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             ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
                        ‫المرصد الفكري / البحثي‬

             ‫التقرير األسبوعي لمراكز األبحاث االميركية‬

                                   07/06/2012




A Bi-Lingual Weekly Report of U.S. Think Tank Community Activities
                                 ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬

Introduction
         Syria had a great deal of the Think Tank    political and military personnel to newly and
community focus. As Kofi Annan’s original plan       purposely targeting the civilian population in
to defuse the conflict has proven to be              Afghanistan. The Foundation for the Defense of
stumbling, the Brookings Institute looked at the     Democracies was concerned about Egypt’s
pitfalls of Annan’s Plan B, which proposes a         president-elect Mohamed Morsi’s rhetoric,
national unity council that includes the             particularly in regard to Israel. While Morsi is
opposition and excludes those who challenge it.      described as a moderate, his desire to free
The Washington Institute chose to focus on the       Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and inability to
Syrian Army’s significance in keeping the regime     openly recognize the state of Israel is seen as
propped up, while the Foundation for the             less than moderate. The Obama administration
Defense of Democracies focused on the cons of        was harshly criticized by The Hudson Institute
a U.S. intervention. A coup within the Syrian        for not imposing sanctions on Iran earlier;
regime and an ally-organized transition of           Obama’s perceived leniency with Iran about its
power was of concern to Stratfor analysts, as        nuclear program has left it to assume that
was insight into the chaos that could occur in a     Obama does not perceive the Gulf region as
post-Assad Syria.                                    vital to the United States; while Reva Bhalla
                                                     discussed the pitfalls of sanctions on Iran.
         The Brookings Institute provided a
testimony by Michael O’Hanlon about the                      The rise of violence in Nigeria and the
progress of the Afghan National Security Forces,     prospect of a religious war between Christians
as well as the challenges that lie ahead. Despite    and Muslims were observed by the Foundation
significant progress, ANSF still faces issues such   for the Defense of Democracies. At the height of
as criminal patronage, funding concerns and          tensions in Syria, Khalid Koser discussed many
experience. The United State Institute of Peace      issues surrounding migration of refugees and
reported on the Taliban’s shift from attacking       internally displaced persons.




                                                                                         :‫المقدمة‬
‫مساعي المبعوث االممي لحل االزمة في سورية القت ظاللها ايضا على اهتمامات مراكز االبحاث‬
‫االميركية، ال سيما اقتراحه للخطة – ب القاضية بتشكيل مجلس موحد يضم طرفي السلطة والمعارضة‬
‫ويستثني االطراف التي ال توافق عليها. ايضا، استمرار الجدل الدائر حول الحكمة من التدخل العسكري‬
‫في سورية بزعامة الواليات المتحدة، وتدرج الخطاب السياسي الى المراهنة على حدوث انقالب داخل‬
   .‫المؤسسة العسكرية السورية لالطاحة بالنظام، وما قد يسفر عنه من اضطراب وفوضى وعدم استقرار‬

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                              ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬



‫ايضا، تواصل االهتمام المشترك بالرئيس المصري المنتخب، محمد مرسي، من زاوية مدى‬
‫التزامه الحقيقي باالتفاقيات الدولية، وتحديدا اتفاقية كامب ديفيد، كاداة للحكم على توجهات السياسة‬
                                                                                ‫المصرية المستقبلية.‬

‫ايران ومفاعيل العقوبات الدولية عليها كانت مدخال للنيل من سياسة االدارة االميركية محطة انتقاد‬
‫للرئيس اوباما، وتصاعد االتهامات له بتراجع اولوياته االستراتيجية من التركيز على الشرق االوسط الى‬
                                                                    ‫الشرق االقصى والمياه االسيوية.‬

     ‫في ذات السياق، زاد اهتمام بعض مراكز االبحاث لتجدد اعمال العنف في نيجيريا من زاوية‬
  ‫تفسيرها بان جذرها ترجمة لصراع ديني بين المكونين الرئيسيين للمجتمع هناك، المسلمين والمسيحيين؛‬
     ‫وتوطئة لدعم النظرية الغربية الشاملة بأن الصراعات في المنطقة العربية اساسها االنتماءات المذهبية‬
                                                                                           ‫والدينية.‬




                                    ‫ملخص دراسات ونشاطات مراكز االبحاث‬

                                                                                               ‫سورية:‬

‫خطاب الرئيس بشار االسد امام الحكومة السورية الجديدة اثار قلقا متوقعا لدى اقطاب مراكز‬
‫االبحاث، ال سيما اعالنه بأن بالده "في حالة حرب،" وما ينطوي عليها من اتخاذ الحكومة تدابير‬
‫واجراءات داخلية. معهد بروكينغز ‪ Brookings Institution‬اعرب عن اعتقاده ان االعالن يؤطر‬
‫"شن حرب مجردة من اي كوابح،" الفتا االنتباه الى عالقة االعالن باسقاط الطائرة التركية التي اخترقت‬


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‫االجواء السيادية السورية. واضاف ان الخطة – ب للمبعوث االممي كوفي أنان "الرامية لتشكيل وزارة‬
‫وحدة وطنية تضم االطراف المعنية باستثناء تلك الساعية لتقويضها .. هي مسعى غير مباشر (ألنان)‬
‫للقضاء على (الرئيس) االسد من اي دور له في حكومة مستقبلية." وامام التفاؤل بخطة أنان، استدرك‬
‫المعهد بالقول ان دور روسيا "الرافض لمناقشة مرحلة ما بعد (حكم) االسد .. ال يزال يعتبر ان الحل‬
‫يتأتى عبر حوار سياسي" بين الطرفين. واشار الى توقعاته بأن يسفر لقاء المعارضة في مقر الجامعة‬
‫العربية (عقد بعد اعداد الدراسة) عن ترسيم عناصر خطة عمل تحدد مالمح "مرحلة االطاحة الحتمية"‬
‫بالرئيس االسد. وحذر "بروكينغز" من مغبة انتهاج "ارساء حكومة وحدة وطنية مع نظام االسد النه يمثل‬
‫التوجه الخاطيء اما تحقيق وحدة بين فصائل قوى المعارضة من شأنه ارغام روسيا على سحب دعمها‬
                                                                                      ‫لنظام االسد."‬

‫معهد واشنطن لسياسة الشرق االدنى، ‪،Washington Institute for Near East Policy‬‬
‫ركز اهتمامه على مستقبل الجيش العربي السوري، معربا عن اعتقاده بأن تؤدي تصاعد الهجمات لقوى‬
‫المعارضة الى "انهياره وتفككه او انسحابه الى مناطق الكثافة السكانية للعلويين بغية المحافظة على ما‬
‫تبقى من هيبة النظام. بل ان بعض الوحدات (العسكرية) قد تتحرك ضد النظام الجل سالمتها الذاتية،"‬
‫الفتا النظر الى عزم االطراف الدولية على "تصعيد حرب االستنزاف" ضد المؤسسة العسكرية؛ ومعربا‬
                                                        ‫عن اعتقاده "بصعوبة التنبؤ بتوقيت االنهيار."‬

‫مسألة جدوى التدخل العسكري في سورية كانت من نصيب "مؤسسة الدفاع عن الديموقراطيات‬
‫‪ "،Foundation for Defense of Democracies‬التي اعربت عن خشيتها من "بروز تشكيالت‬
‫نافذة اسوأ من النظام" الراهن نتيجة للتدخل، في اشارة منها الى تعاظم دور عناصر القاعدة والمقاتلين من‬
‫كل حدب وصوب للقتال في سورية "وفق اسس طائفية." بيد ان الخشية من مصير ترسانة االسلحة‬
‫السورية استحوذت على االهتمام االوسع للمؤسسة وما تمثله من امتدادات سياسية داخل المشهد االميركي.‬

