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					NEW ZEALAND’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY CHALLENGES
CONTENTS
page INTRODUCTION SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS BACKGROUND ISSUES Global interests, global role New Zealand's sovereign interests New Zealand in the South Pacific Australia Asia United States Africa and the Middle East Latin America Europe Disarmament and non-proliferation 11 15 17 20 23 27 31 33 35 37 1 3 9

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade May 2000

INTRODUCTION
Earlier in the year the Minister of Defence was invited to prepare for Cabinet consideration a formal statement of the government‟s defence policy for use as a basis for reviewing and prioritising defence purchase options. As part of the same process Cabinet requested a paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade on related foreign policy issues. The analysis that follows looks at New Zealand's external interests under a number of broad headings. In each case the paper highlights implications for New Zealand's security policy and defence priorities. There are many points on which the report echoes the conclusions of the Report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, among them: the absence of direct military threat to New Zealand the fact that security involves more than defence, and has both international and domestic dimensions the importance for New Zealand's international interests of the work we do on sustainable development, emergency relief and disaster assistance, international trade, support for the rules-based multilateral system and international law, human rights, disarmament and arms control the central place of the United Nations Charter - and the need for UN members, including New Zealand, to continue to share the burdens and fulfil the obligations they have undertaken under the Charter the importance of maintaining our capacity to participate militarily in appropriate UN and other coalition activities the contribution made by the NZDF, working in partnership with foreign policy, in pursuit of New Zealand's wider national interests.

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The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that for a country committed to upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to playing a role as a good international citizen in a troubled world, military force remains (with all the obvious caveats) an important foreign policy instrument and crisis management tool.

Phil Goff Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
Security is only one element in New Zealand's external interests  A comprehensive approach is needed to promote our external interests and meet our international responsibilities. This involves a range of foreign policy instruments along with defence.

It remains a violent world. But we can and should help keep the peace.  There are few things as fundamental for New Zealand foreign policy as a commitment to help keep the peace. Parts of the world are still torn by violence. This means loss of life or a life of misery for far too many. Violence on this scale offends deeply held New Zealand values. As a country committed to act against abuses of basic human rights we have an obligation to play our part in preventing or resolving conflicts within or between states.

We have fundamental commitments under the United Nations Charter  The UN Charter brings together key parts of the global agenda: fundamental human rights, the rule of international law, the promotion of social progress, friendly and peaceful relations between states and efforts to maintain international peace and security. The UN Charter and associated agreements are keystones in the multilateral system and in our approach to foreign relations. New Zealand has important obligations under these treaties.

We have a strong commitment to non-violent means and peaceful solutions  Military force is not our method of choice. We shall always prefer to use peaceful means to respond to conflict in keeping with the principles of the UN Charter and fundamental New Zealand values.

We may also have to contemplate use of force - but rarely, and with the greatest reluctance  Chapter VII of the UN Charter recognises that situations will arise which cannot be resolved by diplomatic or other peaceful means. Timor is a recent example. Collective effort involving the threat or use of force may, occasionally, prove to be the best (or the least bad) option. New Zealand governments will insist on a high threshold for any such decisions.

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Defence capabilities are only one element in a broader approach to international security  A New Zealand commitment to keeping the peace involves a multi-track approach: a commitment to the principles and obligations of the UN Charter; policies which stress peaceful resolution of disputes; collective effort by interested governments; a long-term effort to address the root causes of poverty and conflict; work to support good governance and human rights; use of development assistance; support for international law and legal institutions; and use of various other peace-building instruments, including preventive diplomacy and confidence building measures.

The principle of collective effort underpins multilateral responses to international security problems  This follows from UN Charter provisions and the requirements of international law. In most situations where New Zealand defence capabilities are used we shall be working with other countries. This means that as a practical matter our decisions on force structure, standards, equipment and so on should emphasise interoperability. This approach - which tends to favour adoption of standards used by the Australia/Britain/Canada/US group - in practice expands rather than narrows our operational flexibility.

The NZDF needs to retain combat capabilities  We do not want to see New Zealand forces involved in combat. But we will inevitably be asked to make NZDF units available for situations in which they face risk of attack or may need to use force. In some cases we are likely to agree (Timor and Bosnia are recent examples). This requires a defence force that is structured, equipped and trained for a combat role. Lack of such capabilities would narrow the range of scenarios in which a New Zealand government would have the option of making a contribution.

We have a track record of using defence resources in good causes  Our track record over several decades underlines the value of the contribution New Zealand diplomatic and defence capabilities can make to the resolution of conflict and humanitarian emergencies. Our achievements have been out of proportion to our size. Our policy assets include consistent principles, good relationships and independence of approach. At a practical level the defence units we have deployed have proved to be highly effective in supporting our wider external objectives in line with New Zealand values.

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The core NZDF responsibility is protection of New Zealand's sovereign interests. But regional and global roles are more important when it comes to decisions on capabilities and force structure.  Protection of New Zealand sovereignty will continue to require defence force capability and effort. The most fundamental requirement is monitoring what is happening in our immediate area of interest - essentially a maritime surveillance task. We shall have a continuing need to support resource protection in the EEZ, the Southern Ocean and Antarctica and to provide support for civil authorities in areas such as search and rescue, civil defence, crime and illegal migration. A counter-terrorist capability will continue to be required. Providing options for responding to a variety of emergencies in the South Pacific should be a basic determinant of defence force structure and capabilities. The New Zealand public, our neighbours in the region and the wider international community will expect us to take a leading role. These military capabilities will also allow us to assist in such areas as disaster relief, search and rescue and surveillance of South Pacific EEZs. There is a history of joint effort with Australia on security issues within the region and further afield. We have many interests in common. The high level of cooperation at operational level is an important asset in terms of New Zealand national goals. This has been demonstrated in Cambodia, Bougainville and Timor. As both countries confront the costs of new-generation equipment we should keep an open mind on the scope for greater co-operation in areas such as procurement or support. Working with the Australians in such areas could have practical benefits but need not compromise New Zealand independence in terms of policy or operations. It is no longer useful to look at a New Zealand role in Southeast Asia in traditional defence alliance terms. But our role in the Five Power Defence Arrangements provides tangible evidence of a New Zealand commitment to stability in the region. Our continuing participation is useful from the perspective of confidence building and preventive diplomacy as well as for broader political reasons. A security role in the wider Asia-Pacific region recognises our commitment as a member of the regional community. It contributes to long-term effort to build confidence and stability, responds to regional expectations that New Zealand will play a role, and is part of a broadly-based pursuit of New Zealand interests. Our role should continue to emphasise security relationships and processes, along with disarmament and non-proliferation effort. There will sometimes be peace support tasks such as Cambodia and Timor. Our military capabilities are not particularly important in a regional context, except as a supplement to those of Australia. NZDF capabilities will most frequently be used as a contribution to UN and other collective activities in Asia or further afield. These will primarily take the form of

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peacekeeping, although we have to keep in mind the possibility (as with Timor) of contributing in situations where there is a possibility of combat involvement. Currently New Zealand is engaged in 13 peace support operations ranging from East Timor and Bougainville in our own region to Sierra Leone and Bosnia. Australian and American expectations raise some special issues  The Australians have a strong sense of potential threat in the region. They attach higher priority to defence capabilities than we do, put more resources into defence and are concerned about the defence of Australia. They will continue to have high expectations of New Zealand defence funding levels. Regardless of any differences Australians do see defence as an important part of the trans-Tasman relationship. They expect reciprocity. For the Australians, with defence budget pressures of their own, New Zealand capabilities and how well they mesh in with the ADF are significant. We shall sometimes have different perspectives on issues but it is important to stay in close touch. Defence co-operation is also important for wider relationship reasons. Times have changed. Militarily the United States may now be the lone superpower. But in most global trouble spots the Americans are reluctant to lead and will help out (eg in Timor) only if there are others to front up and share costs and risks. In general US expectations present fewer difficulties these days: the Americans are natural company on a lot of good causes. But there will be times when we differ: they have a habit of unilateral action and on occasion a narrow view of the US interest. The nuclear issue is now more manageable: constraints remain (naval visits, exercises, friend rather than ally status) but there are plenty of positives in the relationship for both of us. In managing relations with the US and Australia a framework which emphasises real capabilities and readiness and which provides stability in defence planning is probably more important than the overall range of NZDF capabilities. In the case of Australia we have an alliance-level relationship. There is a long-held expectation and understanding that each country would go to the defence of the other in time of need.

