Held  Yes, Def liable Reasoning  juge doit déterminer la norme, et analyser le comportement  inherently dangerous activity, but plf did not accept the specific risk of the boulder that had moved.  Def negligent: had an obligation to have an expert test the boulder  Def not act as “bon père de famille”  donc, la norme est accrue puisque activité dangéreuse et risque de dommage sérieux  given severity of warning and possible disastrous consequences, Def have obligation to have rock tested by experts prior to inviting amateurs to the place Ratio  standard of reasonable man varies depending on the severity of the consequences Comments 

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 36

11.3. Common Employment (Fellow-Servant) (old cml)  common employment : common employer not liable for fault caused to servant by a fellow servant  ie, servant assumes the risk of fellow servant‟s negligence  now defunct  exception to respondeat superior Hall v. Johnson and another [cml] [employer not liable for underlooker injuring miner] [1865] Ex. Ch. The Law Times Report Vol. XI, 779. Faits  underlooker ignored mine worker‟s warnings that a stone was cracking & would likely fall. stone fell, mine worker injured. mine worker bring action against mine cie. Questions en  Employer liable for fellow-servant‟s negligence? litige Dispositif  No. Analyse Erle C.J.  underlooker negligent in not propping up the roof of the mine, and caused injury to the Plf  no evidence that Def mine cie negligent in selection of underlooker, nor proof of negligence in keeping mine in proper order for mining operations  underlooker & plf were fellow laborers  “a servant, when he engages to serve a master, undertakes as b/t himself and his master to run all the ordinary risks of the service, including negligence on the part of a fellow servant, when he is acting in the discharge of his duty as servant of him who is the common master of both” Ratio  laborer assumes the risk of his fellow laborer‟s negligence when serving a common master Comments 

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12. SPECIAL REGIME : Work Accidents 12.1. History: Crisis of Civil Liability at the turn of the century

Report of the Wainwright Commission, 1909 [judges ask legislators to remedy the inequity] INQUIRY: Wainwright  law of employer‟s liability in NY  cml bears harshly on workers b/c doctrines of fellow-servant (assuming the risk), contributory negligence. RESPONSE: Judge Learned Hand o “present law economically inequitable to employees” Objects to: o employer‟s liability:  employer more able to bear industrial risks o employer‟s defenses:  fellow-servant: “wholly fictitious acceptance” of servant assuming the risk of his fellow-servant‟s negligence, imposed on employee w/o any real basis of fact  assumption of the risk of dangerous machinery: “unjust to place upon the employee the alternative of risking his life/limb, or of losing an employment.  contributory negligence: (incl in employer‟s liability) Suggests: “if in place of [the current law] could be devised a system of fixed compensation I think the load of a great economic waste would be lifted from the community, and especially from that part of it which is least able to bear it and which now carries it.” RESPONSE: W.S. Andrews o doctrine of assumed risk: “the rule really is an encouragement to the master to be negligent at the expense of servants who are helpless” o all three doctrines “utterly fail to prevent accidents” and “no one of them has any real tendency to make the servant more careful” RESPONSE: Francis M. Scott o actions by employees against their employers “produces most unequal and often most inequitable results” o “unfair both to employer and employee” o “utterly unreasonable economic waste” Tunc, La Responsabilité Civile, “19e et 20e siècles”  age of the machine: men required to work directly w/ machines: “coexistence d‟hommes et de machines”  age of accidents: accidents previously rare, but now commonplace o distinguish b/t accident caused by negligence, and that caused by force majeure o resistance to change b/c individualist theories, and employers not want to assume the costs J.C. Lamothe, Responsabilité du patron dans les accidents du travail (1905)  Need for Legislative Reform : legislative change to meet today‟s industrial needs, more fair to employees, recognize industrial shift from individual work to “machinisme”  Three Models: - Germanique: plus radical, adopté en 1885-7. Premier a être adopté en Occident, sous Bismarck (les auteurs français ont paniqué à l‟époque). Il n‟était pas exactement un socialiste, mais adopta un régime de protection en matière d‟accident, de maladie et de vieillesse. En plus, on impose une assurance obligatoire et publique. Coupe l‟herbe sous le pied des socialistes. Catastrophe pour les opposants: loup dans la bergerie, État Providence „dangereux‟. Ce régime va devenir un repoussoir.

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- Anglo-saxon: plus libéral, adopté en 1897 (avant, avait tenté de réduire le caractère nocif de la CL, mais avec un succès relatif). Adopte le risque professionnel, mais avec une protection réduite. On ne reconnaît que l‟accident du travail, pas la maladie (même industrielle) ou la vieillesse. On rejette le principe de l‟assurance obligatoire. On maintient le choix, l‟option: le travailleur victime d‟un accident peut soit obtenir l‟indemnité prévue ou poursuivre devant les tribunaux en vertu de la règle de CL. C‟est encore le cas aujourd‟hui en Angleterre. - Français: entre les deux, adopté en 1898, après 18 ans de débat. Se limite également à l‟accident et refuse l‟assurance obligatoire, mais ne retient pas l‟option de poursuite de droit commun, seule une indemnité en cas d‟accident. - Québec: adopté en 1909 (entrée en vigueur, 1/1/1910, première province canadienne), alors que le premier projet de loi a été déposé en 1904. Le régime est fondé sur le modèle français: on évacue le concept de faute, ce qui devient déterminant est l‟événement (il y a-t-il un accident du travail?). S‟il y a accident, les indemnités sont prévues par la loi. Ce régime ne comprend pas au départ les maladies industrielles et il n‟impose pas d‟assurance obligatoire (vs. modèle germanique). De plus, il n‟y a pas de recours possible au nom du droit commun (vs. modèle anglo-saxon). MC Prémont, “François Gény et les enjeux de la resp civile” Civil Liability in the Factory  pauperism as product of industrialization (industry produce cotton + poor ppl)  negative effects on workers (injury + disease) & factory neighbors (annoyances, odors) Social Reality of Factory Accidents  factory worker now replaces the apprentice & domestic servant  change in types of accidents: pre-industrial victim could identify the negligent actor, but industrial victim suffer from “anonymous accident” (gradually intensifies, cannot identify cause, employees voluntarily quit b/c sickness)  very harsh work conditions, more work required for less remuneration, esp impact on women  classic doctrine: employee author of his own misfortune  Bellom‟s German study (1889): 20% accidents due to fault, and 80% of accidents where no identifiable fault, and victim left w/o recourse  empirical evidence confirms that causes of industrial accidents were not foreseen by classic doctrine (focused on fault) Role of Insurance  before 1st worker‟s comp regime, about 50% of employees covered by insurance, insurance as “crucial pawn”  types of insurance: shielding employer from liability, or compensating the victim  compulsory employer‟s society: compensation at employer‟s discretion, mgmt at one cie leads to a strike Interpretation of Civil Code  overwhelming volume of cases  courts respond: i) Kual obligation implied of security of the person in work K, but not upheld by courts & easily defeated by insertion of exoneration clause; ii) no recovery where no fault  Romieu: “anonymous accident”: not employee‟s fault, not employer‟s fault  ANONYMOUS ACCIDENT under fault-based regime  EMPLOYEE BEARS THE BURDEN/FAULT  new doctrine: not based on fault, upholds risk theory o professional risk: risk from a particular profession, independent of employer or employee‟s fault, where accidents occur even when due care taken. machine belongs to owner, and owner should assume the risks. o Jasserand & Saleilles: fault should be seen in historical context, not applicable today. o find support in codal provisions for new doctrine (1384, 1382).

