Google opening brief in Posner appeal by FlorianMueller

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									          Case: 12-1548     Document: 131     Page: 1    Filed: 03/14/2013

                        Appeal Nos. 2012-1548, 2012-1549


                      APPLE INC. AND NEXT SOFTWARE, INC.
                    (formerly known as NeXT Computer Inc.),


          MOTOROLA INC. (now known as Motorola Solutions, Inc.) AND
                         MOTOROLA MOBILITY, INC.,


 Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
                in case no. 11-CV-8540, Judge Richard A. Posner

                 MOTOROLA SOLUTIONS, INC.

Kathleen M. Sullivan                   David A. Nelson
Edward J. DeFranco                     Stephen A. Swedlow
SULLIVAN, LLP                          SULLIVAN, LLP
51 Madison Ave., 22nd Floor            500 W. Madison St., Suite 2450
New York, NY 10010                     Chicago, IL 60661
(212) 849-7000                         (312) 705-7400

Charles K. Verhoeven                   Brian C. Cannon
SULLIVAN, LLP                          SULLIVAN, LLP
50 California St., 22nd Floor          555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111                Redwood Shores, CA 94065
(415) 875-6600                         (650) 801-5000

                                       Attorneys for Motorola Mobility LLC and
                                       Motorola Solutions, Inc.
           Case: 12-1548     Document: 131     Page: 2    Filed: 03/14/2013

                         CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
      Counsel for Appellee-Cross-Appellants Motorola Mobility LLC and

Motorola Solutions Inc. certifies the following:

      1.      The full name of every party or amicus represented by me is:

      Motorola Mobility LLC, formerly known as Motorola Mobility, Inc. On
      June 22, 2012, Appellant Motorola Mobility, Inc. was converted into a
      Delaware limited liability company, changing its name to Motorola Mobility

      Motorola Solutions, Inc., formerly known as Motorola, Inc., is incorporated
      under the laws of Delaware and has its principal place of business in
      Schaumburg, Illinois.

      2.      The name of the real parties in interest represented by me is:


      3.      All parent corporation and any publicly held companies that own 10

percent or more of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by me are:

      Motorola Mobility LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Google Inc., a
      publicly held company.

      The stock of Motorola Solutions, Inc. is publicly traded. No publicly held
      entity owns 10 percent or more of the stock of Motorola Solutions, Inc.
      Motorola Solutions, Inc. has no parent corporation.

      4.      The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that

appeared for the party or amicus now represented by me in the trial court or agency

or are expected to appear in this Court are:

      See the Addendum to Motorola’s Certificate of Interest on the following

             Case: 12-1548   Document: 131    Page: 3   Filed: 03/14/2013


      Counsel for Appellees-Cross-Appellants Motorola Mobility LLC and

Motorola Solutions Inc. certifies the following:

      The names of all law firms and partners or associates that appeared for the

parties now represented by me in the agency or that are expected to appear in this

court are:


Jennifer Anne Bauer
Cheryl A. Berry
Jeffrey Neil Boozell
Meghan Bordonaro
Linda J. Brewer
Brian C. Cannon
Thomas W. Cushing
Edward J. Defranco
David Eiseman
David M. Elihu
Charles P. Emanuel
Richard W. Erwine
Kevin Johnson
Rebecca Frihart Kennedy
David A. Nelson
Raymond N. Nimrod
Graham Morris Pechenik
David Andrew Perlson
Matthew Robson
Carlos A. Rodriguez
Alexander Rudis
David L. Shaul
Amy Lynn Signaigo
Kevin A. Smith
Robert William Stone
Kathleen M. Sullivan

           Case: 12-1548   Document: 131    Page: 4   Filed: 03/14/2013

Stephen A. Swedlow
Matthrew A. Traupman
Charles Kramer Verhoeven
Amanda S. Williamson
Thomas R. Watson


Scott W. Hansen
Lisa Nester Kass
Lynn M. Stathas


Mitchell S. Feller

   Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 5   Filed: 03/14/2013

                            Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 13, 2013        By:      s/Kathleen M. Sullivan
                            Kathleen M. Sullivan
                            Edward J. DeFranco
                            QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
                            SULLIVAN, LLP
                            51 Madison Ave., 22nd Floor
                            New York, NY 10010
                            (212) 849-7000

                            Charles K. Verhoeven
                            QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
                            SULLIVAN, LLP
                            50 California St., 22nd Floor
                            San Francisco, CA 94111
                            (415) 875-6600

                            David A. Nelson
                            Stephen A. Swedlow
                            QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART &
                            SULLIVAN, LLP
                            500 W. Madison St., Suite 2450
                            Chicago, IL 60661
                            (312) 705-7400

                            Brian C. Cannon
                            QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN,
                            555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor
                            Redwood Shores, CA 94065
                            (650) 801-5000

                            Attorneys for Appellees-Cross Appellants

             Case: 12-1548             Document: 131             Page: 6         Filed: 03/14/2013

                                       TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................................ix

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................... 1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .......................................................................... 4

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ........................................... 5

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................. 6

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ........................................................... 9

        A.      Motorola’s Contributions To Cell Phone And Wireless
                Standards ............................................................................................... 9

        B.      Apple’s Refusal To Pay FRAND Royalties On SEPs ........................ 10

        C.      Apple’s ‘949 Patent ............................................................................. 11

        D.      Apple’s ‘263 Patent ............................................................................. 13

        E.      Apple’s ‘647 Patent ............................................................................. 14

        F.      Motorola’s ‘559 Patent ........................................................................ 14

        G.      Motorola’s ‘712 Patent ........................................................................ 15

        H.      Motorola’s 898 Patent ......................................................................... 16

        I.      The District Court Decisions Excluding Damages Experts And
                Denying Injunctive Relief ................................................................... 16

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 17

ARGUMENT – ISSUES ON APPEAL................................................................... 20

        TO PERFORM THE CLAIMED COMPUTER FUNCTIONS. ................... 20

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       A.      The Term “Heuristics” Connotes No Definite Structure Or
               Algorithm ............................................................................................ 20

       B.      Claim 1 Of The ‘949 Patent Is A Means-Plus-Function Claim,
               As Found By The District Court ......................................................... 21

       C.      Claim 1 Is Invalid As Indefinite Because There Is Insufficient
               Structure Recited In The Specification ............................................... 23

       D.      To The Extent Sufficient Structure Is Disclosed, The District
               Court Properly Limited The Next Item Heuristic To A Right
               Tap .......................................................................................................26

       “REALTIME API.” ....................................................................................... 28

       TERMS FROM THE ‘647 PATENT. ........................................................... 31

       A.      The District Court Correctly Construed The Term “Analyzer
               Server” ................................................................................................. 31

       B.      The District Court Correctly Construed The Phrase “Linking
               Actions To The Detected Structures” ................................................. 35

       JUDGMENT DENYING RELIEF ON APPLE’S PATENTS. .................... 37

       A.      The Court Properly Excluded Apple’s Damages Expert For
               The ‘949, ‘263 and ‘647 Patents And Granted Summary
               Judgment Denying Damages ............................................................... 38

               1.       Napper Failed To Measure The Value Of The Patented
                        Features Of The ‘949 Patent ..................................................... 38

               2.       Napper Had No Reliable Evidence To Identify Design-
                        Around Alternatives To The ‘263 Patent .................................. 39

               3.       Napper Improperly Valued The ‘647 Patent Based On
                        Facts Unrelated To This Case ................................................... 40

       B.      The District Court Correctly Denied Apple Injunctive Relief ............ 42

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                1.       Apple Failed to Show Any Causal Nexus To Irreparable
                         Harm.......................................................................................... 43

                2.       Apple Failed To Show That Monetary Damages Are
                         Inadequate ................................................................................. 45

                3.       The Balance Of Hardships Favors Motorola, And An
                         Injunction Would Not Be In The Public Interest ...................... 47

ARGUMENT – ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL .................................................... 48

I.     The District Court Erred in its Claim Construction of the ‘559 Patent. ........ 48

       A.       The Court Erroneously Required That The Steps Of Claim 5
                Must Be Performed In Sequential Order ............................................. 48

                1.       Claim 5 Does Not Impose Any Storage Or Temporal
                         Requirement On The “Forming” Steps .................................... 49

                2.       Nothing In The Specification Directly Or Implicitly
                         Requires Claim 5 To Be Performed In Strict Order ................. 50

       B.       The Court Read The Preferred Embodiment Out of Claim 5 ............. 51

       ‘712 PATENT. ............................................................................................... 53

III.   The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment of No
       Damages for the ‘898 Patent. ........................................................................ 56

       A.       Motorola’s Damages Theory Is Valid And Supported By The
                Evidence .............................................................................................. 59

       B.       The District Court Improperly Discounted The Opinions Of
                Motorola’s Expert Charles Donohoe .................................................. 62

       STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS. ..................................................... 63

       A.       Injunctions Are A Remedy Authorized By Congress For All

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        B.       FRAND Commitments Do Not Waive The Right To Injunctive
                 Relief ................................................................................................... 67

        C.       Imposing An Automatic Rule Barring Injunctions For
                 Standards-Essential Patents Upsets The Balance Between
                 Patent Owners And The Public ........................................................... 68

        D.       Motorola Should Be Allowed To Make Its Case For Injunctive
                 Relief At Trial ..................................................................................... 71

                 1.       The District Court Failed To Apply The eBay Factors............. 71

                 2.       Material Fact Disputes Should Have Precluded The
                          District Court’s Ruling That Motorola Could Not Obtain
                          An Injunction ............................................................................ 72

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................74

Material has been deleted from pages 9, 10, 21, 46 of the nonconfidential Brief of
Defendants-Cross-Appellants Motorola Mobility LLC and Motorola Solutions, Inc.
This material is deemed confidential information pursuant to the Protective Orders
entered January 28, 2011 (A1-A26) and February 1, 2012 (A596). The material
omitted from these pages contains confidential deposition testimony, confidential
business information, confidential patent application information, and confidential
licensing information.

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Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc.,
      659 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................... 51

Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
     551 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 66

AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A,
     657 F.3d 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................... 55

Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,
       318 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ..................................................................... 48

Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC,
     474 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ..................................................................... 34

Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,
      886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012) ....................................................... 64

Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,
      No. 3:11-cv-00178-BBC, 2012 WL 5416941, at *15 (W.D. Wis. Oct.
      29, 2012) ........................................................................................................ 68

Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-178-BBC, 2012 WL
      5943791, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 28, 2012)

Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,
      No. 3:11-cv-178-BBC, 2012 WL 5943791 (W.D. Wis. Nov.
      28, 2012) ........................................................................................................ 71

Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
      678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................43, 45

Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd.,
      695 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................43, 44

Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.,
      435 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..................................................................... 59

             Case: 12-1548          Document: 131           Page: 11       Filed: 03/14/2013

Aristocrat Technologies Australia PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Technology,
      521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .........................................................20, 23, 24

Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc.,
      574 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ..................................................................... 24

Cybersettle, Inc. v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc.,
     243 Fed. Appx. 603 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ............................................................ 48

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
     509 U.S. 579 (1993)................................................................................passim

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
      547 U.S. 388 (2006)................................................................................passim

Edwards Lifesciences AG v. Corevalve, Inc.,
     699 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ...............................................................46, 66

ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc.,
      700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ....................................................................... 23

ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC,
     629 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ..................................................................... 64

Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,
     112 F.3d 495 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ....................................................................... 54

Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co.,
      185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ..................................................................... 61

In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Lit.,
       639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ..................................................................... 22

Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,
      256 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ..................................................................... 48

Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc.,
      689 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012) ......................................................................... 61

Lewis v. CITGO Petroleum Corp.,
      561 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2009) ......................................................................... 38

               Case: 12-1548             Document: 131             Page: 12         Filed: 03/14/2013

Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp.,
    525 F. 3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 30

Mass. Inst. Of Tech. v. Abacus Software,
      462 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ..................................................................... 21

Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
     395 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................... 35

On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH,
     386 F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..................................................................... 52

Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
       415 F. 3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..............................................................30, 55

SSL Servs., LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc.,
      No. 2:08-cv-158-JRG, 2012 WL 1995514, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 4,
      2012) .............................................................................................................. 61

State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc.,
       884 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ..................................................................... 59

Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.,
       716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ..................................................................... 70

Storer v. Hayes Microcomputer Products, Inc.,
      960 F. Supp. 498 (D. Mass. 1997) ................................................................. 22

TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp.,
      646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ....................................................................... 66

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
     456 U.S. 305 (1982)....................................................................................... 42

Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc.,
     550 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ..................................................................... 22

WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Technology,
    184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ..................................................................... 23


19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) ................................................................................................. 67

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28 U.S.C. §1295(a)(1) ................................................................................................ 4

28 U.S.C. §1331 ......................................................................................................... 4

28 U.S.C. §1338 ......................................................................................................... 4

35 U.S.C. §112 ...................................................................................................20, 21

35 U.S.C. §154(a) .................................................................................................... 65

35 U.S.C. §283 .............................................................................................42, 65, 67

35 U.S.C. §284 ......................................................................................................... 58

                                          OTHER AUTHORITIES

In re Certain Personal Data and Mobile Commc’ns Devices and Related
       Software,Inv. No. 337-TA-710, ITC LEXIS 2874, at *34, 42 (Dec. 29,
       2011) .............................................................................................................. 41

U.S. Const. art. I, §8 ................................................................................................. 65

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) ................................................................................................... 4

Fed. R. Evid. 702 ...............................................................................................38, 62

Order, Dated January 16, 2012 (DKT 526) .................................................... A40-58

Order, Dated January 25, 2012 (DKT 556) .................................................... A59-68

Order, Dated March 19, 2012 (DKT 671) ...................................................... A69-89

Order, Dated March 29, 2012 (DKT 691) ...................................................... A90-95

Order, Dated April 27, 2012 (DKT 826) ...................................................... A96-100

Order, Dated May 22, 2012 (DKT 956) ....................................................... A101-22

Opinion and Order, Dated June 22, 2012 (DKT 1038) ................................ A123-60

             Case: 12-1548          Document: 131          Page: 14       Filed: 03/14/2013

Judgment, Dated June 22, 2012 (DKT 1039) ..................................................... A161

U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647............................................................................. A162-77

U.S. Patent No. 6,343,263............................................................................. A178-93

U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949........................................................................... A194-555

Order, Dated October 13, 2011 (DKT 176) ................................................ A3312-85

Order, Dated March 30, 2012 (DKT 706) ................................................ A12688-90

Order, Dated April 9, 2012 (DKT 751) .................................................... A14702-06

Order, Dated June 5, 2012 (DKT 1003) ................................................. A100146-49

U.S. Patent No. 5,319,712....................................................................... A100181-87

U.S. Patent No. 6,175,559....................................................................... A100209-15

U.S. Patent No. 6,359,898....................................................................... A100216-21

Order, Dated May 20, 2012 .................................................................... A140427-29

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                     STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
      Prior to dismissal in November 2012, the Court was considering Apple’s

appeal of an ITC decision involving infringement by HTC Corp. of the ‘647 and

‘263 patents at issue here, Apple Inc. v. ITC, No. 2012-1125 (Fed. Cir. filed Dec.

29, 2011), and HTC’s appeal from that same decision regarding the ‘647 patent,

HTC Corp. v. ITC, No. 2012-1226 (Fed. Cir. filed Feb. 24, 2012). A December

2011 ITC exclusion order prohibited HTC from importing devices that infringe the

‘647 patent. In re Certain Personal Data and Mobile Commc’ns Devices and

Related Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-710, USITC Pub. No. 4331 (Dec. 19, 2011)

(Final). Also related to that case was Apple Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 1:10-cv-00166-

GMS (D. Del. filed Mar. 2, 2010), which was stayed pending completion of the

proceedings arising from the ITC. In November 2012, Apple and HTC dismissed

all current lawsuits pursuant to a global settlement. This Court therefore dismissed

the consolidated appeals. HTC Corp. v. ITC, No. 12-1226, Dkt. No. 43 (Fed. Cir.

Nov. 15, 2012); Apple Inc. v. ITC, No. 12-1125, Dkt. No. 48 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15,


      The ‘647 patent is also at issue in Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,

Ltd., No. 5:12-cv-00630-LHK (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 8, 2012). This Court recently

considered Samsung’s appeal of the district court’s grant of a preliminary

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injunction, but that appeal was limited to a single patent not at issue here. Apple

Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 12-1507 (Fed. Cir. filed July. 6, 2012).

      Apple has filed a complaint against Samsung in the ITC that involves the

‘949 patent. In re Elec. Digital Media Devices, Inv. No. 337-TA-796 (U.S.I.T.C.

filed July 5, 2011). The ITC has not issued a final determination. The target date is

currently set for August 1, 2013. Apple had also asserted the ‘263 patent against

Nokia in the District of Delaware, but all claims and counterclaims were dismissed

when the parties settled. Nokia Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00791-GMA (D.

Del. filed Oct. 22, 2009).

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                          PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
      In the almost two decades preceding Apple’s introduction of the iPhone,

Motorola—together with others in the telecommunications industry—developed

the mobile communication technology that we now take for granted. Contributing

both its patented and non-patented research and development, Motorola worked

with standards-development organizations (“SDOs”) to improve the ability of

mobile devices to transmit, receive and process data by developing

telecommunications and wireless standards that allow different devices to operate

compatibly. Motorola and others developed large portfolios of standard-essential

patents (“SEPs”)—technology that must be licensed in order to practice a

particular standard. The system worked. Industry participants cross-licensed each

other, creating ever more efficient networks and advantages to consumers.

      Apple is a relative newcomer to cellular communications. In 2007, Apple

released the iPhone, its first device that relies upon cellular communications

technology. The product has generated billions of dollars in profits. Yet Apple

has not paid one dollar for its use of Motorola’s hundreds of fundamental patents.

      The district court was correct to dismiss Apple’s claims for infringement of

three patents directed to user interface features. The district court also correctly

dismissed Apple’s claim for damages under the Daubert standard, finding its

experts’ damages theories unreliable, because they failed to use reliable

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benchmarks and failed to consider reasonable design around costs. The district

court also correctly dismissed Apple’s claim for an injunction under the eBay

factors, because Apple failed to show any nexus between any irreparable harm and

infringement of its patents.

      In its brief, Apple touts its user interface design as propelling Apple’s

“meteoric rise.” Apple Opening Brief (“AOB”) at 2. But Apple ignores that it

sells a cellular phone, and that its phone uses technology developed by others.

Apple’s mobile applications and user interface design would mean nothing if

Motorola and others had not invested in the development of fundamental

communications standards.

      Motorola’s cross-appeal concerns three of its SEPs: the ‘559 patent

(essential to 3G cellular standard), the ‘712 patent (essential to WiFi), and the ‘898

patent (essential to GPRS cellular standard). For the ‘559 and ‘712 patents, the

district court erred in claim construction and used those incorrect constructions to

find that the patents were not infringed. For the ‘898 patent, the district court’s

claim construction was correct, but the court nevertheless wrongly dismissed

Motorola’s claims, ruling that neither damages nor an injunction were available for

Apple’s infringement.

      In rejecting Motorola’s claim for damages for infringement of its SEPs, the

district court failed to take into account that patents essential to a

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telecommunication standard are extremely valuable. Technology incorporated into

standards is voted upon by industry participants, and represents the industry’s best

available solution for standards that are adopted worldwide. Motorola owns a

portfolio of SEPs and licenses them as a portfolio. Because of the nature of

SEPs—which all cover a defined standard, meaning an implementer of the

standard infringes all patents on that standard—has never licensed its SEPs on a

patent-by-patent basis. The best available evidence of damages for Motorola’s

SEPs is therefore its portfolio rate. Motorola submitted expert testimony that

different patents can have different contributions to the value of a standard, and

that in practice, the first patent negotiated from a portfolio may command a

disproportionate portion of the portfolio rate. The district court rejected that theory

and ruled that Motorola’s damages must be measured by valuing the patent in

question at the time right before it is contributed to the standard—many years

before Apple began infringement. This was error. The statute provides for a

“reasonable royalty” that is based on a hypothetical negotiation occurring at the

time of first infringement, not an ex ante valuation of the patent.

      As to the denial of any injunctive relief to Motorola, the district court set

forth a seemingly categorical rule against injunctions for infringement of essential

patents whose holders commit to SDOs to offer licenses on fair, reasonable and

non-discriminatory (“FRAND” or “RAND”) terms. Under this rule, the district

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court declined to examine Apple’s refusal to accept a license over years of

infringing use. That ruling requires this Court’s reversal, because the district

court’s automatic rule that injunctions are never available for SEPs is contrary to

the Patent Act, which provides injunctions as a statutory remedy; to the equitable

principles of eBay; and to Motorola’s FRAND commitments to the SDOs at issue

here, which did not waive its rights to injunctive relief. Subject to the terms of the

FRAND commitments at issue, the same injunction rules should apply to SEPs as

to all other patents, and while the traditional factors reaffirmed in eBay set a high

bar, Motorola should be given the chance to surmount it.

      The district court’s rulings require this Court’s vacatur or reversal because

they devalue essential patents as a manner of protecting fundamental research and

development, upset the settled expectations of contributors to industry standards,

and create disincentives going forward for others to participate in standards

development that have served consumers well for decades.

                       JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
      Motorola agrees that this Court has jurisdiction over Apple’s appeal.

Motorola timely filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal from the final judgment. Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a). The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and

1338, and this Court has jurisdiction over the cross-appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.


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      Issues on Appeal

      1.       Did the district court (a) rule correctly that the ‘949 patent’s claims

are means-plus-function claims, and, in the alternative, (b) err in failing to rule that

Apple’s ‘949 patent claims—directed to ambiguous software “heuristics” for

accomplishing functions—are invalid as indefinite, because they rely on purely

functional claiming?

      2.       Did the district court err in its claim construction of the term “realtime

application program interface” from Apple’s ‘263 patent?

      3.       Did the district court correctly construe the disputed terms of Apple’s

‘647 patent?

      4.       Did the district court (a) properly exclude Apple’s damages expert for

the ‘949, ‘263 and ‘647 patents for lacking foundation to rely on the costs of non-

infringing alternatives, and (b) properly deny Apple a permanent injunction,

because Apple failed to establish irreparable harm?

      Issues on Cross-Appeal

      1.       Did the district court err in its construction of Motorola’s ‘559 patent?

      2.       Did the district court err in its construction of Motorola’s ‘712 patent?

      3.       Did the district court err in (a) granting summary judgment of no

damages for infringement of Motorola’s ‘898 patent where factual issues existed

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that should have been heard by the jury, and (b) excluding the reliable testimony of

Motorola’s damages experts?

      4.     Did the district court err in applying an automatic rule that injunctions

are never available for patents declared essential to SDOs, and thus in declining to

consider evidence that Apple was an unwilling licensee?

      Apple released its first cell phone—the iPhone—in 2007. It did not seek a

license from Motorola for any of Motorola’s patents related to the cellular or

wireless communication standards Motorola helped to develop, even though it is

undisputed that the iPhone leverages these same standards.             Consequently,

Motorola approached Apple to initiate licensing discussions. But after years of

refusal by Apple to negotiate in good faith for a license to Motorola’s patents, and

the launch of a lawsuit by Apple against HTC alleging infringement of a number of

Apple patents by the same Android platform that Motorola used in its offerings,

Motorola filed suit against Apple in both the district courts and the International

Trade Commission.      Shortly thereafter, Apple extended its action against the

Android platform by suing Motorola in a number of venues.

      This appeal arises from a complaint that Apple filed in the Western District

of Wisconsin on October 29, 2010, alleging that Motorola’s offerings infringed

three Apple patents. Motorola filed a counterclaim alleging that Apple infringed

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six patents. Apple then filed an amended complaint, adding twelve additional

patents. The case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois in December

2011, with Judge Posner, sitting by designation, presiding.

      This appeal concerns a subset of the patents originally raised by the parties,


          • Apple’s Patent Nos. 7,479,949 (“‘949 patent”) [A194-551]; 6,343,263

            (“‘263 patent”) [A178-193]; and 5,946,647 (“‘647 patent”) [A162-


          • Motorola’s Patent Nos. 5,319,712 (“‘712 Patent”) [A100181-87];

             6,175,559 (“‘559 patent”) [A100209-215];         and 6,359,898 (“‘898

            patent”) [A100216-221].

      The district court issued a number of orders that are relevant to this appeal:

      On October 13, 2011, the district court construed the phrase “transmit

overflow sequence number” in Motorola’s ‘712 patent, holding that it cannot be

transmitted to the receiver. A333-3341.

      On January 16, 2012, the district court provided initial claim constructions

for Apple’s ‘949 patent in its summary judgment order, finding that the ‘949 patent

claims “gesture towards” the step-by-step process required for means-plus-function

claims. A45-47.

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      On January 25, 2012, the Court construed “realtime application program

interface,” in Apple’s ‘263 patent to mean: “API that allows realtime interaction

between two or more subsystems.” A66-68.

      On March 19, 2012, the district court construed claim 5 of Motorola’s ‘559

patent, A85-86, and certain terms in the ‘647 patent, A76-79. The Court also held

that the claims of the ‘949 patent were means-plus-function claims. A80-83.

      On March 29, 2012, the Court provided a supplemental claim construction

order for Apple’s ‘949 patent, where the Court determined the structure in the

specification for each claim. A90-95. The district court denied Apple’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s claim construction for the ‘949 patent on March 30,

2012. A12688-90.

      On April 27, 2012, the Court granted in part Motorola’s renewed motion for

summary judgment of non-infringement of Apple’s ‘949 patent. A96-100.

      On May 20, 2012, the district court construed an additional limitation in

claim 5 of the ‘559 patent, holding that the “forming” steps in the patent must be

performed in order. A140427-29.

      On May 22, 2012, the Court struck the damages experts of both sides, ruling

that neither party’s expert had presented sufficiently rigorous damages analyses.


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                                                                      Material Omitted

      The Court granted Apple summary judgment of non-infringement for claim

5 of the ‘559 patent on June 5, 2012. A100146-49.

      On June 22, 2012, the Court granted both sides summary judgment on the

grounds that neither side was entitled to monetary or injunctive relief. A123-160.

The court dismissed the cases in their entirety. Id.


    A.     Motorola’s Contributions To Cell Phone And Wireless Standards
      Motorola has been a pioneer in phone and radio technology, and was

responsible for the first-ever commercial portable cellular telephone in 1983.

A118036-37. As part of that research and development, Motorola has participated

in approximately 30 SDOs, including the European Technical Standards Institute

(“ETSI”). A117796. Members of SDOs like Motorola work together to determine

technical solutions enabling interoperability among manufacturers’ products and

then implement those solutions into standards. Sometimes, those standards use

patented technology. A117793. When member companies declare their patents

essential to a standard, often they agree to license those patents on FRAND/RAND

terms. A117794, A117797-98.

      Motorola has successfully negotiated and entered into cross licenses for its

standards essential patents with

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                                                                          Material Omitted

Motorola’s portfolio has generated                          in royalties and, through

cross-licensing, additional value in the form of freedom of operation for Motorola

to develop its own mobile devices. A118883.

    B.      Apple’s Refusal To Pay FRAND Royalties On SEPs
        Apple has not historically participated in SDOs and only recently joined

ETSI.    A117800.     Utilizing the technology developed by Motorola and other

companies, Apple entered into the cell phone market in 2007. A117800. Apple

knew that Motorola owned essential patents, but released its phone without seeking

a license. A117801.

        Shortly after Apple released the first generation iPhone in the summer of

2007, Motorola reached out to Apple to initiate cross-license discussions.

A117802. Motorola offered to license its standards essential portfolio to Apple in

exchange for a 2.25% royalty on licensed sales, the same proposal Motorola has

made to dozens of other companies. A118883-85. But Apple made plain at the

parties’ initial meeting that it had no intention of taking a license. A104856.

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      Motorola continued to seek to license its portfolio to Apple, but for years

Apple resisted taking a license, rejected Motorola’s proposals, and refused to

provide any counter-offer. A118885-86. Up through the fall of 2010, when

Motorola filed this lawsuit, Apple had still failed to make any reasonable licensing


    C.      Apple’s ‘949 Patent
      Apple’s ‘949 patent claims “heuristics” for translating finger movements on

a touchscreen device into computer commands. A194-555. Apple asserted claim

1 and dependent claims 2, 9 and 10. A4799. Claim 1 of the patent provides:

              A computing device, comprising:

                    a touch screen display;

                    one or more processors; memory; and

                    one or more programs, wherein the one or more programs are
                    stored in the memory and configured to be executed by the one
                    or more processors, the one or more programs including:

                    instructions for detecting one or more finger contacts with the
                    touch screen display;

                    instructions for applying one or more heuristics to the one or
                    more finger contacts to determine a command for the device;

                    instructions for processing the command;

                    wherein the one or more heuristics comprise:

                            a vertical screen scrolling heuristic for determining that
                            the one or more finger contacts correspond to a one-
                            dimensional vertical screen scrolling command rather

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                           than a two-dimensional screen translation command
                           based on an angle of initial movement of a finger contact
                           with respect to the touch screen display;

                           a two-dimensional screen translation heuristic for
                           determining that the one or more finger contacts
                           correspond to the two-dimensional screen translation
                           command rather than the one-dimensional vertical screen
                           scrolling command based on the angle of initial
                           movement of the finger contact with respect to the touch
                           screen display; and

                           a next item heuristic for determining that the one or
                           more finger contacts correspond to a command to
                           transition from displaying a respective item in a set of
                           items to displaying a next item in the set of items.


      At claim construction, the district court adopted Apple’s definition of

heuristics as “one or more rules to be applied to data to assist in drawing inferences

from that data.” A45-47. But the court construed the ‘949 heuristic elements as

means-plus-function claims, finding: “Apple’s patent cannot cover every means of

performing the function of translating user finger movements into common

computer commands on a touch-screen device—that would be a patent on all

touch-screen computers.” A83.

      Following the court’s claim construction rulings, Motorola filed a renewed

motion for summary judgment, A14713-49, which the court granted in large part.

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A96-100. The remainder of the case concerning the ‘949 patent was dismissed due

to Apple’s failure to prove any damages. 1 A123-61.

    D.     Apple’s ‘263 Patent

      Apple’s ‘263 patent relates to a system to perform “realtime” services using

a “realtime API” allowing the host processor to interact with the realtime

subsystem. A178-93. Claim 1 of the patent provides:

      1. A signal processing system for providing a plurality of realtime services
to and from a number of independent client applications and devices, said system

             a subsystem comprising a host central processing unit (CPU)
             operating in accordance with at least one application program and a
             device handler program, said subsystem further comprising an adapter
             subsystem interoperating with said host CPU and said device;

             a realtime signal processing subsystem for performing a plurality of
             data transforms comprising a plurality of realtime signal processing
             operations; and

             at least one realtime application program interface (API) coupled
             between the subsystem and the realtime signal processing subsystem
             to allow the subsystem to interoperate with said realtime services.

A190. The district court adopted Apple’s proposed construction for “realtime

API,” A66-68, and denied Motorola’s motion for summary judgment of non-

infringement, A14702-06.

          In December 2012, the USPTO issued an Ex Parte Reexamination Non-
Final Office Action finding the ‘949 patent preliminarily invalid as anticipated and
obvious. Reexam – Non-Final Action, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Dec.                 3,              2012,                available                at

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    E.      Apple’s ‘647 Patent
        Apple’s ‘647 patent is directed to a system that detects “structures” (e.g.,

phone numbers) in documents, links user actions to those structures, and provides

users with the ability to select one of those actions. A162-77. Claim 1 provides:

        A computer-based system for detecting structures in data and performing
        actions on detected structures, comprising:

              an input device for receiving data;

              an output device for presenting the data;

              a memory storing information including program routines including

              an analyzer server for detecting structures in the data, and for linking
              actions to the detected structures;

              a user interface enabling the selection of a detected structure and a
              linked action; and

              an action processor for performing the selected action linked to the
              selected structure; and

              a processing unit coupled to the input device, the output device, and
              the memory for controlling the execution of the program routines.


        The Court adopted Motorola’s proposed constructions for the term “analyzer

server” and the phrase “linking actions to the detected structures.” A76-79.

    F.      Motorola’s ‘559 Patent
        Motorola’s ‘559 patent covers important aspects of 3G technology, and

allows mobile devices to initiate communications with cellular stations more

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effectively. A118080. Claim 5 of the ‘559 patent is dependent on claim 1 and


      5. A method for generating preamble sequences in a CDMA system, the
      method comprising the steps of:

              forming an outer code in a mobile station;

              forming an inner code in the mobile station utilizing the following

                    where sj, j= 0,1, . . .,M-1 are a set of orthogonal codewords of
                    length P, where M and P are positive integers; and

              multiplying the outer code by the inner code to generate a preamble

A100215. The Court adopted Apple’s proposed constructions, A86, and then

granted summary judgment of non-infringement, A14703, A100146.

    G.      Motorola’s ‘712 Patent

      Motorola’s ‘712 patent covers certain WiFi technology.            A108970-71.

Claim 17 of the ‘712 patent provides:

      17. In a communication system having a physical layer, data link layer, and
      a network layer, a method for providing cryptographic protection of a data
      stream, comprising:

              (a) assigning a packet sequence number to a packet derived from a
              data stream received from the network layer;

              (b) updating a transmit overflow sequence number as a function of
              the packet sequence number; and

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               (c) encrypting, prior to communicating the packet and the packet
               sequence number on the physical layer, the packet as a function of the
               packet sequence number and the transmit overflow sequence number.

A100186. The Court adopted Apple’s proposed construction, A3340-41, and then

granted summary judgment to Apple of non-infringement. A40-42.

    H.       Motorola’s 898 Patent
         The ‘898 patent is directed to a method in which a mobile device informs a

cellular station of when it can expect the mobile to be finished with a transmission.

It provides greater advanced warning to the cellular station of the impending

completion of a transmission than prior art methods did.

    I.       The District Court Decisions Excluding Damages Experts And
             Denying Injunctive Relief

         The district court excluded Apple’s damages expert Brian Napper from

offering testimony regarding Apple’s patents. A116-17, A119. The court found

that Napper failed to exercise the same level of intellectual rigor as would be used

in the field outside litigation. A111-119. The court also found that Apple could

not prove irreparable harm, or that the balance of harms favored granting an

injunction, because Apple’s patents related to only minor features in the accused

products. A155-57.

         The district court also excluded Motorola’s damages expert Carla Mulhern,

and her testimony regarding damages for the ‘898 patent based on a portion of the

established portfolio rate.     A121.    In addition, the court excluded portfolio

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licensing expert Charles Donohoe’s declaration. A138-39. As a result, the court

granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment of no damages for the ‘898 patent.

A140. Finally, the court granted Apple’s motion for summary judgment that

Motorola could not obtain an injunction on the ‘898 patent, because it was a

standard essential patent, without regard to the standard commitment Motorola had

made or the evidence of Apple’s refusal to negotiate in good faith. A140-143.

                           SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
        The ‘949 Patent: The asserted claims of the ‘949 patent do not contain

sufficient structure (in this case a computer algorithm) to perform the functions

specified in the claims. As a result, the district court correctly determined that the

“heuristic” elements in these claims must be interpreted as means-plus-function

claims.    The district court erred in part, however, in its identification of the

corresponding structure from the specification for performing the claimed function,

because the specification did not provide sufficiently definite structure linked to

the claimed functions.

        The ‘263 Patent: The district court improperly construed the term “realtime

API.”     The court should have found that a “realtime API” must itself have

“realtime” functionality by placing specific time constraints on the execution of the

API. Some of the claims of the patent recite a “realtime API” providing the

interface between applications and the realtime subsystem, while others recite an

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API without the modifier “realtime” providing the same interface. This dictates a

distinction between “realtime” API’s and other API’s, which the district court’s

construction eliminates.

      The ‘647 Patent: The district court properly construed “analyzer server” in

Apple’s ‘647 patent. Intrinsic evidence supports the court’s construction. The

district court also properly construed “linking actions to the detected structures.”

      Apple’s Damages and Injunction Claims:              The district court properly

excluded the expert opinions of Apple’s damages expert Brian Napper. Napper’s

damages opinions failed the basic prerequisites to survive Daubert.

      The district court also correctly found that Apple was not entitled to

permanent injunctive relief. Apple’s patents relate to only minor features in the

accused products, and there is no evidence in the record of any causal nexus to any

irreparable harm from their infringement.

      The ‘559 Patent: The district court improperly construed Motorola’s ‘559

patent, because it held incorrectly that the steps in the patent must be performed in

specific sequence, and determined that the same codeword cannot be repeated,

which excludes the preferred embodiment.

      The ‘712 Patent: The district court erred in its construction of “transmit

overflow sequence number” by ruling that it can never be transmitted by the

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wireless device to the receiver, improperly relying on non-contemporaneous

extrinsic evidence.

      Ruling of No Available Damages for the ‘898 Patent: The district court

improperly rejected Motorola’s claim for damages. The district court improperly

required Motorola to value its patent ex ante—at the time right before the standard

was adopted, years before Apple’s infringement. This Court’s precedent requires

that a reasonable royalty be determined as of the time of first infringement—at

which point Motorola’s FRAND commitments and cross-licensing considerations

would be taken into account—but the district court failed to apply this standard.

      Availability of Injunctions for Standards-Essential Patents: The district

court improperly held that Motorola could not obtain an injunction on the ‘898

patent, which is essential to the GPRS standard and subject to FRAND

commitments carefully defined by ETSI. Without referencing the actual terms of

the ETSI commitments (which include no prohibition on seeking injunctions), the

court ruled that the holder of SEPs is categorically unable to obtain injunctive

relief against willful infringers. The traditional eBay factors should apply to SEPs,

just as is the case with any other patent.

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                      ARGUMENT – ISSUES ON APPEAL

      Apple’s appeal on the ‘949 patent should be rejected because the district

court correctly found the heuristic elements of claim 1 should be interpreted as

means-plus-function, A80-83, and because there is no structure or algorithm

recited in the claims by which the claimed computer system could perform the

claimed heuristic functions. 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶6. Pure functional claiming of

computer functions without recitation of an algorithm would render the claim

indefinite. Aristocrat Technologies Australia PTY Ltd. v. Int’l Game Technology,

521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

     A.      The Term “Heuristics” Connotes No Definite Structure Or
          Claim 1 of the ‘949 patent claims “instructions for applying” three

“heuristics for determining” how to perform certain functions—vertical screen

scrolling versus two-dimensional screen translation, and moving to the next item.

A549-50. Nowhere in the patent is the term “heuristic” defined. A194-555. In its

brief, Apple deems heuristics “engineer-speak for rules applied to data . . . to assist

in drawing inferences . . . from that data.” AOB 7 (emphasis added). Apple’s

vague reference to “engineer-speak” is telling. Claims are written for those of

ordinary skill in the art, i.e., software engineers in this instance. But none of the

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                                                                          Material Omitted

named engineer inventors could define what “heuristics” meant. When asked to

define heuristics at his deposition, inventor Paul Marcos said

                               A5054 at 15:23-24.        Named inventor Scott Herz

answered that

            A5046 at 95:20-96:16.

       “Heuristics” is an imprecise concept that does nothing to delineate a

particular structure or algorithm to perform the recited function. Therefore, unless

the term is interpreted in means-plus-function fashion, claim 1 does not cover a

specific invention but merely refers to an idea for an invention. This is improper

functional claiming. See, e.g., Mark Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of

Functional Claiming (July 25, 2012), Stanford Public Law Working Paper No.

2117302, available at 2117302 (last visited March 12,

2013). Such functional claiming fails to put the public on notice of what is

covered by each patent, which stifles innovation. 2

    B.     Claim 1 Of The ‘949 Patent Is A Means-Plus-Function Claim, As
           Found By The District Court
      If a claim limitation does not use the words “means” or “means for,” there is

a rebuttable presumption against construing the limitation as means-plus-function.

         The USPTO has recently sought comments on how to address the issue of
functional claiming in software-related patents under 35 U.S.C. §112. Request for
Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of
Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. Reg. 292-02 (Jan. 3, 2013).

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Mass. Inst. Of Tech. v. Abacus Software, 462 F.3d 1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

This presumption can be overcome if a claim “fails to recite sufficiently definite

structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing

that function.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

      For example, in Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., this Court determined that

the claim limitation at issue should be construed as means-plus-function, even

though the limitation did not use the word “means.” 550 F.3d 1090, 1095-1097

(Fed. Cir. 2008). This Court noted that “the generic terms mechanism, means,

element, and device, typically do not connote sufficiently definite structure [to

avoid means-plus-function treatment] . . . The term mechanism standing alone

connotes no more structure than the term means.” Id. at 1096 (internal quotations

omitted) (emphasis removed).

      The term “heuristic” is similarly generic; it encompasses any and all rules

for accomplishing the function set forth in the claims. See, e.g., Storer v. Hayes

Microcomputer Products, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 498, 502-503, n. 5 (D. Mass. 1997)

(equating a “heuristic” to an “algorithm,” “method,” or “means.”)          The law is

well-settled that, when a generic function of a general purpose computer is recited

in the claims without sufficient structure claimed to perform the function, the claim

must be interpreted to incorporate the specific algorithm recited in the specification

linked to the claimed function. In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Lit.,

          Case: 12-1548      Document: 131      Page: 39   Filed: 03/14/2013

639 F.3d 1303, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2011). See also ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software,

Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 518-19 (Fed. Cir. 2012); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game

Technology, 184 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

      Apple attempts to find structure in the claim by pointing out the other

generic limitations, which include a “computing device” with a touchscreen,

processors, memory and unspecified programs. AOB 26. A “computing device” is

insufficient structure within the claim, as every software patent requires some type

of computing device. A generic computer alone does not describe the structure

needed to carry out the described function. Aristocrat Technologies, 521 F.3d at

1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Claim 1 of the ‘949 patent therefore should be analyzed as

a means-plus-function claim, looking to the specification to determine whether

sufficient structure exists for the claim to survive.

     C.    Claim 1 Is Invalid As Indefinite Because There Is Insufficient
           Structure Recited In The Specification
      The district court was correct that the heuristic elements of claim 1 should be

construed as means-plus-function claims. However, as alternative grounds for

affirmance of judgment in favor of Motorola on the ‘949 patent, this Court should

hold that the district court was incorrect in finding that there was sufficient

structure in the specification linked to each of the claimed functions.

      “If the specification is not clear as to the structure that the patentee intends

to correspond to the claimed function, then the patentee has not paid the price but

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is attempting to claim in functional terms unbounded by any reference to structure

in the specification.” Aristocrat Technologies, 521 F.3d at 1333 (citation omitted).

“That ordinarily skilled artisans could carry out the recited function in a variety of

ways is precisely why claims written in ‘means-plus-function’ form must disclose

the particular structure that is used to perform the recited function.” Blackboard,

Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Without claiming

a definite structure, a patentee is attempting “to capture any possible means for

achieving that end.” Id.

      In Aristocrat, this Court was unable to find structure for the function

“‘pay[ing] a prize when a predetermined combination of symbols is displayed in a

predetermined arrangement of symbol positions selected by a player[.]’” 521 F.3d

at 1334. Figure 1 and Table 1 in the patent provided examples of how player

selections could translate to possible winning combinations, but that was not

sufficient. They were “at most, pictorial and mathematical ways of describing the

claimed function of the game control means. That is not enough to transform the

disclosure of a general-purpose microprocessor into the disclosure of sufficient

structure to satisfy section 112 paragraph 6.” Id. at 1335. Therefore, this Court

found that the claims were invalid.

      The description of the way to perform the claimed heuristic functions in the

specification of the ‘949 patent is similarly deficient. The structure identified by

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the district court for the vertical screen scrolling and two-dimensional translation

heuristics, Figure 39C, contains only one dotted arrow with the notation “<27º”

and another dotted arrow with the notation “>27º.”

A345. Nowhere in the figure or elsewhere in the specification does the patent

outline any of the rules or parameters that must be considered to implement these

functions, (such as speed, acceleration or distance traveled by the measured input),

nor does it explain how to determine the “angle of initial movement.” See A194-

555. The same is true for the alleged structure of the next item heuristic, Figure

16A, which contains merely a dotted arrow (1616) and a dotted circle (1620).

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A229. The specification notes myriad variables that may be analyzed to interpret

the characteristics of finger gestures (e.g., speed, acceleration), but does not

disclose an algorithm that uses these variables to interpret a finger gesture as a next

item command. A496 col. 15:10-13. Claim 1 is therefore invalid as indefinite.

     D.    To The Extent Sufficient Structure Is Disclosed, The District Court
           Properly Limited The Next Item Heuristic To A Right Tap
      To the extent there is sufficient structure disclosed in the specification

corresponding to any of the claimed heuristic functions, the district court properly

held that the next item heuristic must be limited to a tap on the right side of the

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screen, rather than a “swipe” from right to left. An algorithm corresponding to the

next item heuristic must be able to determine whether a particular gesture is

intended to be a next item command. A necessary corollary to this is that the

algorithm must be able to determine that a given gesture corresponds to one

command (e.g., a next item command) rather than a different command (e.g., a

horizontal screen scrolling command).

      Apple argues, AOB 31, that the district court erred in its premise that claim

1 requires that “a horizontal finger swipe should be interpreted as a command to

shift the screen horizontally.” A93. In Apple’s view, claim 1 instead covers a

“‘two-dimensional’ (diagonal) swipe,” which it argues is different than a horizontal

swipe. AOB 31-32. This argument has no support in the patent. On the contrary,

Figure 39C shows that a vertical screen scrolling command will be implemented if

the user’s angle of initial finger movement is less than 27º, and that all movements

at an angle greater than 27º will implement a two-dimensional screen translation

command. A345. By definition, a horizontal 90º swipe would fall within this

threshold and would trigger a two-dimensional translation command.

      Apple is also incorrect that the district court “appears to have confused claim

1 with dependent claim 10, which does cover a situation where a horizontal swipe

may lead to a ‘one-dimensional horizontal screen scrolling command.’” AOB 32.

Apple made this argument in its motion for reconsideration of the district court’s

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order, and the district court rejected it, stating “[a]t page 4 of my opinion I compare

the next item heuristic not to claim 10’s horizontal screen scrolling function, but to

claim 1’s diagonal translation function.” A12689. The district court found the

“inconsiderate sloppiness” of Apple’s “flagrant misreadings” of the district court’s

order to be “unprofessional and unacceptable,” yet Apple attempts to advance the

same arguments again here. A12689-90.

      Apple has also waived its argument that “the patent does not describe a

device where ‘the same user finger movement is understood to communicate two

separate commands’ at the same time,” AOB 32. While Apple argues that “the

district court misunderstood the invention,” AOB 22, in fact, Apple did not raise

this argument until its motion for reconsideration of the district court’s claim

construction regarding the next item heuristic; at that time, the district court

“decline[d] to consider the merits” of the argument, because “Apple failed to

advance [the waived argument] anywhere in its briefing of the construction of the

‘949 patent prior to this motion to reconsider,” and Apple therefore forfeited it.



      The district court construed the term “realtime API,” as recited in claims 1

and 2 of Apple’s ‘263 patent to mean: “API that allows realtime interaction

between two or more subsystems.” A68. To the extent this Court reverses the

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district court’s rulings relating to damages and injunctive relief on the ‘263 patent,

it should reverse its construction of “realtime API”, because it reads the “realtime”

limitation on the API itself out of the claim.

       The ‘263 patent claims recite at least two API types that interoperate with

realtime devices. The first type, recited in claim 1 and at issue here, is a realtime

API: “at least one realtime application program interface (API) coupled

between the subsystem and the realtime signal processing subsystem to allow the

subsystem to interoperate with said realtime services.” A190 col. 11:39-42. The

other type, recited in independent claim 31, is an API without any realtime

requirement: “at least one application programming interface for receiving the

requests generated by said device handler program and issuing commands to said

realtime engine to perform the requested data transformations.” A191 col. 14:40-

43 (emphasis added).

       The APIs of both claims 1 and 31 allow for realtime operations of other

components by providing an interface to the realtime subsystem, per the express

language of the claims. But the realtime API of claim 1 also must itself be

realtime. 3

         Indeed, the ‘263 inventors chose to identify several components in claim
1 as realtime, but did not require that every element within the system be
“realtime.” For example, the “realtime signal processing subsystem” and “realtime
API” are explicitly recited to be “realtime,” while other components in claim 1

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      The inventors’ deliberate use of the “realtime” modifier within the claim

confirms that “realtime” elements must have realtime functionality. See Phillips v.

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (use of the word “steel” in the

term “steel baffles” of the claim “strongly implies” a difference between steel

baffles and other, non-steel baffles).

      The district court’s construction requires the “realtime API” to “allow[]

realtime interaction between two subsystems,” A68, which facially might suggest

that the “realtime” modifier for the API is addressed by the construction. But a

closer look reveals otherwise.       Claim 1 independently requires the claimed

realtime API “to allow the subsystem to interoperate with said realtime services,”

meaning that the “realtime” modifier of the API in the claim must provide an

additional limitation. Indeed, this Court rejects constructions where they would

“ascribe[] no meaning to the term . . . not already implicit in the rest of the claim.”

Mangosoft, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 525 F. 3d 1327, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

      Motorola proposed two constructions for this term:

      •      “an API that itself has defined upper bounded time limits” 4

      •      “API facilitating constant bit rate data handling”


(e.g., adapter subsystem, application program, device handler program, etc.) are
not. See A190 col. 11:28-43.
          The district court did not consider this construction and deemed it
“untimely.” A6352.

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The International Trade Commission, in the dispute between Apple and HTC

involving the ‘263 patent, adopted the following construction: “an API that

operates in realtime, i.e., as an API that operates with a defined upper bonded time

limit.” All of these constructions address the notion that the API itself must be

“realtime,” and for that reason, any are acceptable.

        FROM THE ‘647 PATENT.
        The district court construed two terms from Apple’s ‘647 patent: “analyzer

server” and “linking actions to the detected structures.” A76-79.

       A.   The District Court Correctly Construed The Term “Analyzer

        The district court adopted Motorola’s proposed construction for the term

“analyzer server,” construing it as “a server routine separate from a client that

receives data having structures from the client.” A78.

        In adopting Motorola’s construction, the district court relied on the claim

language—particularly the meaning of “server” to one of ordinary skill in the

art 5—and the only embodiment described in the specification. A77-78. The ‘647

patent describes “the program 165 of the present invention,” which contains the

          See, e.g., A10682-92; A10932-40; A10973; and A11963-70. The
commonly-held understanding of “server” is also evident from the arguments the
‘647 applicants made regarding the claimed invention during prosecution. See

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analyzer server, as being depicted in Figure 1 (A174 col. 3:37-44) separate from

the “[a]pplication 167”:


        On appeal, Apple presents no conflicting evidence about the meaning of the

term “server” or the description of the “analyzer server” in the intrinsic evidence.

Indeed, Apple acknowledges that the preferred (and only) embodiment in the

patent shows that the analyzer server is separate from the client applications, AOB

35, consistent with a “client-server” model. Instead, Apple claims that the ITC and

district court have “issued conflicting constructions.” AOB at 33-34. That is

incorrect. In the ITC case in question—which involved HTC, not Motorola—the

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parties agreed to a construction of “analyzer server.” 6 That construction was not

evaluated by either the ALJ or the Commission. Regardless, any ITC decision

would not be binding here, and thus Apple did not even raise the ITC proceedings

with the district court.

      Apple’s claim differentiation argument also fails. Apple argues that, under

the district court’s construction, dependent claims 3 and 10 improperly cover the

same subject matter of claim 1. AOB 35. But Apple is wrong.

      Claim 3 recites that “the input device receives the data from an application

running concurrently.” A176 col. 7:27-28. Moreover, claim 3 recites that the

“program routines stored in memory further comprise an application program

interface for communicating with the application.” Id. at 7:29-31. Claim 10

recites a different application that “causes the output device to present the data

received by the input device,” and “an application program interface that provides

interrupts and communicates with the application.” Id. at 7:58-61.

      The system of claim 1 is broader than dependent claim 3, because its input

device can receive data from an application running concurrently or not

concurrently, and it can work with or without an application program interface.

The system of claim 1 is similarly broader than dependent claim 10, because it can

          The citation in Apple’s own brief makes this clear. AOB 34 (citing the
Initial Determination at 28-29, which notes that the parties agreed to the
construction of “analyzer server.”). See also A10785-86.

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work with or without the recited application and application program interface of

claim 10. In light of these distinctions, any claim differentiation argument fails.

Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, 474 F.3d 1361, 1369-71 (Fed. Cir.

2007) (rejecting claim differentiation arguments where there were differences in

scope between the claims in question).