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Disarmament and non-proliferation will remain a core challenge for New Zealand international security effort  Disarmament effort remains a critical element of New Zealand's approach to wider issues of international security. The risks are changing: new technologies are generating fresh risks in the areas of biological and chemical weaponry, and proliferation of nuclear technology is a major threat. Defence policy needs to be supportive and consistent with our disarmament policy. Defence can provide important technical and operational support in some areas.

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Threat based planning is not particularly useful for New Zealand  There are a limited range of tasks the NZDF is required to perform for the protection of New Zealand sovereignty. Beyond that there are potential risks to wider New Zealand interests in the Asia-Pacific region and further afield. But there is no direct “threat” that we can use as a point of reference for decisions on defence resources or capabilities.

Priorities and force structure  The judgments above do not provide direct answers to issues over level of defence funding or nature of capabilities. The evidence is that we can do some useful things within the current level of resources and with current capabilities, but naturally we might expect to have wider options if there were more resources or better developed capabilities. There is no direct threat to New Zealand or immediate interests that provides an answer. Relationship factors (especially with Australia and the US) are important but do not provide answers to key resource or priority questions. Key tests for defence resourcing and capability decisions should be: ability to perform core “sovereignty” tasks around New Zealand capabilities allowing an effective response to a variety of emergencies in the South Pacific capacity to play a constructive role in security relationships and processes in the Asia-Pacific region capabilities allowing us to make an effective military contribution to multilateral coalition responses, in our own region or further afield, noting that some (including peacekeeping) may involve a high level of risk ability to work effectively with others - and particularly the Australians - in such situations.

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FOREIGN POLICY BACKGROUND
New Zealand’s foreign policy is driven by three main national interests:
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to protect New Zealand‟s territorial integrity and security to derive maximum benefit from relations with other countries to promote the core values shared by most New Zealanders.

There are some constant factors affecting the way we pursue those interests:
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size - New Zealand is a small country in terms of land area, population and economic output. This limits its military and diplomatic capabilities - but, as has recently been argued, influence is “soft power” geographical position - New Zealand is geographically isolated and remote from major world centres. The likelihood of a direct threat to its borders is very small history - immigration patterns and past associations have established New Zealand as a country with values based in democracy and the Western liberal tradition economy - New Zealand has an export-oriented production base, which requires secure trade routes and access to overseas markets outlook - New Zealand has a tradition of constructive and active participation in international affairs.

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New Zealand has chosen to place emphasis on some particular aspects of its dealings with other countries:
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human rights - New Zealand will seek to conduct its international relations in a way that promotes forms of governance and civil liberties which accord with the values of New Zealanders disarmament - New Zealand foreign policy is informed by a broad-based commitment to reducing the threat posed by weapons, in particular nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. environment - New Zealand is concerned to work with other countries to prevent degradation of the global environment and promote sustainable development

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cultural values - through its international dealings New Zealand will project to other countries what is unique and valuable in New Zealand culture, including the Maori aspects of its heritage.

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GLOBAL INTERESTS, GLOBAL ROLE FOR NEW ZEALAND
We have put behind us the post-war world order  The core international institutions date back to the 1940s. The world has changed dramatically since that time. Most colonies have made the transition to independence. Four decades of Cold War came to an end with the break-up of the Soviet Union. The past two decades have seen the democratisation of many societies that previously had authoritarian governments of the right or the left - in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. Looking at key global players we see a much more diverse picture. The US remains the preeminent economic, commercial and military power. But it no longer commands the “leader of the free world” loyalties it enjoyed during the Cold War. A united and expanding European community is seeking a larger international role. The Asian economies, notwithstanding the 1997-98 downturn, have become a dynamic factor in global growth. Latin American economies are heading in a similar direction. China and India are demonstrating their giant potential. Russia faces a gulf between aspirations and resources.

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New forces are shaping global economic development  Over several generations we have also seen the transformation of the global economy. The command economies have largely collapsed. Market models of various kinds now prevail. Global capital markets operate in a giant free-for-all that would never have been possible under the Bretton Woods system. There has been revolutionary change in the economics of transportation and travel, especially by air. And now the new economy is emerging on the back of the information revolution. The focus of trade is gradually shifting from goods to services. The knowledge economy is driving business development and wealth creation. Multinational corporate structures are a feature of globalisation. Skills and labour are becoming more mobile. National boundaries are becoming less significant as we enter the electronic commerce era.

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New-generation relationships between states are being developed  Regionalism is a phenomenon of the late 20th century. Agreements such as CER and the EU treaties have meant much more intimate relationships between member states and a blurring of the divide between domestic and external policies. Diplomats increasingly have to think domestically. The pressures of globalisation are nudging modern economies further in this direction.

The multilateral rules-based system has been extensively developed  New Zealand has since the end of World War II actively supported the development of multilateral institutions which give small states an international voice (and vote) and promote the rule of international law. These institutions are not completely robust: they depend on preserving the consensus on liberal values and the duties of international citizenship. But they do provide important safeguards for the interests of New Zealand and other small states. New Zealand has played a part out of proportion to its size and established a track record of activism and creative involvement.

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Civil society is questioning globalisation  Nations of all sizes have made binding treaty commitments in areas such as trade, environment, labour and human rights on the basis that they serve the greater national good. But there are challenges to some of these institutions, notably from parts of civil society concerned at the impact of globalisation, the loss of “sovereignty” and the influence of multinational business.

Threats to the multilateral system do exist  The trend has been for greater international engagement and for steady development of institutions. It has been based on a growing recognition that an internationalist approach serves the wider national interest. Internationalism has delivered immense benefits. But the trend is not irreversible. Contrary pressures - such as historical, religious and ethnic antagonism, great power status or aspirations, or a sense of insecurity - could combine to undermine them. Such pressures are particularly visible in the Middle East, the Balkans, Africa, East Asia and South Asia. The great powers still have unilateralist habits. Rogue states and the proliferation of nuclear and other technologies present special risks.

Conflict increasingly occurs within rather than between states  Modern conflicts are typically within states rather than between states. In such cases there is tension between the need to maintain international peace and security and the UN principle of respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of member states.

There is a continuing gulf between the haves and the have nots  Poverty remains the great global challenge. More than a fifth of the world‟s people live in extreme poverty, while many more subsist outside the modern economy. This usually means living without the other basic human rights and freedoms we take for granted in New Zealand. Conflict and violence are typically associated with lack of economic and social development.