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 39

prof. risk as employer’s obligation: if employer benefits from the risk, the law should impose on him the negative effects of the risk (Saleilles)  also Fitzpatrick J. in Shawinigan Carbide  classic doctrine: fault-based liability o Planiol: risk theory NOT compatible w/ the Code & constitute a regression o Colin & Capitant: risk theory contradicts equity & social interest o Gény Legislative Intervention (1898)  legislative intervention as the only solution  heavy debates in France starting in 1880, worker‟s comp law only adopted in 1898  constitutes first narrowing of application of Civil Code to private relations o
 



mouvements sociaux (surtout visible en Europe) resp indiv  resp collectif (Gény) o MCP n‟est pas d‟accord : ne ns donne pas une indication qui ns aide à comprendre les mécanismes juridiques avant l‟adoption des lois d‟accidents du travail (LAT), grands entreprises avaient déjà développé des assurances (MCP les décrit dans son article)

Historique de la transformation des régimes d‟assurance  droit commun  assurance : employeur fait face à l‟assureur (donc, vise à protéger l‟employeur)  causes : Allemagne 1e pays à mettre en place un régime d‟assurances maladies (recueil 173) o Causes juridiques (Cause in Law)  l‟employeur (21%): 1) sa faute ; 2) resp du fait des choses ; 3) respondeat superior  la victime (27%) : sa faute  application de la théorie causa causans : victim as primary cause of the accident (Bergeron)  contributory negligence : cvl partager ; cml NOT contributory, but sole  tiers (3%) : sa faute (tiers = qqn qui n‟est pas poursuit)  force majeure  cas fortuit (47%) : inexpliqué, non-déterminé, qqch d‟inévitable, risques inhérentes de la chose ; risques professionnels  **absence de responsabilité = la faute de la victime** « prejudice must lie where it falls » o DONC, suivant les règles à l‟époque, au moins 80% des victimes ne seraient PAS indemnifiés et chance de 20% que l‟employeur indemnifie  LAT  assurance : vise à indemnifier les travailleurs qui subi un accident  LATMP  assurance : Assurances en général  collectivisation des risques  prépaient les risques avant que l‟accident ne survient Les employeurs eux-mêmes demandent changement au régime fondé sur la risque  commençaient déjà, avant l‟adoption des LAT, à s‟assurer  payer cher pour obtenir le bénéfice Transformation : Faute  Risque  1880s-1890s : adoption of work accident laws in England, Qc, USA  le machinisme (no longer individual workers, apprentices, domestic servants)

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 40

 



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faute : personne raisonnable (n‟exige pas la perfection)  erreur, inattention = faute risque : concepte mathématique, statistique o Lapeirre : risque de vaccination o Shawinigan Carbide : Fitzpatrick J. finds risk theory in 1054(1) strict liability for ”les choses qu‟elle a sous sa garde.” guardian of a thg, used it for profit, benefits from advantages of the thg. o Saleilles: “c‟est parce que le chef de l‟exploitation profite des bonnes chances, que la loi met à sa charge les mauvaises chances, les risques d l‟industrie, de la profession.” **resp du fait des choses** : embrillon de la théorie du risque à l‟intérieur du régime de faute o germe pour développer le risque professionnel o risques inhérents  personne qui crée le risque doit assumer les coûts (et non pas la victime) transposer les regles de resp civil (subjective) sur les risques professionnels (objective)

Mutation du régime juridique : assistance/charité  protection légale Droit commun  assistance, charité : 80% des victimes ne sont pas indemnifiés  absence total (presque) de recours Régime d‟assurance  sous droit commun, renforce la charité  sous régime objectif, renforce un régime de protection, de sécurité Régimes objectifs  la protection légale, sécurité  déjudiciarisation  ne disent plus « maladie profesionnelle » mais « accident » 12.2. Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases

How to Proceed:  do the presumptions in s. 28 (general) or s. 29 (occupational disease) apply?  look at definition of employment injury under s. 2, look at s. 30 (occupation disease not listed under Sched 1) Special Regime  liability on principles rejected by “droit commun”  do NOT refer to CCQ provisions or principles of ”droit commun”  strict liability, administered by administrative body, Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail Consequence : automatic liability + social compromise  Automatic Liability : results in automatic compensation o déjudiciariser le processus : organisme adminsitratif  Social Compromise : limit liability + automatic compensation o benefits : limit employer‟s liability (ie, victim forego right of action under cvl liability) o sacrifices : limit victim‟s compensation (ie, not full restitutio in integrum, instead have 90% income indemnity, lump sum for funeral costs, excludes moral prejudice.) Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases Compensation (a. 1)

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 

Object of Act : compensation for employment injuries and the consequences they entail for beneficiaries. Compensation includes care, rehabilitation, income replacement, and bodily injury: o provision of necessary care for consolidation (ie, complete healing) of an injury, o the physical/social/vocational rehabilitation of worker, o income replacement indemnities  temporary total disability: 90% weighted net income (a. 45) , ceiling of $55K  permanent total disability: difference b/t current salary & 90% previous salary  death: beneficiaries receive indemnity depending on victim‟s age o compensation for bodily injury (incl death benefits)

Definitions (a. 2)  employment injury (lésion professionnelle): injury/disease arising out of or in the course of an industrial accident, or an occupational disease, including a recurrence, relapse or aggravation  industrial accident (accident du travail): sudden & unforeseen event, attributable to any cause, which happens to a person, arising out of or in the course of his work and resulting in an employment injury to him.  occupational disease (maladie professionnelle): a disease contracted out of or in the course of work and characteristic of that work or directly related to the risks peculiar to that work.  worker: natural person who does work for an employer for remuneration under an employment K or apprenticeship EXCEPT: a domestic, caregiver not residing in the residence, prof athlete. Limited Application  limiter le champ aux industries les plus dangéreuses  personne blessé est un employé o faut démontrer un K d‟emploi o possible pour les employeurs de contourner ceci  sur le lieu du travail  pendant les heures du travail Legal Presumptions of Employment Injury (arts. 28 & 29)  an injury that happens at the workplace while the worker is at work is presumed to be an employment injury o Chaput c STCUM: bus driver waiting, dropped pencil, lumbar pain, legal presumption. rebuttable if does NOT meet the definition of an industrial accident in a. 2)  worker having contracted a disease contemplated in Sched 1 is presumed to have contracted an occupational disease if he has done work corresponding to that disease according to the Schedule. o Succession de Guillemette c JM Asbestos : lung cancer, Registration with the Commission  employers obligated to register employees  independent operators, domestics, employers and directors of legal persons may register (a. 18)  even if worker fails to fulfil obligations, worker may exercise his rights (a. 26) No Right of Action (a. 438)  no worker who has suffered an employment injury may institute a civil liability action against his employer by reason of his employment injury (a. 438). o Vincent c Gallo: no right of action, cannot recover for damage to property (wooden arm)  neither may beneficiaries, except in certain circumstances (a. 441) Advantages of Strict Liability

