Terrorism

Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 1 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Terrorism Terrorism................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Terrorism Declining Now.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Terrorism Declining Now.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Impact Defense.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Impact Defense.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 A2: Nuclear Terrorism .............................................................................................................................................................................................. 6 A2: Bioterrorism ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 A2: Cyber Terrorism ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8 A2: Retaliation .......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Nuclear War Outweighs .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 Impact Offense ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 11 Alt Cause................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12 Impact Inevitable ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13 United Nations CP................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14 Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 2 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Terrorism Declining Now The “War on Terror” is moving toward an end George Friedman, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the world‘s leading intelligence and forecasting company, renowned expert on national security, geopolitics, and forecasting, 2009 (―The Next 100 Years,‖ pg. 31) The American Age began in December 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving the United States as the only global power in the world. But the twenty-first century truly began on September 11, 2001, ten years later, when planes slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This was the first real test of the American Age. It is debatable whether the United States has actually won the U.S.-jihadist war—but it has certainly achieved its strategic goals. And it is also clear that the war is, as all wars do, moving toward an end of sorts. People talk about ―the long war,‖ and the idea that the United States and Muslims will be fighting for a century. As is usually the case, what appears permanent is only a passing phase. Consider the twenty-year perspective we have been using. Conflict may continue, but the strategic challenge to American power is coming to an end. Al Qaeda has failed in its goals. The United States has succeeded, not so much in winning the war as in preventing the Islamists from winning, and, from a geopolitical perspective, that is good enough. The twenty-first century has begun with an American success that on the surface looks like not only a defeat but a deep political and moral embarrassment. Estimations of terrorist strength were exaggerated John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, expert on terrorism, Sept/Oct 20 06 (―Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,‖ Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/61911) A fully credible explanation for the fact that the United States has suffered no terrorist attacks since 9/11 is that the threat posed by homegrown or imported terrorists -- like that presented by Japanese Americans during World War II or by American Communists after it -- has been massively exaggerated. Is it possible that the haystack is essentially free of needles? The FBI embraces a spooky I-think-therefore-they-are line of reasoning when assessing the purported terrorist menace. In 2003, its director, Robert Mueller, proclaimed, "The greatest threat is from al Qaeda cells in the U.S. that we have not yet identified." He rather mysteriously deemed the threat from those unidentified entities to be "increasing in part because of the heightened publicity" surrounding such episodes as the 2002 Washington sniper shootings and the 2001 anthrax attacks (which had nothing to do with al Qaeda). But in 2001, the 9/11 hijackers received no aid from U.S.-based al Qaeda operatives for the simple reason that no such operatives appear to have existed. It is not at all clear that that condition has changed. Mueller also claimed to know that "al Qaeda maintains the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." If this was true -- if the terrorists had both the ability and the intent in 2003, and if the threat they presented was somehow increasing -- they had remained remarkably quiet by the time the unflappable Mueller repeated his alarmist mantra in 2005: "I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing." Intelligence estimates in 2002 held that there were as many as 5,000 al Qaeda terrorists and supporters in the United States. However, a secret FBI report in 2005 wistfully noted that although the bureau had managed to arrest a few bad guys here and there after more than three years of intense and well-funded hunting, it had been unable to identify a single true al Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the country. Thousands of people in the United States have had their overseas communications monitored under a controversial warrantless surveillance program. Of these, fewer than ten U.S. citizens or residents per year have aroused enough suspicion to impel the agencies spying on them to seek warrants authorizing surveillance of their domestic communications as well; none of this activity, it appears, has led to an indictment on any charge whatever. In addition to massive eavesdropping and detention programs, every year some 30,000 "national security letters" are issued without judicial review, forcing businesses and other institutions to disclose confidential information about their customers without telling anyone they have done so. That process has generated thousands of leads that, when pursued, have led nowhere. Some 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants have been subjected to fingerprinting and registration, another 8,000 have been called in for interviews with the FBI, and over 5,000 foreign nationals have been imprisoned in initiatives designed to prevent terrorism. This activity, notes the Georgetown University law professor David Cole, has not resulted in a only a small number of people picked up on terrorism charges -- always to great official fanfare -- have been convicted at all, and almost all of these convictions have been for other infractions, particularly immigration violations. Some of those convicted have clearly been mental cases or simply flaunting jihadist bravado -single conviction for a terrorist crime. In fact, rattling on about taking down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch, blowing up the Sears Tower if only they could get to Chicago, beheading the prime minister of Canada, or flooding lower Manhattan by somehow doing something terrible to one of those tunnels. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 3 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Terrorism Declining Now Global terrorism declining – your studies are flawed SFU News, Simon Fraser University News Online, 6/12/08 (―Study finds global terrorism declining,‖ report for the Human Security Report Project in the School for International Studies http://www.sfu.ca/sfunews/Stories/sfunews061208015.shtml) A recently released report by researchers at the SFU-based Human Security Report Project (HSRP) in the School for International Studies challenges the common perception that global terrorism is increasing with compelling evidence that it‘s actually declining. Among their observations in the Human Security Brief 2007, the HSRP researchers conclude that: • Fatalities from terrorism have dropped by 40 per cent while al-Qaeda has faced a dramatic collapse in support throughout the Muslim world. • There has been an "extraordinary, but largely unnoticed, positive change" in the sub-Saharan African security landscape, with the number of conflicts being waged falling by more than half between 1999 and 2006, and the combat toll dropping by 98 per cent. • A previously observed decline in the total number of armed conflicts and combat deaths around the world also continues. The HSRP team analyzed statistical trends from three U.S.-based research centres — the National Counterterrorism Center, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. While trend data from these centres appears to support claims that the threat of terrorism is increasing, HSRP researchers argue that the data are misleading when defined in another way. For example, fatalities in Iraq, which appear to drive the global trend, are typically labeled civilian deaths, but are counted in the centres‘ evaluations. Meanwhile similar acts of civilians being intentionally killed in sub-Saharan Africa civil wars aren‘t counted. The project‘s director, Andrew Mack, says such inconsistencies distort the global terrorism trend data. However, the researchers found that even including the Iraq data, a major recent decline in incidence of terrorism could be seen in the latter half of 2007. The decline is not surprising, says Mack: "Historically, most terrorist campaigns have failed and the Islamists‘ slumping popular support in the Muslim world is now a huge liability for the al–Qaeda network." Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 4 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Impact Defense Risk of terrorist attack exaggerated – inferior WMD capabilities, US and allied intelligence, lack of coordination Glenn L. Carle, member of the CIA‘s Clandestine Service for 23 years, 7/16/ 08 (―Overstating our fears about Osama bin Laden and others of his ilk,‖ The Salt Lake Tribune, http://www.sltrib.com/opinion/ci_9901142) Sen. John McCain has repeatedly characterized the threat of "radical Islamic extremism" as "the absolute gravest threat ... that we're in against." Before we simply accept this, we need to examine the nature of the terrorist threat facing our country. If we do so, we will see how we have allowed the specter of that threat to distort our lives and take our treasure. The "Global War on Terror" has conjured the image of terrorists behind every bush, the bushes themselves burning, and an angry god inciting its faithful to religious war. We have been called to arms, built fences, and compromised our laws and the practices that define us as a nation. The administration has focused on pursuing terrorists and countering an imminent and terrifying threat. Thousands of Americans have died as a result, as have tens of thousands of foreigners. The inclination to trust our leaders when they warn of danger is compelling, particularly when the specters of mushroom clouds and jihadists haunt every debate. McCain, accepting this view of the threats, pledges to continue the Bush administration's policy of few distinctions but ruthless actions. I spent 23 years in the CIA. I drafted or was involved in many of the government's most senior assessments of the threats facing our country. I have devoted years to understanding and combating the jihadist threat. We rightly honor as heroes those who serve our nation and offer their lives to protect ours. We all "support the troops." Yet the first step for any commander is to understand the enemy. The next commander in chief should base his counterterrorism policies on the following realities: We do not face a global jihadist "movement" but a series of disparate ethnic and religious conflicts Osama bin Laden and his disciples are small men and secondary threats whose shadows are made large by our fears. Al-Qaida is the only global jihadist organization and is the only Islamic terrorist organization that targets the U.S. homeland. Al-Qaida remains capable of striking here and is plotting from its redoubt in Waziristan, Pakistan. The organization, however, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing and leading a terrorist operation. Al-Qaida threatens to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, but its capabilities are far inferior to its desires. Even the "loose nuke" threat, whose consequences would be horrific, has a very low probability. For the involving Muslim populations, each of which remains fundamentally regional in nature and almost all of which long predate the existence of al-Qaida. medium term, any attack is overwhelmingly likely to consist of creative uses of conventional explosives. No other Islamic-based terrorist organization, from Mindanao to the Bekaa Valley to the Sahel, targets the U.S. homeland; is part of a "global jihadist movement"; or has more than passing contact with al-Qaida. These groups do and will, however, identify themselves with global jihadist rhetoric and may bandy the bogey-phrase of "al-Qaida." They are motivated by hostility toward the West and fear of the irresistible changes that education, trade, and economic and social development are causing in their cultures. These regional terrorist organizations may target U.S. interests or persons in the groups' historic areas of interest and operations. None of these groups is likely to succeed in seizing power or in destabilizing the societies they attack, though they may succeed in killing numerous people through sporadic attacks such as the Madrid train bombings. There are and will continue to be small numbers of Muslims in certain Western countries - in the dozens, perhaps - who seek to commit terrorist acts, along the lines of the British citizens behind the 2005 London bus bombings. Some may have irregular contact with al-Qaida central in Waziristan; more will act as free agents for their imagined cause. They