      Finally, Apple proposes its own construction—one that would eliminate the

“server” concept entirely and swap it out in favor of the broader, generic term

“program routine”:

      If claim 1 was not intended to require a server, the patentees could have

drafted the claims to recite a “program routine” for performing the various

“detecting,” “linking,” “enabling,” and “performing” steps without further

clarification. Indeed, they did so in claims 13, 14, and 15. A176 col. 8:1-33. They

included the term “server” in claim 1 because it has a specific meaning—a separate

component that serves various clients. “A claim construction that gives meaning to

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all the terms of the claim is preferred over one that does not do so.” Merck & Co.,

Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

     B.    The District Court Correctly Construed The Phrase “Linking
            Actions To The Detected Structures”
      The district court adopted Motorola’s proposed construction for the phrase

“linking actions to the detected structures,” construing the phrase as “creating a

specified connection between each detected structure and at least one computer

subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a sequence of operations on that

detected structure.” A78-79.

      Apple complains that the district court’s construction—and in particular the

“specified connection” language—is improperly based on the ‘647 specification’s

reference to “pointers,” which Apple claims is a preferred embodiment. AOB 37.

Apple instead proposes a construction that substitutes the word “associating” for

“linking.” AOB 36. But Apple’s purposely-vague proposal conflicts with the

intrinsic evidence.

      The ‘647 specification teaches that the analyzer server first “receives data

having recognizable patterns from a document. . . .” A174 col. 3:57-58. “Upon

detection of a structure, [the] analyzer server [] links actions associated with the

responsible pattern to the detected structure, using conventional pointers.” Id.

3:65-67 (emphasis added). The specification therefore draws a distinction between

associating and linking – a distinction Apple’s proposed construction eliminates.

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      Dependent claims 4 and 5 provide additional support. Claim 4 recites that

“the analyzer server includes grammars and a parser for detecting structures in the

data.” A176 col. 7:33-35. Claim 5 depends on claim 4 and further recites that “the

analyzer server includes actions associated with each of the grammars, and

wherein the analyzer server links to a detected structure the actions associated with

the grammar which detects that structure.” Id. at 7:36-40 (emphasis added). These

dependent claims use the verbs “linking” and “associating,” but in different

contexts, confirming that they should not be used interchangeably as Apple’s

construction suggests.

      Apple also argues that claim 1 requires linking multiple actions to each

detected structure. AOB 37. Apple is wrong. The plain language of the phrase

“linking actions to the detected structures” does not require multiple actions for

each detected structure. Indeed, a system that detects two structures, each with a

single linked action, would fall within the scope of this phrase (two detected

structures, two linked actions). Figure 4 of the ‘647 specification confirms this

point, A166, illustrating a date grammar for detecting a date structure that includes

only one associated action:

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      The district court properly excluded the testimony of Apple’s damages

expert (Napper) under Daubert, and then granted Motorola’s motion for summary

judgment that Apple could not establish damages for infringement of its ‘949, ‘263

or ‘647 patents. A116-17, A119. Napper failed to offer any opinions that anyone

outside of litigation would rely upon. Thus, none of the affirmative damages

methodologies or theories could be presented to a jury.

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     A.     The Court Properly Excluded Apple’s Damages Expert For The
            ‘949, ‘263 and ‘647 Patents And Granted Summary Judgment
            Denying Damages
       Under Rule 702, an expert may provide opinion testimony only if the

testimony “is the product of reliable principles and methods” and “the expert has

reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid.

702. The district court is the gatekeeper that ensures such expert testimony meets

the requirements of Rule 702. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,

589-90 (1993). The proponent of the expert testimony must demonstrate that the

opinion is both reliable and relevant for purposes of assisting the “trier of fact to

understand the evidence or determine a fact at issue in a case.” Lewis v. CITGO

Petroleum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Napper

did not reliably apply his theories to the facts of this case and would not have

assisted the jury. 7

              1.       Napper Failed To Measure The Value Of The Patented
                       Features Of The ‘949 Patent
       Napper utilized a comparison for the asserted claims of the ‘949 Patent to a

product that possessed none of the patented features. He based his analysis on

          Should Apple prevail on its arguments relating to Napper, this Court
should also overturn the district court’s exclusion of Motorola’s rebuttal damages
expert - Michael Wagner - on Daubert grounds. Contrary to the district court’s
ruling, Mr. Wagner did more than act as a conduit for fact testimony: Mr. Wagner
opined that based on fact testimony relating to availability of alternatives, a
reasonable royalty would be a lump sum. See A111-12. The Court did not find
Wagner otherwise unqualified to offer expert testimony on patent licensing.

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Apple’s Magic Trackpad, which, like a mouse, “operates by the user’s moving his

finger on the pad and then clicking; it is that movement that moves the cursor on

the computer screen.” A112. Napper reasoned that if Apple priced the Trackpad

at $69.99, and a mouse was priced at $49.99, that would mean consumers are

willing to pay $20 for the touch gestures of a Trackpad not present with a mouse.

Id. Napper then reduced this to $2, because he decided the Trackpad provided

more features than those claimed by the ‘949 patent. Notwithstanding the arbitrary

nature of this “calculation,” the fatal flaw in Napper’s “analysis” is that the

Trackpad contains none of the function asserted from the ‘949 patent. A22722-

28 at 312:9-318:3; A22732-33 at 322:19-323:9. Apple cannot, as a matter of law,

seek damages under the guise of the ‘949 for all touch gestures          or vertical

scrolling, A549-50 at 122:37-123:2.

            2.     Napper Had No Reliable Evidence To Identify Design-
                   Around Alternatives To The ‘263 Patent
      The district court struck Napper’s analysis of ‘263 patent damages in part

because Apple asserted that Motorola would agree to pay a royalty equal to the

cost of design-around, but failed to consider any objective evidence of that cost to

Motorola. A116-17. Napper’s sole reliance on a biased source—Apple’s own

technical expert, Dr. Polish—was unreliable, because Apple’s retained expert was

likely to inflate the cost of design-around for Motorola rather than identify the

lowest viable non-infringing alternative technology.       Id.   The district court

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suggested that Napper should have looked to other, impartial sources, to determine

whether an alternative technology existed, and, if it did, what the cost to Motorola

would have been to implement that technology. Id. The district court’s exclusion

of this testimony should be affirmed because Apple, as the party affirmatively

offering the cost of design-around as its damages measure, bears the burden of

establishing the reasonableness of its claim.

      With respect to the design-around Napper chose, he also failed to

demonstrate that the set-top box chip (and associated price) he referenced - which

has never been used in a cell phone and has nothing to do with cell phones - is

even an appropriate design-around for the ‘263 patent. Napper admitted at his

deposition that he did not do any investigation to determine if anyone ever bought

the chip at any price in 2005 (or ever), nor did he even look to see if the chip was

for sale at the relevant time. A22606-11 at 196:20-201:7; A22618-19 at 208:25-

209:22. He had no basis (reliable or otherwise) for his assertion that the set-top

box chip, and a fictional chip that would be inserted in a Motorola phone, were

related. A22599 at 189:1-14; A22606-08 at 196:20-198:5.

             3.    Napper Improperly Valued The ‘647 Patent Based On Facts
                   Unrelated To This Case

      For the ‘647 patent, Napper based his damage measurement on an estimate

of design-around costs based on a litigation scenario of another smartphone

manufacturer not involved in this action—HTC. AOB 49. HTC was required to

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design around the ‘647 patent because of an ITC exclusion order, which gave HTC

a four-month period to implement a design-around. Id.

      The district court properly excluded Napper’s damage theory, because it had

nothing to do with Motorola or Motorola’s cost of design-around (which Napper

was attempting to insert as the royalty payment Motorola would pay to Apple to

avoid this cost). A129-30, A140. For example, the ITC in the HTC litigation

construed the claims differently than the district court here (In re Certain Personal

Data and Mobile Commc’ns Devices and Related Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-710,

2011 ITC LEXIS 2874, at *34, 42 (Dec. 29, 2011)), so the implementation and

cost of a design-around could be different. The four-month period Napper used for

time to design-around was also arbitrary, as it was taken from the HTC period

provided by the ITC for that exclusion order; there was no evidence offered

concerning the time it would take Motorola to implement a design-around, or even

what that design-around would be. 8 Apple argues that these differences (as well as

the arbitrary nature of the design-around calculation) should go only to weight and

not to admissibility. AOB 50-51. However, the role of the district court as a

gatekeeper is to prevent the jury from hearing unreliable and arbitrary damage

theories based upon unrelated evidence.

          Napper’s opinion also was not based upon any evidence about HTC,
HTC’s accused products, or the engineering resources that HTC invested to modify
its products in response to the exclusion order. A130; A21058-60, 21258.

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     B.    The District Court Correctly Denied Apple Injunctive Relief
      The “decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of

equitable discretion by the district court” and “injunctive relief ‘may’ issue only ‘in

accordance with the principles of equity[.]” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,

547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (citing 35 U.S.C. §283). An injunction should not issue

“to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are merely trifling.”

Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1982) (internal quotation

and citation omitted). A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must show (1)

that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as

monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,

considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy

in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a

permanent injunction. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. The district court properly analyzed

these factors and determined that Apple was not entitled to seek injunctive relief.

      Apple argues that the district court “substitute[d] its own predictions for the

rigors of fact-finding.” AOB 54. Apple ignores the fact that the district court

requested briefing specifically on this issue and that Apple submitted all of its

“evidence” in its 44-page brief, along with its exhibits and deposition testimony.

A29025-81. Fact and expert discovery had closed, A157, so if Apple did not cite

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sufficient evidence in its briefing, it did not have sufficient evidence to warrant a


               1.     Apple Failed to Show Any Causal Nexus To Irreparable
         To show irreparable harm, Apple must establish both that “absent an

injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm” and “that a sufficiently strong causal

nexus relates the alleged harm to the alleged infringement.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung

Elecs. Co., Ltd., 695 F.3d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (hereinafter “Apple II”)

(rehearing en banc denied Jan. 30, 2013). Apple cannot establish this causal nexus

for any of its patents at issue. See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 678 F.3d

1314, 1323-33 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (hereinafter “Apple I”) (considering causal nexus

for each patent).

         Apple cannot establish irreparable harm if the patented feature itself “does

not drive the demand for the product, [because] sales would be lost even if the

offending feature were absent from the accused product.” Apple I, 678 F.3d at

1324. This Court has held that the causal nexus inquiry is crucial to the calculus,

as it informs whether the patentee “seeks to leverage its patent for competitive gain

beyond that which the inventive contribution and value of the patent warrant.”

Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1375. See also eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J.,

concurring).        The district court correctly found that Apple, rather than

demonstrating any facts establishing causal nexus between the specific patents at

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issue and the alleged harm, instead attempted to “turn the case into an Apple versus

Motorola popularity contest.” A152. The district court held that Apple’s “‘feel

good’ theory does not indicate that infringement of these claims (if they were

infringed) reduced Apple’s sales or market share, or impaired consumer goodwill

toward Apple products.” Id. Apple was unable to show that consumers buy any of

Motorola’s accused products because of the specific functionalities in the asserted

claims of the ‘949, ‘263 or ‘647 patents.

      Apple asserts that the ‘949 patent covers “touchscreen gestures” and that

“having a superior touchscreen interface” drives consumer demand for

smartphones. AOB 62, 65. But the ‘949 patent does not cover all touchscreen

gestures, nor does it cover “scrolling, panning, or pinch to zoom” or the general

ability to “scroll vertically, horizontally and in two dimensions on a touchscreen.”

Instead, the ‘949 patent claims only a particular way: (1) to lock into a vertical

scroll rather than move in two dimensions, and (2) to tap on the right side of the

screen to move to the next item. A549-50 at 122:37-123:2. Apple failed to show

that consumers buy the Motorola accused products because of the claimed

invention of the ‘949 patent as opposed to the ability to scroll or gesture generally

on a touchscreen. See Apple II, 695 F.3d at 1376. None of the evidence that Apple

cites describes the specific invention of the ‘949 patent as driving consumer

demand. In any event, the type of evidence Apple cites—testimony of Motorola

          Case: 12-1548     Document: 131     Page: 61   Filed: 03/14/2013

executives about what consumers may “expect”—is precisely the type of evidence

that this Court previously has rejected in this regard. AOB 65-66. See Apple I,

678 F.3d at 1327-28 (rejecting evidence of “infringer’s subjective beliefs as to why

it gained them (or would be likely to gain them)[]”).

      For the ‘263 patent, Apple cites to studies and surveys that claim that iPad

and iPhone users enjoy streaming video and audio and watching YouTube. AOB

8. Apple cites to no similar studies for consumers of Motorola’s products, which

is the only relevant inquiry to determine whether that is the reason that Apple lost

sales to Motorola. Apple’s only other citations involve Motorola’s subjective

beliefs as to why it might gain sales and are not relevant for this inquiry. AOB 67-

68; Apple I, 678 F.3d at 1327-28.

      For the ‘647 patent, Apple once again cites to Motorola identifying the

feature as a “differentiating” feature. AOB 68. A citation to the Orlando Sentinel

about a “cool” feature also does not constitute evidence sufficient to show that the

features of the ‘647 patent drive consumer demand for Motorola products. Id.

(citing A29893).

             2.    Apple Failed To Show That Monetary Damages Are

      Apple failed to demonstrate that monetary damages would be inadequate or

Motorola would be unable to satisfy a monetary judgment. “Precedent illustrates

the variety of equitable considerations, and responsive equitable remed[ies] in

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                                                                           Material Omitted

patent cases” such as “the grant of a royalty-bearing license instead of imposing an

injunction in situations where the patentee would experience no competitive

injury” or “where there is an overriding public interest in continued provision of

the infringing product.” Edwards Lifesciences AG v. Corevalve, Inc., 699 F.3d

1305, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).

      Although Apple contends that it “has a general policy against licensing its

inventions, particularly to competitors,”

AOB 55, 57. In fact, Apple originally submitted an expert report from Napper

calculating a reasonable royalty for all the remaining patents at issue. A20959-

21074. It was not until after the district court struck Napper’s report as unreliable

and granted Motorola’s summary judgment motion for no damages that Apple

began to argue that monetary damages were inadequate, and that its losses “defy

attempts at valuation.”    A29067.    The district court struck Apple’s damages

theories not because monetary damages are inadequate, but because Apple’s

theories were unreliable. As the district court noted, a patentee should not be able

to “base a claim to an injunction on a self-inflicted wound, such as sponsoring a

damages expert who prepares a demonstrably inadequate report.” A151.

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            3.     The Balance Of Hardships Favors Motorola, And An
                   Injunction Would Not Be In The Public Interest

      The district court properly found that an injunction would impose costs on

Motorola that are “disproportionate both to the benefits to it of having infringed

and to the harm to [Apple] and would thus be a windfall to the patentee and a form

of punitive rather than compensatory damages imposed on the infringer.” A147.

The district court was correct in recognizing that “[a]n injunction that imposes

greater costs on the defendant than it confers benefits on the plaintiff reduces net

social welfare.” A155-56.

      The district court also properly found that the public interest would not be

served by an injunction. A154-55. The harm to consumers who can no longer buy

the products they prefer, and the cost to the judiciary and the parties of

administering an injunction, far outweigh the alleged harm to Apple.         A154.

Apple’s contention that harm to consumers occurs every time an injunction is

granted, AOB 72, ignores the fact that the alleged inventions are small aspects of

extremely complex devices where (as discussed by Justice Kennedy) an injunction

would not serve the public interest. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97.

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      OF THE ‘559 PATENT.

     A.    The Court Erroneously Required That The Steps Of Claim 5 Must
           Be Performed In Sequential Order
      In its May 20, 2012 claim construction order, the district court construed

claim 5 of the ‘559 patent, such that each of the steps of the method claim must be

performed in sequential order. 9 A140429. The district court reached this result by

misreading the ‘559 patent’s specification and ignoring a critical portion of the


      The steps of a method claim need not be performed in the order written

unless sequential performance is required by logic, grammar, or the specification.

See Cybersettle, Inc. v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 243 Fed. Appx. 603, 609

(Fed. Cir. 2007); Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369-72 (Fed. Cir.

2003); Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1342

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

         The district court’s construction resulted in summary judgment of non-
infringement on claim 5, since Apple’s accused products practiced claim 5 out of
order. A100146-48.

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            1.     Claim 5 Does Not Impose Any Storage Or Temporal
                   Requirement On The “Forming” Steps

      The grammatical structure of claim 5 does not require the “forming” steps to

be completed prior to multiplication. Claim 5 refers to “forming,” not “completely

forming” or “fully forming.” A100215 col. 5:22-24. Likewise, the “multiplying”

step includes the phrase “multiplying the outer code by the inner code,” not

“multiplying the completely formed outer code by the completely formed inner

code.” See id. at 5:34-35.

      The plain language of the claims merely require that (1) the inner code is

formed as part of the method, (2) the outer code is formed as part of the method,

and (3) that outer code is multiplied by the inner code. Although those steps could

be conducted one after another, they could also be performed at the same time and

still satisfy the claim language and the purpose of the claimed invention. The

district court never found (and Apple never argued) the contrary. The district court

in fact acknowledged that “it’s possible for the multiplication step to begin while

the inner and outer codes are still forming.” A140428.

      Indeed, logic suggests that it would be better to perform the steps of claim 5

out of order. The ‘559 patent teaches, by Apple’s own admission, multiplying the

inner code by the outer code bit by bit, meaning each component of the inner code

is multiplied, component-wise, by the corresponding bit of the outer code.

100636-37; A100214 at 3:32-39; A102282-83.

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      Thus it is in fact more efficient to begin multiplication of the inner and outer

code bits before the last bits of the inner and outer code are formed. A140438-41;

A140455-58. Because the preamble sequence bits are transmitted over the air as

they are generated, forming and multiplying on the fly also avoids having to store

the entire inner or outer codes at any one point of time. Id.

             2.    Nothing In The Specification Directly Or Implicitly
                   Requires Claim 5 To Be Performed In Strict Order
      The specification of the ‘559 Patent likewise imposes no requirement on

whether the multiplication of the inner and outer code can begin before all of the

bits of the inner and outer code have been formed. See A100209-15. To the

contrary, the ‘559 patent specification contemplates practicing the invention in a

variety of hardware, where in the case of custom and programmable hardware it

would be preferable to practice the claim 5 not in strict sequential order. A100214

col. 4:15-17 (“The preamble generator of the present invention can be

implemented in custom hardware, programmable hardware, or software in a

microprocessor.”); see also A140438-41; 140455-58.

      The district court’s error stemmed from its undue reliance on column 2, lines

52-57 of the specification, which uses the phrase “present invention.” A100213.

The district court held that “[the patentee’s] reference to the ‘invention’ in [that

section]—in contrast to his repeated reference to preferred embodiments

elsewhere—indicates that he intended this description to be coextensive with the

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‘559 method.” A140428-29. This was incorrect. The portion of the specification

describing the types of hardware that would practice the invention also uses the

phrase “present invention.” A100214 at 4:15-17. As this Court has explained, “use

of the phrase ‘present invention’ or ‘this invention’ is not always so limiting, such

as where the references to a certain limitation as being the ‘invention’ are not

uniform, or where other portions of the intrinsic evidence do not support applying

the limitation to the entire patent.” Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc.,

659 F.3d 1121, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

    B.     The Court Read The Preferred Embodiment Out of Claim 5
      The district court erred in another construction relating to claim 5 by

excluding from the inner code an orthogonal codeword that is repeated – in other

words, an inner code where the orthogonal code words are not unique. See A85-

86. Motorola’s construction of the disputed phrase “wherein sj, J=0,1, . . . m-1 are

a set of orthogonal codewords . . .” in claim 5 was simple: “wherein sj, J=0,1, . . .

m-1 are taken from a set of orthogonal codewords . . .” A123032. Motorola’s

clarifying construction is consistent with the ‘559 patent specification, as shown by

the patent’s repeated use of the phrases “taken from” and “derived from.”

A100214 col. 3:66-67 (“These codewords are preferably taken from a set of

Hadamard codewords of length P.”), 4:4-5 (“the codewords are taken from a set of

orthogonal Gold codes.”), 4:5-6 (“The codewords may also be derived from a set

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of orthogonal codewords by upsampling.”). It is also consistent with unambiguous

language describing the preferred embodiment, where the inner code can be made

up of the same orthogonal codeword repeated, or from different codewords, as

long as they are from the same orthogonal set. Id. col. 3:57. The district court’s

construction on the other hand found no support in the specification and excluded

the preferred embodiment.

      It is well established that “a claim interpretation that excludes a preferred

embodiment from the scope of the claim is ‘rarely, if ever correct.’” On-Line

Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed. Cir.

2004) (citations omitted). The preferred embodiment describing the inner code

appears in the specification beginning at column 4, line 46. A100214. The patent

describes the preferred embodiment for the inner code and includes the same

equation that appears in the claim element at issue. At column 3, line 57, in the

sentence immediately following the same equation as appears in claim 5, the

specification states: “It is not-required that the orthogonal code words [that form

the inner code] are unique.” Id. col. 3:57. Thus, the specification expressly

discloses two configurations of the preferred embodiment: (1) the same code word

chosen from a set of orthogonal codewords is repeated over and over again to form

an inner code (the code words in the set are not unique), and (2) an inner code can

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include different codewords, as long as those code words are taken from the same

set of orthogonal codewords.

      Summary judgment of non-infringement of the ‘712 patent was granted on

January 17, 2012 based on a claim construction that the “transmit overflow

sequence number” (“TOSN”) patent is never transmitted to the receiver. A40-42.

Without support in the claim language or the specification, the district court

improperly read a negative limitation into the claim based on a statement made

nine years after the patent issued during the prosecution of a foreign counterpart in

Japan. A3340-41.

       Claim 17 of the ‘712 patent recites steps for encrypting a packet of data.

 A101588 at 8:65-9:12.     It is silent on what occurs after       encryption.   The

 transmission of the packet sequence number and the encrypted packet are not

 steps in the method, and their transmission is not required by the claim. See id.

 In fact, whether the encrypted packet or any other element claimed is ultimately

 transmitted is irrelevant to the encryption method of claim 17.

       The patent specification never discusses any purported benefits of keeping

 the TOSN private to the transmitter. A101583-89. Instead, the patent states the

 invention was intended to address the problems prior art encryption techniques

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had with reassembling packets that arrive at different times at their destination.

See A100213 col. 2:3-14, 17-20.

      The lower court did not disagree. Even by the district court’s own account,

the intrinsic evidence imposes no restriction on whether the TOSN can be


      [N]either the claim language nor the specification prohibits transmission of
      the overflow sequence number or gives any clear indication of what happens
      to the number. There is simply silence on the issue. . . . Thus, the question
      whether the overflow sequence number may be transmitted is not answered
      in the claim language or specification.

A3334-35 (emphasis in original).

      The district court should have stopped there, but it did not. Given claim 17’s

use of the word “comprising,” transmission of the TOSN is clearly within the

scope of the claim, since it is not otherwise prohibited by the specification.

Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The district

court, however, construed the TOSN term to include a negative limitation that

prevented its transmission to the receiver. A3341. In so doing, the district court

relied exclusively on statements made in a corresponding Japanese application

more than 9 years after the ‘712 Patent issued and on inventor testimony more than

15 years after the ‘712 Patent issued. A3335-40.

      At bottom, the court erred by giving statements made in the related foreign

prosecution the weight of compelling intrinsic evidence. The prosecution history

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of a related, foreign patent that post-dates the issuance of the ‘712 patent by nine,

10, and 11 years, however, is not intrinsic evidence and is irrelevant. See A3340-

41 (acknowledging that statements made during the Japanese prosecution are

extrinsic evidence); see also AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d

1264, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[O]ur precedent cautions against indiscriminate

reliance on the prosecution of corresponding foreign applications in the claim

construction analysis.”).

      Finally, for claim construction, the intrinsic evidence should not be

overruled by extrinsic evidence created after the patent has issued. To hold

otherwise would violate the policy of providing public notice of the breadth of

patent claims. There is no dispute as to how the TOSN would have been construed

during the first nine years of the life of the ‘712 patent. Claim terms should not

take on one unambiguous construction for well over half a decade, and then take

on an opposite construction due to statements made in another country under a

different set of patent laws. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F. 3d 1303, 1318-19

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[U]ndue reliance on extrinsic evidence poses the risk that it will

be used to change the meaning of claims in derogation of the indisputable public

records consisting of the claims, the specification and the prosecution history,

thereby undermining the public notice function of patents.”).

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       Motorola sought damages on its ‘898 patent based on a share of the value

previously paid in comparable licenses for Motorola’s portfolio of patents essential

to cellular standards.    Motorola would have demonstrated at trial that it has

previously received its 2.25% standard royalty rate in the form of royalty payments

and cross licenses (and combinations thereof). Motorola, through its experts and

through factual testimony in support of these expert opinions, demonstrated that

the most relevant and accurate measure of the reasonable royalty for a SEP that is

licensed as part of a portfolio is a share of the license that has been paid previously

under comparable patent licenses. This comparable license analysis accurately

reflects the hypothetical negotiation if such negotiations had led to a license at the

time of first infringement by Apple.

       Motorola’s expert determined reasonable royalty damages consistent with

Daubert and this Court’s precedent. While Apple would be free to argue at trial

that both the rate and base should be different, Motorola established a reliable

methodology for determining the royalty base associated with the 2.25% rate (i.e.,

historical and current comparable license analysis where the licensing marketplace

has recognized that this rate applied to the selling price of the device itself).

A20046-20328. The comparable licenses include some provisions unique to each

individual negotiation (e.g., royalty base caps, cross revenue payments and cross-

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licenses) but all of these licenses demonstrate that the proper royalty base for the

2.25% royalty is the selling price of the device. A20091-99. In the circumstance

where that royalty base is reduced, Motorola’s royalty rate would necessarily


      Further, the share of the portfolio royalty rate in this instance attributable to

the patent at issue would be non-linear (i.e., not just a proportional fraction based

upon the number of patents in prior licenses) because in a hypothetical negotiation

under this Court’s precedent Motorola’s SEPs at issue are presumed valid and

infringed. A20124. Not all patents within a standards-essential portfolio have the

same value: each patent covers different technology and inventions and has a

different relative technological contribution to the standard.        A20099-20101.

Motorola, for its part, would have offered technical expert testimony regarding the

value of the ‘898 patent as an invention and as a relative contribution to the

standard. See A20100. In addition, Motorola presented expert testimony that in

this market the first patents negotiated within this unique type of patent portfolio

command a disproportionate share of the royalty paid for the SEP portfolio.

A20101-04. Neither party disputes that Apple would not seek and Motorola would

not offer a license to a single cellular standards-essential patent because Apple

would only be able to utilize this patent if it had a license to the rest of Motorola’s

cellular standards-essential patents as well.

          Case: 12-1548     Document: 131    Page: 74    Filed: 03/14/2013

      As a cross-check on the reasonableness of the royalty, Motorola’s expert

compared the iPod Touch and iPhone, which are functionally the same device

except for the iPhone’s ability to communicate on the wireless cellular network.

A20107-09. She determined that $216 reflects the price of the iPhone directly

associated with cellular technology.    A20109.     She then determined that the

consumer demand for an iPhone driven by cellular functionality far exceeds this

$216 premium because she also analyzed the significant increased market demand

for an iPhone over an iPod Touch. A20093.

      The district court rejected Motorola’s theory, ruling that reasonable royalty

damages for infringement of standards-essential patents must be measured based

on the value of such patents before the standard is adopted, on a “patent qua

patent” basis:

             The proper method of computing a FRAND royalty starts
             with what the cost to the licensee would have been of
             obtaining, just before the patented invention was declared
             essential to compliance with the industry standard, a
             license for the function performed by the patent. That
             cost would be a measure of the value of the patent qua
             patent. But once a patent becomes essential to a
             standard, the patentee’s bargaining power surges because
             a prospective licensee has no alternative to licensing the
             patent; he is at the patentee’s mercy.

A140. As set forth below, Motorola’s damages theory is consistent with the

current law for damages established by this Court, and the district court erred in

prematurely rejecting it.

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     A.    Motorola’s Damages Theory Is Valid And Supported By The

      The Patent Act ties the amount of damages to the infringing acts: “the court

shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement[.]”

35 U.S.C. §284. This Court has consistently held that in the context of damages a

reasonable royalty is to be determined based on a hypothetical negotiation as of the

date infringement began. See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical

Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he hypothetical negotiation

relates to the date of first infringement.”); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc.,

884 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The determination of a reasonable

royalty…[is based] on what a willing licensor and licensee would bargain for at

hypothetical negotiations on the date infringement started.”).

      Motorola disclosed sufficient evidence to present a triable issue on its

damages theory. Mulhern considered evidence showing Motorola’s history of

licensing the asserted patents as part of its portfolio of cellular standards-essential

patents and evidence showing how Motorola’s portfolio rate would be apportioned

in a hypothetical negotiation as of 2007—the date of Apple’s first infringement—

involving only one patent or a small number of patents. A20046-328.

      The ex ante analysis required by the district court may be a relevant data

point, but it cannot be the beginning and end of the damages analysis because it

would value the patent years before infringement and would set the value before

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the technology had been tested in the market-place. If the patented technology

(incorporated into the standard) is not successful, the technology is replaced or

improved or the standard is abandoned. Evaluating the patent only before the

standard is released pegs the patent’s value years before the hypothetical

negotiation, when it may have been worth considerably less than it became after

the standard was implemented.

      In 2007, Motorola and Apple discussed a portfolio license. A118884-85.

Mulhern used 2007 as the date of the hypothetical negotiation. A20089. Mulhern

further properly analyzed relevant factors including the market and consumer

demand for cellular standards technology in the iPhone as compared to the iPod

touch, Motorola’s existing license agreements relating to its cellular standards-

essential patents, and, as described below, facts and expert opinions concerning

how to apportion Motorola’s portfolio rate for individual patents.

      In contrast, the district court properly excluded the opinions of Apple’s

damages expert Napper, who pointed to the cost of switching to non-infringing

alternatives as the bases for his opinions but failed to establish adequate foundation

for relying on those alternatives: Napper relied primarily on statements from

Apple witnesses and consultants, and did not investigate impartial sources to

evaluate what non-infringing alternatives were available to Motorola or the cost of

those alternatives. A115-17. The burden of proving availability of alternatives

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rests on the party who seeks to offer such evidence. Grain Processing Corp. v.

Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999); SSL Servs.,

LLC v. Citrix Sys., Inc., No. 2:08-cv-158-JRG, 2012 WL 1995514, at *3 (E.D. Tex.

June 4, 2012) (slip op.) (where noninfringing alternatives were actually “on the

market,” damages expert need not rely on foundation showing those alternatives

were available; in contrast to cases where alleged alternatives were not on the

market and “the burden shifted to the offering party’s expert to reliably

demonstrate that non-infringing alternatives would have been ‘available.’”)

(emphasis added).     While Apple’s expert Napper employed a fundamentally

flawed methodology and was properly excluded, whether Mulhern ought to have

considered additional facts is a credibility question that should have been left to the

jury; her opinions should not have been excluded on Daubert grounds.               See

Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc., 689 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A Daubert inquiry is not

designed to have the district judge take the place of the jury to decide ultimate

issues of credibility and accuracy. If the proposed expert testimony meets the

Daubert threshold of relevance and reliability, the accuracy of the actual evidence

is to be tested before the jury with the familiar tools of ‘vigorous cross-

examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the

burden of proof.’”) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,

596 (1993)).

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     B.     The District Court Improperly Discounted The Opinions Of
            Motorola’s Expert Charles Donohoe

      Motorola and Mulhern further properly apportioned Motorola’s portfolio

rate to value the ‘898 patent individually. In order to apportion the value of

Motorola’s portfolio and determine a reasonable royalty for a single patent,

Mulhern considered the opinions of Charles Donohoe, a patent licensing expert,

who opined that in practice a single patent within a standards-essential patent

portfolio, presumed valid and infringed, would command “a disproportionate share

of the overall portfolio rate,” “40 to 50 percent of the overall rate.” A20101-02;

A20330-38. Mulhern also consulted Motorola’s Director of Outbound Licensing,

Brian Blasius, who stated that in his experience a single patent or a small number

of patents within Motorola’s standards-essential portfolio would command “at least

50 percent” of the portfolio rate. A20102. Mulhern further considered published

evidence of patent licensing practices generally, and specifically relating to cellular

standards, as well as her own knowledge and experience as an expert economist, in

determining how to apportion Motorola’s portfolio rate for individual patents. See


      The district court initially agreed Donohoe was qualified as an expert on

standards-essential patent licensing, A137-38, but nevertheless determined that

Donohoe’s opinions could not support any damages award because Donohoe’s

opinions related to patent licensing generally. A137-39.

            Case: 12-1548   Document: 131       Page: 79   Filed: 03/14/2013

      First, Donohoe’s opinions were not improper under Rule 702 and Daubert:

expert testimony regarding general principles is appropriate and admissible. See

Advisory Committee Notes on the 2000 Amendments to Fed. R. Evid. 702 (“it

might . . . be important in some cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about

general principles, without ever attempting to apply these principles to the specific

facts of the case. . . . The amendment does not alter the venerable practice of using

expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general principles.”).

      Second, to the extent Donohoe’s deposition testimony was inconsistent with

his opinions set forth in his report regarding the value commanded by a single

patent or small set of patents within a portfolio, the jury, not the court, should have

resolved that credibility issue. See A138-39.

      Third, the testimony of Donohoe was not the only evidence Motorola

proffered on its royalty rates. Motorola intended to offer fact testimony from

witnesses including Dailey and Blasius discussed above. See, e.g., A118882-84,

A20102 at ¶131. Motorola should have been permitted to present this testimony to

the jury.

      The district court dismissed Motorola’s claim for injunctive relief because it

concluded, as a matter of law, that injunctive relief is “unavailable for infringement

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of a patent governed by FRAND.”          A141.    The district court did include a

qualification that an injunction would be justified if “Apple refuse[d] to pay a

royalty that meets the FRAND requirement,” but refused to consider the actual

facts of this case. See A140, 142 (stating, with respect to “Apple’s refusal to

negotiate for a license,” that it was “unnecessary for [the court] to resolve. . . why

negotiations broke down”).

      Injunctions are a statutory remedy provided for by Congress, and patent

owners have a fundamental right to pursue such remedies.            See, e.g., ERBE

Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Technology LLC, 629 F.3d 1278, 1292 (Fed. Cir.

2010) (applying Noerr-Pennington doctrine); Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.,

886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1075-1077 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (same). The district court

failed to apply the four-factor eBay test to evaluate Motorola’s claim for injunctive

relief. Instead, the district court improperly enacted a bright-line rule permitting

continued infringement not only of Motorola’s ‘898 patent, but all FRAND-

committed patents in Motorola’s portfolio irrespective of the terms of those

commitments, and even by parties that have consistently refused to take a FRAND


      Motorola offered considerable evidence showing that, unlike every other

major cellular handset manufacturer, Apple has been an unwilling licensee vis-à-

vis Motorola’s standards-essential patent portfolio. Apple’s refusal to negotiate in

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good faith has forced Motorola to pursue litigation patent-by-patent, in the district

courts and elsewhere, at significant cost to Motorola, the courts, and the public, to

try to obtain fair compensation for Apple’s use of Motorola’s patented inventions.

The district court disregarded this evidence and failed to properly conduct the fact-

specific inquiry required under eBay.

    A.     Injunctions Are A Remedy Authorized By Congress For All Patents
      Injunctions are a remedy for patent infringement authorized by Congress.

The FRAND commitments at issue in this case do not waive the right to seek

injunctions and thus should not deprive Motorola of that remedy. The Constitution

provides that Congress shall have power to secure exclusive rights for authors and

inventors for a limited time period. U.S. Const. art. I, §8. Congress enacted the

Patent Act, which provides that every patent shall contain “a grant to the patentee,

his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for

sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States, or importing the

invention into the United States. . . .” 35 U.S.C. §154(a). The Patent Act further

provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may

grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the

violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems

reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. §283.

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      This Court should decline to adopt a categorical rule barring injunctions for

all FRAND-committed patents because that would deprive the district courts of

their discretion to fashion appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis. Indeed,

this Court has repeatedly recognized that under eBay, the decision to grant or deny

injunctive relief rests within the discretion of the district courts. See Edwards

Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

(quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 394) (“equitable aspects should always be considered”

when deciding “whether to grant or deny injunctive relief”); see also TiVo Inc. v.

EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 890 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“[D]istrict

courts are in the best position to fashion an injunction tailored to prevent or remedy


      The Supreme Court in eBay also specifically noted that the district court in

that case erred in creating a categorical rule to determine that “injunctive relief

could not issue in a broad swath of cases.” 547 U.S. at 393. Adopting such a

categorical rule “cannot be squared with the principles of equity adopted by

Congress.” Id. This Court has also found that “the fact that a patentee has

previously chosen to license the patent . . . is but one factor for the district court to

consider.” Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

An automatic rule prohibiting injunctions for all standards-essential patents is

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inconsistent with the equitable principles of eBay and would divest the district

courts of their discretion.

     B.     FRAND Commitments Do Not Waive The Right To Injunctive
      The district court held that patent owners agree to license standards-essential

patents on FRAND terms “as a quid pro quo for their being declared essential to

the standard.”    A142.       This “quid pro quo” analysis derives from Apple’s

contention that a FRAND commitment is a contract. But if FRAND commitments

are to be analyzed as contracts, principles of contract interpretation must apply.

Any contract (or commitment) that purports to deprive a patent owner of the

statutory remedies provided by Congress must clearly do so and the ETSI policy

does not.

      The district court’s conclusion regarding the “quid pro quo” was incorrect.

The record shows that although ETSI’s policy at one time restricted standards-

essential patent owners from seeking injunctions in certain circumstances, that

restriction was withdrawn in 1994—years before Motorola’s patented technology

was incorporated into an ETSI standard (and over a decade before this case).

A138490, A138557-A138558. Since 1994, the ETSI policy has contained no rule

or restriction on the availability of injunctions. A138490, A138572-A138581.

Therefore, it is incorrect to conclude that Motorola surrendered its right to seek

injunctive relief for infringement of the patent at issue.

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      In a related case pending between the parties, the district court for the

Western District of Wisconsin recently held as follows:

            There is no language in either the ETSI or IEEE contracts
            suggesting that Motorola and the standards-setting
            organizations intended or agreed to prohibit Motorola
            from seeking injunctive relief. In fact, both policies are
            silent on the question of injunctive relief. Moreover, in
            light of the fact that patent owners generally have the
            right to seek injunctive relief both in district courts, 35
            U.S.C. §283, and in the International Trade Commission,
            19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), I conclude that any contract
            purportedly depriving a patent owner of that right should
            clearly do so. The contracts at issue are not clear.

Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-00178-BBC, 2012 WL

5416941, at *15 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 29, 2012). The Wisconsin district court therefore

held that as a matter of law, nothing in the ETSI policy expressly precludes

Motorola or any patent owner from pursuing an injunction or other relief as a

remedy for infringement. Id.

    C.     Imposing An Automatic Rule Barring Injunctions For Standards-
           Essential Patents Upsets The Balance Between Patent Owners And
           The Public
      Standards-setting has undisputed pro-competitive benefits and has

substantially advanced the state of the art—and the distribution of the benefits of

that innovation to consumers—in numerous industries, including cellular

communications. A18772. SDOs, in turn, have evolved a variety of means for

preventing “patent hold up,” including requirements that participants disclose

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potentially essential patents in advance so that the SDO can consider alternatives

and that participants commit to license their patents on FRAND terms to would-be

implementers of the standard. A18771-A18774. In developing those rules, SDOs

must balance the interests of all their members, including both innovator-licensors

and implementer-licensees, in an effort to maximize the quality and adoption of the

resulting standards.

      The Department of Justice and USPTO both recently recognized that there

should be no categorical rule preventing injunctions, and that the public interest

dictates that injunctions should be available in some cases, including at least in the

case of unwilling licensees.      See U.S. Dept. of Justice and U.S. Patent &

Trademark Office, Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents

Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments, January 8, 2013, at 7 (“An exclusion

order may still be an appropriate remedy in some circumstances, such as where the

putative licensee is unable or refuses to take a F/RAND license and is acting

outside the scope of the patent holder’s commitment to license on F/RAND

terms.”) The district court focused on “hold up” considerations, A140-41, but

failed to consider the issue here, described by the Department of Justice and PTO

as “hold outs.” An essential patent owner who has no ability to exclude an

unwilling licensee will face barriers to obtaining the full value for its portfolio

because it will be forced to litigate potentially hundreds of patents in order to

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obtain (at most) the royalties to which it is entitled for its standards-essential patent

portfolio.    See id. at 7 n. 15 (“We recognize that the risk of a refusal to license

decreases where the putative licensee perceives a cost associated with delay and

increases where the putative licensee believes its worst-case outcome after

litigation is to pay the same amount it would have paid earlier for a license.”). In

the absence of the possibility of injunction, infringers have less incentive to engage

in license negotiations.

        In another context, this Court has recognized that the district courts may

tailor remedies so that they are “adequate to compensate for the infringement,”

because otherwise infringers would have no incentive to resolve patent disputes in

the marketplace. See Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir.

1983)     (“[T]he trial court may award an amount of damages greater than a

reasonable royalty so that the award is ‘adequate to compensate for the

infringement,’” because otherwise, “the infringer would have nothing to lose, and

everything to gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty

non-infringers might have paid. As said by this court in another context, the

infringer would be in a ‘heads-I-win, tails-you-lose’ position.”).

        The result of a per se rule against injunctions for FRAND patents is likely to

be reduced innovation and interoperability, as consumers both lose the benefit of

the technical improvement that comes from collaborative standard-setting and

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implementers lose the guarantee of access to the technology on FRAND terms.

The cost of innovators moving away from SDOs will be borne by consumers and

implementers at large, even though the collaborative standard-setting and FRAND

licensing systems had worked for decades until Apple recently adopted its hold-out

and SEP-devaluation strategy.

      Even as recently as November of 2012, Apple refused to pay (or even be

bound by) a court-determined FRAND rate for Motorola’s cellular essential

patents. Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-178-BBC, 2012 WL

5943791, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 28, 2012) (“Apple was requesting that the court

declare that Motorola breached its contracts and ‘declare’ a FRAND rate for

Motorola’s patents, but Apple had refused to be bound by the rate chosen by the

court.”). In this “hold out” situation, the patentee should be permitted to seek an


    D.        Motorola Should Be Allowed To Make Its Case For Injunctive
              Relief At Trial
      This Court should remand and direct the district court and determine

Motorola’s right to an injunction under eBay.

               1.    The District Court Failed To Apply The eBay Factors
      Unlike in its analysis of Apple’s patents, the district court did not apply the

eBay factors to Motorola’s request for injunctive relief, or undertake any fact-

specific inquiry in evaluating Motorola’s claim. A140-43. Instead of applying

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eBay, the district court based its opinion on an interim Federal Trade Commission

(“FTC”) statement in response to a request by the International Trade Commission

(“ITC”) for statements on the public interest relating to the availability of

exclusion orders in section 1337 investigations.          A141.     As a threshold

consideration, the interim FTC statement is not binding on the courts, and cannot

replace the district court’s required analysis of the eBay factors. Further, an FTC

statement issued the same day as the one cited by the district court makes clear that

the FTC does not advocate a per se rule against injunctions on RAND-encumbered

patents. Instead, it provided that “[in]n cases that address RAND-encumbered

SEPs, the FTC urges the ITC to follow the requirements of Sections 337(d)(1) and

(f)(1) and consider the impact of patent hold-up on competitive conditions and

United States consumers.” FTC Statement on the Public Interest, Inv. No. 337-TA-

752     (U.S.I.T.C.),     at     5     (June      6,      2012),    available      at


             2.    Material Fact Disputes Should Have Precluded The District
                   Court’s Ruling That Motorola Could Not Obtain An

      Motorola ought to have been given the opportunity to present its facts that it

suffered irreparable harm from Apple being an unwilling licensee. Apple has for

years profited from its use of Motorola’s patented technology, while refusing to

negotiate a license or suggest any terms under which it would accept a license.

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Motorola, for its part, has ongoing licenses with other manufacturers as well as

FRAND commitments to others to license all parties on non-discriminatory terms.

The telecommunications standard-setting process has fostered tremendous

innovation through a series of ever-improving generations of mobile technology,

but that is the result of equally tremendous amounts of investment by innovative

companies that invent, share and license their research and development. This

system relies on the expectation that both licensors and licensees, will act in good

faith, but it is ultimately founded upon the belief that licensing is necessary for

implementers to market their products. 10 Motorola’s ability to license its portfolio

to future new entrants in the market and to negotiate renewed agreements with its

existing licensees—as it is required to do under its FRAND commitments—will

continue to be undermined if the courts permit non-licensees like Apple to

continue to infringe with no risk whatsoever of injunction.

      ETSI’s reciprocity requirement further demonstrates that a FRAND royalty

is an inadequate remedy and that Motorola may suffer irreparable harm: ESTI’s

policy expressly states that FRAND licenses may be offered “subject to

reciprocity,” A138915, and thus contemplates that SEP owners like Motorola may

condition a license to their portfolios on receiving a cross-license under others
         Other industries might operate differently. SEPs in the Internet sector, for
example, are generally licensed on a royalty-free basis and both innovators and
implementers base their business strategies around that expectation. The district
court’s decision, however, was not based on an examination of the evidence.

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SEP.    The district court’s categorical rule wrongly deprives SEP owners of

remedies expressly contemplated by ETSI. 11

       The district court’s exclusion of Apple’s damages expert and its finding that

Apple is not entitled to damages or an injunction should be upheld, as should its

construction of the ‘647 patent. The ‘949 patent should be found invalid as

indefinite.   The constructions of the ‘559, ‘712 and ‘263 patents should be

overturned. The case should be remanded to trial for the factual issues relating to

damages and the availability of an injunction for the ‘898 patent.

Dated: March 13, 2013                         Respectfully submitted,
                                                s/ Kathleen M. Sullivan
                                              Kathleen M. Sullivan
                                               QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART&
                                               SULLIVAN, LLP
                                               51 Madison Ave., 22nd Floor
                                               New York, NY 10010
                                               (212) 849-7000
                                              Attorney for Appellees-Cross

            While there is some dispute as to the extent of the reciprocity
requirement, the Court does not need to resolve that in this case. The key point is
that the district court’s categorical elimination of injunctive relief for an entire
category of patents would preclude any condition of reciprocity.

Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 91   Filed: 03/14/2013

Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 92   Filed: 03/14/2013


     Dated January 16, 2012
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                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
                             NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
                                   EASTERN DIVISION 
APPLE INC. and NeXT SOFTWARE                                                ) 
INC. (f/k/a NeXT COMPUTER, INC.),                                           )   
                       Plaintiffs,                                          )        No. 1:11‐cv‐08540 
         v.                                                                 ) 
                                                                            )     Judge Richard A. Posner. 
MOTOROLA, INC. and MOTOROLA                                                 )           
MOBILITY, INC.,                                                             ) 
                       Defendants.                                          ) 
Before the court are motions for summary judgment regarding nine patents. 
Apple’s  summary  judgment  motion  regarding  U.S.  Patent  No.  5,319,712  is 
       Apple has moved for summary judgment of noninfringement of Motorola’s 
U.S.  Patent  Number  5,319,712  (“Method  and  Apparatus  for  Providing  Crypto‐
graphic  Protection  of  a  Data  Stream  in  a  Communication  System”).  The  patent 
discloses a method for encrypting data packets that are sent from one device to 
another. Claim 17 specifies that the algorithm encrypts each packet according to 
a function whose inputs are a packet sequence number, a transmit overflow se‐
quence number, and a random encryption key.  The sequence number increases 
with each packet encrypted, to a maximum of 128, at which point it begins anew 
at 1. The transmit overflow sequence number increases each time the packet se‐
quence number resets. 
       Motorola alleges that a particular encryption method called Wi‐Fi Protected 
Access  (“WPA”) used  by  Apple  infringes  the  method  disclosed  in  the  ‘712  pat‐
ent. The dominant IEEE 802.11 standard requires devices to be capable of WPA 
encryption, as well as of other encryption methods. Many of Apple’s devices are 
compliant  with  the  802.11  standard  and  therefore  capable  of  performing  WPA 
encryption.  The  disagreement  is  over  whether  the  extended  initialization  value 
used  in  the  WPA  encryption  process  is  the  equivalent  of  Motorola’s  patented 
transmit overflow sequence number.    
       During claim construction Judge Crabb limited “transmit overflow sequence 
number” in Motorola’s patent to an overflow number that is never transmitted to 
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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             2
the receiver device. Her ruling was based on statements that Motorola had made 
to the Japanese Patent Office to distinguish the Japanese counterpart to the ‘712 
patent from prior art. (Claim 9 of the Japanese patent was identical to claim 17 of 
the ‘712 patent.) Motorola told that office that “unlike  the key or the packet se‐
quence number, there is no chance to intercept the overflow sequence number [a 
reference to the ‘transmit overflow sequence number’ in the ‘712 patent]; thus it 
provides  a  higher  level  of  security”—no  chance  because  that  number  is  never 
transmitted, unlike its counterpart in Apple’s devices that are alleged to infringe. 
     Foreign  patent‐prosecution  history  is  relevant  even  though  it  must  be  con‐
sidered in light of differences between the foreign patent regime and the U.S. re‐
gime.  TI  Group  Automotive  Systems  (North  America),  Inc.  v.  VDO  North  America, 
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. United States Int’l 
Trade Commission, 109 F.3d 726, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Motorola’s statement to the 
Japanese Patent Office was motivated not by an idiosyncratic rule of foreign pat‐
ent law, cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 
2006), but by the prohibition—applicable under United States as well as Japanese 
patent law—against patenting methods that are obvious to someone of ordinary 
skill  in  the  relevant  field  of  invention  who  is  acquainted  with  prior  art  in  that 
field.  35  U.S.C.  § 103.  In  order  to  distinguish  the  method  disclosed  in  the  ‘712 
patent  from  prior  encryption  methods,  Motorola  emphasized  to  the  Japanese 
Patent Office the increased security obtained by not transmitting all the encryp‐
tion inputs, and specifically by never transmitting the transmit overflow sequence 
number, Its statement was precise and unequivocal, in contrast to foreign prose‐
cution  history  rejected  in  cases  such  as  AIA  Engineering  Ltd.  v.  Magotteaux  Int’l 
S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Berco, S.p.A., 
714 F.2d 1110, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Judge Crabb’s construction estops Motorola 
to assert a broader interpretation of “transmit overflow sequence number” in this 
proceeding.  Because  the  parties  agree  that  the  extended  initialization  value  in 
WPA is transmitted (and it is the only structure that is potentially analogous to 
the patented  transmit overflow sequence number), Apple’s  WPA‐capable prod‐
ucts do not literally infringe Motorola’s ‘712 patent. 
     Pointing  to  expert  opinion  that  the  broadcast  of  the  extended  initialization 
value  does  not  actually  reduce  the  security  of  the  WPA  protocol,  Motorola  ar‐
gues  that  its  infringement  claim  may  still  prevail  under  the  doctrine  of  equiva‐
lents. But this contradicts its previous ground for distinguishing its method from 
prior art, and if presented to the Japanese Patent Office would have resulted in 
rejection of the patent application. “[S]ince, by distinguishing the claimed inven‐
tion over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover, he 
is by implication surrendering such [patent] protection.” Ekchian v. Home Depot, 
Inc.,  104  F.3d  1299,  1304  (Fed.  Cir.  1997).  “[T]he  concept  of  equivalency  cannot 
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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             3
embrace  a  structure  that  [was]  specifically  excluded  from  the  scope  of  the 
claims.”,  Inc.  v.  Federated  Department  Stores,  Inc.,  527  F.3d  1300, 
1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Asyst Technologies, Inc. v. Emtrak, Inc., 402 F.3d 1188, 
1190 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Motorola relied during the Japanese patent prosecution on 
a  specific  narrow  characterization  of  its  encryption  method—that  it  did  not 
broadcast the transmit overflow sequence number. The WPA encryption method 
which Apple’s 802.11‐compliant  devices are capable of performing does not in‐
fringe claim 17 of Motorola’s patent. 
Apple’s motion for summary judgment regarding U.S. Patent No. 5,572,193 is 
      Apple has moved for summary judgment of noninfringement and invalidity 
of  Motorola’s  U.S.  Patent  Number  5,572,193  (“Method  for  Authentication  and 
Protection of Subscribers in Telecommunications Systems”). The ‘193 patent de‐
scribes methods for encrypting communications signals between devices in a cel‐
lular  network,  to  enable  the  network  to  authenticate  calls  from  cellphone  users 
while preventing impersonation of one cellular phone user by another. 
      Claims 29 and 31 of the ’193 patent have been incorporated into the CCMP 
(“Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Protocol,“ 
more commonly referred to as WPA2—Wi‐Fi Protected Access II) component of 
the  IEEE  802.11  standard.  Many  Apple  devices,  including  iPhones  and  iPads, 
comply with the 802.11 standard and so are usable on networks that use WPA2 
      Apple argues that claims 29 and 31 are invalid because they were anticipated 
by two items of prior art: U.S. Patent Number 5,091,942 (the Dent patent) and the 
American National Standard’s “Financial Institution Retail Message Authentica‐
tion, X9.19” (the X9.19 reference). There is no factual dispute that both preceded 
the ‘193 patent; the question is whether either of them anticipated the limitations 
in claims 29 and 31. (Motorola says that it is asserting only claim 31, that is, that 
it is not alleging infringement of claim 29, but claim 31 is dependent on claim 29, 
so  both  claims  must  be  analyzed.)  Apple  must  “show  by  clear  and  convincing 
evidence  that  a  single  prior  art  reference  discloses  each  and  every  element  of  a 
claimed  invention.”  Silicon  Graphics,  Inc.  v.  ATI  Technologies,  Inc.,  607  F.3d  784, 
796 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
      Claims 29 and 31 are as follows: 
       29. A method of authenticating a subscriber unit in a communication system, 
       (a) providing the subscriber unit with at least part of a plurality of informa‐
       tion bits which uniquely identify a target communication unit; 

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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             4
       (b) generating an authentication message in the subscriber unit as a function 
       of the at least part of the plurality of information bits; and(c) transmitting the 
       authentication  message  and  the  at  least  part  of  the  plurality  of  information 
       bits from the subscriber unit to the communication system. 
       31. The method of claim 29 wherein the authentication message is generated 
       in the subscriber unit further as a function of a random number known to the 
       subscriber unit. 
     Claim 29 describes a method for creating an authentication message—an en‐
crypted message that confirms the identity of the cellphone user to the network 
and  thus  prevents  impersonation.  The  user  dials  on  the  cellphone  (“the  sub‐
scriber unit”) a telephone number; the cellphone creates the authentication mes‐
sage “as a function of” the target’s phone number and transmits to the network 
both the target’s phone number and the authentication message. Claim 31 incor‐
porates claim 29 and adds that the authentication message must also be created 
“as a function of” a random number “known to the subscriber unit.” The quoted 
phrases—“as a function of” and “known to the subscriber unit”—are the focus of 
the  dispute between  the parties,  as  it is  clear that  both the  Dent  patent and the 
X9.19 reference anticipate the other elements of claims 29 and 31. 
     The  Dent  patent  describes  an  algorithm  that  generates  an  authentication 
message  using  both  a  random  number  that  is  “known  to  the  mobile  station  in 
advance” and the “dialed digits” of the target’s phone number. The question is 
whether this description anticipates the “known to the subscriber unit” element 
of  claim  31.  Motorola  argues  that  this  phrase  cannot  be  taken  literally  if  it  is  to 
add  anything  to  the  claim.  Of  course,  to  use  a  number  for  encryption  the  cell‐
phone  must  “know”  that  number,  so  the  addition  of  the  phrase  “known  to  the 
subscriber  unit”  must  signify  something  more  if  it  is  to  be  given  independent 
meaning.  I  think  that  what  “known  to  the  subscriber  unit”  means  is  that  the 
number used for encryption  must be  “known to  the  subscriber unit well in  ad‐
vance of its use”; this excludes, for example, the case in which the network sends 
the cellphone a random number immediately  prior to  the  use of  the number in 
the  encryption  process,  or  in  which  the  user  must  enter  a  random  number  into 
the phone every time he makes a call. In the Dent patent the random number is 
known to the cellphone in advance of its use in creating an authentication mes‐
sage.  The  cellphone  periodically  receives  a  new  random  number  from  the  net‐
work and stores that number in its memory for use in authentication messages. 
So when the authentication message is created as a function of the random num‐
ber,  the  random  number  is  known  to  the  cellphone.  That  is  all  that  claim  31 
     Motorola  points  to  language  in  the  specification  of  the  ‘193  patent  that  dis‐
cusses and criticizes prior art in which the random number is generated by the 

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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             5
network  and  transmitted  to  the  cellphone  rather  than  originating  in  the  cell‐
phone. The criticism—that this “random number transmission required for enci‐
pherment necessitates additional communication between [the cellphone and the 
network]  which  increases  the  probability  of  transmission  error  and  adds  a 
transmission  step  to  the…authentication  protocol  routine”—is  applicable  to  the 
process discussed in the Dent patent, and the ‘193 patent lists the Dent patent as 
a reference. This shows that Apple was aware of prior art in which the random 
number is transmitted to the cellphone by the network, and viewed the elimina‐
tion of  that extra  transmission step  as among its innovations over the prior art. 
Yet  nothing  in  the  specification  says  where  the  random  number is  supposed  to 
come from,  by contrast  to other  numbers  that are said to  be  either dialed  in by 
the user or stored in the cellphone’s memory; there is no suggestion that the cell‐
phone is capable of generating random numbers or contains in its memory a list 
of random numbers. 
     The drafter of  the  patent  must ensure that  the claims  reflect all the innova‐
tions  he  seeks  to  claim;  if  he  fails  to  include  such  an  element  in  a  claim  he  has 
failed to provide sufficient notice of his invention. Language in the specification 
may be useful in interpreting vague or ambiguous limitations in the claims but 
cannot  add  limitations  to  unambiguous  claims.  CollegeNet,  Inc.  v.  ApplyYourself, 
Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 
1249 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Motorola asks me to read into claim 31 “a random number 
known to the subscriber unit that was never transmitted from the base station to the 
subscriber unit.” I can’t do that. 
     Because the “known to the subscriber unit” element of claim 31 is clearly an‐
ticipated  in  the  Dent  patent  and  there  is  no  serious  question  that  all  other  ele‐
ments of claims 29 and 31 are also anticipated, those claims in the ‘193 patent are 
invalid. They are also anticipated by the X9.19 reference, which describes an au‐
thentication  method  for  use  in  electronic  financial  transactions.  A  limitation  of 
claim 29 describes the generation of an authentication method “as a function of” 
the target’s telephone number. X9.19 also describes the use of the target commu‐
nication unit’s number in the creation of an authentication message, but uses that 
number as part of the number to be encrypted by the encryption algorithm—“an 
authentication  element  [that]  represents  the  data  stream  that  the  authentication 
algorithm acts upon.” I can’t see a meaningful distinction between these formu‐
lations, and I note that “the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood 
by  a  person  of  skill  in  the  art  may  be  readily  apparent  even  to  lay  judges,  and 
claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the 
widely  accepted  meaning  of  commonly  understood  words.”  Phillips  v.  AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             6
Motorola’s motion for summary judgment regarding U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 
is denied 
     Motorola has moved for summary judgment determining invalidity or alter‐
natively  noninfringement  of  Apple’s  U.S.  Patent  Number  7,479,949  (“Touch 
Screen  Device,  Method,  and  Graphical  User  Interface  for  Determining  Com‐
mands By Applying Heuristics”). This is a patent for applying “heuristics” to the 
movements  of  the  user’s  fingers  on  the  screen  of  touch‐screen  devices  (such  as 
Apple’s  iPhone)  that  change  the  visual  field  or  select  files.  According  to  the 
specification,  “in  some  embodiments,  heuristics  are  used  to  translate  imprecise 
finger  gestures  into  actions  desired  by  the  user.”  In  particular,  the  patent  pro‐
vides a heuristic for determining whether a user who swipes his finger along the 
screen of the touch‐screen device intends to scroll perfectly vertically or to shift 
the screen diagonally. Users often wish to scroll vertically, yet it’s hard for a user 
to swipe his finger perfectly vertically; so if the touch‐screen device simply shifts 
the  screen  in  the  same  exact  direction  of  the  user’s  finger  swipe,  users  who  in‐
tend  to  scroll  vertically  will  often  instead  produce  diagonal  motions  (what  the 
patent  calls  “two‐dimensional  screen  translation”).  The  patent’s  solution  is  a 
heuristic  that  treats  “substantially  vertical”  swipes—swipes  that  are  within  a 
specified  range  of  a  perfectly  vertical  swipe  (for  instance,  within  27  degrees  of 
perfectly  vertical)—as  commands  for  vertical  scrolling;  outside  that  tolerance 
swipes produce diagonal motion in the direction of the swipe. 
     Motorola  argues  that  the  ‘949  patent  is  invalid  because  its  use  of  the  term 
“heuristic”  renders  the  patent  indefinite,  35  U.S.C.    § 112,  ¶ 2,  and  that  it  is  a 
means‐plus‐function  patent,  see  § 112,  ¶ 6,  that  fails  to  indicate  any  definite 
structure (for instance, an algorithm for a computer program) in its specification. 
Indefiniteness is a question of law. Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 
359 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
     Motorola’s  primary  evidence  of  indefiniteness  consists  of  statements  in 
depositions of nine of the inventors listed in the patent, most of whom concede 
that  “heuristics” is  “sort of a  vague  word”  or are otherwise  unable to  define  it. 
But  defining  a  word  is  often  more  difficult than  grasping  its  meaning  in  a  spe‐
cific context. It is “particularly inappropriate to consider inventor testimony ob‐
tained  in  the  context  of  litigation  in  assessing  validity  under  section  112,  para‐
graph 2, in view of the absence of probative value of such testimony.” Solomon v. 
Kimberly‐Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2000). And in fact some of the 
inventors were able to define the term (essentially as equivalent to “rule” or “al‐
gorithm”), and both parties  were  able to  offer definitions  for  purposes of  claim 
construction. Apple defined “heuristics” as “one or more rules to be applied  to 
data to assist in drawing inferences from that data,” which is an adequate defini‐
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tion.  Section  112  requires  invalidation  for  indefiniteness  only  where  a  claim  is 
“insolubly ambiguous” and cannot “be given any reasonable meaning,” Ultimax 
Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
quoting Young v. Lumenis, Inc., 492 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and a claim 
can be definite even when “reasonable persons will disagree” about its meaning. 
Source Search Technologies, LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 
2009),  quoting  Exxon  Research  &  Engineering  Co.  v.  United  States,  265  F.3d  1371, 
1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
     Means‐plus‐function claims are usually identified as such by inclusion of the 
term  “means,”  and  there  is  a  rebuttable  presumption  that  claims  that  lack  that 
term—such as the claims of the ‘949 patent—are not means‐plus‐function claims. 
The presumption is rebutted if the claim “fails to recite sufficiently definite struc‐
ture  or  else  recites  function  without  reciting  sufficient  structure  for  performing 
that  function.”  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology  v.  Abacus  Software,  462  F.3d 
1344, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006), quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 
1359,  1369  (Fed.  Cir.  2002).  Patents  that  claim  a  means  for  performing  a  com‐
puter‐implemented function must thus thdisclose the algorithm, or “step‐by‐step 
process,” for performing that function. Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. 
International Game Technology, 521 F.3d 1328, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also In 
re  Katz  Interactive  Call  Processing  Patent  Litigation,  639  F.3d  1303,  1314–15  (Fed. 
Cir. 2011); Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
     The  claims  in  patent  ‘949  gesture  toward  such  a  step‐by‐step  process,  but 
don’t  describe  one.  The  specification  does,  however,  in  Figure  39C;  and  a  pat‐
ent’s diagrams can substitute for a written description. Vas‐Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 
935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).) Motorola contends that Figure 39C “relates 
only  to  the  claim  limitation  relating  to  vertical  scrolling,”  but  that  is  wrong;  it 
also relates to diagonal movement. The patent does not describe program code to 
perform  the  heuristics  it  claims,  but  disclosure  of  code  is  unnecessary  when  a 
person of ordinary skill in the relevant field of invention would be able to write a 
program  to  perform  the  described  algorithm  without  difficulty.  Medical  Instru‐
mentation  &  Diagnostics  Corp.  v.  Elekta  AB,  344  F.3d  1205,  1214  (Fed.  Cir.  2003). 
Whether that is so here is a disputed question of fact, which therefore cannot be 
answered in the context of a motion for summary judgment. 
     Motorola further argues that even if the patent is valid, its products do not 
infringe  because  they  use  a  wider  tolerance  for  determining  a  user’s  intent  to 
scroll  vertically  than  the  example  given  in  Figure  39C—within  33.7  degrees  of 
perfectly vertical rather than 27 degrees. Infringement is a question of fact, Abso‐
lute  Software,  Inc.  v.  Stealth  Signal,  Inc.,  659  F.3d  1121,  1129–30  (Fed.  Cir.  2011), 
and whether 33.7 degrees is close enough to 27 degrees to infringe Apple’s pat‐
ent, in light of evidence that a small difference in angle affects performance sub‐
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stantially, is a disputed question that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 
Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Apple men‐
tions 27 degrees only as an example, moreover; the patent claims are not limited 
to that angle; hence we need not consider whether, if so limited, Motorola would 
nevertheless  be  infringing  under  the  doctrine  of  equivalents.  Motolora’s  argu‐
ment  that  the  patent‐prosecution  history  is  inconsistent  with  the  charge  of  in‐
fringement fails for the same reason: the language of the patent on which the ar‐
gument pivots—“based on an angle of initial movement of a finger contact with 
respect  to  the  touch  screen  display,”  which  was  added  after  an  interview  be‐
tween Apple representatives and the PTO examiner—does not specify an angle. 
Motorola’s motion for summary judgment regarding U.S. Patent No. 5,455,599 
is granted, and Apple’s motion for summary judgment regarding the same pat‐
ent is denied 
     Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 5,455,599 (“Object‐Oriented Graphic System”) is an 
invention for drawing graphics on an output device (like a display screen). The 
patented  system  is  “object‐oriented,”  meaning  the  graphics  are  produced  by  a 
series  of  objects  (such  as  straight  lines  and  curved  lines)  that  are  described 
mathematically, as opposed to being produced as a series of dots arranged in a 
pattern. Object‐oriented graphics systems allow the programmer greater flexibil‐
ity to manipulate the graphics. 
     Apple contends  that  Motorola  products infringe claim  15 and  also claim  26 
(which however is derivative from 15) of the ‘599 patent. Motorola counters that 
the  claims  are  invalid  because  indefinite,  which  Apple  denies.  The  controversy 
revolves primarily around limitation (g) of claim 15, which describes an appara‐
tus for graphic processing that includes “means for capturing state information 
and rendering information at the grafport object.” 
     “[S]tate  information”  is  information  about  the  graphic’s  appearance  (color, 
line  thickness,  etc.);  “rendering  information,”  which  the  parties  agree  is  the 
“drawing sequence of a graphic object,” is instruction to other parts of the device 
on  how  to  render  the  graphic  (as  by  rendering  a  square  by  drawing  a  line  in  a 
specified  way,  such  as  left,  up,  right,  and  down  from  a  given  point);  and  the 
“grafport object” is the interface between the graphic objects and the output sys‐
tem  (displays,  memory,  printers,  etc.).  The  grafport  stores  the  graphic  informa‐
tion  by  “capturing”  it  into  a  polymorphic  cache;  once  the  information  is  stored 
there, the grafport makes it available to other parts of the system. Thus the func‐
tion of claim 15(g) is “capturing state information and rendering information at 
the grafport object.” 
     The dispute is over the structure that performs that function. To avoid inva‐
lidity  for  indefiniteness,  the  patent  must  describe  the  structure  in  the  specifica‐
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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             9
tion.  Biomedino,  LLC  v.  Waters  Technologies  Corp.,  490  F.3d  947,  950  (Fed.  Cir. 
2007). Apple argues that the polymorphic cache is the structure—it performs the 
capturing  function.  Motorola  agrees  that  information  is  stored  in  the  polymor‐
phic cache, but counters that this tells us nothing about how the information gets 
into the cache. Maybe the polymorphic cache does the capturing itself, like a Ve‐
nus flytrap, or maybe some undisclosed structure captures the information and 
transports it to the cache for storage. Motorola further argues that even if the po‐
lymorphic cache performs the capturing, it captures only state information, and 
15(g) requires the capture of both state and rendering information. 
      Motorola points to the following language in the specification: “the graphic 
port  captures  state  information…into  a  polymorphic  cache.”  That  suggests  that 
the structure for capturing rendering information has not been specified, though 
it  also  undermines  Motorola’s  argument  that  the  claim  is  indefinite,  because  at 
least  it  discloses  the  structure  for  capturing  state  information:  it  is  the  graphic 
port  that  does  that  capturing.  This  does  not  explain  precisely  how  the  grafport 
performs the capturing, but it clearly associates structure with performance, and 
that is sufficient to defeat Motorola’s indefiniteness challenge, Biomedino, LLC v. 
Waters Technologies Corp., supra, 490 F.3d at 950 (“this is not a high bar”); Cardiac 
Pacemakers,  Inc.  v.  St.  Jude  Medical,  Inc.,  296  F.3d  1106,  1113  (Fed.  Cir.  2002),  at 
least insofar as the capturing of state information is concerned (a vital qualifica‐
tion,  as  we  are  about  to  see).  Bearing  in  mind  the  Federal  Circuit’s  admonition 
that the  bar is  not  high  for  finding a link in the  specification  between  structure 
and  function,  I  conclude  that  the  graphic  port  captures  state  information  and 
stores it in a polymorphic cache. 
      Apple’s  expert,  Dr.  Egbert,  argues  that  the  grafport  captures  rendering  in‐
formation in a  polymorphic  cache too: “The grafport  object,  as used  in  the ‘599 
patent, captures  both geometry  (rendering  information) and  state  information.” 
Egbert Decl., ¶ 8. But “geometry” and “rendering information” are not synony‐
mous,  as the  expert  opined;  nor  is rendering information a  subset of geometry. 
An object’s geometry tells an output device what to draw: rectangle, line, curve, 
point, etc. (‘599 patent at 8:16–20); rendering information tells the device how to 
draw it. The patent doesn’t “clearly associate” any structure with performance of 
the function of making rendering information available for producing a graphic. 
      That  invalidates  claim  15  (and  its  derivative  claim  26)  for  indefiniteness—
unless we accept Apple’s proposed claim construction of “capturing.” (The term 
was not construed at the claim‐construction phase of this litigation.) Apple con‐
tends that “capturing” is synonymous with “storing,” pointing to the term “cap‐
tured state” in Figure 2 of the patent. ”Captured” state is “stored” state all right, 
but storage is the outcome of capturing; you capture a mutinous sailor, and store 
him in  the  brig.  Sometimes, it’s true, capture and  storage  are indistinguishable. 
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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             10
Apple argues that when a child captures fireflies in a jar, the structure that per‐
forms the “capturing” function is the jar, and the jar then stores the fireflies. But 
while the jar indeed stores the fireflies, the child may have captured the fireflies 
with a net or with his hands and then placed the captives into the jar. The same 
ambiguity  arises  when  rendering  information  is  captured  “into  a  polymorphic 
      Motorola’s motion for a summary judgment ruling of invalidity for claims 15 
and 26 of the ‘599 patent are granted, and Apple’s motion for a summary judg‐
ment ruling that the claims are not indefinite is denied. 
Apple’s motion for summary judgment regarding U.S. Patent No. 5,311,516 is 
      Apple has moved for a summary judgment ruling that Motorola’s U.S. Pat‐
ent Number 5,311,516 (“Paging System Using Message Fragmentation to Redis‐
tribute Traffic”) is invalid and in any event that Apple has not infringed it. The 
patent  describes  a  method  for  transmitting  long  messages  wirelessly  that  in‐
volves  chopping  the  message  into  sequential  data  packets,  each  containing  an 
address and message data, including an indication of whether more packets for 
that  message  are  on  the  way.  The  receiver  determines  whether  a  packet  is  in‐
tended for it by comparing its own address to the incoming packet’s destination 
address. The patent calls this comparison process “correlation.” If there’s a suc‐
cessful  correlation,  the  receiver  decodes  and  stores  the  packet’s  message  data. 
When  the  receiver  determines  from a  packet that  no further  packets containing 
data that are part of the message are coming, it deems the chopped‐up message 
complete and thus ready to be read. 
      Apple  contends  that  the  ‘516  patent  is  invalid  because  anticipated  by  prior 
art,  namely  U.S.  Patent  Nos.  4,908,828  (“Tikalsky”)  and  4,975,972  (“Mabey”)—
patents  that  like  the  ‘516  describe  methods  for  transmitting  long  messages  in 
fragments.  The  dispute  is  over  whether  these  earlier  patents  disclose  limitation 
(d) of claim 1 of the ‘516 patent, which is “successively storing the decoded mes‐
sage data of each message packet of the one or more message packets to recon‐
struct the fragmented message, the fragmented message being completely recon‐
structed  after  detection  in  the  decoded  message  data  of  one  of  the…message 
packets  an  indication  that  no  more  message  packets  are  to  be  received  for  the 
fragmented message.” The dispute is over “successively storing,” which requires 
the receiver to receive the packets in their original order; the question is whether 
the  prior  art  both  successively  stores  packets  and  satisfies  the  requirement  that 
reconstruction  be  complete  when  the  receiver  detects  that  it  won’t  be  receiving 
any more packets containing fragments of the message. Invalidity must of course 

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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             11
be  proved  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence.  Eli  Lilly  &  Co.  v.  Barr  Laboratories, 
Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
     The  Tikalsky  patent  discloses  a  system  for  sending  message  fragments  re‐
petitively to minimize transmission errors, and recommends up to five transmis‐
sions of  each fragment. If, for example,  a  message contains 5  fragments, the  re‐
ceiver  might  receive  packets  1  and  4  on  the  first  try,  5  on  the  second,  2  on  the 
third,  and  3  on  the  fourth,  and  it  will  rearrange  the  series  of  packets  in  proper 
order, thus reconstructing the entire message. The Mabey patent is similar. Ap‐
ple argues  that  the  method  in  the Tikalsky  and  Mabey  patents—receiving frag‐
ments  out  of  order  and  then  placing  them  in  order—necessarily  includes  Mo‐
torola’s  simpler  method—receiving  the  packets  sequentially.  For  in  the  inven‐
tions described in those patents, Apple argues, if the first transmission results in 
the  error‐free  receipt  of  the  entire  message  (rather  than  in  transmission  of  just 
fragments  of  the  message),  the  fragments  will  automatically  be  stored  sequen‐
tially—“successively stor[ed].” 
     True, the prior art doesn’t mention receipt of an error‐free message in a sin‐
gle  transmission,  but  Apple  argues  that  such  receipt  has  been  “inherently”  an‐
ticipated—it’s  “necessarily  present”  in  the  anticipating  reference.  But  “inher‐
ency… may not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that 
a  certain  thing  may  result  from  a  given  set  of  circumstances  is  not  sufficient.” 
Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(emphasis in original); see also Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d 
1373, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003). But that is all that Apple has shown thus far. 
     There is also a triable issue of whether the prior art satisfies limitation (d)’s 
requirement  that  a  message’s  last  packet  contain  “an  indication  that  no  more 
message packets are to be received.” The prior art methods do notify the receiver 
which fragment occupies the last position in the sequence of packets, but that no‐
tification is not “an indication that no more message packets are to be received.” 
Subsequent packets may be received, as in our example in which the fifth packet, 
which is the last, is received before the second and third. 
     Asking in the alternative for a ruling of noninfringement, Apple argues that 
Motorola  hasn’t  presented  evidence  of  any  infringement.  Motorola  must  show 
that it’s “more likely than not [that] one person somewhere in the United States 
had performed the claimed method using [the alleged infringer’s] products.” Lu‐
cent  Technologies,  Inc.  v.  Gateway,  Inc.,  580  F.3d  1301,  1318  (Fed.  Cir.  2009).  By 
pointing  to  its  expert’s  tests  on  Apple’s  products  as  well  as  tests  performed  by 
Apple’s  third‐party  testing  institutions,  Motorola  has  created  a  triable  issue  of 
whether the ‘516 patent was directly infringed. 
     Against this conclusion Apple argues that its products don’t practice limita‐
tions  (c)  or  (d)  of  claim  1  in  the  ‘516  patent.  It  argues  that  its  products  comply 
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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                             12
with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard 802.11 for wireless 
communication between devices, and that it’s not possible both to conform to the 
802.11  standard  and  to  practice  those  limitations.  The  802.11  standard  calls  for 
certain data (including indications whether more fragments are being sent) to be 
received  and  decoded  prior  to  correlation,  whereas  ’516  requires  that  message 
data be decoded “in response to a successful [address] correlation.” Motorola de‐
scribes this pre‐correlation decoding as merely an extra step above and beyond 
the steps required by ‘516. It thus invokes the rule that “absent some special cir‐
cumstance or estoppel which excludes the additional factor, infringement is not 
avoided by the presence of elements or steps in addition to those specifically re‐
cited in the claim.” Vivid Technologies, Inc. v. American Science & Engineering, Inc., 
200  F.3d  795,  811  (Fed.  Cir.  1999).  Even  if  this  extra  step  precludes  literal  in‐
fringement, Motorola contends that Apple’s products infringe under the doctrine 
of equivalents because the initial decoding step doesn’t alter the invention in any 
meaningful way. See Insta‐Foam Products, Inc. v. Universal Foam Systems, Inc., 906 
F.2d  698,  702  (Fed.  Cir.  1990).  These  arguments  involve  factual  disagreements 
that cannot be resolved on summary judgment. 
Apple’s motion for summary judgment regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,359,898 is 
     Apple has moved for summary judgment of invalidity and noninfringement 
as  to  Motorola’s  U.S.  Patent  Number  6,359,898  (“Method  for  Performing  a 
Countdown  Function  During  a  Mobile‐Originated  Transfer  for  a  Packet  Radio 
     The  ‘898  patent  provides  a  method  for  efficiently  allocating  channels  in  a 
wireless  communications  system.  Data  are  transmitted  in  small  increments  of 
time  called  “frames.”  Each  frame  includes  eight  “time  slots,”  which  are  the 
channels. Each time slot transmits one block (a small quantity of data) per frame; 
thus a total of eight blocks can be transmitted per frame. A time slot allocated to 
a  given  cellphone  will  transmit  one  block  per  frame  until  the  transmission  is 
complete.  Multiple  time  slots  can  be  assigned  to  a  given  signal,  increasing  the 
speed of the transmission. For example, a transmission of 10 blocks will require 
10 frames if the signal is allocated to only one time slot, but only five frames if 
two time slots are allocated to the signal. 
     When a transmission is completed, the cellphone no longer needs time slots 
and  the  network  must  reallocate  them  to  other  phones  (or  other  devices)  that 
have  data  to  send.  The  overall  speed  of  the  network  depends  on  the  network’s 
being able to perform this reallocation efficiently, without downtime between the 
completion  of  one  transmission  on  a  given  time  slot  and  the  beginning  of  an‐
other. Because channel and processing delays create a lag time of several frames, 
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the network needs advance warning of a transmission’s impending completion if 
it is to reallocate its time slots without downtime. A cellphone can give advance 
warning  by  indicating  in  each  frame  the  number  of  blocks  remaining  in  the 
transmission.  The  ‘898  patent  claims  methods  of  providing  this  advance  warn‐
ing,  particularly  in  cases  in  which  multiple  time  slots  are  allocated  to  a  single 
      Claims 1, 2, and 5 of the ‘898 patent are at issue. They provide: 
       1. In a wireless communication system, a method for transmitting a commu‐
       nication  signal  comprising  a  plurality  of  units  of  information  [the  “blocks”], 
       the method comprising: transmitting the plurality of units of information via 
       a predetermined number of channel resources [the “time slots”]; determining 
       a number of the plurality of units remaining in at least a portion of the com‐
       munication signal; based on the predetermined number of channel resources, 
       adjusting  the  number  of  the  plurality  of  units  remaining  to  produce  an  ad‐
       justed  number  of  units  remaining;  and  transmitting  the  adjusted  number  of 
       units remaining to the wireless communication system. 
       2.  The  method  according  to  claim  1,  wherein  the  step  of  adjusting  further 
       comprises:  dividing  the  number  of  the  plurality  of  units  remaining  by  the 
       predetermined number of channel resources. 
       5.  The  method  according  to  claim  1,  wherein  the  predetermined  number  of 
       channel resources is greater than one. 
Apple  argues  that  the  ‘898  patent  is  invalid  because  it  was  anticipated  and/or 
made  obvious  by  prior  art,  specifically  a  publication  of  the  communications 
company Nortel (“the Nortel reference”) just over a year before the priority date 
of the ‘898 patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
    The  Nortel  reference  describes  a  mobile  device,  such as  a  cellphone,  that  be‐
gins a transmission by sending a “channel request” to the network, which opens 
a  channel  through  which  the  cellphone  tells  the  network  how  many  blocks  of 
data it has to transmit. The network responds by telling the cellphone how many 
time  slots  the  cellphone  has  been  allocated,  the  start  time  for  the  transmission, 
and a duration time for each time slot; there may be multiple different duration 
times because the Nortel reference allows for each time slot to be allocated to a 
given  signal  for  a  different  amount  of  time.  Having  determined  the  start  time 
and  duration  times  itself  from  the  number  of  blocks  to  be  transmitted  and  the 
number  of  time  slots  allocated,  the  network  knows  how  long  the  transmission 
will last and can reallocate its time slots to other signals upon completion of the 
  Apple’s anticipation argument fails because the Nortel reference does not an‐
ticipate  one  element  of claim 1 of  Motorola’s patent:  “transmitting  the adjusted 
number of units remaining to the wireless communication system.” The adjusted 

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number  is  calculated  by  the  mobile  unit  and  then  transmitted  to  the  network, 
while in the Nortel reference the network performs the calculation and transmits 
the adjusted number (the duration times) to the mobile unit. It’s true that “wire‐
less communication system” is somewhat ambiguous: throughout the remainder 
of the ‘898 patent the phrase is used to refer to the entire system, consisting both 
of  mobile  units  and  of  the  network’s  base  units,  such  as  communications  satel‐
lites  and  cellphone  towers.  But  in  the  present  context  that  definition  makes  no 
sense, because both the base units and the mobile units are part of the wireless 
communication system, yet one of them must be doing the transmitting. And the 
“wireless communication system” could hardly be the mobile unit; it must be the 
base unit or units. By the same token, the term “network” can refer to the entire 
system, consisting both of users’ mobile units and the company’s base units, or 
only to the base units, or to one particular base unit. (Apple does not address its 
obviousness argument to this element of the ‘898 patent.) So claim 1 is not antici‐
pated  by  the  Nortel  reference,  and  this  conclusion  precludes  invalidation  of 
claims 2 and 5 as well, which are dependent on claim 1. 
  Apple makes the further argument that claims 1 and 2 are invalid because in‐
definite: the step “based on the predetermined number of channel resources, ad‐
justing  the  number  of  the  plurality  of  units  remaining  to  produce  an  adjusted 
number  of  units  remaining”  is  incoherent,  it  argues,  and  therefore  indefinite 
where only one channel resource (time slot) is allocated to the transmission, be‐
cause the number of blocks cannot be “adjusted” by the number 1. Multiplication 
by  1  doesn’t  do  anything.  But  to  “adjust”  the  number  of  blocks  based  on  the 
number of time slots is merely to apply the latter number to the former, for in‐
stance by dividing the number of blocks by the number of time slots, as provided 
in claim 2. Dividing by one, rather than being incoherent or indefinite, is a trivi‐
ally simple operation. That the quotient will equal the dividend in the particular 
case does not mean that division by 1 is not a form of adjustment. 
  Apple further argues that Motorola has failed to create a disputed issue of ma‐
terial  fact  concerning  whether  Apple  has  infringed  claim  5.  Apple  asserts  that 
Motorola  must  produce  evidence  that  the  Apple  products  are  ever  assigned 
more than one time slot by the networks, as is required for violation of claim 5. 
Motorola  may rely on circumstantial evidence in arguing infringement, Molecu‐
lon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1986), abrogated on 
other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(en banc), and a finder of fact may find infringement if at some point during the 
relevant  period  if  it  was  “more  likely  than  not  [that]  one  person  somewhere  in 
the United States had performed the claimed method using the [accused] prod‐
ucts.”  Lucent  Technologies,  Inc.  v.  Gateway,  Inc.,  580  F.3d  1301,  1318  (Fed.  Cir. 
2009).  Motorola  has  presented  evidence  from  which  a  jury  could  find  that  the 
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Apple  devices  are  capable  of  transmitting  in  multiple  time  slots  and  are  given 
the opportunity to do so by their networks at least some of the time. 
Motorola’s motion for summary judgment regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,343,263 
is dismissed as premature 
    Motorola  moves  for  a  summary  judgment  ruling  of  noninfringement  of  Ap‐
ple’s U.S. Patent Number 6,343,263 (“Real‐Time Signal Processing System for Se‐
rially Transmitted Data”). Apple’s patent describes a computer system that per‐
forms realtime signal processing on serially transmitted data. Claim 1 describes 
two subsystems—a “host central processing unit” and a “realtime signal process‐
ing  subsystem”—connected  by  a  realtime  application  program  interface.  The 
realtime API interfaces between the two subsystems, requesting realtime services 
(for  instance,  video  image  processing)  from  the  realtime  signal  processing  sub‐
system on behalf of applications running on the host subsystem. 
    Motorola argues that its devices don’t infringe because their signal‐processing 
systems lack a realtime API. Underlying the dispute is a claim‐construction dis‐
pute over the meaning of the term “realtime API.” Motorola contends that it’s an 
API  that  has  realtime  functionality,  which  it  defines  as  “constant  bit  rate  han‐
dling,”  while  Apple  contends  the  term  refers  to  an  API  that  facilitates  realtime 
signal processing. 
    Neither party sought construction of the term at the claim‐construction hear‐
ing, and as a result the motion for summary judgment is premature, and is there‐
fore dismissed. The parties shall submit briefs on construction of the term “real‐
time  application  program  interface”  in  claim  1  of  Apple’s  ‘263  patent  no  later 
than January 23. 
Motorola’s  motion for summary judgment  on  U.S.  Patent No. 5,566,337  is de‐
  Motorola  has  moved  for  summary  judgment  of  noninfringement  of  Apple’s 
U.S. Patent  Number  5,566,337  (“Method  and  Apparatus for Distributing  Events 
in  an  Operating  System”).  The  ‘337  patent  describes  a  method  for  distributing 
“events” between devices in a computer system. An event is “any occurrence in 
a computer of which software programs running on that computer or on a con‐
nected computer need to be informed.” Events include keystrokes, mouse clicks, 
and file modifications. The occurrences are generated by “event producers,” and 
the programs which need to be informed are referred to as “event consumers.” A 
simple example is asking a computer to calculate “2 + 2.” The “2” and “+” keys 
are pressed and the program monitoring keystrokes informs the calculator pro‐
gram, which sends the answer, 4, to the monitor control program, which orders 
the monitor to display a “4.”  Each device could notify all others, but that would 
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involve  inefficient  communication  (especially  as  the  chain  of  communication 
grows longer) and risk events being sent out of order. The ‘337 patent proposes a 
centralized system with specific structures to keep track of which programs are 
to be notified, to control the timing of notifications, and to distribute them to the 
relevant programs. 
   Claim  1  describes  the  storage,  control,  and  distribution  components  of  the 
event‐management  system,  each  component  being  described  as  a  means‐plus‐
function  limitation  tied  to  specific  structures  disclosed  in  the  patent.  Cardiac 
Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The 
“storing  means”  component  of  the  system  corresponds  (meaning,  as  Cardiac 
Pacemakers  explains,  that  the  specification  in  the  patent  “must  clearly  associate 
the structure with performance of the function”) to what is called the “sequential 
consumer database” (as well as to a “subscription matrix” not challenged in this 
motion). The sequential consumer database keeps track of which programs are to 
be  informed  of  various  events  and  the  order  in  which  they  are  to  be  informed. 
(Obviously  the  word  “consumer”  does  not  bear  its  usual  meaning  in  this  con‐
   Motorola  asks  for  a  summary  judgment  ruling  of  noninfringement  on  the 
ground that the Android operating system, which runs on its allegedly infring‐
ing  phones  and  tablet  devices,  has  no  sequential  consumer  database  and  thus 
cannot  infringe  the  ‘337  patent’s  event‐management  method.  Summary  judg‐
ment is warranted if it is clear that the Android operating system lacks any struc‐
ture  identical  or  equivalent  to  the  sequential  consumer  database  described  in 
Apple’s patent. Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organization v. Buf‐
falo Technology (USA), Inc., 542 F.3d 1363, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
   Apple points to Android structures—“mReceiverResolver” and “the mFilters 
set of the IntentResolver”—that it contends are equivalent to the sequential con‐
sumer database and subscription matrix described in its patent. Its expert, a pro‐
fessor of computer science skilled in the relevant art, opines that these structures 
are  equivalent,  and  his  extended  analysis  of  the  Android  event‐management 
structures  is  more  than  mere  ipse  dixit.  Cf.  Tech  Search,  L.L.C.  v.  Intel  Corp.,  286 
F.3d  1360,  1371  (Fed.  Cir.  2002).  A  reasonable  jury  could  find  that  the  Android 
operating system’s method of tracking event consumers infringes on the storage 
method disclosed in claim 1.  Motorola’s expert disagrees, but that creates a fac‐
tual  dispute  rather  than  resolving  it.  See,  e.g.,  In  re  Gabapentin  Patent  Litigation, 
503 F.3d 1254, 1259–60 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
   Motorola  argues  that  its  operating  system  lacks  any  structure  corresponding 
to the third limitation of claim 1, which describes a “distributor means for receiv‐
ing the event from the control means and directing said control means to distrib‐
ute  an  appropriate  event  to  an  appropriate  event  consumer.”  Although  struc‐
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tures  corresponding  to  the  distributor  means  were  not  identified  during  claim 
construction, the parties appear to agree that at least one requisite structure must 
be an API. An API, short for “Application Programming Interface,” is a specifica‐
tion  allowing  various  programs  to  communicate  with  each  another.  Since  the 
claim describes communication between programs, an API is necessary to enable 
it.  Apple’s  expert  has  opined  that  specific  Android  operating  system  elements 
are identical or equivalent to Apple’s API described above. He has supported his 
opinion  sufficiently  to  create  a  material  question  of  fact  about  whether  Mo‐
torola’s products infringe the thrid limitation of claim 1. 
Apple’s motion for summary judgment regarding U.S. Patent No. 6,175,559 is 
denied in part and deferred in part 
  Apple  has  moved  for  a  summary  judgment  ruling  of  invalidity  or  alterna‐
tively of noninfringement of Motorola’s U.S. Patent Number 6,175,559 (“Method 
for  Generating  Preamble  Sequences  in  a  Code  Division  Multiple  Access  Sys‐
tem”). The ‘559 patent discloses a method for generating “preamble sequences,” 
which are numbers used to identify cellphones in a cellular division multiple ac‐
cess  (“CDMA”)  system.  CDMA  enables multiple  cellphones  to  transmit  data  to 
cellular towers using the same frequency, thus economizing on bandwidth; but it 
gives rise to a concern that simultaneous transmissions from multiple cellphones 
on the same frequency will interfere with each other. The ‘559 patent describes a 
method of generating preamble sequences that uses orthogonal codes (codes that 
minimize interference). The method helps a cellular tower identify, on the basis 
of the preamble sequence attached to each transmission it receives, which phone 
sent which transmission,. 
  Apple  manufactures  cellphones  that  communicate  on  CDMA  networks.  Mo‐
torola alleges that the cellphones’ use of the CDMA standard requires preamble 
sequences  to  be  generated  in  a  manner  that  infringes  its  ‘559  patent.  Apple  ri‐
postes that the ‘559 patent is invalid and alternatively that Apple’s devices don’t 
infringe the patent. 
  Apple argues that a preliminary application for U.S. Patent No. 7,173,919 (the 
Dabak  patent)  predates  the  ‘559  patent’s  filing  date  by  26  days  and  anticipates 
the method claimed in ‘559. A preliminary application can establish priority over 
a  later‐filed  patent  if  it  discloses  sufficient  detail  to  cover  the  latter  patent’s 
claims. 35 U.S.C. § 119(e); cf. In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
But  if  Motorola  can  prove  that  the  ‘559  patent  was  conceived  before  the  Dabak 
application  date,  it  regains  priority.  Spansion,  Inc.  v.  International  Trade  Commis‐
sion, 629 F.3d 1331, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
  Motorola argues that the ‘559 patent was actually conceived on June 2, 1999, 
five days before the Dabak application was filed. It relies on a memorandum to 
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the  Motorola  patent  committee  that  contains  a  declaration  by  the  inventor  that 
June 2, 1999, was the date of conception. Apple disputes this evidence. But what‐
ever  the  date,  Motorola  has  raised  significant  doubts  whether  the  preliminary 
Dabak  application  and  subsequent  patent  sufficiently  disclosed  the  method  of 
the  ‘559  patent  “either  expressly  or  inherently,  such  that  a  person  of  ordinary 
skill in the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.” Id. 
at  1355–56;  Dewey  &  Almy  Chemical  Co.  v.  Mimex  Co.,  124  F.2d  986,  989  (2d  Cir. 
1942) (L. Hand, J.). The preliminary application is four pages long and does not 
mention the sequence generators discussed in the ‘559 patent. And Motorola has 
submitted  an  expert  opinion  (which  I  rule  admissible  over  Apple’s  objection) 
that  the  Dabak  application  does  not  anticipate  the  ‘559  patent’s  claims  in  suffi‐
cient detail to invalidate that patent. 
  Apple next argues that claims 4 and 5 of the Motorola patent disclose only ab‐
stract mathematical manipulations. Mathematical formulae are unpatentable, 35 
U.S.C. § 101, if divorced from a new and useful process. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584, 590–91 (1978). But the ‘559 patent’s claims are expressly limited to the proc‐
ess of generating preamble sequences “in a CDMA system,” and the ‘559 patent 
purports  to  improve  this  specific  system.  These  limitations  leave  many  uses  of 
the mathematical formula in the public domain. Id. 
  Apple  also  requests  summary  judgment  of  noninfringement.  It  compares  its 
phones’ actual preamble generation process with the method claimed in the ‘559 
patent  and  asserts,  on  the  basis  of  differences  between  the  two  methods,  that 
there is no direct infringement. The smallest unit of a preamble sequence is a bi‐
nary chip. Apple’s phones generate preambles chip‐by‐chip, combining the gen‐
erated chips with a third number and transmitting the result before repeating the 
cycle.  In  contrast,  the  method  disclosed  in  claims  1,  4,  and  5  of  the  ‘559  patent 
consists of forming an outer code and an inner code and multiplying the two to‐
gether. Read naturally the language of ‘559 implies generating the codes in their 
entirety  before  multiplying  them  together.  But  Motorola’s  expert  has  explained 
that one skilled in the art would know how to implement the method described 
in  the  ‘559  patent  chip‐by‐chip,  which,  if  true,  revives  Motorola’s  infringement 
  Apple, however, notes other differences between its preamble generation sys‐
tem and that described in the ‘559 patent. Its system requires three numbers in its 
preamble generation system rather than the two claimed in the ‘559 patent and 
combines the numbers by means of an XOR operator (expressed in formal logic 
terms as “P or Q, but not both”) rather than the multiplication operator (“P and 
Q”).  And  its  inner  and  outer  codes  are  based  on  single  repeated  codewords, 
while the ‘559 inputs are a “set of Hadamard codewords” and a “set of orthogo‐
nal  codewords.”  (Hadamard  codewords  are  a  subspecies  of  orthogonal  code‐
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words.) But Motorola provides plausible explanations for why these differences 
are either insubstantial or illusory. Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air 
Products  Co.,  339  U.S.  605,  608  (1950).  Since  infringement  under  the  doctrine  of 
equivalents is a question of fact, Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 659 
F.3d 1121, 1129–30 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and a jury could find Motorola’s explanations 
convincing,  I  reject  Apple’s  argument  that  no  jury  could  find  its  products  di‐
rectly infringe the ‘559 Patent. 
  Apple further requests a ruling of no contributory infringement, based on Mo‐
torola’s failure to identify a specific hardware or software component of Apple’s 
devices that has no substantial use apart from uses that infringe the ‘559 patent. 
35 U.S.C. § 271(c); Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). Motorola responds that further third‐party discovery is needed to identify 
such a componen. Having granted Motorola’s request for further discovery pur‐
suant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (a request that was unopposed), I defer considera‐
tion of Apple’s motion for summary judgment on contributory infringement un‐
til the discovery is completed. 
  Apple  also wants me to  rule that there has been  no  induced  infringement.  It 
argues that Motorola has presented no evidence of Apple’s “specific intent to en‐
courage another’s infringement” of the ‘559 patent. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b); DSU Medi‐
cal  Corp.  v.  JMS  Co.,  471  F.3d  1293,  1305  (Fed.  Cir.  2006).  But  Motorola’s  expert 
identified  Apple  guides  that  instruct  users  how  to  operate  their  phones  on 
CDMA  networks,  and  that  operation  is  alleged  to  infringe.  A  genuine  issue  of 
material fact is presented, barring summary judgment on this issue. Fujitsu Ltd. 
v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010); DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 
supra, 471 F.3d at 1305. 
  Apple’s motion for summary judgment regarding the ‘559 patent’s invalidity 
and  also  regarding  direct  infringement  is  therefore  denied.  Regarding  indirect 
infringement the motion is denied in part and deferred in part, as just explained.   
                                                                                                             SO ORDERED. 

                                                              United States Circuit Judge, 
                                                                   Sitting by designation 
January 16, 2012 

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      Dated January 25, 2012
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                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 
                              NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
                                    EASTERN DIVISION 
APPLE INC. and NeXT SOFTWARE                                                ) 
INC. (f/k/a NeXT COMPUTER, INC.),                                           )   
                       Plaintiffs,                                          )        No. 1:11‐cv‐08540 
         v.                                                                 ) 
                                                                            )         Judge Richard A. Posner. 
MOTOROLA, INC. and MOTOROLA                                                 )           
MOBILITY, INC.,                                                             ) 
                       Defendants.                                          ) 
This order resolves motions, argued January 23, for summary judgment regard‐
ing  four  patents,  plus  claim  construction  of  a  fifth  patent,  also  argued  at  that 
As a result of these orders, the following patents involve, unless I am mistaken 
(please point out if I am), issues for trial: Apple ‘002, ‘263, ‘337, ‘354, ‘647, ‘867, 
‘949; Motorola ‘516, ‘559, ‘898. 
Motorola’s  summary  judgment  motion  regarding  Apple  ‘486  and  ‘852  is 
granted, and Apple’s motion for summary judgment is dismissed as moot 
  Apple  claims  that  certain  Motorola  devices  running  the  Android  operating 
system infringe U.S. Patent Number RE 39,486 E (“Extensible, Replaceable Net‐
work Component System”) and related U.S. Patent Number 5,929,852 (“Encapsu‐
lated Network Entity Reference of a Network Component System”). I will refer 
to these patents collectively as the “Network Component Patents.” Motorola has 
moved for summary judgment that its devices do not infringe the patents.  
  Claim 1 of the ‘486 patent describes “replaceable…component[s]” in a layered 
computing system. (The ‘852 patent incorporates the replaceable component sys‐
tem of ‘486 by reference at 13:22–44, and my interpretation of the terms applies 
equally  to  both  patents’  claims.)  The  use  of  replaceable  components  promotes 
program  flexibility  and  facilitates  customization  because  replaceability  enables 
the user to alter functionality within a given program. The prior art was “appli‐

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cation‐based,” which meant that users had to accept an application’s functional‐
ity as is or not use it at all.   
  Apple  argues  that  the  Java  objects  in  the  Android  Runtime  (the  part  of  the 
Android  system  that  facilitates  communication  between  the  processor  and  the 
applications)  are  the  infringing  replaceable  components.  Motorola  asks  that  I 
construe “replaceable components” to mean components replaceable by Android 
end‐users, and argues that the allegedly infringing Java objects are irreplaceable 
under that claim construction.     
  Apple’s opening argument that apparatus claims, such as claim 1, may never 
be  construed  to  require  functional  limitations  doesn’t  mesh  with  the  claim  lan‐
guage of the patent. A patent’s claims may describe a physical apparatus without 
reference  to  its  components’  capabilities,  and  when  described  in  “purely  struc‐
tural terms” cannot be altered by functional limitations derived from the patent 
specification. Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1324 
(Fed.  Cir.  2002);  Hewlett‐Packard  Co.  v.  Bausch  &  Lomb,  Inc.,  909  F.2d  1464,  1468 
(Fed. Cir. 1990). But see ACCO Brands, Inc. v. Micro Security Devices, Inc., 346 F.3d 
1075,  1076–78  (Fed.  Cir.  2003).  But  apparatus  claims  can  incorporate  functional 
limitations in the description of the claimed apparatus elements without invali‐
dating the patent. Typhoon Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1380 
(Fed.  Cir.  2011);  Microprocessor  Enhancement  Corp.  v.  Texas  Instruments  Inc.,  520 
F.3d  1367,  1374–75  (Fed.  Cir.  2005).  The  replaceable  components  in  the  layered 
computing arrangement described in ‘486 are not a purely structural description, 
but  a structural description  defined in relation to  a specific  function of replace‐
ability. (A car’s brakes are replaceable, as are lightbulbs, but they require of the 
replacer  different  degrees  of  skill  and  effort.)  The  ‘486  apparatus  is  innovative 
because of the ability to replace components, and that claim term must be under‐
stood to interpret the computing environment patented by ‘486. I therefore reject 
Apple’s  argument  that  clarifying  who  must  be  able  to  replace  the  components 
would improperly impose a functional limitation on a purely structural appara‐
tus claim. 
  Interpretation  of  patent  claim  language  is  based  primarily  on  intrinsic  evi‐
dence, including the patent specification. Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Co‐
vad  Communications  Group,  Inc.,  262  F.3d  1258,  1267  (Fed.  Cir.  2001).  The  ‘486 
specification emphasizes the flexibility of the replaceable components; “if a user 
does  not  like  the  way  a  particular  component  operates,  that  component  can  be 
replaced with a different component provided by another developer…. Clearly, 
the  replaceability  feature  of  the  novel  network  component  system  provides  a 
flexible alternative to the user” in contrast with the prior art of using “monolithic 
applications” that cannot be altered by the user. This is convincing evidence that 

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the  system  described  in  claim  1  intended  its  components  to  be  replaceable  by 
  But is an Android developer a “user”? Apple argues that he is, and cites the 
Android developers’ guide as an instruction manual for replacing components of 
the Android system. And even if “user” is confined to end‐user (the consumer), 
the Android developers’ guide contemplates that some end‐users skilled in An‐
droid  programming  will  customize  their phones’  functionality.  “Android  Com‐
patibility,”  (visited  Jan.  24, 
2012) (“a mobile phone is a highly personal, always‐on, always‐present gateway 
to the Internet. We havenʹt met a user yet who didnʹt want to customize it by ex‐
tending its functionality. Thatʹs why Android was designed as a robust platform 
for running after‐market applications”). 
  But the developers’ guide is geared towards modification of Android applica‐
tions,  not  the  Android  Runtime  environment.  It  states  that  “Android  offers  de‐
velopers  the  ability  to  build  extremely  rich  and  innovative  applications,”  and 
that  the  Android  Runtime  libraries  provides  the  “functionality  available  in  the 
core libraries of the Java programming language” to facilitate application devel‐
opment. “What is Android?”‐is‐
android.html (visited Jan. 24, 2012). The parties agree that the Android Runtime 
environment,  not  the  higher‐level  Android  application  environment,  is  the 
“software  component  architecture  layer”  which  must  contain  replaceable  com‐
ponents to infringe the Network Component Patents.  Motorola’s expert has said 
that  “the  Android  Runtime,  including  its  Java  classes,  is  part  of  the  core  infra‐
structure of Android, and it cannot be modified or replaced by a user, other than 
through a full system update.” Apple’s response is that such a full system update 
is  still  “replacement”  if  the  updated  code  replaces  any  Java  objects  of  the  An‐
droid Runtime libraries.  
  The  examples  of  component  replacement  within  the  Android  Runtime  envi‐
ronment described by Apple’s expert are remote from the interchangeable com‐
ponent system described in the ‘486 patent specification. The specification states 
that an “object[] of the [‘486] invention is to simplify a user’s experience” and to 
“provide a platform that allows third‐party developers to extend a layered net‐
work  component  system  by  building  new  components  that  seamlessly  interact 
with  the  system  components.”  Components  that  are  theoretically  replaceable 
only  by  manually  updating  code  during  a  full  Android  system  update  neither 
simplify the user’s experience nor promote the formation of a third‐party devel‐
oper community creating interchangeable components to modify Android Run‐
time functionality.  
  Apple’s expert asserts that he has replaced Java objects in his Motorola Droid 
X’s  Android  Runtime  environment,  but  has  not  explained  why  even  sophisti‐
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cated users would want to make such modifications, or whether the components 
he  substituted  had  to  be  written  from  scratch.  He  fails  to  rebut  Motorola’s  evi‐
dence  that  the  components  of  the  Android  Runtime  environment  are  not  “re‐
placeable” as the term would be understood by a knowledgeable person in light 
of  the  ‘486  patent  specification.  The  language  of  the  patent  specification,  which 
touts  the  invention’s  ability  to  simplify  users’  experience  and  spur  third‐party 
development  of  interchangeable  components,  describes  an  invention  similar  to 
the  application  layer  of  the  Android  system,  but  not  to  the  Android  Runtime 
layer.  Since  the  existence  of  meaningfully  replaceable  components  within  An‐
droid Runtime is a necessary element of Apple’s infringement claim, Motorola is 
entitled  to  summary  judgment  of  noninfringement.  Vivid  Technologies,  Inc.  v. 
American Science & Engineering, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
Motorola’s motion for summary judgment regarding Apple ‘867 is denied 
    Motorola  has  moved  for  summary  judgment  of  noninfringement  of  Apple’s 
U.S. Patent Number 5,519,867 (“Object‐Oriented Multitasking System”). The pat‐
ent  covers  an  apparatus  for  allowing  incompatible  applications  and  operating 
systems  to  communicate.  Some  programming  languages  are  “object‐oriented”; 
others are “procedural.” Object‐oriented applications are incompatible with pro‐
cedural  operating  systems  (and  vice  versa),  much  as  an  English  speaker  would 
be unable to follow instructions or answer questions in Japanese. The ‘867 patent 
bridges this linguistic gap by creating a “wrapper” for procedural operating sys‐
tems  that  makes  object‐oriented  applications  compatible  with  procedural  sys‐
tems by providing an apparatus for enabling object‐oriented applications  to ac‐
cess procedural system services. 
    One  aspect  of  this  compatibility  relates  to  “threads.”  A  thread  is  a  series  of 
code to accomplish a discrete task. To run on a procedural operating system, ob‐
ject‐oriented applications need to be able to get information from the operating 
system about threads; they may need to know about the priority (relative impor‐
tance) of a thread, or its state (whether it’s currently running, ready to execute, or 
    Limitation (e) of claim 1 is “means…for enabling said object‐oriented applica‐
tion to access said services to spawn, control, and obtain information relating to a 
thread of execution.” The parties agree that this language describes the function 
of enabling object‐oriented application to access the operating system’s services 
(“said services”) to spawn (create), control, and obtain information relating to a 
thread.  Motorola argues that its products don’t infringe the ‘867 patent because 
they do not enable object‐oriented applications to access the operating system to 
obtain thread information. 