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 42

  

évaluation continu de la situation du travailleur indemnisation des régimes collectifs plus limité que l‟indemnisation par les cours (ie, not 100%, no préjudice moral, etc) au bout du compte, si on compare l‟indemnisation objectif est de loin supérieur à l‟indemnisation par les tribunaux parce que :  pas de frais judiciaires  élément fiscal : no taxes on worker‟s comp payments

Processus de réclamation (Me Katherine Lippel)  problèmes psychologiques, épisodes de dépression clinique Vincent & Co. Inc. c. Gallo [cvl] [Court not have jurisdiction to hear case] [1944] 64 B.R. 202 (Qc) Faits  Gallo suffered accident, as a consequence injury to face and body and loss of wooden arm  worker‟s comp refused to compensate for wooden arm  indemnity for damage to face and body was insufficient to cover cost of new wooden arm Questions en  Court have jurisdiction to hear the case? litige Dispositif  No. Analyse Mr. Justice Barclay  received compensation for accident under Worker‟s Comp Act (WCA), and thus denied action under CCLC 1056a: “no recourse provided for under the provisions of the chapter shall lie, in the case of an accident contemplated by WCAt, 1931, except to the extent permitted by such Act.”  WCA also denies right of action (art. 15)  CCLC 1056a is complete denial of any right of action for accident covered by WCA, this accident undoubtedly an accident contemplated by that Act  WCA does NOT allow recourse for loss of property (wooden arm = prop.) M. le juge Marchand  “la loi est une loi de compromis, de transaction, assurant à l‟ouvrier une compensation, même quand il a contribué à l‟accident et obligeant dans tous les cas le patron à l‟indemniser, les obligeant tous deux à des concessions réciproques” Ratio  both WCA art. 15, and CCLC 1056a deny an employee a right of action against his employer for an injury contemplated by the WCA  WCA as a compromise, where both employee and employer make reciprocal concessions Comments  Chaput c. STCUM [cvl] [a. 28 legal presumption of employment injury] [1992] R.J.Q. 1774 (C.A.) Faits  chauffeur d‟autobus en sortant ses cigarettes de sa poche, le crayon tombe, ramasse son crayon; entorse lombaire  CSST : non, pas lésion prof (pas imprévu et soudain)  Bureau de revue : non, pas lésion prof.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 43

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Questions en litige Dispositif Analyse

 

C.A.L.P. : oui, lésion prof. (cannot appeal from this decision) Did Chaput benefit from s. 28 ? Rebuttable ?

Ratio Comments

Bisson juge en chef  norme de contrôle des decisions de CALP : erreur manifestement déraisonnable  a. 28 : présomption légale pour les accidents du travail: interprétation de l‟art. 28 : « une blessure qui arrive sur les lieux du travail alors que le travailleur est à son travail est présumée une lésion professionnelle. »   l‟art. 28 ne prononce PAS les mots « imprévu et soudain »  trois conditions de l‟art. 28 :  1) blessure (entorse lombaire);  2) sur les lieux du travail (dans l‟autobus);  3) à son travail (attendait).  ici, oui.  présomption réfragable ou irréfragable ? oui, réfragable par l‟art. 2 évènement imprévu et soudain. (MCP : les trois conditions, et non l‟art. 2)  employer failed to rebut the s. 28 presumption (ie, failed to show that driver‟s injury did NOT result from a sudden and unforeseen event, attributable to any cause)  si elle est réfragable, à la lumière de quoi ?  l‟art. 2 : définitions  thin skull rule : Chaput‟s predisposition is irrelevant Fish (concur)  goes through definitions of accidents  “I would therefore find surprising any conclusion that workers in England enjoyed in 1897 broader protection against industrial accidents than do workers today in Quebec, nearly a full century later.” Mailhot (dissent)  geste volontaire  art. 28 is a legal presumption, rebuttable if injury does not meet the definition of industrial accident in art. 2
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Succ. de Guillemette c. J.M. Asbestos [cvl] [a. 29 legal presumption occupational disease] [1998] 1 R.C.S. 315 ; [1996] R.J.Q. 2444 (C.A.) Faits  victim died of lung cancer. worked at JM Asbestos, specializing in extraction & preparation of asbestos fibers.  claimed lung cancer caused by exposure to asbestos at work  CSST denied his claim b/c he was a heavy smoker, which broke the chain of causation. he appealed to CALP, who decided in worker‟s favor. Questions en  Lung cancer = maladie professionnelle? litige Dispositif  Yes. Analyse  ne pas pénaliser le travailleur parce qu‟il y a une absence de preuve  CALP

