Docstoc

Hashing

Document Sample
Hashing Powered By Docstoc
					Web Security

Sandy Kutin CSPP 532 8/7/01

Web security: an overview
Company wants to build web site
Online purchasing Requests for service or support Viewing data files online

How do we make this process secure?
Confidentiality Authentication

Usual answer: cryptography

TCP/IP in 60 seconds
Computers communicate via packets, not connection Packets are directed from machine to machine Smart nodes, stupid network
Contrasts with phone network Applications TCP IP

Internet Protocol controls this movement Transfer Control Protocol: packets at destination Could insert cryptography at any layer

IPsec
IPsec works at IP level Transparent to applications Slows everything down
Applications TCP IPsec

Some say it’s the future, some say it’s not If every packet is encrypted: negates performance-optimization, firewalls

HaSSLe-free Solution
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Works at TCP level Developed by Netscape “Applications” now includes:
Applications SSL Record TCP IP

Handshake, Alert, Cipher Spec Change

Packets encoded by SSL Record Protocol Implemented in web server, browser Successor: Transport Layer Security (TLS)

LoSSLess Communication
SSL Record Protocol:
1. Fragment data into blocks; can compress 2. Append MAC to each block:
MAC = H(K | pad2 | H(K | pad1 | info | data)) H could be MD5 or SHA-1; similar to HMAC info includes sequencing, length information

3. Encrypt each block (symmetric) 4. Append header, send fragment

BusineSSLike Handshake
How do we establish a session key?
1. Client says “hello”: version, random number 2. Server says “hello”: same, includes key exchange method, optional certificate 3. Client initiates key exchange (may just generate master, send it using RSA) 4. Both sides compute various keys from master, random numbers in hello messages 5. Confirmation messages

HelpleSSLy Hoping
So, does SSL secure our site? Confidential, authenticated transactions are important, but not the only issue Threat model: who might attack, and how
Steal customer data (credit cards) Steal private corporate data Deface web site Denial of Service: prevent us from working

SSL has nothing to do with any of these

Trial Separation
How do we keep corporate data secure? Solution: keep it separate Only mix information when you have to: use a floppy, or a laptop Partial solution: restrict web server’s access privileges (e.g., firewall, DMZ) OK if data flow is mostly to the server What about credit card numbers?

Bob

Alice

Stallings, page 464 (from the web site)

SET, I project
Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) MasterCard, Visa Alice sends Bob order, encrypted card info Bob forward card info to MC/Visa MC/Visa pays Bob Bob never gets card number Credit card company never gets order information

Building a Better MouSETrap
OI = order info (include time), OIMD = H(OI) PI = payment info (& time), PIMD = H(PI) Alice signs (OIMD | PIMD) (SHA-1, RSA) Alice sends Bob OI, ECC(PI), PIMD, sig S Bob compute OIMD, checks signature S Bob sends OIMD, ECC(PI), S to MC/Visa They decrypt, check PI, check signature S They transfer funds, Bob ships item to Alice

Improving our MindSET
Think outside the box
Q: How do we store credit card numbers? A: Store them so we can’t read them

Application-level solutions: harder to implement, but better targeted to problems Cryptography is only part of the solution Any system can be broken Build a threat model, measure costs

Breaking and Entering
Enemy could break in
Could corrupt data (deface web site) Could steal data (including passwords) Could gain control of system

Firewalls help, but there’s always a way in Keep data separate whenever possible Educate users about viruses, Trojan horses Install patches as often as you can

Intruder Alert
Home security: locks stop easy attacks Better: door, window alarms
(as long as they don’t go through the walls)

Even better: motion detectors Alarms don’t stop anything directly, but they alert the authorities Fear of alarms forces criminals to hurry, make mistakes

Law and Order
Deterrent to robbery: fear of prosecution After a crime, police gather fingerprints, DNA, eyewitnesses Not aimed at stopping crime or recovering goods, but at punishing criminals Hard to do in computer crime; criminals often minors or foreign nationals

Intrusion Detection
No matter what systems and protocols we use, people will break in if they want Hard to defend against determined teenagers with nothing else to do Solution: monitor system, detect intrusions, watch for unusual activity Honeypots: trap intruders Gather evidence; maybe prosecute At the very least, close off the holes

Denial of Service Attacks
One approach: break in, crash the server Another: flood the server with bad requests Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS):
Take over PCs around the country/world Use them to overload a site

Only solution: have hardware routers detect bad packets Almost impossible; Windows XP may make it worse

Here’s looking at you, KiDDoS
In the real world: to attack, you have to put yourself at risk. Not on the Internet. In the real world: attackers must learn skills. Not on the Internet. One person discovers a hole, writes a script; now “script kiddies” can use it Patches don’t work. Attackers will always be ahead of users. Beta testing doesn’t uncover security holes

Gibson Research Corporation
Steve Gibson’s GRC.com: security Attacked, repeatedly, by DDoSs. No defense. “Nothing more than the whim of a 13-year old hacker is required to knock any user, site, or server right off the Internet.” Solution: Distributed Responsibility Owners responsible for their machines ISPs responsible for their routers Software writers responsible for bugs

EXPensive Problem
Attackers usually spoof source IP addresses, to conceal their location Easy to do in UNIX (as root) Not possible in Windows 9x/ME, but possible in Windows 2000/XP Microsoft says: we’re fixing a bug Gibson says: there’s no legitimate reason home users would need this feature

Bruce Schneier: Counterpane
Author of “Applied Cryptography” Feels only monitoring, intrusion detection, active response can do any good Counterpane.com: corporate security Solution: Insurance Insure against damages from attacks Lower rates for following good practices

Recommended Reading
Secret-sharing:
Schneier, Sections 3.7, 23.2

SSL, SET: Stallings, Chapter 14 General security:
Stallings, Chapters 15-16 www.grc.com/dos/ www.counterpane.com


				
DOCUMENT INFO
Shared By:
Categories:
Tags:
Stats:
views:24
posted:11/6/2009
language:English
pages:23