New Zealand security policy: factoring in global interests The principles, obligations and legal framework set out in the United Nations Charter remain fundamental elements in New Zealand foreign policy. The Charter brings together commitments to fundamental human rights, the rule of international law, social progress, friendly and peaceful co-existence and united effort to maintain international peace and security.  The United Nations was set up in 1945 in order to: promote international peace and security (“save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”); reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person;

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promote respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law (respect for the „rule of law‟), and promote social progress and better standards of living.

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New Zealand‟s interests continue to be served by active participation in the United Nations and other institutions in the multilateral system. International legal principles are of fundamental importance to us and other members of the global community. So too are commitments to collective efforts to maintain peace and security and to secure respect for human rights. Among the obligations members accept are those relating to pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter VI) and action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression (Chapter VII).

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There will continue to be moral, legal and practical dilemmas to be faced in the area of international security  Use of military force, even with the backing of a formal UN Security Council resolution, will always involve difficult political and moral judgments. There are high risks and high costs in any initiative carrying the risk of bloodshed. There can also be difficulties with decisions not to become involved. Sanctions, under Article 41 of the Charter, have been increasingly used in response to threats to international peace and security in recent years, but have had a limited record of success. New Zealand recognises them as a legitimate instrument, but has drawn attention to deficiencies in their application and also to the unintended harm they can inflict on innocent civilians and neighbouring countries. The Security Council needs to develop “smarter sanctions”, more targeted at the regimes and elites for whom they are intended; and it needs to overhaul procedures for approving humanitarian exemptions.

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But we can and should help keep the peace  There are few things as fundamental for New Zealand foreign policy as a commitment to help keep the peace. Parts of the world are still torn by violence. This means loss of life or a life of misery for far too many. Violence on this scale offends deeply held New Zealand values. As a country committed to act against abuses of basic human rights we have an obligation to play our part in preventing or resolving conflicts within or between states.

New Zealand's contribution as a good international citizen has been disproportionately large  New Zealand's contribution has been out of proportion to its size. The combination of solid principles, independence, activism, constructive approach and

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professionalism has left us in good standing. Our record in peacekeeping is particularly strong. We shall want to maintain the option of making a contribution to United Nations or other collective responses to crises  Military force is not the method of choice. We shall always prefer to use peaceful means to respond to conflict in keeping with the principles of the UN Charter and fundamental New Zealand values. But collective military responses may, in some cases, prove to be the best (or least bad) option. In that event New Zealand governments will want to have available capabilities which are relevant, deployable, supportable - and which minimise risks to New Zealand forces. There will be a high threshold for any question of participation in operations involving risk of combat.

Contributions to UN or other coalition operations will remain a primary NZDF role  In the absence of a direct threat to New Zealand's security it is likely that contributions to collective security efforts (including peacekeeping) under UN auspices will remain a primary role for the NZDF - and a principal point of reference for development of NZDF structure and capabilities.

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SOVEREIGNTY
Protecting New Zealand’s sovereign interests is a primary objective of our foreign and security policy
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New Zealand‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity are protected under international law, by the respect for principles enshrined in the United Nations charter and by various international instruments such as UNCLOS.

New Zealand currently faces no direct military threat
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We share the conclusions of last year‟s Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 and the more recent EAB assessment that New Zealand is not directly threatened.

But we do face challenges in such areas as resource protection, illegal migration, and crime
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New Zealand‟s security is subject to new threats that have become increasingly prominent since the end of the Cold War. We are active participants in international and regional efforts to deal with these issues using a range of civil, military and diplomatic resources. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains an issue for us. New Zealand is an active participant in international initiatives to reduce the threats from nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

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Terrorism represents a limited but continuing risk  Terrorist activities by non-state organisations (often based on religious or ethnic causes) can present a threat. New Zealand is less likely to be the target of terrorist acts by “rogue states”.

Sovereignty in New Zealand’s security policy

New Zealand needs the capability to deal with low-level threats to its security
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It is hard to conceive of circumstances in which New Zealand would face a direct military threat. We do, however, need the capacity to deal directly with low-level challenges to our sovereignty.

Marine resources are one example
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As marine resources worldwide remain under intense pressure our fisheries and other marine resources require protection in the face of an increasing threat of illegal harvest. Continual action is required both within the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone and in the Southern Ocean. Illegal fishing is also a problem for some of our neighbours in the South Pacific, whose dependence on their marine resources is much greater even than ours.

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New Zealand‟s military assets have an important role to play in the enforcement of New Zealand and international legislation in respect of fishing in our EEZ and territorial waters. Maritime surveillance is a key element in managing unregulated or illegal fishing in New Zealand‟s EEZ. It is open to New Zealand to pursue remedies under international law, but in such cases the governments of fishing nations, or international tribunals, will require clear evidence and adequate documentation. Military assets are also used to patrol and undertake enforcement action in the Southern Ocean, to support the government‟s policy objectives in Antarctica and to assist in the surveillance of the EEZs in the South Pacific.

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We also require the ability to respond to various other criminal activities
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Illegal immigration is unlikely to abate. It may well take the form of boat landings, as in Australia. Australian experience demonstrates that effective maritime surveillance, including cooperating with neighbouring jurisdictions, is important in containing this risk. New Zealand‟s security is placed at risk also through the incidence of trans-border crime, and an apparent trend towards targeting this country and the small island states associated with it. Crimes such as drug-trafficking, money-laundering and fraudulent business dealings based on flags of convenience will need to be countered.

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The Defence Force may be called on to counter threats by terrorist organisations or to evacuate New Zealanders from difficult situations overseas.
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New Zealand needs to be able to respond to terrorist acts perpetrated in New Zealand. This requires special skills and special training. There may also be occasions where the security situation in a foreign country requires the use of defence assets to evacuate New Zealand citizens. Cambodia in 1997 was one example.

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Natural disasters and civil emergencies will require Defence Force support.
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The Defence Force will play a major role in responding to natural disasters in New Zealand and in the region. Search and rescue is an established Defence Force function in New Zealand and elsewhere in the region. New Zealand has some regional search and rescue obligations which require maritime surveillance capabilities.

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SOUTH PACIFIC
Stressed societies in the South Pacific present serious risks  The problems confronting many island states in the South Pacific - failing governance and infrastructure, marginal economic viability, ethnic and demographic stress - collectively represent a major challenge for New Zealand policy.

Their problems are liable to become our problems  Because of proximity and strong links with the New Zealand community any major issues in these countries are likely to affect us. New Zealand governments will not have the option of looking the other way. The past two decades have seen a series of emergencies in the region which have called for intensive political and diplomatic management from New Zealand governments, usually working with Australian counterparts, and have in some cases carried major economic and security risks. Current trends are not good. We should assume that there are further problems to come.

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There are also opportunities for us in the region  The South Pacific is a key part of New Zealand's heritage. We have extensive commercial interests. There are high levels of trade, with potential for further growth. Air travel has already had a big impact on previously isolated islands in the region. The information revolution has the potential for even greater impact, bringing isolated communities into contact with the world and opening up opportunities in areas such as education, communication and electronic commerce. The Pacific connection is an important factor in New Zealand diplomacy. Northern hemisphere capitals look to us for expertise and leadership on Pacific affairs. We commit a large proportion of our diplomatic resources to representation in the region. We are active in regional institutions. The Pacific caucus (now numbering 13 members) is now a key element in our UN diplomacy. The greater part of our ODA effort is committed to the South Pacific.

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The South Pacific will remain, for better or for worse, a key factor in our external relations.  The combination of proximity, community links, diplomatic and economic interests, humanitarian concerns and expectations of other governments means that the South Pacific will remain a central feature of our external relations as far ahead as we can see. We have constitutional obligations in respect of Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau which extend to aspects of external relations and security.