represent an Islamic-tinged version of the anarchists of the late 19th century: dupes of "true belief," the flotsam of revolutionary cultural change and destruction in Islam, and of personal anomie. We need to catch and neutralize these people. But they do not represent a global movement or a global threat. The threat from Islamic terrorism is no larger now than it was before Sept. 11, 2001. Islamic societies the world over are in turmoil and will continue for years to produce small numbers of dedicated killers, whom we must stop. U.S. and allied intelligence do a good job at that; these efforts, however, will never succeed in neutralizing every terrorist, everywhere. Why are these views so starkly at odds with what the Bush administration has said since the beginning of the "Global War on Terror"? This administration has heard what it has wished to hear, pressured the intelligence community to verify preconceptions, undermined or sidetracked opposing voices, and both instituted and been victim of procedures that guaranteed that the slightest terrorist threat reporting would receive disproportionate weight - thereby comforting the administration's preconceptions and policy inclinations. We must not delude ourselves about the nature of the terrorist threat to our country. We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 5 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Impact Defense Al Qaeda and the Islamic world are not a threat to the US – fragmentation and internal conflicts George Friedman, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the world‘s leading intelligence and forecasting company, renowned expert on national security, geopolitics, and forecasting, 2009 (―The Next 100 Years,‖ pg. 49) Muslim states themselves. They are the ultimate targets of al Qaeda, and whatever their views of Islam or the West, the Muslim states are not about to turn over political power to al Qaeda. Rather, they will use their national power—their intelligence, security, and military capabilities—to crush al Qaeda. The United States wins as long as al Qaeda loses. An Islamic world in chaos, incapable of uniting, means the United States has achieved its strategic goal. One thing the United States has indisputably done since 2001 is to create chaos in the Islamic world, generating animosity toward America— and perhaps terrorists who will attack it in the future. But the regional earthquake is not coalescing into a regional superpower. In fact, the region is more fragmented than ever, and that is likely to close the book on this era. U.S. defeat or stalemate in Iraq and Afghanistan is the likely outcome, and both wars will appear to have ended badly for the United States. There is no question that American execution of the war in Iraq has been clumsy, graceless, and in many ways unsophisticated. The United States was, indeed, adolescent in its simplification of issues and in its use of power. But on a broader, more strategic level, that does not matter. So long as the Muslims are fighting each other, the United States has won its war. As the U.S.-jihadist war slithers to an end, the first line of defense against Islamic radicals will be the Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 6 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao A2: Nuclear Terrorism Threats of nuclear terrorism are overblown by uninformed policymakers and the press Brian Jenkins, internationally renowned terrorism expert, 2008 (―Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?,‖ pg. 55-56) The terrorist attacks on 9/11, not surprisingly, renewed all of the old debates—whether terrorists could get their hands on nuclear weapons or fissile material, whether terrorists could fabricate nuclear weapons, and if they did, what the consequences might be. One major difference between the discussion of nuclear terrorism in the early twenty-first century and the discussions in the 1970s is that different people were doing the talking. In the 1970s, the discussion of nuclear terrorism was initiated and dominated by scientists and a handful of terrorism analysts. Having settled the science with a rough consensus on the plausibility of terrorists clandestinely fabricating a crude nuclear bomb, the Los Alamos generation gradually faded from the scene. From the 1990s on, and especially since 9/11, the discussion of nuclear terrorism has been taken over by policy makers, most of whom possess little knowledge of technical matters. They are backed up by a press that tends to be somewhat ignorant of science and by what one critic has called the "terrorism industry." That label may be a bit cynical, but the tone of the current debate is decidedly more alarming and alarmist. It is difficult to determine exactly when, why, or how the estimated yield of a clandestinely fabricated, crude terrorist nuclear device rose from a tenth or a few tenths of a kiloton to today's "standard" assumption of ten kilotons—a fiftyfold to hundredfold increase. Both are mere estimates, to be sure. Neither the analysts nor the terrorists themselves know what yield they might achieve. And a yield of a tenth of a kiloton—roughly ten times the size of the largest truck bomb that we have seen—is capable of bringing down a skyscraper. Ted Taylor reckoned that a half-kiloton device could topple one of the World Trade Center towers. A tenth of a kiloton might do it.48 But there is a difference. A ten-kiloton device is roughly the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. It would obliterate several city blocks of high-rise buildings. The nuclear bomb tested by the North Koreans in 2006 had a yield of about a half-kiloton. By modern weapons standards, it was close to a dud. The nuclear bombs tested by India and Pakistan in 1999, in contrast, were in the six- to twelve-kiloton range. One has to wonder how terrorists, working under difficult circumstances, would manage to build a nuclear bomb ten to twenty times more powerful than the North Korean bomb. The issue here is not the accuracy of the estimated yield, but the tendency over time to inflate estimates of terrorist capabilities and, thereby, the potential consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack. Minimal impact to a nuclear terrorist attack John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester, expert on terrorism, and Karl Mueller, Assistant Professor of Comparative Military Studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, May/Jun 1999 (―Rethinking Sanctions on Iraq—The Real Weapons of Mass Destruction?,‖ Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/55009/john-mueller-and-karlmueller/sanctions-of-mass-destruction) Nuclear weapons clearly deserve the "weapons of mass destruction" designation because they can indeed destroy masses of people in a single blow. Even so, it is worth noting that any nuclear weapons acquired by terrorist groups or