‫وحذرت المؤسسة المذكورة من مالمح المرحلة المقبلة في حال نجاح خطة "االطاحة بالرئيس‬
‫االسد،" بالقول ان "دعم العربية السعودية وقطر وتركيا لالخوان المسلمين، بشكل اساسي، بغية زيادة‬
‫نفوذها مجتمعة قد .. يؤدي لصعود االسالميين للسلطة والذين لن يبقوا على صداقتهم للغرب .. كما ان‬

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‫نظام (الرئيس) االسد قد يجد مالذا للقيام بشن حرب ضد اسرائيل بغية تغيير موازين القوى االقليمية‬
                                                                        ‫يع‬
‫لصالحه،" مما َ ِد بكلفة عالية لمسألة التدخل العسكري – كما جاء في االصل. ومن بين الخيارات‬
‫االخرى المفضلة بالنسبة لمؤسسة الدفاع عن الديموقراطيات "اغتيال (الرئيس) االسد، تسليح قوى‬
‫المعارضة باسلحة قادرة على محاكاة تلك التي بحوزة النظام .. وانشاء مالذات آمنة ومناطق مجردة (من‬
                                                     ‫السالح) على طول الحدود السورية مع تركيا .."‬

‫مؤسسة "ستراتفور ‪ "Stratfor‬البحثية، المقربة من االستخبارات االميركية، اعربت عن اعتقادها‬
‫بامكانية قيام "عناصر النخبة في النظام السوري تنفيذ انقالب عسكري داخلي واالطاحة بالقوة" برموز‬
‫النظام االساسية، مزدية النصح اليران وروسيا بأن "من مصلحتهما الموافقة على نظام في سورية يبقي‬
‫على صداقته ويحافظ على مصالحهما وال يشذ كثيرا عن الوضع الراهن." وقالت ان السبيل لتحقيق ذلك‬
‫هو "عقد صفقة رسمية لتسليم السلطة بين (الرئيس) االسد وعناصر رفيعة المستوى في النظام .." للتوافق‬
‫على صيغة تتيح بمشاركة اوسع "للطائفة السنية واالقليات الحليفة .. للمحافظة على استمرارية النظام‬
‫وتفادي فراغ سلطوي بغية تحقيق اكبر قدر من االستقرار." وضربت مثاال لتدعيم منطق روايتها مستشهدة‬
‫ببروز جناح في الحزب الشيوعي الروماني مناويء للرئيس السابق شاوشيسكو "الذي مهد المسرح‬
‫السياسي لبسط االستقرار لعقد من الزمن قبل تسلم اطراف اخرى ال تدين بالوالء للحزب الشيوعي لمقاليد‬
‫السلطة." وحذرت المؤسسة المذكورة من استمرار سعي االدارة االميركية بنهجها الراهن "القائم على‬
‫دعامتين قد ال تلتقيان: انزال هزيمة استراتيجية تامة بايران (وربما روسيا) في المشهد السوري والدعوة‬
                                                                       ‫العلنية لوقف اعمال القتل .."‬

                                                                                            ‫مصر:‬

‫مؤسسة الدفاع عن الديموقراطيات ‪ "،Foundation for Defense of Democracies‬مرة‬
‫اخرى، حذرت من ازدواجية خطاب الرئيس المصري المنتخب، محمد مرسي، في مسألتين اعتبرتهما‬
‫اساسيتين: االولى، حقيقة عمق التزامه باتفاقية كامب ديفيد؛ والثانية، تصريحاته السابقة الداعية لتطبيق‬
‫الشريعة االسالمية في مصر. واضافت ان تصريحات مرسي في عدد من المقابالت الصحفية دلت على‬



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‫"مناهضته للصهيونية، والعنف كذلك، بينما اظهر دعمه للمقاومة الشعبية للفلسطينيين وتهرب من االجابة‬
                                                ‫على سؤال هل يقدم على اعالن اعترافه بدولة اسرائيل."‬



                                                                            ‫مشروع اتحاد دول الخليج:‬

‫المعهد الدولي للدراسات االستراتيجية، ومقره لندن، رأى من االهمية في هذه اآلونة تناول اعالن‬
‫العربية السعودية قبل فترة وجيزة عن توجه سياسي ينشد اقامة مشروع التحاد دول الخليج، بقيت تفاصيله‬
‫مبهمة وحقيقته غامضة. وقال ان التوجه "القامة اتحاد بين دول الخليج أمر مستبعد .. لعدم توافق دول‬
‫الخليج االخرى على صيغة اتحاد ضرورية" بينها. واوضح المعهد ان حافز االعالن هو "االحساس‬
‫بالخطر الماثل الذي تمثله ترددات الربيع العربي .. التي يعتبرها العاهل السعودي بانها تشكل تهديدا‬
‫داخليا واقليميا ليس اقلها امكانية تعاظم الدور االيراني" في المنطقة. اما الدول الخليجية االخرى فقد جاءت‬
‫معارضتها "بدافع احساسها المكانية تراجع سلطاتها السيادية" على اراضيها امام جسم اكبر (السعودية) ،‬
                        ‫والتي ال تشاطرها رؤيتها في التهديد الجيوسياسي التي تمثله ايران" في المنطقة.‬

                                                                                                  ‫ايران:‬

‫صعد معهد هدسون ‪ Hudson Institute‬لهجة خطابه السياسي، معربا عن ارتياحه لدخول‬
‫العقوبات االقتصادية الجديدة حيز التنفيذ ضد "قطاعي الطاقة والمصارف" االيرانية. وقال "المحافظة على‬
‫وتيرة الهيمنة االميركية في الخليج .. هي مسؤولية الواليات المتحدة لكنها اضحت ايضا مسؤولية‬
‫اسرائيلية،" وذلك في معرض انتقاداته الشديدة لسياسة االدارة االميركية التي "تخلت عن التزاماتها التقليدية"‬
‫في منطقة الخليج بحيث اصبحت عرضة للنفوذ االيراني. واضاف ان "محصلة سياسة (الرئيس) اوباما‬
‫الشرق اوسطية انها ساهمت في حماية المصالح االمنية االقليمية لطهران – (المتمثلة) في سورية وحزب‬
                                                                                   ‫اهلل والقنبلة" النووية.‬

‫مؤسسة ستراتفور، آنفة الذكر، اعربت عن اعتقادها ان الثغرات البنيوية في نظام العقوبات على‬
‫ايران تدركها االدارة االميركية "وتغض الطرف عنها احيانا،" ال سيما في تغيير ايران لهوية ناقالت النفط‬

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‫وانشائها شركات وهمية عدة عبر البحار. واوضحت ان اعضاء في الكونغرس االميركي ينوون فرض‬
‫"قوانين عقوبات اكثر شدة بغية التحقق من الشركات االيرانية الوهمية .. ويتردد ان االدارة االميركية، في‬
‫المقابل، تستعد لتقديم عدد من الخيارات تمنحها صالحية الغاء العقوبات بصورة انتقائية تتسلح بها في‬
‫جولة المفاضات المقبلة مع طهران." واستطردت بالقول ان هناك "تفاهما ضمنيا قائما بين الواليات المتحدة‬
‫وايران يسمح بموجبه بحرية تدفق النفط عبر مضيق" هرمز. اما تهديد ايران باغالقها للمضيق كوسيلة‬
‫تفاوضية من شأنه "وضع كافة القضايا المتعلقة بين الطرفين من حملة العقوبات الى مساعدة الواليات‬
                ‫المتحدة السرية للمتمردين السوريين وصوال الى الملف النووي" على طاولة المفاوضات.‬




                                                                                     ‫التحليل:‬
          ‫نظرة على الخيارات المحتملة لفريق رومني في السياسة الخارجية ونائب الرئيس‬

                                                               ‫مرشح رومني لمنصب نائب الرئيس:‬

‫بعد تيقن ميت رومني من فوزه بعدد كاف من المندوبين لتأمين ترشيح الحزب‬
‫الجمهوري له لمنصب الرئاسة، يتجدد الحديث حول خياره لشخصيات منصب نائب الرئيس في‬