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    The foundational component of the operating system in the accused products 
is called the Linux kernel, which stores a cached copy of its thread information in 
the  “Dalvik  Virtual  Machine,”  which  is  continuously  updated.  When  Android 
applications  need  information  from  the  operating  system,  they  don’t  query  the 
Linux kernel directly, but instead access Linux kernel services via a “virtual ma‐
chine,”  a  replication  of  a  computer  (computer  in  the  broadest  sense,  meaning 
computing  device)  that  functions  just  like  the  real  machine  but  is  achieved 
through  software  rather  built  from  hardware.    Motorola  argues  that  there  can’t 
be  infringement  because  Android  applications  never  access  the  Linux  kernel  to 
obtain thread information; rather they obtain already‐stored thread information 
from the virtual machine. 
    The  dispute  is  over  whether  the  two‐step  access  system  involving  a  virtual 
machine is an application that accesses the operating system’s services. Apple’s 
expert, Dr. Aldrich, says that the process of caching data and reading the cache 
instead  of  bothering  the  operating  system  directly  with  inquiries  is  a  well‐
accepted technique for accessing system services, so one of ordinary skill in the 
art would conclude that Motorola’s products enable object‐oriented applications 
to  access  system  services  to  obtain  thread  information.  Motorola’s  experts  dis‐
agree, arguing that Aldrich essentially admits that Motorola’s products don’t in‐
fringe the ‘867 patent: because these products merely return information already 
stored  in  the  virtual  machine  and  never  query  the  actual  operating  system  for 
thread  information,  they  do  not  access  the  Linux  kernel.  This  clash  of  experts 
created a disputed issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment. 
Motorola’s summary judgment motion regarding Apple ‘002 is denied 
  Motorola  has  moved  for  summary  judgment  of  noninfringement  of  Apple’s 
U.S. Patent Number 6,493,002 (“Method and Apparatus for Displaying and Ac‐
cessing Control and Status Information in a Computer System”). The patent cov‐
ers the well‐known “control strips” or “toolbars” commonly found on personal 
computer operating systems. A toolbar is a window that, when it appears at all, 
appears in a top “window layer” that other windows—those displaying files or 
running  programs—cannot  overlap  or  block  though  they  can  overlap  one  an‐
other. The  toolbar displays basic status information about the computer system 
through “display areas” (such as icons or other graphical representations), which 
might indicate the system’s audio volume, screen brightness, remaining battery 
power, internet connection strength, clock time, and so forth. As described by the 
‘002 patent, the user can interact with at least one of the display areas using the 
cursor or keyboard. Such interactive display areas are “buttons” on the toolbar—
they can be clicked to make changes to the computer system (for instance by di‐
minishing or increasing screen brightness). The point of including these display 
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areas on a single window (the toolbar) and of placing that window in a top win‐
dow  layer  is  to  allow  the  user  to  view  general  information  about  his  computer 
system and change basic settings quickly and conveniently. 
  Apple  asserts  that  Motorola  smartphones  and  tablets  running  the  Android 
operating system infringe claims 1, 21, and 46 of the ‘002 patent. Each of the ac‐
cused  devices  can  display  two  windows  (as  we’ll  see,  the  two  might  in  fact  be 
only  one)  that  Apple  says  infringe  the  ‘002  patent.  The  “status  bar”  is  consis‐
tently displayed at the top of the accused products’ screen and contains display 
areas—icons and other indicators—akin to those on a computer’s toolbar, such as 
an internet connection icon, a new email icon, a battery life indicator, a clock, and 
so forth. The “notification window” is not usually displayed but can be brought 
up by the user by way of a downward finger swipe from the status bar. The noti‐
fication window contains further display areas to indicate system status, some of 
which are interactive buttons; by contrast, none of the display areas on the status 
bar are interactive—none can be manipulated by the user to change system set‐
tings—though  the  status  bar  itself  can  be  swiped  to  bring  up  the  notification 
   Claim  1  of  the  patent,  which  is  largely  representative  of  the  other  claims  as‐
serted against Motorola, provides: 
       An interactive computer‐controlled display system comprising: a processor; a 
       data  display  screen  [e.g.,  a  computer  monitor]  coupled  to  the  processor;  a 
       cursor  control  device  [e.g.,  a  mouse  or  touchpad]  coupled  to  said  processor 
       for positioning a cursor on said data display screen; a window generation and 
       control  logic  coupled  to  the  processor  and  data  display  screen  to  create  an 
       operating  environment  for  a  plurality  of  individual  programming  modules 
       associated  with  different  application  programs  that  provide  status  and/or 
       control functions, wherein the window generation and control logic generates 
       and  displays  a  first  window  region  having  a  plurality  of  display  areas  on 
       said  data  display  screen,  wherein  the  first  window  region  is  independently 
       displayed and independently active of any application program, and wherein 
       each of the plurality of display areas is associated with one of the plurality of 
       individual programming modules, the first window region and the plurality 
       of independent display areas implemented in a window layer that appears 
       on top of application programming windows that may be generated; and an 
       indicia generation logic coupled to the data display screen to execute at least 
       one of the plurality of individual programming modules to generate informa‐
       tion for display in one of the plurality of display areas in the first window re‐
       gion, wherein at least one of the plurality of display areas and its associated 
       programming  module  is  sensitive  to  user  input,  and  further  wherein  the 
       window  generation  and  control  logic  and  the  indicia  generation  logic  use 
       message‐based  communication  to  exchange  information  to  coordinate  ac‐
       tivities of the indicia generation logic to enable interactive display activity. 
  The  boldface  passages  are  those  contested  by  the  parties.  In  particular,  Mo‐
torola argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Apple has failed to 
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raise a genuine factual dispute that Motorola’s products infringed either or both 
of two limitations of the ‘002 patent: the “first window region” limitation and the 
“message‐based communication” limitation. 
   The parties have not adequately explained one of the grounds on which Mo‐
torola  seeks  summary  judgment:  the  “message‐based  communication”  element 
of  claim  1  and  the  apparently  similar  “sending  a  message  to  a  programming 
module” element in claims 21 and 46. The issue does not appear to be especially 
complex,  but  the  parties’  briefing  of  it  is  impenetrable.  Because  Motorola  has 
failed  to  make  its  argument  comprehensible,  either  in  its  brief  or  at  oral  argu‐
ment, it is not entitled to summary judgment on this ground. 
   The second ground for summary judgment advanced by Motorola—the “first 
window  region”  limitation—has  several  elements:  It  is  just  a  single  window, 
rather  than  a  group  of  windows;  it  has  multiple  display  areas,  and  at  least  one 
such display area is “sensitive to user input,” or interactive (in other words, it is 
a button); and it is “implemented in a window layer that appears on top of appli‐
cation programming windows that may be generated.” 
   Both  the  status  bar  and  the  notification  window  satisfy  the  “top  window 
layer”  limitation.  Each  of  them,  when  displayed,  appears  on  top  of  any  other 
windows and cannot be overlapped by another window. Finally, in none of the 
devices is any display area on the status bar interactive. The fact that the status 
bar may itself be interactive—a downward swipe on it brings up the notification 
window—does  not  mean  that  it  contains  any  interactive  display  areas;  Apple 
does not argue that it does. Motorola’s status bar taken alone therefore does not 
infringe the ‘002 patent. 
   But  the  notification  window  does  contain  interactive  display  areas.  It  is  true 
that the notification window, unlike a conventional personal computer toolbar or 
the accused devices’ status bar, is not usually visible and can only be called up 
by the user’s downward swiping motion. This prevents the notification window 
from fulfilling the toolbar’s primary purpose, as stated in the patent’s specifica‐
tion,  of  making  core  status  indicators  conveniently  visible  and  accessible  to  us‐
ers. But the claims, not the specification, determine the scope of the patent and so 
must  be  analyzed  to  determine  infringement.  CollegeNet,  Inc.  v.  ApplyYourself, 
Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bayer AG v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Motorola has not  pointed to any  language in the asserted 
claims that suggests that they are limited to windows that are always or usually 
visible onscreen or that appear automatically without user action. 
  Apple told the PTO that the “window layer” claim term meant that “the pre‐
sent invention is directed at using individual programming modules that gener‐
ate  displays  that  are  always  visible  on  a  top  layer”  (emphasis  added)  and  distin‐
guished  a  prior  reference  from  the  ‘002  invention  on  the  ground  that  the  prior 
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reference “only allow[ed] the user an unobstructed view of the system if a button 
is  selected”—just  like  the  notification  window,  which  comes  into  view  only 
when the user performs a downward swipe from the status bar. Yet the asserted 
claims,  as  finally  approved  by  the  PTO,  do  not  require  that  the  window  be  al‐
ways visible but only that it appear on top of all other windows and never be ob‐
structed  when  it  is  generated;  nor  is  the  patent  limited  to  toolbars  that  can  be 
viewed without the user’s pressing a button. “[B]ecause the prosecution history 
represents  an  ongoing  negotiation  between  the  PTO  and  the  applicant,  rather 
than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specifi‐
cation  and  thus  is  less  useful for claim  construction  purposes.”  Phillips  v.  AWH 
Corp.,  415  F.3d  1303,  1317  (Fed.  Cir.  2005).  The  patent’s  “first  window  region” 
limitation therefore does not provide a ground for granting summary judgment 
to Motorola—the status window cannot infringe the ‘002 patent, but for all that 
Motorola has shown, the notification window may. 
    My  determination  that  the  notification  window  might  infringe  is  dispositive 
of this motion, but I add that another argument of Apple’s—that the status bar 
and notification window together actually constitute a single window, which it‐
self infringes the ‘002 patent—is a nonstarter. Whether the status bar and the no‐
tification window are two separate windows or a single “composite” window is 
a semantic question to which there is no answer that a jury could give; the par‐
ties  have  not  suggested  what  kind  of  evidence  would  show  that  Motorola’s 
status bar and notification window are only a single window that cannot be seen 
all at once, but only in two glances, by swiping the window down from the top 
of the screen. Apple bears the burden of proving that Motorola has infringed its 
patent, and thus would have to establish the unity of the status bar and notifica‐
tion window taken together to show infringement under this composite‐window 
theory. It cannot do so, though it may be able to prove that the notification win‐
dow taken alone infringes its patent. 
Claim construction of the Apple ‘263 patent 
      Apple’s ‘263 patent (U.S. Patent No. 6,343,263) describes a computer system 
that  performs  realtime  signal  processing  on  serially  transmitted  data.  Claim  1 
lays out the architecture of this signal‐processing system. It includes two subsys‐
tems—a “host central processing unit” and a “realtime signal processing subsys‐
tem”—connected by a realtime application program interface (“realtime API” for 
short).  The  realtime  API  requests  realtime  services  (for  instance,  video‐image 
processing) from the realtime signal processing subsystem on behalf of applica‐
tions running on the host subsystem, receives instructions from the host subsys‐
tem, and supplies the realtime signal processing subsystem with instructions for 
signal processing.  
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     Apple alleges that Motorola phones and tablets infringe the ‘263 patent. Mo‐
torola  countered  that  its  devices  don’t  infringe  because  their  signal‐processing 
systems lack a realtime API, and on that basis it moved for a summary judgment 
ruling  that  it  had  not  infringed.  I  decided  this  factual  dispute  couldn’t  be  re‐
solved without construction of the claim term “realtime API.” 
     Claim  1  asserts  “at  least  one  realtime  application  program  interface  (API)  cou‐
pled between the [host] subsystem and the realtime signal processing subsystem 
to  allow  the  subsystem  to  interoperate  with  said  realtime  services”  (emphasis 
added). There is no dispute over the meaning of the word “realtime” generally: 
to  be  “realtime”  a  system  “must  satisfy  explicit  (bounded)  response‐time  con‐
straints  or  risk  severe  consequences,”  namely  degraded  performance.  Philip  A. 
Laplante,  Real‐Time  Systems  Design  and  Analysis:  An  Engineer’s  Handbook  10 
(1993).  But  the  parties  differ  over  how  the  word  should  be  understood  in  con‐
junction with an API. Motorola asserts that a “realtime API” is a an API that has 
realtime  functionality,  which  Motorola  defines  as  “facilitating  constant  bit  rate 
handling,” while Apple defines it as an API that facilitates realtime signal proc‐
essing, that is, that enables realtime interaction between the two subsystems.  
     Motorola  points  out that the inventors identified some components of their 
invention as “realtime,” but left the word out of claim 31, which describes an API 
that  “issu[es]  requests  to  the  realtime  engine  to  perform  data  transformations.” 
An  API  that  does  that  falls  within  Apple’s  broad  definition  of  realtime  API  as 
any API that links the realtime signal‐processing system to the host system. Real‐
time API in claim 1 must, Motorola reasons, mean something different from the 
API in claim 31, since the latter, even though it fits Apple’s proposed definition 
for purposes of claim construction, is not called a “realtime API.” 
     There  may  indeed  be  a  presumption  that  “API”  in  claim  31  and  “realtime 
API” in claim 1 have different meanings, Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Labora‐
tories,  239  F.3d  1305,  1310  (Fed  Cir.  2001);  Tandon  Corp.  v.  International  Trade 
Commission,  831  F.2d  1017,  1023  (Fed.  Cir.  1987),  but  that  presumption  can  be 
overcome,  for  example  by  the  patent  specification.  Id;  see  also  Philips  v.  AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315–17 (Fed Cir. 2005) (en banc). And ‘273’s specification—
“the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,” Vitronics Corp. v. Con‐
ceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)—consistently refers to the real‐
time API as just the “interface” or the “API.” So too did the inventors during the 
patent’s prosecution. 
     Neither  the  specification  nor  the  prosecution  history  suggests  that  the  real‐
time API disclosed in claim 1 must itself have realtime functionality, as by facili‐
tating constant bit‐rate handling (e.g., preventing a streaming video from being 
interrupted  by  incoming  data).  The  specification  makes  clear  that  the  realtime 
signal‐processing subsystem must assure constant bit‐rate handling, but not that 
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the  realtime  API  must  do  so.  The  patent  does  describe  one  embodiment  of  the 
invention as involving the realtime API’s instructing the real‐time engine on how 
to  process  the  proper  number  of  bits  per  word,  but  this  doesn’t  imply  that  the 
API  itself does the constant  bit‐rate  processing,  and  is  therefore consistent with 
how the realtime API is described everywhere else in the patent: as an interface 
between the realtime subsystem and the host subsystem that receives commands 
from the host and passes the instructions along to the realtime subsystem, which 
does the realtime processing. 
     I  therefore  construe  “realtime  application  program  interface”  in  claim  1  of 
the ‘263 patent to mean an “API that allows realtime interaction between two or 
more subsystems.” 

                                                               United States Circuit Judge 
January 25, 2012 

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       Dated March 19, 2012
            Case: 12-1548         Document: 131         Page: 124       Filed: 03/14/2013

                           NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
                                 EASTERN DIVISION 
APPLE INC. and NeXT SOFTWARE                                                ) 
INC. (f/k/a NeXT COMPUTER, INC.),                                           )   
                       Plaintiffs,                                          )        No. 1:11‐cv‐08540 
         v.                                                                 ) 
                                                                            )     Judge Richard A. Posner. 
MOTOROLA, INC. and MOTOROLA                                                 )           
MOBILITY, INC.,                                                             ) 
                       Defendants.                                          ) 
                                                      ORDER OF MARCH 19, 2012 
     On  the  basis  of  the  hearing  on  claims  construction  that  I  conducted  on  March  12, 
2012, and the parties’ briefs, I adopt the following claims constructions. Cf. Markman v. 
Westview  Instruments,  Inc.,  52  F.3d  967,  978–79  (Fed.  Cir.  1995)  (en  banc),  affirmed,  517 
U.S. 370 (1996). This is the second round of claims construction in this litigation; the first 
was conducted by Judge Crabb before she transferred the case to me. See Apple, Inc. v. 
Motorola, Inc., No. 3:10‐cv‐00662 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 13, 2011). 
Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 6,493,002 
  Apple’s  ‘002  patent  (“Method  and  Apparatus  for  Displaying  and  Accessing  Control 
and  Status  Information  in  a  Computer  System”)  covers  the  well‐known  control  strips 
and toolbars found in personal computer operating systems. The purpose of a toolbar is 
to  provide  the  user  with  easy  access  to  basic  information  about  his  device,  such  as  its 
sound  volume  level  or  internet  connection,  in  a  single  location.  The  parties  propose 
competing constructions of four terms that pertain to characteristics of the covered tool‐
bars and the underlying programming. 
  The first term is “programming module.” Claim 1 of the patent describes: 
                a  window  generation  and  control  logic…to  create  an  operating 
                    environment for a plurality of individual programming modules 
                    associated  with  different  application  programs  that  provide 

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                           status  and/or  control  functions,  wherein  the  window  genera‐
                           tion  and  control  logic  generates  and  displays  a  first  window 
                           region having a plurality of display areas…and wherein each 
                           of  the  plurality  of  display  areas  is  associated  with  one  of  the 
                           plurality  of  individual  programming  modules  (emphases  add‐
The nontechnical reader confronted with this textual edifice sees through a glass, darkly; 
but  the  parties  agree  that  “programming  module”  refers  to  computer  code,  and  their 
disagreement appears to be a narrow one. Apple says the term denotes “a self‐contained 
unit of code,” while Motorola says it denotes “a program file (or files) associated with 
the  control  strip  that  contains  the  code  necessary  to  perform  the  module’s  specified 
    The parties appear to agree that “programming module” refers to a body of software 
code that is sufficient in itself to perform some task. Apple’s definition is consistent with 
one  of  the  common  meanings  of  “module”  in  ordinary  use:  a  distinct  component  of  a 
larger system that performs a given task and is interchangeable with other components 
(that  is,  other  modules).  Motorola’s  proposal  would  limit  programming  modules  to 
those  chunks  of  code  that  constitute  full  program  files.  The  parties  don’t  define  “pro‐
gram  file,”  and  as  Apple’s  definition  seems  correct  and  Motorola  has  failed  to  explain 
what it means by “full program files,” I adopt Apple’s definition. 
  The next term to be construed is “implemented in a window layer that appears on top 
of  application  programming  windows  that  may  be  generated.”  The  parties’  proposals 
aren’t easy to distinguish on the semantic level: compare Apple’s “when generated, the 
first window region appears in a window layer that is in front of active application win‐
dows,” with Motorola’s “implemented in a specific layer such that the first window and 
associated display areas, while generated, are always on top of and cannot be obscured 
by any application windows that may be generated.” 
  I construed this phrase of the ‘002 patent in my January 25, 2012, summary judgment 
order, when I said that “a toolbar is a window that, when it appears at all, appears in a 
top ‘window layer’ that other windows—those displaying files or running programs—
cannot overlap or block though they can overlap one another.” I added that the asserted 
claims “do not require that that the window be always visible but only that it appear on 
top of other windows and never be obstructed when it is generated.” Most windows in 
common operating systems can be partially obstructed by other windows; a key feature 
of the toolbar, distinguishing it from other windows, is that it cannot be partially blocked 
by other  windows; such  obstruction would  interfere with its  function of conveying  in‐

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formation to the user in one convenient location. The toolbar is always on top of other 
windows in the sense that it cannot be partially obstructed by another window; but of 
course by opening certain programs, from the toolbar or elsewhere, the user can make 
the toolbar disappear completely while that program is open. 
  I  reject  both  parties’  proposals  and  adhere  to  my  own,  as  set  forth  in  the  previous 
  The third term is “interactive display activity,” but at the claims construction hearing 
the parties informed me that the term’s meaning is no longer disputed; the parties’ pro‐
posed  definitions  were  similar,  and  they  have  agreed  to  accept  Apple’s  construction: 
“enabling at least one of the display areas and associated programming modules to be 
responsive to user output.” 
  The fourth term is “message‐based communication.” Apple proposes the construction 
“communications  that  do  not  require  immediate  action  by  the  recipient.”  Motorola 
counters with “a method of communication that involves passing a specific data struc‐
ture (‘message’) from one component to another component to  either tell the receiving 
component what to do or to obtain information about the receiving component.” At the 
claims construction hearing, however, both parties conceded that neither proposed con‐
struction is particularly satisfactory, and seemed to agree that the term “message‐based 
communication”  is  more  straightforward  than  either  proposal.  I  construe  “message‐
based communication” to mean “communication that contains a message.” 
Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 6,343,263 
  The parties seek construction of two terms in Apple’s ‘263 patent (“Real‐Time Signal 
Processing System for Serially Transmitted Data”), which describes a data‐transmission 
system that performs realtime signal processing on serially transmitted data. The system 
is made up of two subsystems—a “host central processing unit” and a “realtime signal 
processing  subsystem”—connected  by  a  realtime  application  program  interface,  or 
“realtime API.” As described in my order of January 25 construing the claim term “real‐
time API,” the invention functions as follows: If an application running on the host sub‐
system  needs  “realtime  services”—voice  or  video‐image  processing,  for  example—the 
host  tells  the  realtime  API,  which  in  turn  requests  realtime  data  processing  from  the 
realtime signal processing subsystem. The realtime API then provides the realtime sig‐
nal processing subsystem with signal‐processing parameters supplied by the host.  
  In  my  January  25  order  I  adopted  Apple’s  proposed  construction  of  realtime  API—
“[an] API that allows realtime interaction between two or more subsystems”—rejecting 
Motorola’s  proposed  construction:  “[an]  API  facilitating  constant  bit  rate  data  han‐

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dling.”  I  observed  that  there  was  no  disagreement  over  the  meaning  of  “realtime,”  as 
both parties accepted the definition in Philip A. Laplante, Real‐Time Systems Design and 
Analysis:  An  Engineer’s  Handbook  10  (1993):  to  be  “realtime”  a  system  “must  satisfy  ex‐
plicit  (bounded)  response‐time  constraints  or  risk  severe  consequences,”  namely  de‐
graded performance. (The parties have not been able to explain what “bounded” adds to 
“explicit,” but the precise meaning of these terms is not germane to the constructions.) 
  Now the parties ask me to construe the terms “realtime signal processing subsystem” 
and  “realtime  services.”  The  latter  term  requires  no  construction,  given  the  parties’ 
agreement on the meaning of “realtime.” As for “realtime signal processing subsystem,” 
the  patent  specifies  that  the  invention  contains  “a  real‐time  data  engine  [the  realtime 
signal  processing  subsystem]  for  processing  isochronous  streams  of  data.”  The  word 
“isochronous” means transmitted at a constant bit rate. So the realtime signal processing 
subsystem must be capable of constant bit rate handling. But it doesn’t follow that Mo‐
torola’s proposed construction—“a subsystem that has explicit (bounded) response‐time 
constraints and  must assure constant  bit  rate handling of  data”—is correct.  The patent 
specification doesn’t limit the realtime subsystem’s handling capabilities to isochronous 
data; it purports instead to cover any type of data delivered over any type of transmis‐
sion medium, including data transmitted at a variable bit rate (“asynchronous” streams 
of  data).  Motorola’s  proposed  construction,  in  implying  that  the  response‐time  con‐
straints to which the realtime signal processing subsystem is subject must be internally 
imposed, is also inconsistent with language in the specification to the effect that the real‐
time API—a distinct component of the invention—supplies the realtime subsystem with 
its processing parameters.  
  I therefore construe “realtime signal processing subsystem” in claim 1 of the ‘263 pat‐
ent to mean “subsystem that processes data subject to explicit (bounded) response‐time 
constraints and is capable of handling data transmitted at a constant bit rate.” 
Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 5,566,337 
  Apple’s ‘337 patent (“Method and Apparatus for Distributing Events in an Operating 
System”)  describes  a centralized method for alerting components in a computer of  de‐
velopments  (“events”)  elsewhere  in  the  system.  The  inventor,  taking  full  advantage  of 
his license to be his own lexicographer, Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 
1582  (Fed.  Cir.  1996),  has  assigned  many  idiosyncratic  meanings  to  commonly  used 
words  in  the  patent.  The  computer  component  generating  the  event  is  called  a  “pro‐
ducer” and the component to be notified is called the “consumer.” The system receives 

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events from producers, consults its database of consumers to be alerted for each type of 
event, and notifies the appropriate consumers of each event in the correct order.   
  The  first  two  terms  for  construction  appear  in  claim  1,  which  describes  in  relevant 
                      a system for distributing events comprising: 
                          storing means for storing a specific set of events of which said 
                              at least one event consumer is to be informed; 
                          event manager control means for receiving the event from the event 
                              producer,  comparing  the  received  event  to  the  stored  set  of 
                              events,  and  distributing  an  appropriate  event  to  an  appropriate 
                              event consumer; and 
                          distributor means for receiving the event from the control means, di‐
                              recting said control  means  to distribute an appropriate event to 
                              an appropriate event consumer (emphases added). 
Both  the  “event  manager  control  means...”  and  the  “distributor  means  ...”  are  means‐
plus‐function claims. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. For each I must therefore identify the claimed 
function  and  the  structure  disclosed  in  the  ‘337  specification  that  implements  the 
claimed function. Biomedino LLC v. Waters Technologies Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). When the claimed function is to be performed by a computer, the corresponding 
structure is the algorithm that enables the processor to perform the function, rather than 
the computer itself. Dealertrack Inc. v. Huber, Nos. 2009‐1566, 2009‐1588, 2012 WL 164439, 
at *11–12 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 20, 2012); Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International 
Game  Technology,  521  F.3d  1328,  1332–33  (Fed.  Cir.  2008);  see  also  In  re  Katz  Interactive 
Call  Processing  Patent  Litigation,  639  F.3d  1303,  1314–15  (Fed.  Cir.  2011);  Harris  Corp.  v. 
Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
  The parties agree that “event manager control means...” claims the function “receiv‐
ing the event from the event producer, comparing the received event to the stored set of 
events, and distributing an appropriate event to an appropriate event consumer.” Apple 
contends that the corresponding structure is the “event manager control unit [listed in 
Figure 2 of the ‘337 patent] consist[ing] of at least one software routine which manages 
the event manager data structures.” The control unit is the computer itself. Harris Corp. 
v. Ericsson Inc., supra, 417 F.3d at 1254. The “software routine which manages the event 
manager data structures” sounds like an algorithm, but as it says nothing about how the 
control unit (the computer) receives, compares, and distributes events, it is equivalent to 
claiming  that  a  computer  with  “appropriate  programming”  is  the  relevant  structure,  a 

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gambit that the Federal Circuit rejected in Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty. Ltd. v. In‐
ternational Game Technology, supra, 521 F.3d at 1334. I therefore reject Apple’s proposed 
   Motorola’s proposed construction incorporates the ‘337 patent specification’s descrip‐
tion of how the event manager control unit performs the event receipt, comparison, and 
distribution functions. Though based in part on the specification’s discussion of an em‐
bodiment, that embodiment is the only one disclosed that describes how the event man‐
ager control unit functions. Cf. Nomos Corp. v. Brainlab USA, Inc., 357 F.3d 1364, 1368‐69 
(Fed. Cir. 2004). The quid pro quo for means‐plus‐function claiming is being bound by 
the structural details of the specification, including embodiment descriptions, and Mo‐
torola’s construction appropriately narrows the event manager control unit’s algorithm.   
   Motorola further proposes that the structure of the event manager control means in‐
cludes  APIs  (“application  programmer  interfaces”—code  that  enables  communication 
between software components) for enabling a producer to submit events, enabling con‐
sumers  to  register  as  either  broadcast  or  sequential  consumers  (these  terms  are  con‐
strued  below),  and  distributing  event  notifications  to  event  consumers.    Because  the 
claimed  function  clearly  contemplates  communication  between  producers,  consumers, 
and  the  event  control  means,  and  the  API  discussion  beginning  at  column  10:16  pro‐
vides  the  only  explanation  of  how  these  APIs  would  facilitate  that  communication,  I 
agree that they too are part of the event manager control unit’s algorithm. 
   I  therefore  accept  Motorola’s  proposal  that  the  structure  applicable  to  the  claimed 
event  manager  control  means  is  the  algorithm  that  controls  the  event  manager  control 
unit listed as 305 in Figure 2 of the patent. And I agree with Motorola that the details of 
that algorithm are set forth in the sections of the specification that it cites in its proposed 
construction. I caution, however, that Motorola’s actual proposed construction will not 
be intelligible to a jury evaluating the ‘337 patent, and will have to be substantially sim‐
plified before I will permit it to be presented to a jury.  
   The second term for construction is the “distributor means...,” which the parties also 
agree is a means‐plus‐function claim. And they agree that it claims the function of “re‐
ceiving the event from the control means and directing said control means to distribute 
an  appropriate  event  to  an  appropriate  event  consumer.”  This  too  is  a  computer‐
implemented  function  and  the  appropriate  structure  is  the  algorithm  that  enables  the 
processor to perform the function. 
   I reject Apple’s proposal that the appropriate structure is “software instructions that 
moderate  the  connection  between producers  and consumers of an event”  for the same 

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reasons I rejected its proposal for the first term. “Software instructions” doesn’t identify 
a structure found in the specification of the ‘337 patent. 
  I  accept  Motorola’s  proposal  that  the  structure  includes  event  distributors  for  each 
event type, which control communication with broadcast consumers and are controlled 
by  an  algorithm  that  performs  the  steps  visualized  in  Figure  9D  and  described  in  Mo‐
torola’s  citations  to  the  ‘337  specification.  I  also  accept  Motorola’s  contention  that  the 
structure applicable to the claimed distributor means includes APIs that enable commu‐
nication  with  third‐party  distributors  and  thus  allow  the  ‘337  system  to  handle  new 
event  types.  The  specification  states  at  column  10:18–26  that  “according  to  the  present 
invention,” the distributors may be written by third parties, and goes on to define APIs 
“which allow[] these third parties to communicate with the event manager.” The prefa‐
tory clause means that every incarnation of the invention envisions communication with 
third‐party distributor modules. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 
1318  (Fed.  Cir.  2006).  APIs  are  necessary  to  facilitate  communication  with  those  mod‐
ules,  and  are  included  in  Motorola’s  proposed  description  of  the  structure.  As  before, 
although I adopt Motorola’s proposed structure for the “distributor means” claim, it will 
have to be substantially simplified before it is presented to a jury.     
   Claim  3  of  the  patent  contains  terms  “broadcast  consumer”  and  “sequential  con‐
sumer.” Claim 6, which Apple asserts in this case, is based on claim 3, which describes: 
                      The system according to claim 1, wherein a plurality of event con‐
                      sumers  are  included  in  the  computer  and  the  plurality  of  con‐
                      sumers comprise: 
                         broadcast consumers having no relationship with other consum‐
                            ers,  the  broadcast  consumers  operating  independently  of 
                            other consumers and of the order in which consumers are 
                            informed of the event; and 
                         sequential  consumers  having  relationships  with  other  consum‐
                            ers, the sequential consumers requiring that no other con‐
                            sumer  be  told  about  an  event  while  they  themselves  are 
                            processing  the  vent  and  having  an  ability  to  influence 
                            when  they receive  the event  relative  to  the other consum‐
                            ers (emphases added). 
  Neither term appears in a means‐plus‐function claim, so the general principles of pat‐
ent claim construction apply. Apple’s proposal that a broadcast consumer “has no rela‐
tionship with other consumers” and a sequential consumer “requires that no other con‐

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sumer  be  told  about  an  event  while  it  is  still  processing  the  event”  adds  nothing.  Mo‐
torola proposes that a broadcast consumer is one “that has registered to receive events 
of a given event kind via a broadcast mode of distribution and will receive the event via 
a broadcast mode of distribution” and a sequential consumer is one that “has registered 
to receive events of a given kind via a sequential mode of distribution and will receive 
the  event  via  a  sequential  mode  of  distribution.”  This  narrows  Apple’s  definition  by 
clarifying that consumers of each type must register to receive, and in fact receive, event 
notifications through either the broadcast or sequential type of event notification.  
  This  limitation  is  supported  by  the  specification’s  description  of  the  invention.  The 
specification describes “the present [i.e. ‘337] invention” as allowing a program to “sub‐
scribe as a sequential consumer for some kinds of events and as a broadcast consumer 
for other kinds of events.” Columns 6:48, 7:22–25. Subscription is synonymous with reg‐
istration. Motorola finds no similar support in the specification for its requirement that 
the  broadcast  and  sequential  consumers  actually  receive  event  notifications  through 
those  particular  forms.  Its  specification  references  for  this  limitation  are  either  unre‐
sponsive or focused on a particular embodiment of the ‘337 invention, which is an im‐
proper foundation for claim limitations outside the means‐plus‐function context.  
  I therefore conclude that a broadcast consumer is “a consumer that has registered to 
receive events of a given event kind via a broadcast mode of distribution” and a sequen‐
tial consumer is “a consumer that has registered to receive events of a given event kind 
via a sequential mode of distribution.” 
Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 5,946,647 
  Apple’s ‘647 patent (“System and Method for Performing an Action on a Structure in 
Computer‐Generated  Data”)  describes  a  system  that  recognizes  phone  numbers,  email 
addresses, dates, and other patterns in text, and presents the user with a menu of actions 
that  can  be  performed  on  the  relevant  data.  For  example  a  smartphone  practicing  the 
‘647  system  could  recognize  a  phone  number  in  a  text  message  and  present  the  user 
with  a menu  asking  whether he  would  like  to  call the  phone number  or store  it  in  his 
address book.  
   The ‘647 system relies on an “analyzer server” component that is programmed to rec‐
ognize a wide range of data patterns (the patent calls these patterns “structures”) in data 
from a wide range of files, such as text messages, emails, and web pages. Applications 
submit documents to the analyzer server for detection of structures and for linking. Af‐
ter the analyzer server recognizes structures in a document, it links each structure to op‐
erations  (called  “actions”)  commonly  performed  on  data  of  that  type  (such  as  linking 

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phone  numbers  to  the  functions  for  calling  or  storing  phone  numbers).  It  then  returns 
the document and links to the application that submitted it.  
   A benefit of the ‘647 system is that the analyzer server performs the pattern recogni‐
tion and linking before the user actually requests any of it. That’s useful because it re‐
minds the user of the actions available and relevant to, say, a phone number, in a con‐
venient  list  next  to  it  in  the  document.  So  even  if  the  user  hadn’t  thought  to  call  the 
number,  the  option  to  do  so  (and  to  do  so  without  having  to  write  down  the  number 
and then retype it into the phone application) is presented to him.  
  The  parties  request  construction  of  two  terms  in  claim  1  of  the  patent.  Claim  1  de‐
scribes  “a  memory  storing  information  including  program  routines  including  an  ana‐
lyzer server for detecting structures in the data, and for linking actions to the detected struc‐
tures...” (emphasis added).   
  The “analyzer server” performs the core functions of the ‘647 system, namely struc‐
ture detection and linking. Apple describes the analyzer server as “a program routine(s) 
that receives data, uses patterns to detect structures in the data, and links actions to the 
detected structure.” Motorola proposes that it is “a server routine separate from a client 
that receives data having structures from the client.” Under Apple’s interpretation, any 
set  of  routines  that  performs  structure  detection  and  linking  would  be  an  analyzer 
server.  But  that  is  just  a  definition  of  an  “analyzer.”  “Server”  becomes  superfluous,  as 
Apple’s expert implicitly acknowledges by stating that “the inventors used [’server’] in 
a generic sense intending to describe a service that includes various functionalities.” That 
understanding renders any piece of code a “server.” 
   Motorola  interprets  “server”  to  mean  a  client‐server  relationship  between  the  ana‐
lyzer server and the applications that request structure detection and linking. The ‘647 
specification supports this understanding by visualizing the “program” (item 165) that 
contains the analyzer server as a separate box from the “application” (item 167), which 
submits  a  data  file  to  the  program  for  structure  detection  and  linking.  Had  the  patent 
intended the analyzer server to be integrated into the application, rather than separate, 
the program box would logically appear inside the application box in Figure 1. 


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  Also, Motorola’s construction entails that the analyzer server is a single routine. Ap‐
ple’s expert states that multiple routines would be necessary to implement ‘647’s func‐
tions. “Routine” seems to be used imprecisely throughout this litigation, but the parties 
haven’t  requested  construction.  Routines  often  consist  of  subroutines‐‐and  in  fact  the 
‘647 patent describes the analyzer server as a subroutine (Column 2:26), indicating that 
the  inventor  had  a  broader  conception  of  the  term  “routine”  than  either  party.  In  the 
present context “routine” is synonymous with “module” or “component,” all of which 
describe a piece of programming necessary to perform a specific function; routines con‐
sist of subroutines, and I find nothing wrong with describing the analyzer server as one 
  I therefore construe “analyzer server” to mean “a server routine separate from a cli‐
ent that receives data having structures from the client.” 
  The second term for construction, also in claim 1, is “linking actions to the detected 
structures.”  Apple  proposes  that  this  means  “associating  detected  structures  to  com‐
puter subroutines that  cause the CPU to  perform a sequence of operations  on the  par‐
ticular structures to which they are associated.” Motorola proposes “creating a specified 
connection  between  each  detected  structure  and  at  least  one  computer  subroutine  that 
causes  the  CPU  to  perform  a  sequence  of  operations  on  that  detected  structure.”  The 
constructions diverge on two points.  
   One is the interpretation of “linking.” Apple interprets it to mean “associating.” Mo‐
torola  requires  the  creation  of  “a  specified  connection”  from  the  structure  to  the  code 
that performs the associated action. The ‘647 specification states that “upon detection of 
a structure, analyzer server links actions associated with the responsible pattern to the 
detected structure, using conventional pointers.” A term of art in computer engineering, 
a “pointer” stores a computer memory address. Linking by pointers thus entails storing 
the  memory  address  of  the  code  that  performs  the  action  relevant  to  the  recognized 
structure. The analyzer associates structures with actions, as Apple contends (which ex‐
plains the repetition of “associating” in proximity with “linking” in the specification, but 
doesn’t establish that they are one and the same). But ‘647 makes clear that linking is ac‐
complished  through  pointers.  Motorola’s  explanation  of  pointers—a  concept  that  Ap‐
ple’s brief ignores—convinces me that such linking constitutes a “specified connection.”  
   Second, Motorola’s construction requires “at least one” action to be linked to each de‐
tected structure. Citing the consistent reference to actions (plural) throughout the claims 
and specification of ‘647, Apple argues that two or more actions must be linked to each 
structure. But Figure 4 of the patent, which contemplates an analyzer that links dates to 
just  one  action—“put  in electronic calendar”—undermines this interpretation.  And the 

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ability to link a structure to a single action still comports with the patent’s plural refer‐
ence, so long as other structures are linked to other actions. An analyzer that links dates 
to the calendar and phone numbers to the phone book still “links structures to actions.” 
  I  therefore  adopt  Motorola’s  proposal  for  the  term  “linking  actions  to  the  detected 
Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 5,519,867 
  Apple’s  ‘867  patent  (“Object‐Oriented  Multitasking  System”)  discloses  a  “wrapper” 
for procedural operating systems that enables object‐oriented applications to access pro‐
cedural  operating  system  services.  This  permits  these  otherwise  incompatible  applica‐
tions and systems to communicate with one another.  
  The parties submitted for construction four mean‐plus‐function claims from this pat‐
ent. One is “means for storing said executable program logic in an object‐oriented class 
library.” When construing a means‐plus‐function claim, the first step is to determine the 
function identified by the claim term. Motorola argues that the function tracks the claim 
language: its proposed construction is “storing said executable program logic in an ob‐
ject‐oriented  class  library.”  In  its  claim  chart  and  at  the  hearing,  Apple  countered  that 
the function is merely “storing said executable program logic.” But a footnote in its brief 
disclaims any “meaningful dispute” with Motorola over function. I agree with Apple’s 
latter characterization and adopt Motorola’s proposed construction. The claim requires 
not just that the executable program logic be stored, but that it be stored in a specific lo‐
cation.  The  claim’s  locational  condition  thus  limits  the  scope  of  the  claimed  function; 
and the Federal Circuit holds that “the function of a means‐plus‐function claim must be 
construed  to  include  the  limitations  contained  in  the  claim  language.”  Lockheed  Martin 
Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
  Apple needed the function to be truncated in order to free up the object‐oriented class 
library to serve as its structure, “one or more object‐oriented class libraries, which con‐
tain executable program logic.” (The truncation is omitting “in an object‐oriented class 
library” from its proposed function.) But a means‐plus‐function claim states a function 
“without the recital of structure,” which instead must be disclosed in the specification. 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; Envirco Corp. v. Clestra Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); Cole v. Kimberly‐Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531 (Fed Cir. 1996). So Apple’s proposed 
structure won’t work. 
  Motorola argues that no structure is disclosed in the specification, rendering this limi‐
tation indefinite and claim 1 invalid. To identify structure, one asks: “What performs the 
claimed  function?”  If  the  function  is  “storing…executable  program  logic  in  an  object‐

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oriented  class  library,”  the  pertinent  question  is,  “What  performs  (or  carries  out)  the 
storing in a class library?” Apple’s answer—“object oriented class libraries, which con‐
tain executable program logic”—is wrong both for the reason described above (structure 
can’t  appear  in  the  claim  language)  and  because  it  doesn’t  make  sense  linguistically 
(under Apple’s proposed construction, the claim would effectively read, “class libraries 
containing  executable  program  logic  for  storing  executable  program  logic  in  a  class  li‐
   Claim  1  is  therefore  invalid  because  the  specification  discloses  no  structure  corre‐
sponding to “means for storing said executable program logic in an object‐oriented class 
library.” Having found claim 1 to be invalid, I need not construe the other three terms 
submitted  by  the  parties  for  construction.  A  single  indefinite  limitation  invalidates  an 
entire  claim.  E.g.,  NetMoneyIN,  Inc.  v.  VeriSign,  Inc.,  545  F.3d  1359,  1366–67  (Fed.  Cir. 
2008).  The  other  three  claims  submitted  for  construction  all  appear  in  claim  1,  which  I 
have just ruled indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, so no purpose would be served by 
my construing them. 
Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 
  Apple’s ‘949 patent claims “heuristics” for translating a user’s finger movements on a 
touch screen device (such as an iPhone or iPad) into computer commands, for instance 
to scroll up or to shift the location of an on‐screen item. Claim 1 claims heuristics for de‐
termining whether the user wants to scroll vertically or shift the view diagonally “based 
on an angle of initial movement of finger contact” and a heuristic for translating finger 
movements  into  commands  to  switch  from  one  item  to  the  next,  as  when  the  user  is 
flipping  through  a  series  of  digital  photos.  Claim  2  claims  a  heuristic  for  determining 
whether the user intends to move an on‐screen item rather than shift the frame of view 
itself. Claim 10 claims a heuristic, similar to the first one mentioned, for distinguishing 
between  commands  to  scroll  horizontally  and  commands  to  shift  the  view  diagonally, 
again “based on the angle of initial movement of the finger contact.” In my January 16 
summary  judgment  order  I  rejected  Motorola’s  argument  that  the  term  “heuristics”  is 
indefinite and stated that Apple’s definition of that word—“one or more rules to be ap‐
plied to data to assist in drawing inferences from that data”—is correct. 
  The phrase “based on the angle of initial movement of the finger contact” is the first 
term to be construed. Apple urges that the phrase is clear as it stands and needs no con‐
struction,  but  in  the  alternative  urges  the  construction  “based  on  at  least  the  detected 
direction of initial movement of the finger contact with respect to the X‐Y plane.” Mo‐

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torola’s interpretation is “using the angle of the initial movement of a finger contact as 
the sole criteria [sic].” 
  Apple is right that this phrase needs no construction; it is just a slightly clunky way of 
saying that the heuristic allows the device to determine what the user wants to do, using 
as one input the angle at which he has swiped his finger on the touch screen—more spe‐
cifically, the angle at which his swipe began (“the angle of initial movement”). Motorola 
wants me to construe “based on” to mean “based exclusively on.” Motorola’s interpreta‐
tion  is  contrary  to  the  usual  usage  of  the  phrase  “based  on,”  which  does  not  exclude 
other possible bases for the decision. 
  I decline to construe the phrase “based on the angle of initial movement of the finger 
contact”; it’s okay as is. 
  A second issue is Motorola’s argument that claims 1, 2, and 10 are “means plus func‐
tion” claims, see 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6, and that the patent specification fails to provide the 
structure necessary to perform the claimed functions. 
   The claims are as follows: 
                      1. A computing device, comprising: a touch screen display; one or 
                      more  processors;  memory;  and  one  or  more  programs,  wherein 
                      the one or more programs are stored in the memory and config‐
                      ured  to  be  executed  by  the  one  or  more  processors,  the  one  or 
                      more programs including: instructions for detecting one or more 
                      finger contacts with the touch screen display; instructions for ap‐
                      plying one or more heuristics to the one or more finger contacts to 
                      determine  a  command  for  the  device;  and  instructions  for  proc‐
                      essing  the  command;  wherein  the  one  or  more  heuristics  com‐
                          [1] a vertical screen scrolling heuristic for determining that the one 
                          or  more  finger  contacts  correspond  to  a  one‐dimensional  vertical 
                          screen  scrolling  command  rather  than  a  two‐dimensional  screen 
                          translation command based on an angle of initial movement of a fin‐
                          ger contact with respect to the touch screen display; 
                          [2]  a  two‐dimensional  screen  translation  heuristic  for  determining 
                          that  the  one  or  more  finger  contacts  correspond  to  the  two‐
                          dimensional  screen  translation  command  rather  than  the  one‐
                          dimensional vertical screen scrolling command based on the angle of 

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                           initial  movement  of  the  finger  contact  with  respect  to  the  touch 
                           screen display; 
                           and  [3]  a  next  item  heuristic  for  determining  that  the  one  or  more 
                           finger contacts correspond to a command to transition from display‐
                           ing a respective item in a set of items to displaying a next item in the 
                           set of items. 
                      2. The computing device of claim 1, wherein the one or more heu‐
                      ristics include [4] a heuristic for determining that the one or more fin‐
                      ger  contacts  correspond  to  a  command  to  translate  content  within  a 
                      frame rather than translating an entire page that includes the frame. 
                      10. The computer device of claim 9, wherein the first set of heuris‐
                      tics comprises [5] a heuristic for determining that the one or more first 
                      finger contacts correspond to a one‐dimensional horizontal screen scroll‐
                      ing  command  rather  than  the  two‐dimensional  screen  translation  com‐
                      mand based on the angle of initial movement of the finger contact with 
                      respect to the touch screen display. 
Motorola argues that each of the five italicized portions (I’ve numbered them for ease of 
reference)  describes  a  function  and  that  no  structure  for  performing  these  functions  is 
described in either the  claim or the specification. If  Motorola is  correct  on both points, 
the claims are invalid. 
  Are the quoted claim terms indeed means‐plus‐function terms? The usual format for 
a  means‐plus‐function  term  includes  the  word  “means”  immediately  prior  to  the  de‐
scription of the function, and that word is absent from the quoted claims. So there is a 
presumption that these are not means‐plus‐function limitations. But the presumption is 
rebutted  if  “the  claim  term  fails  to  ‘recite  sufficiently  definite  structure’  or  else  recites 
‘function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’” Invento AG 
v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Americas Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011), quoting CCS 
Fitness v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
  The  quoted  claims  cover  various  functions,  each  of  which  can  be  described  as  the 
translation  of  a  user’s  finger  movements  into  computer  commands.  Do  the  quoted 
claims recite sufficient structure to perform the claimed functions? Apple points out that 
claim  1,  from  which  the  others  ultimately  depend,  describes  a  computing  device  and 
lists  the  generic  components  of  a  generic  touch  screen  computer.  It’s  true  that  a  touch 
screen computer is the device on which the claimed functions can be performed. But pa‐

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tents  that  claim  a  means  for  performing  a  computer‐implemented  function  must,  as  I 
noted  earlier,  disclose  the  algorithm,  or  “step‐by‐step  process,”  for  performing  that 
function—that is the “structure” required by the statute. The touch screen device is not 
itself  a  step‐by‐step  method  for  translating  a  user’s  finger  movements  into  particular 
computer  commands. And  while disclosure of the actual code that  would perform  the 
translations is unnecessary if a person of ordinary skill in the art would be able without 
difficulty to write a program to execute the described algorithm, Medical Instrumentation 
& Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the claims at issue 
do  not  describe  an  algorithm  that  would  be  executed  by  the  code.  It  is  inherent  in  the 
concept of a touch screen computer that the user would want to enter commands to tell 
it to do things, that he would enter those commands by moving his fingers on the touch 
screen, and that the device would need to apply some set of rules to a given finger input 
to determine which command was intended. Apple’s patent cannot cover every means 
of performing the function of translating user finger movements into common computer 
commands on a touch‐screen device—that would be a patent on all touch‐screen com‐
  The patent does provide a bit more detail as to three of the five functions that I itali‐
cized; it instructs on translating finger movements into commands based on the angle at 
which  the  user  moves  his  fingers  on  the  touch  screen.  But  as  I  said  in  my  January  16 
summary  judgment  order,  to  say  that  a  heuristic  determines  what  a  user  wants  to  do 
based on his angle of finger movement hints at a step‐by‐step algorithm as required by 
Aristocrat Technologies but does not actually describe one; and two of the italicized terms, 
[3] and [4], don’t even provide that much information. Because the claims describe func‐
tions  without  describing  the  structure  necessary  to  perform  the  functions,  these  are 
means‐plus‐function claims despite not using the word “means.” 
  The question is therefore whether the specification recites sufficient structure for the 
functions in claims 1, 2, and 10. In my January 16 summary judgment order I accepted 
Apple’s argument that Figure 39C adequately specifies structure for the limitations that 
I  numbered  [1]  and  [2].  Motorola  ignores  my  holding  and  makes  the  same  arguments 
that I rejected at summary judgment. 
  The parties have not briefed the question whether the specification contains enough 
structure to justify the other limitations. The parties shall file simultaneous briefs on this 
question by March 26. 