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 44

Ratio Comments

a. 29 : legal presumption for listed occupational diseases a. 30 : where disease not listed, worker must show that disease is characteristic of work he has done or is directly related to risks peculiar to that work.  lung cancer listed as a disease caused by exposure to asbestos, thus subject to legal presumption of a. 29. rebuttable.  employer claims asbestos not of a sufficient lvl to lead to lung cancer, employee claims asbestos increased the risk, doubts resolve in favor of employee, thus worker did suffer occupational disease.  Superior Court applied standard of manifestly unreasonable error to CALP‟s judgment.  b/c doubt, worker should not have benefited from a. 29‟s legal presumption, and subject to a. 30 instead. not enough proof for a. 30.  Court looks at legislator‟s intent, claims not all lung cancer = occupational disease, and that CALP should not have labelled it as such. M. le juge Forget (dissent at C.A., confirmed by SCC)  C.A. CALP did NOT commit a manifestly unreasonable error. only looking at burden of proof employer had to meet, and he did not meet that burden in order to rebut the presumption.  “si le travailleur exposé à l‟amiante doit démontrer que son cancer pulmonaire est causé par l‟amiante, l‟utilité de l‟art. 29 serait fort limitée.”  ”le tribunal de droit commun doit éviter de prononcer la décision qui appartient en propre à l‟organisme spécialisé, même s‟il choisit de casser sa décision”  legal presumption of a. 29 rebuttable.
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13. SPECIAL REGIME : Auto Accidents  risque automobile omniprésent  activité automobile pose une risque en soi  vous devez vous assurez pour autrui  assurance obligatoire : ne résolut pas le problème, flambée des primes d‟assurance  risques inhérents : can happen to anyone to drive with an alcohol blood lvl exceeding the allowed norm  présomption légal du fait de la chose (cour ajoute au CCBC : le fait autonome de la chose). aujourd‟hui le CCQ inclus le fait autonome de la chose. au Qc, devait démontrer la faute. Historique 1. délit de fait 2. 1961 : fonds d‟indemnisation, s‟applique aux cas limités  courts inundated with auto accident cases 3. 1971 : comité Gauvin : recommend no-fault regime  adopté  1978 : entrée en vigeuer NB: Saskatchewan has also adopted a no-fault regime Automobile Insurance Act Types of Injury : Bodily (strict), Property (droit commun)  bodily injury : STRICT (a. 5) : any physical or mental injury, including death, suffered by a victim in an accident, and any damage to the clothing worn by a victim (a. 2)  liberal interpretation:  includes damage to the economic person (ie, singer whose throat injured indemnified for injury to her business, Avis Canada c Condoroussis)  NOT recover moral & punitive damages under s. 49 Qc Charter (Béliveau-StJacques)  material injury : DROIT COMMUN (a. 108): owner of any auto operating in Qc must have a liability insurance K guaranteeing compensation for proeprty damage caused by such automobile (a. 84) Definition: Accident  accident : any event in which damage is caused by an automobile (a. 1) o car does not need to be in mov‟mt (carbon monoxide case)  automobile: any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular force and adapted for transportation on public highways but not on rails (a. 1) o excluded: farm tractors, trailers, snowmobiles  damage caused by an automobile: any damage caused by an automobile, (a. 1) o by the use thereof or by the load carried in or on an automobile, incl damage caused by a trailer, o BUT excluding damage caused by the i) autonomous act of an animal that is part of the load and ii) injury/damage caused to a person/property by reason of an action performed by that person in connection w/ the maintenance, repair, alteration or improvement of an automobile  liberal interpretation (Rousseau-Houle article) o not apply legal concept of causation (Périard c Ville de Sept-Îles) o plane + car, still a car accident (Les Productions Pram c Lemay) o carbon monoxide fumes from the garage (Cie d’assurance Victoria du Canada c Neveu) o getting in & out of the car

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o

suffer injury later

Applicability APPLIES:  regardless of fault: SAAQ compensates regardless of who is at fault (a. 5)  all victims covered: every person who suffers bodily injury in an accident (caused by an automobile, a. 1) is a victim (a. 5) o if Qcois travelling in US, with american passenger, then american passenger covered (a. 7) o Qc non-resident victims of accidents covered, but only to the extent that not responsible for the accident, unless otherwise agreed b/t authorities of person‟s place of residence & SAAQ (a. 9) NOT apply:  to secondary victims suffering emotional shock (Rousseau-Houle)  when auto not in motion on a public highway, by, or by the use of, a device that can be operated independently, as defined by the regulation, and that is incorporated w/ the auto (a. 10(1))  when accident caused by farm tractor, farm trailer, specialized vehicle or drawn machinery, off a public highway (a. 10(2))  when injury caused by snowmobile, or vehicle intended for use off a public highway (a. 10(3))  when accident result of auto contest, show, race (a. 10(4)) Compensation  bodily injury: effected by SAAQ, funded by creators of the risk (a. 4) o compensation includes: care (a. 79), rehabilitation (a. 83.7)  non-pecuniary injury : loss of enjoyment of life, pain, mental suffering and other post-accident consequences, to the extent allowed by regulation, victim may receive lump sum indemnity not exceeding $175K (a. 73)  NO moral/punitive damages (Béliveau-St-Jacques) o where injurer criminally liable, canNOT have him pay an indemnity to the victim, b/c this essentially creates TWO CATEGORIES of victims: i) those under the normal Auto Insur. Act regime, and; ii) those who may recover additional money by virtue of injurer having committed a criminal infraction (R v Sigouin)  material injury: direct compensation agreement est. by Groupement representing authorized insurers (a. 173) o insurance compensates directly for property damage sustained (a. 173(1)) o compulsory for every authorized insurer to comply (a. 174) o reduces insurers administrative costs, facilitates victim‟s recovery Civil Liability Bodily Injury  NO civil liability : compensation under this title stands in lieu of all rights and remedies by reason of bodily injury & no action in that respect shall be admitted before any court of justice (a. 83.57) o not possible to sue the person causing the accident o criticism: what about the highly inebriated person? no punishment for their “immoral” behavior? Material Injury  droit commun: victim of property damage caused by an auto is compensated in accordance w/ ordinary rules of law to extent that sections 108 to 114 not derogate therefrom (a. 115) o rebuttable presumption of owner’s liability: automobile owner is liable for the property damage caused by such automobile, rebuttable if a) victim/3d person‟s fault,

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o o

fortuitous event; b) owner lost possession by theft; c) auto in possession of garagist (a. 108) driver solidarily liable with owner, rebuttable if prove victim/3d person‟s fault, superior force other than that resulting from his state of health or the passenger‟s fault (a. 109) person under whose name registered solidarily liable with owner, unless prove registration effected by fraud & w/o knowledge) (a. 110)

Administrative Bodies  SAAQ : Société d‟assurance d‟automobile de Québec  Bureau de Révision  TAQ  pas d‟appel, seulement la révision judiciaire Commentaires  l’objectif du régime : obtenir une indemnisation  still have a criminal action  protéger les victimes T. Rousseau-Houle, « Le régime québecois d‟assurance-automobile, vingt ans après » (1998)  « La personne avant toute chose. »  indemnisation des victimes en matière de dommages corporels, fondé sur les principes d‟assurance et de responsabilité collective sans égard à la faute et axé sur une forme de liquidation définitive des recours, fait l‟envie de nombreux pays en raison de la protection généreuse et universeels qu‟il accorde à toutes les victimes de la route, et ce, sans exception  loi de 1961 : le propriétaire d‟une automobile est responsable de tout dommage causé par cette automobile ou son usage »  comité Gauvin (1971) : not incl fault S.D. Sugarman, ”Québec‟s Comprehensive Auto No-Fault Scheme and the Failure of any of the United States to Follow” (1998) Factors standing in the way of US reform:  state politics (power of lawyers who represent victims, position of the insurers, structure of state gov‟t)  public perceptions (negative attitudes towards gov‟t, insurance industry, and prospects of saving money on auto insurance premiums)  traditions (ideological strength of individualism & ideological weakness of collective responsibility)  trade-offs (doing away with the tort system means giving up more in the US than elsewhere)  policy concerns (fears about safety, costs, and the “slippery slope.” D. Gardner, “Comparer l‟incomparable: les indemnité pour préjudice corporel en droit commun et dans la Loi sur l’assurance automobile,” (1998)  undeniable advantages : timely processing, administrative costs  does a better job of indemnifying seriously injured victims than droit commun “Deux Millions de Chauffeurs à risque?” Le Devoir (2003)  if abolish no-fault for road criminals, Transport Minister believes no hike in insurance premiums, but Insurance Bureau of Canada believes this would cause a hike in insurance premiums  Liberal Party proposes: all persons held criminally responsible for an accident would lose his right to an indemnity under the SAAQ. SAAQ could sue the criminal for the indemnity it pays to

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 48

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the victim, and the victim could sue the criminal for an indemnity beyond that provided by the SAAQ. Insurance Bureau‟s response: 44% respondents to survey admit that may at times drive with high blood alcohol level. Thus, if exclude criminals across the board from the no-fault regime, would be excluding 1.9 million of the 4.4 million drivers.