‫الحملة االنتخابية. درجت العادة الختيار الشخصية االفر حظا كي تضفي توازنا على بعض النواقص‬
‫والسلبيات الكامنة في شخص المرشح الرئاسي. فالرئيس اوباما اختار جوزيف بايدن لخبرته الواسعة في‬
‫واشنطن تدعيما لخبرته (اوباما) السطحية في شؤون الكونغرس. والمرشح الجمهوري السابق جون ماكين‬
‫وقع اختياره على سارة بيلين بغية استثمار دورها في تنشيط قاعدة المحافظين في الحزب والتي ال تكن‬
                                          ‫حماسا له العتقادها بأنه محسوب على الخط الليبرالي داخله.‬




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‫آلية اختيار شخصية نائب الرئيس تخضع لعدة اعتبارات اضافية، منها تحقيق توازن تمثيل‬
‫جغرافي الضفاء عامل آخر لفوز المرشح الرئاسي بوالية، او مجموعة، واليات تعد حاسمة واساسية.‬
‫وعليه، تجدر االشارة الى اختيار الرئيس االسبق جون كينيدي لليندون جونسون عام 1960 القادم من‬
                                                                           ‫والية تكساس الجنوبية.‬

‫من بين نقاط الضعف في شخصية رومني عدم قدرته على اثارة حماس الناخبين وسطحية خبرته‬
‫السياسية في دهاليز واشنطن. وقد يجد نفعا في اختيار شخصية سياسية مناسبة استنادا الى حساسية وضع‬
                                                                                     ‫والية بعينها.‬

‫اذ اخذنا بعين االعتبار اهمية تحقيق توازن في فريق المرشحين الرئاسيين، فان الحاكم السابق‬
‫لوالية مينيسوتا والمنافس الرئاسي، تيم بولنتي، يمثل خيارا معقوال. الدوائر الضيقة المحيطة بالمرشح‬
‫رومني اعربت عن اعجابها باداء بولنتي كممثل للمرشح رومني في سباق الحملة االنتخابية، خاصة في‬
‫مواجهة اطقم الصحافيين بفعالية. وجاء على لسان احد المتنفذين في الدائرة الضيقة ان بولنتي "لم يجر‬
                                                                      ‫مقابلة صحافية سيئة بالمرة."‬

‫كما ان خلفية بولنتي العمالية، كنجل لسائق شاحنة مقيم في مدينة سان بول، قد تحدث توازنا‬
‫محتمال لثراء رومني الفاحش. ومن الممكن ايضا ان يسهم بولنتي في تحفيز الواليات المحيطة جغرافيا‬
‫بمينيسوتا، والية ايوا المجاورة، لصالح حملة رومني االنتخابية. اذ تعتبر الواليتين المذكورتين ارضية‬
          ‫محتملة لصالح حملة رومني واللتين صوتتا لجانب الرئيس اوباما في الجولة االنتخابية السابقة.‬

‫من بين الشخصيات المرشحة االخرى السيناتور عن والية اوهايو رون بورتمان، والذي يشارك‬
‫نظيره بولنتي في الميزات الجغرافية. يذكر ان مؤيدي بورتمان لعبوا دورا هاما في فوز رومني بالوالية‬
‫اثناء االنتخابات التمهيدية؛ كما ان بورتمان استمر في اداء دور المستشار غير الرسمي للمشرفين على‬
‫حملة رومني االنتخابية. وجدير بالذكر ايضا، ان بورتمان انتقل بسرعة لالشراف على حملة انتخاب‬
‫رومني في عموم والية اوهايو عقب انتهاء منافسة االنتخابات التمهيدية بين رومني وسانتورم. كما لعب‬
‫دور حلقة الوصل بين القواعد الحزبية للجمهوريين في والية اوهايو مع المشرفين على حملة رومني‬


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                              ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬

‫االنتخابية؛ ولعل قدرته المميزة على جمع التبرعات المالية هي احدى المزايا التي حازت على رضى‬
                           ‫المرشح رومني، والتي يضعها البعض في موازاة الدهاء السياسي لبورتمان.‬

‫من بين المرشحين المحتملين لمنصب نائب الرئيس السيناتور عن والية فلوريدا مارك روبيو، من‬
‫اصول كوبية، التي تعد واليته من بين اهم الواليات حساسية للفوز، خاصة حين االخذ بعين االعتبار‬
‫المكون الديموغرافي الكثيف للجالية الكوبية في فلوريدا بشكل خاص، والجالية ذات االصول الالتينية‬
‫بشكل عام. وذلك على الرغم من التوقعات التي ال ترجح فوز روبيو بدعم قطاع واسع من الجالية‬
‫المذكورة، لكن باستطاعته – كمرشح نائب الرئيس – تضييق هوة دعمها لحرمان الرئيس اوباما من‬
‫تحقيق فوز ساحق بين صفوفها. احدى مثالب روبيو انه حديث الخبرة السياسية اذ دخل حديثا معترك‬
‫التمثيل السياسي في مجلس الشيوخ، وقد يستطيع تجسير الهوة لقطاع الناخبين المذكور ان تسنى له دخول‬
                                                             ‫الحملة االنتخابية لمنصب نائب الرئيس.‬

‫من الواليات الحاسمة االخرى تبرز ويسكونسن التي جددت الوالء للحاكم الجمهوري مؤخرا،‬
‫والتي اظهرت ميوال نحو الحزب الجمهوري في السنتين االخيرتين ال يجوز اغفالها. رئيس لجنة‬
‫الموازن ات في مجلس النواب، بول رايان، عن والية ويسكونسن ابدى رغبته مرافقة رومني في منصب‬
‫نائب الرئيس، اذ يقال انه قدم وثائق مؤهالته وخلفيته السياسية لفريق رومني للتدقيق بها كاجراء متبع مع‬
                                                                          ‫كافة المرشحين للمنصب.‬

‫النائب رايان يعتبر احد الشخصيات المفضلة للشخصيات الداعمة لحملة رومني، لكن يحذر‬
‫البعض اآلخر من شغور منصبه الهام في مجلس النواب في حال التوافق عليه نظرا لدوره الحاسم والمؤثر‬
              ‫لصالح الحزب الجمهوري في واحدة من اهم اللجان المعنية بالشؤون المالية في الكونغرس.‬

‫من االسماء المثارة ايضا للمنصب حاكم والية نيوجيرسي، كريس كريستي، الجمهوري لوالية‬
‫تميل للحزب الديموقراطي بغالبيتها؛ اال ان حظوظ اختياره تبقى ضئيلة، خاصة حين االخذ بعين االعتبار‬
‫ضرورة توفر عامل التوازن الجغرافي في الحملة، اذ ان كليهما (رومني وكريستي) ينتميان لواليات‬
‫الساحل الشرقي التي تميل بمعظمها لتاييد الحزب الديموقراطي. كما ان سجل كريستي يعتبره اقرانه بانه‬


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‫اقرب للتوجه الليبرالي ال سيما في قضايا يعتبرونها حاسمة وغير قابلة للنقاش مثل قضايا االجهاض‬
‫وحمل السالح. تاثيره االيجابي على ميت رومني سينعكس سلبا على عموم القاعدة االنتخابية للحزب‬
                                                                                       ‫الجمهوري.‬

‫احد العوامل التي ينظر بها رومني الختيار رفيقه االنتخابي هو كونه يحظى بميزات المحافظين‬
‫وفي ذات الوقت يملك اطالعا وثيقا بآلية العمل في ردهات واشنطن السياسية. وفق هذه الفرضية، فان‬
‫افضل المرشحين هو السيناتور من داكوتا الجنوبية جون ثون، والذي اقترب من ترشيح نفسه في بداية‬
‫الحملة االنتخابية لمنصب الرئيس لكنه فضل البقاء بعيدا عن الصخب السياسي. ان صح اختياره للمنصب‬
‫فان اهميته تعود الى قدرته على الفوز بمنطقة ما يعرف "بحزام الصدأ" من الواليات وهي التي تمتد على‬
‫طول شواطيء البحيرات العظمى في واحدة من اهم المناطق الجغرافية الصناعية في اميركا، والتي مالت‬
‫بقوة لصالح الرئيس اوباما في الحملة االنتخابية السابقة. كما ان االنتماء الديني للسيناتور ثون، طائفة‬
‫المسيحيين االنجيليين، قد يسهم في استقطاب عدد من منتسبي الطائفة الذين ينظرون بعين الريبة النتماء‬
                                                                           ‫رومني لطائفة المورمن.‬