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The South Pacific in New Zealand’s security policy

The region has seen troubled times in the 1980s and 90s  There have been a series of emergencies in the South Pacific over the past two decades. Several occasions have involved major civil violence and bloodshed (PNG, Bougainville, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, New Caledonia). Evacuation of New Zealanders and other expatriates has been an issue on several occasions. There have been expectations in the region and further afield that Australia and New Zealand would carry the main burden of response or assistance.

We can expect further trouble in the period ahead  Given current indicators there is a strong prospect of further emergencies on the pattern of the 1980s and 1990s. On top of this, we can expect major natural disasters which will demand New Zealand assistance and require deployment of military resources and capabilities.

The Canberra connection remains critical  The Australians will remain key players. We shall need to work closely with them, bearing in mind that any emergency is liable to involve us both. And we want to have a full input into policy debate in Canberra at such times, bearing in mind the scope for differences of perspective on some issues.

The problems of the region demand a multitrack approach  New Zealand policy will be to continue to use all available means to avert further security crises. We shall want to: maintain a long-term strategy for supporting economic development, with associated good governance keep up an active role in South Pacific institutions such as the Forum and encourage collective solutions to region-wide problems make full use of NZODA resources - and encourage governments outside the region to maintain support for island states use our diplomatic resources to help develop political solutions to internal problems use military assets peacefully where that is important and useful (Bougainville etc)

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use military programmes (defence co-operation, New Zealand military assistance programmes) in ways that encourage military and paramilitary forces in the region to operate constitutionally - and help develop security capabilities appropriate to regional needs.

South Pacific capabilities have to be a core requirement for the NZDF  In terms of New Zealand interests it is important that New Zealand governments have military options available to respond to South Pacific emergencies. Situations we could face include: collapse of civil authority leading to unchecked violence (this has long been the nightmare for PNG) a need to evacuate or protect New Zealand and other expatriates placed at risk by a civil emergency a request from a friendly government for assistance for protection in the face of threatened overthrow by force (as in Vanuatu in 1988) or to help control civil violence a request to provide peace brokering or peacekeeping assistance (Bougainville and Solomon Islands being examples).

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In the more difficult scenarios we would be extremely wary of military involvement beyond protection of New Zealand citizens (Fiji in 1987 was a good illustration). But the New Zealand public will as a minimum expect that resources currently going into defence will provide the option of responding to a regional emergency. Although most scenarios would involve combined Australian and New Zealand effort it is also important that New Zealand have some independent capacity.

Several conclusions relating to NZDF capabilities flow from these judgments  The capabilities highlighted in recent debate on defence priorities (army capabilities and associated naval and air support, including maritime surveillance) would form the core of a New Zealand response in most South Pacific scenarios that could be imagined. Ability to perform core military tasks in the South Pacific should be a primary point of reference for future NZDF capability development. The NZDF will also be expected to provide support for resource protection activities, search and rescue, disaster relief and development assistance. Interoperability and close operational links with the Australian Defence Force, along with complementary capabilities, will remain essential.

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AUSTRALIA
The trans-Tasman relationship has been transformed over the past generation.  The relationship with Australia today has moved a long way from what it was 20 years ago. There is now a high degree of integration of the two economies. Many businesses treat the two countries as a single market. We are each other‟s largest and most important markets for manufactured goods. We effectively have a single labour market. Around 400,000 New Zealanders now live long-term in Australia (about 55,000 Australians in New Zealand). This has political and policy consequences and entails major social security commitments. Regulatory and policy processes in many areas are converging. As a result, in some areas the relationship is becoming less like the traditional one of two sovereign nations and more akin to that of countries in the EU where borders are coming down and domestic processes are harmonised. This has implications for New Zealand as we are brought into closer proximity with (and affected by) the Australian federal system.

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New Zealand and Australia share common purpose and effort on much of the foreign policy, trade and security agenda  We have a more traditional relationship in our external relations, although even here working links across the Tasman are extremely close. In practice we operate as a team on a wide range of issues (often with the Canadians, as the „CANZ‟ group). A lot of effort goes into coordination. The closeness with the Australians can sometimes be a constraint (and we do part company on some issues) but more often it is an asset to us. With joint effort we can get greater recognition of New Zealand perspectives, amongst the plethora of issues on the go in multilateral organisations. The areas in which New Zealand and Australia have differences of view are limited but nonetheless important (the divergence in our disarmament policies is currently one). We have also worked closely together in defence and security, participating together in many UN peacekeeping operations.

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CER has become a model for new-era relationships between countries  CER has, along with European integration, become an important model for new-generation economic relationships between states. The evolution of CER demonstrates how, once such an agreement is in place, convergence of a wide range of policies and processes is likely to follow. This closeness brings both benefits (eg New Zealand‟s largest export market by far for some time) and costs (eg constant coordination must be maintained; difficulties of the federal system brought closer to home for New Zealand).

Managing the trans-Tasman relationship is not without difficulty.  Australia‟s size and „middle power‟ outlook can mean a tendency to overlook the interests of smaller neighbours on some issues. This has been exacerbated by confidence gained from the

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strong Australian economic performance over the last few years (the apparent impending cyclical slow-down notwithstanding).

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There is a sense within parts of the Australian system that trans-Tasman freedom of travel and the consequent high level of New Zealand migration place us under an obligation and that benefits in the relationship flow mostly to New Zealand. While we do not share these perspectives, New Zealand needs to manage them and their consequences, just as we need to maintain an overview of the relationship and its importance to New Zealand. There will be a continuing need for high-level political management of links with Australia, especially in case of any issues or differences.

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Security is an area where management of the relationship will continue to be tested   Australia sees defence links as central to the relationship (reflecting in part the importance attached to defence and security policy more generally). There are some differences in our approaches to particular security issues, notably differences over nuclear policy and the weight attached by Australia to its alliance relationship with the US, and the Australian tendency to a significantly more negative assessment of the security environment (reflecting its different geo-political circumstances). Timor reinforced the tendency to take a pessimistic view of the strategic environment. Australia has a tendency (like most Asian states) to see the region in balance of power terms. Australian security policy will continue to operate on two levels: deliberate efforts to promote confidence and stability, and support regional and international peace and security through regional processes (including bilateral links, the UN, APEC, and ARF); and continuing to prepare against security threats through development of major combat capabilities and alliance relationships. Regardless of whether we fully share Australian perspectives on the regional security outlook, they need to be recognised in our dealings with Canberra.

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What does this mean for New Zealand security policy? We have interests in common and working with the Australians can contribute to key New Zealand goals  There is a track record of joint effort with Australia on security issues within the region and further afield. We have many interests in common. Experience in Cambodia, Bougainville and Timor underlines the contribution the defence relationship can make to key New Zealand goals. Defence co-operation is also important for wider relationship reasons.



New Zealand has an alliance-level relationship with Australia

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There is a long-held expectation and understanding that each country would go to the defence of the other in time of need.

It is important to be able to influence Australian policy and decisions  Australian decisions will often affect us (and vice versa). It is important that we have an input if our interests are involved. That will partly depend on whether the Australians see us as a serious player on the issue under debate. On security issues there has been a tendency in some quarters to under-rate New Zealand's interest and role. Our efforts in Timor may have prompted some reassessment. Our INTERFET and UNTAET contribution has been appreciated. New Zealand statements on defence and wider security issues are read closely in Canberra. In the context of an extremely close bilateral relationship there are expectations that we will show some sensitivity to Australian interests (ANZUS and the Australia-US relationship being the obvious example).

