CCSEAS bulletin by mifei


									CCSEAS Bulletin
Newsletter of the Canadian Council of Southeast Asian Studies
Fall 2003 (vol. 3, issue 1)

Peter Vandergeest, (President) Lisa Drummond (Vice-President)

Steve Déry (Vice-President Finance) Keith Barney and Karen McAllister (Graduate Student Representatives & Bulletin Editors)

An Electronic Forum for Southeast Asian Studies in Canada
This CCSEAS Bulletin is the third of what is becoming a regular communication between scholars of Southeast Asia in Canada. The Bulletin is sent out via email to members of the Canadian Council of Southeast Asian Studies (CCSEAS). Current and past issues are accessible online through the CCSEAS website at . If you would rather not receive this newsletter, please send the editor a message at . The CCSEAS Bulletin is intended to help develop a cohesive network of Canadian scholars involved in SEAS, encouraging new approaches and collaborations, and building a critical mass of accessible Canadian research on Southeast Asian issues. We welcome contributions and suggestions, so if you have any news, ideas, or comments, send them to us so we can include these in the next CCSEAS Bulletin. Please keep contributions concise, and copies in both English and French would be appreciated.

Welcome to the Third Edition:

A Note from the Executive Committee
The new executive committee and CCSEAS Bulletin editors are pleased to bring you the third volume of our newsletter. The newsletter includes three parts: first, a short report on the CCSEAS conference in Montreal; second, an introduction to graduate students working on Southeast Asia out of Canadian institutions, and third, five short essays on the regional dimensions of the Bali Bombing.

Upcoming Conferences and Events
Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting: San Diego, CA, USA, March 4-7, 2004.

Most of this newsletter is devoted to the third part, the retrospective on the Bali Bombing and thoughts on terrorist network in Southeast Asia. Our motivation in collecting these essays was a concern with some of the basic assumptions which has organized media and expert presentations of this event. These presentations are often not based in the kind of strong regional knowledge found among members of CCSEAS. Many scholars with area studies expertise in Southeast Asia believe that the media and its usual repertoire of experts on terrorism are far too quick to explain the Bali Bombing and other regional conflicts in terms of international networks of terrorists. The argument that runs through most of the essays included here is that these events are primarily expressions of ongoing regional political conflicts, and that ties to international terrorist networks extending from the Middle East are weak at best. Four of the five essays in this newsletter began as presentations for panels organized first at York University, later reconvened for the CCSEAS conference in Montreal in October. The fifth author is located in Montreal, and was thus not part of the original panel at York. Readers who would like more information are invited to contact the individual authors.
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 23 Page 1 of One of our reasons for initiating this bulletin was as a means for Canadian scholars and professionals with an interest in Southeast Asia to learn about each other. In volume 2, we introduced some new faculty with scholarly interests in Southeast Asia. In this issue we are turning our attention to graduate students. We sent around a general call for graduate student to write short paragraphs about themselves and their research; the responses that we received are presented in the second section of this newsletter. Readers will see that we have an active graduate student community working on Southeast Asia in Canada, which bodes well for continued Canadian strength in Southeast Asian Studies. Our apologies to those students who did not hear about our call; we invite you to send in descriptions of what you are doing, which will be included in our next volume. We would like to thank Craig Candler for his superb work in editing and compiling the previous CCSEAS newsletters.


The Montreal Conference

The biannual conference of the Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies, Coping with Globalization:

East Asian and Southeast Asian Historical and Cultural Heritages, was held in Montreal, October 10-12, organized jointly with the East Asia Council. Rodolphe de Koninck respresented CCSEAS on the joint organizing committee. The large number of panels and presentations at the conference demonstrate that Southeast Asian studies are doing very well in Canada. Geoff Hainsworth was the keynote speaker for our council; he presented a biting critique of current trends in development assistance in Southeast Asia, and is inviting feedback from anyone who wants to read his presentation notes. The conference program may be found be found on the website for the Canadian Association for Asian Studies. Our annual meeting was lively as usual. The minutes are also posted on the CASA website. Highlights include:     The next CCSEAS Conference will be held at York University in October 2005. CASA will hold its bi-annual conference in Calgary in October, 2004. This is a change from the usual pattern of holding a CASA conference with the Learneds every other year. Membership in CCSEAS has tripled to over 60 members during the past two years, primarily due to the active efforts of the new CASA staff (Annamaria Piccioni and Brooke Ellis) to encourage membership. Rodolphe de Koninck will organize a limited publication of proceedings from the 2003 conference. Papers will go through a refereeing process, and be published through the sponsorship Asian studies institution at the University of Montreal, York University, and the University of British Columbia. A suggestion that CCSEAS change its name to Southeast Asia Council (SEAC) was unanimously rejected. The reasons given in favour of the change was to make our name consistent with the two other regional councils making up CASA, and to eliminate redundancy with respect to the word Canada, which is also in CASA. The key reason given by members for rejecting the suggestion was that our current name and acronym predates CASA, and has international recognition and respect. A new executive was elected:
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CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Peter Vandergeest (York University): President Lisa Drummond (York University): Vice-President Steve Déry (Laval University): Vice-President, Finance Karen McAllister (McGill University): Student Representative Keith Barney (York University): Student Representative


New Canadian Scholars of Southeast Asia
Steve Déry Geography, Université Laval

Steve Déry joined the Department of Geography at Laval University on October 1st 2003 as a Southeast Asian studies specialist. His ongoing research aims at improving the understanding of the environmental policies role in integrating marginal regions in Southeast Asia‟s peninsular countries.