‫بعض المراقبين يرجح وقوع اختيار رومني على حاكمة والية كارولينا الجنوبية، نكي هايلي،‬
‫لضخ بعض عوامل االثارة في الحملة. فهي عالوة على كونها امرأة من ابوين من طائفة السيخ هاجرا‬
‫للواليات المتحدة من شبه القارة الهندية، تعد ثاني حاكم لوالية من اصول هندية واللذين ينتميان للحزب‬
‫الجمهوري معا. فالجالية الهندية في الواليات المتحدة تشهد نموا مضطردا ينبغي اخذها بعين االعتبار؛‬
                ‫عالوة على مفاهيمها السياسية المحافظة التي تلقى ترحيبا في اوساط الحزب الجمهوري.‬

‫حاكم الوالية االخر من اصول هندية هو بوبي جندال في والية لويزيانا، والذي شغر منصب‬
‫مساعد وز ير الخدمات الصحية واالنسانية في والية الرئيس السابق جورج بوش االبن. ويسجل لجندال‬
‫مهارته السياسية والتفاوضية في انتشال والية لويزيانا من وضعها المالي المزري سابقا، االمر الذي قد‬
‫يؤهله لمنصب نائب الرئيس. تجدر المالحظة ان مشاعر العنصرية والتطرف ضد المهاجرين ال تزال حية‬
‫داخل صفوف الحزب الجمهوري، الذي ال يزال يكرر فرضيته الخاطئة بان الرئيس اوباما مولود ألب‬
                                 ‫غير اميركي، ويصرون على نقاء االصول االميركية كشرط للمرشح.‬

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‫من بين المرشحين قليلي الحظ بالمنصب السيناتور عن والية اريزونا جون كايل، الذي اعلن‬
‫مؤخرا عن نيته بالتقاعد من مجلس الشيوخ، وهو الذي يحظى بالمرتبة الثانية في تراتبية زعامة الحزب‬
‫الجمهوري في الكونغرس ويحظى باحترام وتقدير عاليين بين اقرانه على الرغم من عدم انتشار شعبيته.‬
                                                                                              ‫س‬
‫ِ جل كايل المحافظ سياسيا ال غبار عليه ال سيما الهليته وخبرته العالية في مسالة االمن القومي التي‬
‫يفتقدها رومني، بيد انه اعلن عن عدم رغبته االستجابة لطلب االنضمام للحملة االنتخابية في منصب نائب‬
                                                                                           ‫الرئيس.‬

                                                                   ‫فريق رومني للسياسة الخارجية:‬

‫من نافل القول ان اهم نقاط القوة المتوفرة لرومني هي خبرته في مجال االعمال الحرة، يقابلها‬
‫شح يقرب من االنعدام التام للخبرة في مجال السياسة الخارجية، االمر الذي يقود الى االستنتاج بأن معالم‬
‫السياسة الخارجية المقبلة للمرشح رومني سيتم صياغتها والتحكم بعناصرها من قبل فريقه الحالي للسياسة‬
‫الخارجية. عضوية الفريق الراهن تضم عددا ال باس به من مسؤولين سابقين في ادارة الرئيس جورج‬
‫بوش االبن، وليس في االمر ادنى استغراب نظرا الن سيطرة الحزب الجمهوري سابقا على البيت االبيض‬
                                        ‫مضى عليها زهاء عشرين عاما، منذ والية جورج بوش االب.‬

‫جدير بالمالحظة حجم الدور المؤثر الذي يلعبه مركز "مبادرة السياسة الخارجية" لالبحاث، مقره‬
‫واشنطن، على تشذيب توجهات اغلب اعضاء الفريق، الى جانب انتماء بعضهم الى مؤسسة هاريتاج‬
                                                                                           ‫اليمينية.‬

                                                                   ‫يتشكل الفريق من التالية اسمائهم:‬

‫اليوت كوهين، المعروف بمواقفة اليمينية المتشددة، يشغل حاليا منصب مدير برنامج الدراسات‬
‫االستراتيجية في جامعة جونز هوبكنز، كلية الدراسات الدولية المتقدمة؛ ومستشارا لوزارة الخارجية‬
           ‫االميركية (2100 – 6110)؛ وعضو مجلس مستشاري السياسة الدفاعية (0110- 6110).‬




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                            ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬

‫مايكل شيرتوف، المتخصص في شؤون االستخبارات ومكافحة التجسس. عمل وزيرا لألمن‬
‫الداخلي (2110 – 6110)؛ وقاضيا في محكمة االستئناف المركزية للمقاطعة القضائية الثالثة (2110 –‬
                                                                                     ‫2110).‬

‫ايريك ايدلمان، متخصص في شؤون مكافحة انتشار االسلحة. عمل اساذا زائرا في كلية الدراسات‬
‫الدولية المتقدمة التابعة لجامعة جونز هوبكنز؛ نائب وزير الدفاع للشؤون السياسية (2110 – 6110)؛‬
                                 ‫نائب مساعد نائب الرئيس لشؤون االمن القومي (0110- 2110).‬

‫مايكل هايدن، متخصص في شؤون االستخبارات ومكافحة االرهاب. عمل مديرا لوكالة‬
             ‫االستخبارات المركزية (9110 – 6110)؛ مدير وكالة االمن القومي (6660 – 2110).‬

‫ماري بيث لونغ، من المرجح ان تشغر منصب مستشار للسياسة االميركية في الشرق االوسط.‬
                                ‫عملت مساعد وزير الدفاع لشؤون االمن الدولي (2110 – 6110).‬

‫روبرت كايغان، يحظى باحترام واسع بين اطياف التيارين اليساري واليميني لخبرته في شؤون‬
‫السياسة االميركية. يعمل كمساهم دوري في اسبوعيتي "نيو ريبابليك" الليبرالية و"ويكلي ستاندارد"‬
‫المحافظة. زميل كبير في معهد بروكينغز في مركزه المختص بالشؤون االميركية واالوروبية؛ عضو‬
                                         ‫مجلس ادارة في مركز "مبادرة السياسة الخارجية" البحثي.‬

‫وليد فارس، عضو مرجح في فريق سياسة الشرق االوسط. استاذ االستراتيجيات العالمية في‬
‫جامعة الدفاع الوطني في واشنطن؛ عضو مجلس استشاري لمنظمة العمل حول االرهاب المستقبلي التابع‬
                                                       ‫لوزارة االمن القومي (9110 – 2110).‬

‫دانيال سينيور، الناطق السابق للسطلة العراقية المؤقتة ومستشار رئيسي لديها (2110 –‬
                                 ‫2110)؛ مدير ومؤسس مساعد لمؤسسة "مبادرة السياسة الخارجية."‬




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‫ميغان اوساليفان، مستشارة لشؤون الشرق االوسط. محاضر في كلية كينيدي للسياسة (جامعة‬
‫هارفارد)؛ مساعد خاص للرئيس جورج بوش االبن؛ نائب مستشار لشؤون االمن القومي في العراق‬
                                                                      .)0112 – 0112( ‫وافغانستان‬