Controverse. Le Principe du no fault. (2003) M. Sauvé.  criticism : secondary victims should be able to recover, civil immunity for criminals is hard to justify.  lifting civil immunity for criminals would have a deterrent effect  secondary victims & victims of road criminals bear a cost not reflected in the SAAQ, the cost of not being able to pursue the author of the accident MC Prémont & W. Foster  insurance rates for bodily injury are some of the lowest anywhere. for the 15% for whom the income replacement indemnity cap of $55k is too low, they can obtain supplementary insurance.  if not indemnify reckless drivers, then costs would be shifted either to social security, or to obliging ppl to take out more insurance  most effective measures: heightened police presence + heavy penalties (lose driver‟s license, hefty fine)  reckless driver putting lives of others at stake + his own life.  if abolish no-fault, only lawyers would benefit b/c entails re-judiciarization of process of indemnification

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 49

14. Charter Issues: where « droit commun » and strict liability meet Qc Charter, s. 49: Any unlawful interference with any right or freedom recognized by this Charter entitles the victim to obtain the cessation of such interference and compensation for the moral or material prejudice resulting therefrom. In case of unlawful and intentional interference, the tribunal may, in addition, condemn the person guilty of it to exemplary damages. Qc Charter, s. 52: No provision of any Act, even subsequent to the Charter, may derogate from sections 1 to 38, except so far as provided by those sections, unless such Act expressly states that it applies despite the Charter. Beliveau St-Jacques c Fed. [cvl] [civil immunity bars action for exemplary damages] Béliveau St-Jacques c Fédération des employées et employés de services publics [1996] 2 R.C.S. 345 (Qc) Faits  victim of sexual harrassment at hands of her boss since 1986. CSST denied her claim for employment injury, but board of appeal granted.  while appeal from CSST decision underway, victim made claim in Superior Court for compensatory damages of $175K, and exemplary damages of $25K under Qc Charter. after board of appeal decision, withdrew claim for compensatory damages. but STILL retain the request for punitive damages  civil immunity in Act respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases AIAOD (s. 438) Questions en  Does AIAOD‟s civil immunity clause preclude awarding of exemplary litige damages under s. 49 of Qc Charter? Dispositif  Yes. Analyse Gonthier J.  protect employers‟ civil immunity  s. 49 remedy has NO autonomy distinct from civil liability  s. 49(1) and 1053 CCLC based on same principle of fault-based liability  violation of Charter right = civil fault  punishment reserved to penal law, but legislature authorized courts to award exemplary damages in certain circumstances, including s. 49(2). still an exceptional remedy (CCQ 1621)  s. 49(2) is a civil liability remedy, requiring proof of wrongful conduct, and AIAOD based on principle of no-fault liability. if allow victim of employment injury to obtain additional damages under s. 49, then scope of AIAOD would be changed. L‟Heureux-Dubé J. (dissent in part)  overlap b/t Charter & AIAOD limited to elements of liability & the compensatory remedy, and does NOT extend to the exemplary remedy in s. 49(2)  exemplary damages serve purpose of punishment, and are an exceptional remedy in Qc (CCQ 1621)  exemplary damages as an AUTONOMOUS remedy distinct from compensation

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 50

Semantics  s. 438 AIAOD bars “civil liability action,” and not simply “liability” actions. civil liability actions are for compensation, and thus more limited than a “liability” action, where have compensation + punitive/disciplinary/deterrent remedies.  immunity clause not mention exemplary damages, it does not explicitly derogate, as required by s. 52 of Charter, from possibility of ordering the payment thereof  compare s. 83.57 Auto Insur Act: compensation under this title stands in lieu of all rights and remedies by reason of bodily injury and no action in that respect Qc Charter  quasi-const‟l statute of public order, must be given large & liberal interpretation to achieve general underlying purposes (esp. s. 53: if doubt, then resolve in keeping w/ Charter‟s intent)  fundamental rights guaranteed in ss. 1 to 38 of the Charter (which may not be derogated from except by an express statutory provision) would be meaningless if s. 49 remedies not have the same precedence. Ratio Comments
  

issue not limited to the Qc Charter

chevauchement: overlapping punitive damages with worker‟s comp Arguments in favor of chevauchement Qc Charter art. 49 (but only arts 1-38 are binding, per art. 62?) compensation under worker‟s comp does not address her moral prejudice dissuasion L‟Heureux-Dubé J. Charter did not introduce new rights & obligations Arguments against chevauchement public policy: historical compromise, would open the floodgates to if sue under Qc Charter, would need to est. fault, which goes counter to the criminal action, with clear preventive purpose, such as infraction of sexual harrassment, assault, aggression? Compare:  Alberta case of man hit by streetcar, covered by worker‟s comp, made s. 15 Charter claim that should be allowed to make cml claim. SCC rejected.  in a situation where the victim has fewer rights than M et Mme tout le monde  how do the rights in the Charter relate to the rights under special regimes (ie, worker‟s comp, auto insurance)?
 

have been small changes in the worker‟s comp regime (look at definition of “imprévu et soudain”) if follow L‟Heureux-Dubé, would result in duplicative insurance  how effective is this solution? goes to the root of the historical compromise.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 51

15. Other Sources of ECO (1458) CCQ 1457 : Every person has a duty to abide by the rules of conduct which lie upon him, according to the circumstances, usage or law, so as not to cause injury to another. Where he is endowed with reason and fails in this duty, he is responsible for any injury he causes to another person by such fault and is liable to reparation for the injury, whether it be bodily, moral or material in nature. CCQ 1458 : Every person has a duty to honour his contractual undertakings. Where he fails in this duty, he is liable for any bodily, moral or material injury he causes to the other contracting party and is liable to reparation for the injury; neither he nor the other party may in such a case avoid the rules governing contractual liability by opting for rules that would be more favourable to them.
     

principle of 1458 did NOT exist under the CCLC if there is a K, then must sue under K do the présomptions légales foreseen in 1459 and onwards apply to regime of Kual liability? two categories of jurists: some believe in broad interpretation of legal presumptions, and some believe the legal presumptions do NOT apply in Kual action MCP: legal presumptions have always applied to Ks, think of Doucet and other workplace injury cases where legal presumptions applied in situation of work K. the more favorable regime (Kual or extra-Kual) varies from case to case

