Présentation PowerPoint

							Reversible and irreversible ageing
François Héran

I

N

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Santé Protection sociale Expertise internationale

GIP-SPSI

à Prague, Bratislava, Budapest et Varsovie

Ambassade de France

CEFRES Centre français de recherches en sciences sociales Prague, 18th December 2008
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The four factors of population aging

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The 4 factors
1. Population ageing high up the age pyramid (in French: "vieillissement par le haut") 2. Population ageing generated at the bottom of the pyramid ("vieillissement par le bas") 3. Present backlash of temporary rise of fertility (the late impact of the baby boom)

4. Selective emigration of the young cohorts (e.g. Albania)
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The 1st factor of population ageing
Population ageing high up the age pyramid
(in French: "vieillissement par le haut")

Due to increased longevity Nothing to do with fertility The first factor of ageing in importance: a 4th floor added to the age pyramid

= "unavoidable ageing"

no room for any policy against it
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Population ageing high up the pyramid

(additional floor due to longevity)

90-94 80-84 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4
0,5 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,1 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5

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The French case: Age pyramids in 2005 and 2050
(INSEE demographic prospects)
Âge

Hommes

100 95 90 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 200 100 0 0 100 200

Femmes

500

400

300

300

400

500

Effectifs en milliers

Effectifs en milliers

France, 2005

2050, scénario central

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The 2nd factor of population ageing
Population ageing generated at the bottom of the pyramid ("vieillissement par le bas") Secular decline of fertility under replacement level, below 2.05 children per woman due to deep reasons ("2nd demographic transition") :
– generalized participation of women in the LF – raising costs of education – contrast between individual autonomy (esp. women) and rigid family structures…

= "avoidable ageing",

open to pro-active policy (in principle)
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Population ageing at the bottom
90-94 80-84 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4
-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

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The 3rd factor of population ageing
Present impact of temporary rise of fertility: e. g. the backlash of the baby boom – In the first decades large birth cohorts rejuvenate the age pyramid; – in the following decades, they make it older Strong impact but limited in time

"Unavoidable ageing"
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A temporary additional fertility (baby-boom) which first rejuvenates the population…
90-94 80-84 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4
-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000
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…but 40 years later makes it older

90-94 80-84 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4
-3 000 000 -2 000 000 -1 000 000 0 1 000 000 2 000 000 3 000 000

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The last backlash of the baby boom
End of a long period of stability in the number of deaths due to:
– the decline of mortality – the depleted fertility of most countries between the two World wars

The baby boomers will finally reach the end of their lives in the coming decades
– Hence an unprecedented increase in the mortality rates – A strong reduction of the natural increase, including in France (in spite of the 300.000 record registered in 2006)

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Few deaths in France for the time being, but baby-boom cohorts will change it

Female deaths by age in 2004
Deaths of depleted cohorts born during 1st World War

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Number of deaths (thousands)

10

8

6

4

Deaths of baby boom cohorts

2

0

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110
13

Source : Insee register of deaths

Age at death

The raising number of deaths in Europe, 2000-2050 (for 100 deaths in 2000)
UN Prospects, central variant
Italy Germany Sweden
150

France
140

Poland UK

130

120

110

100

90 1995- 2000- 2005- 2010- 2015- 2020- 2025- 2030- 2035- 2040- 20452000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 14

l'Union européenne (à 25) de 1960 à 2050

8

1960-2050

millions

Annual number of births and deaths in the 25 EU

7
naissances

6

5
décès

4

3 1960 1980 2000 2020 année 2040
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As a result: in France too, the natural increase will inexorably decline in the next decades…
(Insee prospects, medium variant)
300 000 250 000 200 000 150 000 100 000 50 000 0 -50 000 -100 000
zone A zone B zone C

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

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Can family policy or immigration policy counter population ageing?
A graphic illustration of the widening gap between the rate of growth of the elderly and that of the population in active age
(United Nations demographic prospects, 2006 revision)

Source: UN demographic prospects (2006) in a selection of countries
The graphs give the growth of three age groups: 65+, 15-64, -15, indexed to 100, over 2000-2050 Basis: the "medium scenario", prolonging the present trends, with a convergence close to 1.8 children per woman in 2050 The "high variant" = an additional fertility of 0.5 child
eventually 2.35 instead of 1.85 (a considerable change)