SUMMARY, ANALYSIS, PUBLICATIONS, AND ARTICLES


Executive Summary

         Syria had a great deal of the Think Tank    political and military personnel to newly and
community focus. As Kofi Annan’s original plan       purposely targeting the civilian population in
to defuse the conflict has proven to be              Afghanistan. The Foundation for the Defense of
stumbling, the Brookings Institute looked at the     Democracies was concerned about Egypt’s
pitfalls of Annan’s Plan B, which proposes a         president-elect Mohamed Morsi’s rhetoric,
national unity council that includes the             particularly in regard to Israel. While Morsi is
opposition and excludes those who challenge it.      described as a moderate, his desire to free
The Washington Institute chose to focus on the       Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman and inability to
Syrian Army’s significance in keeping the regime     openly recognize the state of Israel is seen as
propped up, while the Foundation for the             less than moderate. The Obama administration
Defense of Democracies focused on the cons of        was harshly criticized by The Hudson Institute
a U.S. intervention. A coup within the Syrian        for not imposing sanctions on Iran earlier;
regime and an ally-organized transition of           Obama’s perceived leniency with Iran about its
power was of concern to Stratfor analysts, as        nuclear program has left it to assume that
was insight into the chaos that could occur in a     Obama does not perceive the Gulf region as
post-Assad Syria.                                    vital to the United States; while Reva Bhalla
                                                     discussed the pitfalls of sanctions on Iran.
         The Brookings Institute provided a
testimony by Michael O’Hanlon about the                      The rise of violence in Nigeria and the
progress of the Afghan National Security Forces,     prospect of a religious war between Christians
as well as the challenges that lie ahead. Despite    and Muslims were observed by the Foundation
significant progress, ANSF still faces issues such   for the Defense of Democracies. At the height of
as criminal patronage, funding concerns and          tensions in Syria, Khalid Koser discussed many
experience. The United State Institute of Peace      issues surrounding migration of refugees and
reported on the Taliban’s shift from attacking       internally displaced persons.

                                                                                            Page | 12
Think Tanks Activity Summary
Syria

        Bashar al-Assad has stated that Syria is in a “state of war,” as opposition forces become more
active and uncontrollable, the Assad regime becomes “increasingly unrestrained in waging war on its
own people,” and the region becomes more erratic, with the downing of the Turkish military jet. Under
Kofi Annan’s Plan A to end violence in Syria that he issued the placement of “unarmed U.N. observers in
a war zone under the dual authority of the Syrian government and the U.N. Security Council. In the
proposition of Plan B, Annan intends to unite the European Union, Russia, China and the United States in
the plan to form a “Syrian national unity Cabinet that would include government and opposition
members and exclude those who undermine it,” an indirect way of Annan eliminating Assad from the
future government. Conversely, the Free Syrian Army has disregarded the proposal and the Syrian
National council remains cynical of the plan. “Many, however, have indicated their willingness to join
such a government after al-Assad and those orchestrating the killings have been deposed.” Questions
raised of Plan B include:

          1. What regime figures would be included in the proposed unity government?

          2. What guarantees are there that al-Assad and his family would be excluded?

          3. The position of Russia and whether it has finally turned against al-Assad.

        Putin has refused to discuss a post-Assad Syria and considers an achievable solution can be met
through a dialogue between the opposition and the Assad-regime. A political stalemate arises as the
opposition has yet to unify its platform. The Arab League sponsored meeting in Cairo this week will be
attended by chief opposition groups and will put forth a plan of action in the event of “al-Assad’s
inevitable ouster.” Although expectations and outcomes of the conference are low, a “common national
platform united around a common national vision,” is encouraged. As the conflict in Syria becomes
more pressing, building a unity government with the Assad-regime is the incorrect course and the
formation of a unity opposition platform could force Russia to withdraw its support of the Assad-regime.

Sources

The Brookings Institution, The Shortcomings of Annan’s “Plan B” in Syria, Read More
                                  ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
          The Syrian Army is detrimental to the survival of the Assad led Syrian-regime, according to
Jeffrey White of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. In the face of an expanding opposition,
casualties and defections, the Syrian Army “will break, disintegrate, or withdraw to the Alawite
heartland in order to preserve remnants of the regime. Alternatively, some units may move against the
regime in order to save themselves.” Fighting between the Syrian Army and the opposition has been
growing across key regions and more than eighty locations across Syria experienced combat. In June,
more than 250 clashes occurred, the most clashes since the start of the conflict, showcasing the
intensifying pace of the conflict. The regime forces face four challenges as the conflict intensifies:
“Growing opposition capabilities, Geography, Tempo of operation and Attrition.” The Syrian army is
unlikely to emerge triumphant using the tactic of “wearing down the opposition.” Regime forces have
been unsuccessful at establishing new uses of its resources and there lies little “prospect for serious
analysis of the challenges and implementation of realistic solutions…Although it has routinely employed
field artillery against civilian and military targets, it could use such weapons much more widely and
intensely. No place in Syria has witnessed the kind of artillery bombardment that the army is capable of
inflicting.”
          On the other hand, the regime benefits from having Alawite loyal generals and soldiers. Soldier
loyalty to the Assad regime continues due to “personal commitment or benefits in the form of position,
privileges, or pay. Others fear the consequences of regime change or desertion.” If the Syrian Army
cannot address the challenges it faces, “it will likely collapse, though precisely when is difficult to
determine.” Steady collapse of the regime forces is most likely to occur, but the Free Syrian Army must
improve its “planning, intelligence, combat. And command-and-control capabilities would presumably
speed this process even further.” The regime is forecast to fall in the event “the army breaks, and the
opposition must have something ready to replace it.”


Sources

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Mounting Pressure on the Syrian Army, Read More




        Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Emanuele Ottolenghi, discussed
the cons to intervention in Syria and what alternatives exist. Support for the fractioned opposition in
Syria that may have elements of al-Qaeda “suggest that the toppling of the Assad dynasty may give way
to an even worse regime.” The fear that Assad’s stroking of sectarian differences could plunge the
nation into “anarchy if the regime were removed” exists as Assad uses sectarian differences to his
advantage. “Anarchy would leave the vast stockpile of Syria’s weapons- including, crucially, its WMD
arsenal- up for grabs among the warring factions…The danger that sectarianism may engulf ethnic
communities across the border – the Kurds first and foremost – is already real.”

        Iran and Hezbollah have become involved with support the Assad regime as they have a vested
strategic interest in Syria. For economic purposes, such as weapons’ sales, Russia has become active in
supporting the Assad regime. “Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are trying to support those they favor to
come up on top – chiefly the Muslim Brotherhood – as a way to increase their influence.” A post-Assad

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regime may see the rise of Islamists that “will not be friendlier to the West. And under the fog of war
and a looming defeat, a dying [Assad] regime may seriously contemplate using chemical and biological
weapons, transferring them to their Lebanese proxies, or unleashing a war against Israel to tip the
regional balance of sympathy in their favor,” making intervention costly and objectionable.

       Alternatives to intervention include, the assassination of al-Assad, supplying the opposition with
“weapons that can countenance the regime’s,” and create “humanitarian corridors and buffer zones
along Syria’s border with Turkey could alleviate civilian suffering and chip away at the regime’s
confidence.”

Sources

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, The Syrian Conundrum, Read More




         According to Stratfor, in the midst of intensified violence in Syria, the Assad-regime has faced
harsh criticism and increased pressure could force even the Assad-regime’s greatest allies, Iran and
Russia, to initiate a coup forcing Assad out. While a coup is doubtful at this point, Iran and Russia “have
contingency plans for a new regime if a power transfer becomes necessary.” Regime elites, unrelated to
the Assad family, but holding important positions within the regime may also “try to stage a palace coup
and forcibly remove the family from power,” in the event Assad becomes incapable of keeping
“together the disparate elements that form the Syrian regime.” It is in the interest of Iran and Russia “to
maintain a government in Syria that will remain friendly to their interests and does not deviate too far
from the status quo,” rather than to prop up the Assad-regime. “This could be pursued by brokering an
official power transfer between al Assad and other top members of the regime,” and could see a more
diverse regime falling into the hands of “Sunni figures and allied minorities,” that “could use its sectarian
composition to quell some of the opposition while still maintaining the overall regime structure and
avoiding a power vacuum that could lead to greater instability.”