Why talk about Obligations ? Obligations Extra-Contractuelle  on a fait la resp civile Obligations Contractuelles  on fait les contrats
  



historically, legal doctrine grant special priority to Ks ( ?) liberal philosophy looking at obligations  “obligations” historically part of cvl structure & history, but NOT historically part of cml. in cml, think in terms of torts, Ks, etc obligations became important b/c o globalization (MNCs draft Ks b/t cvl & cml countries) o Europe w/ mov‟mt towards normalization of obligations o in transsystemic system, common term looking at renewal of term “obligations” in CCQ o indicates that term applied (and is thus relevant) in past, present & future

Livre: Les Obligations, Tancelin  Contract (rencontre de volontés) et Quasi-Contrat (pas de rencontre de volontés) : un acte légitime qui entraine la naissance d‟une obligation K-uelle  Tort (intentionnel, volontaire) et Quasi-délit (accident, négligence involontaire) : un acte illégitime qui entraine la naissance d‟une obligation extra-Kuelle  Quasi-K : o ex: neighbor who has the window fixed on your house while you‟re away, and asks for you to pay the bill  Three Types of Quasi-Ks: o management of the business of another (CCQ 1482-1490) (ex: mandat as alternative remedy. if have agent, then cannot invoke remedy under gestion d‟affaires) o reception of a thing not due (CCQ 1491) (ex: window fixing) o unjustified enrichment (CCQ 1493-1496)

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 52

Cie immobilière Viger c Giguère [cvl] [unjustified enrichment in qc cvl] [1977] 2 RCS 67 (Qc) Faits  municipality of Plessisville wanted Cooperative Granby to locate a dairy processing plant in their territory.  Viger = subsidiary of Cooperative Granby  Plessisville to sell (levelled) land to Viger, and Plessisville award levelling contract to Giguère. Plessisville assumed obligation to sell lots to Granby completely levelled and improved according to Viger‟s requirements at the sole expense of Plessisville  agreements signed by Plessisville were null b/c contravened Municipal Aid Prohibition Act and were not approved by Municipal Commission. also, some of the lots sold to Viger were located outside the town limits.  Plessisville paid $75,000 to Giguère. Giguère bring claim to recover remaining expenses of $86, 313  cost of work: $147, 547. cost of work + profit: $161,313 Ct of Appeal  set aside financing costs & awarded Giguère cost of work it had carried out, not including profit  Viger could not be given benefit of FG w/o Giguère receiving it also Questions en  i) Theory of unjust enrichment in Qc cvl law? litige  ii) If so, Viger unjustly enriched at Giguère‟s expense? Dispositif  i) Yes.  ii) Yes. Analyse Beetz J. Unjustified Enrichment in Qc Law ? Yes.  yes, UJE undeniably incorporated in cvl  in qc, before and after promulgation of CcLC, case law implicitly but effectively applied UJE  legislative support in CCLC 1041 & 1042, or 1057 & 2613 Conditions under which UJE applies  an enrichment: here, Viger enriched b/c not pay for levelling. but only enriched if he owns the lot, which is unclear if agmt null. but no one contest titles.  an impoverishment: here, reduction of Giguère‟s patrimony  a correlation b/t enrichment and impoverishment: here, same work, carried out by Giguère that caused enrichment & impoverishment  **absence of justification** (most complex): burden on the enriched party to show legal justification. if enrichment consequence of K, then usu justified. o here, o i) Ks do not have the cost of the improvements as their object, and o ii) Ks are not the real cause of Viger‟s enrichment and Giguère‟s impoverishment o THUS, the Ks do NOT constitute justification. o INTENTION of the parties: Viger and Plessisville‟s intended to SEPARATE the aid (levelling of the lots w/o cost to the benefit of Viger) in agreements b/t V&P from Viger‟s

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 53

Ratio Comments

Ks of acquisition absence of evasion of the law  absence of any other remedy  when meet all conditions, remedy maintained for lesser of the two amounts (the enrichment, or the impoverishment) Validity of Ks  K b/t Giguère and Plessisville: NOT intrinsically null, b/c municipalities can have municipal works carried out by contractors  K b/t Viger and Plessisville: inherently NULL b/c law states that municipal subsidies are contrary to public policy (subsidy = aid of levelling of land). neither Municipal Commission nor Minister of Municipal Affairs could give their approval to the Ks for aid.  Giguère had nothing to do w/ Ks b/t Viger and Plessisville. BUT, Viger‟s enrichment and Giguère‟s impoverishment both rooted in agreements made b/t Viger and Plessisville. this is UNLAWFUL with respect to Viger.  illegal for Viger to be enriched at expense of ratepayers of Plessisville, even w/ Plessisville‟s consent. Viger enriched nevertheless, despite illegality, at Giguère‟s expense. unjust and unlawful that a 3d party should bear cost of an illegality of which it is innocent. Unjustified enrichment incorporated in cvl despite the lack of codal provision in CCLC  under CCLC, no rules re : unjustified enrichment  social context: municipalities competing for industries to est. w/in their borders  Qc invoke laws preventing municipalities from giving subsidies to induce industries to move there  compare reasoning of inclusion of cml concepts in Lapierre  Houle ?  quasi-K


CCQ 1493: A person who is enriched at the expense of another shall, to the extent of his enrichment, indemnify the other for his correlative impoverishment, if there is no justification for the enrichment or the impoverishment. CCQ 1494: Enrichment or impoverishment is justified where it results from the performance of an obligation, from the failure of the person impoverished to exercise a right of which he may avail himself or could have availed himself against the person enriched, or from an act performed by the person impoverished for his personal and exclusive interest or at his own risk and peril, or with a constant liberal intention. CCQ 1495: An indemnity is due only if the enrichment continues to exist on the day of the demand. Both the value of the enrichment and that of the impoverishment are assessed on the day of the demand; however, where the circumstances indicate the bad faith of the person enriched, the enrichment may be assessed at the time the person was enriched. CCQ 1496: Where the person enriched disposes of his enrichment gratuitously, with no

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 54

intention of defrauding the person impoverished, the action of the person impoverished may be taken against the third person beneficiary if the latter could have known of the impoverishment.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 55

Obligations extra-contractuelles/torts Professeure Marie-Claude Prémont Faculté de droit, Université McGill 1999-2000 Examen du 28 avril 2000

N.B.

La première question comporte un choix. Ne répondez qu‟à une seule des deux questions IA et IB. Le nombre de minutes est indiqué à simple titre de guide afin de pour permettre de mieux planifier votre temps et n‟a aucune valeur normative.

QUESTION I (Question au choix) Répondez à la question IA ou IB

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 56

April 2000 Exam CCLC-CCQ Question I-A (25 points; 45 minutes) En 1993, le ministre de la Justice du Québec, M. Gil Rémillard, écrivait en introduction aux Commentaires du ministre de la justice quant au Code civil du Québec qui allait entrer en vigueur en 1994 : «( les mutations profondes qu‟a connues la société québécoise depuis l‟adoption, en 1866 du Code civil assure une meilleure adéquation au présent, puisqu‟elle opère une modernisation des règles du droit civil » Cette affirmation est-elle, selon vous, vérifiable en matière de responsabilité civile? Dans ses grands principes, les règles de la responsabilité civile sous le nouveau Code sont-elles différentes des règles soutenues sous l‟ancien Code? Si votre réponse est positive, dites en quoi les nouvelles règles sont mieux adaptées au présent? Si votre réponse est négative, appuyez aussi votre propos. Rémillard says : society has changed since adoption of CCLC in 1866 to today at the turn of the 20th c. Reform of the CCLC as codified in the CCQ more adequately addresses the present since it modernizes the rules of civil law. REFONTE : codifying what judges did. (melt down again) Civil Liability: Is this true? Examine the major principles.




DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE NEW CODE & THE OLD CODE? CCLC: o 1053: “discerner le bien du mal” « dommage » legal presumptions especially relevant for risk theory: o 1054, al. 1 : liability for the act of a thing.  Fitzpatrick CJC in Doucet: uses this as the crucible of liability for the act of a thing.  interpreted by Vandry (1920), Mtl v Watt & Scott (1922) as legal presumption of liability, rebuttable by proof of inability to prevent the damage by reasonable means  trend ends w/ Rubis (1982) & Lacombe (1928): no theory of risk in Qc. if had theory of risk, then would NOT need to prove the autonomous act of the thg. Rubis reads in must have “autonomous act” of a thg under 1054, al. 1, thus implying that must not have fault. o 1054, al 7: liability for agents & servants, not rebuttable AT ALL b/c comes after 1054, al. 6. o 1054, al. 2: parental authority, only rebuttable by al. 6 (force majeure) o DISAPPEARED:  1057 “obligations naissent, en certains cas, de l‟opération seule et directe de la loi”  1056 : Laurent declares this provision a mistake. true determination of victim is direct link with the prejudice. error of importing cml concept into cvl. CCQ: o 1457: endowed with reason, act or fault for liability of another or act of thgs in his custody.  most significant changes re: ACT OF A THING, where codify decisions of Rubis, Lacombe in 1465, weakening victim‟s ability to recover by increasing their burden of proof.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 57



 

1457: liability for the act of a thing. 1463: liability for employer-employee, only rebuttable by force majeure (1470). clarification that employer retains his right of action against employee (1463) o 1459: parental authority, NOW rebuttable by proper supervision, education, and custody. o 1465: def may exonerate if not at fault (Fitzpatrick & Sumner ignored), and codifies Lacombe & Rubis qualification of “autonomous act” of the thg. o TOTALLY NEW:  1458: must sue under K when have a K.  1464, civil liability of the State, intiated after Prudhomme c Prudhomme.  976: neighborly annoyances. DESCRIBE TRANSFORMATION OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS: o from individual who could pinpoint the doer of the wrong, to the victim of an anonymous accident. DO THE DIFFERENCES IN THE CODE ADDRESS THIS TRANSFORMATION OF VICTIMS? LEGISLATION better addresses the changed status of victims, and NOT the Code per se:  vaccination legislation (post-Lapierre v Qc)  auto insurance act  worker‟s comp  EXCEPTION: provisions for manufacturer‟s liability 1468, 1469, 1473)  EXCEPTION: assumption of the risk does not bar recovery though imprudent in the circumstances

o o

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 58

SAAQ Question I-B (Ne pas répondre à cette question si vous avez déjà répondu à I-A) (25 points; 45 minutes) Dans le débat actuel concernant le régime d‟assurance automobile au Québec, certaines personnes soutiennent que pour une plus grande équité et une meilleure gestion des fonds publics, la SAAQ (Société d‟assurance automobile du Québec) devrait pouvoir poursuivre les criminels de la route afin qu‟ils remboursent à la SAAQ les indemnités que la Société doit payer à leurs victimes innocentes? Le ministre responsable de la Loi vous demande votre avis : i. Informez le ministre d‟un impact positif qu‟une telle mesure est susceptible d‟entraîner pour l‟ensemble des détenteurs de permis de conduire et des propriétaires d‟automobile. Si vous êtes d‟avis qu‟il n‟y a pas d‟effet positif, expliquez pourquoi;

driver‟s license holders and auto owners are the FUNDERS of the SAAQ (includes careful + reckless drivers) positive impact of victim‟s right of action against reckless drivers for the indemnities the SAAQ pays to their victims. greater justice? possibly, but other more effective mechanisms:  other more effective mechanisms to achieve greater justice: police enforcement, penalties such as taking away driver‟s license, and imposing heavy fine.  corrective justice?  Béliveau St-Jacques: L‟Heureux-Dubé‟s dissent re: AIAOD can apply to AIA as well. distinction between remedy for compensation, and remedy for punishment. Gonthier argues that s. 49 based on fault, whereas AIAOD based on no-fault. Gonthier‟s argument applies to AIA as well: based on no-fault, so would ruin the compromise of compensating for bodily injury by allowing right of action against reckless drivers.  IMPORTANT: reckless drivers also contributed to the SAAQ. better $$ mgmt?  if SAAQ receives money back from the reckless drivers, then could in theory lower contributions of other driver‟s license holders. ii. Informez le ministre d‟un impact négatif qu‟une telle mesure pourrait entraîner pour l‟ensemble des détenteurs de permis de conduire et des propriétaires d‟automobile. Si vous êtes d‟avis qu‟il n‟y a pas d‟effet négatif, expliquez pourquoi;

negative impact of greater justice? no.  most reckless drivers insolvent, not achieve greater justice if ppl not compensated for their bodily injury  reckless drivers also contributed to the SAAQ  rejudiciarization of the process. better $$ mgmt? no.  not achieve better mgmt of funds: too many ppl at risk of being declared reckless drivers (44%), would abolish the social compromise. delays in receiving compensation.  would result in higher premiums  ppl might have to take out more insurance  costs would simply be shifted elsewhere (social security, add‟l insurance) that could affect ALL drivers

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 59

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 60

Mis-feasance/Non-feasance QUESTION II (10 points; 20 minutes) Que nous indique philosophiquement la difficulté particulière qu‟entretient le droit de la responsabilité civile de common law concernant le secours de la personne en danger? Peut-on faire les mêmes observations en droit civil québécois depuis le nouveau Code civil?
 

non-feasance (omission): failure to take steps to protect others from harm mis-feasance (act): negligent conduct; doing something wrong.

cml
     

acts & omissions treated differently: did the person have a duty of care to act? cml only have affirmative duty where special relationship (ie, is there a duty of care, philosophies of individualism & laissez-faire, cannot force ppl to be charitable duty of care limits scope of civil liability in cml (Donoghue) Horsley, Crocker special relationships: cie-passenger (Palsgraf),

cvl
 

 



acts & omissions treated same (judged by RP) CCQ 1457: owe duty of care to all persons, you owe a duty to do no wrong to all ppl. subject to reasonability. does NOT mean that you owe an affirmative duty to come the assistance of any other person. possible affirmative duty in the standard of the reasonable person, where may have a heightened standard of care seeing the severity of the consequences (Roy c École d’Escalade) Qc Charter, art. 2: Every human being whose life is in peril has a right to assistance. Every person must come to the aid of anyone whose life is in peril, either personally or calling for aid, by giving him the necessary and immediate physical assistance, unless it involves danger to himself or a third person, or he has another valid reason. CCQ 1471: Where a person comes to the assistance of another person or, for an unselfish motive, disposes, free of charge, of property for the benefit of another person, he is exempt from all liability for injury that may result from it, unless the injury is due to his intentional or gross fault.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 61

Fault QUESTION III (25 points; 45 minutes) Dans l‟affaire Montreal Rolling Mills Co. c. Corcoran recueil de texte), le juge Girouard écrit : « Volumes have been written upon the interpretation and application of this simple principle of justice, recognized by the laws of every civilized nation » Répondez aux trois sous-questions suivantes : i. De quel principe de justice parle le juge Girouard?