rogue states, at least initially, are likely to be small. Contrary to exaggerated Indian and Pakistani claims, for example, independent analyses of their May 1998 nuclear tests have concluded that the yields were Hiroshima-sized or smaller. Such bombs can cause horrible though not apocalyptic damage. Some 70,000 people died in Hiroshima and 40,000 in Nagasaki. People three miles away from the blast sites received only superficial wounds even when fully exposed, and those inside bomb shelters at Nagasaki were uninjured even though they were close to ground zero. Some buildings of steel and concrete survived, even when they were close to the blast centers, and most municipal services were restored within days. A Hiroshima- sized bomb exploded in a more fire-resistant modern city would likely be considerably less devastating. Used against wellprepared, dug-in, and dispersed troops, a small bomb might actually cause only limited damage. If a single such bomb or even a few of them were to fall into dangerous hands, therefore, it would be terrible, though it would hardly threaten the end of civilization. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 7 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao A2: Bioterrorism Bioterror is comparatively ineffective, expensive, and inefficient – empirically proven Stratfor, private intelligence agency, analyzes geopolitical trends, 12/21/07 (―Bioterrorism: Sudden Death Overtime?,‖ http://www2.stratfor.com/analysis/bioterrorism_sudden_death_overtime) In this season of large college bowl games and the National Football League playoffs in the United States, and large nonsporting events such as the New Year‘s Eve celebration in New York‘s Times Square — not to mention the upcoming Olympic Games in Beijing — a discussion of bioterrorism and the threat it poses might be of interest. First, it must be recognized that during the past several decades of the modern terrorist era, biological weapons Contrary to their portrayal in movies and television shows, biological have been used very infrequently — and there are some very good reasons for this. agents are difficult to manufacture and deploy effectively in the real world. In spite of the fear such substances engender, even in cases in which they have been somewhat effective they have proven to be less effective and more costly than more conventional attacks using firearms and explosives. In fact, nobody even noticed what was perhaps the largest malevolent deployment of biological agents in history, in which thousands of gallons of liquid anthrax and botulinum toxin were released during several attacks in a major metropolitan area over a three-year period. This use of biological agents was perpetrated by the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo. An examination of the group‘s chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program provides some important insight into biological weapons, their costs — and their limitations. In the late 1980s, Aum‘s team of trained scientists spent millions of dollars to develop a series of state-of-the-art biological weapons research and production laboratories. The group experimented with botulinum toxin, anthrax, cholera and Q fever and even tried to acquire the Ebola virus. The group hoped to produce enough biological agent to trigger a global Armageddon. Between April of 1990 and August of 1993, Aum conducted seven large-scale attacks involving the use of thousands of gallons of biological agents — four with anthrax and three with botulinum toxin. The group‘s first attempts at unleashing mega-death on the world involved the use of botulinum toxin. In April of 1990, Aum used a fleet of three trucks equipped with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin on targets that included the Imperial Palace, the Diet and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. In spite of the massive quantities of agent released, there were no mass casualties and, in fact, nobody outside of the cult was even aware the attacks had taken place. When the botulinum operations failed to produce results, Aum‘s scientists went back to the drawing board and retooled their biological weapons facilities to produce anthrax. By mid-1993, they were ready to launch attacks involving anthrax, and between June and August of 1993 the group sprayed thousands of gallons of aerosolized liquid anthrax in Tokyo. This time Aum not only employed its the attacks produced no results and were not even noticed. It was only after the group‘s successful 1995 subway attacks using sarin nerve agent that a Japanese government investigation discovered that the 1990 and 1993 biological attacks had occurred. Aum Shinrikyo‘s team of highly trained scientists worked under ideal conditions in a first-world country with a virtually unlimited budget. The team worked in large, modern facilities to produce substantial quantities of biological weapons. Despite the millions of dollars the fleet of sprayer trucks, but also use sprayers mounted on the roof of their headquarters to disperse a cloud of aerosolized anthrax over the city. Again, group spent on its bioweapons program, it still faced problems in creating virulent biological agents, and it also found it difficult to dispense those agents effectively. Even when the group switched to employing a nerve agent, it only succeeded in killing a handful of people. A comparison between the Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway attack and the jihadist attack against the Madrid trains in 2004 shows that chemical/biological attacks are more expensive to produce and yield fewer results than attacks using conventional explosives. In the March 1995 Tokyo subway attack — Aum‘s most successful — the group placed 11 sarin-filled plastic bags on five different subway trains and killed 12 people. In the 2004 Madrid attack, jihadists detonated 10 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and killed 191 people. Aum‘s CBW program cost millions and took years of research and effort; the Madrid bombings only cost a few thousand dollars, and the IEDs were assembled in a few days. The most deadly biological terrorism attack to date was the case involving a series of letters containing anthrax in the weeks following the Sept. 11 attacks — a case the FBI calls Amerithrax. While the Amerithrax letters did cause panic and result in companies all across the country temporarily shutting down if a panicked employee spotted a bit of drywall dust or powdered sugar from doughnuts eaten by someone on the last shift, in practical terms, the attacks were very ineffective. The Amerithrax letters resulted in five deaths; another 22 victims were infected but recovered after receiving medical treatment. The letters did not succeed in infecting senior officials at the media companies targeted by the first wave of letters, or Sens. Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy, who were targeted by a second wave of letters. By way of comparison, John Mohammed, the so-called ―D.C. Sniper,‖ was able to cause mass panic and kill twice as many people (10) by simply purchasing and using one assault rifle. This required far less time, effort and expense than producing the anthrax spores used in the Amerithrax case. It is this cost-benefit ratio that, from a militant‘s perspective, makes firearms and explosives more attractive weapons for an attack. This then is the primary reason that more attacks using biological weapons have not been executed: The cost is higher than the benefit. Certainly, history has shown that militant organizations and homegrown militants are interested in large sporting events as venues for terror; one needs to look no further than the 1972 Munich Massacre, the 1980 Olympic Park bombing or even the 2005 incident in which University of Oklahoma student Joel Hinrichs died after a TATP-filled backpack he was wearing exploded outside a football game at Oklahoma Memorial Stadium, to see this. Because of this, vigilance is needed. However, militants planning such attacks will be far more likely to use firearms or IEDs in their attacks than they will biological agents. Unfortunately, in the real world guns and suicide bombs are far more common — and more deadly — than air horns filled with creepy bioterror. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 8 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao A2: Cyber Terrorism Cyber-terror is not a threat – your cards are alarmist Benjamin Friedman, PhD candidate in Political Science from MIT, research fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute, terrorism expert, 6/23/09 (―Morozov vs. Cyber-Alarmism, CATO @ Liberty, http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/06/23/morozov-vscyber-alarmism/) I‘m no information security expert, but you don‘t have to be to realize that an outbreak of cyber-alarmism afflicts American pundits and reporters. As Jim Harper and Tim Lee have repeatedly argued (with a little help from me), while the internet created new opportunities for crime, spying, vandalism and military attack, the evidence that the web opens a huge American national security vulnerability comes not from events but from improbable what-ifs. That idea is, in other words, still a theory. Few pundits bother to point out that hackers don‘t kill, that cyberspies don‘t seem to have stolen many (or any?) important American secrets, and that our most critical infrastructure is not run on the public internet and thus is relatively invulnerable to cyberwhatever. They never note that to the extent that future wars have an online component, this redounds to the U.S. advantage, given our technological prowess. Even the Wall Street Journal and New York Times recently published breathless stories exaggerating our vulnerability to online attacks and espionage. Cyber-threats are over-exaggerated to support the interests of agencies, politicians, companies, and the press. Evgeny Morozov, fellow at the Open Society Institute, Director of New Media at Transitions Online, expert on Internet-politics relations, Jul/Aug 2009 (―Cyber-Scare: The exaggerated fears over digital warfare,‖ Boston Review, http://bostonreview.net/BR34.4/morozov.php) In part, then, the solution to cyber-insecurity is simple: if you have a lot of classified information on a computer and do not want to become part of another GhostNet-like operation, do not connect it to the Internet. This is by far the safest way to preserve the integrity of your data. Of course, it may be impossible to keep your computer disconnected from all networks. And by connecting to virtually any network—no matter how secure—you relinquish sole control over your computer. In most cases, however, this is a tolerable risk: on average, you are better off connected, and you can guard certain portions of a network, while leaving others exposed. This is Network Security 101, and high-value networks are built by very smart IT experts. Moreover, most really sensitive networks are designed in ways that prevent third-party visitors—even if they manage somehow to penetrate the system—from doing much damage. For example, hackers who invade the email system of a nuclear reactor will not be able to blow up nuclear facilities with a mouse click. Data and security breaches vary in degree, but such subtlety is usually lost on decision-makers and journalists alike. Hype aside, what we do know is that there are countless attacks on the government computers in virtually every major Western country, many of them for the purpose of espionage and intelligence gathering; data have been lost, compromised, and altered. The United States may have been affected the most: the State Department estimates that it has lost ―terabytes‖ of data to cyber-attacks, while Pentagon press releases suggest that it is under virtually constant cyber-siege. Dangerous as they are, these are still disturbing incidents of data loss rather than seriously breached data or compromised networks. Breakthroughs in encryption techniques have also made data more secure than ever. As for the data loss, the best strategy is to follow some obvious rules: be careful, and avoid trafficking data in open spaces. (Don‘t put important data anywhere on the Internet, and don‘t leave laptops with classified information in hotel rooms.) Although there is a continuous spectrum of attacks, running from classified memos to nuclear buttons, we have seen no evidence that access to the latter is very likely or even possible. Vigilance is vital, but exaggeration and blind acceptance of speculative assertions are not. So why is there so much concern about ―cyber-terrorism‖? Answering a question with a question: who frames the debate? Much of the data are gathered by ultra-secretive government agencies—which need to justify their own existence—and cyber-security companies—which derive commercial benefits from popular anxiety. Journalists do not help. Gloomy scenarios and speculations about cyber-Armaggedon draw attention, even if they are relatively short on facts. Politicians, too, deserve some blame, as they are usually quick to draw parallels between cyber-terrorism and conventional terrorism—often for geopolitical convenience—while glossing over the vast differences that make military metaphors inappropriate. In particular, cyber-terrorism is anonymous, decentralized, and even more detached than ordinary terrorism from physical locations. Cyber-terrorists do not need to hide in caves or failed states; ―cyber-squads‖ typically reside in multiple geographic locations, which tend to be urban and well-connected to the global communications grid. Some might still argue that state sponsorship (or mere toleration) of cyber-terrorism could be treated as casus belli, but we are yet to see a significant instance of cyber-terrorists colluding with governments. All of this makes talk of large-scale retaliation impractical, if not irresponsible, but also understandable if one is trying to attract attention. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 9 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao A2: Retaliation US retaliation impossible – unable to determine the attacker Mark Dowle, Professor at the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California-Berkeley, Sept 2005 (―Nuclear Fallout: Berkeley Team Thinks Beyond the Unthinkable,‖ California Monthly, http://www.alumni.berkeley.edu/Alumni/Cal_Monthly/September_2005/COVER_STORY-_Berkeleys_Big_Bang_Project_.asp) Because terrorists tend to be stateless and well hidden, immediate retaliation in kind is almost impossible. But some nuclear explosions do leave an isotopic signature, a DNA-like fingerprint that allows forensic physicists such as Naval Postgraduate School weapons systems analyst Bob Harney to possibly determine the origin of the fissile material in the bomb. Nuclear forensics is not a precise science, Harney warns. Post-attack sites are almost certain to be contaminated with unrelated or naturally occurring radioactivity, and there are numerous, highly enriched uranium stashes in the world with unknown signatures. But there is no question, according to Peter Huessy, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger and consultant to the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., that Russian forensic experts could quickly detect Russian isotopes, and that highly enriched uranium (HEU) from, say, France could readily be differentiated from American HEU. But, Huessy warns, distinguishing post-blast residues of Pakistani uranium from North Korean uranium would be more challenging, probably impossible. Because neither country is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA inspectors have been unable to collect from their facilities reliable isotope samples that could be compared to post-attack residues. Even if the uranium were traced, the source nation could claim that the material had been stolen. No retaliation despite immense pressure Roger Alford, Professor of International Law at Pepperdine University School of Law, 3/7/ 07 (―The Awful New Arithmetic of the Atomic Bomb,‖ Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/roger-alford/the-awful-new-arithmetic-_b_42864.html) Just one little problem: nuclear forensics. On the morning after, just how do you do forensics on ground zero to identify the source? After a nuclear strike the will to respond will be overwhelming. But in order to retaliate in kind, we will need more than what the nuclear crime scene investigators can provide. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 10 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Nuclear War Outweighs Nuclear war outweighs nuclear terrorism Linda Rothstein, editor of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (BAS), Catherine Auer, managing editor of the BAS, and Jonas Siegel, assistant editor of the BAS, Nov/Dec 2004 (―Rethinking Doomsday,‖ http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04rothstein) Nuclear terrorism would be horrific, but nuclear war would be far worse. As Lynn Eden reported in "City on Fire," fire damage from nuclear explosions has been vastly and systematically underestimated—a move that allowed early U.S. war planners to demand a much larger nuclear arsenal. As Eden wrote, a single 300-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated above the Pentagon on a clear day would engulf the surrounding 65 square miles in firestorms that would "extinguish all life and destroy almost everything else." And that's a conservative estimate. Let's recap. An attack from a weapons state is highly unlikely; an accidental nuclear launch is far more worrisome. As remote as the possibility is, all-out nuclear war has the potential to end human life on the planet—still the true doomsday scenario. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 11 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Impact Offense Terrorism helps the US economy Timothy Noah, journalist that worked for The New Republic, the Wall Street Journal, US News and World Report, Newsweek, etc., 9/12/ 01 (―Will Terrorism Resuscitate the U.S. Economy,‖ Slate Magazine, http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=1008279) The Wall Street Journal and Washington Post both predict in their Sept. 12 news columns that the havoc wrought by yesterday's events may bring on a recession. Chatterbox thinks they couldn't have it more wrong. While the destruction of the World Trade Center, the multiple plane crashes, and the damage to the Pentagon are morally obscene because of the (probably thousands) of deaths and countless injuries they caused, economically the net result of the terrorists' actions is likely to be beneficial to the United States. "The U.S. economy will go into a recession as a result of the terrorist attack," Sung Won San, chief economist for Wells Fargo & Co., told the Post's John M. Berry and Steven Pearlstein. Why? Consumer confidence will tumble. But what does anxiety about a terrible but decidedly non-monetary tragedy have to do with consumer confidence? In the Journal, Greg Ip and John D. McKinnon explain that by causing an oil spike, the Gulf War depressed consumer confidence and eventually helped cause a recession. Yesterday's oil prices did indeed spike, and "as political tensions rise again in the Mideast" we may see oil prices stay high for some time. Translation: If the United States bombs or invades Afghanistan in order to take out Osama Bin Laden--the increasingly likely mastermind of yesterday's mayhem--then oil-producing nations might get mad and cut back oil production. Could be, but there are an awful lot of "ifs" there. (Certainly the oil-producing Saudis seem unlikely to shed any tears for Bin Laden, who for years has been on the lam from Saudi law enforcement.) Another consumer confidence argument is that people will stay out of airplanes in After a traumatic event like this one, people are eager to reassert normal patterns of behavior, even--perhaps especially--if it means suppressing rational fears. Call it a laudable refusal to be bullied, or call it a pathological amnesia, but it's real and it's beneficial to the economy. (Consider, for example, all droves for fear of fatal hijackings. But Chatterbox bets that won't happen. the people who rebuild their California houses after earthquakes.) As for the stock market, Chatterbox defers to Moneybox columnist Rob Walker's wise judgment that there probably won't be any significant effect. OK, so the World Trade Center disaster won't harm the economy. Why does Chatterbox think it will benefit the economy? Simple: because we live in a very wealthy nation that responds