Sources

Stratfor, Considering a Palace Coup in Syria, Read More




        Robert D. Kaplan and Kamran Bokhari discuss the consequences of a post-Assad Syria descent
into chaos and what that means for neighboring nations. Referencing Syria’s history of government
changes Hafez al Assad, Bashar al Assad’s father “finally ended the chaos by becoming the Leonid
Brezhnev of the Arab world: He staved off the future by institutionalizing fear, even as he did nothing to
nurture a civil society out of the country's inherent divisions. Alas, the collapse of such a state is messy
business. Sectarian awareness may be less deeply etched in Syria than in Iraq, but once the killing starts
people have a tendency to revert to these default identities.” Neighboring nations such as Turkey,
Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia fear chaos in Syria as regional upheaval could spill into their own
countries. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel are concerned with the removal of a pro-Iranian regime,


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however, to topple the pro-Iranian al Assad does not mean it would be pleased with an extended
situation in which nobody is in charge in Damascus... As for the Iranians, they will do all they can to keep
the current Syrian regime in place even as they may privately abhor al Assad's inefficient brutality.”
Russia is concerned with maintaining stability in Syria as they have a vested interested in the port of
Tartus naval rights. In regards to America, “they don't want a Yugoslavia-style situation where they are
under pressure to militarily intervene… One can also argue that from a human rights perspective, chaos
can be worse than authoritarianism.”

         Various historical examples of ethnic violence occurrences have been documented in regions
affected by the Soviet state collapse, though, in 1989 Romania, after the execution of the tyrant Nicolae
Ceausescu “ethnic war and chaos did not result,” likely due to the Ceausescu regime being “replaced by
another branch of the Communist party, which ushered in a half-decade transition before non-
Communists finally took real power through elections.” A post-Assad Syria would benefit from a
transitional phase that would involve an agreement between Iran and America; “there may come a
point where American and Iranian interests in Syria overlap at least to the extent of agreeing on al
Assad's replacement.” A compromise between Iran and Turkey would need to be made as Turkey would
prefer to replace the entire regime structure,” and Iran does not. Obama’s role in such a compromise
would “require more diplomatic realpolitik than it has demonstrated thus far in any crisis… Washington
now wants two things that may not go together: handing Iran (and maybe Russia) a total strategic
defeat in Syria, even as bloodshed is reduced there.”

Sources

Stratfor, Halting Syrian Chaos, Read More




Egypt

        Mohamed Morsi’s rhetoric has been labeled as moderate, he has made statements that are
seen as less than moderate, as, on Friday, he called for the freeing of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who
has been “serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his role in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
and a follow-on plot against New York City landmarks.” Rahman has had previous ties to terrorist
organization such as: al Qaeda, Gamaa Islamiya and Islamic Jihad. Morsi’s call for the freeing of Rahman,
coupled with his statements in May that support the implementation of Sharia law, have caused
concern. Morsi has also said in interviews that he is against Zionism, as well as against violence, while
showing support for Palestinian popular resistance and evading the question of whether he would or
would not recognize the state of Israel. Arguably, ““resistance” is violent and includes Hamas’s extensive
use of suicide bombers. (Hamas is a self-described chapter of the Brotherhood.) In Iraq and Afghanistan,
other senior Brotherhood leaders have advocated violence against American-led forces under the same
mantra of “resistance.”” The Muslim Brotherhood has condemned the September 11th attacks, however,



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“Morsi claimed that we do not know for sure whether or not al Qaeda was responsible for the
September 11 attacks.”

Sources

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Egyptian President Wants Arch-Terrorist Freed, Read More



GCC Union

         A union of Gulf states is improbable, despite Saudi Arabia’s campaign of it, possibly because
other Gulf states do not share the same notion of such a unity. The GCC also proposed personal
invitations of membership to Jordan and Morocco, by the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud,
“who saw the Arab Spring as both a domestic threat and as a regional risk because of the potential for
Iranian influence… Other GCC member states were more concerned with the ensuing loss of sovereignty
concomitant with greater integration. These states did not see Iran as a geopolitical threat and were
more concerned with their domestic political conditions following the Arab Spring.” A GCC union would
have been more likely at the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 when “GCC states tended to put aside
differences in the face of an external threat. However, when threat perceptions were low, there was a
greater emphasis on sovereignty and less incentive for cooperation.”

Sources

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Union of Gulf states ‘unlikely’, Read More




Afghanistan

         In a testimony by Michael O’Hanlon, the Afghan National Security Forces are set to be
responsible for about 75 percent of the country later this year and have just about reached their
preferred size and structure. As America is set to drawback their troops in 2014, the ANSF is predicted to
be capable of fending off future attempted Taliban takeovers. An evaluation of the progress of the ANSF
is subject to several factors:

                          A patient NATO troop drawdown that gives us more
                           time for training and mentoring over the next 30
                           months.
                          Adequate U.S. and NATO troop presence even
                           thereafter to provide mentors and trainers and some
                           special capabilities.
                          Adequate financial support for the ANSF from the
                           international community

                                                                                                 Page | 17
                                 ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬

                           An Afghan political system that survives the 2014
                            election without fracturing along ethnic lines.

        It is expected that insurgency will continue in 2014 and forthcoming years and possibly control
considerable territory, however, as seen with the “Colombia standard,” success is measured in that the
insurgency will not be able to reclaim control over the country and will hence decrease over time.

       Positive signs

                           Afghan security forces have almost reached their
                            envisioned full size of 352,000 counting army and police.
                           the overall ethnic balance and cohesion of the nation’s
                            security forces are reasonably good.
                           Afghan soldiers and police are…participating in at least
                            90 percent of all operations, and leading some 40
                            percent of operations themselves.
                           While the security forces still suffer from political
                            patronage appointments and corruption, the problems
                            are being partially addressed.
                           Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior leadership
                            are generally well regarded, and the Ministry of Defense
                            inspector general is respected and competent, too
                           NATO is belatedly also cleaning up its own act—no
                            longer unwittingly funding nearly as many corrupt
                            actors or insurgent groups as it did before
                           More than 10 percent cost savings have been achieved
                            to date, normalized for the relevant workload, by the
                            reforms in contracting
                           The Afghan Local Police, a form of armed community
                            watch overseen by NATO troops, is generally proving its
                            mettle

Continued challenges

                           While Afghan forces are much bigger and better than
                            before, they are nowhere near good enough, so
                            professionalism and discipline must not only be
                            maintained, but improved in the future
                           While a large number of incompetent or corrupt leaders
                            within the security forces’ ranks have been replaced,
                            many remain,
                           The Afghan Local Police can only be effective in the
                            future if Afghanistan’s own special forces are

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                                  ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
                            increasingly able to play the oversight role that NATO
                            has provided to date.
                           The wrong president or even the wrong type of
                            presidential campaign in 2014 could also generate
                            ethnic tensions that weaken and divide an overall
                            security force that, to date at least, has not shown any
                            major proclivity itself towards civil warfare.
                           The Border Police (within the Ministry of Interior) and
                            the Air Force (within the Ministry of Defense) still suffer
                            from the influence of strong criminal patronage
                            networks within their institutions
                           Western impatience with the mission and pursuit of the
                            false of a smaller, cheaper ANSF after 2015 could leave
                            a force unable to handle the challenges that are likely to
                            face it then.

        Even with American funds being crucial to the continuation of the ANSF program, it would be an
undesirable move to outwardly influence Afghanistan’s 2014 Presidential election, however an informal
veto of a few candidates may be done.

