The Newsletter from Thomas PM Barnett

Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett Release 1.7rev1 ~ June 13, 2005 ―Tomorrow's newsletter will be all Q&A. Did my best on these. Don't know everything. Wish I did. But I don't.‖ ~ Tom Barnett, The POD has landed Page 1 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Contents About this Newsletter … Pg. 3 Furthermore: from the Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog … Pg. 4  The real audience for PNM, or how I can live without a NYT review … Pg. 4 Ask Tom … Pg. 7                       Ira Hoffman Scott Kirsch Bill C. LtCol Matt Smith-Meck, USMC Mark Geraghty Ben Daniel Greg Filak Matt, a USAF Officer Jason Camlic Andrew Batwash Larry Dunbar Frank Laybourn Brian Forster Dave Bullard SMASH (Scott Koenig) Jan in Century, FL Steve Banks "a concerned participant in a 'future worth creating'" Kelly Hall John Siegrist Nicholas J Xenakis Bob Walters Support The Newsletter From Thomas P.M. Barnett … Pg. 35 Glossary (Updated April 29, 2005) … Pg. 36 Page 2 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Contents > About this Newsletter The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett comprises original material by Tom, commentary from his blog, Esquire contributions, and published books, as well as feedback received via email. It is written and published, based on your feedback. Ask Tom You’ve read The Pentagon’s New Map (PNM), Tom’s blog, or perhaps a published article. You’ve seen him do the brief – in person, on CSPAN, or DVD. What happens next? You’ve got questions. Suppose, for instance, you have the following question, ―Tom, should we be concerned with China as a hegemonious power in Asia?‖ You can submit the question to: asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com The questions and suggestions you submit to Ask Tom drive the publication of this newsletter. Please know that Tom reads each email. Additionally, members of The New Rule Sets Project, LLC assist Tom, per his request. One or more of us will personally respond to your email. The submissions we find most useful to the general understanding of The Pentagon’s New Map (PNM) and Blueprint for Action (BFA) will be published in future issues of The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett. As always, your feedback is appreciated. Civil Complaints This issue of The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett has been composed using Microsoft Word 2000. If the online or printed presentation of this document does not meet your needs, please let us know. That is, just asktom@thomaspmbarnett.com. Page 3 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Contents > Furthermore: from the Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog The real audience for PNM, or how I can live without a NYT review Dateline: above the garage in Portsmouth RI, 26 July 2004 Friday I get an email from a TX-based academic who's doing a study of my work and comparing it to Niall Ferguson's. His basic take: we make similar arguments about America's role in the world, the big difference being that I describe a better future world resulting from this effort and that I include prescriptions and an actual strategy for the U.S. to employ in getting the world to that point. Ferguson, the cream-of-the-crop historian right now offers nothing of that sort—strictly a backward-looking comparison to the British Empire which he so loves. That, my friends, is the difference between an academic historian and a practitioner in grand strategy: Ferguson can get by with diagnostics and analysis leading nowhere, but I actually have to come up with a road map, otherwise I'm a complete failure. That's because Ferguson's main audience is fellow historians and the academic crowd in general, whereas my audience is fairly specific: 1) our military; 2) other militaries; and 3) decision-makers in Washington. Ferguson needs the approval of his peers, a scholarly reputation, and good reviews. I need the approval of the "stars" (flag officers) and "bars" (lowering-ranking officers just entering into the senior ranks), broadband acceptance by the operators in the field, and real-world proof that my ideas either reflect or influence actual policy and strategy alterations. That I do well in Ferguson's realm is nice (media appearances, nice reviews, I got NYT BSL status and he didn't!), but completely irrelevant to the book's impact. I didn't write an academic treatise looking at it from the outside, I wrote the memoir of an actual practitioner working on the inside. As such, I don't offer analysis so much as a manifesto for change. When I get invited to address entire student bodies of professional military educational institutions like the Naval War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, that is impact. When those same colleges indicate they'll be distributing PNM to students and faculty, that is impact. When I find myself pulled into senior advisory roles with senior officers at Joint Forces Command, Special Operations Command, and Central Command, that is impact. When the administration has me repeatedly brief new service secretaries as they prepare for confirmation hearings, that is impact. When I brief foreign militaries, the House of Commons in the UK, or representatives from NATO, that is impact. And when John Kerry's people arrange for me to brief their foreign policy task force on Pentagon issues, that is impact. Page 4 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog I have received more than a few reviews from academics stating that my approach isn't real-world enough to be used as a true policy guide, and that judgment is so laughably off-base as to make me cringe at the ignorance of those who offer it. I always knew PNM would have mega-impact within the defense community, because it speaks directly to them and offers them a real framework for engaging with the "everything else" they know instinctively impinges upon every intervention they undertake in this era of globalization. That the material seems unrealistic or Strangelovean to many academics is amusing to me, but nothing more, because the vast majority of what they put out in publications strikes me as completely divorced from any reality I have come to understand in working directly for and with the U.S. military over the past 15 years. For the most part, they seem to live in a dream world of theories and models, and when they do offer prescriptions, they are hopelessly naïve. My stuff is real-world because it was born from hundreds of presentations directly offered to real-world operators, who will call you on the bullshit faster than you can click through your next PPT animation. Why I get to brief so many senior military leaders is because whenever their subordinates come across my stuff, they instantly realize that this is the most solid package yet of the host of ideas that they themselves in many instances have long been trying to articulate up through the ranks. You wanna know the best review I've received so far? It was from Vice Admiral Eric Olson, Deputy Commander of Special Operations Command. His view of what military forces are good for is probably 180 degrees different from mine. The guy is Leviathan through and through, and I respect the hell out of him for that. During a formal interaction with him in front of all of his senior officers, his subordinates had urged me to push my case for the Sys Admin/back half focus in transformation. These younger officers knew full well how little he appreciates this argument, but wanted me to make the case in as strong as terms as possible. So I did. Olson listens intently, pauses for a few seconds as he considers what I said, and then simply replies "thank you," indicating he has absorbed the argument and will give it serious consideration. That is the best review I've received so far on PNM. Five minutes with one of the most hardcore operators you can find in the U.S. military, selling him a vision I know he is opposed to, but doing it in such a way that he felt compelled to consider it seriously. It has taken me a decade-and-a-half to build a standing with operators inside the U.S. military to the point where I even get invited for such face time, so I know what a privilege it is, especially when younger operators push me forward to deliver messages up the chain on their behalf. That is real trust, and that trust is the only evidence that matters to me regarding PNM's deep impact within its targeted audiences. So when I pull open the NYT Book Review yesterday and see John Lewis Gaddis, a highly-respected academic historian, reviewing Niall Ferguson's book Colossus (the entire issue was given over to a slew of "empire" books), and noting that his review contains a calculated mix of praise for the career with the usual backbiting on the details of the book, I think to myself: I can live without a NYT review, because all I'd get is yet another academic take on the "impracticality" of my policy prescriptions. And such a Page 5 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog review would mean almost nothing to me, coming from that detached crowd, because the approval they offer concerns the cleverness and intricacy of the argument, rather than its substance. But since I did not write PNM for that crowd, much less for their approval, I cannot expect anything but the usual sneering disdain ("What is this stuff compared to our elaborate theoretical models?"). Their arguments go on forever, conference by conference, journal article by journal article, and review by review. They can go on forever because they never have to arrive anywhere. But my ideas have to arrive somewhere, otherwise the invitations will stop, the access will be denied, and my dialogue with senior military leaders will come to an end. And you know what? I like it that way. Because the minute my stuff stops being relevant to my clients—the U.S. military—they should absolutely fire my ass. This business is too important for anybody to be wasting their time. +++++ http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/000664.html Page 6 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Contents > Ask Tom From: Ira Hoffman,. Subject: Two Questions on Iran Tom, Two questions: (1) How would you propose "bringing Iran into the fold somehow," given that you acknowledge that we cannot "pretend that economic sanctions or carrots will seal any deal with the mullahs"? (2) Given Iran's existing economic connectivity, why do you think that increased or improved "economic connectivity" will "strengthen the reformists in the government," instead of enriching the mullahs, primarily, and thus strengthening them even more? Best regards, Ira E. Hoffman Principal of Hoffman & Associates, P.C. Rockville, Maryland … Ira, We need Iran to be a security pillar in the region, because without them there's unlikely to be any lasting region-wide security order put in place. The Iranians will simply always play the spoiler or the distracter. Iran's play on nukes is all about pride and prestige, so we need to figure out how to give them that pride and prestige alternatively. That starts with talking with them directly on issues of common concern, reestablishing diplomatic relations, and the like. No one acts responsibly unless you give them responsibility, and we have sanctioned ourselves out of any leverage with Iran, thus denying ourselves a potential pillar in the region. So Iran gets the bomb! How is that going to change anything in the region other than deny our ability to threaten them with invasion? Do we expect them to use it on anyone? Are they somehow going to strengthen the "revolution" on this basis, after all these years of failing to spread it whatsoever, much less achieve anything in the way of economic growth? Iran's society is crammed full of young people who no longer remember the Shah or the revolution, which are both now more than 25 years past. We simply underestimate how much of the mullah's loss of power will be achieved by the people themselves once economic connectivity flourishes between the masses and the outside world. Iran is not much of a police state. The U.S. does as much to keep it imprisoned as the mullahs. We need to move past this obsession and exploit Iran's sullen majority for our own strategic Page 7 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog purposes in the region. Otherwise we simply perpetuate the tyranny just like we do in Cuba. It's a waste of time and strategically a loser. I just don't see the downside of trying a lighter touch with Iran. We've sought isolation for 25 years and the mullahs hold as much political power as ever. Now I say we fight asymmetrically and hit them where they're weak—economically. Kill the mullah's rule with connectivity. The state simply doesn't have the resources to fight broadband connectivity if we push it. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Scott Kirsch Subject: Amish - the peaceful separatists One aspect in the future worth creating I had a difficult time coming to terms with is how to maintain the peace with those in the gap who want to remain seriously disconnected no matter how well their neighbors become integrated into the core. A light turned on for me last week when my mom, a 7th grade geography public school teacher in Indiana, told me that she is not allowed to use the internet in her classroom for teachings. Stunned, I asked her why, and she said it was school policy because Amish (whose children make up 30 percent of her student population) do not allow internet use and access to its content. Going further, the Amish imitate life in the 1800s, do not participate in the democratic process (they traditionally do not vote), have large amounts of children and do not participate in the Social Security, limit content flow to what is in the local paper, follow religious decrees set forth by religious figureheads, pull their children from school after 8th grade, and don’t even allow even extensive use of electricity because it's viewed being too connected to the English lifestyle. So here is a group that exists in large numbers and lives in wide-spread geographical areas, is seriously disconnected from the core, and who despite being barraged with the finest commercial messages the 21st century has to offer, happens to be incredibly peaceful. This happens to be no accident, however, because this peaceful separatist society lives in the core, and that, I believe, demonstrates the power of the core. Therefore, I also believe that in the future worth creating, (permanent) separatist societies in newly formed core states will become like the peaceful Amish. Not to tread on the Amish name, but perhaps an Amish thermometer of sorts could be used to measure against separatist societies as they become enveloped by the core. Congratulations on your move towards final housing plans. Very cool to have a policy rock star in the area! Scott Kirsch Indianapolis, IN Page 8 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Scott, Most of the Salafi movement in Islam, as I understand it, are of the peaceful separatist Amish sort, meaning the radical minority like al Qaeda are more like the David Koresh types: religious separatists with violent tendencies. Sure, there will always be people desiring separation and a return to the simpler life. Most do it in the form of weekend retreats and Spartan vacations. Some want to do it full time and wrap that whole process in religious beliefs, like the Amish. The peaceful and self-selecting disconnectors are not the problem and never will be—only those who seek to impose disconnectedness on others through force, like dictators or religious extremists. So I fundamentally—if I can use that word—agree with your point. Not all disconnectedness is evil, just that which is involuntary. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Bill C. Subject: Competition for Gap Resources Shaping International Affairs Dr. Barnett: Bill here. Sir: Is this a fair/good statement: The most critical factor shaping international affairs today is The Dependency of Both Globalization and World Power on Third World Resources -- the fight for control these resources (between the U.S. and the EU, China, and Russia) will shape the early 21st Century. This statement would seem to explain: The tension within the Atlantic Alliance; the conflict with the Muslim World; the tension with Russia; why the US Army and other instruments of US power are being transformed for and projected into the Third World; why the call for "democracy" is being now touted for the Third World (as a realistic and strategic method -- to enhance and justify our current and future actions in the Gap). Is the capture and control of Third World resources the means by which the U.S. will attempt to contain its potential future rivals? The current planning and application of U.S. soft and hard power seems to directed to this end. I do not seem to see investment, peace and prosperity for the Third World in this approach -- I seem to see conflict -- internal and external war -- due to competition over resources. Sir: I would very much appreciate your thoughts. Sincerely, Bill C. … Bill, I disagree. The most important factor shaping possible conflict is the rise of New Core powers. By and large, there's little to no reason for any resource wars inside the Gap. So long as you're developing or are already developed, it's simply a matter of paying the Page 9 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog money. Sure, we may collectively impose our military will in certain situations now and then to ensure the flow of certain resources, like oil, but where exactly do you see Core powers warring with one another over resources? The conflicts that go on inside the Gap over resources, or the authoritarian regimes that arise in the Gap thanks to resource control, are the real problem. They generate civil strife, repression, and terrorism. When those elements of conflict threaten the flow of resources, expect the Core to get involved, but I think you're going to be deeply disappointed if you're waiting on inter-Core wars over Gap resources. Why fight over what you can simply buy? I don't see the call for democracy to be a ruse, but a genuine attempt to foster pluralism in the Gap. I see it as premature though, because economic development must come first and replace those nations' dependency on raw material exports for the bulk of the economic earnings. There is definitely a "resource curse" in the Gap, but it's not and will not become a cause for inter-Core wars, just police actions by Core powers inside the Gap to deal with the strife and terrorism that curse inevitably engenders. Tom Barnett +++++ From: LtCol Matt Smith-Meck, USMC Subject: RE: Insight Tom, Do you think, then, that an "Office of Strategic Campaign Planning", which would be overseen by the VP, would be an appropriate place/level for the degree of inter-agency coordination (and international as well) required to effectively implement the concepts in "The Pentagon's New Map?" As the VP has, as one of his functions, the responsibility of coordinating the Cabinet Officers (much as the XO of a squadron coordinates the staff), perhaps this is the requisite level? v/r, Matt … Matt, If the alternative is a low bureaucratic figurehead in the State Department, then yes, that would strike me as a great alternative. In fact, it's probably better than even a new cabinet-level department, although there at least you'd have to see Congress put up some consistent level of support. With the VP route, it all can end the minute the administration ends, so there's not the good potential for long-haul bureaucratic effort, and that's what's needed to shrink the Gap over the years and decades. So I stick with my Page 10 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog vision of ultimately creating a department somewhere between that of War (Defense) and Peace (State). Still, if it were to start with the VP, that would be better than nothing. God knows the National Security Council has not proven themselves up to this task under Rice and now Hadley. As with the VP idea, the NSC route has likewise suffered the reality that everything depends on the personality of the people holding these positions, and their relationships with the president. That dependency on personalities is fixed by a permanent cabinet department. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Mark Geraghty Subject: china currency issues Tom, What do you make about the news that the US intends on taking a harder line against China over the devaluation of US currency. I agree with your take on China from the Bush second term article in Esquire i.e.; sacrificing the expiring commitment to Taiwan for assistance with North Korea. But how can this currency issue be addressed in a serious manner without straining relations further. In PNM you argue that China's economy and connectivity with global markets will be what keep us out of a major crisis with them in the new century. Doesn't this threaten that connectivity? Thanks for your time...MG … MG, Our push is all about moving China in the direction of ultimately letting their currency float. We know and the Chinese know that this function requires a load of complex and robust financial coping mechanisms that have yet to be put in place in China. So pushing for too much connectivity too fast on this issue can be dangerous. But it's going to happen, and everyone wants it to happen. The question is strictly one of timing. By harping on the subject so hard, the U.S. is signaling our desire that it be done ASAP—nothing more, nothing less. But if we're pushing for something that increases the Party's vulnerability in China regarding their grip on power (What if a financial panic ensues? Development slows down?), we're wrong to ask for that move at the same time we’re tweaking them on Taiwan, like getting Japan to join the defense guarantee. In short, we need to prioritize our desires. We can't expect progress on all fronts all the time. This is why this "separate lanes" approach that we employ with China is all wrong Page 11 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog (trade in one lane, security in another). Why we hamstring ourselves in this obvious bargaining situation is beyond me. China's emergence is to be managed, because ultimately its economic success weakens the party's control. Missteps in this process can lock in the party's authoritarian grip far longer. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Ben Daniel Subject: Question about Russia and stance of Vladamir Putin I saw you on C-SPAN earlier this year and was very impressed. I think that PNM was just coming out. Anyway, I deeply enjoyed your presentation and have recommended your website to many of my friends who find foreign policy interesting. After reading some of your weblogs and seeing your speech, I am really glad you on our side. What do you think about the stance and posturing of Russia? With Putin in power, his KGB roots show that old habits die hard, and I've even read that Russian citizens are looking back at Stalin through (no pun intended) rose-colored glasses. I am less worried about the hardline stance Putin has taken with business (Yukos) than I am about the glorification of one of histories most notorious and paranoid mass murderers. It's hard to tell the direction that relations Russia are trending and I hope you might shed a little light on that. On one hand, VP tells GWB to "keep his style of democracy out" of Russia (paraphrasing), and on the other hand, VP has a strong commitment (or so it seems) to fight terrorism (Beslan). The PNM does not have Russia in the noose that we are trying to tie around terrorism. Do you think we will be fighting side by side with Russia and at the same time watching our backs? Maybe there is no other way to fight? Do you think that Russia could become a threat like they once were, or is a lot of the posturing just political grandstanding? There is some good news however. The flame of democracy continues to burn at an almost grassroots level in the satellite countries of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine and Viktor Yushchenko)**, and VP has some very sharp, committed democratic adversaries. One of which is Gary Kasparov. If Sun Tszu was right about strategy and the battle being won before it is fought, and VP has to face Gary Kasparov, VP has one hell of a fight on his hands. Keep up the great work. You have a fan in Athens, Georgia. Ben Daniel Terry College of Business MBA Student University of Georgia Page 12 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog … Ben, The serious backsliding with Putin in Russia since 2003 reflects, in my mind, the sense of the political leadership there fearing that the rapid dissolution of the state's vertical control over the economy, which was profound in the USSR, was risking too much political uncertainty and too much crime in the second half of the 1990s (all those descriptions of "gangland capitalism" in Russia). So we're witnessing a correction, where the state is striking back and favoring more order over justice, and in that process sacrificing the speed of development in order to maintain political stability. The siloviki represented by Putin ("men of power" from the old power industries of the USSR), are the right guys for this job, but they're the wrong guys for basically everything else that needs to be done for Russia to move forward and solidify its position in the Core (from which is can definitely slip if it's perceived that it's becoming too Gap-like in its authoritarianism and dependency on energy exports). I understand Putin's desire to secure those "commanding heights," but while that may secure the "now," it does nothing to develop Russia's future. It's a dead end. My sense is that Russia will put up with too much "stability" for the near time, but as it sees fellow Slav states move smartly toward both greater democracy and connectivity with the global economy, they're going to feel again that they're failing behind and demand more political freedom in order to open up more economically to the outside world. It's a yin and yang yo-yo effect, and we have to be realistic that New Core states will often take a big step backward after any two steps forward. The 4th Generation's focus on the rural poor in China is similar, as is the return of Congress in India, or Lula's left-butnot-too-left-of-center track in Brazil. The big thing is that we not let any naturally occurring backsliding period solidify into a downward spiral. In Russia, much depends on how the presidential election unfolds in 2008. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Greg Filak Subject: Iran I've read several of your articles, including your Esquire article of a few months ago, and was curious on your stance concerning Iran. From what you know of Iran, what carrots can the U.S. and the world as a whole, dangle in front of them to get them into the Core? Page 13 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog You say that Iran is using "The Bomb" as their ace-in-the-hole to get what they want, WHAT is it they want? I am the farthest thing from an expert on Iran, but it seems to me that they are a very powerful, and very seclusionist nation. Aside from exporting oil and defeating Israel, they don't seem like they really want anything the world has to offer (granted, I am talking about the mullahs, not the young liberal movement). I would have to think that conceding their possession of nuclear weapons would only strengthen the position of the conservative base in the eyes of their public. So now we're stuck with a strengthened Iranian fundamentalist government which now has nukes. Seems to me that if we have to take on this battle it makes more sense to draw a line in the sand (forgive the pun), and fight your "War of Integration" now, especially since delaying it gives Iran tactical and strategic strength if we wait too long and they have the potential to weaponize their nuclear ambitions. I don't see where any of the quid-pro-quo items which we (the U.S., the world) can get FROM Iran are things which we are not getting, or on track to get anyway. Certainly Iran is a player in exporting terrorism, with their primary focus on Israel, but how can we tell that if we do strike a deal, they won't keep doing it? "We have porous borders, we can't control who comes in an out. We're doing our best." To some degree, I feel this is our relationship with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Is this the best you are hoping for? I just don't see what Iran can give us which we don't already have or couldn't obtain without their support. Especially with recent actions between Lebanon and Syria, coupled with Sharon's willingness to go against the popular Israeli tide in favor of peace with the Palestinians, we're getting what we want despite Iran's refusal to come to the table. What we lose in international security, never mind political capital of being hypocrites, I think, is far more dangerous and counterproductive to our long-term goals if we give them the bomb in any sort of concession. Maybe I'm missing something in your plan? Ideally, I think everyone in the free world agrees that a "peaceful" (realistically, I use that word loosely when it comes to Iran) regime change, with the new leaders dumping nuclear weaponization is the best scenario. Perhaps with Sen. Santorum's bill to fund pro-democracy movements, this will become more plausible. Thoughts? Greg Filak … Dear Greg , Iran's getting the bomb, so the conversation starts with, What are we going to get from Iran having the bomb? You can't project a stable Persian Gulf with Iran remaining in the spoiler role, so it's inevitable that we must co-opt the regime somehow into playing a regional pillar role. It's the one state that can veto peace in Beirut, Baghdad and Jerusalem. Most Iranians support the bomb effort because they want that respect and stature, and because they perceive it will equalize an unequal situation (Israel and US with bombs, Muslims in region without any (Pak too far away)). Countries that get bombs tend to be very careful with them, unless (like with Pakistan), we persist in not recognizing them. Page 14 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog An unrecognized nuclear power is much worse than a recognized one, because with great power comes great responsibility. In addition to signaling our desire to make Iran a security pillar in the region (and thus it has a big say-so on how things go down), our real purpose in bringing Iran back into the global community is generating as much broadband connectivity between Iran's incredibly dissatisfied, highly ambitious and very young population and the global economy as possible. That connectivity will kill the mullahs' power far better and far faster than the isolation/sanctions route, which totally plays into their hands. Sanctions and isolation don't work on authoritarian nor totalitarian regimes. You kill authoritarian regimes with connectivity, just like we killed the USSR (and should kill Castro's rule in Cuba), and you wage war on totalitarian states if they're weak enough to be had (otherwise you're stuck with containment, which is immoral if you can do better). Beyond the Middle East, Iran can help us likewise in the Caspian Basin. Plus, their rising energy connectivity with India and China can help us bring those two nations into the mix of promoting stability in the Gulf. We've spent 25 years trying to isolate Iran and what do we have to show for it? If we want to push the envelope on the gains already accrued from the Big Bang strategy, we need to be more imaginative in how we deal with Iran. Staying course in the Gulf, in my mind, just isn't good enough. Africa awaits. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Matt, a USAF Officer Subject: 2 Questions on Pentagon's New Map Dr. Barnett, Good day sir. I just finished reading PNM for the 2nd time and while I agree with the general thesis of your book, I had 2 questions that I’d like you to address if you have time. 1) One of your key ―flows‖ is the flow of people from the Gap to the Core. You specifically mention Latino immigration to the US as an example that can end up working well for all sides involved. You also note Europe and Japan as places that will have population decline without immigration. My question is this: do you believe that the rule sets that allow Core nations to ―work‖ will continue to function regardless of the people living under those rules? You probably know where I’m going with this- can Europe, or even more so, will Europe be able to remain part of the Core if 20% of the population are Muslims who refuse to assimilate to European norms of tolerance. It just seems that there are enough examples, from the Van Gogh murder and threats against Dutch politicians to the rape epidemic perpetrated by foreign-born Muslims in the Page 15 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Scandinavian countries, of Muslim intolerance significantly changing societies to the point that they lose their original identity. Based upon a NY Times article I read a few weeks ago it seems that the native born Dutch are emigrating at such a rate that in 15-20 years there will be enough political power in the Muslim community that sharia will be instituted in some places. In this example I harbor no bias towards Muslims individually, but it seems that the rules Islam calls for, or at least the ones that are heeded, are in direct conflict with many of the rules that allow Core nations to be successful. 2) Towards the end of your book you discuss the possibility of a Leviathan and Sys Admin breakout of the DoD. On page 321 you note, ―The Leviathan force will be young, overwhelmingly male, and preferably unmarried, while the Sys Admin force will be far older, more educated, gender-balanced, and often married with children.