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Defence links with Australia are important if we want to maximise the effectiveness of New Zealand defence effort on a limited resource base. Australia has an interest in the capabilities we can provide. These links do not compromise New Zealand operational independence.  Our defence resources will remain limited. We shall want to get maximum value from our investment. The defence relationship with Australia is central to this. Working closely with the Australians in training and exercising, operations, procurement and capability development offers opportunities to maximise New Zealand defence force effectiveness. Australia faces problems of its own in funding the capabilities it needs. New Zealand resources are potentially important, particularly if we maximise commonality between the two forces. It is in our interests to take full advantage of potential synergies in the defence relationship. They do not affect our ability to take an independent view on specific issues. Nor do they limit our ability to take independent decisions on how and when New Zealand defence resources will be deployed.

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ASIA
New Zealand’s well-being is tied to the economies of Asia


The growth of New Zealand‟s economic and trade relationship with countries in the Asia-Pacific has reshaped the balance of our global economic and trade interests. Our major trading partners are now in the Asia-Pacific. Five of the top ten are in North Asia. Those relationships are now mature trading relationships, and the long-term prospects are good. Maintaining and improving access to those markets is an important part of our diplomatic and trade effort in the region (including for example the negotiations on possible closer economic partnerships) and multilaterally in the WTO. Trade in services has become significant in these increasingly affluent markets. Sale of education and tourism services to Asian countries is a driver in the growth of these sectors in New Zealand. Growth in migration from Asian countries in recent years has added a new dimension to our relations with the region.

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We need to engage with a wide range of Asian countries across a broad front


New Zealand‟s small size, cultural traditions and geographical position on the margins of Asia mean we have to try hard to develop constituencies and maintain relevance for our larger Asian neighbours. For a trading nation like New Zealand, economic links must be underpinned by political ties. Exchanges of visits between political leaders are important, supported by regular contact between officials. Closer relationships bring with them a greater degree of frankness in our exchanges with these countries including on sometimes sensitive topics such as human rights and the environment. The efforts undertaken in Asian markets by New Zealand‟s commercial interests, and growing links between academic and other non-governmental institutions are also important.

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The stability of the Asia-Pacific region is crucial for New Zealand’s well-being


Asia is an area where key global players are closely engaged. The nature of their engagement will have a bearing on key New Zealand foreign and trade policy interests. Conflict in the Asia-Pacific region runs counter to our interests. It has the potential to disrupt trade and depress demand in some of our key markets. Unimpeded passage through the region‟s shipping lanes and air routes is crucial to the smooth conduct of trade and commerce. Regional conflicts can also create destabilising refugee flows.



The region is basically stable, but there is potential for trouble


Relations between the major players in North Asia are stable thanks to close engagement between Japan, China and the US. This allows periodic ups and downs in those relationships to be

25

managed. China‟s continuing growth, driven by a strategic decision to open up its border, will be a critical factor in the future regional dynamic.

26

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In Southeast Asia, ASEAN was shaken by the financial and economic crisis, but recovery is well under way. ASEAN is evolving, dealing with upheavals in Indonesia, and establishing a modus vivendi with China. It remains to be seen whether the ASEANs will decide to pursue a strategic trade and economic relationship with CER (the AFTA-CER initiative). There are a number of trouble spots in the region, any of which could flare up and destabilise the regional and in some cases the global security situation. The obvious areas of risk are the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan/China, the South China Sea and South Asia. Conflict in any of these areas would affect important New Zealand interests.



Regional frameworks are important, including for the handling of security issues


Bilateral links continue to dominate intra-state contact in this large and diverse region. But a regional architecture is being developed to deal with economic, political, defence and security, social and environmental issues in the region and between the region and other parts of the world (APEC, the mooted trade agreement between the CER countries and ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM), and the East Asia-Latin America Forum). This architecture does not yet work effectively to resolve conflict. New Zealand is an active participant in most of these regional and multilateral processes. We have to work hard at ensuring that we continue to play a positive and relevant role in regional affairs. We must ensure that our involvement continues to be welcome.

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New Zealand defence and security policy in the Asia-Pacific context New Zealand has a large stake in the stability of the region


New Zealand has large commercial and political interests in Asia. Future trade prospects depend on continued economic growth which in turn requires confidence in a stable regional security environment. The scale of New Zealand's interests in Asia argues that we should do what we can for the stability of the region. We are not a large player. But we have been part of the regional picture over a long period. We are a member of the major regional institutions. We have treaty links with some Asian countries. We have a good regional network and good standing.

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Our main focus will be regional processes and institutions


Regional processes such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are a relatively new phenomenon in the Asia-Pacific region. They have had an important role in developing a post-Cold War modus vivendi for the larger regional states, particularly in establishing the habit of getting together at a senior political level on a routine basis. These institutions do not, however, have a guaranteed future: to keep the larger members engaged they need to produce results, and sensitive underlying issues (eg Taiwan) need to be managed. APEC in 1999 was one illustration of the way New Zealand can add value in such forums.

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A multilateral security framework is an important tool for regional stability


The multilateral process is important for small countries such as New Zealand. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was set up in 1993 to provide a forum for working on problems that could threaten regional stability. New Zealand is an active participant. The ARF has concentrated on confidence-building measures designed to reduce tension through better understanding of others‟ capabilities and intentions. There is scope for the ARF‟s role to be expanded. Many Asian countries see the United States‟ military presence as central to the continuing stability of the Asia-Pacific region. For its part the US is clearly looking to other countries in the region to play their part in the larger task of maintaining regional security. The country with which our regional interests are most closely aligned, and the habit of consultation most highly developed, is Australia. In terms of diplomatic influence a concerted effort on the part of Australia and New Zealand carries greater weight than can be achieved by either on its own. And the resources Australia can bring to bear considerably exceed New Zealand's. We and the Australians will not always take an identical approach. The Australians tend to view the Asia-Pacific region in balance of power terms (as do many Asian states). The Australians sees themselves as a regional power with military capabilities that are significant in regional terms. They will continue to develop their maritime capabilities in line with this view of their interests and role.

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There is value for us in maintaining a network of military links in the region
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We already have strong military links with Singapore and Malaysia through the FPDA. The FPDA is a practical demonstration of New Zealand's commitment to regional stability. New Zealand and Australian involvement is appreciated by regional members of the FPDA. There are military links with Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia (although the latter remain suspended in the wake of last year‟s events in East Timor). And we are developing a defence dimension to relationships with China, Japan and Korea. China is a significant factor in the security of the region and it is important to gain some understanding of the Chinese military establishment and its approach to the region. Developing these links is consistent with our emphasis on regional confidence building.

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28

New Zealand defence resources would not be particularly relevant to any major conflict


The capabilities we can maintain at current funding levels will not be a major factor in regional military calculations. New Zealand capabilities and activities will nevertheless be useful in the context of some regional defence relationships (eg FPDA) and processes (such as the ASEAN Regional Forum). They underline the scale of our interests in the region. And they will continue to signal our wider commitment to collective efforts to maintain peace and security.

But we could be expected to participate in regional crisis management


It is likely that occasions will again arise (as with Timor) when we shall be asked to contribute to crisis management, peacekeeping or other multilateral operations in the region. New Zealand has demonstrated its preparedness to participate in operations to keep the peace in this part of the world, most recently in Bougainville and East Timor. Some general principles apply to such deployments. New Zealand is most likely to participate where there is:
   

a request for assistance from the government concerned explicit United Nations authority, and an appropriate mandate participation by other like-minded countries a peacekeeping role, rather than a requirement to impose peace.