Sources

The Brookings Institute, Afghan National Security Forces: A Glass 55% Full, Read More




Tim Luccaro of the United States Institute of Peace wrote that last month the Taliban killed an estimate
of 30-70 civilians in the Spoghmai Hotel at Qargha Lake, making it “one of the largest single incidents of
civilian casualties in the last 11 years.” This is unusual for the Taliban as their targets typically consist of
political officials, members of the international community or members of military operations; civilians
killed during Taliban attacks on “hard” targets are usually considered “collateral damage.” The Taliban’s
rules of engagement, the Layha, was formalized in 2006 and “states that all parties affiliated with the
movement should make every effort to prevent civilian harm,” however this credence was violated as
the Spoghmai Hotel patrons were unarmed civilians. Despite the lack of proof that “immoral behavior”
had taken place, the Taliban justified its actions stating “they were looking to punish and kill those who
were guilty of conducting immoral behavior…and that the executioners were upholding the tenets of
Islamic law.” Conversely, “the summary executions completely disregarded the millennia of
jurisprudence and rights of due process that are enshrined in Islamic Law…Ultimately, such actions as
those in Qargha may come to undermine Taliban claims that they are fighting against a weak system of
governance and corrupted institutions of law that have come to characterize the current regime. It is
imperative that people call the Taliban and all other leaders out for such hypocrisy and not give them
the opportunity to claim the killing of civilians is legitimate within any moral or legal framework.”



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                                  ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
Additionally, the Afghan administration, which has used civilian casualties caused by ISAF as a political
tool should come out in much stronger condemnation of the Taliban attacks.

Sources

United States Institute of Peace, When Civilians Become Willful Targets of an Insurgency, Read More




Iran

         Negotiations with Iran concerning its nuclear program are through as new sanctions are enacted
this week affecting Iran’s energy and banking sectors. “Preserving American hegemony in the Persian
Gulf,” is the duty of the United States that has now become the duty of Israel, as Obama has abandoned
its longstanding obligations to the Persian Gulf, withdrawing troops from Iraq and soon Afghanistan,
leaving the region susceptible to Iranian influence. During the uprising in Egypt, to the dismay of Saudi
Arabia, the Obama administration rejected the Mubarak regime, but during the uprising in Syria, Obama
has done little to rescind Iran, the Assad-regime’s main ally. “Instead, he backed a Russian-inspired
diplomatic process that has served only to buy Assad time… So the net effect of Obama's Middle East
strategy has been to protect Tehran's regional security interests—Syria, Hezbollah, and the bomb.”

        Sanctions will hurt the Iranian economy, but not the nuclear program and were imposed at the
insistence of Congress, rather than the White House. “The Obama Doctrine amounts to a repudiation of
the Carter Doctrine, which declared control of the Persian Gulf and its energy resources to be a vital U.S.
interest.”

Sources

The Hudson Institute, The Obama Retreat, Read More



        Reva Bhalla, writing for Stratfor, discusses sanctions on Iran and U.S.-Iranian negotiations as
news sanctions are imposed, attempting to ultimately target Tehran’s “resources that otherwise would
be allocated to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.” However, there have been ways for Iran to skirt
sanctions through front companies. Iran depends on tax haven nations to “switch out flags, names,
registered owners and agents, and addresses of owners and agents.” While the U.S. Treasury
Department is aware of these tactics, numerous shell companies “operating under different names and
flags can be created in the time it takes a single sanctions lawsuit to be drawn up.” Many nations have
cut their Iranian oil imports in recent months, however, many nations overlook “shell practices to
maintain their crude oil supply at steep discounts.” The Obama administration is aware of the shortfalls
of sanctions, but U.S. legislators plan to compose “stricter sanctions legislation in an effort to track down
more Iranian shell companies…the U.S. administration is rumored to be preparing a list of options by
which it can selectively repeal the sanctions for when it sits down at a negotiating table with Iran.”




                                                                                                      Page | 20
                                  ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
        The Strait of Hormuz acts as a point of contention as Iran and the U.S. “have an understanding
that allows for the free flow of oil through the strait.” Iran can close the strait and use that as a
negotiating tool. This act could make “everything from the sanctions campaign to U.S. covert backing of
Syrian rebels to the nuclear program,” negotiable.

Sources

Stratfor, Negotiations Behind U.S. Sanctions Against Iran,Read more


Nigeria
         Daveed Gartenstein-Ross for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies observes how religious
violence, instigated by Boko Haram, an Islamist Movement suspected of having links to al Qaeda, has
brought Nigeria closer to a religious war that the United States may have to lightly intervene in. Boko
Haram has been actively attacking and killing unarmed church goers during Sunday worship, which has
led to Christian retaliation on the Muslim community. In the past 18 months Boko Haram militants have
been responsible for more than 1,000 deaths. The attacks on church services and Christian groups,
employing tactics such as suicide bombings differ from previous “tactics as assassinations and massed
assaults on security forces.” As tensions rise, both Christians and Muslims are trying to diffuse the
situations- “Jamaatu Nasril Islam, an umbrella group for Nigerian Muslim organizations, released an
open letter to the government that condemned the church attacks, describing them as "barbaric”…The
Rev. Emmanuel Chukwuma, chairman of the South East chapter of the Christian Association of Nigeria,
said that though Christians appealed for peace, "It seems that the present security of Nigeria cannot
curtail the carnage."”

         Impending fears of a civil-religious war “may play right into Boko Haram's hands. Although Iraq
circa 2006 is very different from Nigeria today, it is worth recalling how al Qaeda in Iraq was able to set
sectarian violence in motion through its attacks on Shiite targets -- and then position itself as a protector
of Sunnis. Boko Haram may similarly be able to capitalize on retaliatory attacks directed at Muslims after
it strikes at Christians.” The Nigerian government has reacted by firing the national security advisor and
health minister in hopes of establishing “new tactics” in dealing with Boko Haram. Currently the U.S.
provides counterinsurgency training and intelligence support to Nigerian armed forces, but if the conflict
continues or worsens the “U.S. Special Forces could eventually be used beyond their current training
capacity, or the United States could decide to directly target Boko Haram's leadership.”

Sources

Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Is Nigeria the Next Front in the War on Terror? Read More




Migration & Displacement:




                                                                                                   Page | 21
                               ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
        In light of political instability and conflicts occurring in the Arab Spring, Khalid Koser of
Brookings-LSE discusses the three matters that are of concern to the MENA regions regarding migration
and displacement:

           1. New and Continuing Displacement
              In Syria, 156,000 people have been displaced this past year, according to the Internal
              Displacement Monitoring Centre, making the total of internally displaced persons
              589,000. The UNHCR has an estimate of more than “88,000 registered Syrian refugees,
              in Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq.” As the level of violence in Syria increases, so does
              the number of those fleeing for safety- a matter of deep concern since Syria hosts about
              one million Iraqi refugees, 100,000 of which receive UNHCR aid, and nearly half a million
              Palestinian refugees. Reports say that some Iraqi refugees have returned back to Iraq.
              Parts of the Syrian regime have accused the Palestinians of supporting the revolution,
              worrying analysts that the regime may attack the refugee camps, but widespread
              violence, displacing some Palestinians is more probable. An estimated 175,000 people
              have been displaced this year in Yemen and the estimated half million displaced last
              year in Libya have returned home, yet 70,000 people continue to be internally
              displaced.

           2. Filling the Protection Gap for Foreign Nationals
              “At the level of international institutions, the focus for IOM’s annual International
              Dialogue on Migration in 2012 was ‘Migration Consequences of Complex Crises.’ Among
              the chair’s recommendations were: greater coordination between humanitarian,
              migration and development policies and actors in order to better integrate the different
              principles and procedures often adopted in these separate realms; and more coherent
              links between short-, medium- and long-term responses. Another recommendation was
              for vulnerability mapping, acknowledging that existing categories for crisis-affected
              populations do not always capture the vulnerabilities experienced by those displaced in
              crises. A third recommendation was for more innovative partnerships between the
              various U.N. agencies, international and non-governmental agencies involved in
              migration crises such as Libya, but also including a role for the private sector. There
              may, for example, be a role for the private sector in the provision of micro-insurance to
              migrants to help them cope with emergency situations.”

           3. Developing Regional Protection Frameworks
              Egypt and Tunisia have been applauded for keeping their borders open to Libyan
              refugees, however Egypt has been criticized for not protecting the refugees during the
              Egyptian revolution and Tunisia has been criticized for not inhibiting refugees from
              trying to reach Europe by boat. The MENA has poor framework for the protection of
              displaced people as for the most part they “are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee
              Convention and its 1967 Protocol… Even in those countries in the region that are
              signatories, international protection principles have tended to be poorly applied.” The


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                                  ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
                 UNHCR is currently working on helping Egypt and Tunisia improve their legislation
                 regarding refugees and asylum seekers. “And direct experience of displacement,
                 combined with regime change based on concerns about dignity, rights, social justice,
                 legitimate governance and representative democracy, should provide an opportunity to
                 strengthen international protection principles, at both the national and regional levels.”