Canadian Graduate Students Undertaking Research in Southeast Asia

The following represents our efforts in collecting a listing of Canadian graduate students undertaking current research in Southeast Asian studies. We hope that this may serve as a way of promoting a sharing of understandings, skills and experiences, and to assist in developing an assemblage of engaged, committed and effective researchers. From this first effort, it seems there are concentrations in the areas of environment and natural resources; gender and development; globalization and uneven development; urban studies and migration; labour regimes; Islamic studies; and social policy and human rights. Please do contact the editors if we missed you, you can still be included in the next newsletter. Muhrisun Afandi Master‟s Programme in Social Work, McGill University Country of research: Indonesia Research focus: “Intervention Programs for Street Children in Jogjakarta, Indonesia.” This research is aimed to expose in detail the major problems of street children in the royal city of Jogjakarta, which have not been included in previous national studies on street children in Indonesia. It is hoped that this research will provide feedback on the failure of the intervention programs instituted by the government and, furthermore, will apply pressure on the government to change their policy on street children in Jogjakarta and in country as a whole. E-mail contact:

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Page 3 of 23 Bastien Affeltranger PhD Candidate, Université Laval, Québec Country of research: Vietnam and PR China (Yunnan Province) Research focus: "Polycentric governance and cooperation over international basins: modelling the involvement of multiple decision levels in the process. A study of sino-vietnamese relations on the Red River”. Statistical analysis of international relations only partly account for the geopolitics of shared water courses and river basins. The dichotomy between state versus non-state actors also limits the study of events and processes occurring at intra-national and trans-national levels. Designing water-related cooperation schemes requires multi-scalar analysis. The objectives of this study are to 1. examine the status of water issues in the geopolitics of Sino-Vietnamese relations, 2. understand the terms & conditions of water-sharing and information exchange, 3. apply stakeholder mapping and multi-scalar approach of water-related institutions, 4. devise an inventory of priorities of existing government levels, 5. explore the role of geographic representations in the construction of water issues, and 6. understand the conditions of third-party mediation to support a cooperation process. E-mail contact:

Ian Baird PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia Countries of research: Thailand, Laos, Cambodia Research focus: Ian G. Baird is a PhD student in Geography at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver. He has had extensive previous experience working for NGOs and conducting natural resource management oriented research in mainland Southeast Asia. Between 1986 and 1992 he lived and worked in Thailand, and between 1992 and 2003 he was resident in Laos. He conducted his Master‟s research in northeast Cambodia. He is presently interested in identity issues amongst the ethnic Brao people, a littleknown Mon Khmer language-speaking group of indigenous peoples who straddle the border between southern Laos and northeast Cambodia. He is particularly interested in how ethnicity and country of residence have affected the natural resource management practices of the Brao on both sides of the Lao and Cambodian borders. Therefore, his present research interests are focused on southern Laos and northeast Cambodia. E-mail contact:

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Page 4 of 23 Keith Barney PhD programme, Department of Geography, York University Countries of research: Doctoral fieldwork will be in Thailand and Laos, but have also undertaken research in Malaysia, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Research focus: My broader research represents a geographical perspective on the intersections between the political economy of plantation forestry, commodity networks, ethnic identities and the production of socio-natures in the forest zones of Southeast Asia. My upcoming doctoral field-work will bring these themes into focus through the lens of tree plantations, forest certification, resource tenure and the politics of local access in Laos and Thailand. My interest in this area represents a continuation of my Master‟s research on plantations and displacement in Sarawak and Thailand, as well as recent consulting work in Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam with the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and Forest Trends. I would be very interested to hear from you if you are planning research in the region, I will be based in Vientiane starting April 2004. E-mail contact:

Christine Bonnin MA Candidate, International Development Studies, Dalhousie University Country of research: Philippines Research focus: "Women Traders in the Informal Sector: survival strategies of urban sari-sari microentrepreneurs in Metro Manila." This research project is an exploration of the opportunities, constraints and needs of women engaged in the operation of sari-sari stores (home-based variety stores), the most common type of entrepreneurial activity undertaken by women in the Philippines. The project includes an examination of the range of supports that micro-entrepreneurs feel is accessible to them and the reasons behind the choices of supports that they are utilizing. The research project was funded by CIDA under their Awards Program for Canadians. E-mail contact: Craig Candler PhD programme, Anthropology, University of British Columbia Country of research: Thailand

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Page 5 of 23 Research focus: “Changing Land Use and Children’s Health: Ecologies, Ontologies and 50 years of Parent-Farmer Agency in a northern Thai Glocality.” My work is an attempt to understand the links between health and land use within the context of local lives and transnational flows of 'development' and change in a northern Thai valley. I am currently using a non-spatial GIS to map and track oral narratives of parentfarmer agency as maneuvers between the various streams of land use and child health available in the valley at various points in the past 50 years. E-mail contact: Jon Corbett SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellow, Department of Geography, University of Victoria Country of research: Indonesia Research focus: My research has focused on the geographical area of East Kalimantan, Indonesia over the past seven years. My doctoral research explored the relationship between empowerment and the introduction of multi-media information technology in remote indigenous communities. In particular it examined how new technologies might facilitate the documentation of community knowledge and be used to influence planning and decision making processes. My doctoral study site was located in West Kutai, East Kalimantan, Indonesia. This research was funded by the CGIAR-Canada Linkage Fund, a Canadian International Development Agency programme and worked in collaboration with the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and SHK-KalTim a local based non-governmental organisation (NGO). I am currently funded by SSHRC to explore how similar multimedia technologies might be applied by First Nations communities. This work involves collaboration with the Cowichan Band, on Vancouver Island. Email:

Dang VuKhac Maîtrise en Géographie, Université du Québec à Montréal - UQAM Country of research: Vietnam Research focus: "Application des SIG et de la télédétection à l'étude de l'évolution du glissement de terrain et son interaction avec l'autoroute Ho Chi Minh dans la région montagneuse de la province Quang Binh, Vietnam." E-mail contact:

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Page 6 of 23 Wolfram Dressler PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, McGill University Country of research: Philippines Research focus: My research sits at the cross section of human-environment relations and incorporates a regional political ecology approach. My study site is at Palawan in the Southwestern Philippines. There I examine the political economic context of how community-based conservation ties into and supports certain household livelihoods and how this sustains patterns of socioeconomic and political differentiation. It is in this context that I critically question that 'community-based' conservation can fulfill its management objectives through devolved and decentralized management in settings where access to and use of forest resources are highly contested. E-mail contact: (i.e. wolfram underscore dressler) Eulalio R. Guieb III PhD Candidate, Department of Anthropology, McGill University Country of research: Philippines Research focus: My PhD research looks into the relationship of local knowledge, territoriality and governance and how evolved patterns of relations among these variables tie into the politics of marine protection in two villages in Bohol, Central Philippines. I have also done research on the narratives of coastal communities in Northern Palawan. I also do video documentaries on the struggle of the different marginalized groups in the Philippines. E-mail contact:

Emily Henry MA Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Victoria Country of research: Cambodia Research focus: “Rural-urban migration: A response to vulnerability in rural Cambodia.” The aim of this research is to identify how environmental change affects communities‟ ability to adapt, and how this relates to community sustainability. This will be examined through the perspective of rural-urban migrants interviewed within several squatter and relocated communities in Phnom Penh. Power differentials, vulnerability, historical contexts, amongst others, are motivating factors for migration. While there are many economic reasons for people to move to the city, these issues are propagated by increased vulnerability in
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 7 of 23 the rural areas with respect to environmental degradation, natural resource scarcity, and lack of access to productive land. E-mail contact:

Lathiful Khuluq Graduate Programme, Social Work and Islamic Studies, McGill University Country of research: Indonesia Research focus: “Street Children Problems in Jakarta: Government and NGO responses”. E-mail contact:

Cara Kirkpatrick MA Candidate, International Development Studies, Dalhousie University Country of research: Cambodia Research focus: “The livelihood impacts of land concessions in rural Cambodia”. Smallholder rice cultivation is the primary livelihood activity for most people in Tumring Commune, Kampong Thom Province, Cambodia. This research considers how livelihoods of residents of two villages are impacted when access to land becomes an issue after the arrival of a rubber plantation to the commune. This and other livelihood changes are investigated. My research in Cambodia was funded through an IDRC John Bene scholarship. E-mail contact: Michelle Kooy PhD Programme, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia Country of Research: Indonesia Research focus: “The governance of urban water in Jakarta, Indonesia”. The scope of my research is really much more interesting than the rather dry title indicates! Interested in how power flows through water, I‟m looking at both political economic and socio-cultural relations of power surrounding the management of water in colonial and contemporary Jakarta. Having begun with archival research to conduct a history of the present system of water supply in Jakarta, I hope to extend my look at colonial governmentality and urban
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 8 of 23 water management into contemporary Jakarta to ask how the political rationalities of the Indonesian state/NGOs/development industry implicate water resources in both their strategies of rule (involving certain representations of water/nature); and the material and discursive effects of this eco-governmentality for ecology, society (class, gender, race), and political economy. I‟d be very interested in hearing from other graduate students (in Canada or elsewhere) who are also doing research involving: Indonesia, water supply/resources, and governmentality. I‟ll be conducting my field research in 2004-2005 in Jakarta. E-mail contact: Tracey P. Lauriault PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, Carleton University. Country of research: Nagalim India, East Timor Research Focus: My research interests are in the application of participatory geomatics to resolve social, economic, and development problems. My MA Thesis was A Geospatial Data Infrastructure (GDI) is an Infrastructure for Sustainable Development (SD) in East Timor (ET). The research demonstrated that geospatial data is important for SD policies and the implementation of a GDI at the beginning of the nation building process such as in the case of East Timor is key to SD decision-making. It was argued that an ETGDI would enable the new government to implement its constitutional mandate, and inform East Timor‟s immediate reconstruction and development. A model was developed based on the new nation‟s social, economic, cultural and institutional circumstances. My Doctoral thesis title is Integrating the Tools of the New Economy to Represent an Ancient Land and Age Old Concepts: Developing A Cybercartographic Atlas of Peace and Development for Nagalim. A Cybercartographic Atlas of Peace and Development will be a method to analyze, organize, visualize and present geospatial data to inform policy and decisions to implement peace and SD. This area of research is an extension of both my non-academic work on environment and human rights with indigenous peoples from a number of Asia Pacific countries including Nagalim, as well as my professional work on GDIs, community mapping, homelessness and quality of life. I believe that geomatics and ethnographic research approaches using geospatial data can bridge cultural and digital divides to give a greater of understanding of peace and development. E-mail contact:

Jennifer Lockyer MA Candidate, Asia Pacific Studies (collaborative programme with Political Studies) University of Toronto Country of research: Southeast Asia (ASEAN Nations)

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Page 9 of 23 Research focus: “The Socio-Political motivations and consequences of language policy creation in Southeast Asia” (tentative). My BA was completed at Brock University with a double major in Linguistics and Political Science with a minor in International Studies. I am hoping to mesh Sociolinguistic theory and understanding together with Political theory in this project. E-mail contact:

Karen McAllister PhD Candidate, Department of Anthropology, McGill University Countries of research: Doctoral fieldwork will be in Laos, but have also done research in Indonesia, Philippines, India and Bangladesh. Research focus: “Shifting rights, resources and representations: risk taking and decision making among shifting cultivations in upland Laos.” Shifting agriculture is the primary mode of livelihood for the many minority ethnic groups living in the Lao uplands. These farmers are currently facing an ecological and livelihood crisis. Government policies designed to eliminate shifting agriculture are imposing new forms of privatized land tenure and are relocating entire communities. These policies are being implemented in the context of pre-existing customary tenure systems as well as growing ecological constraints, political strife, and new market opportunities. My research focuses on understanding how farmers perceive and are adapting to these rapidly changing social and ecological conditions, particularly their understanding of and response to risk. I will specifically study how and why farmers make collective and individual decisions about resource management, respond to risks and opportunities (including new market opportunities), participate in agricultural development research projects, and experiment with and adapt new agricultural technologies and practices into their farming systems. Underlying this will be an examination of the interaction between the diverse goals, narratives and meanings of “development interventions” and “environmental change” of different farmers (women, different ethnic groups, etc.), development agencies, and the state, and how these influence action at these different scales. This research is funded by IDRC, SSHRC, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), and the International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT). E-mail contact:

Paul Miller PhD Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Victoria Country of research: Thailand

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Page 10 of 23 Research focus: My current research focuses on the introduction, growth, and operation of inland shrimp farming in Thailand, as well as its varied impacts on the environment and rural communities. More specifically, I am examining the Thai rice farmers' adoption of low-salinity marine shrimp culture systems which rely upon seawater or salt farm effluent that is trucked inland. This innovation, combined with low farm gate prices for rice and high prices for shrimp, has led to increasing numbers of rice farmers in Thailand to convert paddy fields to shrimp ponds. My dissertation research makes the assertion that inland shrimp farming raises serious concerns over the disposal of pond effluents and accumulated sediments, the impact of saltwater intrusion on surrounding agricultural activities, and the long-term welfare of rural communities. The development of low-salinity shrimp farming in freshwater environments is a new innovation that has yet to be adequately scrutinized. My current research program benefits from an established linkage between Burapha University, Chonburi, Thailand and the University of Victoria. E-mail contact:

Nguyen Kim Ha PhD Candidate, Social Cultural Anthropology, University of Toronto Country of research: Vietnam Research focus: Domestic workers under economic reforms in Hanoi, Vietnam. This research aims to explore relationships between employers and domestic workers in the period of economic reforms in Vietnam. I would like to focus specifically on the gender and class dimensions of these relationships, especially because most domestic workers are poor migrant women. E-mail contact: or

Julie H.D.T. Nguyen Graduate Programme: Interdisciplinary Studies and Asian Research, University of British Columbia Country of research: Vietnam Research focus: “Exploring Indigenous Approaches to Women's Well-being in Vietnam: Negotiating Gender.” My research examines how Vietnam can negotiate and adapt to the gender and development approach to suit its historical, political and cultural context; assesses how cultural factors interact with the 'forces of modernization' to affect the well-being and future prospects of women and female children in their struggle to achieve more effective and equitable human development. E-mail contact: or

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Page 11 of 23 Pham Thanh Hai PhD Candidate, Geography, Université de Montréal Country of research: Vietnam Research Focus: “La migration et ses impacts sur l’environnement au Vietnam”. E-mail contact:

Austina J. Reed PhD Candidate, International Relations, Department of Political Science McMaster University Countries of research: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia Research focus: The effects of economic globalization on labour movements, particularly opportunities for transnational linkages among workers' organizations as well as changes in labour market regulation, in a comparative study of the three regions: Southeast Asia (ASEAN), North America (NAFTA), and Europe (EU). My current research in Southeast Asia represents a comparative study of the historical development of labour movements in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. E-mail contact:

George Roman MA Candidate, Department of Geography, University of Victoria Country of research: Thailand Research focus: I am currently in the final stages of writing my M.Sc. thesis based on research conducted in Thailand. My main research topic is tourism management in tropical marine parks. For my M.Sc. thesis, I designed and conducted a research project at Mu Koh Chang National Marine Park, Thailand. This study integrates biophysical surveys on the structure and composition of coral reefs with social science surveys on visitor perceptions to create a draft zoning plan for managing tourism around coral reefs in the Marine Park.

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Page 12 of 23 E-mail contact:

Karen Topelko MA Candidate, Marine Protected Areas Research Group, University of Victoria Country of research: Thailand Research focus: I am conducting research in Koh Libong, Thailand for my Master's degree. E-mail contact:

Muhammad Zuhdi PhD Candidate, Education, McGill University Country of research: Indonesia Research focus: “The History of Indonesian Islamic Schools Curriculum 1945 – 2003.” E-mail contact:


Regional Dimensions of the Bali Bombing
The Bali Bombing and Terrorism in Indonesia Jacques Bertrand Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto E-mail contact:

On October 12, 2002 a bomb exploded in a nightclub in the resort town of Kuta, Bali. Almost 200 people were killed, mostly foreigners. Never before had Islamic militant groups in Indonesia resorted to international terrorism. On the surface, it appeared that local Islamic groups had joined a new level of radicalism. Yet, Islam in Indonesia has a long tradition of moderation. Political Islam reached its peak in the 1950s when some political parties, especially Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama, supported the establishment of an Islamic state. Even for these parties, however, Islam represented more a cultural basis for unifying a diverse Indonesia than an agenda to implement a rigid form of Islamic law. Since then, most Islamic groups have supported the compromise established at independence that Indonesia could not officially endorse Islam as its religion of state without alienating significant, and regionally concentrated, religious minorities.
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 13 of 23 The two largest Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah (a modernist Islamic organization) and Nahdlatul Ulama (the largest organization of traditional Islam) have repeatedly adopted approaches to politics that emphasized this compromise. The revival of Islamic politics since the fall of Suharto has not gained strong support. Islamic political parties gained altogether only 33.71% of the votes in the 1999 elections. More recent survey analysis suggests that Megawati‟s PDI-P (Democratic Party of Indonesia for the Struggle) and Golkar continue to enjoy the broadest support. Political Islam has made no significant gains. The Bali bombing needs to be analyzed within this context. It showed that a small group, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), influenced by some forms of radical Islam, was able to mount an effective terrorist attack, but it does not suggest a wider trend of radicalism in Indonesia. The Megawati government was initially reluctant to take action against the JI. Although it was suspected of several bombings in Singapore and the Philippines, as well as plots to attack US embassies in the region, it refused to crack down on the organization for fear that it might increase support for radical militants. Many moderate Islamic leaders, including vice-president Hamzah Haz, were critical of the Bush administration‟s war on terrorism and its effects on tarnishing the image of Islam abroad. Megawati could not afford to face criticism of being anti-Muslim or being associated with the anti-Muslim repressive policies that had characterized the earlier part of the Suharto regime. The Bali bombing gave Megawati the political leverage required as the bombing was widely condemned by all major Islamic political organizations. The JI‟s alleged spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, was arrested on charges relating to a series of church bombings in 2000. The investigations into the Bali bombings produced a highly effective response that contrasted sharply with past hesitations. By early December 2002, the four major suspects had been arrested: Ali Gufron, alias Mukhlas, seen as the “mastermind” of the bombing; Imam Samudra, also involved in the planning of the attack; Amrozi, brother of Mukhlas and accused of providing the van and bombs; and Ali Imron, another brother of Mukhlas who admitted to assembling the main bomb. In 2003, Amrozi, Samudra and Mukhlas were sentenced to death, while Ali Imron was sentenced to life in prison. In early September, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir was sentenced to four years in prison in connection to the 2000 bombings but prosecutors found no convincing evidence linking him to the Bali bombing or to Al-Qaeda. The Bali bombing was most likely a highly effective terrorist act involving only a small group of radicals. There was no evidence to suggest a broad network of terrorists operating in Indonesia. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, there was even a lack of consensus within the Jemaah Islamiyah: Abu Bakar Ba‟asyr advocated a pause in terrorist actions but radicals within the movement, including Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, thought that Ba‟asyir was too weak and too accommodating. The Jemaah Islamiyah began to take shape in the mid-1980s, around a boarding school (pesantren) in the village of Ngruki, near Solo (Central Java), established by Abu Bakar Ba‟asyr and his associate, Abdullah Sungkar. Ba‟asyr and Sungkar fled to Malaysia in 1985 as they were going to be arrested once again for radical activism. They had been arrested in 1978 for allegedly seeking to revive the Darul Islam rebellion of the 1950s and to establish an Islamic state. From Malaysia, they organized the Jemaah Islamiyah into a more formal, hierarchical and military structure. During the first decade after 1985, several hundred men
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 14 of 23 were sent to fight and train in Afghanistan, and later in Mindanao. Not only did they learn the techniques of guerilla warfare, but they also made links to other radical Muslim organizations. The Jemaah Islamiyah‟s first major action was a series of bombings in December 2000. They were motivated by the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Maluku and Sulawesi. As other organizations sent militants to Maluku to defend Muslims, the Jemaah Islamiyah chose terrorist actions instead. They were acting independently but with similar, domestic motivations. More than 30 bombs targeted churches and priests in eleven cities across six provinces in Indonesia. It was a highly coordinated act that, at the time, was attributed to rogue elements associated with the military because of the technical skills required. Eventually, it became evident that the Jemaah Islamiyah had been responsible and its spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba‟asyir, was convicted for these acts. The US war on terrorism seemingly shifted the Jemaah Islamiyah‟s source of anger. As the conflicts in Maluku and Sulawesi subsided, Muslims appeared to be targeted internationally in response to the September 11 attacks. The Bali bombing marked the Jemaah Islamiyah‟s entry into international terrorism while it had previously been concerned essentially with domestic issues. The link with Al-Qaeda was established but did not appear to be a hierarchical one. Many of the individuals associated with Jemaah Islamiyah had contacts with Osama bin-Laden and some of his associates when they trained in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda reportedly funded some of the Jemaah Islamiyah‟s operations but did not seem to have been issuing directives. In all likelihood, Jemaah Islamiyah operated as an independent organization with its own objectives, with some collaboration and funding from Al-Qaeda on specific operations where interests coincided. Jemaah Islamiyah established a network across the archipelago that can instigate damage but does not have deep-rooted support. Beyond the core network around Abu Bakar Ba‟ashyr‟s followers, there are other small networks in other regions. Most of the links and recruitment of top members can be traced to training camps in Afghanistan and Mindanao. However, it remains a tightly-knit organization with radical ideas that prevent its spread of support to the broader, moderate population. Unusual Suspects Joshua Barker Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto Email contact: From the standpoint of an outside observer, the investigation into the Bali bombings and the arrest of suspects in the case was an interesting story but not terribly surprising. While one may have felt momentary surprise at the speed and efficiency of the police investigation, the parade of suspects before the media dispelled most fears that this might be a frame up. After all, the suspects in the bombings were what-in the post 9/11 world-have become instantly recognizable as „terrorists‟. In place of Osama Bin Laden was another bearded spiritual leader and supposed mastermind by the name of Abu Bakar Baasyir. Rather than Zawahiri, there was another coldly calculating operational commander known as Hambali. And then there were the rather familiar characters of determined field commanders and youthful foot soldiers.