For such regional tasks we would rely on capabilities developed for wider multilateral roles


For any lesser role we undertake in the region we shall need to draw on capabilities we have developed as a basis for our contribution to wider collective security effort under UN auspices. Our special interests in Asia will therefore be reflected mainly in the form of our defence and security relationships (eg in FPDA and ARF, and in bilateral defence relationships, particularly with Australia) rather than through capabilities developed specifically for a role in the region. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that New Zealand would face a decision to commit forces to a combat role in Asia it is not easy to envisage a situation in which this would occur. This limits the value of scenarios involving war in Asia as a point of reference for the development of NZDF force structure.

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THE UNITED STATES : NEW ZEALAND INTERESTS
The United States exercises a profound influence over international financial and economic structures and trends affecting New Zealand.
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Its economy, at 25% of global GDP, is the world‟s largest. Over the past decade its growth rate has averaged 2.5%. United States market trends strongly affect trends in other markets, including New Zealand. United States commercial and technological dynamism is a spur to development world-wide. It is driving e-commerce and the information revolution. A high proportion of the major multinational companies are based there.

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The United States is central to our trading interests, both as a market and for its role in supporting an open international trading system.
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In 1999 the United States took 13.8% of our exports (NZ$ 3,105m) and supplied 16.6% of our imports (NZ$ 4,500m). Despite inconsistencies and lapses, the US free trade philosophy, and the progressive opening-up of the US market, have been central to post-war trade liberalisation. This has been fundamentally important to New Zealand as a small trading nation outside a major regional trade bloc. Further development of the international trading system to secure fairer treatment for agricultural products and to accommodate a new generation of trade issues (services, intellectual property, electronic commerce) will hinge on the US strategy and input.

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United States policies and culture are strongly influential in other parts of the world.
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The United States model of a democratic government, a market economy and a pluralist society has affected the direction of development in many other countries. Aspects of United States culture, including films and music, shape international standards and cultural norms.

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The United States is in military terms the world’s sole superpower.
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Following the end of the Cold War, the United States is unrivalled in its global reach and in the extent and range of its military capabilities. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has given it a capacity for military intervention that is targeted and relatively low-risk for its own forces.

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The way the United States exercises its global influence may not always be in accord with New Zealand’s interests or perceptions of what is desirable internationally.
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The United States is a global power, with global interests, which may lead it in directions other than those suggested by our own more narrow interests.

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

As a major power the United States often finds it expedient to deal bilaterally, rather than take a broader range of national interests into account. The United States is reluctant to cede sovereignty to international institutions. It at times asserts extraterritorial application of its laws. There are constraints on the Executive‟s freedom of action in international affairs imposed particularly by domestic political imperatives reflected in the attitudes of Congress. The United States lacks a broadly-based whole of government strategy for dealing with the rest of the world.

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On many issues there is a natural affinity of interest between New Zealand and the United States.
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The United States favours democratic values, human rights, the rule of law, environmental protection, an open trading system. Such objectives, combined with a free and open media and active public debate supported by effective NGO groups, mean that the United States will be to the fore internationally on many issues which we also support. Given its international clout, the United States will often exercise deciding influence. New Zealand has to accept that fact, and seek opportunities to make common cause or to bring the United States closer to our point of view.

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Implications for New Zealand Security Policy US nuclear policies have evolved considerably over the past decade.
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There have been decisions to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons, to remove nuclear weapons from all US Navy vessels except ballistic missile submarines, to cease testing and to reduce weapon stocks. The US has been active in promoting non-proliferation, through its efforts in relation to countries like Iraq and the DPRK, its response to testing in India and Pakistan, and its investment in stockpile management in the former USSR.

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Nevertheless, the US is still a long way from embracing a full disarmament agenda.
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The United States continues to rely upon nuclear deterrence, and to deploy strategic nuclear weapons. For the time being the Senate has rejected ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. A potentially destabilising National Missile Defence system is under active consideration.

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The challenge for New Zealand is to work with the United States to accelerate progress towards disarmament objectives.
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Multilateral initiatives such as the New Agenda initiative offer a means of bringing pressure to bear on all nuclear states to take further steps towards disarmament.

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

Through its statements and by contributing to any necessary preventative measures New Zealand should play its part in opposing nuclear proliferation. Disarmament and arms control are areas of high sensitivity for the United States; New Zealand should pursue its disarmament agenda steadfastly, but in a way that does not unnecessarily provoke disagreement.

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The United States still sees New Zealand’s nuclear policies as an unresolved aspect of the defence relationship.
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Despite the decision to remove nuclear weapons from USN vessels, New Zealand's ban on nuclear-propelled ships means that there remains what Washington regards as a fundamental impediment to the US Navy accessing our ports. The United States will maintain the position that New Zealand is a friend rather than an ally, and will maintain a range of restrictions on defence co-operation.

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There is no advantage in trying to clarify the status of the ANZUS treaty.
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The ANZUS treaty still exists. Although it has ceased to be a point of reference for the NZ/US security relationship, it remains important to Australia as the formal vehicle for the Australia-United States alliance. Differences over port access mean that there is at present no prospect of reactivating the treaty as it applies to the defence relationship between New Zealand and the United States. The status of the treaty is not a matter of current debate in New Zealand, and there is nothing to be gained by revisiting it at this stage.

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It is nevertheless possible and desirable to maintain good defence links with the United States.
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In very many instances when New Zealand considers it appropriate to commit defence forces overseas, it will be as part of a coalition force that includes also the United States. The most recent example is East Timor. It will often not be possible to mount an effective coalition operation, without United States participation. A good working relationship with the United States is therefore an important aspect of New Zealand‟s capacity to contribute effectively to the resolution of international security issues. How defence relationships develop will depend in part on the level of New Zealand‟s defence spending, and the extent to which New Zealand is willing to commit military resources to deployments (eg in the Middle East) which the United States considers important.

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A good working relationship includes the greatest possible level of interoperability with United States forces.
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In situations of actual or potential conflict we are likely to find the United States contributing key assets such as core force elements, communication, logistical support and intelligence. The ability to operate routinely with United States forces will be significant in determining how effectively New Zealand can contribute in such situations, and how safely. The forces of other countries with which we are likely to combine will also tend to rely upon equipment that is either of US origin or built to US/NATO standards. This reinforces the desirability of interoperability with the US. Much of our own current equipment is of US origin. For reasons of cost and technical requirements (as well as the desirability of interoperability) this is likely to continue to be the case for future procurements.

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In the interests of maximising the effectiveness of our contribution to global security needs, and the safety of our forces, it is to our advantage to build up defence co-operation with the United States as much as possible, notwithstanding continuing constraints at the Washington end.
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It is an acceptable position to be a friend not an ally. New Zealand should maintain a close relationship and seek to be helpful and positive where our views and interests coincide. We have to accept that there will be issues upon which we do not agree, and that the unilateral tendencies of the United States will at times place them at odds with our own multilateral outlook. At the same time we must accept that the United States will often be the key element in the international community‟s ability to respond effectively to a particular security crisis. Recent experience (over the cancellation of the F16 contract) has demonstrated a United States capacity to understand and accept the practical considerations underlying a variation in defence policy. The United States is nevertheless capable of misreading decisions in other capitals. It is in our interest to make a special effort to ensure it reads correctly future New Zealand decisions on defence policy or specific procurement options. The weight New Zealand is prepared to give to „relationship‟ considerations in defence decisions will be one factor that influences how the United States approaches the defence relationship from its side.