FAULT. ii.
 

Puisqu‟il dit que ce principe est respecté par « every civilized nation »; comment se formule ce principe en common law? Fault established by violation of a particular expected conduct (ie, reasonable person, or statutory norm) of person endowed with reason. Reasonable Person as objective standard, including foreseeability of injury: “prudent & diligent person, endowed w/ reason and ordinary judgment, could the circumstances causing injury have been avoided?” (Vaughan v Menlove) mitigation of objective standard in certain contexts (ie, child, expert/prof, dangerous activity, statute, custom) Horwitz: shift from nuisance‟s strict liability to negligence‟s fault-based liability. during industrial revolution, exoneration for those previously held liable. (importance of protecting right of enjoyment of PROPERTY, abus de droit?) Holmes: “prejudice must lie where it falls.” wants to see shift towards negligence + standard of reasonable person. Etes-vous d‟accord avec le juge Girouard que justice était faite à son époque, dans les „civilized nations‟ à l‟aide de ce principe? Expliquez. No, justice not done because: cml  Horwitz: workers subsidizing industrialization.  defense of assumption of the risks:  judges themselves crying out for justice: Learned Hand, Andrews.  where cannot establish fault, then victims of anonymous accident bear the burden. cvl  Josserand & Saleilles‟ professional risk.

 



iii.

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Risk QUESTION IV (20 points; 35 minutes) La notion de risque a-t-elle une place en common law? Donnez deux exemples à la lumière d‟arrêts vus en classe. Ces deux utilisations du concept du risque sont-elles analogues ou fondamentalement distinctes de l‟utilisation qu‟en faisait le juge Fitzpatrick dans l‟affaire Doucet c. Shawinigan Carbide 281 (p.510, Vol II de votre recueil)? Expliquez. Vous devez caractériser la notion de risque, telle que soutenue par le J. Fitzpatrick et la comparer aux deux utilisations de common law que vous avez rapportées, qui doivent aussi être caractérisées.




TWO EXAMPLES of concept of “risk” in cml o employer-employee : respondeat superior. employer assumes risks of employee‟s faults, and the inherent risk or risks characteristic of its activities (see Bazley v Curry, Ira Bushey) o Rylands v Fletcher (and/or neighborly nuisance, Appleby v Erie Tobacco) o defense of assumption of the risk (Woodley v Met, Birch v Thomas): creator does NOT assume the risk/burden, and that falls to the employee.  could incl (now defunct) theory of common employment, where employees assume the risk of the fault of the fellow-servant. COMPARE TO FITZPATRICK: o Fitzpatrick J. finds risk theory in 1054(1) strict liability for ”les choses qu‟elle a sous sa garde.” guardian of a thg, used it for profit, benefits from advantages of the thg. o adopts the Fr doctrine of, for example, Saleilles. rebuttable under 1054, al. 6. o same as Bazley v Curry, o in property: distinct from absolute strict liability in Rylands v Fletcher (not rebuttable) o defense of assumption of the risk as mirror image of Fitzpatrick‟s risk theory.

Obligations Extra-K (Prémont) 63

Work Accident QUESTION V (20 points; 35 minutes) Maryse St-Arnaud travaille comme enseignante auprès d‟enfants handicapés à Trois-Rivières. Elle est responsable d‟une classe de 3e année qui comprend 13 enfants qui pour des raisons diverses sont en chaise roulante. Elle arrive normalement en classe dès 8h du matin et quitte à 16h. Au cours de la journée, elle est constamment appelée à soulever les enfants pour les aider à se déplacer, à s‟habiller, etc. Elle a remarqué depuis quelques jours que le petit François, âgé de 10 ans est particulièrement triste. Le 28 avril 2000, elle décide d‟appeler le père du petit François à l‟heure du midi, et lui demande de passer prendre son fils non pas à l‟heure normale de 15h45, mais après ses heures de travail, soit à 17h30, afin de lui donner le temps de parler avec le petit François et à le consoler. Elle n‟avise pas la directrice de l‟école qu‟elle restera plus tard cette journée. Vient la fin des classes et tous les enfants quittent, sauf le petit François, que Maryse amène dans la salle de séjour des enseignants afin d‟y être plus confortable. Maryse veut installer le petit François dans un fauteuil rembourré afin de le libérer de sa chaise roulante et créer ainsi une atmosphère plus conviviale à la discussion. Au moment où elle prend François dans ses bras pour le transférer de sa chaise roulante au fauteuil, elle se blesse au dos. Ce sera finalement le petit François qui devra consoler et réconforter Maryse jusqu‟à l‟arrivée du père qui s‟empresse de la conduire à l‟urgence. Le médecin de garde diagnostique un étirement majeur et lui prescrit 4 semaines de repos au lit. Il ne fait aucun doute que Maryse ne puisse travailler au cours des 3 prochaines semaines. a. De qui Maryse pourra-t-elle exiger réparation de son préjudice?

in Qc. may apply to the CSST (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail). b. c. En vertu de quelles règles de droit? Quels sont les éléments de preuve que devra présenter Maryse? Under the CCQ‟s Related Statute of Act respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases. Start with article 28 : must show i) injury, ii) at the workplace, iii) while the worker is at work. Or, article 2, definition of industrial accident: i) sudden & unforeseen event, ii) attributable to any cause, iii) arising out of or in the course of his work, iv) and resulting in an employment injury to him. THEN, as a consequence: employment injury: i) injury/disease, ii) arising out of or in the course of an industrial accident or an occupational disease, iii) including a recurrence, relapse or aggravation. d. o Discutez de ses chances de succès. s. 28 : would have most trouble meeting element of ”while the worker is at work,” BUT:  in Chaput: bus driver waiting for his route was deemed to be at work.  thus, Maryse waiting for the father to pick up the child, child was still in her care as a teacher with the father‟s consent.  rebuttability of the presumption? under the definition of industrial accident, she would most encounter the most difficulty proving “arising out of or in the course of his work” (here, we have two things: lifting/picking up children, consoling child as a teacher after-hours) counter-args: no longer on the clock, did not tell Director

o o

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