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An illustration of the divide between "avoidable" and "unavoidable" ageing (2)
The widening gap between the 65+ and the 15-64 (or –15) curves displays the relative population ageing
– countering population ageing would mean closing the gap between the two curves ! (see last scenario of the UN report on "replacement migrations")

The slim difference between "medium" and "high" fertility variants illustrates the capacity of a pronatalist policy to maintain the active population over time
– A limited impact, compared to the impact of increased longevity

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Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 ITALY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

ITALY 65+ ITALY 15-64 High variant 15-64 ITALY 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

20

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 GERMANY 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

GERMANY 65+ GERMANY 15-64 High variant 15-64 GERMANY 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

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Population aged 65+ and population aged 15-64 POLAND 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

POLAND 65+ POLAND 15-64 High variant 15-64 POLAND 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050
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Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 JAPAN 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

JAPAN 65+ JAPAN 15-64 High variant 15-64 JAPAN 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

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Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 FRANCE 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

FRANCE 65+ FRANCE 15-64 High variant 15-64 FRANCE 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

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Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 UK 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

UNITED KINGDOM 65+ UNITED KINGDOM 15-64 High variant 15-64 UNITED KINGDOM 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

25

Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 RUSSIAN FED. 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

RUSSIAN FED. 65+ RUSSIAN FED. 15-64 High variant 15-64 RUSSIAN FED. 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

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Life expectancy of women
85 84 83 82 81 80 79 78 77 76 75 74 73 72 71 70

France Spain Italy Sweden UK USA Russia

19 60 19 65 19 70 19 75 19 80 19 85 19 90 19 95 20 00 20 05

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Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 U S A 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

U S A 65+ U S A 15-64 High variant 15-64 U S A 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

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Population aged 65+, aged 15-64 and aged -15 CHINA 2000-2050 (per 100 persons in 2000)
240 220 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

CHINA 65+ CHINA 15-64 High variant 15-64 CHINA 0-14

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

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Conclusion (1)
Sweden, UK or France: a population policy supporting the fertility rate is able to maintain the active population over the next decades Italy, Germany, Poland, Japan: it will fill but a part of the gap In all EU countries, however, the increased longevity accounts for most of the population ageing process (France is no exception) In spite of its strong fertility, USA will not escape from the ageing process Russia will, to some extent. But this is bad sign: people have no time to grow older. For most Russians, the privilege of an ageing population is out of reach
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Conclusion (2)
Immigration policy cannot counter population aging in Europe; it brings only a slight retrospective correction to the fertility rates of 30 years ago
– however, immigration is essential to maintain the absolute numbers of active population and contribute to the good working of home care and institutional care

Finally, population ageing cannot be compensated for by any population policy
– neither policy immigration – nor family policy

If population ageing is a demographic issue, it does not call for a demographic solution
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Two children per woman in France in 2006: is this due to immigration?
Source: INSEE data, exploited by François Héran and Gilles Pison, "Two children per woman in France in 2006: are immigrants to blame?", Population & societies, 432, March 2007 (downloadable from http://www.ined.fr/en)

ANNEX 1

A large contribution to births may go with a limited impact on fertility
It is often claimed that the French fertility rate is due to foreign population Surprising though it may seem, the foreign population brings a large contribution to births but a limited impact on fertility (see graph)
– 2005: 94 000 babies born to a foreign mother out of 774 000 = 12 % – This raises the national fertility rate by just 0.10 child, from 1.8 (for French women) to 1.9 (for women of all nationalities)

Explanation:

If we take immigrant rather than foreign women, the contribution to births increases, while the contribution to fertility gets smaller
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– Foreign women have 1.5 child more than the nationals – But represent only 7% of the female population of childbearing age  the 1.5 additional child accounts only for 7% in the national rate – The impact of foreigners on the number of births depends more from the extra number of foreign women than from their extra fertility

– since the immigrants have arrived at an earlier age, they resemble more native French women in terms of fertility

France 1980-2005: the limited impact of immigration on the national fertility rate
(Source: Population & societies #432, March 2007)

4

3

3,14 2,81 2,80 1,79 1,72

3,29

2

1,92 1,84

1,78 1,71

1,90 1,80

Foreign women

1
TOTAL French women

0 1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

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ANNEX 2
Family policy in France in the European context

Social protection benefits in France, 2003 Distribution of risks (or functions)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Old age Sickness, health care FAMILY, CHILDREN Unemployment Survivors Disability Housing Work accidents Poverty, social exclusion
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% of social protection benefits % of GDP