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AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Neither region contains any key bilateral partnerships for New Zealand, nor comes close to matching the Asia Pacific region for importance - but New Zealand does have (different, limited) interests in both regions. Africa Commonwealth ties.....
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Common elements in our histories, working together on Commonwealth projects and shared objectives (such as the good governance goals of the Harare Declaration) are the basis for New Zealand‟s closest links on the African continent, with the Commonwealth African nations. South Africa is emerging as a pivotal state in Southern Africa. New Zealand‟s bilateral relationship with South Africa has strengthened significantly since the transition to non-racial, democratic rule began in 1990, and the lifting of sanctions took place in 1993 and 1994. Commonwealth ties are at the heart of the political relationship, along with New Zealand support for the anti-apartheid movement. The trading relationship is promising - New Zealand exports have more than trebled over the past decade - but it is too early to confirm that this trend will be sustained.

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...and good international citizenship objectives shape our involvement
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New Zealand‟s global objectives - of being a good international citizenship, of standing up for the interests of small states, and of promoting peace and security and the rule of law - are served by carefully targeted involvement in humanitarian, development and peacekeeping work on the African continent. In 1999, one fifth of our emergency and disaster relief funding was allocated to relief projects in Africa. NZ$2.41 million was also allocated to bilateral development assistance projects in Botswana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. Two NZDF personnel are stationed with the Mozambique Accelerated Demining Programme, providing training in mine-clearing techniques. Two NZDF officers are serving with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.

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The Middle East The region’s peace and security is economically as well as politically important to us.
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New Zealand is heavily dependent on the Middle East for oil supplies. A significant deterioration in Middle East peace and security has the potential to have a major impact on our energy supplies and, therefore, our economic position. New Zealand contributes along with other nations to United Nations peace and security efforts in the region. An Army officer is stationed at the Combined Joint Task-Force headquarters, Kuwait. 26 personnel are serving with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai desert between Egypt and Israel. Seven military observers are working with the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in Israel, Lebanon and Syria. Participation in the UN verification and monitoring mission in Iraq (UNSCOM) was a major New Zealand commitment in the 1990s. New Zealand has also over the 1995-1999 period contributed to the Multinational Interception

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Force (MIF) in the Gulf, which polices the arms embargo against Iraq (three frigate deployments and the stationing of one boarding party.) New Zealand has important emerging markets in the region.
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The Middle East also contains some valuable, growing markets for New Zealand exports Middle Eastern countries tend to be food deficient and to have the money (from oil) to pay for imports. Positive bilateral links need to be maintained with these markets, principally Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Iran, as well as a couple of the GCC countries. New Zealand exporters are working hard to exploit markets for consultancy and education services, and niche technologies in the region.

What does this mean for New Zealand security policy?
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While our resources are limited, New Zealand can make a real contribution to promoting good governance and alleviating the plight of vulnerable populations in Africa, particularly through active United Nations and Commonwealth involvement. This ability to make a real contribution is due in part to the high regard in which NZDF personnel are held, for their expertise and peacekeeping experience. While the Government continues to want to contribute to humanitarian and good governance activities in Africa, the maintenance of military expertise and relevant military assets will be required. In the Middle East, similarly, relevant military expertise and assets can help meet New Zealand‟s objectives of promoting and maintaining regional peace and security (as both a good international citizen and a nation with significant economic interests in the region) through collective security work.

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LATIN AMERICA
Latin American democracies with reformed economies are taking a much fuller role in world affairs
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In not much more than a decade processes of reform have transformed major Latin American nations. On the basis of vigorous democracies and strong economic growth their governments are playing an active and positive role in world affairs.

There is a natural affinity with New Zealand on many issues
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We find ourselves working comfortably alongside Latin American governments in a range of forums: WTO (where Latin American governments have been highly active in the Cairns Group on agricultural trade), APEC (Chile, Mexico and Peru), on Antarctic issues and disarmament.

There is a lot of potential in these relationships
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We can expect links with South America to broaden in much the same way as relationships with Asia have developed over a generation. Travel is flourishing, New Zealand is seen as a stepping stone to the Pacific and Asia, and we can expect to become a destination for students and working holiday makers looking for an English-speaking environment. The economies of the major Latin American states are large and expanding, presenting opportunities for New Zealand exporters. There is some reciprocal interest in a strategic approach to new-generation economic relationships. At the New Zealand end there is strong interest in getting to know the countries of Latin American much better. New Zealand government agencies have been investing in additional representation in the region, which will support these trends.

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Are there any implications for New Zealand security policy? The Latin American democracies are natural company for us on many international issues, including disarmament and security
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We are seen by key Latin American states as good company on a range of multilateral issues. There is no impediment to co-operation on international security affairs, and some natural affinities, including our disarmament interests and preference for multilateral solutions within a framework of international law. We have specific interests in common with Argentina and Chile in respect of Antarctica and the Antarctic environment. There are also some geographical affinities (isolation from northern hemisphere capitals and the maritime dimension to our security interests).

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It is early days, but we are more likely in future to find ourselves working alongside Latin American states in multilateral defence coalitions
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It is difficult to see this leading to extensive bilateral defence links, at least in the short term, but we should remain open to initiatives from governments in the region. We need to recognise the potential value of having Latin American states take on a more active role in international security affairs, bearing in mind the still limited pool of active and effective peacekeeping contributors.

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NEW ZEALAND AND EUROPE
Europe is a significant global power with influence in many areas of interest to New Zealand
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Europe, expanded, has a combined economic and diplomatic weight comparable to that of the United States. It is a major player in world affairs in many areas that are of direct interest to New Zealand. We will need to respond to initiatives from Europe in a wide range of areas including trade and economics, environment and human rights, disarmament and security.

New Zealand shares many European traditions and has a strong interest in maintaining its political access in Europe
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New Zealand‟s interaction with Europe is shaped by cultural affinities and common values, including liberal traditions. But we have our own distinct world view and priorities, determined by our own circumstances. It will remain important for New Zealand to retain high levels of political access in Europe. Such political access is important first and foremost to support our trade access into Europe. We have successfully maintained a respectable level of access for our traditional agricultural trade, which has been bolstered by the outcomes of the Uruguay Round. Making our access secure, and building on this for improved outcomes from future multilateral trade rounds is a core focus of our effort in Europe. Europe is important to New Zealand in areas beyond trade. It is an important source of foreign direct investment and revenue from tourism. People-to-people links have always been very strong. There continue to be close educational and cultural links.

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In defence and foreign policy matters, New Zealand will have to deal with a single European entity.
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We need to think of European countries as a unit rather than a collection of individual countries. Europe is increasingly coordinating its foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. There are common European positions on a wide range of issues (though it remains important also to keep abreast of the positions of individual European nations). New Zealand interacts with the EU in many forums, including in consultations with the Presidency. On the defence and security front, there is also a growing European dimension. Post Kosovo, Bosnia and the Gulf, Europe is intent on developing a pan-European military capability, which might include out-of area capabilities.

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NATO remains a significant actor in European defence
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NATO has changed since the end of the Cold War. It has expanded to include former foes and this has complicated its relationship with Russia. Despite the development of a European approach to defence, NATO remains of primary importance as the foundation for Europe‟s security. It has recently reinforced its active role in international affairs. NATO will continue to be a key component in the management of some international coalitions.