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Motorola’s U.S. Patent No. 6,175,559 
  Motorola’s ‘559 patent (“Method for Generating Preamble Sequences in a Code Divi‐
sion Multiple Access System”) concerns the creation of numerical “preamble codes” that 
precede cellular transmissions and identify the transmitting cell phone to the receiving 
tower.  Verifying  the  source  of  each  transmission  is  important  because,  in  a  CDMA 
phone system, multiple cell phones communicate with a tower on the same frequency. 
The  preamble  code  is  created  by  mathematically  combining  two  strings  of  binary  bits: 
an “inner code” that identifies the transmitting phone and an “outer code” that identi‐
fies the recipient tower. When the tower receives a transmission it runs the combination 
algorithm  in  reverse  to  extract  the  inner  code  (since  it  knows  its  own  outer  code)  and 
thus identify the source of the transmission.  
  Both claim terms  for construction relate to  the ‘559 method for generating the  inner 
code, which identifies the sending cell phone. The inner code is itself made up of indi‐
vidual “codewords” (actually series of digits, not letters) each a much shorter string of 
binary  bits.  Those  codewords  are  “orthogonal”  if,  when  two  codewords  are  compared 
bit‐by‐bit, the number of matching bits is equal to the number of non‐matching ones (in 
other  words,  if  you  multiply  the  corresponding  elements  of  two  codewords  and  then 
add the results, you get zero). For example, the code words {1, 1, ‐1, ‐1} and {1, ‐1, 1, ‐1} 
are  orthogonal  to  each  other  because  1*1  +  1*(‐1)  +  (‐1)*1  +(‐1)*(‐1)  =  1+(‐1)+(‐1)+1  =  0, 
whereas  the  codeword  {1,  1,  1,  ‐1}  would  not  be  orthogonal  to  either  of  them.  And  a 
codeword  is  never  orthogonal  to  itself  since  all  bits  match,  meaning  that  each  corre‐
sponding term will multiply to 1, and so the sum of those terms will not equal zero.  Or‐
thogonal  codewords  are  (among  other  properties)  unique,  which  furthers  the  inner 
code’s function of differentiating cell phones transmitting on the same channel. 
  Claim  4  of  the  ‘559  patent  is  “A  method  for  generating  preamble  sequences  in  a 
CDMA  system  in  accordance  with  claim  1,  wherein  the  inner  codes  comprise  a  set  of  Ha‐
damard  code  words”  (emphasis  added).  Hadamard  codewords  are  a  class  of  codewords 
each of which is orthogonal to all the others. The parties request construction of passage 
in the claim that I’ve italicized. Motorola proposes “wherein the inner codes for the pre‐
amble  sequences  are  taken  from  a  set  of  Hadamard  code  words.”  Apple  proposes 
“wherein the inner codes contain at least one Hadamard code word.” Their dispute boils 
down to a disagreement over the term “comprise.”  
   When it appears in a patent claim, “comprise” is generally understood to mean “in‐
cluding  but  not  limited  to.”  E.g.,  Exergen  Corp.  v.  Wal‐Mart  Stores,  Inc.,  575  F.3d  1312, 
1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2111.03, p. 2100‐44 (8th ed., 
revision 6, Sept. 2007), (vis‐

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ited March 13, 2012). Motorola’s construction interprets comprise to mean “taken from” 
or “made from” or “derived from,” all of which are far afield from the meaning quoted 
in Exergen and the patent examiner’s manual. Although the patentee can supply his own 
definition  for  a  patent  term,  Vitronics  Corp.  v.  Conceptronic,  supra,  90  F.3d  at  1582,  no‐
where in the specification or claim terms does the ‘559 redefine comprise to take on this 
idiosyncratic meaning,  so its ordinary meaning  in  patent law governs. Phillips  v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).   
   Apple’s  definition  equates  “comprise”  with  “contain  at  least  one,”  which  comports 
with the term’s common definition. It’s true that Apple’s construction may exclude the 
embodiments disclosed in the ‘559 patent specification at column 4:5–21, which contem‐
plate  inner  codes  taken  from  Gold  codes,  or  codes  subjected  to  certain  manipulation 
techniques (upsampling and quadrature transformations, the details of which are irrele‐
vant to construing this claim). While there is a strong presumption against constructions 
that have the effect of excluding embodiments specified in the patent, In re Katz Interac‐
tive  Call  Processing  Patent  Litigation,  supra,  639  F.3d  at  1324,  the  embodiments  excluded 
by  Apple’s  construction  in  this  case  are  limited  to  “alternate  embodiments,”  some  of 
which may be excluded under Motorola’s proposal as well (for example, “In an alternate 
embodiment of the present invention, the code words are taken from a set of orthogonal 
Gold  codes”—Gold  codes  aren’t  taken  from  Hadamard  codes.).  Apple’s  construction 
includes  the  ‘559  patent’s  preferred  embodiment,  and  the  cases  upon  which  In  re  Katz 
relies  caution  against  construing  a  claim  to  exclude  the  preferred  embodiment  but  are 
silent on the subject of alternates.  
  I  therefore  accept  Apple’s  proposal  that  “wherein  the  inner  codes  comprise  a  set  of 
Hadamard  code  words”  in  claim  4  of  the  ‘559  patent  means  “wherein  the  inner  codes 
contain at least one Hadamard code word.” 
  Claim 5 of the ‘559 patent describes a particular method for selecting and combining 
the codewords to create the inner code. It claims, in relevant part, the method of: 
                      forming  an  inner  code  in  the  mobile  station  utilizing  the  follow‐
                         ing equation: 
                                                                   M 1
                                                       ci (k )    s
                                                                   j 0
                                                                          j   (k  jP )  

                      where sj, j=0,1, … , M‐1 are a set of orthogonal codewords of length P, 
                         where M and P are positive integers... (emphasis added). 

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The claim construction dispute turns on whether the set of codewords forming the inner 
code  (s  in  the  claim’s  terminology)  must  contain  orthogonal  elements,  as  Apple  pro‐
poses, or whether it just must be drawn from a set of orthogonal elements, as Motorola 
posits. The constructions diverge when each draw from the set of orthogonal codewords 
is a repeat of the last one, resulting in a set entirely of repeats. Such a set contains no or‐
thogonal elements, since a codeword, as explained above, cannot be orthogonal to itself. 
Motorola’s construction encompasses such a set, while Apple’s does not. 
   Motorola’s  construction  requires  that  the  disputed  term  in  claim  5  cover  all  sets  of 
codewords  “taken  from  a  set  of  orthogonal  codewords  of  length  P.”  This  includes  the 
preferred  embodiment,  which  describes  drawing  the  inner  code’s  component  code‐
words  from  a  set  of  Hadamard  codewords.  (Each  element  of  the  Hadamard  set  is  or‐
thogonal  to  every  other).  And  the  set  of  drawn  codewords  needn’t  all  be  unique—the 
specification  makes  this  clear  at  column  3:57;  there  can  be  repeats.  Permitting  repeats 
might  not  be  thought  wholly  inconsistent  with  the  requirement  that  the  drawn  set  be 
“orthogonal,”  because  a  set  containing  some  identical,  hence  non‐orthogonal,  code‐
words  as  well  as  some  different  ones  might  still  be  described  as  “a  set  of  orthogonal 
codewords if the latter predominated. But a set consisting entirely of repeats contains no 
elements orthogonal to each other, and so it cannot be “a set of orthogonal codewords.” 
   Consider  {A,  B,  C,  D}  to  represent  four  Hadamard  codewords.  (In  reality  each  Ha‐
damard code word is a collection of 1’s and ‐1’s, but I represent each codeword as a let‐
ter for simplicity’s sake. A is orthogonal to B, C, and D, but not to itself.) Motorola ar‐
gues that the set {A, A, A, A, A} is still “orthogonal” in the sense that it is orthogonal to a 
set that repeats a different Hadamard codeword, {B, B, B, B, B} for example. This would 
be more convincing if claim 5 covered “an orthogonal set of codewords,” but in fact it 
claims “a set of orthogonal codewords,” suggesting that the words, not the series, must 
be orthogonal. There is no intra‐set orthogonality in {A, A, A, A, A}.  
   Apple’s proposed construction—“the codewords consist of one or more codewords... 
wherein if there are more than one codwords, at least two must be orthogonal to each 
other”—comports with an ordinary understanding of these terms and is correct. 
Motorola’s U.S. Patent No. 6,359,898 
  Motorola’s  ‘898  patent  (“Method  for  Performing  a  Countdown  Function  During  a 
Mobile‐Originated  Transfer  for  a  Packet  Radio  System”)  describes  a  method  for  effi‐
ciently allocating channels in a wireless communications system, such as a cell phone or 
Wi‐Fi network.  Wireless data transmissions are transmitted in small increments of time 
called  “frames.”  Each  frame  includes  eight  “time  slots”—those  are  the  channels.  Each 

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time slot transmits one block of data per frame, so a total of eight blocks are transmitted 
per  frame.  A  network  can  allocate  its  time  slots  to  different  signals  from  mobile  units 
(such as cell phones or Wi‐Fi capable devices), either allocating each time slot to a differ‐
ent mobile unit or allocating multiple time slots to a single mobile unit. A time slot allo‐
cated  to  a  given  mobile  unit  transmission  will  transmit  one  block  per  frame  until  the 
transmission is completed; hence the more time slots that are allocated to a given trans‐
mission, the faster it will be completed. For example, a transmission of 10 blocks will re‐
quire 10 frames if the signal is allocated only a single time slot, but will require only 5 
frames if it is allocated 2 time slots. 
  When a transmission is completed, the mobile device no longer needs time slots and 
the  network  must reallocate them to  other  devices that still have data to  transmit.  The 
overall speed of the network depends on its being able to perform this reallocation with 
minimal downtime between the completion of one transmission on a given time slot and 
the  beginning  of  another.  Channel  and  processing  delays  create  a  lag  time  of  several 
frames, so the network needs advance warning of a transmission’s impending comple‐
tion if it is to reallocate its time slots without downtime. A cell phone or other device can 
give  advance  warning  by  indicating  in  each  frame  the  number  of  blocks  remaining  in 
the transmission. The ‘898 patent claims methods for providing this “countdown,” par‐
ticularly in cases in which multiple time slots are allocated to a single signal. 
  The parties debate the construction of the word “predetermined” in the term “prede‐
termined number of channel resources,” which appears several times in claims 1, 2, and 
5.  Claim  1  is  “transmitting  the  plurality  of  units  of  information  [the  data  blocks]  via  a 
predetermined number of channel resources [the time slots]” and “based on the prede‐
termined  number  of  channel  resources,  adjusting  the  number  of  the  plurality  of  units 
remaining to produce an adjusted number of units remaining”—in other words, divid‐
ing the number of data blocks by the number of time slots to yield the number of frames 
remaining in a transmission; that countdown number can be transmitted to the network 
in  each  frame  to  enable  the  network  to  reallocate  the  time  slots  as  soon  as  the  count‐
down reaches zero. 
  Apple  argues  that  “predetermined  number  of  channel  resources”  requires  that  the 
number of time slots (channel resources) be “determined at the beginning of the trans‐
mission of the communication signal and…cannot be changed during the transmission 
of the communication signal.” Motorola urges that “predetermined” just means that the 
number is determined “before transmission of the units of information.” So the question 
is  whether  the  number  of  time  slots  is  determined  before  the  entire  transmission  (Ap‐

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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                                         20 

ple’s position), or just before some group (“plurality”) of blocks, of which a transmission 
could contain many (Motorola’s position). 
  Motorola’s proposed construction is correct: “transmitting the plurality of units of in‐
formation  via  a  predetermined  number  of  channel  resources”  implies  only  that  the 
number  of  time  slots  is  determined  before  transmission  of  blocks,  not  that  it  has  to  be 
determined before any portion of the message is transmitted. The fact that the claim says 
“the” plurality rather than “a plurality” may seem to imply all the blocks. But that is not 
correct.  The  claim  says  “a  plurality”  first,  and  then  later  says  “the  plurality”  to  make 
clear, by use of the definite article, that it is referring to the same “plurality” that had al‐
ready been mentioned; and then it refers to “the plurality of units remaining,” presuma‐
bly  a  subset  of  “the  plurality  of  units”  that  is,  because  only  a  subset,  smaller  than  the 
transmission as a whole. Here is the language: “1. In a wireless communication system, 
a  method  for  transmitting  a  communication  signal  comprising  a  plurality  of  units  of  in‐
formation,  the  method  comprising:  transmitting  the  plurality  of  units  of  information  via  a 
predetermined  number  of  channel  resources;…based  on  the  predetermined  number  of 
channel resources, adjusting the number of the plurality of units remaining…” (emphases 
added).  As  I  said  earlier,  “comprise”  in  patentspeak  means  “including  but  not  limited 
to,” so  “a plurality of units of information”  need not  be equal to the transmission  as a 
whole—it can be just “a number of data blocks,” for instance the several blocks transmit‐
ted in different time slots during a single frame. Nothing in the claim language suggests 
that the number of time slots assigned cannot change mid‐transmission; Apple is trying 
to add that limitation to the text. 
  Motorola’s  construction  is  also  reasonable  in  view  of  the  operation  of  the  patented 
method. The network base station determines how to allocate its time slots among dif‐
ferent mobile units, but the mobile units perform the patented countdown and report it 
back to the base station in each frame. So when the patented method is practiced—when 
the mobile unit “adjusts” the number of blocks remaining by  the number of time slots 
assigned—the number of time slots has already been “predetermined” by the base sta‐
tion.  That  doesn’t  preclude  the  base  station  from  altering  the  number  of  time  slots  as‐
signed  to  a  given  signal,  since  the  new  number  will  necessarily  have  been  “predeter‐
mined” by the time the mobile unit uses it to calculate the new countdown number. 
  I  adopt  Motorola’s  proposed  construction:  “a  number  of  channel  resources  deter‐
mined before transmission of the units of information.” 

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No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                                                                         21 

                                                                          United States Circuit Judge 
March 19, 2012 

Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 145   Filed: 03/14/2013


       Dated March 29, 2012
          Case: 12-1548       Document: 131       Page: 146     Filed: 03/14/2013

                        NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
                              EASTERN DIVISION

APPLE INC. and NeXT SOFTWARE                  )
INC. (f/k/a NeXT COMPUTER, INC.),             )
              Plaintiffs,                     )        No. 1:11-cv-08540
     v.                                       )
                                              )     Judge Richard A. Posner.
MOTOROLA, INC. and MOTOROLA                   )
MOBILITY, INC.,                               )
              Defendants.                     )

                                 ORDER OF MARCH 29, 2012

   In my claims construction order of March 19, 2012, I held that the asserted claims of
Apple’s U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 are means-plus-function claims and therefore subject
to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, including the requirement that the patent’s
specification describe “corresponding structure” capable of performing the claimed
function. Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Technologies Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 948 (Fed. Cir. 2007). If
the specification fails to do this, the claim is invalid as indefinite. Ergo Licensing, LLC v.
Carefusion 303, Inc., 2012 WL 987833, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 2012).
   The required level of disclosure is “not a high bar,” Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Technolo-
gies Corp., supra, 490 F.3d at 950; “a challenge to a claim containing a means-plus-
function limitation as lacking structural support requires a finding, by clear and con-
vincing evidence, that the specification lacks disclosure of structure sufficient to be un-
derstood by one skilled in the art as being adequate to perform the recited function.”
Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1376–77 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
   Patents that claim a means for performing a computer-implemented function, such as
the ‘949 patent, must describe the algorithm—a “step-by-step process” —for performing
that function, Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. v. International Game Technology,
521 F.3d 1328, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent
Litigation, 639 F.3d 1303, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2011), though they need not disclose com-
puter code for implementing that step-by-step process if a person of ordinary skill in the

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                                           2

relevant technology would be able without difficulty to write a program to implement
the steps. Medical Instrumentation & Diagnostic Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1214
(Fed. Cir. 2003). A patent’s specification may disclose structure through diagrams, along
with any other format that would communicate the requisite information to one skilled
in the art. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Typhoon
Touch Technologies, Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
   Here are the claims, with the terms for construction italicized and preceded by brack-
eted numbers for ease of reference:

              1. A computing device, comprising: a touch screen display; one or
              more processors; memory; and one or more programs, wherein
              the one or more programs are stored in the memory and config-
              ured to be executed by the one or more processors, the one or
              more programs including: instructions for detecting one or more
              finger contacts with the touch screen display; instructions for ap-
              plying one or more heuristics to the one or more finger contacts to
              determine a command for the device; and instructions for proc-
              essing the command; wherein the one or more heuristics com-

                 [1] a vertical screen scrolling heuristic for determining that the one
                 or more finger contacts correspond to a one-dimensional vertical
                 screen scrolling command rather than a two-dimensional screen
                 translation command based on an angle of initial movement of a fin-
                 ger contact with respect to the touch screen display;

                 [2] a two-dimensional screen translation heuristic for determining
                 that the one or more finger contacts correspond to the two-
                 dimensional screen translation command rather than the one-
                 dimensional vertical screen scrolling command based on the angle of
                 initial movement of the finger contact with respect to the touch
                 screen display;

                 and [3] a next item heuristic for determining that the one or more
                 finger contacts correspond to a command to transition from display-
                 ing a respective item in a set of items to displaying a next item in the
                 set of items.

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                                         3

              2. The computing device of claim 1, wherein the one or more heu-
              ristics include [4] a heuristic for determining that the one or more fin-
              ger contacts correspond to a command to translate content within a
              frame rather than translating an entire page that includes the frame.

              10. The computer device of claim 9, wherein the first set of heuris-
              tics comprises [5] a heuristic for determining that the one or more first
              finger contacts correspond to a one-dimensional horizontal screen scroll-
              ing command rather than the two-dimensional screen translation com-
              mand based on the angle of initial movement of the finger contact with
              respect to the touch screen display.

   I have already determined that terms [1] and [2] are adequately supported by struc-
ture in the patent’s specification, particularly Figure 39C and the associated text. See my
summary judgment order of January 16 and my claims construction order of March 19. I
construe term [1] as follows, based on Apple’s proposed construction:
    • Function: determining that the user’s finger contacts correspond to a one-
       dimensional vertical screen-scrolling command rather than a two-dimensional
       diagonal screen translation command based on the initial angle of the finger’s
       movement on the screen.
    • Structure: a heuristic that uses as one input the initial angle of the user’s finger
       swipe gesture and determines whether that angle is within a predetermined
       range of being perfectly vertical, as shown for example in Figure 39C at 3937.

  Ditto for term [2]:
  • Function: determining that the user’s finger contacts correspond to two-
      dimensional diagonal screen translation command rather than the one-
      dimensional vertical screen-scrolling command based on the initial angle of the
      finger’s movement on the screen.
  • Structure: a heuristic that uses as one input the initial angle of the user’s finger
      swipe gesture and determines whether that angle is within a predetermined
      range of being perfectly vertical, as shown for example in Figure 39C at 3939.

   The function claimed by term [3] is “determining that the one or more finger contacts
correspond to a command to transition from displaying a respective item in a set of
items to displaying a next item in the set of items.” The structure (if any) that performs
this function must be a “heuristic” (i.e., an instruction) disclosed by the structure that

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                                        4

takes as its input a user’s finger contacts and determines whether or not the user intends
to implement the “next item” command, as when a user flips through photos on an iPh-
one’s camera roll.
   Apple argues that the specification provides two such heuristics, both displayed in
the patent’s Figures 12A and 16A and described in the text accompanying them. Each
heuristic takes a certain user input and interprets it as a next item command. The first
input is a horizontal right-to-left finger swipe (see Figure 12A’s element 1220 and Figure
16A’s element 1616), and the second is a finger tap on the right side of the screen (Figure
12A’s element 1218 and Figure 16A’s element 1620). “Thus, the 949 patent teaches that if
a user either makes a right to left swipe gesture on a displayed item, or taps the screen
on the right side of the displayed item, the heuristic determines that the command is to
transition from the current item in a set of items to the next item.” The diagrams provide
roughly the same level of detail about term [3] as Figure 39C provides about terms [1]
and [2].
   Apple runs into problems with the horizontal finger swipe. Claim 1 of the patent
claims heuristics for performing three different functions (the three I’ve discussed thus
far): [1] determining whether the user intends to scroll vertically, [2] determining
whether he intends to shift the view diagonally, and [3] determining whether he intends
to move to the next item in a set. Heuristics [1] and [2] and the associated structure (Fig-
ure 39C) explain what rules the device applies to distinguish between vertical and di-
agonal movement commands: if the user’s finger swipe is within a certain range on ei-
ther side of perfectly vertical, the device implements the vertical scrolling command;
otherwise it alters the screen in the direction of the user’s finger swipe. According to
heuristics [1] and [2], a horizontal finger swipe should be interpreted as a command to
shift the screen horizontally (or nearly horizontally, if the finger swipe is not perfectly
horizontal). Yet Apple now argues that the same gesture is a distinct command, the next
item command. If the same user finger movement is understood to communicate two
separate commands, the heuristic fails to perform the function of “determining” which
“command” “the one or more finger contacts correspond to.” So I reject the horizontal
finger swipe as a potential structure for function [3].
   But the finger tap heuristic provides the required structure: if the user taps the right
side of the screen, the device interprets the tap as a command to display the next item in
the set. That is a valid heuristic, like the one for distinguishing between vertical and di-
agonal movement. I therefore adopt the following construction:

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                                         5

   •   Function: determining that the user’s finger contacts correspond to a command to
       transition from displaying one item in a set of items to displaying the next item in
       the set.
   •   Structure: a heuristic that uses as one input a user’s finger tap on the right side of
       the device’s touch screen.

   The function claimed by term [4] is “determining that the one or more finger contacts
correspond to a command to translate content within a frame rather than translating an
entire page that includes the frame.” A touch screen device often has to determine
whether the user is trying to shift the entire view or just move one object (“a frame”)
within it.
   Apple argues that the specification discloses two separate heuristics for performing
this function. The first, disclosed by Figures 42A, 42B, and 42C, determines whether the
user means to move just a frame or the entire screen on the basis of the number of fin-
gers the user has swiped along the screen. For instance, the device could interpret the
user’s swipe of a single finger as a command to translate the whole view screen in the
direction of the swipe and interpret a two-finger swipe as a command to move the frame
within the view screen while keeping the view screen static. The numbers one and two
are only examples, and the structure covers any program that takes as an input the
number of fingers used in performing the function.
   The second heuristic proposed by Apple as structure for this function would not rely
on the number of fingers used but would instead determine whether the user intended
to move the entire screen or just a frame on the basis of whether he made a finger mo-
tion within the frame (which would shift the frame) or outside of it (which would shift
the screen). Apple argues that such a heuristic is inherent in claim 2’s language “one or
more finger contacts correspond to a command” and is depicted in Figures 42A, 42B,
and 42C.
   I accept the first proposed heuristic, which is adequately described by the diagrams
and the patent’s description of them. I reject the second proposed heuristic, for which
there is no basis in either the claim language or the diagrams and descriptions. So I
adopt this amended version of Apple’s proposed construction:
    • Function: determining that the user’s finger contacts correspond to a command to
       shift content within a frame rather than shifting the whole page that includes the

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                                        6

   •   Structure: a heuristic that uses as an input the number of fingers the user has em-
       ployed in touching the touch screen, as shown for example in Figures 42A
       through 42C at 4210 and 4214.

   The final term for construction is [5], which is in claim 10 and claims the function of
determining that the user’s finger contacts correspond to a one-dimensional horizontal
screen-scrolling command rather than the two-dimensional diagonal screen shift com-
mand, on the basis of the angle of initial movement of the finger contact with respect to
the touch screen display. This function differs from term [1] only in relating to horizon-
tal rather than to vertical movement. The patent’s specification describes adequate struc-
ture for performing this function. “In some embodiments, in one heuristic of the one or
more heuristics, a contact comprising a finger swipe gesture that initially moves within
a predetermined angle of being perfectly horizontal with respect to the touch screen
display corresponds to a one-dimensional horizontal screen scrolling command. For ex-
ample, a finger swipe gesture that initially moves within 27 degrees of being perfectly
horizontal corresponds to a horizontal scrolling command, in a manner analogous to
vertical swipe gesture 3937 (Fig. 39C).” Col. 111:40–48; see also Col. 75:4–12; Col. 110:31–
   I reject Motorola’s argument (this is the third time they’ve made it and the third time
I reject it) that the structure must be limited to the 27-degree angle used as an example
by the specification. It is just an example. I therefore construe term [5] as follows:
    • Function: determining that the user’s finger contacts correspond to a one-
        dimensional horizontal screen-scrolling command rather than a two-dimensional
        diagonal screen-scrolling command based on the initial angle of the finger’s
        movement on the screen.
    • Structure: a heuristic that uses as one input the initial angle of the user’s finger
        swipe gesture and determines whether that angle is within a predetermined
        range of being perfectly horizontal, in a manner analogous to that shown for ver-
        tical motion in Figure 39C at 3937.

                                                               United States Circuit Judge

March 29, 2012

Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 152   Filed: 03/14/2013


         Dated April 27, 2012
                     Case: 12-1548                           Document: 131                           Page: 153                   Filed: 03/14/2013

                                           UNITED  STATES  DISTRICT  COURT  FOR  THE  
                                              NORTHERN  DISTRICT  OF  ILLINOIS  
                                                     EASTERN  DIVISION  
APPLE  INC.  and  NeXT  SOFTWARE                                                                                                                      )  
INC.  (f/k/a  NeXT  COMPUTER,  INC.),                                                                                                                 )     
                                             Plaintiffs,                                                                                              )              No.  1:11-­‐‑cv-­‐‑08540  
                  v.                                                                                                                                  )  
                                                                                                                                                      )         Judge  Richard  A.  Posner.  
MOTOROLA,  INC.  and  MOTOROLA                                                                                                                        )                 
MOBILITY,  INC.,                                                                                                                                      )  
                                             Defendants.                                                                                              )  
                                                                                                             ORDER  OF  APRIL  27,  2012  
   Motorola  has  moved  for  summary  judgment  of  noninfringement  of  Apple’s  U.S.  Pa-­‐‑
tent  No.  7,479,949  (“Touch  Screen  Device,  Method,  and  Graphical  User  Interface  for  De-­‐‑
termining   Commands   By   Applying   Heuristics”),   arguing   that   its   products   do   not   in-­‐‑
fringe   in   light   of   my   interpretation   of   the   patent’s   language   in   my   claims   construction  
order   of   March   29,   2012.   On   April   7   I   denied   Motorola’s   previous   summary   judgment  
motion,   permitted   the   parties   to   supplement   their   expert   reports   with   new   evidence  
based  on  my  claims  construction,  and  granted  Motorola  leave  to  file  a  renewed  motion  
for  summary  judgment  based  on  the  supplemented  expert  reports.  I  have  now  received  
both  Motorola’s  new  summary  judgment  motion  and  Apple’s  brief  in  opposition.  I  grant  
Motorola’s  motion  in  part.  
   The  motion  and  response  focus  on  a  single  limitation  (that  is,  claim  provision)  of  the  
‘949  patent,  the  “next  item”  heuristic,  which  Motorola  argues  is  not  practiced  by  any  of  
the  products  that  Apple  alleges  infringe.  The  limitation  is  in  claim  1  of  the  patent,  and  
the  other  claims  that  Apple  asserts—claims  2,  9,  and  10—depend  on  claim  1.  
          The  limitation  describes  “a  next  item  heuristic  for  determining  that  the  one  or  more  
finger  contacts  [that  is,  the  user’s  touching  the  screen  of  a  touch-­‐‑screen  device  with  his  
finger]  correspond  to  a  command  to  transition  from  displaying  a  respective  item  in  a  set  
of  items  to  displaying  a  next  item  in  the  set  of  items.”  I  have  ruled  that  claim  1  and  its  

                               Case: 12-1548                                           Document: 131                                            Page: 154                                Filed: 03/14/2013

No.  1:11-­‐‑cv-­‐‑08540                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  2

dependent   claims   are   means-­‐‑plus-­‐‑function   claims   (see   35   U.S.C.   §  112,   ¶  6),   that   the  
function   covered   by   the   next-­‐‑item   heuristic   is   “determining   that   the   user’s   finger   con-­‐‑
tacts  correspond  to  a  command  to  transition  from  displaying  one  item  in  a  set  of  items  
to  displaying  the  next  item  in  the  set,”  and  that  the  structure  that  performs  this  function  
is  “a  heuristic  that  uses  as  one  input  a  user’s  finger  tap  on  the  right  side  of  the  device’s  
touch  screen.”  
   In  less  technical  terms,  the  covered  function  is  switching  from  one  item  to  the  next  on  
a   touch-­‐‑screen   device   such   as   an   iPhone   or   one   of   Motorola’s   smartphones,   as   when   a  
user  flips  through  photos;  the  patent  covers  that  function  only  when  the  user  performs  it  
by  tapping  his  finger  on  the  right  side  of  the  screen.  I  rejected  Apple’s  argument  that  the  
patent  also  covers  performing  the  function  with  a  horizontal  finger  swipe  rather  than  a  
finger  tap.  
   Apple   accuses   Motorola’s   products   of   infringing   the   patent   by   six   applications   that  
can   run   on   Motorola   devices:   “Gallery,”   “Music,”   “Browser”   (specifically,   the   Browser  
application’s   bookmark   feature),   “YouTube,”   “Google   Image   Search,”   and   “Kindle  
   I  conclude  that  the  Gallery,  Music,  Browser  bookmarks,  and  YouTube  applications  do  
not   infringe.   Each   of   those   applications   presents   the   user   with   an   array   of   options  
(“items,”  in  the  language  of  the  patent)  in  graphic  form:  photographs  (in  the  Gallery  ap-­‐‑
plication),   album   covers   (the   Music   application),   screenshots   of   bookmarked   websites  
(Browser  bookmarks),  and  still  images  from  YouTube  videos  (YouTube).  The  array  (or  a  
portion  of  it)  appears  on  the  screen,  and  by  tapping  one  of  the  items  the  user  moves  that  
item  to  the  center  of  the  screen.  Apple  claims  that  these  applications  infringe  the  next-­‐‑
item  limitation  because  the  user  can  select  (bring  to  the  center  of  the  screen)  one  of  the  
“next  items”  displayed  on  the  right  side  of  the  screen  by  tapping  it  with  his  finger,  and  if  
he  does  so  he  will  have  selected  a  next  item  by  way  of  a  finger  tap  on  the  right  side  of  
the  screen.  That  is  literally  true,  but  Apple’s  reading  of  my  claims  construction  is  too  lit-­‐‑
eral.  For  what  the  user  is  actually  doing  is  selecting  an  option  by  tapping  the  option  itself  
with   his   finger,   a   mode   of   selection   not   covered   by   the   limitation.   What   the   next-­‐‑item  
limitation  covers  is  the  selection  of  an  item  by  tapping  not  on  the  item  to  be  selected  but  
on   the   right   side   of   the   screen.   This   interpretation   is   confirmed   by   the   two   diagrams  
from  the  ‘949  patent’s  specification  that  I  relied  on  in  holding  that  the  specification  spec-­‐‑
ified   enough   structure   to   perform   the   next-­‐‑item   function.   These   are   Figures   12A   and  
16A,  and  in  both  diagrams  one  item  is  displayed  on  the  screen  and  the  user  can  switch  
to  the  next  image  by  tapping  on  the  right  side  of  the  screen  (gestures  1218  and  1620).  

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No.  1:11-­‐‑cv-­‐‑08540                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  3

    The  Google  Image  Search  and  Kindle  Reader  applications,  by  contrast,  both  appear  to  
include  the  ‘949  patent’s  next-­‐‑item  functionality.  A  user  who  performs  a  Google  Image  
Search   using   the   Browser   application   can   select   one   of   the   images   brought   up   by   the  
search,  which  then  fills  the  device’s  screen,  and  then  switch  to  the  next  image  in  the  se-­‐‑
quence  by  tapping  the  right  side  of  the  screen.  Similarly,  a  user  reading  an  e-­‐‑book  in  the  
Kindle   Reader   application   can   turn   to   the   next   page   by   tapping   the   right   side   of   the  
    It  is  true  as  Motorola  points  out  that  the  computer  code  that  performs  the  next-­‐‑item  
function  during  a  Google  Image  Search  is  not  preloaded  or  stored  permanently  on  the  
Motorola  devices.  Instead  the  instructions  for  implementing  the  function  “are  contained  
within   the   JavaScript   downloaded   from   Google   when   the   search   is   being   performed.”  
And  it  is  also  true  that  the  fact  “that  a  device  is  capable  of  being  modified  to  operate  in  
an   infringing   manner   is   not   sufficient,   by   itself,   to   support   a   finding   of   infringement.”  
Telemac  Cellular  Corp.  v.  Topp  Telecom,  Inc.,  247  F.3d  1316,  1330  (Fed.  Cir.  2001).  The  oper-­‐‑
ation  of  a  computer  (and  a  modern  cell  phone  is  a  computer)  is  “modified”  routinely  by  
applications   that   enable   the   computer   to   perform   functions   that   it   could   not   perform  
without  the  applications.  But  Motorola  may  do  more  than  just  make  it  possible  for  users  
to  conduct  a  Google  image  search  by  selling  them  a  computer  that  can  be  made  to  per-­‐‑
form  that  function.  According  to  Apple,  Motorola’s  devices  come  preloaded  both  with  a  
Google  search  application  and  with  a  Browser  search  application  that  uses  Google  as  its  
default   search  engine.  When  a  user  searches  for  an  image  using  either  application,   the  
Motorola  device  uses  Google  Image  Search,  and  that  invokes  the  next-­‐‑item  function.  
    So  the  cell  phone  itself  does  not  infringe,  but  it  invites  and  enables  infringement,  and    
“whoever   actively   induces   infringement   of   a   patent   shall   be   liable   as   an   infringer.”   35  
U.S.C.  §  271(b).  But  liability  for  inducement  requires  “knowledge  that  the  induced  acts  
constitute   infringement”   at   the   time   of   the   inducement.   Global-­‐‑Tech   Appliances,   Inc.   v.  
SEB  S.A.,  131  S.  Ct.  2060,  2068  (2011).  Apple  has  pointed  to  no  evidence  that  Motorola  
knew  (or  was  reckless  in  failing  to  learn)  that  switching  to  a  next  item  by  means  of  a  fin-­‐‑
ger  tap  in  the  Google  search  engine  might  be  held  (in  combination  with  the  other  limita-­‐‑
tions   of   claim   1)   to   infringe   the   ‘949   patent.   I   therefore   grant   summary   judgment   to  
Motorola  with  respect  to  Google  Image  Search.  
    Kindle  Reader  is  an  application  created  by  Amazon  that  allows  users  to  read  e-­‐‑books  
on  computers  other  than  Amazon’s  Kindle  devices,  including  desktops,  laptops,  touch-­‐‑
pads,  and  smartphones.  Motorola  is  not  liable  for  infringement  caused  by  end  users  who  
choose   to   download   Kindle   Reader   onto   their   Motorola   devices.   See   Telemac   Cellular  
Corp.  v.  Topp  Telecom,  Inc.,  supra,  247  F.3d  at  1330.  But  Apple  points  out  that  at  least  some  

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No.  1:11-­‐‑cv-­‐‑08540                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  4

of  Motorola’s  devices  ship  at  least  some  of  the  time  with  Kindle  Reader  pre-­‐‑installed.  In  
those  cases,  Motorola  itself  cannot  elude  a  finding  of  infringement  by  not  being  the  au-­‐‑
thor  of  the  application,  because  by  installing  the  application  onto  its  devices  it  has  made  
and   then   sold   an   infringing   device.   I   therefore   grant   Motorola’s   motion   for   summary  
judgment   insofar   as   it   pertains   to   the   Kindle   Reader   application   installed   by   users,   ra-­‐‑
ther  than  pre-­‐‑installed  by  Motorola.  
   I  must  also  consider  Apple’s  argument  that  a  horizontal  finger  swipe  is  “equivalent”  
to  a  finger  tap—equivalent  either  under  the  patent  law’s  means-­‐‑plus-­‐‑function  provision,  
35   U.S.C.   §  112,   ¶  6,   which   requires   that   means-­‐‑plus-­‐‑function   claims   be   interpreted   to  
cover  the  structure  for  performing  the  claimed  function  that  is  disclosed  in  the  specifica-­‐‑
tion  “and  equivalents  thereof,”  or  under  the  doctrine  of  equivalents.    
     Apple   contends   that   the   finger   swipe   is   equivalent   to   a   finger   tap   because   the   two  
gestures   are   interchangeable:   touch   screen   devices   are   often   programmed   so   that   the  
two  gestures  can  both  perform  the  same  next-­‐‑item  command.  That  does  not  make  them  
equivalent.   Some   consumers   prefer   one   of   the   methods   of   flipping   to   a   next   item   and  
some  prefer  the  other,  and  so  programmers  often  provide  both  and  let  the  user  choose.  
If  consumers  distinguish  between  the  two,  they  are  not  interchangeable;  if  they  were  in-­‐‑
terchangeable,   programmers   would   be   content   to   use   one   or   the   other   method   rather  
than  providing  a  choice.  Equivalence  refers  to  a  situation  in  which,  in  an  effort  to  avoid  
liability   for   infringement   without   making   a   substantive   change   in   a   patented   product,  
the  alleged  infringer  makes  a  trivial  change  that  neither  lowers  a  producer’s  costs  or  al-­‐‑
ters   the   consumer’s   experience,   as   in   International   Nickel   Co.   v.   Ford   Motor   Co.,   166   F.  
Supp.  551  (S.D.N.Y.  1958).  This  is  not  such  a  case.  
     Apple’s  equivalents  argument  is  also  inconsistent  with  my  claims  construction.  In  my  
March  29  order  I  held  that  the  finger-­‐‑tap  gesture  recited  in  the  specification  was  struc-­‐‑
ture  that  could  perform  the  next-­‐‑item  function,  but  I  rejected  Apple’s  argument  that  the  
finger-­‐‑swipe  gesture  was  an  alternative  structure  also  disclosed  by  the  specification.  My  
reason  was  that  I  had  already  accepted  Apple’s  argument  that  a  finger  swipe  performed  
another  function  in  claim  1—the  two-­‐‑dimensional  screen  translation  function—and  that  
single  gesture  could  not  perform  both  functions,  since  then  the  device  would  be  unable  
to  determine  when  a  user  swiped  his  finger  on  the  screen  what  command  the  user  was  
trying  to  give  the  device.  That  would  have  been  unacceptable  because  the  patented  in-­‐‑
vention  codes  user  gestures  as  commands  to  the  computer.  “[A]n  element  of  an  accused  
product  or  process  is  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  equivalent  to  a  limitation  of  the  claimed  in-­‐‑
vention   if   such   a   finding   would   entirely   vitiate   the   limitation.”   Freedman   Seating   Co.   v.  

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No.  1:11-­‐‑cv-­‐‑08540                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  5

American  Seating  Co.,  420  F.3d  1350,  1358  (Fed.  Cir.  2005).  The  limitations  in  claim  1  are  
assignments  of  user  gestures  to  commands—one  gesture  to  one  command.  
   Apple’s  final  equivalents  argument  is  that  “a  tap  is  a  zero-­‐‑length  swipe.”  That’s  silly.  
It’s  like  saying  that  a  point  is  a  zero-­‐‑length  line.  

                                                                                                                                      United  States  Circuit  Judge  
April  27,  2012  

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          Opinion and Order

          Dated May 22, 2012
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                                IN THE 
                          EASTERN DIVISION 
       No. 1:11‐cv‐08540  
       (f/k/a NeXT COMPUTER, INC.), 
       MOTOROLA, INC.,  
                        OPINION and ORDER of May 22, 2012 
          POSNER,  Circuit  Judge,  sitting  by  designation.  On  May  16,  I 
       conducted  a  Daubert  hearing  to  consider  challenges  based  on 
       Fed.  R.  Evid.  702  and  703  to  four  party  damages  experts:  Mi‐
       chael  J.  Wagner  (Motorola),  Brian  W.  Napper  (Apple),  Carla  S. 
       Mulhern  (Motorola),  and  Charles  R.  Donohoe  (Motorola).  The 
       four experts, besides having submitted reports pursuant to Fed. 
       R.  Civ.  P.  26(a)(2),  testified  at  the  hearing,  followed  by  oral  ar‐
       gument by counsel for Apple and Motorola. 
          The only issue of any significance concerning Donohoe was a 
       possible conflict of interest owing to his former employment by 

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       Samsung,  a  firm  whose  interests  so  far  they  relate  to  this  case 
       parallel  those  of  Motorola.  He  testified  without  being  contra‐
       dicted  that  he  has  no  financial  stake  in  Samsung;  he  neither 
       owns stock in nor has a pension from the company. I reject the 
       challenge to his proposed expert testimony. 
           The  challenges  to  the  other  damages  experts  encompass  tes‐
       timony on all six patents that remain in this litigation, and I will 
       discuss the challenges patent by patent.  
           But  I  begin  with  a  few  general  remarks  about  Daubert  hear‐
       ings.  Their  purpose  is  to  enable  the  judge  to  screen  expert  evi‐
       dence in advance of trial. By the time the hearing is held, the ex‐
       pert will have submitted a report and been deposed, the object‐
       ing party will have filed a brief in support of its challenge to the 
       expert,  and  the  party  desiring  to  call  the  expert  as  a witness  at 
       trial  will  have  had  an  opportunity  to  file  a  response  to  the  ob‐
       jecting  party’s  brief.  The  purpose  of  the  hearing  and  submis‐
       sions is to enable the judge to decide whether the expert’s pro‐
       posed  evidence  is  sufficiently  reliable  to  be  considered  by  the 
       jury, if, as in this case, trial is to be to a jury, or by the judge if it 
       is to be a bench trial. The burden of persuading the judge to al‐
       low the expert to testify is on the party tendering the expert, and 
       is  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  Daubert  v.  Merrell  Dow 
       Pharmaceuticals,  Inc.,  509  U.S.  579,  592  n.  10  (1993);  Bourjaily  v. 
       United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175–76 (1987); Lewis v. CITGO Petro‐
       leum Corp., 561 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2009); Committee Notes on 
       2000 Amendment to Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
           The biggest challenge to the judge at a Daubert hearing, if as 
       in this case the subject matter of the proposed expert testimony 
       is  within  the  judge’s  comprehension,  is  to  distinguish  between 
       disabling  problems  with  the  proposed  testimony,  which  are  a 
       ground  for  excluding  it,  and  weaknesses  in  the  testimony, 
       which are properly resolved at the trial itself on the basis of evi‐
       dence  and  cross‐examination.  “Vigorous  cross‐examination, 
       presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the 

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       burden  of  proof  are  the  traditional  and  appropriate  means  of 
       attacking  shaky  but  admissible  evidence.”  Daubert  v.  Merrell 
       Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 509 U.S. at 596; see also Bielskis 
       v. Louisville Ladder, Inc., 663 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2011); Heller v. 
       Shaw  Industries,  Inc.,  167  F.3d  146,  152,  160  (3d  Cir.  1999);  In  re 
       Paoli  R.R.  Yard  PCB  Litigation,  35  F.3d  717,  746  (3d  Cir.  1994) 
       (“the  judge  should  not  exclude  evidence  simply  because  he  or 
       she thinks that there is a flaw in the expert’s investigative proc‐
       ess which renders the  expert’s conclusions incorrect.  The  judge 
       should only exclude the evidence if the flaw is large enough that 
       the expert lacks ‘good grounds’ for his or her conclusions”). The 
       focus  thus  is  not  on  results  but  on  methodology.  The  expert 
       must  use  a  “proper  methodology,”  an  “acceptable 
       methodology.” Walker v. Soo Line R.R., 208 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir. 
           An important test for deciding whether a problem with pro‐
       posed  expert  testimony  is  disabling,  or  merely  a  weakness,  is 
       whether the expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of 
       intellectual  rigor  that  characterizes  the  practice  of  an  expert  in 
       the  relevant  field.”  Kumho  Tire  Co.  v.  Carmichael,  526  U.S.  137, 
       152  (1999);  see  also  Zenith  Electronics  Corp.  v.  WH‐TV Broadcast‐
       ing Corp., 395 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2005); Sheehan v. Daily Rac‐
       ing  Form,  Inc.,  104  F.3d  940,  942  (7th  Cir.  1997);  Best  v.  Lowe’s 
       Home Centers, Inc., 563 F.3d 171, 181–82 (6th Cir. 2009). If so, then 
       with possible exceptions not necessary to examine in this opin‐
       ion the testimony is admissible and its weaknesses are to be left 
       to  be  explored  at  trial.  If  not—if  the  expert,  though  he  could 
       have used in the lawsuit the same approach that he would have 
       been required by the applicable professional standards to use to 
       deal with an identical issue outside the litigation context, failed 
       to  do  so—then  (again  with  possible  exceptions  inapplicable  to 
       this case) his proposed testimony should be barred. Id.; Guinn v. 
       AstraZeneca  Pharmaceuticals  LP,  602  F.3d  1245,  1255  (11th  Cir. 
       2010) (per curiam). 