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Page 15 of 23 From the standpoint of many Indonesian observers, however, the Bali bombers were anything but the usual suspects. Immediately upon the release of preliminary suspects‟ descriptions by the police, people expressed skepticism. After the first arrests, politicians, pundits, and ordinary people were incredulous. To them there was something about the official story about the Bali bombings and the Bali bombers that simply did not add up. The disbelief was manifest in the widespread circulation of conspiracy theories about the bombings. To the outsider, some of these seemed incredibly far-fetched, likethe idea that the main bomb had actually been a micro-nuclear device and that it had been planted by the Israelis and the Americans in order to justify military intervention in Southeast Asia. Other theories seemed a little bit more plausible, such as the idea that the attack had been orchestrated by former Indonesian Army officers as an act of vengeance against Australia for its role in facilitating and supporting East Timorese independence; perhaps with the additional aim of driving a wedge between the current Indonesian President, Megawati Soekarnoputri, and the western powers (or, in the event that she chose to support the „war on terror‟, to drive a wedge between the President and domestic Islamic groups in advance of the 2004 general election). Why did the official story (also a theory of a conspiracy, by the way) seem far-fetched to so many Indonesian observers? An examination of the main conspiracy theories suggests that suspicion revolved around two main themes. The first concerned the speed and efficiency with which the police arrived at a list of suspects and proceeded to find them and arrest them. The police in Indonesia are generally regarded with a mixture of contempt, disgust, and pity. They are seen as corrupt, incompetent, and lacking any of the material resources or scientific training necessary for effective, modern investigations. So the idea that the police could come up with a list of suspects within days of the blast seemed absurd. Far more likely was that someone with political power had pressured the police to produce a patsy and the police had complied. The second theme concerned the suspects themselves. The urban intelligentsia, in particular, had trouble believing that these rural men, schooled in Islamic boarding schools located in the boondocks of Java and Malaysia, could possibly have been responsible for such a complex and successful operation as the Bali bombings. They were, in the Indonesian context, extremely unusual suspects for a crime of such technical, political, and symbolic magnitude. In the symbolic logic of crime one cannot escape the principle of presumed proportionality: the greater the crime, the greater the criminal. In this case, the symbolic demand to „let the criminal fit the crime‟ (which often precedes the retributive demand to „let the punishment fit the crime,‟ as it did in this case) resulted in a kind of crisis of proportionality. The appearance of conspiracy theories involving the usual suspects in Indonesian political crime-such as Suharto and his henchmen, the Army, the CIA, and the Israelis-had the effect of reasserting a perceived proportionality between crime and criminal. It also had the more general effect of reinforcing prevailing (mis)conceptions about the character of „criminality‟ in the Indonesian context and the hidden loci of domestic and global political power. It remains to be seen whether the outcome of the investigation and the trials succeeded in changing people‟s perceptions on these matters. It is certainly true that the police went to great lengths to convince a skeptical public of police investigative competence and the suspects‟ guilt. The most remarkable of their actions in this regard was the televised re-enactment of the assembly of the bombs by one of the suspects in the case. This elaborate and costly performance aimed to demonstrate that he had the technical skills
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 16 of 23 necessary to build such a powerful explosive. If people were convinced by this type of performance, there could be some interesting consequences. For instance, Indonesia may see the emergence on the national scene not only of a new criminal type but also a new police type. In addition to the homegrown religiouslyinspired criminal capable of acting on a global stage, one might also expect to find in Indonesia the figure of an honest detective, working from the evidence, and seemingly immune from political influence and corruption. Would it not be ironic for such characters to emerge in Indonesia precisely when the „war on terror‟ has so effectively chased them from the American scene? Reflections on the Bali Bombing Ratno Lukito Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal Email contact: The Bali bombing of 2002 has shocked so many people not only because it happened in a place where mutual religious tolerance has been the common practice, but also because of the fact that it took place at a time when Muslim leaders in the country were trying so hard to defuse the debate over Islam and the West, as a result of September 11. Muslims in the country were also concerned since those guilty of the bombing were Muslim youths who saw their actions as conforming to religious injunctions. To make matters worse, it was realized that most of the youths were graduates of Islamic madrasahs or Islamic boarding schools (pesantrens). It is not surprising that relationships between Islam and the West have always been a topic of heated debate in Indonesian Islam. As a former Dutch colony, Indonesia has had to deal with the legacy of Western ideals and institutions. Perhaps this explains why this country, blessed with the world‟s largest Muslim population, has followed a Western model in its development efforts. This however has led to a wide chasm of distrust and antagonism between the two parties of the debate: traditional and modernist Muslims. Traditional Muslims, on the one hand, believe that Islam should be the orientation of the country‟s development; thus they support the idea of ridding the nation of Western values. Modernist Muslims, on the other hand, believe that Western values are not necessarily in contradiction with Islam. They see many points of contact between Islamic and the Western culture such as democracy, human rights and women‟s empowerment. Thus, Indonesia should not automatically reject everything that comes from the West. And yet, although the debate is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia (it has existed since the early independence of the country), the Bali bombing has in some ways widened the gap between the two Muslim groups, since each suspects the other of using the bombing to further its goals. Since the bombing, however, many from both sides have come to realize that the Bali bombing was simply the result of a transnational movement of some Muslim groups who are willing to abuse Islam for their own objectives. The Bali incident (as also in the case of other bombings elsewhere in the country) is now seen as nothing more than an action by a desperate element that wants to challenge Western domination and correct the injustices afflicting many Muslim countries due to Western presence in the Muslim world. Most Indonesian Muslims, for a fact, believe that violence is not the answer. The injustices in many Muslim countries, such as in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan, cannot be resolved merely by setting off bombs and killing innocent peoples. Not only is this wrong in itself, but it only serves to worsen the situation. This is especially true in the case of Indonesia, a country with a reputation for pluralism and multiculturalism that has been blackened by hatred and mistrust, as well as by the consequent economic downturn. The two
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 17 of 23 groups agree that “moderate” Islam is and should always be the face of Islam in Indonesia, even as it addresses the many problems afflicting the Muslim world as a result of its encounters with the West. Old Networks, New Demons: Locating the Bali Bombing in Global Islamic Politics Judith Nagata Professor, Department of Anthropology, York University, Toronto E-mail contact: The drama of the Bali bombing has been inscribed in the minds of many in the world as an iconic event, incriminating Indonesia in global Islamist politics and raising questions about the reach of Al Qaeda. However, as in the case of 9/11, there is a risk of allowing current obsessions with worldwide terrorisms to infuse our interpretations of recent events in Muslim Southeast Asia with a tinge of determinism, the stuff of conspiracy theories. I argue that the Bali bombing may more convincingly be understood as a product of pre-existing local and regional issues, as much as a direct instigation by external agencies, and that any links with the Middle East and/or Al Qaeda are ad hoc and personal rather than structural or systemic. Historical Islamic Networks and Infrastructure Islam has always been a cosmopolitan, transnational religion, based on extensive transregional networks of trade, pilgrimage, scholarly (ulama) ties, kinship and intermarriage. These co-exist with obligations of national citizenship, and may be intension with secular authority. It was by means of such networks that Islam was originally brought to Southeast Asia, whereby missionary scholars and teachers usually married and settled locally, and established independent religious schools, which became centres of rural education, literacy and leadership. Among the missionaries were Sufis, whose mystical and contemplative style contrasted with the austere (Shari’ah) law-based Arab tradition, borne by Hadhrami Arabs from South Yemen, where Wahhabism later flowered (and Osama bin Laden‟s ancestral homeland). To the present, Southeast Asian Islam has largely been grounded in interpersonal networks, linking teachers and students of rural religious schools in South Thailand, Cambodia, Southern Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia with Middle Eastern centres in Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. More recently, other Southeast Asian students have graduated from secular universities across the world. Such circulation ensures fertile exchanges of ideas between students of all Muslim backgrounds, reinforcing ideological diversity, and creating infrastructures potentially available for political activism of any stripe. Important ulama and their followers usually create multiple polygynous marriage alliances spanning Southeast Asia and the Middle East, to enhance their religious and political influence, as potential rivals to secular and national leaders. Genealogical and old-school ties are the foundation of Muslim religious society, often ignoring national boundaries and citizenships. Muslims from outside Southeast Asia, including the latest cohort of Wahhabis, normally make their first overtures in the region by marrying locally, as Omar Farouk, arrested on suspicion of Al Qaeda links in West Java. During the 1980s and 90s, some Indonesian scholars, harassed under Suharto, migrated to Malaysia, which was at the time recruiting migrant workers. Malaysia was also home to a local Muslim (dakwah) revival movement of its own, which offered a religiously hospitable climate, as well as easily available
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 18 of 23 permanent residence and citizenship status. Some Indonesian migrants founded their own religious schools, including one at Sungei Manis, near Kuala Lumpur, and another, Lokmanul-Hakiem, in Johore. Among them were two teachers of Arab descent, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Basheer, both reputed to be leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah, widely implicated in the Bali bombing. Both continued to manage their own network of schools in Java, including Abu Bakar‟s famous Al Irshad in Ngruki. Jemaah Islamiyah‟s antecedents grew out of a post-Independence movement to create a pan-Southeast Asian Islamic state, Darul Islam, an entirely indigenous idea which never completely subsided. During the 1980s students from both countries fought the Russians alongside the mujahiddin in Afghanistan. This was an opportunity for recruitment and bonding among Southeast Asian and other Muslims, when many Indonesian activists married Malay wives to consummate the religious bond. One wife was a Sabah-born Chinese convert, who married Hambali, the much-sought JI activist, alleged to be personally close to Al Qaeda, and who was apprehended in August 2003, in his sanctuary in Thailand. Meanwhile, a few Malaysian academics at the Universiti Teknologi MARA (UTM), mostly with engineering and science degrees from western countries, became involved in extracurricular instruction in the Lokmanul-Hakiem religious school. They were later to put their technical skills to JI‟s bomb-making unit, whose major cell is reputed to be in the Southern Philippines, and who at time of writing, are thought to be hiding in Indonesia. Throughout this period, Malaysia‟s Prime Minister Mahathir, seems to have played a double game towards Islamists of all origins in his territory. His policy alternated between control and pacification of religious schools through financial sweeteners on the one hand, and unforgiving application of the Internal Security Act, from which many suspected terrorists never emerged. This policy pushed most of the real action offshore to Indonesia, leaving the training, recruitment, money collection and planning to Malaysia. Religious Diversity in Indonesia Becoming a world religion entails adaptation to local cultural needs, and maintaining a balance between the core message and practice and local culture. Indonesian Islam is often described as syncretic (abangan), from its fusion with earlier sub-strata of Indic and Sufi religious practices. Followers of a more Arabised style of Islam (santri), claim to be “orthodox”, in opposition to the “heretical” abangan, a tension which has persisted to the present. This tension was recently dramatized by the actions of three abangan brothers from a religious family in an East Javanese village, Tenggulun, who had been swept in to the latest wave of orthodoxy, and ended by destroying village harmony along with its “heretical” holy shrines and relics. These brothers are the (now infamous) Amrozi, Ali Imran and Ali Ghufron (aka Mukhlas), who were tried and convicted in Indonesian courts for their central role in the Bali bombing in August and September 2003, amid worldwide publicity. While Indonesian Islam remains generally eclectic, pluralistic and non-violent, certain combinations of political conditions and personal connections may turn it in other directions. By far the most visible and celebrated (if largely by tourists), legacy of the Indic tradition remains in Bali itself, where “Hindu-Bali” is one (the latest) of Indonesia‟s five officially recognized faiths. The island‟s tourist economy reflects tensions between the Balinese workforce and a growing number of Muslim Javanese transmigrants, in competition for jobs and resources. In addition, a small minority of politicallyconnected, wealthy Javanese are major investors in hotel and taxi enterprises, yet the most extensive collateral damage by the Bali bomb among Indonesians was to the Hindu Balinese