‖ I believe that splitting the Pentagon in this manner would be a mistake, and here’s why: nobody I know joined the military to do what you describe as the Sys Admin’s main roles of peacekeeping and rebuilding- we all came in defend the Constitution by breaking the enemy in half; thus I agree with the idea of a Leviathan. Where I see the problem is with the Sys Admin. Those are the guys that are going to be doing the really hard work (nobody would argue the fact that in modern war the actual fighting is easier than rebuilding) for months or years, yet you see them as the older, more experienced guys. I don’t think people would join career fields in the Sys Admin corps, or if they were forced to they wouldn’t stay in the service because of the amount of time away from their families. You can see this now in the Army Guard and Reserve units- while some of the drop in enlistment is due to the active soldiers that normal trickle in after active duty not coming, due to Stop Loss, there is enough anecdotal evidence to assume that many people just don’t want to spend a year in Iraq building schools. All this leads up to my question: if I am right, and the career fields that make up Sys Admin have a hard time keeping people and is thus ineffective, how do we maintain the Leviathan as a warfighting force at the same time that its doing stabilization ops? Would you agree that the services, especially the Army and Marines, need to to have their end strength upped considerably? Thank you for your time, sir. I’m looking forward to your next book. Regards, Matt … Matt, On the first question, I think you are projecting too linearly on the rise of Islam in Europe: as it rises, the EU will have to adjust its political rule sets to incorporate this rising tide. In short, Muslims will need to be co-opted politically as well as socially. A huge, disconnected ghetto culture won't work. But you're basically assuming that ghetto grows without altering the political landscape in Europe, and I just don't see that in democracies. Push will come to shove and compromises must emerge. It happens all the Page 16 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog time in our system. Europe's may seem more brittle now, but the change tends to come generationally, so you have to give it time. On the second question, don't assume that the U.S. will make up the bulk of the SysAdmin force (it won't), or that the military will make up the bulk of the SysAdmin force (also won't). My idea of the SysAdmin force composition, which I cover in BFA, is that the U.S. plays hub but does not populate the SysAdmin as a whole. Think "training the trainers," or the Special Operations Command approach. We leverage larger numbers, if we're smart. But that can only happen if we embed the use of the Leviathan within a larger Core-wide application designed to deal with the Gap's bad states (the Ato-Z system I propose in BFA). Tom Barnett +++++ From: Jason Camlic Subject: Gen Peter Pace What do you think about the General's appointment to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)? For the first time a Marine will be the Chairman of the JCS. Does this underline a more prominent role in the war on terror? This makes a good connection with Boyd's ideas on military structure and more importantly on maneuver warfare. As you know the USMC is the only service to teach some of Boyd's ideas. I think the appointment, keeping in mind the connection between Boyd and the USMC, says a lot about how the US plans to fight the military side of the war on terror. Jason Camlic … Jason, Rumsfeld seems to like "Nixon-goes-to-China" choices, so having a Marine and admiral as #1 (Pace as Chairman) and #2 (Giambastiani as Vice) respectively does a lot to pull both services in the difficult direction of adjusting them to a global security environment that demands a far larger SysAdmin-style effort from both. They are like bringing Schoomaker back from the Special Ops community to head the Army. Bigger issue, though, is the strong personal connections for both with Rummy. Pace works very well with him, thus the reward. Giambastiani is the former defense aide who did well at Joint Forces Command. Both will do well, I think. Both are passionate, and Giambastiani is also quite slick and political (great mind). He's really gearing up to be the Chairman who lives beyond Rummy's rule. I watch him with great interest. Tom Barnett Page 17 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog +++++ From: Andrew Batwash Subject: the liberalization of China Tom, I was reading your take of Nicholas Kristof's op-ed on China and it got me thinking. While it may well be true that increased wealth and education generally lead to political liberalization, isn't the Chinese leadership trying to avert exactly that? What I mean is, are the Chinese trying to stake out and legitimize their own version of the "market-state" (a term used by Philip Bobbit in The Shield of Achilles) where individuals have economic but not political freedoms? This type of state would seem be in direct contradiction with the so-called western model where political freedoms are valued as much of not more. A historical analogy would be the competing forms of the nation-state found between the Western parliamentary systems and Nazi Germany, for instance. So if the Chinese leadership can't bottle up the demand for more liberalization then there would be little to worry about. However, if they demonstrate that a competing system where there is plenty of wealth, but no political freedom, is feasible and legitimate doesn't that pose serious problems on a global scale? Other states may seek to adopt this model if China demonstrates that it can keep the ruling elite safe and in power, the country stable, and generate wealth at the same time. I would think that if China becomes the archetype for this model, we will have no choice but to oppose them simply based on their ideological leanings. After all we didn't fight the Cold War for another system to creep up and win, right? Sorry for not being more concise. Thanks. Best, Andrew Batwash … Andrew, I don't see this formulation of the "market state" as a full-blown alternative, but merely the name of a stage in political development as you move from authoritarian-statist to authoritarian-market to pluralist-market. Most undeveloped states tend to be authoritarian, but no truly developed states of any size have remained authoritarian. You can keep the genie in the bottle in small city-state models like Singapore, but they're the exception to the rule. For a China to truly develop, it goes pluralistic, which we're seeing in spades in the economic realm and will ultimately see in the political realm. Remember your American history. We didn't vote directly for Presidents for quite some time. Big chunks of our population didn't vote effectively until well into the 20th century. Page 18 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog If the market state model held, then Japan would still be a single party state. But until you can show me a non-city state that holds that model intact deep into its broadband economic development, then you're still just describing the journey, not some real-world end point. China still has a good America-and-a-half worth of people living in serious poverty. They are nowhere near proving a sustainable model of authoritarian growth that does not lead to pluralism. I don't see China getting anywhere near $6-7,000 per cap GDP with the Party still the only going political concern. Thomas Barnett +++++ From: Larry Dunbar Subject: NCW Warfare Dear Tom, I see Network Centric warfare as a clearly defined tactic of war different than 3GW, 4GW or Pre-modern warfare. After reading your 7 deadly sins I am not so sure that because of the Internet Osama is not waging a NCW on the cheap. Below are my definitions of some of the forms of warfare. 3GW is used to cut the head off the snake, with the hope of growing a new one in our own image, so to speak. It uses the power of the network to supply itself and for information processing, but the network itself is really only a tool. 4GW is a horizontal force acting like a vertical force. Ideology is used as a weapon to change the implicit laws of your enemy. The obvious drawback is sooner or later it has to emerge as a vertical force. When it does, it makes itself vulnerable for a greater vertical force to defeat its horizontal force. It also uses a network as a tool. Pre-modern warfare is a vertical force acting like a horizontal force. Its goal is also to change the implicit laws of its enemy. It does this by forcing the enemy to act like we do with the hopes that what quacks like a duck and walks like a duck is a duck. The obvious drawback to this warfare is that the tactics used can at times be counter to the implicit laws that govern our own nation. It also uses a network as a tool. When I think of Network Centric warfare I see a battleship as a large cell. Its purpose is to output information to the network and input the information necessary to maintain the cell. The battleship has a large vertical force, but the force is really for the network to use and not just the single ship. My guess is that the OODA factor is so quick that the battleship could not respond on its own anyway. The goal of a Network Centric War is unique. Not only is it to kill your enemy but if possible bring your enemy into your network. It is kind of like the Pat Tillman factor; you are either in the network or you are dead. The down side is that the enemy must also understand your goals of network inclusion, be willing to join with limited administrative rules and abide by a strictly enforced firewall, which both sides will obvious try to break. However if this happens, Page 19 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog they are, as you say, crossing the gap. As I see it, the network is not a tool, but the force itself. Are my assessments more accurate than not? Thanks Larry Dunbar … Larry, Hard for me to say. You propose a model of analysis that I do not recognize easily from my career. Could be fairly accurate, could be way off target, but I'm not getting enough yet from your description to follow your logic. Your description of NCW as a Borg-like entity basically rings true with me, but I associate that phenomenon more with globalization itself than the process of war. I guess I see a much smaller role for the military in shrinking the Gap than maybe you do. To me, the globalization process is fundamentally market-driven. I'm with Friedman there. The Leviathan takes out the bad guys in the way, and the SysAdmin picks up the pieces, but the serious integration is private sector driven. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Frank Laybourn Subject: A question about European Security and Defence Policy Dear Mr. Barnett. I have enjoyed many of your writings and especially the Pentagon's New Map. However, I'm interested in your view on the development of the European Security and Defence Policy. I think we can easily agree that the Balkan wars of the 1990s showed how weak European governments were when they tried to act alone. That experience, however, encouraged governments to forge a common European Union foreign policy, so that they would act together in future crises. In 1999 governments agreed to set up an EU defence policy to support their common foreign policy. Since then, EU governments have made rapid progress in developing the defence policy. Towards the end of 2004, the EU is due to take over the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia from NATO. Bosnia will be a crucial Page 20 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog test of the EU's military mettle, much more than the peacekeeping missions the EU carried out in Congo and Macedonia in 2003. In December 2003, EU leaders agreed on a 'European security strategy' - also known as the Solana-doctrine. This document spells out the main threats facing European security: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime. None of these challenges are purely military; nor can they be addressed by purely military means. As I'm sure you are aware, EU governments are also becoming more ambitious for the types of soldiers and equipment their armed forces should have. In April 2004, European defence ministers agreed that, by 2007, the EU should be able to use nine 'battle groups', each consisting of 1,500 troops, and deployable within two weeks. EU defence ministers have also signed up to a capabilities 'headline goal 2010'. This plan commits them to acquire various sorts of equipment, such as transport planes, unmanned aircraft and precision-guided missiles by 2010. But there is a real need for Europeans to think more creatively about what kind of defence capability they want. What sorts of missions do we envisage undertaking - and how do we expect our forces to operate in future? European governments need to make a searching assessment of the kinds of additional tasks we want our armies to perform, alongside traditional peacekeeping. I'm very interested in your views on the recent development in the ESDP. Do you, for example, see a stronger ESDP as a "threat" to US security interests as is the view in some circles in the US? Furthermore, what do you think is the single most urgent step the EU needs to take if the EU is the present itself as not only a strong soft policy player but a strong overall security and defence cooperation? Sincerely, Frank Laybourn Foreign and Security Policy Adviser to the Danish Liberal Party, part of the Danish coalition government. … Frank, To be honest, I don't expect much from NATO or the Europeans in general in the future. Waiting on their developments will take too long. Rather, I would focus America's efforts on co-opting and locking into strategic relationships the major pillars of the New Core, specifically focusing on India and China. Seeing that process of partnership emerge is the best prod to get the Europeans to get their own house in order. Once in order, I think the Europeans could do a lot of good SysAdmin work in the Middle East, along with co-opted pillar Iran and local regional pillar India. I know, I Page 21 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog know, that seems a dim prospect with the recent "no" votes and Turkey feeling like its drive for EU membership will never come to fruition. But the friction always heats up just as the integrating forces reach their tipping points. Muslims are coming to Europe in numbers. Those numbers must be accommodated. Europe—especially Old Europe— will freak out a lot during this process, but it will eventually happen because there is no alternative save Europe's withdrawal from the global economy as the rest of the world continues to integrate. I would hope for some effort on NATO's part in Africa, but there's a lot of conflicted motives there due to the colonial legacy. In Africa, believe it or not, I would advocate a strong U.S. (Leviathan)/Chinese (SysAdmin) partnership. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Brian Forster Subject: ONE campaign thoughts? Hello, I'm an avid reader of your writings- books, articles, and the blog. Keep it up and I'm looking forward to the new book. Was wondering about your thoughts regarding the ONE campaign http://www.one.org/index.aspx as an effective way to promote "connected-ness" as you describe in your writings. Do you believe it's an effective use of America's resources (allocating one percent of the U.S. budget to fighting AIDS and poverty in Africa) versus using that one percent in other ways e.g. continuing to transform the military in a SysAdmin sense? In an ideal world, we'd be able to do all these things but we live in a world of trade-offs and costbenefit analysis. I believe ONE is an admirable goal but in many ways naive, or is it just ONE has an optimistic point of view versus my somewhat cynical viewpoint? Your thoughts appreciated. Brian Forster Darien, CT … Brian, Any collaborative effort like the ONE campaign that draws in the attention of Echo Boomers is obviously a good thing, because if you teach your children well, you can change everything in about 15 years. Will is everything in shrinking the Gap, because persistence will be required. My only issue with such campaigns is the generalized desire to avoid discussions on security other than the give-peace-a-chance tenor that seems to suggest that this is a clear alternative to "war." We need to rethink the military-market nexus so we understand Page 22 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog better that the lack of security is the biggest killer of economic advance in the Gap. You can get over such sources of insecurity, you just can't get around them by pretending they're an "alternative" pathway worth avoiding. A little willingness to wage war can get you a lot of peace, and the unwillingness to wage the right wars can leave you struggling with a host of security issues that will easily swamp a lot of good and much-needed development efforts. So while I applaud the efforts of Bono and others to push for debt reduction and a big flow of aid and a serious restructuring of trade relations in the Doha development round of the WTO, the Core as a whole needs to understand that all that effort may well go completely wasted without a commensurate security effort. I say, give peacekeeping a chance! Tom Barnett +++++ From: Dave Bullard Subject: The Top-Ten List of Reasons Why I Hate "World War IV". Hi Tom, I was just reading your article ―The Top-Ten List of Reasons Why I Hate ―World War IV‖…‖ and I agree with 10. This struggle isn't about us. Let me ask you about this though, Do you think that a strong united European Union can effectively apply more pressure than we can and effectively shrink the gap with the right leadership behind it? Instead of America trying to do everything, a united Europe, with an alliance of strong nations and the consensus power that comes with it could apply the pressure necessary to integrate the gap nations into the core. A strong Europe with the right leadership could in fact pacify even the Israeli Palestinian problem which in turn would resonate out into neighboring gap countries. How small or big a role do you see America and the EU playing in reducing the gap? With recent events related to the voting for the EU constitution I wonder what it’s going to take short of another system perturbation to unite the EU into an effective player…..your thoughts? J ~Cheers Dave … Dave, Waiting on a strong EU will simply take too long. The Europeans will be essentially a source of go-slow ideology and strategy on globalization, because there's no great incentive for them to go faster. I personally advocate focusing on locking in strategic partnerships with New Core pillars like India, China, Russia and Brazil. For these countries, the stability of the global economy is a lot more crucial to their own domestic stability than it is to a Japan or the EU. Page 23 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog When you face tough tasks, best to go with the countries most similarly afraid of possible failure. That's not Europe for us, despite the long history, and despite all the recent lofty talk of a United States of Europe. Frankly, for Old Europe, there is still too much fear of Turks and Poles and Romanians sweeping into their markets and stealing their jobs. Their popular fears of globalization's costs to their well-established welfare states keeps their strategic vision very myopic. Tom Barnett +++++ From: SMASH (Scott Koenig) Subject: Shrinking the Gap in Africa? Dr. Barnett, I recently had an opportunity, along with several other high-profile bloggers oxymoron?), to participate in a conference call with Sir Bob Geldof regarding his latest effort to "End Poverty in Africa." The demands of Geldof's "Live 8" organization are threefold: "doubling aid, fully canceling debt, and delivering trade justice for Africa." I know, I know -- it sounds like an undertaking with almost no prospect of measurable success. The call included bloggers from across the political spectrum. I was one of many conservative "skeptics" participating. I don't think throwing good money after bad is the answer for Africa, nor do I believe forgiving debt will help much. I found the term "trade justice" to be quite alarming, but the way Geldof described it, they want to knock down trade barriers, not erect new ones. Like many others, I came away impressed with Geldof's passion and the depth of his insight into the problems of the "Deep Gap" (although he didn't call it that -- I doubt he's read your book). He's come a long way since 1985, when he believed that he could "feed the world" by throwing a big rock concert -- he was actually talking about linking aid to democratic reform and economic liberalization. Geldof did not dodge the sticky problem of endemic corruption. He of course talked in depth about the problems of AIDS, but also touched on the problems of eradicating resurgent Polio and water-borne diseases. Still, I wonder if there's any hope for shrinking the Gap in Africa in the near term. These are tribal societies, where cronyism, nepotisms, and corruption are a way of life. Communications infrastructure is pitiful, and modern transportation infrastructure is virtually non-existent. The problems are just so huge -- where does one begin? Success stories are hard to find. Ghana has a democratically elected government, and is twice as productive as most of her neighbors, but still remains mired in poverty. Mozambique recently had a peaceful transition of power between rival parties after a free Page 24 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog election, and enjoys 8.2% economic growth, but she has a 12% AIDS infection rate and remains dependent upon foreign aid to feed her people. And those are two of the top performers (aside from the RSA) in Sub-Saharan Africa. I'd like to believe that there's a way to at least begin the process of shrinking the Gap in Africa, but the prospect seems daunting -- the Middle East looks like a cake-walk by comparison. I think it's important to make the effort, however, as neglecting the problem will only result in much bigger problems in the future, especially if we become more dependent on Africa's natural resources to feed the global economy. The way I see it, the more we invest in economic development today, the less we'll have to spend in blood and treasure twenty years from now. I'm hoping for input from you on two fronts: 1) How do we sell the idea that working to "shrink the Gap" in Africa is in our national interest? (Keep in mind that I'm trying to sell this idea to my blog readership, which is mostly national-security focused, and right-of-center politically.) 