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          Another test of the adequacy of proposed expert testimony is 
       whether  the  expert  has  sufficiently  explained  how  he  derived 
       his  opinion  from  the  evidence  that  he  considered.  In  other 
       words the judge must determine whether the methods used by 
       the  expert  were  properly  applied  to  the  facts  of  the  case.  See 
       Fed.  R.  Evid.  702(c),  (d).  “[A]ny  step  that  renders  the  analysis 
       unreliable…renders the expert’s testimony inadmissible. This is 
       true  whether  the  step  completely  changes  a  reliable 
       methodology  or  merely  misapplies  that  methodology.”  In  re 
       Paoli  R.R.  Yard  PCB  Litigation,  supra,  35  F.3d  at  745  (emphasis 
       omitted).  A  trial  court  “may  conclude  that  there  is  simply  too 
       great  an  analytical  gap  between  the  data  and  the  opinion 
       proffered.” General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); 
       see also United States v. Mamah, 332 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003); 
       Milward  v.  Acuity  Specialty  Products  Group,  Inc.,  639  F.3d  11,  15 
       (1st Cir. 2011); Committee Notes to 2000 Amendment of Fed. R. 
       Evid. 702.  
          It remains to note that even where expert testimony is admis‐
       sible,  it  may  be  too  weak  to  get  the  case  past  summary  judg‐
       ment.  Thus  Hirsch  v.  CSX  Transportation,  Inc.,  656  F.3d  359,  362 
       (6th  Cir.  2011),  distinguishes  between  the  admissibility  of  evi‐
       dence  and  its  sufficiency,  and  upheld  a  grant  of  summary 
       judgment  on  the  ground  that  the  expert  testimony  offered  in 
       opposition to a motion for summary judgment, though admissi‐
       ble  under  the  Daubert  standard,  did  not  preclude  summary 
          The  reader  should  bear  this  background  discussion  in  mind 
       as I proceed through the patents. 
          Apple  ‘002  is  the  patent  feature  on  the  toolbar  notification 
       window that gives the user basic information about the state of 
       his  device,  such  as  battery  strength;  it’s  analogous  to  an  auto‐
       mobile’s dashboard. Apple contends that Motorola infringes the 
       patent by  including  on its cell phones (and other handheld  de‐
       vices, such as tablets—but for simplicity I’ll pretend in this opin‐

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       ion that the case involves just cell phones) Apple’s patented in‐
       vention  of  a  software  program  that  prevents  the  notification 
       window from being partially obstructed by an application pro‐
       gram selected by the user. Total, as opposed to partial, obstruc‐
       tion occurs when, for example, the user selects the camera pro‐
       gram  on  the  iPhone,  which  fills  the  entire  screen;  the  patented 
       invention does not prevent total obstruction. 
          Mr.  Wagner  asserts  that  a  reasonable  royalty  for  Motorola’s 
       use  of  Apple’s  invention  would  be  $100,000.  Motorola  would 
       pay  no  more,  he  contends,  because  creating  the  allegedly  in‐
       fringing  notification  window  in  the  first  place  had  cost  only 
       $67,000, and so it would (he reasons) cost even less to alter the 
       code  for  the  notification  window  slightly  so  that  it  would  not 
       prevent  applications  from  partially  obstructing  the  window, 
       thus  avoiding  infringement.  Wagner  interviewed  Dr.  Richard 
       Cooper,  one  of  Motorola’s  technical  experts  in  this  litigation, 
       who  wrote  a  bit  of  code  into  the  application  window  program 
       that  allowed  it  to  be  partially  obstructed  by  other  application 
       windows.  Apparently  he  was  able  to  do  this  in  a  single  after‐
       noon.  Wagner  further  asserts  that  consumers  wouldn’t  be  put 
       off by an occasional partial obstruction, which if true means that 
       Motorola has obtained no revenue from its infringement and so 
       owes  Apple  no  royalty  beyond  the  meager  cost  savings  that  it 
       derived  from  not  inventing  around.  Wagner  rounded  up  to 
       $100,000 out of an excess of generosity. 
          Wagner’s proposed testimony that the infringing notification 
       window  cost  Motorola  $67,000  to  develop  is  not  expert  testi‐
       mony  but  fact  testimony.  The  special  limitations  that  Rule 
       26(a)(2)  places  on  expert  testimony  are  not  intended  for  a  wit‐
       ness  who  merely  testifies  that  his  company  spent  $x  to  make 
       something.  It  also  is  not  the  best  evidence  of  that  fact,  if  it  is  a 
       fact; and while an expert witness is permitted to base an opinion 
       on  hearsay  evidence,  he  isn’t  permitted  to  use  that  privilege 

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       merely  to  shield  the  source  of  the  evidence  from  cross‐
           As for Wagner’s report of his conversation with Cooper, it is, 
       like the $67,000 figure, a mere echo of another witness—another 
       interested witness—and it thus violates the principle that a testi‐
       fying expert must use the same approach (if it is feasible for him 
       to  do  so)  that  he  would  use  outside  the  litigation  context.  So 
       imagine that Motorola had  not  been sued, but had approached 
       Wagner and told him “we’re concerned that we may be accused 
       of  infringing  Apple’s  patent  ‘002;  we’d  like  you  to  advise  us 
       how much it would cost us to invent around the patented inven‐
       tion.” Wagner would not ask an engineer at Motorola; Motorola 
       would  ask  an  engineer  at  Motorola.  Wagner  would  canvass 
       software  firms  in  search  of  the  lowest  price  and  report  back  to 
       Motorola.  The  same  approach  applied  in  this  case  would  have 
       required  Wagner  to  shop  around.  He  would  not  have  asked  a 
       Motorola  engineer,  because  Motorola  doesn’t  have  to  hire  an 
       outside consultant who is not an engineer to ask an engineering 
       question of a Motorola engineer. 
           The inadequacy of Wagner’s proposed testimony (surprising 
       in  light  of  his  careful  expert  testimony  upheld  against  Daubert 
       challenge  in  i4i  Ltd.  Partnership  v.  Microsoft  Corp.,  598  F.3d  831, 
       853–55  (Fed.  Cir.  2010))  compels  me  to  exclude  it.  But  we  are 
       about to see that its exclusion is academic. 
           Apple’s  damages  expert  with  respect  to  patent  ‘002,  Mr. 
       Napper, estimates that a reasonable royalty (covering the period 
       up until the trial) would be a lump sum of $14 million. In other 
       words, he differs with Mr. Wagner by a factor of 140. The size of 
       the disparity is a warning sign. Either one of the experts is way 
       off base, or the estimation of a reasonable royalty is guesswork 
       remote from  the application of expert knowledge  to  a manage‐
       able issue within the scope of that knowledge. 
           Napper bases his $14 million estimate on a consumer survey 
       conducted  by  Motorola,  in  which  the  survey  respondents  were 

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       asked  to  pick,  from  a  list  of  the  attributes  of  a  Motorola  cell 
       phone,  those  attributes  that  were  among  the  respondent’s  top 
       five “main reasons” for buying the $270 phone. Fifteen percent 
       of the respondents selected “appealing features & functions” as 
       among their top five “main reasons” for buying the phone; and 
       Napper,  multiplying  $270  by  .15,  assigned  $40  in  consumer 
       value  to  “appealing  features  &  functions.”  Napper  further  as‐
       sumed that the only “appealing features & functions” that con‐
       tribute  to  the  phone’s  value  to  consumers  are  those  used  by  a 
       consumer  every  day.  That  is  an  unreasonable  assumption.  The 
       owner of a cell phone may not use it every day to make a tele‐
       phone  call,  but  the capability  to  make  a  call  is  obviously  a  fea‐
       ture  that  drives  consumer  demand  for  a  cell  phone,  just  as  the 
       fact  that  a  car  had  airbags  might  be  important  to  a  consumer 
       even though in all likelihood he would never use them. 
           Four percent of the survey respondents replied that they “re‐
       viewed notifications” every day. That is vague—what does “no‐
       tification”  in  the  cell  phone  context  mean,  exactly?  When  the 
       user  clicks  on  email,  for  example,  he  is  “notified”  of  the  latest 
       emails  he’s  received.  But  I’ll  assume—very  generously  to  Mr. 
       Napper—that  the  survey  respondents  assumed  it  to  mean  that 
       they look at the notification window at least once a day. Napper 
       multiplied $40 by .04, yielding $1.60, then divided that by two (a 
       totally arbitrary choice of divisor) to reach $0.80. He did this be‐
       cause  “reviewed  notifications”  might  not  be  limited  to  looking 
       at  the  notifications  window  (indeed).  He  multiplied  that  figure 
       by the number of cell phones that Motorola sold, and the prod‐
       uct of the multiplication was $14 million. 
           The survey asked users to name the five attributes that were 
       their main reasons for buying, rather than just the top attribute. 
       Napper  in  his  report  assigns  to  each  attribute  a  value  equal  to 
       the total cost of the device multiplied by the percentage of peo‐
       ple who listed that attribute among their top five. By this meth‐
       odology,  the  total  value  of  all  the  attributes  on  each  respon‐

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       dent’s list would come to 500 percent of the value of the phone. 
       That’s impossible. 
          All  other  objections  to  Napper’s  method  to  one  side,  it  de‐
       pended on the unverified, indeed arbitrary, assumption that oc‐
       casional  partial  obstruction  of  the  notification  window  would 
       force Motorola to reduce the price of its cell phone from $270 to 
       $269.20 ($270 – $0.80). Critically, Napper failed to compare a cell 
       phone that has a notification window that can’t be partially ob‐
       structed with one that has a notification window that can be. So 
       at most all he established is that a small percentage of Motorola 
       consumers value the notification window enough to consult it at 
       least  once  a  day  (assuming  “reviewed  notifications”  refers  ex‐
       clusively  to  viewing  the  notification  window).  Suppose  they 
       consult it before opening any windows; then they would be in‐
       different  to  partial  obstruction,  because  it  would  never  occur 
       when they wanted to look at the notification window. 
          Now  imagine  how  Mr.  Napper  would  have  proceeded  had 
       he been hired by Motorola to determine the value to consumers 
       of an unobstructed notification window. Suppose there were no 
       question of infringement; Motorola just didn’t know whether it 
       should bother with providing an unobstructed notification win‐
       dow rather than a window that provides notifications but some‐
       times  is  obstructed  by  other  applications.  It  needed  to  get  a 
       sense  of  the  value  of  such  a  window  to  consumers.  Suppose 
       Napper conducted the identical survey that he used in this liti‐
       gation  (that  is,  a  Motorola  survey)  and  reported  back  to  Mo‐
       torola  that  the  average  value  to  the  consumer  was  $0.80.  Mo‐
       torola  would  say  to  him:  “Dummy!  You  haven’t  estimated  the 
       value  of  the  non‐obstruction  feature.  You’ve  just  estimated  the 
       value  of  the  notification  window.  What  you  need  to  do  is  find 
       out  how  many  consumers  think  it  worthwhile  to  pay  a  higher 
       price  for  a  Motorola  phone  to  avoid  occasional  partial  obstruc‐
       tion  of  that  window.  So  you’ll  have  to  ask  the  survey  respon‐
       dents: How often do you look at the notification window in an 

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       average day? What windows do you open most frequently in an 
       average  day?  Suppose  the  answer  includes  three  windows 
       which  when  opened  would  partially  obstruct  the  notification 
       window. The next question would be: If each of these windows, 
       when  opened,  partially  obstructed  the  notification  window, 
       would that be a big annoyance, a little annoyance, or no annoy‐
       ance?  How  much  lower  would  the  price  of  a  smartphone  have 
       to  be  to  compensate  you  for  the  occasional  partial  obstruction 
       caused by these windows?” 
           I’m not trying to draft a consumer survey. I am merely assert‐
       ing  that  the  survey  that  Motorola  did  conduct,  which  did  not 
       look  for  aversion  to  partial  obstruction  and  so  far  as  I  can  tell 
       had  nothing  to  do  with  pricing,  but  rather  with  helping  the 
       company  to  determine  which  programs  and  features  are  par‐
       ticularly important to cell phone users, is not the kind of survey 
       that Napper—assuming him to be a responsible adviser on mar‐
       keting  or  consumer  behavior—would  have  conducted  had  he 
       been  hired  outside  the  litigation  context  to  determine  the  rela‐
       tive  values  to  Motorola’s  consumers  of  a  notification  window 
       that can be partially obstructed and one that cannot be. 
           Granted,  the  Motorola  survey  isn’t  quite  all  that  Napper  re‐
       lied  on.  His  report  also  mentioned  an  application  called  “List 
       Notifier  Widget,”  which  smartphone  users  can  download  for 
       $1.33  and  which  performs  some  of  the  same  functions  as  the 
       patented  notification  window.  To  eliminate  from  comparison 
       the  features  of  List  Notifier  Widget  that  do  not  duplicate  the 
       patented  invention,  he  halved  the  price,  thereby  obtaining  an 
       estimated  value  for  the  notification  window  of  $0.66,  which  is 
       close  to  the  $0.80  estimate  that  he  got  from  the  survey.  But  by 
       ignoring  the  non‐obstruction  feature  he  opens  himself  to  the 
       same criticism as his use of the survey. 
           I am mindful that a degree of speculation is permitted in cal‐
       culating damages, J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 
       U.S.  557,  566–67  (1981);  BCS  Services,  Inc.  v.  Heartwood  88,  LLC, 

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        637 F.3d 750, 759 (7th Cir. 2011), especially but not only in cases 
        in which the defendant’s wrongful conduct has made the calcu‐
        lation of damages difficult. Haslund v. Simon Property Group, Inc., 
        378 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2004). That doesn’t seem to be a factor 
        in this case, but nevertheless when the plaintiff has done his best 
        to prove damages his inability to dispel uncertainty concerning 
        the  accuracy  of  his  claim  is  not  fatal.  But  if  an  expert  witness 
        fails to conduct a responsible inquiry that would have been fea‐
        sible  to  conduct,  his  failure  cannot  be  excused  by  reference  to 
        the  principle  that  speculation  is  permitted  in  the  calculation  of 
        damages;  that  permission  presupposes  the  exhaustion  of  feasi‐
        ble  means  of  dispelling  uncertainty.  Uncertainty  is  a  bad;  it  is 
        tolerated only when the cost of eliminating it would exceed the 
        benefit. Apple could have conducted a survey of Motorola cus‐
        tomers  (or  consumers,  or  would‐be  consumers,  of  cell  phones 
        generally)  targeted  on  determining  the  value  consumers  attach 
        to  having  a  notification  window  that  is  never  partially  ob‐
        structed by another window; consumer surveys designed to de‐
        termine  the  value  of  a  particular  feature  or  property  of  a  con‐
        sumer  product  are  a  common  and  acceptable  form  of  evidence 
        in patent cases. E.g., i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp., supra, 
        598 F.3d at 855–56; Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 
        F.3d  1301,  1333–34  (Fed.  Cir.  2009).  Such  a  survey  might  well 
        have dispelled the uncertainty that I conclude vitiates Mr. Nap‐
        per’s proposed testimony about the ‘002. 
           Remember  that  “a  court  may  conclude  that  there  is  simply 
        too  great  an  analytical  gap  between  the  data  and  the  opinion 
        proffered,” General Electric Co. v. Joiner, supra, 522 U.S. at 146—a 
        judge  must  exclude  expert  evidence  that  fails  to  meet  a  mini‐
        mum threshold of reasonableness. The patentee therefore “must 
        in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the 
        defendant’s  profits  and  the  patentee’s  damages  between  the 
        patented  feature  and  unpatented  features,  and  such  evidence 
        must  be  reliable  and  tangible,  and  not  conjectural  or  specula‐

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        tive.”  Uniloc  USA,  Inc.  v.  Microsoft  Corp.,  632  F.3d  1292,  1318 
        (Fed.  Cir.  2011),  quoting  Garretson  v.  Clark,  111  U.S.  120,  121 
        (1884). Apple thinks it enough that Napper used actual numbers 
        from  Motorola’s  own  consumer  survey—it  doesn’t  defend  the 
        bizarre way in which he threw those numbers together to come 
        up with his unsupportably  high damages figure. No  lower  fig‐
        ure  can  be  extracted  from  his  report,  so  there  is  no  basis  for  a 
        damages  estimate  that  Apple  can  fall  back  upon.  And  so  Nap‐
        per’s evidence with regard to damages for the alleged infringe‐
        ment of patent ‘002 must be excluded. 
           Apple  ‘949.  Wagner’s  procedure  (as  well  as  conclusion—
        damages  of  $100,000)  in  estimating  a  reasonable  royalty  for  a 
        license to use this patent (assuming infringement) was identical 
        to the procedure he employed to generate his estimate of dam‐
        ages  from  the  alleged  infringement  of  the  ‘002.  I  granted  sum‐
        mary  judgment  of  noninfringement  on  this  patent  except  with 
        regard to cell phones that come preloaded with Amazon’s Kin‐
        dle Reader application (those are the only Motorola cell phones 
        that employ the “tap for next item” heuristic claimed by the pat‐
        ent).  So,  to  avoid  the  alleged  infringement,  Motorola  would 
        have  had  either  to  (1)  remove  the  tap  gesture  from  the  Kindle 
        Reader  application,  so  that  the  user  could  turn  the  page  only 
        with  a  swiping  motion,  or  (2)  not  ship  cell  phones  preloaded 
        with  the  application,  since  a  consumer  who  wants  the  applica‐
        tion  can  download  it  at  no  charge.  Motorola  would  not  have 
        paid more to license the patent from Apple than the cost of the 
        cheaper of those two options. The second alternative would im‐
        pose  an  inconvenience  on  some  consumers,  though  probably  a 
        slight  one;  but  Wagner  provided  no  analysis  of  it.  The  first  al‐
        ternative  he  estimated  to  cost  only  $18,000,  and  rounded  up  to 
        $100,000  only  (I  am  guessing)  because  jurors  would  be  more 
        skeptical  of  the  lower  number,  especially  in  light  of  the  ex‐
        tremely  high  number  that  Wagner  could  anticipate  from  Ap‐
        ple’s  expert  witness.  Again  his  procedure  for  cost  estimation 

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        was  improper.  The  $18,000  figure  came  from  an  interview  he 
        conducted  with  the  supervisor  of  the  Google  engineer  who 
        added the swipe gesture functionality to the Android operating 
        system  (the  operating  system  used  in  Motorola  cell  phones, 
        which was created by Google). Wagner calculated that the engi‐
        neer’s  salary  allocable  to  that  project  was  $18,000.  But  his  as‐
        sumption that the tap functionality is similar to the swipe func‐
        tionality and that removing a function takes no more time than 
        adding it did is not within Wagner’s competence. His proposed 
        testimony  must  therefore  be  excluded,  but  again  the  exclusion 
        has  only  academic  significance  because  the  procedure  used  by 
        Apple’s expert, again Mr. Napper, was improper. 
           Napper  estimated  Apple’s  damages  from  the  alleged  in‐
        fringement of the ‘949 at $35 million ($2 per Motorola cell phone 
        sold  during  the  damages  period).  This  figure  is  based  on  the 
        price  that  Apple  charges  for  a  device  called  Magic  Trackpad 
        which can be plugged into a desktop computer and used as an 
        alternative to a mouse. Whereas a mouse operates by the user’s 
        moving it on a mouse pad and pushing its buttons to move the 
        cursor  on  the  computer  screen  and  select  items  with  it,  a  track 
        pad  operates  by  the  user’s  moving  his  finger  on  the  pad  and 
        then clicking; it is that movement that moves the cursor on the 
        computer  screen.  The  fact  that  some  consumers  will  pay  more 
        for  Magic  Trackpad  than  for  a  mouse—$69.99,  according  to 
        Napper’s  report,  versus  $49.99  for  Apple’s  mouse—suggests 
        that  some  consumers  indeed  value  gestural  as  opposed  to 
        mouse‐driven control of the cursor. 
           At  this  point  in  the  litigation  the  dispositive  element  of  the 
        ‘949  patent  is  the  use  of  a  tap  on  the  right‐hand  side  of  the 
        screen to switch to the next page of a Kindle book that has been 
        loaded  on  the  cell  phone.  The  value  of  that  feature  to  the  con‐
        sumer is again a question the answer to which could be elicited, 
        within  a  permissible  (because  unavoidable)  range  of  uncer‐
        tainty,  by  a  properly  designed  and  executed  consumer  survey. 

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        Napper’s  comparison  with  the  Magic  Trackpad  fails  to  isolate 
        the value to consumers of the “tap for next item” function. That 
        a consumer will pay something for gestural control does not en‐
        able an estimation of how much he will pay for a particular im‐
        provement in a system of such control, such as the addition of a 
        new  gesture  to  perform  a  function  that  can  already  be  per‐
        formed with another gesture. The next‐item function can be per‐
        formed with a swipe of the finger as well as a tap, and I’ve ruled 
        that the tap but not the swipe is covered by the patent. 
            This  is  one  fatal  defect  in  Napper’s  proposed  testimony  but 
        there is another, and that is a failure to consider alternatives to a 
        $35  million  royalty  that  would  enable  Motorola  to  provide  the 
        superior  gestural  control  enabled  by  the  relevant  claim  in  the 
        Apple patent. There is no basis in any expert report for suppos‐
        ing that it would cost Motorola millions of dollars, either in in‐
        vent‐around  software  development  or  in  loss  of  consumer 
        goodwill  (resulting  in  a  loss  of  sales  revenue),  to  drop  the  tap 
        for turning the page in the Kindle application (though to do this 
        it would need Amazon’s permission) or to drop the Kindle ap‐
        plication itself, leading consumers who wanted it to download it 
        themselves (which costs nothing). As it is, Motorola sells many 
        of its cell phones without the Kindle application. 
            Apple  argues  that  as  long  as  its  expert  produces  a  plausible 
        method  of  avoiding  infringement  (here,  licensing  the  patent) 
        and thus a basis for estimating a reasonable royalty (the royalty 
        being the cost of the method), the existence of alternative meth‐
        ods  that  might  be  substantially  cheaper  is  an  issue  to  be  re‐
        solved  at  trial by a comparison  of the patentee’s evidence with 
        adverse evidence presented, or cross‐examination by the lawyer 
        for the alleged infringer, and is irrelevant to the admissibility of 
        the  expert’s  testimony.  That  cannot  be  correct,  for  again  one 
        must consider how the expert would proceed in a parallel non‐
        litigation context. So suppose Motorola came to Mr. Napper and 
        said: find out for us how we can at lowest cost, whether in soft‐

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        ware development or loss of consumer goodwill, avoid infring‐
        ing Apple’s patent; we need to know that lowest cost because it 
        will be the ceiling on our willingness to pay for a patent license. 
        If  we  can  avoid  infringement  at  $1  a  phone,  we  will  not  pay  a 
        royalty in excess of $1. 
            In response to such an assignment the expert would not say: 
        It will cost you $35 million to buy a chip that will duplicate the 
        functionality  of  Apple’s  patent  without  infringing  it.  Because 
        Motorola would ask him: Is that the only way we can avoid in‐
        fringement? The expert would reply: Well actually you can drop 
        the tap heuristic from your Kindle application or you can drop 
        the application and tell your consumers that if they want it they 
        can download it without charge; and this is what each of these 
        alternatives  would  cost  you  in  lost  sales,  contract  damages,  or 
        whatever. An expert witness “must provide reasons for rejecting 
        alternative  hypotheses  ‘using  scientific  methods  and  proce‐
        dures’ and the elimination of those hypotheses must be founded 
        on  more  than  ‘subjective  beliefs  or  unsupported  speculation,’” 
        Clausen  v.  M/V  NEW  CARISSA,  339  F.3d  1049,  1058  (9th  Cir. 
        2003), quoting Claar v. Burlington Northern R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 502 
        (9th  Cir.  1994);  see  also  Committee  Notes  on  2000  Amendment 
        to Fed. R. Evid. 702, as an aspect of his more general duty to be 
        as  “as  careful  [in  his  litigation  work]  as  he  would  be  in  his 
        regular  professional  work  outside  his  paid  litigation 
        consulting.” Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., supra, 104 F.3d at 
        942; see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, supra, 526 U.S. at 152. 
            But  I  cannot  end  my  analysis  of  Napper’s  proposed 
        testimony  here,  because  Napper’s  report  was  submitted  before 
        my  pretrial  rulings  on  the  scope  of  the  ‘949  patent.  He  had 
        proceeded on the assumption that the patent claim would not be 
        limited  to  the  right‐tap  heuristic  on  the  Kindle  application,  but 
        would  encompass  the  use  of  a  horizontal  swipe  to  turn  a  page 
        or  otherwise  change screens.  I ruled that  the claim was  limited 
        to  the  tap,  and  this  narrowed  the  case  to  the  Kindle  Reader 

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        application because that’s the only case in which Motorola’s cell 
        phones use a “tap for next item.” The part of the patent claim on 
        which  Napper’s  proposed  testimony  is  mainly  based  is  a 
        heuristic  (an  instruction  to  the  cell  phone)  that  “tells”  the  cell 
        phone to treat an upward or downward motion of the finger as 
        a vertical swipe even if it is not perfectly vertical; as long as it is 
        within  a  specified  range  to  right  and  left  of  vertical  (think  of  a 
        fan), the cell phone interprets the gesture as a perfectly vertical 
        gesture. This is almost certainly a more valuable feature of a cell 
        phone  than  the  finger‐tap  heuristic  for  turning  pages  in  pre‐
        installed Kindle applications. 
           But Napper’s proposed testimony does not provide a reliable 
        basis for inferring the value even of the vertical scrolling feature. 
        The  fact  that  many  consumers  will  pay  more  for  a  Magic 
        Trackpad  than  for  a  mouse  tells  one  nothing  about  what  they 
        will  pay  to  avoid  occasionally  swiping  unsuccessfully  because 
        their  swiping  finger  wasn’t  actually  vertical  to  the  screen. 
        Maybe consumers would pay $2, but there  is no evidence  they 
        would, or at least none furnished by Napper. 
           Against this background, the question whether he should be 
        allowed to supplement his expert report to provide an estimate 
        of a reasonable royalty for the Kindle Reader application finger‐
        tap page‐turning feature is easily answered: no. For if as I have 
        just  said  his  methodology  (the  Magic  Trackpad  comparison)  is 
        inadequate  to  provide  a  reliable  estimate  of  the  value  of  the 
        vertical‐scrolling‐in‐a‐range  program,  how  can  it  provide  a 
        reliable estimate of the value of the page‐turning program? 
           It  is  conceivable  that  there  is  some  program  or  device  other 
        than  Magic  Trackpad  that  could  be  matched  with  the  page‐
        turning  program  to  provide  an  estimate  of  the  value  of  the 
        latter. But if so it should have been in Napper’s report. He was 
        asked  to  provide  an  estimate  of  Apple’s  damages  from  the 
        alleged  infringement  of  its  ‘949  patent,  and  one  of  the 
        components  of  those  damages  was  damages  for  infringing  the 

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        finger‐tap page‐turning element of the patent. He mentioned the 
        component  in  his  expert  report  as  an  advance  over  existing 
        methods  but  he  did  not  estimate  its  value.  Either  that 
        component  is  buried  somewhere  in  the  $35  million,  with  the 
        Magic  Trackpad  meant  to  provide  an  analogy  to  the  page‐
        turning  program  (though  this  seems  unlikely,  since  tapping  as 
        distinct from swiping seems more like clicking on a mouse than 
        moving one’s finger on a track pad), or Napper considered the 
        damages  likely  to  be  applicable  to  such  an  infringement  too 
        slight to bother about, as he has provided no evidence on which 
        to base an estimate of a reasonable royalty for that program, let 
        alone  for  the  subprogram  applicable  only  to  the  Kindle 
        application.  So  far  as  appears,  the  only  evidence  that  could  be 
        provided  would  be  consumer‐survey  evidence;  it  is  much  too 
        late for Apple to be permitted to conduct a survey. 
           Napper’s testimony about Apple patent ‘949 is excluded. 
           Apple ‘263. This is a patent on a system for making sure that 
        programs  which  present  video  or  aural  material  in  real  time 
        (rather than storing it for later viewing/hearing) are able to pre‐
        sent  that  material  smoothly,  without  interruption  or  distortion. 
        This unquestionably is a valuable feature of a smartphone as of 
        other types of computer. Mr. Napper asserts in his expert report 
        that it would cost Motorola $29 to $31 million to add a chip to its 
        smartphones  that  would  replace  the  functionality  of  the  ‘263 
        patent.  The  disabling  objection  is  similar  to  the  objection  to 
        Wagner’s  damages  estimate  for  the  ‘002:  in  both  cases  the 
        party’s  damages  expert  obtained  the  essential  information, 
        namely the identity of the chip that would avoid infringement, 
        from  an  agent  of  the  party  rather  than  from  a  disinterested 
        source. The agent in this case is Nathaniel Polish, Apple’s prin‐
        cipal technical expert. 
           Suppose  Napper  had  been  hired  by  Motorola  to  advise  on 
        how  at  lowest  cost  Motorola  might  obtain  the  functionality  of 
        the  ‘263  without  infringing  that  patent.  Obviously  Napper 

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        would not have gone to the patentee for that information! For it 
        would  be  in  the  patentee’s  interest  to  suggest  a  method  of  in‐
        venting  around  that  was  extremely  costly,  because  the  costlier 
        the  invent‐around,  the  higher  the  ceiling  on  a  reasonable  roy‐
        alty.  Of  course  Polish  is  not  Apple;  he  is  an  independent  con‐
        tractor.  And  if  he  were  the  only  person  competent  to  opine  on 
        substitutes  for  the  ‘263,  his  evidence  would  be  admissible,  and 
        the  jury  would  be  warned  that  he  had  a  conflict  of  interest  be‐
        cause he is handsomely compensated by Apple to provide tech‐
        nical evidence in support of Apple’s claim that Motorola has in‐
        fringed the ‘263. But there is no evidence that he is the only en‐
        gineer  who  is  familiar  with  computer  hardware  (or  software) 
        that  duplicates  the  functionality  of  the  ‘263.  So  again  imagine 
        this  imaginary  conversation  between  Napper  and  Motorola, 
        which I’ll pretend hired Napper to advise on how at lowest cost 
        to  duplicate  the  patent’s  functionality  without  infringement: 
        Motorola:  “What  will  it  cost  us  to  invent  around,  for  that  will 
        place a ceiling on the royalty we’ll pay Apple?” Napper: “Brace 
        yourself: $35 million greenbacks.” Motorola: “That sounds high; 
        where  did  you  get  the  figure?”  Napper:  “I  asked  an  engineer 
        who works for Apple.” Motorola: “Dummkopf! You’re fired.” 
           Napper’s proposed testimony regarding damages for alleged 
        infringement of Apple’s patent ‘263 is excluded. 
           Apple  ‘647  (structure  detection  and  linking).  Napper’s  re‐
        port states that it would cost Motorola $10.5 million to duplicate 
        the  functionality  of  Apple’s  patent  without  infringement.  He 
        based this estimate on the price of a program called “Clipboard 
        Manager”  which  is  available  for  download  by  iPhone  users 
        from  the  iPhone  app  store  for  $1.  Napper  apportioned  $0.60  of 
        the $1 to the functionality covered by the patent and multiplied 
        by the number of Motorola cell phones sold during the damages 
        period to reach the $10.5 million figure. 
           “Clipboard  manager”  is  actually  a  generic  term;  the  capital‐
        ized name refers to a specific version offered in the iPhone app 

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        store. During the damages period, Clipboard Manager (the Ap‐
        ple version) was a set of five sub‐applications (that is, it did five 
        different  things). Three  of the sub‐applications  related  to  struc‐
        ture detection and linking, the other two to alphabetization and 
        images—that’s  why  Napper  apportioned  three‐fifths  of  the  ap‐
        plication’s $1 price to the ‘647 invention. The three that relate to 
        structure  detection  and  linking  are  redundant  to  the  superior 
        technology  for  structure  detection  and  linking  that  is  included 
        in  the  iPhone—the  superior  technology  is  the  technology  cov‐
        ered  by  the  ‘647.  Napper’s  report  acknowledges  both  that  the 
        ‘647  technology  comes  preloaded  on  the  iPhone  and  that  it  is 
        superior  to  Clipboard  Manager’s  version  of  that  functionality. 
        From  this  it  follows  that  any  knowledgeable  consumer  who 
        buys Clipboard Manager  is buying it  solely for its alphabetiza‐
        tion  and  images  functionality,  because  its  structure  detection 
        and linking technology  has  no  value  to  someone  who owns an 
        iPhone;  and  iPhone  users  are  the  only  individuals  who  would 
        be  downloading  the  Clipboard  Manager  application  from  the 
        iPhone  app  store.  If all consumers are knowledgeable, the pur‐
        chase  of  Clipboard  Manager  provides  zero  information  on  the 
        value  to  consumers  of  structure  detection  and  linking,  because 
        they  already  have  that  functionality;  and  if  so,  then  Napper’s 
        allocation  of  $0.60  of  the  $1  price  to  that  functionality  is  sense‐
            Of  course  not  all  consumers  are  knowledgeable,  and  doubt‐
        less most value structure detection  and  linking  (not in that ter‐
        minology of course, but the terms refer to the cell phone’s ability 
        to  recognize  patterns  in  text  such  as  phone  numbers,  web  ad‐
        dresses, and dates and then to present the user with a list of the 
        actions he or she can take in regard to the patterns, such as call‐
        ing  the  phone  number  or  creating  a  calendar  entry).  Many  of 
        those who don’t realize they have it already may indeed be will‐
        ing to pay $0.60 to get it (though it seems odd to base damages 
        on sales revenues obtained as a result of mistakes by consumers 

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        for which the seller seems largely responsible). But Napper pro‐
        vided no estimate of how many such ignorant consumers there 
        are,  still  another  question  that  could  be  answered  within  the 
        limits  of  tolerable  uncertainty  by  a  competently  designed  and 
        administered  consumer  survey.  So  once  again  I  must  exclude 
        Napper’s evidence. 
           Motorola ‘559 (preamble sequence) and ‘898 (countdown). I 
        can  discuss  these  two  Motorola  patents  together.  They  provide 
        for  telecommunication  between  cell  phones  and  cellular  base 
        stations. I assume for purposes of the Daubert analysis that these 
        are  “standards  essential”  patents,  which  is  to  say  patents  that 
        cell phone makers must have a license for in order to communi‐
        cate over specified telecommunications networks, and therefore 
        that  Motorola  must  license  to  Apple  at  fair,  reasonable,  and 
        nondiscriminatory (“FRAND”) rates. 
           Motorola’s  damages  expert  Mulhern  estimates  that  a  proper 
        FRAND  royalty  would  have  cost  Apple  $347  million;  I  assume 
        in  this  opinion  that  this  figure  satisfies  FRAND.  But  Mulhern 
        failed to consider the range of plausible alternatives (to licensing 
        Motorola’s  patents)  facing  Apple,  alternatives  that  she  would 
        doubtless  have  considered  in  non‐litigation  consulting  if  asked 
        by Apple (say), what is the lowest‐cost method of obtaining ac‐
        cess to the functionality of these patents? The answer is to con‐
        tract with another carrier, rather than AT&T, because Motorola’s 
        cellular  patents  are  necessary  only  in  communications  over 
        AT&T’s  network.  Apple  chose  AT&T  over  the  alternatives,  of 
        which the most attractive, it appears, would have been Verizon. 
        So  presumably  any  other  alternative  would  have  been  inferior, 
        and  therefore  Apple  obtained  a  benefit  from  contracting  with 
        AT&T  instead  of  Verizon,  and  if  that  benefit  was  a  fruit  of  in‐
        fringement it is a proper basis for computing a reasonable roy‐
        alty. But Mulhern has not tried to quantify the benefit; nor does 
        she argue that the benefit, though substantial, cannot be quanti‐

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            She began her testimony at the Daubert hearing by explaining 
        that $347 million, while a seemingly large number, is nothing to 
        Apple—a company that made some $30 billion in revenue from 
        the products that Motorola contends infringe the Motorola pat‐
        ents.  The  implication  is  that  even  if  Apple  could  have  saved, 
        say, $100 million by launching on Verizon, what’s the difference 
        to Apple of having to pay $347 million versus $247 million? Ei‐
        ther figure is less than 1 percent of Apple’s total profits during 
        the  damages  period.  Obviously  a  damages  estimate  cannot  be 
        based on such reasoning. For imagine her being hired by Apple 
        for advice on how to minimize its liability to Motorola, and her 
        advising Apple that although her highest estimate of the cost of 
        avoiding  infringement  is  $347  million,  that’s  probably  too  high 
        by a couple of hundred million dollars, but that she hasn’t both‐
        ered  to  consider  avoidance  measures  that  would  cost  less  than 
        $347  million  because  one  hundred  million  dollars  or  so  is 
        chicken feed to Apple and so it wouldn’t want to pay an addi‐
        tional fee to her to search the alternatives. That is nonsense. 
            Motorola  points out that the contract that AT&T signed was 
        exclusive;  during  its  term,  Apple  could  not  have  switched  to 
        Verizon.  That  is  incorrect.  If  it  could  not  have  negotiated  a 
        modification or abrogation of the contract, it could simply have 
        broken  it,  at  a  cost  measured  by  the  damages  to  which  AT&T 
        would  have  been  entitled.  Mulhern  made  no  effort  to  estimate 
        those damages. She devoted only one page of her report to the 
        possibility of Apple’s having contracted with Verizon instead of 
        AT&T;  all  she  says  is  that  Apple  and  Verizon  were  unable  to 
        strike a deal. True; but the question is, had Apple known that it 
        was infringing Motorola’s cellular patents, would it have struck 
        a  deal  with  Verizon?  Mulhern  gives  no  reason  to  doubt  that  it 
        would have. The deal would have been inferior to the deal with 
        AT&T if there were no issue of infringement, as otherwise Ap‐
        ple  would  have  negotiated  a  contract  with  Verizon  rather  than 
        with  AT&T  in  the  first  place.  But  Mulhern  offers  no  evidence 

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        that it would have been $347 million more costly to Apple. Her 
        failure  to  analyze  Apple’s  alternative  of  contracting  with  Veri‐
        zon marks  her  approach to  calculating a  reasonable  royalty  for 
        Apple’s cellular patents as unreliable; and she offers no backup 
        estimate based on a reliable methodology. 
           She does offer an alternative measure of damages to her $347 
        million estimate of a reasonable royalty. The alternative is $468 
        million  and  includes  lost  profits  of  Motorola  plus  a  reasonable 
        royalty on sales not subject to a lost‐profits analysis. 
           The  lost‐profits  estimate  posits  a  counterfactual  world  in 
        which  there  is  no  Apple  product  on  the  market  because  Apple 
        doesn’t have a license to use Motorola’s cellular patents. This is 
        science fiction. Apple infringes those patents only on the AT&T 
        network,  and  at  worst  Apple  could  have  paid  the  2.25  percent 
        royalty  demanded  by  Motorola.  The  alternative‐universe  ap‐
        proach  must  take  account  of  alternatives  the  alleged  infringer 
        would have embraced in order to avoid a trip to that universe. 
        Grain  Processing  Corp.  v.  American  Maize‐Products  Co.,  185  F.3d 
        1341, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Apple would not have said to it‐
        self that because it couldn’t launch the iPhone on AT&T without 
        infringing the Motorola patents it would not make a cell phone.  
           I exclude Mulhern’s evidence. 
           Motorola  complains  that  Napper’s  references  to  Motorola’s 
        FRAND obligations in his rebuttal report to Mulhern are preju‐
        dicial and asks me to strike all FRAND references under Fed. R. 
        Evid.  403.  But  Motorola’s  obligation  to  license  its  standards‐
        essential  patents  on  FRAND  terms—the  content  of  those  terms 
        to be determined in the bench trial immediately upon the liabil‐
        ity  trials—is  highly  relevant  to  the  royalty  it  would  have  been 
        able  to  extract  from  Apple  had  they  successfully  negotiated  a 
        reasonable royalty ex ante. I therefore decline to strike Napper’s 
        mention of FRAND.   
           There are several other issues relating to damages for the al‐
        leged infringement by Apple of Motorola’s cellular patents gov‐

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        No. 1:11‐cv‐08540                                                                           22 

        erned  by  FRAND.  But  they  are  best  deferred  to  the  FRAND 
        trial,  in  which  the  central  issue  will  be  whether  in  its  dealings 
        with  Apple over the cellular patents  Motorola  violated  its  obli‐
        gation to offer licenses that comply with FRAND.

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          Opinion and Order

         Dated June 22, 2012
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                        IN THE
                  EASTERN DIVISION

No. 1:11-cv-08540

(f/k/a NeXT COMPUTER, INC.),



             OPINION and ORDER of June 22, 2012

   POSNER, Circuit Judge, sitting by designation. In my opinion
and order of May 22, following the Daubert hearing held on the
16th, I ruled that proposed testimony by three of the parties’
damages experts (one for Apple and two for Motorola) was in-
admissible. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-8540, 2012
WL 1959560 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2012); see Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703.
This ruling precipitated motions by both parties for summary
judgment with respect to their opponents’ damages claims, fol-
lowed by motions for summary judgment directed at each oth-
er’s injunction claims as well. These submissions prompted me
to ask the parties to brief the question whether, if all damages
and injunctive claims dropped from the case, the case could be

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               2

kept alive by Apple’s claim for declaratory relief. Motorola had
in its answer to Apple’s amended complaint asked for a declara-
tory judgment that each of Apple’s patents sought to be en-
forced in this suit was invalid. But unlike Apple it acknowledg-
es that such a request can’t keep a case going once all claims for
monetary or injunctive relief are rejected.
   After further briefing, and an oral hearing on June 7, I tenta-
tively concluded that the case would have to be dismissed. And
so I canceled the trials on liability, which had been scheduled to
begin on June 11. I said that an opinion would follow, defini-
tively resolving the question. On June 13, however, I granted
Apple’s request, made at the June 7 hearing, for a further hear-
ing on injunctive relief. I said that I had “decided to grant Ap-
ple’s request...for ‘a hearing at which the parties could attempt
to satisfy the eBay factors and do a traditional injunction hear-
ing.’… [At the hearing] each party may argue that it would be
entitled to injunctive relief as to its patent or patents were the
other party found to have infringed. The parties may submit
briefs, if they wish, no later than the close of business on Mon-
day, June 18. The parties should be prepared to address the
possibility of substitution for an injunction of an equitable de-
cree for a reasonable royalty going forward. They should indi-
cate any evidence in the existing record (for it is too late to sup-
plement the record) bearing on the question of injunctive or
other equitable relief. And if Motorola means to argue for in-
junctive relief it should be prepared to address the bearing of
FRAND on the injunction analysis.”
   The parties filed briefs and responses and the hearing was
held as scheduled. The question whether the case must be dis-
missed without a determination of liability is now fully ripe for
decision. I begin with the damages claims and then move to the
equitable issues addressed in the recent submissions and hear-
ing and then to declaratory relief.

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               3

    Damages. When the summary judgment motions were filed,
my expectation was that the liability trials (one a trial of Apple’s
claims of infringement, the other of Motorola’s claims of in-
fringement) would be followed immediately (if any claims of
infringement were upheld in the liability trials) by trials on is-
sues of relief: a jury trial on damages and a bench trial on equi-
table relief. The trials on relief would have involved five pa-
tents—four Apple patents (‘002, ‘263, ‘647, and ‘949) and one
Motorola patent (‘898)—if all were found to have been in-
fringed. Apple concedes that my exclusion of proposed testi-
mony by its damages expert witness Brian W. Napper dooms
its claims for damages for infringement of the ‘002 and ‘949 pa-
tents, and that leaves only the ‘263 and ‘647 patents for me to
consider in evaluating Motorola’s motion for summary judg-
ment on damages.
    Regarding the ‘263 (the realtime patent), I said in my Daubert
ruling that “Mr. Napper asserts in his expert report that it
would cost Motorola $29 to $31 million to add a chip to [each of]
its smartphones that would replace the function performed by
the invention that is the subject of the ‘263 patent. The disabling
objection [to Napper’s proposed testimony] is…[that he] ob-
tained the essential information, namely the identity of the chip
that would avoid infringement, from an agent of the party ra-
ther than from a disinterested source. The agent in this case is
Nathaniel Polish, Apple’s principal technical expert.” 2012 WL
1959560, at *9.
    Apple wants to substitute Dr. Polish, a computer scientist
whose competence to testify as an expert witness on liability
was not questioned, for Napper as its damages expert for the
‘263. The expert report by Polish on which Apple relies (Polish
filed more than one report) does say that Motorola could have
bought a chip (that is, a piece of computer hardware) that would
have enabled Motorola to perform the same functions per-
formed by the ‘263, without infringing. But Polish did not iden-

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                  4

tify the chip, let alone price it, let alone suggest that he had
searched across all (or at least many, or some, or even a few) of
the chips that Motorola might have bought, or of alternative
ways in which it might have invented around Apple’s patent.
(To simplify, I’ll generally call all ways of substituting a nonin-
fringing for an infringing invention “inventing around.”) All the
report says is that “running without a DSP [digital signal pro-
cessor] would be slower and the CPU would realize a substan-
tially shorter battery life. Thus, it is likely that instead of pursuing
this approach, a different solution would be purchasing an additional
chip to provide dedicated audio and video decoding capabilities. Such a
multi-chip solution would not need the codecs currently run-
ning on the DSPs in the Accused Products” (emphasis added).
   Napper says that Polish named the chip to him in a private
conversation not mentioned in Polish’s report. That was too late
and anyway the mere existence of a chip that would substitute
for the ‘263 is not enough to establish damages. An expert’s re-
port must contain “a complete statement of all opinions the wit-
ness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). There is no basis in Polish’s
report for a claim that his mystery chip is a feasible, let alone an
economical, substitute for the ‘263.
   Apple has not asked me to allow Polish to supplement his
report. Nor would the needed supplementation be within his
competence as disclosed in his report. There is no suggestion
that he is familiar with the range of chips that might constitute
feasible and economical substitutes for the ‘263. A competent
damages witness would be one who was involved in the pro-
curement of chips, or who advised as a consultant on the choice
of chips; there is no suggestion that Polish has such experience.
He was, it is true, listed as a damages witness. But his only role
in a damages trial was to be to testify about technical matters
relevant to damages, namely design around. And the only opin-
ion in his expert report that is relevant to design around is his

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                 5

statement about the existence of the chip that he later told Nap-
per about.
   The only testimony that I have found in Polish’s four expert-
witness reports that actually bears on damages is a statement
that Motorola’s DSP chip (alleged to infringe Apple’s ‘263 pa-
tent) is part of a set of chips, and the set costs $14.05. Polish said
the DSP function is a substantial part of the overall functionality
of the chip set, and so the value of the DSP in the allegedly in-
fringing devices—a value that might be used to estimate the
royalty to which Apple would be entitled if the DSP infringes
Apple’s ‘263 patent—should be a substantial fraction of the
$14.05. But Polish didn’t estimate the fraction, and this com-
pelled Napper to acknowledge in his report that since “the DSP
within the accused products is integrated with other functionali-
ty, and not sold or priced separately, I am unable to determine
the portion of the $14.05…that would relate to DSP functionali-
ty, though I understand it is a substantial piece.” Apple has not
tried to base a damages estimate on this chip.
   Apple argues that to establish a prima facie case it need only
show that there is one chip, however costly, somewhere in the
world of computer hardware, that Motorola could have substi-
tuted for the ‘263. It argues that the cost of that chip is a suffi-
ciently accurate estimate of Apple’s damages to shift the burden
of production to Motorola to prove the existence of cheaper
chips. Such an allocation of burdens of production might make
sense if knowledge of those alternatives to Apple’s proposed
mode of avoiding infringement were uniquely within
Motorola’s knowledge and difficult for Apple to access even
with all the tools of modern discovery. Campbell v. United States,
365 U.S. 85, 96 (1961) (“the ordinary rule, based on considera-
tions of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant of es-
tablishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adver-
sary”); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);
Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944); Duncan v. Duck-

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               6

worth, 644 F.2d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 1981). That is not argued, how-
ever, and would not be credible. The parties—both leading
manufacturers of cell phones—have equal access to information
about computer hardware for such devices.
   Other than in a case of unequal access by one side of the law-
suit (rare given modern discovery, at least when the opposing
parties are roughly equal in resources and sophistication, as
Apple and Motorola are), a plaintiff to withstand summary
judgment must present enough evidence to make a prima facie
case—that is, enough evidence to justify a trier of fact in finding
in favor of the plaintiff if the defendant presents no contrary ev-
idence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
142–43 (2000); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252–55 (1981). Even if Motorola presented no evi-
dence concerning other chips, the mere fact that there is a chip
that might substitute for the alleged infringing invention would
not enable the trier of fact to infer that the cost of that chip ap-
proximates the cost that Motorola avoided by (allegedly) in-
fringing, and hence the royalty it might have had to pay Apple
for a license to use Apple’s patented chip.
   At the June 7 hearing, Apple’s counsel remarked—about re-
quiring a patentee to “identify or be able to opine that that is the
absolute lowest cost best design-around, so it is the best meas-
ure of damages”—“I am not aware of any law to that effect.”
True, but Apple still must show that the chip that it suggested
that Motorola could have purchased was a commercially rea-
sonable design-around. As I said (not very articulately, I’m
afraid) at that hearing, “Apple didn’t have to show that the chip
identified by Dr. Polish was the very best design-around. Obvi-
ously, there are limits to how much of a burden you place on
[the plaintiff. If] Dr. Polish said…this is the standard thing, this
is what other people use[, t]hat might well be enough, but—of
course, that’s not in his report, and I don’t think a computer sci-
entist really is…the only expert you need on damages. You

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               7

need someone who is involved more in a financial part of the
company or the selling part, the marketing, the procurement
    I also agree with what Apple’s counsel said next: “our belief
is [that] the law is that as long as your expert puts forth a cog-
nizable, proper measure of damages, one that if by itself were pre-
sented to a jury, it would be sustainable as proper evidence, that
that is sufficient to bear the burden of proof by that party at that
time” (emphasis added). I take it by “sustainable as proper evi-
dence” counsel did not mean admissible, which goes without
saying, but that the evidence establishes a prima facie case.
Polish’s testimony about the chip does not establish a prima fa-
cie case. It invites guesswork. That won’t do.
    The ‘647, to which I now turn, is an Apple patent on what is
called “structure detection and linking.” The term refers to a cell
phone’s ability to recognize patterns such as phone numbers,
web addresses, and dates in text and then present the user with
a menu of possible responses, such as calling the phone number
or creating a calendar entry. I rejected Napper’s attempt to use
sales of an iPhone application called “Clipboard Manager” to
estimate the value of the functions performed by the ‘647. No
rational iPhone owner would knowingly purchase Clipboard
Manager for its structure detection and linking capabilities, be-
cause the capabilities built into the iPhone for doing these things
are already superior to the Clipboard Manager’s method of
structure detection and linking.
    Apple argues that there is an alternative basis for assessing
damages for the alleged infringement—Napper’s proposed tes-
timony (which I was not asked to exclude at the Daubert hear-
ing) about the cost of duplicating the functions performed by
the ‘647 without infringing. That estimate, intended to make
Napper’s proposed damages figure (the one based on Clipboard
Manager that I disallowed) seem conservative, was based on the
time it took another cell phone manufacturer, HTC, to design

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               8

around the ‘647 patent after the International Trade Commis-
sion, finding that HTC cell phones infringed the ‘647, threatened
to forbid their importation to the United States. In re Certain Per-
sonal Data & Mobile Communications Devices & Related Software,
Inv.        No.        337-TA-710      (Dec.        19,       2011),$File/33
7-ta-710.pdf (visited June 22, 2012). An infringer enjoined from
using a patented invention has to stop selling the infringing
product until it purges the infringement, as by an invent-
around. The cost (including lost sales) of having to invent
around is therefore one method of estimating the reasonable
royalty for a license.
    The estimate of Apple’s damages based on HTC’s experience
was an afterthought; it occupies only two pages in Napper’s re-
port and says nothing about HTC the company, or about HTC’s
cell phones, or about the engineering resources that HTC de-
voted to modifying its phones in response to the International
Trade Commission’s exclusion order, which permitted HTC to
import the offending phones for four more months before it had
to prove that it had successfully designed around the ‘647.
Napper’s report also doesn’t mention that the International
Trade Commission’s construction of the patent’s claims differs
from my construction of the same claims. So while at the June 7
hearing Apple’s counsel was literally correct in saying that HTC
was “faced with the exact same patent,” the statement was mis-
leading because as construed the claims were different and that
means that the cost of designing around may have been differ-
ent, an issue that responsible expert testimony would have to
address but that Napper’s report ignores.
    Apple argues last-minute that any act of infringement, even if
it gives rise to no measurable damages, is an injury entitling it to
a judgment. It points to a distinction between a breach of con-
tract and a tort. A breach of contract is a wrong, so even if the
victim of the breach (the other party to the contract) fails to

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                 9

prove that he was injured by it he is entitled to judgment and
the symbolic award of nominal damages. Mindgames, Inc. v.
Western Publishing Co., 218 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2000); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8, p. 784 (3d ed. 1999). In contrast, a
tort does not come into existence until there is an injury, without
which negligence or recklessness or other tortious behavior, in
the sense of behavior that if it causes an injury gives rise to a
tort, is not a basis for relief. Chang v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 599
F.3d 728, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2010); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser &
Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, pp. 164–65 (5th ed. 1984); cf. Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 899, comment c (1977).
    To this as to most legal generalizations there is an exception:
intentional trespass to land is a tort actionable even if no dam-
age results. Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 163. The reason
is to prevent the trespasser from acquiring title by adverse pos-
session. Chang v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., supra, 599 F.3d at 733. A
suit for “harmless” trespass is analogous to a suit to quiet title,
though the latter proceeding is in rem and thus if successful es-
tablishes title good against the world rather than just against a
single trespasser.
    More fundamentally, exclusion is the fundamental right that
ownership of property confers and it is not limited (as tort rights
are) to intrusions that cause palpable injury. It would be ridicu-
lous to think that to get an injunction against people picnicking
on your front lawn you’d have to prove they weren’t cleaning
up after themselves or were sitting in your favorite picnic spot.
    A patent is property too, and a suit to establish the validity
or scope of a patent by means of a suit against an alleged in-
fringer would be analogous to a “harmless trespass” suit, see
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick
Co., 895 F.2d 1403, 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and could therefore jus-
tify an award of nominal damages if no injury were proved.
Dobson v. Dornan, 118 U.S. 10, 17 (1886); Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Nominal dam-

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               10

ages are awarded in other types of case as well, for example
cases in which a violation of procedural due process is proved
even if no actual injury is shown. E.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S.
103, 112 (1992). Why nominal damages are ever awarded is a
separate question, for which I doubt there is a satisfactory an-
swer. Nominal damages “may be little better than a fossil rem-
nant of an earlier legal system, when it was thought that to say
such things as that ‘from my earliest reading, I have considered
it laid up among the very elements of the common law, that,
wherever there is a wrong, there is a remedy to redress it; and
that every injury imports damage in the nature of it; and, if no
other damage is established, the party injured is entitled to a
verdict for nominal damages,’ Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 Fed.
Cases 506, 507 (Cir. Ct. Me. 1838) (Story, J.), was to say some-
thing, rather than to talk in a circle.” Habitat Education Center v.
United States Forest Service, 607 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2010).
    But without questioning the propriety of an award of nomi-
nal damages in patent-infringement as in other classes of case, I
strongly doubt (despite a contrary intimation in Morrow v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007)) that a patentee
can sue for nominal damages, at least not in a federal court given
the meaning that the Supreme Court has given to the terms
“Cases” and “Controversies” in Article III of the Constitution.
Without an actual or prospective tangible injury, a federal court
has no subject-matter jurisdiction. In Farrar v. Hobby, supra, the
plaintiffs sued for $17 million but were awarded nominal dam-
ages because they failed to prove actual damages. They had not
sued for nominal damages. What rational person would?
    It’s not as if nominal damages were compensation for a nom-
inal harm. They are a symbolic recognition of a wrong that pro-
duced no harm, though it may have infringed a right. You can’t
go into federal court and say you had a contract with X and X
broke it and you’re really annoyed even though you sustained
no injury of any sort (in fact you made money because you re-

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               11

contracted at a higher price) so please give me a judgment for $1
that I can pin on my wall. No more can Apple be permitted to
force a trial in federal court the sole outcome of which would be
an award of $1. Which anyway it doesn’t want to do. When
Motorola filed a motion for summary judgment contending that
Apple cannot establish “any amount of damages arising from
alleged infringement of” its patents, Apple did not respond that
summary judgment should be denied because Apple could ob-
tain nominal damages if it proved infringement; it responded
that Motorola was wrong to think Apple couldn’t establish sub-
stantial damages.
    But I must consider the possible bearing of 35 U.S.C. § 284,
a provision of the Patent Act that provides in relevant part that
“upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the inven-
tion by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by
the court” (emphasis added). This conceivably could be read to
entitle a patentee to a royalty if it proves infringement even if it
presents no evidence at all of harm; and presumably the royalty
that the court would award wouldn’t be a nominal royalty. Nei-
ther party is seeking such relief here—a substantial royalty
predicated on no showing of harm. But for completeness I want
to dispel any impression that such relief—substantial “compen-
satory” damages for no tangible injury—would be proper even
apart from constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.
    A reasonable royalty is a form of damages when awarded
in the damages phase of an infringement litigation, though it
usually is a form of equitable relief, as we’ll see, when it is im-
posed, in lieu of an injunction, to prevent future harm to the pa-
tentee. The difference between conventional damages and a
royalty is that often a royalty is actually a form of restitution—a
way of transferring to the patentee the infringer’s profit, or,

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                12

what amounts to the same thing, the infringer’s cost savings
from practicing the patented invention without authorization.
Although the Federal Circuit in Dow Chemical Co. v. Mee Indus-
tries, Inc., 341 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003), spoke of “the pre-
sumption of damages when infringement is proven,” it quickly
added: “But, the district court’s obligation to award some
amount of damages ‘does not mean that a patentee who puts on
little or no satisfactory evidence of a reasonable royalty can suc-
cessfully appeal on the ground that the amount awarded by the
court is not ‘reasonable’ and therefore contravenes section
284.’” Id.
      The quotation is from Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v.
American Hoist & Derrick Co., supra, 895 F.2d at 1407, so we go to
that opinion and learn (id.) that “‘one who fails to submit evi-
dence in support of a position cannot be heard on appeal to
complain that the trial court failed to find facts upholding that
position,’” quoting Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727
F.2d 1506, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Lindemann cites Devex Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d 347, 363 (3d Cir. 1981), affirmed
on other grounds, 461 U.S. 648 (1983), which had “affirm[ed an]
award of zero damages for lack of evidence” and in doing so
had said that “the statute [35 U.S.C. § 284] requires the award of
a reasonable royalty, but to argue that this requirement exists
even in the absence of any evidence from which a court may
derive a reasonable royalty goes beyond the possible meaning
of the statute.” Not even nominal damages could be awarded.
      Any intimation that proof of infringement is alone enough
to warrant a remedial order (as when Dow posits an “obligation
to award some amount of damages” if infringement is proved)
was scotched by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. Mer-
cExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006). And with specific
reference to calculating a royalty, Dow itself instructs district
courts not pull the royalty out of a hat but instead “to consider
the so-called Georgia-Pacific factors in detail, and award such

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                    13

reasonable royalties as the record evidence will support.” 341
F.3d at 1382 (citation omitted); see also Lucent Technologies, Inc.
v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Parental Guide of
Texas, Inc. v. Thomson, Inc., 446 F.3d 1265, 1270 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
    So let’s take a look at those factors (Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.

