Israel-Lebanon Conflict: Where are Hezbollah’s missiles coming from? By Michael Richardson For the Straits Times, Saturday 29 July, 2006. When a radar-guided cruise missile slammed into a naval gunboat helping to enforce Israel’s blockade of Lebanon earlier this month (14 July), it was a shock. Neither Israel nor its main ally, the United States, knew that Hezbollah fighters had such a sophisticated weapon in their arsenal. As a result, the Israeli vessel did not have its missile-defence system on. Even if it had, the system would probably not have stopped the sea-skimming cruise missile, traveling at just below the speed of sound, from hitting the ship, causing severe damage and killing several sailors. Hezbollah leaders warned this week that they have more surprises in store for Israel unless it agrees to a negotiated ceasefire and exchange of prisoners. With the armed wing of the Shiite group threatening to strike ever deeper into Israel with rockets and missiles, how did the C-802 anti-ship cruise missile - rated by experts as among the most lethal in the world - get into Hezbollah’s hands? The supply trail runs from China to Iran and then into Lebanon, either by sea or over land via Syria. Iran and Syria are Hezbollah’s allies of convenience against Israel and the US. China has used Israel as a military supplier in the past but has political and energy interests in Iran and Syria that now conflict with those of Israel. The tale of the C-802 is a classic story about the dog-eat-dog nature of the global arms trade and the destabilizing impact of weapons that are not effectively controlled by national regulation or international treaties and agreements. Both China and Iran watched with concern in the 1991 Gulf War as the US brought its superior technology to bear and unleashed long-range, land-attack cruise missiles with devastating effect against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Beijing and Teheran decided that they must develop similar missiles that can hit targets from afar with great accuracy and are difficult to counter because they are relatively small and can fly low, even weaving in between mountain ranges to minimize detection.
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Iran started by importing C-802 cruise missiles from China. It expected to buy 150 but had only received about half when Beijing suspended the deal in 1996 after strong objections from the US. Still, Iran was able to equip some of its warships and combat aircraft with the cruise missiles, along with launch sites on its islands and coastline overlooking the Strait of Hormuz that carries vital Gulf oil supplies to Asia and other parts of the world. Ironically, should Teheran carry out its threat to shut the strait if it is attacked by the US or Israel for allegedly trying to develop nuclear weapons, Beijing may find that some of the tankers that bring oil to China may be hit by derivatives of the C-802 anti-ship missiles it exported to Iran. Many of these tankers are not owned by Chinese companies and do not fly the Chinese flag. Since taking delivery of the C-802s, Iran has reportedly received help from China and North Korea to extend their range and improve their accuracy. Teheran clearly feels it now has enough of the cruise missiles to send some to Hezbollah and provide the training needed to operate them successfully. The original C-802s carried a 165 kilogram conventional explosive warhead and had a range of 120 kilometres. Their export was (and still is) legal. No international agreement bans transfers of anti-ship missiles. The C-802 is not covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime, a voluntary accord that includes Russia, the US and most advanced missile manufacturers but not Iran or North Korea. China is not an MTCR member but claims to adhere to its guidelines. These are intended to restrict exports of ballistic and cruise missiles that can carry 500 kilogram conventional warheads at least 300 kilometres or deliver any type of weapon of mass destruction. There are, of course, many players in the missile trade, either for money or political influence or both. Not long after China halted C-802 shipments to Iran under US pressure, Britain and France were criticized by fellow MTCR members for selling Black Shaheen cruise missiles, which have a maximum capable range of 500 kilometres, to the United Arab Emirates. Like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and some other Sunni Arab states, the UAE fears the rising power and influence of Shia-dominated Iran. London and Paris argued that the sale was not in violation of the MTCR because the missiles’ range was below 300 kilometres when flying at normal operating altitude close to sea level. This kind of skating on thin missile ice by some players is hardly likely to induce restraint in others. However, far more serious for global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them was the disclosure early last year by officials of Ukraine’s recently installed democratic government of the illegal export of 20 Kh55SM cruise missiles, which have a range of about 3,000 kilometres. The Kh-55 family of missiles is Russia’s main nuclear-armed cruise missile launched from the air by strategic bombers.
The missiles exported in 2000 and 2001 were diverted from Soviet stocks left behind after Ukraine declared independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The illicit sale took place despite the fact that Ukraine was an MTCR member. Twelve of the Kh-55SMs reportedly went to Iran, six to China and two to Pakistan. Iran is alleged to have paid nearly $US50 million for its missiles. None of the Kh-55SMs from Ukraine had their 200 kiloton nuclear warheads. But the deal included the system for testing, programming and launching the missiles which had been in service for a number of years. China and Pakistan, both declared nuclear powers, evidently wanted to strip the missiles to copy and incorporate its design, propulsion and guidance components into their own efforts to develop long-range cruise missiles – a process known as reverse engineering. Iran, too, may have similar interests in using some of the Kh-55SMs as a shortcut for developing a derivative long-range cruise missile - one capable of striking Israel, some 1,500 kilometres away. But having a dozen of the missiles could also enable Teheran to fit the weapon to its Soviet built Su-24 strike aircraft or fire it from ships or land-based truck launchers. Unlike China and Pakistan, Iran is not known to have nuclear weapons but is widely suspected of seeking them. The ultimate nightmare for Israel and the US would be a Kh-55SM-type missile, armed with an Iranian nuclear warhead. - The writer is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies. This is a personal comment.