Russia
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While Russia no longer has superpower status, the extent to which it develops a viable basis for sustainable economic and political development will determine the sort of role that it is able to

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play in world affairs. Russia‟s role in the UN, its application to the WTO and its approach to disarmament are of direct interest to New Zealand.

New Zealand defence policy : the European dimension

New Zealand has been an active player in European security
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Historically, New Zealand has been deeply involved in European security, including large deployments to Europe in both world wars. This historic contribution has been an important factor in many of our modern European relationships. The presence of New Zealand troops in Bosnia and our contributions to international efforts to resolve the Balkan crisis have demonstrated our on-going acknowledgment of European security concerns, and our shared perception of the issues involved.

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Our future focus will need to be shared interests in international security affairs
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We can expect to find common ground with European counterparts on a range of international security issues, particularly those involving multilateral responses under UN auspices. The affinity in our values and international outlook means that we shall often have a similar perspective. The European role in such scenarios is set to grow. European foreign policies are more closely coordinated these days, and there are moves under way to co-ordinate community security effort, with more of a focus on out-of-area roles. There is no immediate prospect of Europe rivalling the US in terms of global reach, but European resources, military capabilities and contribution to coalition management will become more important. On some issues Europe will be important for us as a balance to US views. At a practical level NATO standards will remain an important factor in interoperability in multilateral coalition operations. If we are to maintain an active and effective role for the NZDF in multilateral security operations there will be advantages in close links with European counterparts in the area of standards and doctrine.

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DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION
New Zealand has a strong interest in international efforts to promote disarmament and support the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
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The existence and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical) and their delivery vehicles represents a continuing threat to international peace and security. New Zealand is an active participant in international efforts to achieve the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and to enforce a ban on chemical and biological weapons.

The outlook for the nuclear disarmament agenda is mixed.
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On the positive side, the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference agreed a programme of nuclear disarmament measures which has heightened hopes for future progress. Importantly, the five nuclear weapon states gave new political undertakings to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Also agreed were new commitments to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, to further unilateral reductions alongside the US/Russia bilateral strategic nuclear arms reduction (START I and II) process, and to address reductions of tactical nuclear weapons. New measures to improve the transparency of nuclear stockpiles, and accountability to NPT non-nuclear states for their reduction, were also adopted. Implementation of the new NPT commitments is likely to take time and may face obstacles. For the nuclear weapon states, progress will depend on their assessment of their own security environment. Current military doctrines foresee the retention of nuclear arms well into the future. Commitment to rapid reductions of stockpiles is not strong. The START I and II treaties do not require the weapons to be eliminated, do not yet encompass tactical nuclear weapons, and are often hostage to political fortunes (there is some prospect of renewed progress in the START talks with Russian ratification of START II, though this is caveated by uncertainties related to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and US proposals for missile defence, see below) . Of great concern is the prospect of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPT provides a framework to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the existing nuclear weapon states. This is seriously challenged by the South Asian nuclear tests, and by Israel‟s ambiguous nuclear programme. There is the continuing threat of “rogue” states (including Iraq and North Korea) acquiring nuclear weapons. Nuclear technology is no longer out of reach of emerging industrial economies. Prospects for early entry into force of the CTBT are not good: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not yet signed and last year the US Senate failed to ratify the treaty. There is stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, delaying the commencement of negotiations to ban the production of fissile material for use in weapons. Uptake of the new strengthened IAEA safeguards on nuclear installations has been slower than hoped.

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The spread of long-range missile technology is complicating the disarmament agenda.
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The proposed (but as yet unproven) US National Missile Defence system carries with it the risk of undermining the US/Russia Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the cornerstone of strategic stability under-pinning nuclear arms reductions. Its associated Theatre Missile Defence system risks complicating the regional security situation in North Asia. Because of concerns they cause both China and Russia (over the potential to undermine the deterrent capacity of their nuclear forces and, in the case of China, its situation regarding Taiwan) National Missile

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Defence/Theatre Missile Defence proposals have become a negotiating chip at various points in the disarmament agenda.

New Zealand has joined with a coalition of like-minded countries to press for faster elimination of nuclear arsenals
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The international nuclear disarmament agenda spawns a complex set of coalitions and alliances. There are diverse interests involved - the nuclear weapon states, those with aspirations to join the club, those who don‟t have them but are comforted that others do, those who want to see a determined pace of balanced reductions, and those who want to move rapidly to wholesale elimination within a specified time-frame. New Zealand is standing apart from many of its traditional defence allies and forging links with a new group of like-minded countries. New Zealand is playing a leading role in the New Agenda Coalition (New Zealand, Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden). The objective of the coalition to elicit new political undertakings from the nuclear weapon states to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals received a boost when this was agreed at the recent NPT Review Conference. Many of the Coalition‟s other nuclear disarmament proposals have now been adopted by the entire NPT membership.

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More progress is being made on biological and chemical weapons and landmines
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Prospects look better in the field of biological weapons, with progress in negotiations on verification protocols under the Biological Weapons Convention (although a determined proliferator might still escape detection). Implementation of the ban on chemical weapons is underway. International efforts against landmines received a fillip from the conclusion of the Ottawa Convention, though a number of important states have failed to sign it. Illegal trade in small arms is attracting closer attention - both in the UN and regionally. This is important for New Zealand given the potential for flows of small arms to destabilise countries in our region.

Shipment of radio-active materials through New Zealand’s immediate neighbourhood is an ongoing concern.
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Public concerns about the safety of shipments of nuclear materials through the Tasman Sea and South Pacific remain strong. While the transport States (UK, France, and Japan) have provided new assurances to New Zealand about safety, and respect for our EEZ, the international liability and compensation regime in the event of an accident falls well short of expectations.

New Zealand is looking at the possibility of a Southern Hemisphere Free of Nuclear Weapons
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Nuclear weapon free zones are part of the international security architecture. The four zones in place in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and Africa are progressively codifying the transition to a nuclear weapon-free world. New zones are sought in regions of tension, including the Middle East and South Asia. New Zealand is reviving the concept promoted by Brazil for a Southern Hemisphere free of nuclear weapons. Advocacy of this has a solid constituency among zone members but will be resisted if perceived by the nuclear weapon states to encroach on freedom of navigation under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

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Disarmament in New Zealand’s defence and security policy

Disarmament policy and defence policy need to be complementary
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Disarmament is a central element in global and regional security, and security policy needs to be fully consistent with disarmament policy. There will also be areas in which defence policy or resources can provide practical support for New Zealand's disarmament agenda. It is important for New Zealand‟s defence policy to support and complement the exercise and implementation of New Zealand‟s disarmament policy. International disarmament initiatives can help manage tensions and reduce the chances of conflict in regions where risks of proliferation or even use of weapons of mass destruction are particularly acute. An active New Zealand role in disarmament is central to our wider security objectives.

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Anti-nuclear policy limits the extent of military co-operation with some major international players
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The US will not exercise with New Zealand while our anti-nuclear policy remains in place, and other restrictions on defence co-operation will continue. This has not precluded us from working together with US forces in peace-keeping operations or “coalitions of the willing”.

Work on conventional weapons is also important
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Landmines are an area in which the NZDF can contribute to New Zealand‟s disarmament objectives. Our policy means there may be a grey area in joint military activity with other countries in combat situations where landmines are used. New Zealand will want to participate actively in global efforts to control small arms. There is potentially a certain amount that New Zealand can do for the small arms problem in our region by way of practical assistance in such areas as training and technical advice. The problem of small arms flows is one of operational concern to the NZDF in the conflicts in many regions where it is or could potentially become involved.


				
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