    A comprehensive list of evidentiary facts relevant, in gen-
    eral, to the determination of the amount of a reasonable
    royalty for a patent license may be drawn from a conspec-
    tus of the leading cases. The following are some of the fac-
    tors mutatis mutandis seemingly more pertinent to the is-
    sue herein:
    1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing
    of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an estab-
    lished royalty.
    2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other pa-
    tents comparable to the patent in suit.
    3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-
    exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of ter-
    ritory or with respect to whom the manufactured product
    may be sold.
    4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing pro-
    gram to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing
    others to use the invention or by granting licenses under
    special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
    5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and
    licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the
    same territory in the same line of business; or whether
    they are inventor and promoter.
    6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting
    sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value
    of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of
    his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative
    or convoyed sales.
    7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
    8. The established profitability of the product made under
    the patent; its commercial success; and its current popu-
    9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over
    the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for
    working out similar results.

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                   14

    10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of
    the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced
    by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used
    the invention.
    11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
    invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that
    12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that
    may be customary in the particular business or in compa-
    rable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or
    analogous inventions.
    13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be cred-
    ited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
    elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or
    significant features or improvements added by the in-
    14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
    15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a
    licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon
    (at the time the infringement began) if both had been rea-
    sonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that
    is, the amount which a prudent licensee—who desired, as
    a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture
    and sell a particular article embodying the patented in-
    vention—would have been willing to pay as a royalty and
    yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount
    would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who
    was willing to grant a license.

   This is a formidable list. The “some” in the second sentence
is particularly rich—how many additional factors may be lurk-
ing somewhere? And could a judge or a jury really balance 15
or more factors and come up with anything resembling an ob-
jective assessment? We needn’t try to answer these questions.
Apple has not presented admissible evidence that the Georgia-
Pacific factors support its damages claim.
   The remaining patent for which damages are sought is
Motorola’s ‘898, part of a portfolio of patents for enabling com-
munication between cell phones and cell towers (called “cellu-
lar base stations” in the patent). The ‘898 and ‘559 (a Motorola
patent for which I granted Apple’s motion for summary judg-

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ment of noninfringement) have both been declared by Motorola
to be “standards essential” patents. These are patents that cell
phone makers must use to communicate over specified tele-
communications networks and therefore that the patentee
(Motorola) has committed to licensing to anyone on fair, rea-
sonable, and nondiscriminatory (acronym “FRAND,” or some-
times “RAND”—the word “fair” adds nothing to “reasonable”
and “nondiscriminatory”) terms, as required by the standards-
setting organizations as a condition of the patented technolo-
gy’s being deemed essential to compliance with the standard.
   My summary judgment order of June 5, finding that Apple
had not infringed Motorola’s ‘559 patent, may seem incon-
sistent with the proposition that Apple’s 3G (“third genera-
tion”) mobile devices, which are governed by the Universal
Mobile Telecommunications Standard (UMTS), must therefore
use patents declared essential to that standard, such as the ‘559.
But there is no inconsistency. Motorola’s standards-essential
patents (including the ‘898 still at issue in this case) are merely
claimed to be standards-essential. The European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute collects declarations by companies
that claim to own patents essential to compliance with the
UMTS standard, but the Institute does not determine whether
they really are essential. See “ETSI IPR Database FAQ,”
(visited June 22, 2012); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Inc., No.
11-CV-01846, 2012 WL 1672493 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2012). Apple
showed that although its cell phones generate the preamble se-
quences (the subject of Motorola’s ‘559 patent) required by the
3G UMTS standard, they do not do so in the manner claimed by
‘559, and so the ‘559 isn’t essential.
   With its principal damages witness for the ‘898, Carla S. Mul-
hern, excluded as a result of my Daubert ruling, Motorola has
fallen back on another of its expert damages witnesses, Charles
R. Donohoe, who was not excluded. Mr. Donohoe is qualified to

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opine on the licensing of standards-essential patents, but the
bottom line of his 8-page declaration (he did not submit a formal
report, as Rule 26 requires, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B); Meyers v.
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 619 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2010);
Gay v. Stonebridge Life Ins. Co., 660 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2011)) is
that if Apple had wanted to license any of the patents in
Motorola’s standards-essential portfolio, the license fee would
have exceeded the product of the percentage of the portfolio
represented by the patent and the value of the entire portfolio.
Suppose the portfolio contained 100 patents and they would
command a reasonable royalty of $700 million to a firm that li-
censed all 100. One patent is 1 percent of 100 patents and 1 per-
cent of $700 million is $7 million. But according to Donohoe’s
declaration, the license fee for that single patent, if licensed on
its own rather than as part of a package deal that comprised the
entire portfolio, would be “up to” 40 to 50 percent of the royalty
for the entire portfolio—that is, up to $350 million.
    That “up to” covers a lot of ground. Even a royalty of only
$14 million would be mathematically disproportionate
(Donohoe’s term is “nonlinear”) for using a single patent in a
portfolio of 100 patents worth in the aggregate a $700 million
royalty, because $14 million is 2 percent of $700 million rather
than 1 percent (1 out of 100 patents). How to pick the right non-
linear royalty? Donohoe’s declaration does not answer that es-
sential question, and there is no suggestion that any other wit-
ness can answer it. In his deposition Donohoe tried to retract the
“up to” of his declaration by testifying that the royalty for a sin-
gle patent in the portfolio “should be at least 40 to 50 percent of
overall rate is my experience” (emphasis added)—still open-
ended, though now on the upside. He gave no reason for his
change of mind, no estimate of the shape of the nonlinear royal-
ty function, no basis, in short, for his estimate of “at least 40 to
50 percent” of a reasonable royalty for the entire portfolio. And
he admitted that he knows nothing about the portfolio that in-

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cludes the ‘898 patent; his 40-to-50 percent figure is a statement
about portfolios of standards-essential telecommunications pa-
tents in general.
    It might seem that at a minimum Motorola could argue for
the linear price—in my example, 1 percent of the value of the
portfolio. But it does not make that fallback argument; it’s going
for broke. Moreover, if the proper pricing is nonlinear, Motorola
would need evidence that the ‘898 patent is not less valuable
than the average patent in the portfolio, for in that case it would
merit less than a linear proportion of the portfolio’s value. It
hasn’t presented any such evidence.
    “Going for broke” is the inescapable characterization of
Motorola’s damages claim. Motorola claims to be entitled to a
minimum royalty of 2.25 percent for a license for the patents in
the portfolio that contains the ‘898. Though it’s the only patent
in the portfolio that remains in this suit, Motorola claims to be
entitled to damages equal to (or “up to,” or “at least”—it seems
not to have made up its mind) 40 to 50 percent of 2.25 percent,
which would be 0.9 to 1.125 percent of sales of Apple devices
that infringe the ‘898.
    At the June 7 hearing Motorola’s lawyer said that in future
litigation it would prove that Apple had infringed the other pa-
tents in the portfolio as well and so Motorola would prove its
entitlement to 2.25 percent of all sales. In his words: “Apple is
infringing all the standards-essential patents [this was said be-
fore I granted Apple summary judgment regarding its alleged
infringement of Motorola’s ‘559 patent] that Motorola owns by
selling its cell phones that communicate on these wireless net-
works. As…a practical reality, we cannot sue on a hundred pa-
tents in one case, or 75…. There are other cases pending, and
there are cases in various stages of development at the Interna-
tional Trade Commission. But the ultimate result would have to
be, as a result of all the litigations, that Apple would pay
Motorola whatever the standards-essential license negotiated

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fee would be. We say it’s 2.25 percent, but I'm not going to be able
to prove to you that that’s the right number today” (emphasis add-
ed). And now it’s too late.
    There is another decisive objection to Motorola’s damages
claim. The proper method of computing a FRAND royalty starts
with what the cost to the licensee would have been of obtaining,
just before the patented invention was declared essential to
compliance with the industry standard, a license for the func-
tion performed by the patent. That cost would be a measure of
the value of the patent qua patent. But once a patent becomes
essential to a standard, the patentee’s bargaining power surges
because a prospective licensee has no alternative to licensing the
patent; he is at the patentee’s mercy. The purpose of the FRAND
requirements, the validity of which Motorola doesn’t question,
is to confine the patentee’s royalty demand to the value con-
ferred by the patent itself as distinct from the additional value—
the hold-up value—conferred by the patent’s being designated
as standard-essential. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d
297, 313–14 (3d Cir. 2007); Daniel G. Swanson & William J.
Baumol, “Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royal-
ties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power,” 73 An-
titrust L.J. 1, 7–11 (2005). Motorola has provided no evidence for
calculating a reasonable royalty that would be consistent with
this point.
    So damages are out for both parties. But a patentee can also
seek injunctive relief for infringement, and both parties seek
such relief, as I have already noted with respect to Apple.
    Injunctive Relief. To begin with Motorola’s injunctive claim, I
don’t see how, given FRAND, I would be justified in enjoining
Apple from infringing the ‘898 unless Apple refuses to pay a
royalty that meets the FRAND requirement. By committing to
license its patents on FRAND terms, Motorola committed to li-
cense the ‘898 to anyone willing to pay a FRAND royalty and
thus implicitly acknowledged that a royalty is adequate com-

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                  19

pensation for a license to use that patent. How could it do oth-
erwise? How could it be permitted to enjoin Apple from using
an invention that it contends Apple must use if it wants to make
a cell phone with UMTS telecommunications capability—
without which it would not be a cell phone.
   The Federal Trade Commission recently issued a policy
statement which implies that injunctive relief is indeed unavail-
able for infringement of a patent governed by FRAND. “Third
Party United States Federal Trade Commission’s Statement on
the Public Interest,” filed on June 6, 2012, in In re Certain Wireless
Communication Devices, Portable Music & Data Processing Devices,
Computers & Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-745, (visited June
22, 2012). This was said in the context of an exclusion order by
the International Trade Commission, but its logic embraces any
claim to enjoin the sale of an infringing product. For the FTC
says it’s “explaining the potential economic and competitive
impact of injunctive relief on disputes involving SEPs [standard-
essential patents].” Id. at 2. It goes on to note that

     a royalty negotiation that occurs under threat of an exclu-
     sion order may be weighted heavily in favor of the patent-
     ee in a way that is in tension with the RAND commitment.
     High switching costs combined with the threat of an ex-
     clusion order could allow a patentee to obtain unreasona-
     ble licensing terms despite its RAND commitment, not be-
     cause its invention is valuable, but because implementers
     are locked in to practicing the standard. The resulting im-
     balance between the value of patented technology and the
     rewards for innovation may be especially acute where the
     exclusion order is based on a patent covering a small com-
     ponent of a complex multicomponent product. In these
     ways, the threat of an exclusion order may allow the hold-
     er of a RAND-encumbered SEP to realize royalty rates that
     reflect patent hold-up, rather than the value of the patent
     relative to alternatives.

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Id. at 3–4; see also (besides the Broadcom case and the Swanson &
Baumol article) Douglas Lichtman, “Understanding the RAND
Commitment,” 47 Houston L. Rev. 1023, 1039–43 (2010); Mark A.
Lemley, “Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Or-
ganizations,” 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1889, 1916 (2002).
   Motorola counters that Apple’s refusal to negotiate with it af-
ter rejecting its initial offer of a 2.25 percent royalty warrants in-
junctive relief; by opting not to take a license ex ante, it argues,
Apple should lose the FRAND safe harbor. But Apple’s refusal
to negotiate for a license (if it did refuse—the parties offer com-
peting accounts, unnecessary for me to resolve, of why negotia-
tions broke down) was not a defense to a claim by Motorola for
a FRAND royalty. If Apple said no to 2.25 percent, it ran the risk
of being ordered by a court to pay an equal or even higher roy-
alty rate, but that is not the same thing as Motorola’s being ex-
cused from no longer having to comply with its FRAND obliga-
tions. Motorola agreed to license its standards-essential patents
on FRAND terms as a quid pro quo for their being declared es-
sential to the standard. FTC Statement on the Public Interest, su-
pra, at 2. It does not claim to have conditioned agreement on
prospective licensees’ making counteroffers in license negotia-
   Motorola argues further that deprived of the possibility of in-
junctive relief, it will not be able to extract a reasonable royalty
from Apple. Suppose, hypothetically, that the maximum rea-
sonable FRAND royalty would be $10 million. If Motorola
therefore demanded such a royalty, Apple, knowing that litiga-
tion is costly, would refuse, and Motorola would accept a lesser
amount. Of course litigation would also be costly for Apple, and
this might induce it to pay the $10 million rather than fight. But
the deeper objection to Motorola’s argument is that the “Ameri-
can rule,” which with immaterial exceptions makes the winning
party in a litigation bear his litigation costs rather than being
able to shift them to the loser, does not deem damages an inad-

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                              21

equate remedy just because, unless backed by a threat of injunc-
tion, it may induce a settlement for less than the damages right-
ly sought by the plaintiff. You can’t obtain an injunction for a
simple breach of contract on the ground that you need the in-
junction to pressure the defendant to settle your damages claim
on terms more advantageous to you than if there were no such
   A further objection to Motorola’s claim for injunctive relief
applies to Apple’s claim for such relief as well. The grant of an
injunction is not an automatic or even a presumptive conse-
quence of a finding of liability, either generally or in a patent
case—in fact the Supreme Court has held that the standard for
deciding whether to grant such relief in patent cases is the nor-
mal equity standard. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., supra, 547
U.S. at 391–92; see also Ecolab, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 569 F.3d 1335,
1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2009). And that means, with immaterial ex-
ceptions, that the alternative of monetary relief must be inade-
quate. “[T]he inadequacy of one’s damages remedy is normally
a prerequisite to injunctive relief.” Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531,
533 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property
Co., 966 F.2d 273, 274 (7th Cir. 1992). “[A] plaintiff seeking an
injunction is quite often successful precisely because he cannot
calculate the damages he suffers.” Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co.,
863 F.2d 1550, 1558 n. 15 (11th Cir. 1989). A FRAND royalty
would provide all the relief to which Motorola would be enti-
tled if it proved infringement of the ‘898 patent, and thus it is
not entitled to an injunction.
   In fact neither party is entitled to an injunction. Neither has
shown that damages would not be an adequate remedy. True,
neither has presented sufficient evidence of damages to with-
stand summary judgment—but that is not because damages are
impossible to calculate with reasonable certainty and are there-
fore an inadequate remedy; it’s because the parties have failed
to present enough evidence to create a triable issue. They had an

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                              22

adequate legal remedy but failed to make a prima facie case of
how much money, by way of such remedy, they are entitled to.
That was a simple failure of proof.
   The monetary remedy in patent cases is measured as I have
already noted either by the patentee’s loss or by the value of the
infringement to the infringer. The premise of the alternative
measure—value to the infringer—is that had the infringer nego-
tiated for a license rather than infringing, that value would have
been transmuted into a license fee paid to the patentee, and the
loss of that fee constitutes damages suffered by the patentee.
“Restitution measured by the market value of an unauthorized
use appeared at an early date as a remedy for patent infringe-
ment, in cases where the patentee was unable to prove either his
own damages or the infringer’s profits. (Although such an
award has always been denominated ‘damages’ in the context of
patent infringement, it is more accurately described as a species
of restitution for the value of a benefit wrongly obtained.) Un-
like the accounting for the infringer’s profits, restitution meas-
ured by use value survives in the current Patent Act.” Restate-
ment (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 42, comments
c and f (2011); see also George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution §
2.7, pp. 93–94 (1978); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, “An
Economic Analysis of Damages Rules in Intellectual Property
Law,” 39 William & Mary L. Rev. 1585, 1650 (1998).
   There is no question of collectability in this case, a common
reason why a damages remedy is inadequate. Both parties have
deep pockets. And neither has acknowledged that damages for
the infringement of its patents could not be estimated with tol-
erable certainty. On the contrary, each insists not only that dam-
ages are calculable but that it has calculated them. The problem
is not that damages cannot be calculated, but that on the eve of
trial, with the record closed, it became apparent that the parties
had failed to make a responsible calculation.

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   Apple claims that Motorola profited from infringement by in-
corporating the desirable features of Apple’s patented technolo-
gy into its own devices without either paying a royalty for a li-
cense to use the patents or incurring the cost of inventing
around them. Apple has never contended that these benefits to
Motorola of infringement cannot be quantified. It merely has
failed, despite its vast resources and superb legal team, to do so
in a minimally acceptable manner—failed whether because of
mistakes in trial preparation (which even the best lawyers can
make), or because too many cooks spoil the stew (Apple is rep-
resented by three law firms in this litigation), or maybe because
the infringements did not deprive Apple of any profits (I’ll come
back to this counterintuitive point).
   Apple also contends that it’s losing market share (which
could happen though its sales were growing—as they have
been—because a competitor, namely Motorola, was growing
faster) to Motorola, and also losing future customers to
Motorola because of infringement, and requests an injunction to
limit Motorola’s penetration of the market and preserve Apple’s
own customer base. But it has not laid a foundation for such re-
   To begin with, as far as the record shows, an injunction
would not avert such losses, because of the ease of designing
around the patent claims at issue. The costs of designing around
the ’647 patent (structure detection and linking) would be simi-
lar to the costs of designing around the '002 (unblockable
taskbar); both invent-arounds would just require reprogram-
ming Motorola’s smartphones to avoid at least one claim limita-
tion. (A claim is not infringed if at least one “limitation” (ele-
ment) of the claim is not present in the allegedly infringing de-
vice. Catalina Marketing Int’l, Inc. v., Inc., 289 F.3d
801, 812 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538,
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985).) Given my claims construction of the '647
patent, Motorola could design around simply by creating copies

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                              24

of the code that performs structure detection and linking for
each particular program rather than by using a common-code
module for all programs; for without a common code there is no
”analyzer server,” as required by the patent claim. Motorola
could similarly include programs that occasionally block the
taskbar to avoid ‘002. As far as the ‘263 patent (realtime) is con-
cerned, there is no evidence of the cost of inventing around the
surviving claims in it, and for all the records shows the cost may
be slight. And finally I noted in my May 22 opinion how easy
and cheap it would be for Motorola to avoid infringing the fin-
ger-gesture claim in the ‘949 patent.
   If, then, Apple couldn’t exclude Motorola from the market
with an injunction because of the ease of inventing around, the
only thing Apple lost as a result of the alleged infringements
was royalties capped at the minimum design-around cost. Its
alleged loss of market share because Motorola’s smartphones do
the same thing (either via license or design-around) would have
occurred with or without an injunction, and so doesn’t establish
the inadequacy of damages.
   Thus, while difficulty of quantifying loss of goodwill or of
market share might justify injunctive relief in some cases, in this
case an injunction would in all likelihood be ineffectual in pre-
venting such loss. (No damages are sought for past such loss.)
Unsurprisingly, there’s no evidence of loss of market share or
customer goodwill by Apple, and no basis for expecting such
loss in the future. The price differences between the iPhone,
which is Apple’s smartphone, and Motorola smartphones sug-
gest that the markets for the two classes of product are not per-
fectly overlapping, and so a small improvement in a Motorola
smartphone attributable to infringement may not take signifi-
cant sales from Apple. And while the patents themselves (or
some of them at least) may well have considerable value, after
the claims constructions by Judge Crabb and myself and after
my grants of partial summary judgment only a handful of the

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                              25

original patent claims remain in the case; infringement of that
handful may not be a source of significant injury past, present,
or future. For a variety of reasons patents in the field of infor-
mation technology often have little if any value except defen-
sively. See Alan Devlin, “Systemic Bias in Patent Law,” 61 De-
Paul L. Rev. 57, 77–80 (2011), and references cited there.
     A related reason for withholding injunctive relief in this
case is that it would be likely to impose costs on the alleged in-
fringer disproportionate both to the benefits to it of having in-
fringed and to the harm to the victim of infringement, and
would thus be a windfall to the patentee and a form of punitive
rather than compensatory damages imposed on the infringer.
Not only is there no evidence of gain to Motorola or loss to Ap-
ple even though if there were gain or loss Apple should have
been able to quantify it, but in addition an injunction could force
Motorola to remove lucrative products from the market for as
long as it took to remove the infringing features—minor fea-
tures in complex devices most features of which are not alleged
to infringe—from its products, or to invent around the infring-
ing features.
     This point about potential harm to the infringer from an in-
junction may seem to imply that had Motorola refrained from
infringing Apple’s patents (supposing it did infringe, an unan-
swered question, obviously), it would have had to pay a very
large license fee to Apple as the alternative to a costly invent
around. And such an implication might seem inconsistent with
my determination that Apple has failed to show that Motorola
derived significant benefits from the alleged infringements; for
if there are no big benefits from infringing, there would be no
big license fee for being allowed to continue to use the patents
infringed on. But this ignores the fact that the market for
smartphones (the kind of advanced cell phones sold by Apple
and Motorola) has grown rapidly since Motorola’s alleged in-
fringements began three years ago. Sales of smartphones grew

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               26

by almost two-thirds last year alone. An injunction issued today
might do much greater harm to Motorola than the license fee
that Apple would have charged had Motorola sought one when
the alleged infringements began.
     Apple could have sought, in lieu of an injunction against the
sale of Motorola’s devices, an order that Motorola pay a reason-
able royalty for continued use of the inventions covered by the
Apple patents. Such an order would impose a compulsory li-
cense on Apple in exchange for its receiving a perpetual royalty.
(The Federal Circuit prefers the term “ongoing royalty,” Paice
LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 n. 13 (Fed. Cir.
2007).) It would be an equitable remedy imposed as a substitute
for an injunction against infringement. Bard Peripheral Vascular,
Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., 670 F.3d 1171, 1192 (Fed. Cir.
2012), vacated in part on other grounds, 2012 WL 2149764 (Fed.
Cir. June 14, 2012). (Equitable remedies, contrary to the familiar
dichotomy between monetary and equitable relief, are often
monetary. E.g., McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, 672 F.3d 482, 483
(7th Cir. 2012); Hoelzer v. City of Stamford, 972 F.2d 495, 498 (2d
Cir. 1992).)
     A compulsory license with ongoing royalty is likely to be a
superior remedy in a case like this because of the frequent dis-
proportion between harm to the patentee from infringement
and harm to the infringer and to the public from an injunction, a
factor emphasized in Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., supra, 547 U.S. at 396–97, in
which he pointed out that “when the patented invention is but a
small component of the product the companies seek to produce
and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not
serve the public interest.” He could have been describing this
case. Three Justices joined his opinion, and no Justice expressed
disagreement with it.

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               27

     The ongoing royalty will usually be the reasonable royalty
as of the time of first infringement. If the infringement occurred
in 1999, say, the royalty would be a percentage of the sale price
of the infringing product and would continue as long as the li-
censee continued to sell the product, as in Shatterproof Glass
Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Ms. Mulhern, the Motorola damages expert whom I excluded,
thought that Apple should have paid Motorola $298 million for
the right to use the ‘898. That would not have been for a per-
petual license. It was simply the product of multiplying Apple’s
sales revenues, during the period from the beginning of the al-
leged infringement to the present, from devices allegedly in-
fringing the ‘898, by a percentage (we haven’t been able to fig-
ure out precisely what percentage) in Donohoe’s 40 to 50 per-
cent range (actually, since his range actually was “up to 40 to 50
percent,” the lower end was not 40 percent but zero percent) of
2.25 percent. The reasonable royalty going forward would be
the product of multiplying by the same percentage the estimat-
ed future sales by Apple of infringing devices. The failure to
justify the percentage leaves Motorola without a basis for calcu-
lating a going-forward royalty, as it has proposed no alternative
to the method just suggested.
     Apple’s damages case consisted of an attempt to calculate
the reasonable royalty for the period up to trial—the money that
Motorola owed it for past infringement. Had Apple been able to
prove its damages case (as well as establish liability for in-
fringement of its patents), those damages (that is, the reasonable
royalty, looking backwards) would have been the basis for fix-
ing a reasonable royalty to be paid for each future sale in lieu of
an injunction, that is, the per-unit royalty going forward, or as it
is sometimes called the “running royalty.” Damages are de-
signed to place the patentee in the position it would have occu-
pied had the patent not been infringed; had the patent not been
infringed the royalty would have been an estimate of the future

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                28

as well as the present value of being allowed to practice the pa-
tent. An alternative to the running royalty would be a lump-
sum royalty representing the present value of the expected fu-
ture royalties, by analogy to a lump-sum damages award for
lost future earnings in a tort case.
      An award of damages could have given Apple damages in
the form both of restitution of any past gains by Motorola from
the infringements and of the present value of a reasonable royal-
ty for future use by Motorola of the patented inventions. Alt-
hough an order to pay a royalty in the future certainly sounds
like an equitable order (a mandatory injunction) and can be one
as we noted earlier, the Federal Circuit in Telcordia Technologies,
Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 612 F.3d 1365, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
indicated that alternatively it could be part of a jury’s verdict on
damages. If past damages are awarded along with future dam-
ages either calculated as a lump sum or as a nonequity running-
royalty order, there would be no occasion to order equitable re-
      I am mindful that Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353,
1361–62 (Fed. Cir. 2008), holds that the retrospective reasonable
royalty (damages “going backward”) should be lower than the
prospective royalty (“going forward”) to reflect the parties’
greater certainty in the latter case—infringement having been
determined by a court and not merely claimed by the patentee—
that the device really does infringe a valid patent. See also Bard
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc., supra, 670
F.3d at 1193. This is consistent with the proposition that the
forward royalty is an injunction substitute, so not really damag-
es, so not really based on what the parties might have negotiat-
ed years earlier. Fair enough. But nothing in the record of this
case—a record now closed—enables me to calculate the adjust-
ment necessary to determine either a running royalty or a lump-
sum royalty.

Case: 12-1548       Document: 131     Page: 210     Filed: 03/14/2013

No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               29

     Although both parties asked for injunctive relief, neither
named an expert witness who would testify about such relief—
either about an injunction or about the equitable substitute of a
compulsory license at a reasonable royalty were an injunction
denied. Neither party suggested that any of its damages experts
had an opinion about such a royalty, except that one of them,
Professor Dennis Carlton, properly challenged Motorola’s claim
to be entitled to what in effect would be a hold-up royalty for
standards-essential patents.
     The reports of the damages experts no more provide a ra-
tional basis for computing royalties going forward than for
computing royalties going backward, even if they are different
rates. Damages experts in a patent case would be expected to
estimate running royalties as well as past damages, but none
has done so in this case.
     But all this is an aside because in the brief Apple filed on
June 18 in response to my order of June 13 it states that it cannot
compute a prospective royalty (either a running or a lump-sum
royalty) because that computation would depend on expert evi-
dence that I struck. Instead it argues that it is entitled to an in-
junction because it has no adequate damages remedy for future
losses attributable to continuing infringement by Motorola.
     A patentee cannot base a claim to an injunction on a self-
inflicted wound, such as sponsoring a damages expert who pre-
pares a demonstrably inadequate report. What is true, but a dif-
ferent point, is that the fact that a patentee seeks and even ob-
tains damages for past harm from infringement does not disable
it from obtaining injunctive relief. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). It might have been able to
quantify only a small part of the harm that it had incurred, and
similarly might be able to quantify only a small part of the fu-
ture harm it would incur if the infringement continued. And
then it might well be entitled to an injunction, as well as to (only
partially adequate) damages for past infringement.

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                30

     Apple in conjuring loss of consumer goodwill and of market
share tries to make the kind of case for an injunction that was
made successfully by the plaintiff in i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Mi-
crosoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2010), where the court
concluded that “a small company was practicing its patent, only
to suffer a loss of market share, brand recognition, and customer
goodwill as the result of the defendant’s infringing acts. Such
losses may frequently defy attempts at valuation, particularly
when the infringing acts significantly change the relevant mar-
ket, as occurred here.” Apple is not a “small company”; its mar-
ket capitalization exceeds that of Google and Microsoft com-
bined. To suggest that it has suffered loss of market share, brand
recognition, or customer goodwill as a result of Motorola’s al-
leged infringement of the patent claims still in play in this case
is wild conjecture. And until about a week ago Apple had not
suggested in this litigation that the losses it allegedly suffered or
will suffer from the alleged infringement “defy attempts at val-
     In its latest written and oral submissions Apple attempts
what I told its legal team at a pretrial conference I would not let
it do in the liability trials then envisaged: turn the case into an
Apple versus Motorola popularity contest. Apple wanted me to
allow into evidence media reports attesting to what a terrific
product the iPhone is. I said I would not permit this because the
quality of the iPhone (and of related Apple products, primarily
the iPad) and consumers’ regard for it have, so far as the record
shows, nothing to do with the handful of patent claims that I
had ruled presented triable issues of infringement. Apple’s “feel
good” theory does not indicate that infringement of these claims
(if they were infringed) reduced Apple’s sales or market share,
or impaired consumer goodwill toward Apple products. Typical
is the statement in Apple’s brief of June 18 that “an Apple sur-
vey identified watching streaming videos from YouTube among
the top ten planned activities for consumers using iPads in the

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                 31

United States.” The ‘263 patent in issue in this litigation is not a
claim to a monopoly of streaming video!
     Apple is complaining that Motorola’s phones as a whole
ripped off the iPhone as a whole. But Motorola’s desire to sell
products that compete with the iPhone is a separate harm—and
a perfectly legal one—from any harm caused by patent in-
     Because there are such substantial grounds for skepticism
concerning the harm that Apple is likely to incur from contin-
ued infringement, cf. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,
supra, 580 F.3d at 1333, it would not be proper even to consider
ordering an injunction without evidence that would enable me
to compare the costs and benefits of an injunction with the costs
and benefits of the substitute equitable remedy of a compulsory
license with a reasonable royalty, that is, a running (ongoing)
royalty. Apple, as noted earlier, has acknowledged that it can’t
estimate a royalty substitute for an injunction—not because such
an estimate is inherently infeasible but because I struck the pro-
posed testimony of its indispensable damages witness, Mr.
Napper. While such a royalty may perhaps, as held or assumed
in the Telcordia case, be part of a damages remedy (the remedy
“at law” as distinct from an equitable remedy), it certainly can
be a substitute equitable remedy for an injunction. This possibil-
ity is germane to the “balance of hardships” component of
eBay’s test for whether to grant an injunction in a patent case.
547 U.S. at 391.
     Apple tries to elide the issue of a royalty substitute for an in-
junction by trivializing the costs of an injunction to Motorola. It
says it has no objection to delaying the effective date of the in-
junction for a period of three months to allow Motorola to try to
invent around the Apple patents. If Motorola succeeded during
that period in inventing around—that is, in duplicating the
functionality of Apple’s patents without infringing them—the
cost of the injunction to Motorola would be no greater than if

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               32

Motorola had invented around in the first place rather than in-
     I am not persuaded by Apple’s soothing reassurance that a
tailored injunction would avert significant hardship to
Motorola. Apple ignores the following possibilities: that a non-
infringing invent-around cannot be completed, installed, and
tested within three months (Motorola might therefore return to
court seeking a modification of the injunction); that the cost to
Motorola of retooling its production lines to make the rede-
signed devices would be considerable and a further source of
delay in completing the invent-around in three months; that
Motorola might have to destroy (if it is not feasible to rebuild)
the smartphones that are in its inventory or in the inventories of
distributors and can be refitted with the invent-around only at a
cost so stiff as to make the devices unsalable at a competitive
price; and, perhaps most ominous, that Apple will sue Motorola
alleging that the redesigned phones still infringe its patents, just
as it is challenging HTC’s design-around of the ‘647 in current
proceedings before the International Trade Commission.
     Also ignored are the harm that an injunction might cause to
consumers who can no longer buy preferred products because
their sales have been enjoined, and the cost to the judiciary as
well as to the parties of administering an injunction—which un-
der the rubric of “public interest” is another factor that eBay re-
quires me to weigh in deciding whether to grant injunctive re-
lief. 547 U.S. at 391. The danger that Apple’s goal in obtaining
an injunction is harassment of its bitter rival, requiring particu-
larly watchful supervision by the court should it issue the in-
junction, is suggested by the fact that while a delayed injunction
would in principle render no benefit to Apple besides harming
its competitor by forcing it to waste time and money finding a
new way of performing the functions now performed in an al-
legedly infringing manner, an ongoing royalty would yield sig-

Case: 12-1548       Document: 131    Page: 214     Filed: 03/14/2013

No. 1:11-cv-08540                                              33

nificant income to Apple—yet which it wants to forgo in favor
of imposing costs and litigation burdens on its adversary.
     Because of the potential costs to Motorola and the federal
judiciary I could not responsibly order injunctive relief in favor
of Apple without knowing whether the lower cost of a compul-
sory license at a reasonable royalty would produce a better bal-
ance of hardships. I note, amplifying earlier points, the absence
of evidence that if Motorola is infringing the patent claims at is-
sue, it is imposing a significant cost on Apple. Consider the ‘002,
which Apple charges is infringed by Motorola’s preventing par-
tial obstruction of its smartphones’ notification windows. There
is no evidence, and it seems more than unlikely, that occasional
partial obstruction would appreciably reduce the value of
Motorola’s smartphones to consumers—Apple didn’t even
bother to install a notification window on its devices until last
year. Consider next the ‘949, which Apple contends is infringed
by Motorola’s enabling customers who buy a Motorola
smartphone with a Kindle reader pre-installed to turn pages by
tapping on the screen rather than by swiping a finger across it
(which actually is more like turning pages than tapping is).
Consider the ‘263, the realtime patent, alleged to be infringed by
Motorola’s adopting a method for avoiding glitches in “real
time” communications (such as movies) that has not been
shown to provide a superior experience to consumers than al-
ternative, noninfringing realtime software or hardware or oth-
erwise drive consumer demand for the iPhone. And consider
the ‘647 (structural linking and detection), which also provides
unproved consumer benefits.
     The notion that these minor-seeming infringements have
cost Apple market share and consumer goodwill is implausible,
has virtually no support in the record, and so fails to indicate
that the benefits to Apple from an injunction would exceed the
costs to Motorola. An injunction that imposes greater costs on
the defendant than it confers benefits on the plaintiff reduces net

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No. 1:11-cv-08540                                              34

social welfare. That is the insight behind the “balance of hard-
ships” component of the eBay standard for injunctive relief in
patent cases.
     And I must not lose sight of the basic principle that injunc-
tive relief is available only when the remedy at law is inade-
quate—that is, only when damages would not provide complete
relief. As noted in Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1983)—though the point is too obvious to require a
citation—a patentee can’t obtain an injunction (and, by parity of
reasoning, an ongoing royalty in lieu of an injunction) if either
damages or an equitable substitute such as a running royalty
would provide complete relief. Ordinarily a running royalty,
combined with the damages remedy for past sales, should pro-
vide full compensation to the patentee, thus obviating injunctive
     Apple could have sought such a remedy, but did not. It ba-
ses its claim for injunctive relief on future harms that it claims
cannot be quantified for purposes of a monetary remedy, name-
ly loss of consumer goodwill and of market share. In fact such
losses are conventional items of damages. But assume they can’t
be quantified in this case. An injunction would not prevent the-
se losses, as I have explained, given the feasibility of avoiding
the effect of the injunction by either doing without a functionali-
ty that may be worth very little (such as the functionality that
prevents application programs from ever partially, though not
entirely blocking, a notification window, in the ‘002, or that ena-
bles pages in a Kindle application to be turned by tapping rather
than swiping, in the ‘949), or by inventing around, such as in-
venting around the ‘263, which, because of the deficiencies of
Napper’s expert report, I cannot conclude would be expensive,
or inventing around the ’647 patent by reprogramming
Motorola’s smartphones to avoid at least one claim limitation,
for example by simply creating copies of the code that performs
structure detection and linking for each particular program ra-

Case: 12-1548       Document: 131     Page: 216     Filed: 03/14/2013

No. 1:11-cv-08540                                               35

ther than using a common code module for all programs, be-
cause if there is no common code there is no ”analyzer server,”
as required by the patent claim.
     By failing to present a minimally adequate damages case,
Apple has disabled itself from arguing that damages would not
provide a complete remedy, going forward in the form of run-
ning royalties, as well as backward. It harps on loss of consumer
goodwill and market share, as a ground for an injunction, but
not only has no real evidence of such loss, but, given the nature
of the patent claims, it is not a loss that an injunction would
avert. Apple’s case for injunctive relief flunks the irreparable in-
jury, balance of hardships, and public interest standards of eBay.
     The deadline for discovery was April 23, 2012, and for ex-
pert reports March 20, and supplementation of expert reports
continued through late April. The expert and the other witness-
es have been deposed. The parties do not claim to have been
rushed unduly by Judge Crabb (who presided over the litigation
before the case was assigned to me) or by me. They are proud,
as they should be, of their ability to provide superb service to
their clients under time pressure that would crush less skilled
and resourced firms and clients. There is no question of sur-
prise, or haste in ruling on the issues of relief. The parties have
had a full opportunity to present all evidence germane to sum-
mary judgment proceedings on relief. Apple describes the brief
that it filed on June 18 as its offer of the evidence it would pre-
sent at a full evidentiary hearing on relief, and does not evince a
desire, or claim a right, to present additional evidence. It turns
out that despite the parties’ best efforts, they do not have evi-
dence to withstand summary judgment on damages and injunc-
tive relief.
     Declaratory Relief. The parties seek declaratory judgments of
invalidity and noninfringement of their opponents’ patents.
Motorola concedes, as I said at the outset of this opinion, that
once damages and injunctive relief drop out, it has no basis for

Case: 12-1548       Document: 131      Page: 217      Filed: 03/14/2013

No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                 36

seeking declaratory relief. Apple, however, argues (or argued,
for it may have dropped its request for declaratory relief) that
with the case ready for trial after an extensive and very costly
pretrial period (it made this argument at the June 7 hearing,
held just four days before the trials had been scheduled to
begin), it is a waste of resources to abort the trials. It is true that
any continued sale of Motorola products, including the products
involved in this case that are alleged to violate Apple’s patents
would be a fresh act of alleged infringement and Apple could
bring a new suit just like this one, though it would have to con-
tend with a possible defense of collateral estoppel to some or
many of its claims and contentions. But as Motorola points out,
if a plaintiff fails to establish any basis for an award of relief, the
defendant is entitled to a judgment dismissing the case with
prejudice even if a future lawsuit between the parties, continu-
ing their dispute, can be anticipated. “[A]n actual controversy
cannot be based on a fear of litigation over future products.”
Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Quadlux, Inc., 172 F.3d 852, 855–56
(Fed. Cir. 1999); cf. ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 665
F.3d 882, 896 (7th Cir. 2011).
     A party may sue for declaratory relief in federal court only
if either it or its opponent could bring a federal suit for injunc-
tive or monetary relief. See Franchise Tax Board v. Construction
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 and n. 19 (1983); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671–74 (1950). An in-
surance company that denies coverage can seek a declaratory
judgment against its insured, because the insured could sue the
company for having broken the insurance contract by denying
coverage. And a firm alleged to have infringed a patent can seek
a declaratory judgment of noninfringement against the patentee
because the latter could sue the former for infringement. But
when the court has determined that neither party could obtain
monetary or injunctive relief against the other, as in this case, a
declaratory judgment in favor of either party would confer no

Case: 12-1548       Document: 131     Page: 218      Filed: 03/14/2013

No. 1:11-cv-08540                                                37

tangible benefit on the victor and so there would be no federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1026–27
(10th Cir. 2011); Hickman v. State of Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1142
(8th Cir. 1998).
     In any event the decision whether to grant declaratory relief
is discretionary, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (courts “may”—not
“must”—issue declaratory judgments); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 136 (2007); Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.,
515 U.S. 277, 286–89 (1995), and Apple concedes that “[t]here is
no controlling case law that prevents that exercise of discretion
[over whether to exercise declaratory judgment authority] in
this case.” Even if I could grant a declaratory judgment in this
case, I would not do so, because the issuance of such a judgment
would have no practical effect.
     Form of Dismissal. It remains only to consider the appropri-
ate form of the judgment of dismissal (actually dismissals, be-
cause there are two suits—Apple’s and Motorola’s—which were
consolidated for the sake of judicial economy). It might seem
that the case has become moot, because the parties cannot obtain
any benefit from further proceedings. But that is not correct.
They can’t obtain any benefit from further proceedings in this
case but they can appeal its dismissal. And even if no appeal
were planned, the case would not be moot, because a failure of
proof, whether with respect to liability or to remedy, while it
ends a case does not make the case moot. A dismissal for moot-
ness ordinarily (though with exceptions, for example because of
voluntary cessation by the defendant of his alleged misconduct,
or because the case is capable of repetition but evades review) is
without prejudice. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); University of Pittsburgh v.
Varian Medical Systems, Inc., 569 F.3d 1328, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216–17
(10th Cir. 2006). And when a suit is dismissed without preju-
dice, so that the dismissal is not res judicata, the loser can (again
with exceptions) refile it. In re IFC Credit Corp., 663 F.3d 315, 320

Case: 12-1548       Document: 131    Page: 219     Filed: 03/14/2013

No. 1:11-cv-08540                                              38

(7th Cir. 2011); Robinson v. Sherrod, 631 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir.
2011). It would be ridiculous to dismiss a suit for failure to
prove damages and allow the plaintiff to refile the suit so that he
could have a second chance to prove damages. This case is
therefore dismissed with prejudice; a separate order to that ef-
fect is being entered today.

Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 220   Filed: 03/14/2013


         Dated June 22, 2012
              Case: 12-1548   Document: 131 Page: 221 Filed: 03/14/2013
      Case: 1:11-cv-08540 Document #: 1039 Filed: 06/22/12 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:94980

AO 450 (Rev. 1 1/11) Judgment in a Civil Actioo

                                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                                                              for the
                                                   Northern District oflllinois

           Apple, Inc. and NeXT Software Inc.,                   )
                              Plaintiff                          )
                           v.                                    )      Civil Action No. 1:11-cv-08540
_ _ _ Mot_orola, )nc:..and Motorola Mobility, Inc.,              )
                             Defendant                           )

                                              JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL ACTION

The court has ordered that (check one):

0    the plaintiff (name)
 defendant (name)
                               - - - - -- - --------------------- recover from the
                                                                     the amount of
- - - -- --..,....----- - - - - - - - -- - --                   dollars($          ), wb.ich includes prejudgment
interest at the rate of _ ___ %, plus post judgment interest at the rate of _ _ _ % per annum, along with costs.

 0 the plaintiff recover nothing, the action be dismissed on the merits, and the defendant (name)
- -- - - -- - - -- recover costs from the plaintiff (name)

 r/ other:       The case, including all claims and counterclaims. is dismissed with prejudice.

 This action was (check one) :

 0 tried by a jury with Judge             - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - --                    presicling, and the jury has
 rendered a verdict.

 0 tried by Judge - - - -- - - -- - - - - -- - -- -- - without a jury and the above decision
 was reached .

 ~   decided by Judge                             Richard A. Posner                      on~for
       summary judgment.

 Date;\.e. 22.. 1 2 0 l 2._                                  CLERK OF COURT -1 'Tho~==-             G- •   Be lA.:\o V\

Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 222   Filed: 03/14/2013

      US Patent No. 5,946,647
               Case: 12-1548                          Document: 131 Page: 223 Filed: 03/14/2013
                                                                   111111 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
United States Patent                                                [19J                    [11]    Patent Number:                       5,946,647
Miller et al.                                                                               [45]    Date of Patent:                Aug. 31, 1999

[54]     SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PERFORMING                                                Schwarz, Peter and Shoens, Kurt. "Managing Change in the
         AN ACTION ON A STRUCTURE IN                                                     Rufus System," Abstract from the IBM Almaden Research
         COMPUTER-GENERATED DATA                                                         Center, pp. 1-16.
                                                                                         Myers, Brad A. "Tourmaline: Text Formatting by Demon-
[75]      Inventors: James R. Miller, Mountain View;                                     stration," (Chapter 14) in Watch What I Do: Programming
                     Thomas Bonura, Capitola; Bonnie                                     by Demonstration, edited by Allen Cypher, MIT Press,
                     Nardi, Mountain View; David Wright,                                 (Cambridge, MA 1993), pp. 309-321.
                     Santa Clara, all of Calif.                                          Maulsby, David. "Instructible Agents," Dissertation from
                                                                                         the Department of Computer Science at The University of
[73]     Assignee: Apple Computer, Inc., Cupertino,                                      Calgary (Calgary, Alberta-Jun. 1994), pp. 178, 181-188,
                   Calif.                                                                193-196 (from Chapter 5).
                                                                                         Rus, Daniela and Subramanian, Devika. "Designing Struc-
[21]     Appl. No.: 08/595,257                                                           ture-Based Information Agents," AAAl Symposium (Mar.
                                                                                         1994), pp. 79-86.
[22]      Filed:          Feb. 1, 1996
                     6                                                                   Primary Examiner--Forester W. Isen
[51]      Int. Cl. ...................................................... G06F 17/27     Assistant Examiner-Patrick N. Edouard
[52]      U.S. Cl. ...................................................... 704/9; 704/1   Attorney, Agent, or Firm-Carr & Ferrell LLP
[58]      Field of Search .................................. 704/1, 7, 9-10,
                                               704/243; 707/513, 101-104                 [57]                   ABSTRACT

[56]                          References Cited                                           A system and method causes a computer to detect and
                                                                                         perform actions on structures identified in computer data.
                     U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS                                               The system provides an analyzer server, an application
                                                                                         program interface, a user interface and an action processor.
       5,115,390 5/1992 Fukuda et a!. . ... ... ... ... .... ... ... ... 364/146
                                                                                         The analyzer server receives from an application running
       5,130,924 7/1992 Barker eta!. ............................... 704/1
       5,164,899 11/1992 Sobotka et a!. ............................. 704/9              concurrently data having recognizable structures, uses a
       5,202,828 4/1993 Vertelney eta!. ...................... 364/419                   pattern analysis unit, such as a parser or fast string search
       5,247,437 9/1993 Vale et a!. ................................... 704/1            function, to detect structures in the data, and links relevant
       5,369,575 11/1994 Lamberti et a!. . ... ... ... .... ... ... ... ... . 704/1      actions to the detected structures. The application program
       5,574,843 11/1996 Gerlach et a!. ......................... 395/118                interface communicates with the application running
                                                                                         concurrently, and transmits relevant information to the user
                         01HER PUBLICATIONS
                                                                                         interface. Thus, the user interface can present and enable
TerryMorse Software "What is Myrmidon" Downloaded                                        selection of the detected structures, and upon selection of a
from the Internet at URL (Pub-                                 detected structure, present the linked candidate actions.
lication Date Unknown), 2 pages.                                                         Upon selection of an action, the action processor performs
Shoens, K. et al. "Rufus System: Information Organization                                the action on the detected structure.
for Semi-Structured Data," Proceedings of the 19th VLDB
Conference (Dublin, Ireland 1993), pp. 1-12.                                                           24 Claims, 10 Drawing Sheets






                                                                                                         180                        190


           Case: 12-1548            Document: 131                           Page: 224                   Filed: 03/14/2013

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                 Case: 12-1548     Document: 131       Page: 227     Filed: 03/14/2013


                        Phone number: phone number grammar
                                                                                                 r- 22 0
                              Actions: Call#

                                       Put in electronic telephone book

                        Post-office address: post-office address grammar
       410                    Actions: Write letter

                                         Put in address book

                        E-mail address: e-mail address grammar

                   "           Actions: Send E-Mail

                                        Put in E-Mail address book

                        Date: date grammar
                   r\         Actions: Put in electronic calendar


                        Name: name library
                                                                                         ,...-          420   c""'
                               Actions:   Write letter                                           """-
                                          Call person (retrieve#)
                                          Put in electronic message folder

                                                  FIG. 4
    Case: 12-1548            Document: 131                 Page: 228         Filed: 03/14/2013

U.S. Patent                  Aug. 31, 1999                   Sheet 5 of 10                5,946,647

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    Case: 12-1548               Document: 131                   Page: 229           Filed: 03/14/2013

U.S. Patent                     Aug. 31, 1999                     Sheet 6 of 10                  5,946,647


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    Case: 12-1548         Document: 131        Page: 230        Filed: 03/14/2013

U.S. Patent               Aug. 31, 1999          Sheet 7 of 10               5,946,647



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    Case: 12-1548    Document: 131    Page: 231    Filed: 03/14/2013

U.S. Patent          Aug. 31, 1999      Sheet 8 of 10           5,946,647


                Receive Document Content                  810

         Scan for Patterns in Document Content            820

           Link Actions to Detected Structures            825

  Retrieve Presentation Regions for Detected Structures


                       FIG. 8

    Case: 12-1548     Document: 131   Page: 232    Filed: 03/14/2013

U.S. Patent           Aug. 31, 1999     Sheet 9 of 10           5,946,647

                    Display Regions               910

              Display Menu of Actions                   930

                    Execute Action             950

                      FIG. 9

    Case: 12-1548     Document: 131    Page: 233       Filed: 03/14/2013

U.S. Patent          Aug. 31, 1999          Sheet 10 of 10              5,946,647

                         START                                           820

           Retrieve Data to be Analyzed             1010            /
                  Retrieve Grammars                                     1020

        Detect Structures Using Grammars                1040

        Link Associated Actions to Detected                  1050
     ------~-------------    ------------------------'
              Retrieve Library of Strings           1070

          Detect Identical Strings in Data            1080

       Link Associated Actions to Detected
                      Strings                                1090

          Perform Other Pattern Analysis                1100


                     FIG. 10

           Case: 12-1548               Document: 131               Page: 234           Filed: 03/14/2013

                              1                                                                  2
   SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PERFORMING                                tion of an action and automatically performs the selected
       AN ACTION ON A STRUCTURE IN                                 action on the structure.
        COMPUTER-GENERATED DATA                                                SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
          BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION                          5
                                                                     The present invention overcomes the limitations and
                                                                  deficiencies of previous systems with a system that identifies
   1. Field of the Invention                                      structures in computer data, associates candidate actions
   This invention relates generally to manipulation of struc-     with each detected structure, enables the selection of an
tures in computer data. More particularly, the invention          action, and automatically performs the selected action on the
                                                                  identified structure. It will be appreciated that the system
relates to a system and method for performing computer- 10
                                                                  may operate on recognizable patterns for text, pictures,
based actions on structures identified in computer data.
                                                                  tables, graphs, voice, etc. So long as a pattern is
   2. Description of the Background Art                           recognizable, the system will operate on it. The present
   Much data that appears in a computer user's day-to-day         ~nvention has significant advantages over previous systems,
activities contains recognizable structures that have seman-      m that the present system may incorporate an open-ended
tic significance such as phone numbers, e-mail addresses, 15 number and type of recognizable patterns, an open-ended
post-office addresses, zip codes and dates. In a typical day,     number and type of pattern analysis units, and further that
for example, a user may receive extensive files from word-        the system may enable an open-ended number and type (i.e.
processing programs and e-mail that contain several of these      scripts, macros, code fragments, etc.) of candidate actions to
structures. However, visually searching data files or docu-       associate with, and thus perform, on each identified struc-
ments to find these structures is laborious and cognitively 20 ture.
disruptive, especially if the document is lengthy and hard to        The present invention provides a computer system with a
follow. Furthermore, missing a structure such as a date may       central processing unit (CPU), input/output (110) means, and
lead to missing an important meeting or missing a deadline.       a memory that includes a program to identify structures in a
   To help facilitate searching a document for these              document and perform selected computer-based actions on
structures, programmers can create or employ pattern analy- 25 the identified structures. The program includes program
sis units, such as parsers, to automatically identify the         subroutines that include an analyzer server, an application
structures. For the purposes of the present description, the      program interface, a user interface and an action processor.
term "pattern" refers to data, such as a grammar, regular         The analyzer server receives data from a document having
expression, string, etc., used by a pattern analysis unit to      recognizable structures, and uses patterns to detect the
recognize information in a document, such as dates, 30 structures. Upon detection of a structure, the analyzer server
addresses, phone numbers, names, etc. The term "structure"        links actions to the detected structure. Each action is a
refers to an instantiation of a pattern in the document. That     computer subroutine that causes the CPU to perform a
is, a "date" pattern will recognize the structure "Oct. 31,       sequence of operations on the particular structure to which
1995." The application of a pattern to a document is termed       it is linked. An action may specify opening another
                                                               35 application, loading the identified structure into an appro-
                                                                  priate field, and closing the application. An action may
   Conventional systems that identify structures in computer
                                                                  further include internal actions, such as storing phone num-
data do not enable automatic performance of an action on an
                                                                  bers in an electronic phone book, addresses in an electronic
identified structure. For example, if a long e-mail message is
                                                                  address book, appointments on an electronic calendar, and
sent to a user, the user may implement a pattern analysis unit 40
                                                                  external actions such as returning phone calls, drafting
to search for particular structures, such as telephone num-
                                                                  letters, sending facsimile copies and e-mail, and the like.
bers. Upon identification of a structure, the user may want to
                                                                     Since the program may be executed during the run-time of
perform an action on the structure, such as moving the
                                                                  another program, i.e. the application which presents the
number to an electronic telephone book. This usually
                                                                  document, such as Microsoft Word, an application program
involves cutting the structure from the e-mail message, ~
                                                                  interface provides mechanisms for interprogram communi-
1ocating and opening the electronic telephone book appli-
                                                                  cations. The application program interface retrieves and
cation program, pasting the structure into the appropriate
                                                                  transmits relevant information from the other program to the
field, and closing the application program. However, despite
                                                                  user interface for identifying, presenting and enabling selec-
the fact that computer systems are getting faster and more
                                                                  tion of detected structures. Upon selection of a detected
efficient, this procedure is still tedious and cognitively 50
                                                                  structure, the user interface presents and enables selection of
                                                                  candidate actions. When a candidate action is selected the
   One type of system that has addressed this problem             action processor performs the selected action on the sel;cted
involves detecting telephone numbers. Such systems enable         structure.
a user to select a telephone number and request that the
                                                                     In addition to the computer system, the present invention
application automatically dial the number. However, these 55
                                                                  also provides methods for performing actions on identified
systems do not recognize the selected data as a telephone
                                                                  structures in a document. In this method, the document is
number, and they generally produce an error message if the
                                                                  analyzed using a pattern to identify corresponding struc-
user selects invalid characters as a phone number. Also, they
                                                                  tures. Identified structures are stored in memory and pre-
do not enable the performance of other candidate actions,
                                                                  sented to the user for selection. Upon selection of an
such as moving the number to an electronic telephone book. 60
                                                                  identified structure, a menu of candidate actions is
That is, if a user wishes to perform a different action on an
                                                                  presented, each of which may be selected and performed on
identified telephone number, such as storing the number in
                                                                  the selected structure.
an address book, the user cannot automatically perform the
action but must select and transfer the number to the                    BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
appropriate data base as described above.                      65    FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a computer system having a
   Therefore, a system is needed that identifies structures,      program stored in RAM, in accordance with the present
associates candidate actions to the structures, enables selec-    invention.