to horrible disasters by spending large sums of money. In this case, the spending will come both from private insurers and from the federal government's Federal Emergency Management Agency, which over the past decade has established itself as a politically unstoppable source of federal largesse. FEMA helped Southern California's recession-plagued economy to boom after it suffered various natural disasters in the early 1990s. In that instance, of course, California benefited from a Democratic administration's reliance on its votes in the upcoming 1996 election. Since New York is unlikely to go for Bush in 2004, this president will likely be less enthusiastic about rebuilding it. But rebuild it he must if he wants to demonstrate that terrorists can't damage U.S. morale. Why will the entire U.S. economy benefit, as opposed to just New York's? Because the money will be spent in the nerve center of American finance, which is having a rough time of it these days. Chatterbox believes that the mere presence of construction activity around Wall Street will have a beneficial psychological effect on bankers and brokers. It will also provide a meaningful Keynesian stimulus to a national economy that, let's face it, was tottering on the brink of recession well before Sept. 11. The recession may still come, but the countercyclical spending should help shorten it. Does this mean we should be glad that terrorists attacked the United States? Of course not. For years the leftist San Francisco economic think tank Redefining Progress has been pointing out that, by boosting spending, disease and natural disasters and assorted other social ills routinely increase the Gross Domestic Product. (See, for example, "If The GDP Is Up, Why Is America Down?" by Clifford Cobb, Ted Halstead, and Jonathan Rowe in the Oct. 1995 Atlantic Monthly.) The answer, obviously, is not to have more disease and natural disasters, but rather to rely less on GDP as an absolute measure of the nation's well-being. Still, Chatterbox won't deny a certain Churchillian satisfaction in believing that in seeking to harm America, terrorists will probably end up in making it more prosperous. They can make us die, and they can make us weep, but they can't make us poor. Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 12 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Alt Cause Balkan organized crime strengthens international terrorism Selvete Gërxhaliu, Ph.D. candidate in international criminal law, legal advisor to the Kosovo Prime Minister, formerly worked for Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Jan 20 07 (―Human Security, Organized Crime, and Terrorism Challenges in Kosovo‘s Perspective,‖ http://www.etc-graz.at/cms/fileadmin/user_upload/humsec/Workin_Paper_Series/Working_Paper_Gerxhaliu.pdf, pg. 5) Notes: Jan 2007 – last known source before publication International terrorism has not yet taken roots in the Western Balkans. Nevertheless, this threat cannot be ignored. Based on initial assessments, there are already visible attempts of terrorist groups to slowly infiltrate the region to establish beachheads for future use. This process is strengthened by the existence of a rather strong ―community‖ of criminals which, unlike the law enforcement and intelligence services in the region, are able to maintain a high level of cooperation among themselves22. Terrorism inevitable as long as totalitarianism exists Binyamin Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel, 4/27/02 (―The Root Cause of Terrorism,‖ aish.com, http://www.aish.com/ci/s/48898622.html) who practice terrorism do not believe in these things. In fact, they believe in the very opposite. For them, the cause they espouse is so all-encompassing, so total, that it justifies anything. It allows them to break any law, discard any moral code and trample all human rights in the dust. In their eyes, it permits them to indiscriminately murder and maim innocent men and women, and lets them blow up a bus full of children. There is a name for the doctrine that produces this evil. It is called totalitarianism. Indeed, the root cause of terrorism is totalitarianism. Only a totalitarian regime, by systemically brainwashing its subjects, can indoctrinate hordes of killers to suspend all moral constraints for the sake of a twisted cause. That is why from its inception totalitarianism has always been wedded to terrorism -- from Lenin to Stalin to Hitler to the ayatollahs to Saddam Hussein, right down to Osama bin Laden and Yasser Arafat. It is not merely that the goals of terrorists do not justify the means they choose, it is that the means they choose tell us what their true goals are. Osama bin Laden is not seeking to defend the rights of Muslims but to murder as many Americans as possible, and ultimately to destroy America. Saddam Hussein is not seeking to defend his people but to subjugate his neighbors. Arafat is not seeking to build a state but to destroy a state; the many massacres of Jews he sponsors tells us what he would do to all the Jews of Israel if he had enough power. Those who fight as terrorists rule as terrorists. People who deliberately target the innocent never become leaders who protect freedom and human rights. When terrorists seize power, they invariably set up the darkest of dictatorships -- whether in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan or Arafatistan. In short, the reason why some resort to terror and others do not is not any absence of rights, but the presence of a tyrannical mindset. The totalitarian mind knows no limits. The democratic mind sets them everywhere. But those Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 13 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao Impact Inevitable WMD attack inevitable by 2013 Newsmax.com, 9/10/08 (―Terror Expert: WMD Attack on U.S. Inevitable,‖ http://www.newsmax.com/headlines/cetron_terror_attack/2008/09/10/129636.html) A major terrorist attack on the United States, probably featuring a weapon of mass destruction, is inevitable during the next four to five years, says Marvin J. Cetron, the futurist who predicted 9/11 with alarming insight. During an exclusive interview with Newsmax, Cetron said the attack could come in as little as two-and-a-half to three years. Obama means terrorist attack is inevitable David A. Patten, graduate of the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University and the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, 6/14/09 (―FBI Agent: Obama Making Another 9/11 ‗Inevitable‘,‖ Newsmax.com, http://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/fbi_agent_al_qaida/2009/05/14/214563.html) A former FBI agent who recently won a lawsuit defeating FBI attempts to muzzle him tells Newsmax that the agency's morale may be at its lowest ebb ever, and warns the "chilling" effect of Obama administration policies is making another terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland "inevitable." Speaking in an exclusive Newsmax interview, retired FBI Agent John Vincent says his gravest concern is that the Obama administration is repeating mistakes of the past, thereby leaving America vulnerable to a terrorist attack. "I'm not exactly sure where the president is coming from, but all the signals he gives out is that the United States is prepared to talk peace, we're not going to do anything to upset any of the people that are conducting all these terrorist acts, we're going to back out of everything we've done before, we're going to apologize for everything we've done in the past – what kind of signals does that send?" Vincent asks. "It sends a signal of weakness and: 'We are not willing to try and stop what you have planned.'" Stahl-Bricker-Harris SDI 2009 14 Terrorism – Daniel Zhao United Nations CP Counterplan Text: The United Nations should establish a global anti-terrorism organization. Competition: 1. Net benefit – the CP avoids DAs to the case and captures multilateralism 2. Not topical – the CP doesn’t use the USFG to increase social services for persons living in poverty in the United States Solvency: 1. The CP solves multilateralism and terrorism through cooperation Alistair Miller, Director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, and Eric Rosand, senior fellow at the Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Nov 2007 (―Building Global Alliances in the Fight Against Terrorism,‖ http://www.globalproblemsglobalsolutions-files.org/unf_website/PDF/2008_millar_rosand_terrorism.pdf, pg. 10-11) The next Administration should call for the establishment of a global anti-terrorism organization under the auspices of the UN. The new White House ‗Czar‖ for International Counterterrorism Cooperation should lead an inter-agency process within the U.S. government to guarantee that this organization receives support from all the relevant departments, including Homeland Security, State, Justice, Treasury, and Defense. It should be made abundantly clear, perhaps in a presidential address to the General will serve the interests of not only the United States, but also countries in all parts of the world, and that the next Administration intends to work with partners within and outside of the UN in supporting the creation and the work of Assembly in September 2009, that the new global counterterrorism body such an entity. In addition to overcoming the inter-agency turf battles among State, Defense, Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security that have characterized U.S. multilateral engagement on counterterrorism issues under the Bush Administration, White House leadership will be needed to overcome the inevitable skepticism from career U.S. government counterterrorism officials the United States would benefit from the creation of an effective global body dedicated to counterterrorism are numerous. It could provide a forum for engaging with traditional and non-traditional allies on a range of counterterrorism issues, including those related to countering the growing radicalization and extremism that fuels Islamist terrorism and for which there is currently no broad-based and effective forum. To overcome the stigma attached to its bilateral relations with many Muslim countries, the U.S. could take advantage of such a forum for developing broad-based programs with countries such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, and other leading voices in the Muslim world as part of a multilateral effort to help to overcome the growing skepticism and distrust among Muslim nations and communities around the globe that the U.S.-led counterterrorism effort is targeting Islam. • It could help sustain U.S. engagement in the hard and unglamorous work of counterterrorism when the political spotlight fades at home and help sustain international engagement that has already waned because of the perception that this has all been about U.S. interests and even U.S. hegemony. • It could improve the coordination, cooperation, and information sharing among individual nations and different multilateral bodies currently engaged in counterterrorism activities and become the focal point for coordinating international counterterrorism technical assistance efforts, which would help the international community make better use of the limited funds and expertise available. • It regarding the contributions that multilateral bodies can make to this global effort. The reasons why could help spread among many countries the capacity building and training burdens that are currently subsidized by the United States and a handful of other countries. • It could focus on the urgent task of identifying and correcting vulnerabilities in countries that are not priority countries for run the risk of becoming terrorist safe havens or breeding grounds for terrorism. • If designed properly, a new global body could not only be able to set international counterterrorism standards for trains, busses and other mass transit systems, where, unlike aviation, international norms on security do not currently exist, but also publicly identify those countries lacking the political will to comply with these standards. • It could also highlight its members‘ commitment to upholding the highest standards of human rights and the rule of law while countering terrorism by enunciating a clear set of principles in this area. Such an initiative should be coupled with the closing of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and a clear statement by the next Administration signaling America‘s strong support for these standards. • Finally, a new body could provide a forum for the United States to show its commitment to a multilateral, rule-of-law-based approach to combating terrorism and enable it to work more effectively with traditional and nontraditional allies, conferring greater legitimacy to its counterterrorism efforts and reassuring other countries that the days of American unilateralism in addressing the terrorist threat are a thing of the past. The military has an indispensable role to play on the frontlines of the the U.S. but which tight against terror. However, it is time for a strategic realignment to alleviate the immense pressure on our military and to ensure that our global partners are fighting with us and sharing the burden. As the 2006 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states, during the Cold War we created an array of domestic and international institutions and enduring partnerships to Today, we require similar transformational structures to carry forward the fight against terror and to help ensure our ultimate success.‖ With the continuation of terrorist attacks around the globe, the need to fill this gaping hole in the defeat the threat of communism. international system has become more obvious than ever.