Total amount: 465 billions € = 30% of GDP

Social protection benefits for the families in Europe in cash and in kind, in % of GDP)
(tax cuts excluded, as well as school services )
Luxemburg Austria Germany FRANCE Belgium Finland Sweden Ireland U. K. Denmark Greece Netherl. Portugal Italy Spain 0 0,5 1 1,5 2

Cash benefits Benefits in kind (services) 2,5 3 3,5 4
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Some traits of the French family policy
(see P. Strobel and O. Thévenon) Complex and not always consistent
– More than 30 measures (not easy to evaluate) – Means-tested benefits (for social redistribution), but also tax cuts (quotient familial, tax-splitting system") – Combines social policy and family policy, by helping altogether disadvantaged families and the well-off – Still wavering between extra support to the 3rd child and benefits from the 1st child

But quite consensual and politically neutral
– Unquestioned in the last electoral debates

More feministic then familistic
– No need to be married; no need to stay home – Strong support to the one-parent families

A 70-year continuity that inspires confidence in the population
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France 2003: Social protection benefits in "Family" and "Maternity" functions (billions €)
0
Parental allowance "APE" Health care during pregnancy Per diem for parental leave (per diem) "Short" child allowance (pregn.+ infancy) Other compensations FAMILY ALLOWANCES Social support in kind non-MT Family supplement Support to hiring "maternal assistant" Family support allowance "ASF" Other benefits in kind non-MT Other compensations Lump-sum compensation non-MT Studentship allowance "Long" child allowance Family complement (civil servants) Schooling allowance One-parent allowance Lump-sum compensation MT Social support in kind MT (child care) Other benefits in kind MT

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11 12

Temporary compensation of charges or income losses

Periodic compensation, non means-tested

Periodic compensation, means-tested

Lump-sum compensation Social support in kind

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The actors of the French family policy
60% Social Security system through its "Family" branch:
– CNAF (National Fund for Family Allowances) – not synonymous with the State

14% local authorities
– municipalities – départements

12% other Social protection regimes, complementary funds

8% the State as an employer

6% private employers
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Cash benefits do not include all benefits
See also benefits in kind, not counted in the "family" or "child" risk, i.e. subsidies to equipments or facilities used by the children Such as:
– Housing allowances – Schooling transportation – Subsidies to "cantines" at school – – – – –

But above all: the universal pre-elementary school

100 % of the children enrolled at age 3 (world record) 35 % of the children enrolled at age 2 (generally mid-time) With teachers of same training and level as in primary school = a "public good", free of charge for the families Origin: demanded by the working-class families in the 30's, then extended upwards, up to the bourgeois families
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A few words about the "quotient familial"
The "quotient familial" (tax-splitting) diminishes the marginal rate of taxation of the household according to the number of "parts" (or shares) attributed to the household The number of parts depends essentially on the number and birth order of the children:
– – – – 1 part for each spouse or partner 0.5 for the 1st child (becomes 1 in case of one-parent family) 0.5 for the 2nd child but 1 part for each child from the 3rd on (adds a semi-part)

The taxable income of the household is divided by the number of parts, hence the importance of the additional semi-parts to reduce the household taxes However, the resulting tax cut is limited by a ceiling
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What is the impact of the "quotient familial"?
Most controversial issue in France
– Concerns only the tax-payers (half of the households in France)

According to a simulation model this is an additional expense of 10 %

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How is generally assessed the impact of a family policy?
Rather easy to evaluate: the impact on income disparities ("redistribution effect") and the "child cost" – measurable through simulation
– See review by Letablier & Thevenon for EU DG Employment (2008)

(before/after comparisons by types of households)

More difficult to assess: the impact on the fertility rate – Too many parameters – Constantly changing – Confusing variables, such as economic situation – Few harmonized data between countries
(difficult to isolate the "pure" effect of a specific measure)

(see however the aggregates defined by the ESSPRO system of Eurostat)
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Impact on fertility rate?
Few studies
– Hantrais & Letablier (1993)

– Blanchet (1994)
– Ekert, Randall et al. (2001) – Breton & Prioux (2007)

Evaluated impact
– Between 0.1 and 0.2 attributed to the fiscal measures, compared to the English system – But, on several decades, this is a significant surplus – Impact on the 3rd birth (more on tempo than on quantum)

More studies needed at a comparative level
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