2) Assuming that aid money is forthcoming, how could it most effectively be used? (Not that I think I'll have much say in this department, but it can't hurt to get the discussion moving.) At this point, this is all nothing more than talk. I hope, however, that it will soon be more than just another intellectual exercise. I look forward to your response. Regards, Scott Koenig aka "Citizen Smash" www.lt-smash.us … Scott, There is a big push on Africa right now, and while I hope it works, such interest has the tendency to wax and wane with regularity. I don't expect the big push on aid to accomplish much if it amounts to just a bulge that doesn't include a serious security effort by concerned Core pillars to rein in the long-running violence that has afflicted much of sub-Saharan Africa. It also must include a sustained focus on government reforms throughout much of the region, where public corruption is endemic. I have little expectation that such a combined package will emerge any time soon, with the U.S. so focused on the Middle East militarily and Central Asia gobbling up too much attention from Asian pillars and Europe so vested in a lengthy period of navel gazing. Page 25 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Of the Core states, I frankly see the U.S. and China being the greatest mid-term possibilities for security-enhancement in Africa, with the trigger being China's aggressive search for raw materials leading the U.S. to worry about too much Chinese "influence" in the region. If that rising concern combines with the Pentagon's growing sense of Africa as a strategic rear for the global Salafi jihadist movement now centered in the Middle East, we might be talking a serious uptick in security commitment by America in coming years. The dream would be that China and the United States start to recognize their complimentary regional security interests in Africa, with the U.S. playing more Leviathan when needed and China working more the SysAdmin angle. To me, that's an unbeatable combination of fire power and man power. Of course, the danger is that the complimentary relationship could easily segue into competitive rivalry, especially is there was a negative trigger back in Asia like Taiwan or North Korea. This is why I say we need to lock in China ASAP back in Asia, because it can become such a huge complimentary force to our efforts in Central Asia and Africa, just as India should become in the Middle East. Again, absent some concerted efforts to align such great power security "stars," I fear all the effort on Africa will go down historically the same way past big pushes have (noble, inspiring, largely ineffectual). There is no shock therapy or magic economic bullets that will wrest Africa magically out of the security sinkhole it's currently trapped within. The SysAdmin effort will necessarily be a long one. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Jan in Century, FL Subject: PNM Dear Sir, I picked up a copy of your book in the Pensacola airport last week, and I'm almost through it. Great book and for the first time, someone is saying something that makes sense about why we're doing what we're doing and why we need to keep doing it. It certainly fits my philosophy....and I'm no military/foreign affairs expert, only an interested lifetime student. I am discouraged by the hatred poured out on us (especially from THE CORE) for doing what is basically a good thing, but I bet you have some comments on that somewhere in your newsletter/blog. If you could point me in that direction, I'd appreciate it. Looking forward to the next book. Jan … Page 26 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Jan, Whatever hatred is poured out on us reflects the underlying reality that we're in a serious security rule set reset period. We have proposed some scary new rules in security after 9/11, and have demonstrated to great effect the awesome power of our Leviathan force. Now we need to listen to the feedback of all that "hatred" and see it for what it really is: fear of our power and distrust of our intentions in this Global War on Terrorism. We eliminate that fear by seeking to create a larger, overarching Core-wide decision-making system that assuages legitimate concerns regarding our employment of the Leviathan. Just telling other Core countries to trust us is not enough. We need to show we trust them as well. This is a big theme of BFA. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Steve Banks Subject: Thank you Dr. Barnett, I also sent a copy of this text to the Naval War College Webmaster, so you may receive it from two different directions. My apologies. I am 3/4ths through your work entitled "The Pentagon’s New Map". As a retired Marine, I am reading it with an ingrained institutional bias, I suspect. However, I just wanted to thank you for being able to articulate so well the ambivalence I have always felt about the civilian leadership of the Defense Department, and its apparent lack of vision. Viewing "war in the context of everything else" is, to me, exactly what has been missing from the discussion of the future for so long. Your work has struck a number of positive chords for me, and I look forward to finishing it in order to broaden my understanding of the issues, the risks, and the potential futures that lay before us. Thank you ever so much. Regards, and Semper Fidelis, Steve Banks CWO4, USMC (Ret) … Page 27 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Steve, Compliments from retired Marines are always to be savored, because they are not given lightly. Thanks. Tom Barnett +++++ From: "a concerned participant in a 'future worth creating'" Subject: THE NEW MAP GAME Attachments: COE Info Sheet Sept 04.doc Tom- Thanks for the opportunity! Of course being on the winning team helped!!! A thought came to mind Wednesday during your talk about the "Blueprint For Action". You mentioned how post-9/11 DoD has been sort of brought back into the fold--no longer the 800 lb gorilla amongst the rest of the USG. Perhaps this "normalization" is something the USG needs to think about on the global level- the US can't be the 800 lb gorilla among nations any more. After all didn't we Chinese try to tweak the US team every chance we got? If you are ever out this way....let me know. Attached is a description of where I work. Take care and good luck. GO PACKERS!! Warm regards. … Concerned Participant, Dealing with the "overmatch" issue is the basic premise of BFA, or normalizing the relationship between DoD and the rest of the US Government on the issue of "transformation" for the post-9/11 environment and normalizing the relationship between America and the rest of the Core on this issue of the Global War on Terrorism. For now, we're just at the easy recognition point, as in, we see the gap in capabilities and we seek to even it out over time. Baby steps, like putting a new office to oversee non-DoD efforts at SysAdmin inside State, are the order of the day, which is why I've really striven in BFA to push the envelope and describe the steps-after-next. I do foresee more poor efforts at nation-building, but ones that continue to improve with time. We are at the beginning of a very long journey, but the vast majority of young officers that I deal with in the Defense Department seem committed to the learning curve that lies ahead. Tom Barnett +++++ Page 28 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog From: Kelly Hall Dr. Barnett, You stated that the U.S. will come to resemble the New Core more than the Old. Having said that, what do think will become of Old Core Europe? With its rapidly aging population, rock-bottom birthrate, untenable social welfare systems, low per capita productivity vis-à-vis the U.S., and swarms of, shall we say, non-assimilating immigrants, do you feel that this part of the world will maintain any semblance of economic relevancy in the future? Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder just had their political heads handed to them by Chriac's own countrymen, as well as the Dutch. Do you feel the EU will come together before atrophying into oblivion? Sincerely, Kelly C. Hall … Kelly, I think Europe will either change in response to America and the New Core pulling dramatically ahead in innovation and competitiveness and development or they will decide to wallow in the slow lane for the long haul, fading into the sunset. The saving grace here may well be the rising Muslim population in Europe that certainly didn't come there merely to remain a ghettoized underclass forever. Rather than turning out to be the big threat to Europe's identity, their ambition and drive may well end up fueling a new cultural fusion that jump starts Europe's sense of historical identity and sends them down a better pathway. The key sign, in my mind, will be upstart Muslim politicians who inevitably begin appearing as Islam in Europe mutates into an almost Marxist-like opposition party with demographic heft. It may take a while, but these leaders will appear, just like their Hispanic counterparts will inevitably appear in the U.S. Tom Barnett +++++ From: John Siegrist Subject: Three Things Regarding "The Pentagon's New Map" Hello Dr. Barnett, I enjoyed reading your book "The Pentagon's New Map" and found it to be a most enlightening read. Included below are several questions and comments it has sparked. Page 29 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Question 1: How do you see your view of the world as being divided between the nonintegrating gap and the functioning core differ from the "Global North-South" divide which has been around for some time? Question 2: Although you do not discuss it directly, do you believe that Gap countries should have the right to say that they do not want to become a part of the globalized world? Should the United States be able to override the decision of a nation-state if it chooses to do so? Comment 1: In several of the chapters you demonstrate a passing familiarity with the complexity theories, or at least their terminologies. The "complexity science" has been busy in the last twenty years: they have come to better understand complex systems and classified them into system components with the links between them. Of late, they have started making significant progress in bringing the disparate scientific disciplines together under the single framework of the "science of networks". I believe that this body of work deals with the "everything else" in which you seek to understand war, and networks theory provides a rigorous mathematical underpinning and vocabulary to help describe the phenomena you attempt to explain. Several recent books on the subject that I believe would be a good place for you to start if you have not taken a look at complexity in a while are the following: Complexity by M. Mitchell Waldrop Linked by Alberto-Laszlo Barabasi Six Degrees of Separation by Duncan J. Watts These books are good in that they give a high-level overview of the work that has so far been done and provide many links to resources in case you are interested in further reading. Comment 2: You advocate in TPNM that the U.S. military should bifurcate itself into two militaries - the behemoth and the globocop. May I suggest that instead of trying to do two things at once, the U.S. military should focus on its role as Leviathan. To fulfill the role of globocop, the U.S. would be better off establishing several international forces whose soldiers and lower-level officers are provided by the countries in the Gap who require our protection. The U.S. could retain control by holding onto key aspects such as command and control, air support, and logistics as well as a reasonable share of the cost of maintaining the forces. Any Core nations who wanted a say in how these forces operated would have to "buy in" at a certain level of support with training assistance, money, armaments, etc. Such an arrangement is beneficial to the U.S. in that our population is shielded from American casualties and greater ties (militarily) to