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Page 19 of 23 Old Demons, New Demonisation During the past decade, however, the pace and intensity of Wahhabi influence and direct Middle Eastern funding has increased across Southeast Asia, while local attitudes to Arabs/Hadhramis oscillate between respect for their provenance and religious knowledge, and resentment over their perceived power, oilwealth and arrogance. The growing polarisation between Hadhrami and indigenous Muslims now plays the field of existing local conflicts, tainting them with a demonic religious image largely unrelated to the original issues. Ongoing inter-religious conflict between Indonesian Muslims and Christians reached deadly fever pitch in the church and mosque bombings in Maluku, Ambon and Jakarta in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the same time, a spate of furious attacks on “un-Islamic” nightclubs in Jakarta raised the stakes on a general local distaste for “western” cultural pollution. Meanwhile, older conflicts between the Moros and Christian Filipinos in the Southern Philippines, and many decades of simmering hostility between Thai Muslims and Buddhists near Thailand‟s southern border with Malaysia continued. Bombings and terrorism by home-grown Muslim organizations erupted regularly in both places. It is important to recognize that all these conflicts had long local antecedents, reflected local Islamic cultural styles, and that outsiders were rarely implicated. Only since the demon of Al Qaeda came on the scene did it become politically fashionable for observers to set the scenario within the theatre of global terrorism, and to assign the original cast of characters a starring role on a world stage, whereby older networks assumed more sinister significance. Although Southeast Asian Muslims have always been cosmopolitan, direct connections with Al Qaeda terrorists appear to be exceptional and marginal. In this respect, JI (as many Indonesian commentators themselves concede), does not represent a “new normal”, but an indigenous fringe group, whose more violent escapades few Indonesians endorse. Philippine Violence, Real Causes David Wurfel Senior Research Associate, York Centre for Asian Research Professor Emeritus, Political Science, University of Windsor Email contact: What are the real causes of violence in the Southern Philippines and of US and Philippine government policies directed against it? The Bush Administration, needing to justify its worldwide ambitions, had been looking for Al Qaeda in the Philippines ever since 9/11, long before the Bali bombing. In fact, in late 2001 the Pentagon began to send troops to help fight the Abu Sayyaf group in Basilan island, off Mindanao- this in spite of the fact that the Pacific commander, Admiral Denis Blair, admitted that he had no evidence of its current links with "international terrorism". By 2002 Abu Sayyaf, though originally founded in 1991 by an Islamic preacher, had actually become a tiny bandit group, with some spectacular kidnappings of foreigners to its 'credit'. Still AS had widespread support in Basilan. American "trainers" together with Filipino troops spent months in field operations, but by 2003 Abu Sayyaf had simply moved to the Sulu Archipelago, where they are still active. The Sulu governor refused the entry of US "advisors", claiming it smacked of early 20th century colonialism.