           Case: 12-1548               Document: 131               Page: 235            Filed: 03/14/2013

                              3                                                                  4
   FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the program of FIG. 1.                After identifying structures and linking actions, applica-
   FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating the analyzer server      tion program interface 230 communicates with application
of FIG. 2.                                                         167 to obtain information on the identified structures so that
                                                                   user interface 240 can successfully present and enable
   FIG. 4 is a block diagram illustrating a particular example
of the analyzer server of FIG. 2.                               5 selection of the actions. In a display-type environment,
                                                                   application program interface 230 retrieves the locations in
   FIG. 5 illustrates a window presenting an example of a          document 210 of the presentation regions for the detected
document having recognizable structures.                           structures from application 167. Application program inter-
   FIG. 6 illustrates a window with the identified structures      face 230 then transmits this location information to user
in the example document of FIG. 5 highlighted based on the 10 interface 240, which highlights the detected structures,
analyzer server of FIG. 4.                                         although other presentation mechanisms can be used. User
   FIG. 7 illustrates a window showing the display of a            interface 240 enables selection of an identified structure by
pop-up menu for selecting an action.                               making the presentation regions mouse-sensitive, i.e. aware
   FIGS. 8 and 9 together are a flowchart depicting the            when a mouse event such as a mouse-down operation is
preferred method for selecting and performing an action on 15 performed while the cursor is over the region. Alternative
an identified structure.                                           selection mechanisms can be used such as touch sensitive
                                                                   screens and dialog boxes. It will be appreciated that detected
   FIG. 10 is a flowchart depicting the preferred method for
                                                                   structures can be hierarchical, i.e. that a sub-structure can
identifying a structure in a data sample.
                                                                   itself be selected and have actions associated with it. For
            DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF 1HE                            example, a user may be able to select the year portion of an
                PREFERRED EMBODIMENT                               identified date, and select actions specific to the year rather
   Referring now to FIG. 1, a block diagram is shown of a          than to the entire date.
computer system 100 including a CPU 120. Computer                     User interface 240 communicates with application 167
system 100 is preferably a microprocessor-based computer,          through application program interface 230 to determine if a
such as a Power Macintosh manufactured by Apple 25 user has performed a mouse-down operation in a particular
Computer, Inc. of Cupertino, Calif. An input device 110,           mouse-sensitive presentation region, thereby selecting the
such as a keyboard and mouse, and an output device 105,            structure presented at those coordinates. Upon selection of
such as a CRT or voice module, are coupled to CPU 120.             this structure, user interface 240 presents and enables selec-
ROM 155, RAM 170 and disk storage 175 are coupled to               tion of the linked candidate actions using any selection
CPU 120 via signal bus 115. Computer system 100 option- 30 mechanism, such as a conventional pull-down or pop-up
ally further comprises a printer 180, a communications             menu.
interface 185, and a floppy disk drive 190, each coupled to           The above description of the user interface is cast in terms
CPU 120 via signal bus 115.                                        of a purely visual environment. However, the invention is
   Operating system 160 is a program that controls and             not limited to visual interface means. For example, in an
facilitates the processing carried out by CPU 120, and is 35 audio environment, user interface 240 may present the
typically stored in RAM 170. Application 167 is a program,         structures and associated actions to the user using voice
such as a word-processor or e-mail program, that presents          synthesis and may enable selection of a pattern and action
data on output device 105 to a user. The program 165 of the        using voice or sound activation. In this type of embodiment,
present invention is stored in RAM 170 and causes CPU 120          analyzer server 220 may be used in conjunction with a
to identify structures in the data presented by application 40 text-to-speech synthesis application 167 that reads docu-
167, to associate actions with the structures identified in the    ments to users over a telephone. Analyzer server 220 scans
data, to enable the user to select a structure and an action,      document 210 to recognize patterns and link actions to the
and to automatically perform the selected action on the            recognized patterns in the same manner as described above.
identified structure. This program 165 may be stored in disk       In the audio environment, user interface 240 may provide a
storage 175 and loaded into an allocated section of RAM 45 special sound after application 167 reads a recognized
170 prior to execution by CPU 120. Another section of RAM          pattern, and enable selection of the pattern through the use
170 is used for storing intermediate results and miscella-         of an audio interface action, such as a voice command or the
neous data 172. Floppy disk drive 190 enables the storage of       pressing of a button on the touch-tone telephone keypad as
the present program 165 onto a removable storage medium            before. Thus, user interface 240 may present the linked
which may be used to initially load program 165 into 50 actions via voice synthesis. One can create various environ-
computer system 100.                                               ments having a combination of sensory mechanisms.
   Referring now to FIG. 2, a schematic block diagram of              Upon selection of a candidate action, user interface 240
program 165 is shown together with its interaction with a          transmits the selected structure and the selected action to
document 210. Program 165 contains program subroutines             action processor 250. Action processor 250 retrieves the
including an analyzer server 220, an application program 55 sequence of operations that constitute the selected action,
interface 230, a user interface 240 and an action processor        and performs the sequence using the selected structure as the
250. Analyzer server 220 receives data having recognizable         object of the selected action.
patterns from a document 210, which may be retrieved from             Referring now to FIG. 3, a block diagram illustrating an
a storage medium such as RAM 170, ROM 155, disk storage            analyzer server 220 is shown. In this figure, analyzer server
175, or the like, and presented on output device 105 by 60 220 is described as having a parser 310 and a grammar file
application 167. Analyzer server 220 comprises one or more         320, although alternatively or additionally a fast string
pattern analysis units, such as a parser and grammars or a         search function or other function can be used. Parser 310
fast string search function and dictionaries, which uses           retrieves a grammar from grammar file 320 and parses text
patterns to parse document 210 for recognizable structures.        using the retrieved grammar. Upon identification of a struc-
Upon detection of a structure, analyzer server 220 links 65 ture in the text, parser 310 links the actions associated with
actions associated with the responsible pattern to the             the grammar to the identified structure. More particularly,
detected structure, using conventional pointers.                   parser 310 retrieves from grammar file 320 pointers attached

           Case: 12-1548               Document: 131               Page: 236            Filed: 03/14/2013

                              5                                                                  6
to the grammar and attaches the same pointers to the               regions change 850, for example by the a user scrolling
identified structure. These pointers direct the system to the      document 210, then new presentation regions from applica-
associated actions contained in associated actions file 330.       tion 167 are again retrieved 830. Otherwise, method 800
Thus, upon selection of the identified structure, user inter-      continues to block 860. As illustrated by block 860, method
face 240 can locate the linked actions.                          5 800 loops between blocks 840 and 860 until a request for
   FIG. 4 illustrates an example of an analyzer server 220,        display of identified structures is received 860. It will be
which includes grammars 410 and a string library 420 such          appreciated that the steps of the loop (blocks 840, 850 and
as a dictionary, each with associated actions. One of the          860) can be performed by application 167.
grammars 410 is a telephone number grammar with asso-                 Referring also to FIG. 9, when a request for the display of
ciated actions for dialing a number identified by the tele- 10 detected structures is received 860, the regions are displayed
phone number grammar or placing the number in an elec-             910 using presentation mechanisms such as highlighting the
tronic telephone book. Analyzer server 220 also includes           presentation region around each detected structure, although
grammars for post-office addresses, e-mail addresses and           alternative presentation mechanisms can be used. If a
dates, and a string library 420 containing important names.        request for the display of candidate actions linked to a
When analyzer server 220 identifies an address using the 15 detected structure is not received 920, method 800 returns to
"e-mail address" grammar, actions for sending e-mail to the        block 840. However, if a request is received 920, the actions
identified address and putting the identified address in an        linked in block 825 are displayed 930. This request for
e-mail address book are linked to the address.                     display of candidate actions can be performed using a
   FIG. 5 shows a window 510 presenting an exemplary               selection mechanism, such as a mouse-down operation over
document 210 having data containing recognizable 20 a detected structure, which causes the candidate actions
structures, including a phone number, post-office address,         linked to the structure to be displayed 930. Display 930 of
e-mail address, and name. Window 510 includes a button             candidate actions may be implemented using a pop-up
520 for initiating program 165, although alternative mecha-        menu, although alternative presentation mechanisms can be
nisms such as depressing the "option" key may be used.             used such as pull-down menus, dialog boxes and voice
Upon initiation of program 165, system 100 transmits the 25 synthesizers.
contents of document 210 to analyzer server 220, which                As illustrated in block 940, if an action from the displayed
parses the contents based on grammars 410 and strings 420          candidate actions is not selected 940, method 800 returns to
(FIG. 4). This parsing process produces the window shown           block 840. However, if an action is selected 940, the action
in FIG. 6. As illustrated in FIG. 6, analyzer server 220           is executed 950 on the structure selected in block 920. After
identifies the phone number, post-office address, e-mail 30 execution 950 of an action, method 800 returns to block 840.
address and name. Although not shown in FIG. 6, analyzer           Method 800 ends when the user exits application 167,
server 220 links the actions associated with grammars 410          although other steps for ending method 800 can alternatively
and strings 420 to these identified structures, and application    be used.
program interface 230 retrieves information on the location           Referring now to FIG. 10, a flowchart illustrating the
of these structures from application 167. User interface 240 35 preferred method 820 for scanning and detecting patterns in
then highlights the identified structures in document 210,         a document is shown. Method 820 starts by retrieving 1010
and makes the identified structures mouse-sensitive.               data to be analyzed. After the data is retrieved, several
   As shown in FIG. 7, upon recognition of a mouse-down            pattern analysis processes may be performed on the data. As
operation over a structure, user interface 240 presents a          illustrated in block 1020, a parsing process retrieves 1030
pop-up menu 710. In this example, pop-up menu 710 40 grammars, detects 1040 structures in the data based on the
displays the candidate actions linked to the selected tele-        retrieved grammars, and links 1050 actions associated with
phone number grammar 410, including dialing the number             each grammar to each structure detected by that grammar.
and putting the number into an electronic telephone book.          As illustrated in block 1060, a fast string search function
Upon selection of the action for putting the number in an          retrieves 1070 the contents of string library 420, detects
electronic telephone book, user interface 240 transmits the 45 1080 the strings in the data identical to those in the string
corresponding telephone number and selected action to              library 420, and links 1090 actions associated with the
action processor 250. Action processor 250 locates and             library string to the detected string. As illustrated in block
opens the electronic telephone book, places the telephone          1100, additional pattern analysis processes, such as a neural
number in the appropriate field and allows the user to input       net scan, can be performed 1100 to detect in the data other
any additional information into the file.                       50 patterns, such as pictures, graphs, sound, etc. Method 820
   FIGS. 8 and 9 display a flowchart illustrating preferred        then ends. Alternatively, the pattern analysis processes can
method 800 for recognizing patterns in documents and               be performed in parallel using a multiprocessor multitasking
performing actions. This method is carried out during the          system, or using a uniprocessor multithreaded multitasking
run-time of application 167. Referring first to FIG. 8,            system where a thread is allocated to execute each pattern
method 800 starts by receiving 810 the content, or a portion 55 detection scheme.
of the content, from document 210. Assuming program 165               These and other variations of the preferred and alternate
initiates with the receipt of any text, the received content or    embodiments and methods are provided by the present
portion is scanned 820 for identifiable structures using the       invention. For example, program 165 in FIG. 1 can be stored
patterns in analyzer server 220. Upon detection of a structure     in ROM, disk, or in dedicated hardware. In fact, it may be
based on a particular pattern, actions associated with the 60 realized as a separate electronic circuit. Other components of
particular pattern are linked 825 to the detected structure.       this invention may be implemented using a programmed
Assuming a display-type environment, the presentation              general purpose digital computer, using application specific
region location for a detected structure is retrieved 830 from     integrated circuits, or using a network of interconnected
application 167. If the document content being displayed on        conventional components and circuits. The analyzer server
output device 105 is changed 840, for example by the user 65 220 of FIG. 2 may use a neural net for searching a graphical
adding or modifying text, method 800 restarts. Otherwise,          document 210 for faces, or a musical library for searching a
method 800 continues with block 850. If the presentation           stored musical piece 210 for sounds. The user interface 240

           Case: 12-1548               Document: 131                Page: 237            Filed: 03/14/2013

                              7                                                                   8
may present structures and actions via voice synthesis over          13. A program storage medium storing a computer pro-
a telephone line connection to system 100. The embodi-            gram for causing a computer to perform the steps of:
ments described have been presented for purposes of illus-
tration and are not intended to be exhaustive or limiting, and       receiving computer data;
many variations and modifications are possible in light of 5         detecting a structure in the data;
the foregoing teaching. The system is limited only by the            linking at least one action to the detected structure;
following claims.
   What is claimed is:                                               enabling selection of the structure and a linked action; and
   1. A computer-based system for detecting structures in            executing the selected action linked to the selected struc-
data and performing actions on detected structures, com- 10             ture.
prising:                                                             14. In a computer having a memory storing actions, a
   an input device for receiving data;                            system for causing the computer to perform an action on a
   an output device for presenting the data;                      structure identified in computer data, comprising:
   a memory storing information including program routines           means for receiving computer data;
      including                                                15
                                                                     means for detecting a structure in the data;
      an analyzer server for detecting structures in the data,
         and for linking actions to the detected structures;         means for linking at least one action to the detected
      a user interface enabling the selection of a detected             structure;
         structure and a linked action; and                          means for selecting the structure and a linked action; and
      an action processor for performing the selected action 20      means for executing the selected action linked to the
         linked to the selected structure; and                          selected structure.
   a processing unit coupled to the input device, the output         15. In a computer having a memory storing actions, a
      device, and the memory for controlling the execution of     method for causing the computer to perform an action on a
      the program routines.
                                                                  structure identified in computer data, comprising the steps
   2. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the analyzer 25
server stores detected structures in the memory.
   3. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the input device        receiving computer data;
receives the data from an application running concurrently,          detecting a structure in the data;
and wherein the program routines stored in memory further 30         linking at least one action to the detected structure;
comprise an application program interface for communicat-            enabling selection of the structure and a linked action; and
ing with the application.                                            executing the selected action linked to the selected struc-
   4. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the analyzer               ture.
server includes grammars and a parser for detecting struc-           16. The method recited in claim 15, wherein the computer
tures in the data.                                                data is received from the application running concurrently.
   5. The system recited in claim 4, wherein the analyzer
                                                                     17. The method recited in claim 15, wherein the memory
server includes actions associated with each of the
                                                                  contains grammars, and wherein the step of detecting a
grammars, and wherein the analyzer server links to a
                                                                  structure further comprises the steps of retrieving a grammar
detected structure the actions associated with the grammar
                                                               40 and parsing the data based on the grammar.
which detects that structure.
                                                                     18. The method recited in claim 17, wherein the grammar
   6. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the analyzer
                                                                  is associated with a particular action, and wherein the step
server includes a string library and a fast string search
function for detecting string structures in the data.             of linking at least one action to the detected structure
   7. The system recited in claim 6, wherein the analyzer 45 includes the step of linking the particular action to the
server includes actions associated with each of the strings,      detected structure.
and wherein the analyzer server links to a detected structure        19. The method recited in claim 15, wherein the memory
the actions associated with the grammar which detects that        contains strings, and wherein the step of detecting a structure
string structure.                                                 further comprises the steps of retrieving a string from the
                                                               50 memory and scanning the data to identify the string.
   8. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the user
interface highlights detected structures.                            20. The method recited in claim 15, further comprising
   9. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the user             after the step of detecting a structure, the step of highlighting
interface enables selection of an action by causing the output    the detected structure.
device to display a pop-up menu of the linked actions.               21. The method recited in claim 15, further comprising,
   10. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the programs        after the step of linking at least one action to the detected
stored in the memory further comprise an application run-         structure, the step of displaying and enabling selection of an
ning concurrently that causes the output device to present        action for performance on the detected structure.
the data received by the input device, and an application            22. A computer-based method for causing a computer to
program interface that provides interrupts and communi- 60 identify, select and perform an action on a structure in
cates with the application.                                       computer data received from a concurrently running
   11. The system recited in claim 1, wherein the user
                                                                  application, said application presenting the computer data to
interface enables the selection of a detected structure and a     the user, the method comprising the steps of:
linked action using sound activation.                          65
                                                                     receiving computer data from the application;
   12. The system recited in claim 1, wherein a first one of         detecting a structure in the computer data;
the actions may invoke a second one of the actions.                  linking at least one action to the detected structure;

        Case: 12-1548              Document: 131              Page: 238           Filed: 03/14/2013

                          9                                                               10
communicating with the application to determine the             23. The method recited in claim 15, wherein the step of
  location of the detected structure as presented by the     enabling uses sound activation.
  application, to enable selection of the detected structure
  and a linked action, and to determine if the detected         24. The method recited in claim 15, wherein a first one of
  structure and a linked action have been selected; and 5    the actions may invoke a second one of the actions.
performing a selected action linked to the detected pat-
  tern.                                                                           * * * * *

Case: 12-1548   Document: 131   Page: 239   Filed: 03/14/2013

  US Patent No. 6,343,263 B1
              Case: 12-1548                              Document: 131 Page: 240 Filed: 03/14/2013
                                                                      111111 1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

(12)   United States Patent                                                                            (10)   Patent No.:     US 6,343,263 Bl
       Nichols et al.                                                                                  (45)   Date of Patent:      Jan.29,2002

(54)    REAL-TIME SIGNAL PROCESSING SYSTEM                                                                           OTHER PUBLICATIONS
                                                                                                    Tanenbaum, Structured Computer Organization, 1984, pp.
(75)    Inventors: James B. Nichols, San Mateo; John                                                10--12.*
                   Lynch, San Jose, both of CA (US)                                                 Frankel, "DSP Resource Manager Interface & Its Role in
                                                                                                    DSP Multimedia", May 1994.*
(73)    Assignee: Apple Computer, Inc., Cupertino, CA
                  (US)                                                                              Silberschatz et al., Operating System Concepts, p. 489,
( *)    Notice:           Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this                               Jon Udell, "Computer Telephony," Byte, vol. 19, No. 7, Jul.
                          patent is extended or adjusted under 35                                   1994, pp. 80--96.
                          U.S.C. 154(b) by 0 days.
                                                                                                    * cited by examiner
(21)    Appl. No.: 08/284,061
                                                                                                    Primary Examiner-Patrick Assouad
(22)    Filed:            Aug. 2, 1994                                                              (74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm-Burns, Doane, Swecker &
(51)    Int. Cl? .... ... .. ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... ... ... .. ... ... .. G06F 13/00        Mathis, L.L.P.
(52)    U.S. Cl. ........................................ 702/189; 709/328                          (57)                   ABSTRACT
(58)    Field of Search .............................. 364/514, 238.5,
                          364/924, 576, 725, 726; 395/2.09, 2.1,                                    A data transmission system having a real-time data engine
                    2.91, 2.94, 406, 651, 680, 682, 821, 892,                                       for processing isochronous streams of data includes an
                     561, 566, 733; 455/84, 3.1, 39; 370/210;                                       interface device that provides a physical and logical con-
                                           340/825; 342/195, 196; 360/39                            nection of a computer to any one or more of a variety of
                                                                                                    different types of data networks. Data received at this device
(56)                           References Cited                                                     is presented to a serial driver, which disassembles different
                                                                                                    streams of data for presentation to appropriate data manag-
                    U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS
                                                                                                    ers. A device handler associated with the interface device
       5,327,558 A         * 7/1994 Burke et a!. ................ 395!650                           sets up data flow paths, and also presents data and com-
       5,363,315 A         * 11/1994 Weiss eta!. ................ 364/514                           mands from the data managers to a real-time data processing
       5,381,346 A         * 1!1995 Monaham-Mitchell eta!. .. 364/                                  engine. Flexibility to handle any type of data, such as voice,
                                                                                514                 facsimile, video and the like, that is transmitted over any
       5,406,643     A     *    4/1995      Burke et a!. ................ 395/200                   type of communication network with any type of real-time
       5,438,614     A     *    8/1995      Rozman eta!. ............... 379/93
                                                                                                    engine is made possible by abstracting the functions of each
       5,440,619     A     *    8/1995      Cann ........................... 379/97
       5,440,740     A     *    8/1995      Chen et a!. ................. 395!650                   of the elements of the system from one another. This
       5,442,789     A     *    8/1995      Baker et a!. ................ 395!650                   abstraction is provided through suitable interfaces that iso-
       5,487,167     A     *    1!1996      Dinallo et a!. .............. 395!650                   late the transmission medium, the data manager and the
                                                                                                    real-time engine from one another.
EP                       218859                 4/1987                                                            41 Claims, 6 Drawing Sheets


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U.S. Patent                Jan.29,2002                     Sheet 1 of 6                      US 6,343,263 Bl

                                                 10                                           12          14

                                ,                                            ,
                 Application                                         Comm.                  Comm./
                 Program                                             Application            Application


                 Fax Sender
                 Printer Driver


                 Extension _ ( _ _
                                                                                              ,      ~
                                                                                        Seriaf Driver

 r ------              ~-            - - -        -----~                 ~
                                                                             - -       --- -         -
     Communications                                                               Modem Logic
     Toolbox          16
                                        I          Modem Tool
                                                                         I                  20

                                      Control/Command Line Interpreter             ~I
       Panel      -    ~

                           ..       Modem Application
                                      Data Control
                                                            Telephone_       Fax
                                      & Protocol            Controller       Protocol
                                            28                 2§.                JQ

                                            •                   ~~

     --------- -                             1--       -- -        -- --- -----
                                                Computer Hardware Interface            22

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U.S. Patent          Jan.29,2002          Sheet 2 of 6                       US 6,343,263 Bl


                                                   Application Program              .1Jl


          ~--- -- ------- -t--- -
                                                   Modem Logic                 2Q
                                      .I APr I
                 Realtime                                            Adapter
                 Engine                   I API   '-


                     46                                                   44
                                          I Fcsl


              DMA                            Serial Driver

                              Hardware Abstraction Layer               ~

    I                                                                                           I
    L     - - - - - - - --             -- --- - - -----                                    _   _j

                                   """ ]:<___q7
                               Telecom Adapter     _I<-_


          (0\                                      .A A          A   !::A.. A [::7-....

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U.S. Patent             Jan.29,2002                   Sheet 3 of 6                         US 6,343,263 Bl


          Realtime Engine
                                                .                                     --
                   46                                     Service                                           48
                                                            §2                                      ~
                                                                                      --            L--L--- 48
          1-     ----              -     --                                                -
                                                          Telephone           I                     ~·
          I                                               Service
                                            ~                                         ~

          I                                                                "'"I
                 Translation                                                  I            I--
                 Software 54
                               ,           ,,                                 I
          I                                                                   I            r--
          I                            Interface     64
                                                                              I                     r-t----'49
          I                                                                   I
          L...   --- -         --          -~-----                     -   _I              ..__

                              Processing Engine (DSP) ..--(__ L--52

                 Oper. Sys.             Processor           Libraries
                    M                     §§.                    .§Q

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U.S. Patent         Jan.29,2002       Sheet 4 of 6           US 6,343,263 Bl

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U.S. Patent          Jan.29,2002       Sheet 5 of 6             US 6,343,263 Bl

  8EEUQ8I!Q~            MODEM              HANQ!.eB            Bl:8L.-IJMe
                       SOFTWARe                                  eNGINe

  Call Remote
                                       Generate DTMF
                                           For x

                                                               Generate PCM


                     Next Digit

                                        Generate DTMF
                                            For y

                                                                Generate DTMF


                      Next Digit


                                                                    FIG. 48

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U.S. Patent           Jan.29,2002           Sheet 6 of 6                   US 6,343,263 Bl

    AEEUQ~JJQ~             MOI:Btl                    ~~~                    BE.AL-T!ME
                          SOFTWARE                                            ENG!~!;


                         Listen For


                                                                                 Call Tone

                                  ToneDetected         Return

                           Set Up

                                                                              Generate PCM



  Retrieve Data

                          Send Data

                                                       Send Data


                                                                            FIG. 4C

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                                                   US 6,343,263 Bl
                             1                                                                 2
   REAL-TIME SIGNAL PROCESSING SYSTEM                               While the analog telephone network was the only prac-
     FOR SERIALLY TRANSMITTED DATA                               tical medium for transmitting information between geo-
                                                                 graphically distributed computers for quite some time, more
                FIELD OF THE INVENTION
                                                                 recently other, non-analog transmission mediums have
   The present invention is directed to the transmission of 5 become available. Examples of these other mediums include
data to and from a computer, and more particularly to a          the integrated services digital network (ISDN), private
system for performing real-time signal processing of data        branch exchange (PBX) telephone systems, and TI digital
that is serially transmitted to and from a computer.             data links. Since information is transmitted over these medi-
          BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION                            urns as digital data, conventional analog modem circuits are
   Various devices are known for transmitting data between 10 not suited for use with them. Thus, for example, a standard
a computer and a remote site via wide-area telecommuni-          Group III facsimile machine cannot operate on a digital PBX
cations networks. One of the most widely used devices of         system.
this type is the modem, which enables data to be transmitted        Similarly, digital signal processing systems which are
to and from a computer over a wide-area analog telephone         designed to work with PCM-encoded analog data that is
network. Generally speaking, the modem includes one or 15 received and transmitted via a modem are likewise not
more sets of registers, typically embodied in an UART or an      suited for use with these other types of transmission medi-
USART, for storing bits of digital data transmitted to or from   ums. While it is possible to incorporate another DSP system
the computer, a processor for implementing modem                 into a computer that can handle data transmitted via any of
operations, such as dialing a telephone number or answering      these digital networks, it would be more desirable to provide
a ringing signal, in response to commands sent from the 20 a single system that can process data that is received over
computer and stored in the UART, and a modulator/                any type of transmission medium, whether it be digital or
demodulator for converting digital bits of data to be trans-     analog. Further in this regard, it is desirable to provide a
mitted into analog signals, and vice versa. Originally, all of   signal processing system that is not limited to one specific
these features were hardwired in a separate peripheral device    DSP, but rather one that can operate with any of a variety of
that could be externally connected to the computer via a 25 different types of signal processors.
serial 1!0 port, or internally connected to the computer's          When personal computers communicate with one another
data bus. More recently, some of the functions associated        through non-modem transport facilities, they typically oper-
with these features, most notably the processing of com-         ate in a burst mode. While this mode of operation enables
mands to implement modem operations, have been removed           data to be transferred at much higher rates than with
from the hardwired configuration and incorporated into the 30 modems, it is still not suitable for applications such as video
computer itself. This approach has increased the versatility     or speech processing. These types of applications require
of the modem. For example, while the hardwired modem             isochronous data handling, i.e. data that is transmitted at a
configuration had to be specifically designed for the tele-      constant bit rate and that must be processed in real time.
phone system requirements of a particular country, the later     Generally speaking, therefore, it is desirable to provide a
approach could enable a single product to be used in a 35 serial data transmitting and receiving system that is capable
variety of countries, each of which might have different         of processing real-time isochronous data.
telephone signaling requirements. Similarly, since the com-         Further in this regard, it is desirable to provide such a
puter itself was handling the data to be transmitted, addi-      system that is capable of handling streams of data pertaining
tional services, such as the ability to send information as a    to different functions. For example, in a video conferencing
facsimile transmission, in which graphical data is processed, 40 application, speech data is transmitted at the same time as
became feasible. However, the presence of the UART, or           video and other graphic information. However, each of these
similar such device through which the data must flow, still      types of data must be processed separately in real time. It is
limits the effective rate at which the data can be exchanged     desirable, therefore, to provide a data transfer system that
between the computer and the telephone lines.                    can handle each of two or more types of data at isochronous
   To enhance the performance of modems, a digital signal 45 rates.
processor (DSP) has been incorporated into its structure. In
this arrangement, the modem software was designed to                     BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION
cooperate with the DSP to provide data thereto for process-         The present invention provides a data transmission system
ing prior to transmission or after reception over the tele-      having a real-time data engine for processing isochronous
phone line. While the addition of the DSP provided 50 streams of data. An interface device provides a physical and
increased capabilities in terms of the speed at which the data   logical connection of the computer to any one or more of a
could be transmitted over a telephone network and the ease       variety of different types of data networks, including analog
with which the modem could be configured, it was still           telephone, ISDN, PBX and the like. Data received at this
limited in the types of data that could be processed. More       device is presented to a serial driver, which disassembles
particularly, because of the restrictions imposed by passing 55 different streams of data for presentation to appropriate data
the data through an UART or the like, even the most modem        managers, such as the operating system of the host
modems are only capable of effectively transmitting data in      computer, a service provider or an application program. A
the range of 9.6-14.4 Kb/sec. While this rate of data transfer   device handler associated with the interface device sets up
may be useful for transmitting static information such as text   data paths and issues service requests. The device handler
files or the like, it is not suitable for many real-time 60 also presents data and commands from the data managers to
applications in which the data is provided at much higher        a real-time data processing engine, that can be used for a
rates, such as speech or video conferencing.                     variety of applications such as voice recognition, speech
   Further in this regard, the modem control software had to     compression, and fax/data modems. This real-time engine
be designed to work with the specific DSP incorporated into      can be shared by any application program running on the
the computer. If a different DSP was to be used, the modem 65 host computer.
control software had to be reprogrammed to work with the            The invention enables any arbitrary type of data, such as
new DSP.                                                         voice, facsimile, multimedia and the like, which is trans-

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                                                   US 6,343,263 Bl
                             3                                                                  4
mitted over any type of communication network, to be              communications toolbox 16 contained within fax/data
handled with any type of real-time engine, by abstracting the     modem logic modules 20. A hardware interface 22 transmits
functions of each of the elements of the system from one          the services provided by these modules over a transmission
another. This abstraction is provided through suitable inter-     medium to which the computer is connected, e.g. a tele-
faces that isolate the transmission medium, the data man- 5 phone line.
agers and the real-time engine from one another. The data is         Referring to the modem logic 20, a Modem Control and
provided to the real-time engine as multiple streams of           Command Line Interpreter (CLI) 24 accepts command
isochronous data, i.e. it is delivered as it arrives over the     inputs from the application programs to configure the
network without data handling delays. This feature allows         modem, dial, receive calls, initiate data or fax transmission,
more complex applications, such as speakerphones, video- 10 hang up, and so on. Any operation of the modem must be
phones and high-speed modems to be readily implemented.           initiated by issuing commands to the CLI. The CLI 24 can
                                                                  be an interface that is often referred to as the "AT command
   These features of the invention, as well as the advantages     set", which uses simple printable character sequences and
offered thereby, are described in greater detail hereinafter      constitutes a de facto standard among modems.
with reference to a specific embodiment illustrated in the           A Telephone Controller module 26 dials, answers, and
accompanying figures.                                          15
                                                                  hangs up the telephone line. The Telephone Controller can
                                                                  be "worldwide" in nature. In such a case it configures the
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS                          modem to conform to the standards of telephone systems in
   FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the software architecture for     most major economic markets. This can be carried out by
a facsimile/modem communications engine;                          storing a country code identifier that allows the Telephone
   FIG. 2 is a block diagram of the computer hardware
                                                                  Controller to configure the modem properly.
interface for the engine;                                            A Data Control and Protocol module 28 provides all data
                                                                  capabilities for the modem. It supports standard asynchro-
   FIG. 3 is a more detailed block diagram of the architecture    nous text read and write, as well as the standard CCITT V.42
of the real-time engine; and                                      and V.42 bis and Microcom MNP class 2 through 5 reliable
   FIGS. 4A-4C are flow diagrams of the steps that are 25 link and data compression protocols, for example.
carried out in the operation of a virtual fax/data modem in          The Fax Protocol module 30 performs the functions of a
accordance with the invention.                                    T.30 fax engine in a dedicated fax modem. It communicates
                                                                  with a Fax Extension driver 32, a component of a Fax
                                                                  Terminal 34, for example using an extension of the AT
   The following description of an embodiment of the              command set known as +F ("plus F"), or TR.29.
present invention is presented in the context of its imple-          The hardware interface 22 contains the appropriate
mentation in a moderate speed (e.g. T1 data rates), low cost,     transport-dependent protocol components. The logical and
digital interconnect to a wide-area network. An example of        physical interface to the wide-area network is hidden in this
such an interconnect is described in U.S. patent application 35 layer. This allows the fax/data modem modules to be used on
Ser. No. 08/180,926 filed Jan. 11, 1994, now U.S. Pat. No.        any wide-area connection, including PBX, T1 and ISDN, as
5,515,373 the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by       well as traditional POTS ("plain old telephone system")
reference. The practical applications of the invention are not    channels. The components of this interface are illustrated in
limited to this particular embodiment, however. For               the block diagram of FIG. 2.
example, it can also be employed as a high-performance 40            Referring now to FIG. 2, the hardware interface includes
interconnect to multimedia devices such as digital imaging        an external adapter 36 that provides the physical and logical
equipment and audio appliances.                                   connection of the computer to the telephone line 38 or other
   To facilitate an understanding of the invention, it will be    communications network, such as ISDN, PBX or T1 link.
described with reference to the specific example of a             This connection can be provided through a serial port 37 of
telephone-based telecommunication subsystem that pro- 45 the computer. An example of such an adapter is described in
vides basic fax/data modem services, plus call management         copending U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/078,890 filed
and audio stream handling. This particular example is per-        May 10, 1993, and Ser. No. 08/180,925 filed Jan. 11, 1994,
haps one of the more complex applications of the invention,       the disclosures of which are incorporated herein by refer-
because of the number of different signaling requirements         ence. Such an adapter preferably includes processing
associated with communications over the telephone lines. 50 capabilities, as disclosed in concurrently filed U.S. patent
Further complexity is added by the fact that these require-       application Ser. No. 08/288,144 now U.S. Pat. No 5,799,190
ments are often country-specific, and therefore the handling      entitled Intelligent Communications Coprocessor, which
of a command, such as dialing a telephone number, can vary        enables it to provide a constant stream of data to the
greatly from one country to the next. Other implementations       computer from one or more communications networks. This
of the invention, for example in the context of transmitting 55 data can be delivered in a time-division multiplexed manner,
sounds and video data, will become apparent from an               or it can be delivered in a packetized form.
understanding of the principles of the invention explained           Data received at the adapter 36 from the telephone line 38
with respect to this particular example.                          can be provided to a driver 40 which functions as a hardware
   FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a communications engine           abstraction layer. This driver is a hardware-dependent
that is designed to provide modem and facsimile services. 60 implementation of a serial controller, and is configured in
The top level of the diagram represents communications            accordance with the particular characteristics of the com-
applications 10-14. These applications send commands for          munications port 37 to which the adapter 36 is connected. It
communications services to a data service provider, or            isolates the remainder of the software from the different
application programming interface (API), such as the Tele-        implementations for connecting the adapter to the computer,
phone Manager provided by Apple Computer, Inc. or the 65 e.g. serial port, parallel port or bus device.
Telephone Application Programming Interface (TAPI) pro-              A serial driver 42 operates to separate multiple incoming
vided by Microsoft Corp. This interface is represented by the     data streams from one another, or to combine multiple

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                                                     US 6,343,263 Bl
                               5                                                                    6
outgoing data streams that are intended for respective trans-        communications network, 1t 1s provided to the real-time
mission to separate destinations, whether logical or physical.       engine as pulse-code modulated (PCM) data through the
For example, the adapter 36 might be connected to a desktop          DMA 50. If the computer does not have DMA capabilities,
telephone for voice communications and to the telephone              the data can be transferred between the adapter and the
line for wide-area communications. Data streams for these 5 handler as packetized data, as described in application Ser.
two connections can be combined in a multiplexed manner              No. 08/058,750 filed May 7, 1993 now abandoned.
by the serial driver, to be sent to the adapter 36 through the
                                                                        As another example, the real-time engine may operate as
computer's serial port 37.
                                                                     a virtual speech recognition device. To do so, the real-time
   An adapter handler 44 is specific to the particular adapter
                                                                     function block initializes the engine and installs the modules
36 and carries out features associated with that adapter. For 10
                                                                     necessary to carry out this function. In this mode of
example, if the adapter is one that is designed to be con-
                                                                     operation, the engine may convert pulse-code modulated
nected to a telephone network, the handler implements
                                                                     (PCM) data received from the adapter into vector-quantized
functions germane to that network such as ring detection,
                                                                     speech components. The engine transforms this PCM data
pulse dialing, on/off hook control and the like, in response
                                                                     into data appropriate for subsequent processing by a speech
to commands received from the application programs 10. 15
                                                                     recognition application program, according to the com-
One example of the manner in which data can be exchanged
                                                                     mands from the handler 44, and the results of the transforms
between the adapter 36 and the handler 44 is described in
                                                                     are provided through the shared FIFOs.
U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/058,750 filed May 7,
1993, now abandoned the disclosure of which is incorpo-                 With this configuration, the handler does not need to have
rated herein by reference.                                           any knowledge of the real-time engine implementation.
   A real-time engine 46 can perform transforms on data           °2
                                                                     Communications with the real-time engine are carried out in
streams provided to and received from the adapter 36. The            a robust fashion. In essence, the architecture of the system
particular transforms to be performed are sent as commands           provides a message-passing capability between devices that
to the real-time engine from the adapter handler 44 via              know nothing about the configuration or existence of one
suitable application programming interfaces 48. For com- 25 another.
municating with the real-time engine, each interface                    As illustrated in FIG. 2, there can be a number of
includes shared command/control mailboxes in the comput-             interfaces 48 situated between the handler 44 and the
er's RAM, as well as bi-directional first-in, first-out (FIFO)       real-time engine 46. Each interface represents services for a
buffers for transferring data. As an example, if the system is       particular class of functionality. For example, one interface
set up to operate as a fax/data modem, the real-time engine 30 may relate to the operation of the engine as a virtual
functions as a virtual telephone. In such a case, the handler        telephone, another interface can be associated with a virtual
may instruct the engine 46 to send a facsimile in response to        sound device, e.g. stereo, and a third interface can pertain to
a command from an application program. For this purpose,             a virtual video device. Each interface receives commands
the real-time engine is configured with a suite of modem and         from an application program, through the handler 44, and
call processing functions. This configuration is implemented 35 instructs the real-time engine to carry out the necessary
by a real-time function control block 49, which initializes          transforms which relate to the function of the virtual device
and manages the operation of the real-time engine. Gener-            being implemented, e.g. text-to-speech conversion, video
ally speaking, whenever a new task is to be carried out by           image processing, etc.
the real-time engine 46, the real-time function control block           The architecture of the real-time engine 46 is illustrated in
49 issues commands that are specific to the operating system 40 further detail in FIG. 3. Referring thereto, when configured
of the real-time engine. These commands cause the engine             as a virtual device, the real-time engine is made up of two
to start up, if it is not already running, and to configure itself   main components, a processing engine 52, such as a DSP,
with a library of routines that are necessary for it to              and translation software 54. The DSP comprises a processor
implement the task.                                                  56, an operating system 58 for that processor, and a set of
   When the handler 44 requests a facsimile transmission, 45 libraries 60 which enable the processor to perform desig-
for example, the real-time function block issues commands            nated signal processing functions. There are three possible
to start the real-time engine and install the various modules        implementations of the DSP, respectively identified as hard,
that are needed for it to function as a virtual telephone.           soft and native. In the hard implementation, all three com-
Binary facsimile image data is transferred to the real-time          ponents of the DSP are fixed within a piece of hardware, i.e.
engine via the FIFO buffers, where it is encoded as PCM 50 an IC chip. In other words, the libraries and the operating
data which is further encoded according to the transport             system are embedded as firmware, and cannot be repro-
medium over which it is to be transmitted. If the adapter is         grammed or updated without changing the chip. An example
connected to a telephone line, for example, these signals can        of a hard implementation is the Rockwell 9623 data-pump.
be encoded as 16-bit pulse-code modulated (PCM) samples,             This type of DSP might be able to perform only one class of
and forwarded directly to the adapter 36 via the serial driver 55 virtual device operation, i.e. Function as a modem. When a
42. Alternatively, if the transport medium is an ISDN line,          hard DSP is employed for the real-time engine, the function
the modem signals are encoded as mulaw-companded 8-bit               control block 49 operates to initialize the processor at the
PCM signals. The different types of encoding are stored in           outset of the operation of the real-time engine.
different tables, and the appropriate one to be used by the             The soft implementation differs from the hard implemen-
real-time engine is installed by the real-time function block 60 tation in that the libraries, and possibly also the operating
during the initial configuration of the engine and/or desig-         system, are resident as software in the computer's memory.
nated by the API 48 at the time the command to transform             In this implementation, the libraries are programmable and
the data is issued.                                                  can be updated as desired. The processor, however, is still
   Transformed signals from the real-time engine that are to         resident as a separate piece of hardware. Because of this
be transmitted via the transmission medium are provided to 65 programmability, the DSP can carry out more functions than
the hardware abstraction layer 40 through direct memory              a hard DSP, such as sound processing and Fourier trans-
access (DMA) 50. When data is being received from the                forms. An example of a soft DSP is the AT&T 3210. When

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                                                    US 6,343,263 Bl
                              7                                                                  8
a soft DSP is employed for the real-time engine, the function         The interface provides for the origination and answering
control block 49 operates to configure the appropriate librar-     of calls routed through traditional analog switches. To
ies for the transforms that are to be carried out by the DSP,      answer calls, the interface monitors incoming signals, as
in addition to initializing the processor.                         reported by the real-time engine, for appropriate frequency
   In the native implementation of the DSP, the processor 5 and cadence consistent with a particular country's require-
does not reside in a separate piece of hardware. Rather, it's      ments. The interface also includes facilities for tracking call
functions are carried out by the CPU of the host computer.         progress, such as detection of dial tone, ring back and busy
As in the case of the soft implementation, the DSP operating       signals. It further includes the necessary information relating
system and the libraries are resident in the computer's            to the generation and detection of DTMF signals.
memory. When this implementation is employed, the func- 10
tion control block 49 operates to allocate system resources           The interface generates calls that can be classified into
to the DSP function, such as to enforce system time                two general categories, originating calls and callback calls.
management, to ensure that adequate processing time is             Originating calls are those which are generated in response
given to DSP operations.                                           to commands from the application program. Callback calls
   The translation software 54 is made up of two parts. The        are used to report progress information to the application
                                                                15 program. Most originating calls might take time to complete,
main part of the software comprises a generic service
provider 62 which functions as a device driver. This part of       and are therefore asynchronous, so that the host processor
the software receives the commands from one of the APis 48         can suspend servicing of the calling application program
and issues the instructions to the DSP to perform the              until the task associated with the call is complete. This
transforms that are required in the operation of the virtual       allows the interface to be called from within an interrupt
device being implemented. This part of the software is 20 handler as well as freeing the processor while waiting for
labeled as being generic because it is independent of the          some hardware to execute a task. Completion of the process
actual hardware that is used in the implementation of the          is indicated by executing a completion routine for an asso-
DSP 52. To enable the service provider to communicate with         ciated callback.
the DSP, an interface 64 is provided. This interface is               The originating calls are of two types, system task calls
specific to the particular DSP that is employed as the 25
                                                                   and general purpose calls. The system task calls can include
processing engine for the real-time engine. In other words,
                                                                   those such as "Open", which causes system resources to be
the generic service provider does not need to know whether
                                                                   allocated to the real-time engine, and "Close", which deal-
the processing engine is a hard, soft or native DSP. In
essence, therefore, the interface 64 functions as an additional    locates the resources. General purpose calls can include such
layer of abstraction which virtualizes the DSP, i.e. the 30 calls as "State", which returns the current state of the virtual
generic service provider is aware of the existence of a DSP,       device, e.g. on-hook, ringing, off-hook or on-line, "Gener-
but does not need to know how it is actually being imple-          ateDtmf" which causes DTMF tones to be generated, and
mented in order to operate.                                        "SetAutoAnswer", which instructs the engine to answer a
   In a practical embodiment of the invention, separate            call after a predetermined number of rings. Other examples
generic service providers can be employed for the different 35 of general purpose calls include "SetSilenceDuration",
virtual devices to be implemented. For example, one service        which passes to the engine the length of a silence to be
provider can be employed to provide the services of a virtual      detected, "Hook", which is used to take the virtual phone
                                                                   off-hook and on-hook, and "DialNumber", which dials a
telephone. Such a service provider might include a set of
calls which enable it to determine the capabilities of the         number in a designated string. Similar types of general
hardware being employed, e.g. whether it can support line 40       purpose calls can be included for functions associated with
current detection, remote wakeup, etc. Other sets of calls are     facsimile types of operations.
used for control and status information, tone generation and          Examples of suitable callback calls include
detection, data transfer, and power management.                    "DtmfDetected", which indicates that a particular DTMF
   Another service provider can be used for sound                  digit has been detected, "Ringindicate", which identifies
applications, and a third service provider for video applica- 45   when a valid ring has been detected on the line, and
tions. Depending upon the particular virtual device to be          "DialToneDetected", which is called when a valid dial tone
implemented, the function control block 49 calls up the            is detected. Other appropriate callback calls will be readily
appropriate service provider when configuring the real-time        apparent from these examples.
engine. Each service provider communicates with the han-              The flow of events that occur when the fax/data modem
dler 44 through a respective one of the APis 48, and with the 50 is activated will now be described. These events are illus-
DSP 52 through the same interface 64.                              trated in the flow diagrams of FIGS. 4A-4C. From the
   An example of a suitable interface 48 for telephony             perspective of an application program 10, it is "talking" to
applications will now be described in detail. The interface        an external modem connected to the serial port. In fact,
basically operates to transmit high-level requests for service.    however, it is actually obtaining communications services
The functionality of such an interface can be divided into 55 from an internal virtual modem 20 and the hardware inter-
two main categories, namely functions that are used only on        face 22.
public service telephone network (PSTN) lines, such as ring           At boot time, the computer's operating system determines
detection, and those functions used on any telephone line,         whether the computer is capable of supporting a communi-
such as D1MF generation and detection. This arrangement            cations system. This allows the operating system to notify
allows the interface to be used for ISDN and PBX lines as 60 the user on application program activation that a communi-
well as traditional analog lines for call progress and modem       cations session is not possible on the computer. This deter-
functions. For PSTN lines, the interface generates com-            mination is made by assessing system-dependent factors
mands for setting the appropriate electrical parameters, such      such as presence of a data stream processor, sufficient
as voltage levels that comply with a particular country's          system resources, and so forth. In the following discussion
regulations. For this purpose, the interface can include data 65 it is assumed that the requisite resources are available.
tables containing information on all country-specific param-          At the outset, with reference to FIG. 4A, a communica-
eters.                                                             tions application 10 is launched. A communications "con-

           Case: 12-1548                Document: 131                Page: 251            Filed: 03/14/2013

                                                     US 6,343,263 Bl
                               9                                                                   10
nection" is opened either implicitly on launch, or by com-               Referring now to FIG. 4C, upon completion of the virtual
mand. This directs the communications subsystem to                    phone dial command, the fax/data module issues a command
initialize itself. The communications application's connec-           to the virtual phone, i.e. the hardware interface, directing it
tion establishment request is passed to the communications            to listen for an answering modem sequence. Again, this
toolbox 16. This in turn causes a driver command "Open" to 5 command is received by the handler 44 and is translated into
be issued by the fax/data modem logic 20 to the hardware              a virtual real-time engine command to detect tones (signal
interface 22.                                                         energy) at certain specified frequencies and levels.
   The hardware interface driver command "Open" is                    Optionally, the real-time engine may be commanded to
received by the hardware interface adapter handler 44. As             concurrently listen for voice energy in case a human answers
noted, the handler has previously-typically at boot time- 10 the phone.
determined that the host computer has the resources to                   Assuming that the answering station presents valid
establish a communications session, in this example being             answering modem tones, the handler will then be directed to
an analog modem over a telephone service line.                        instigate a modem connection. This results in another com-
   The handler calls function control block 49, to initialize         mand to the virtual real-time engine, this time requesting a
the real-time engine. The action taken by function control 15 modem connection compatible with the answer tone
block depends on the real-time engine's implementation. If            sequence received. The actual modulation and demodulation
a programmable DSP is used for the real-time engine, the              of the hardware interface adapter's isochronous PCM data
function control block might issue a series of DSP operating          stream is accomplished entirely by the real-time engine.
system specific commands to download and initialize the                  Once the modem connection is established, the handler
DSP subsystem, followed by commands to download the 20 notifies the fax/data modem module that data transmission
DSP algorithms that perform the modem's analog modula-                may begin. Digital data now flows between remote and local
tion. A native-mode DSP implementation may result in the              computers via handler Read and Write calls. Data is passed
function control block simply allocating system memory and            between the real-time engine and the handler via full-duplex
host processor resources needed for the modem algorithms.             FIFOs. This data is in turn passed between the handler and
In either case, it is significant to note that the hardware 25 the application program through the modem logic 20.
interface is designed to use a virtual real-time engine. The             The ability to communicate over different types of trans-
entire real-time engine implementation is "hidden" from the           mission mediums in this single system is made possible by
handler 44 by the function control block. The handler does            the fact that each of the various components is isolated from
not communicate with the real-time engine directly, via               the particular features of the other through suitable levels of
DSP-specific commands. Rather, all communications take                abstraction implemented via the application programming
place over the virtual real-time engine interface 48 via the          interfaces. For example, to change the transmission medium
mailboxes and the full-duplex data FIFO registers.                    from the telephone lines to an ISDN line, the telecom
   The handler 44, as part of the Open process, prepares the          adapter 36 is disconnected from the serial port 37, and a new
attached telecom adapter 36 for operation. After                      adapter appropriate for ISDN is plugged into the serial port.
initialization, the hardware interface telecom adapter deliv-         The associated adapter handler 44 is also loaded into the
ers a full duplex, isochronous data stream.                           system. Thereafter, whenever the adapter handler issues a
   If the real-time engine is successfully configured, the            command to the real-time engine to perform a transform, it
hardware interface is initialized properly, and all other             identifies the fact that the transformed data must be suitable
necessary resources are available, the handler Open opera- 40 for ISDN format. In response thereto, the API 48 which
tion will be successful, and an analog modem communica-               receives these commands supplies the real-time engine with
tions link over the hardware interface adapter can begin at           the appropriate parameters for performing the transforms in
any time. Otherwise, communications are impossible and an