the most troubled regions of the world. Also, by having troops forward deployed in trouble spots will be cheaper for monetarily to maintain in the long run. By supplying such international Gap forces with "many and cheap" vehicles, the U.S. can also ensure that Page 30 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog the forces we train and maintain will not turn around and pose a threat to us while providing us the perfect laboratory in which to test out the newer equipment. Comment 3: The New Rule Sets Project war gaming could easily be adapted to play over the Internet where you could accommodate play by a much larger group of people, making the simulation more realistic in that the number of nations in the Old Core, New Core, Seam, and Gap could be greatly increased. I believe that the "science of networks" dovetails nicely with your current work and that you will greatly benefit from learning more about it. Regards, John Siegrist … John, In order: My Core includes a lot of South (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, South Africa, Industrialized and Developing Asia), and my vision posits that the Core cannot stay rich by keeping the Gap down but only by shrinking it. The North-South neo-Marxist stuff of the past never admitted the possibility of anyone in the South ever reaching development status, and argued that the Core had to keep the "periphery" down forever in order to maintain its privileged position. The North-South vision basically postulated a static division wherein the advanced East and West would remain locked in a bipolar stand-off. That vision was driven by the sense that the Cold War would last forever. Once it disappeared, and economists started recognizing a far greater portion of the East and South now belonging to a larger, more deeply integrating global economy, the North-South lingo basically disappeared because it stopped describing the world as most people saw it. Many Marxists and opponents of capitalism still love to employ it, simply because they can't admit its demise. On the question of wanting to remain off-grid to the global economy, show me the culture where that is true. I know of regimes that want to remain off-grid, but not any populations. People in general desire freedom to choose and connectivity by which to express that freedom. They don't want to lose cherished collective identities in that process, to be sure, so the question of globalization can often revolve around the question of speed of the integration process, a big subject of BFA. There will always be small segments of any country that, for a variety of reasons (spiritual, environmental, philosophical) desire extreme disconnectedness, or off-grid living. Such pockets of people are easily accommodated, just like the general desire of people to "get away from it all" regularly through vacations, retreats, etc. Page 31 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog But I am still waiting to meet the society with the uniform desire to remain isolated from everyone else. I have not met that society in the modern age, even as I have witness lengthy spasms of such xenophobia in history. Complexity theory is neat, and a lot of good work has been done, but it comes nowhere near explaining the complexity of human life as many of its advocates believe it does. No one social science can do this, nor can any "hard" one like complexity. But I continue to peruse its literature, appreciating the many attempts of writers to explain the world through this particular prism, so I think you for the references. The notion of having the US specialize solely in Leviathan and letting the rest of the Core and Gap do all the SysAdmin is a non-starter, because it de-links the front-end and backend decision making too much, as in, the US would start wars and expect others to finish them. That model of intervention inside the Gap was tried, to a certain extent in the 1990s, with the notion that the U.S. military would simply hand off all SysAdmin jobs to the UN. The US simply needs to demonstrate commitment in both spheres. Absent that, the SysAdmin will never come to Core-wide fruition. The same bandwagoning on war applies to peace: smaller states will only join if they see a clear winning hand in the offing, and no US in the backhalf effort means no guaranteed winning hand for potential coalition partners. We think of constantly expanding the game upward into virtual realms, but I personally want to continue focusing on F2F venues. I think spreading grand strategic visions is a hands-on job. Tom Barnett +++++ From: Nicholas J Xenakis, Arlington Va. Subject: The Pentagon's New Map Dr. Barnett, My name is Nick Xenakis and I just graduated Kenyon College. I am very interested in pursuing a career in international relations (in fact I am currently contemplating an offer to study Theory & History of IR at the London School of Economics.) I recently read The Pentagon’s New Map. I have to admit, I found it profoundly insightful and it has forced me to reevaluate many of my interpretations and positions on the current grand strategy of the United States. Although, I am hesitant to e-mail authors, after reading the frequent references you make in your book to e-mails you received from readers, I decided to write you, not only to express how your inspired argument has affected my own thinking but also to see if you could help resolve a subject that occurred to me frequently while reading your book. Page 32 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog As I understand it, the gist of the argument is that if globalization causes power to dissipate away from the nation-state, how effective will countries be (like America, for example) in enhancing and maintaining the security environment if the very act of doing so requires spreading globalization and thereby mitigates their effectiveness as a security guarantors. I thought that that there might be two perspectives to look at this problem – one from the Gap and one from the Core. I suspect the solution lies somewhere in between these two viewpoints. In terms of the Core I thought that there might be two possible solutions to this issue. First, the idea that globalization dissipates power away from the nation-state is nothing more than a myth similarly linked with the global chaos idea you dispel. The second idea was that as power dissipates away from the traditional nation-state other ―post-modern states‖ (as Robert Cooper terms them in The Breaking of Nations) will arise and assume the role of security guarantor as the Gap slowly but surely closes. However, the idea of the ―post-modern state‖ brings up a whole other set of issues, not the least of which is that Cooper’s primary example is the EU and the recent French and Dutch votes at least cause one to take another look at that project’s viability. Coming from the perspective of the Gap I found somewhat more complex. In thinking about it I realized that as much as the Core can affect the Gap, the Gap can also function as a countervailing force against the Core. There are Gap trends that still exist within the Core that can be exacerbated as the Core continues to engage the Gap. The example that first comes to mind is the effects of NAFTA. In one way this trade agreement brought a country previously in the Gap (Mexico) into the core. However, at the same time many of Mexico’s problems (i.e. drug trade) were transmitted into America, and thus far we have been arguably unsuccessful in addressing them. I originally got this idea from Robert Kaplan’s article ―The Coming Anarchy‖ although he focuses on examples such as how America’s involvement in West Africa could affect America’s own African-American population as well as the problems associated with the ―shantytowns‖ surrounding many of America’s urban centers (I have to admit I don’t find these example completely convincing.) However, ultimately his concern is over the increasing regionalization and fragmentation of American society and it is easy to see how this could eventually compromise America’s security guarantee abroad. I am very interested in hearing your thoughts on the subject. Thank you so much for taking time to read this e-mail – Nick Demakis. P.S. – I am currently looking into graduate programs where I would be able to study grand strategy and diplomatic/military history. Are there any programs or schools you are particularly in favor of either on the masters or PhD level? Thank you once again. … Nick, I guess I fundamentally reject the conventional wisdom that says globalization diminishes the role of the state. Statistics are clear: the most globalized states features the most Page 33 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog regulation, the most expansive welfare systems, and the biggest governments as a share of GDP. So if globalization is withering states, I ain't seeing it. Governments don't go away with globalization, they just get more complex in order to successfully intermediate between the population and the world outside. They become less Leviathan and more SysAdmin, and this transition strikes many observers as a loss of "power," but I guess I just don't view it that way. It is true that the more we seek to shrink the Gap the more we will take on its pain without our own expanding economic—and ultimately political—borders. We will be as much changed by the process as the Gap itself, and I think that's good. Stasis is good for nothing, whereas persistent evolution pushes us to improve our thinking, our practices, and our institutions. This is why I think a United States that expands into Central and South America isn't just inevitable but a very good thing. As for grad schools, the best one is the one that gets you through its program fastest and with the least debt. Harvard did that for me, but I would have gone elsewhere at the drop of a hat. The only good PhD is a done PhD. Tom Barnett +++++ Page 34 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog From: Rev. Bob Walters Subject: New Map Game Just a short thank you note for the New Map Game experience. I look forward to having you as a neighbor in Indy. What I learned in Newport: 1. Our Kamina, DRC, project is already up to speed on your whole strategy for shrinking the Gap. We have already addressed (in innovative ways) security threats that were blocking development. The learning is that what we had previously thought of as outside the Church's domain were essential community security conversations. We called them peace accords, but they were really community development security strategies involving the community and the military base. 2. Playing on the Iranian team I gained practical experience in thinking through Gap nation strategies. 