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Page 20 of 23 Meanwhile the much larger and older Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) - which had first demanded independence, but later indicated a willingness to consider genuine autonomy--had re-engaged in peace negotiations with the Philippine government after the January 2001 assumption of power by Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The President knew that MILF forces on the island of Mindanao were too strong to be defeated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). But after the Bali bombing, links were discovered between the MILF and Jamaah Islamiya (JI) in Indonesia; elements in the AFP wanted to use this as justification for an all-out attack (at the same time some generals were making money by selling munitions to the rebels). The evidence indicates that the MILF was probably of more assistance to JI than vice-versa, though the latter may have provided some training to Filipinos in urban bombing. And the President insisted on continued negotiations, a stance she has maintained. The more closely one examines Philippine reality, the more obvious it becomes that "international terrorism", in Indonesia or elsewhere, despite American claims, has had very little to do with ongoing violence in the South. The Bush view of the world simply does not fit. We can understand events of the last few years more easily by looking at four important contexts: USPhilippine relations, domestic civil-military relations, corruption, and the nature and history of Muslim struggle. Ever since the Philippines was granted formal independence by the US in 1946, American influence on Philippine politics and economy has been overwhelming. But when the Philippine Senate refused to ratify a renewal of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991 many assumed that the links with the US had fundamentally altered. Yet plus c'est la change… Pres. Joseph Estrada, who as senator had been a vocal opponent of the bases, signed a Visiting Forces Agreement in 1998 under the terms of which hundreds of US troops remain today. But Filipino attitudes have sometimes had as much of an impact on US-Philippine relations as have US interests. And with the tragedy of 9/11 there was an unmatched outpouring of Filipino sympathy for the US. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, with a long record of being very pro-American herself, was also shrewd. When she went to Washington in November she was effusive in support of Pres. Bush--which earned a promise of $100 million in new military aid and the sending of "combat trainers". (Bush, at the same time, was looking for a renewal of bases under another name.) The Philippine military, quite non-political before 1972, became accustomed to political influence during the rule of Ferdinand Marcos. Yet a segment of that same military helped overthrow him. The end of the Estrada administration was also triggered by the withdrawal of military support from the president, making Estrada's successor, Mrs. Macapagal-Arroyo, as indebted to the military as any of her predecessors. Thus she was eager to exploit new opportunities in Washington by which she could reward the generals. Even so she has suffered from an increasing number of bungled coup attempts in recent months. Corruption in the Philippines is endemic. The country has long been listed by international monitoring bodies as one of the most corrupt in the world. Massive high-level corruption was institutionalized by Pres. Marcos, but then some progress toward dismantling it was made during subsequent presidencies. However, within less than two years of Joseph Estrada's election in 1998 a "falling out among thieves" revealed an unprecedented rate of accumulation of illegal wealth. Needless to say, the example he set
CCSEAS bulletin, Volume 3, Issue 1 Page 21 of 23 was quickly noted among military officers, confirming the acceptability of their own extra-legal incomes, such as illegal logging concessions protected by Abu Sayyaf. Though Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo started with a relatively clean reputation, corruption charges against her family have mounted in recent months, further weakening her legitimacy and authority. The nature of the long struggle of Muslim Filipinos to protect their land and their culture, and for selfgovernment has been frequently ignored by analysts fixated on "international terrorism". Moro grievances were first raised with the beginning of Spanish colonialism, and are hardly any closer to being met than they were 100 years ago. Intense frustration, even resort to violence, is thus understandable. The declaration of jihad in extreme circumstances, an integral part of Islam, has been indigenous to the Philippines for centuries. No foreign plotters were required to introduce it. So if violence in the Southern Philippines has long been fueled by denial of reasonable Moro demands, legitimized by Islam; if corruption is widespread, even within the military; and if a president--despite her realistic assessment of the urgency of peace-- needs to pander to the wishes of a restive officer corps, the scene is set for further violence. Authority is especially weak in Mindanao and for some generals continued fighting is profitable. US policy pushes the Philippine government toward military, not negotiated solutions, while foreign aid increases the opportunities for military corruption. Given the tendency of the AFP to mistreat the local population during operations, military retaliation against Moros often is more a cause of rebellious violence than a deterrence to it. In Manila coup attempts further undermine the President's authority over the AFP and its own internal discipline. Press focus on "foreign terrorists" deflects government and public attention from real problems. In fact, if the Bali Bombing had never occurred, and Al Qaeda never existed, violent conflict in the Philippines would hardly have been less, given the weight of other factors. No solutions are possible unless analysis of the problems is accurate.

Our Next Edition
We welcome your letters to the editors on this special issue on the Bali Bombing. If you are involved in a research project or are aware of conferences, events, or new publications which you think would be of interest to other Southeast Asian scholars in Canada, please feel free to volunteer a few paragraphs or pages to the newsletter. Also, if you are a graduate student that we missed in this edition and would like to be included in the next newsletter, please send us a paragraph on your research. Comments and submissions may be sent to the editors, Karen McAllister and Keith Barney at .

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