Sources

Brookings, Migration, Displacement and the Arab Spring: Prospects for the Next Year, Read more




ANALYSIS
Romney’s Vice Presidential Choice
Now that Romney has enough delegates to win the Republican nomination, talk is centering on his
choice for a vice presidential running mate.

Traditionally vice presidential candidates are chosen to balance the ticket or overcome weakness of the
presidential candidate. Obama picked Senator Biden, who had more years in Washington and would
offset the inexperience of Obama. McCain picked Palin to energize the conservative base that wasn’t
excited by the more moderate McCain.

VP candidates are also chosen for geographical balance and to help the candidate win a critical state.
These were two reasons why Kennedy picked Johnson in 1960.

Romney’s weaknesses are a lackluster character that doesn’t excite the voter and a lack of Washington
Experience. He could also make a pick based on winning a key state.

If geographic balance and winning a state are important criteria, than Tim Pawlenty, the former
Minnesota governor and onetime Romney primary-season foe would be a good choice. Privately, some
Romney campaign officials have noted that Mr. Pawlenty has impressed them with his work as a
Romney representative on the campaign trail and with the press. “He’s never done a bad interview”
while acting as a campaign spokesman, said one Republican operative.

Moreover, Mr. Pawlenty’s background as the son of a truck driver from South St. Paul, Minn., is a
potential counterweight to Mr. Romney’s wealth. The former governor also could help Mr. Romney in
the battleground states of Minnesota and neighboring Iowa, both of which the campaign sees as
potential pickups from President Barack Obama’s 2008 column.


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                                 ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
Senator Ron Portman from Ohio also has some of the same geographical balance qualities. Portman
backers played an important part in Romney’s narrow Ohio victory, especially in the voter-rich suburbs
of southwestern Ohio. For much of the winter, Portman also informally advised top Romney strategists.
After the Ohio primary, during the tail end of the Romney-Santorum battle, Portman took on an
influential, if private, role in preparing Romney’s general-election operation in the Buckeye State. He
consulted on hires and connected Romney aides with Ohio-based GOP operatives. Perhaps most
notably, Portman has impressed Romney headquarters with his fundraising prowess. Instead of seeking
appearances on cable talk shows, one Romney aide says, Portman focuses on working his donors.
Among Romney advisers, Portman’s fundraising savvy is as prized as his policy smarts.

Senator Mark Rubio has also been mentioned for VP since he comes from the critical swing state of
Florida. His parents come from Cuba, so he is Latino. He is not expected to be able to win the majority
of the Hispanic vote, but could keep Obama’s margin lower than in 2008. One downside is that Rubio is
still in his first term and is inexperienced. Yet, he will able to tie down those critical Florida electoral
votes.

Another state that Romney may be looking at is Wisconsin, which has acted more Republican in the last
two years than in the past. Representative Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, the Budget Committee Schairman in
the house, has submitted paperwork to the Romney campaign. Sources confirm that he is being vetted
for the vice-presidential nomination.

Ryan, one of the GOP’s brightest young stars, is clearly a favorite of Romney allies. But some top
Republican officials are wary of plucking him from the House, where he is the party’s most influential
voice on fiscal issues. Ryan previously stumped for Romney in late March and early April, ahead of
Wisconsin’s Republican presidential primary.

One name that is frequently mentioned but probably will not be chosen is New Jersey Governor Chris
Christie. Although Christies is popular in a state that is considered Democratic, he would not be a good
match. A Romney/Christie ticket would be geographically unbalanced since both are from the
Northeast, a Democratic stronghold. Christie also has liberal stands on several conservative hot button
issues like abortion and gun rights. He might make Romney comfortable, but he would not make the
Republican base comfortable.

Another strategy for Romney is to pick someone with conservative credentials who knows Washington.
One such choice would be Senator John Thune of South Dakota. Thune had considered a run for
president, but stayed on the sidelines. Thune, who holds a master’s degree in business administration
from the University of South Dakota, says one of Romney’s challenges will be to win over the swaths of
the Rust Belt that President Obama swept four years ago. Thune is also an evangelical Christian, which
would help in evangelical Christian corners, where they are still suspicious of Romney’s Mormonism.

If Romney wants more excitement on the ticket, he could pick Governor Nikki Haley of South Carolina.
Not only is she a female governor, her parents were immigrants from India – a rapidly growing American
immigrant community. She is the youngest governor at 40 and has conservative credentials that appeal
to the Republican base.

                                                                                                   Page | 24
                                 ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
Another American-Indian being considered is Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal. Not only is he a
governor (considered good experience for president) he was Assistant Secretary for Health and Human
Services in the last Bush Administration. He has also been a member of Congress. As governor, he
restored Louisiana’s credit rating – something that would make him that much more attractive as a VP
choice. One problem with Jindal is that some anti-immigrant parts of the Republican Party will question
is ability to be president since he was born to Indian citizens instead of Americans.

A long shot for the position is Senator Jon Kyl, who is retiring from the Senate this year. The Arizonian is
the second in command in the Senate Republican leadership and very highly regarded for his work, even
though he is not well known. He has strong conservative credentials and has made it known that he is
open to being on the ticket if asked. He also has strong national security credentials, which is a
weakness for Romney.



The Romney Foreign Policy Team

Romney’s strength is his business background. Consequently, he is something of a blank slate on foreign
policy and much of his policy will be shaped by his current campaign foreign policy team. Not
surprisingly, the team is very heavy with people who served in the George W. Bush administration.
That’s rather inevitable, given that the previous Republican administration (Bush SR) left office in
January 1993–almost twenty years ago.

It is interesting to note that the Washington Think Tank called Foreign Policy Initiative may have a major
influence on any possible Romney administration. There are also several people who have been
associated with the conservative Heritage Foundation.

Here is some of the team:

Eliot Cohen. Well known for his neo conservative positions. Director of the Strategic Studies Program
at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Counselor to the United
States Department of State (2007-2009); Defense Policy Advisory Board Member (2001-2009).

Michael Chertoff. Will specialize in counterterrorism and intelligence. United States Secretary of
Homeland Security (2005-2009); Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (2003-
2005).

Eric Edelman. Will specialize in proliferation issues. Visiting Scholar at School of Advanced International
Studies at Johns Hopkins University; Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (2005-2009); Principal Deputy
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (2001-2003).

Michael Hayden. Will specialize in counterterrorism and intelligence. Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (2006-2009); Director of the National Security Agency (1999-2005).




                                                                                                   Page | 25
                                ‫مركز الدراسات األميركية والعربية‬
Mary Beth Long. Will probably help develop Middle East policy. Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (2007-2009)

Robert Kagan. Highly regarded by both left and right wings of American politics. Is a contributing editor
to the liberal New Republic and the conservative Weekly Standard. Senior Fellow at the Brookings
Institution in the Center on United States and Europe; Board Member of the Foreign Policy Initiative.

Walid Phares. Will probably be one of team mem on the Middle East. Professor of Global Strategies at
the National Defense University in Washington; Member of the Advisory Board of the Task Force on
Future Terrorism at the Department of Homeland Security (2006-2007).

Daniel Senor. Iraq Provisional Authority Spokesman and Senior Advisor (2003-2004); Director and Co-
Founder, Foreign Policy Initiative.

Meghan O’Sullivan. Will be an advisor on the Middle East. Lecturer at Kennedy School of Government;
Special Assistant to President George W. Bush and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and
Afghanistan (2004-2007).




Mounzer A. Sleiman Ph.D.
Center for American and Arab Studies
Think Tanks Monitor
National Security Affairs Analyst

C: 301 509 4144




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