3. Our community level team can move up to the big people's table. Soon the Kamina Project will be a major sysadmin contractor, building world peace at the community level. Thanks for a great event! Bob Walters Executive Director Metro Ministries, Inc. Indianapolis, IN … Bob, I enjoyed having you at the game. I think it's critical we engage the faith-based aid community in a big way to shrink the Gap, so your enthusiasm and sense of practical, real-world experience is immensely gratifying. I look forward to learning more upon moving to Indiana. Keep me in mind for a F2F. Tom Barnett Page 35 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Contents > Support The Newsletter from Thomas P.M. Barnett    Order The Pentagon’s New Map from Amazon (Hardcover) or (Paperback). Order Blueprint for Action from Amazon. Buy a map poster of The Pentagon's New Map from the Everything Else Store at Amazon. Page 36 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Contents > Glossary updated 29 April 2005 Asymmetrical warfare — A conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities. After the Red Army dissolved in the 1990s, the U.S. military knew it was basically unbeatable, especially in a straight-up fight. But that meant that much smaller opponents would seek to negate its strengths by exploiting its weaknesses, by being clever and ―dirty‖ in combat. On, 9/11, America got a real dose of what asymmetrical warfare is going to be like in the twenty-first century. Connectivity — The enormous changes being brought on by the Information Revolution, including the emerging financial, technological and logistical architecture of the global economy (i.e., the movement of money, services accompanied by content, and people and materials). During the boom times of the 1990s, many thought that advances in communications such as the Internet and mobile phones would trump all, erasing the business cycle, erasing national borders, erasing the very utility of the state in managing a global security order that seemed more virtual than real. 9/11 proved differently: that connectivity, while a profoundly transforming force, could not by itself maintain global security, primarily because a substantial rise in connectivity between any nation and the outside world typically leads to a host of tumultuous reactions, including heightened nationalism. Disconnectedness — In this century, it is disconnectedness that defines danger. Disconnectedness allows bad actors to flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their dictatorial control, or, in the case of failed states, it allows dangerous transnational actors to exploit the resulting chaos to their own dangerous ends. Eradicating disconnectedness is the defining security task of our age, as well as a supreme moral cause in the cases of those who suffer it against their will. Just as importantly, however, by expanding the connectivity of globalization, we increase peace and prosperity planet-wide. Functioning Core — Those parts of the world that are actively integrating their national economies into a global economy, and that adhere to globalization’s emerging security rule set. The Functioning Core at present consists of North America, Europe both ―old‖ and ―new,‖ Russia, Japan and South Korea, China (although the interior far less so), India (in a pockmarked sense), Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, and the ABCs of South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile). That is roughly four billion out of a global population of just over six billion. The Functioning Core can be subdivided into the Old Core, anchored by America, Europe, and Japan; and the New Core, whose leading pillars are China, India, Brazil and Russia. Globalization — The worldwide integration and increasing flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people. Until 9/11, the U.S. government tended to identify globalization primarily as an economic rule set, but thanks to the Global War on Terrorism, we now Page 37 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog understand that it likewise demands the clear enunciation and enforcement of a security rule set as well. Globalization I, II, and III — The history of globalization can divided into three parts, each governed by its own rule set. Globalization I, from 1870 to 1914, was ended by the start of World War I. Globalization II, from 1945 to 1980, was initiated by the United States at the end of World War II, and continued until the effective end of the Cold War. Globalization III (1980 -2001) has been an era of relative peace and enormous economic growth around the world that has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, but whose rule sets have now been challenged by rogue states and international terrorists, as exemplified by 9/11. Greater inclusive — What we need to create as we expand our definition of national security crises in the age of globalization. After more than half a century of almost complete isolation from the rest of the world as it sought to guard against the terror of nuclear war, the Pentagon needs to reconnect to the world—to war within the context of everything else. We need to break up the old hierarchies between the ―big one‖ and all the lesser includeds. We need something that covers the whole enchilada—that makes us one with everything. We need a greater inclusive. Lesser includeds — Pentagon long-range planning during the Cold War had been very simple: always keep our forces ahead of the Soviets by matching the size of their forces and pursuing the latest technological advances. World War III constituted the ―Big One‖ against which all long-range planning proceeded. Everything else the U.S. military did in terms of operations around the world was bundled together in the concept of the ―lesser includeds.‖ Even though the U.S. military spent over ninety percent of the Cold War engaged in such lesser includeds, its force-sizing principle remained the Big One with the Soviets. The forces of globalization and 9/11 made clear that there wasn’t going to be a Big One—the lesser includeds were the whole ball game. Leviathan — The U.S. military's unparalleled warfighting capacity and the highperformance combat troops, weapon systems, aircraft, armor and ships associated with all-out war against traditionally defined opponents (i.e., other militaries). This is the force America created to defend the West against the Soviet threat, now transformed from its industrial era roots to its information age capacity for high-speed, high-lethality, and high-precision combat operations. This force is without peer in the world today, and—as such—frequently finds itself fighting shorter and easier wars. However, this "overmatch" means that current and future enemies in the Global War on Terrorism will largely seek to avoid triggering the Leviathan's employment, preferring to wage asymmetrical war against the United States. The Leviathan rules the "first half" of war, but is often ill-suited, by design and temperament, to the "second half" of peace, to Page 38 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog include postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. It is thus counterposed to the System Administrators force. Military-Market Nexus — Markets create connectivity, and military security is needed for markets to take root and flourish. ―Where security enables the steady rise of connectivity between any national economy and the outside world, markets logically emerge to manage the marginal risks that remain, and where markets can effectively manage risk, investments invariably flow toward desired resources, such as relatively inexpensive but dependable labor. Over time, these essential transactions engender further connectivity among nations and regions, reflected in the rise of more complex and suitably entangling rule sets that moderate the behavior of not just nation-states but likewise firms and individuals. The desired security end state of this integration process is a community of states within which rule-set transgressions find certain—if not immediate—resolution through universally agreed-upon legal means. In other words, the military never has to get involved.‖ The Pentagon’s New Map, Pg 198. Military operations other than war — How the Pentagon defines crisis response activity, nation-building, peacekeeping, and so forth—everything outside of major warfare. Abbreviated MOOTW (pronounced ―moo-twah‖), it held a very low priority before 9/11. Non-Integrating Gap — Regions of the world that are largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability. Today, the Non-Integrating Gap is made up of the Caribbean Rim, Andean South America, virtually all of Africa, portions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and most of Southeast Asia. These regions constitute globalization’s ―ozone hole,‖ where connectivity remains thin or absent in far too many cases. Of course, each region contains some countries that are very Core-like in their attributes (just like there are Gap-like pockets throughout the Gap defined primarily by poverty), but these are like mansions in an otherwise seedy neighborhood, and as such are trapped by these larger Gap-defining circumstances. Rule Sets — A collection of rules (both formal and informal) that delineates how some activity normally unfolds. The Pentagon’s New Map explored the new rule sets concerning conflict and violence in international affairs—or under what conditions governments decide it makes sense to switch from the rule set that defines peace to that which defines war. The events of 9/11 shocked the Pentagon and the rest of the world into the realization that we needed a new rule set concerning war and peace, one that replaces the old rule set that governed America’s Cold War with the Soviet Union. The book explained how the new rule set will actually work in the years ahead, not just from America’s perspective but from an international one. Rule set reset — When a crisis triggers your realization that your world is woefully lacking certain types of rules, you start making up those new rules with a vengeance (e.g., the Patriot Act and the doctrine of preemption following 9/11). Such a rule set reset can be a very good thing. But it can also be a very dangerous time, because in your rush to fill in all the rule set gaps, your cure may end up being worse than your disease. Page 39 of 40 Thomas P.M. Barnett http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog Seam states — The countries that ring the Gap, such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Some are already members of the Core, and most others are serious candidates for joining the Core. These states are important with regard to international security because they provide terrorists geographic access to the Core. The U.S. security strategy regarding these states is simple: get them to increase their security practices as much as possible and to close whatever loopholes exist. System Administrators (SysAdmin) — The "second half" force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has waged war successfully. Therefore it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counter-insurgency operations, and small-scale crisis responses. System perturbations — A system-level definition of crisis and instability in the age of globalization; a new ordering principle that has already begun to transform the military and U.S. security policy; also a particular event that forces us to rethink everything. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served as the first great ―existence proof‖ for this concept, but there have and will be others over time (some are purposeful, like the Bush Administration's "Big Bang" strategy of fomenting political change in the Middle East by toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, but others will be accidents, like the SARS epidemic or the Asian Tsunamis of December 2004). 9/11, as a system perturbation, placed the world’s security rule set in flux and created a demand for new rules. Preemption is the big new rule. By creating that new rule, 9/11 changed America forever and through that process altered global history. Page 40 of 40